[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 10900-10901]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             YUCCA MOUNTAIN

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I stand to try to enlighten Members 
about the Yucca Mountain resolution which is going to be before this 
body. Yesterday, I took to the floor to speak on the current status of 
the Yucca Mountain debate in the Senate. I bring it to my colleagues' 
attention this measure has been reported by the Energy and Natural 
Resources Committee and is now ready for consideration by the full 
Senate.
  There is a process here. I think it is somewhat confusing to Members, 
and hopefully we will get a better understanding when I share my 
analysis.
  I want to make sure everyone understands that I certainly support the 
majority leader's ability to control the floor of the Senate and hence 
the schedule. I hope the majority leader will bring this issue to the 
floor shortly. I and others are looking forward to working with him, 
Senator Lott and others, to try to come to an agreement to move the 
Yucca Mountain issue. However, should the majority leader choose not to 
bring this up and asks the Republicans to do it, we are prepared to 
oblige.
  The process laid out is unique in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It 
was intended to eliminate any opportunity to delay, impede, frustrate, 
or obstruct the Senate and House votes on this siting resolution. That 
is the reason this expedited procedure was put into the act.
  As Senator Craig pointed out last week, this was very specific 
language. It provides that any Senator on either side may move to 
proceed to consideration of the resolution.
  There is a historical association with these procedures. Back when 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was debated in 1982, a central question 
was how to treat an obligation by the State selected for the repository 
if, in fact, the State objected--hence the situation with regard to 
Nevada. Nevada was selected. Nevada has rejected the site.
  Back then there was a Congressman by the name of Moakley, the 
chairman of the House Rules Committee. He was concerned over what he 
perceived as a constitutional issue--single House action--and sought an 
approach that would allow a State to raise an objection but also 
guarantee that a decision would be made without raising constitutional 
questions. The solution he proposed, and which is included in the 
legislation, was passage of a joint resolution coupled with expedited 
procedures that would eliminate any opportunity for obstruction or 
delay. In other words, trying to make it fair to the State that was 
affected.
  Moakley's State veto provision was added to the House-Senate 
compromise bill after Senator Proxmire threatened to filibuster the 
bill unless it was included. Senator Proxmire described the provisions 
as making it ``in order for any Member of the Senate to move to proceed 
to consideration of the resolution'' to override the State's veto.
  That is where we are today on this matter.
  Further, as a little history, Senator George Mitchell, who was the 
majority leader at that time, insisted that the language ``should not 
burden the process with dilatory or obstructionist provisions'' and was 
only accepted in the Senate because we were all assured that there were 
no procedural or other avenues that would prevent the Senate from 
working its will within the statutory framework.
  Again, I want to quote Congressman Moakley on that provision when the 
House approved the final measure:

       The Rules Committee compromise resolved the issue in a fair 
     manner. We proposed a two-House veto of a State objection but 
     required that both the House and Senate must vote within a 
     short timeframe. So long as the vote is guaranteed, the 
     procedures are identical as a political and parliamentary 
     matter.

  The process, which includes the right of any Senator to make the 
motion to proceed, is that guarantee.
  All of this brings me to the point of the majority leader's ability 
to control the flow of legislation in this body. The majority leader 
has been very forthcoming in his position on the resolution, and I 
understand and appreciate that. While I disagree with his position, I 
do not question his honesty or his integrity. Nor do I wish to hinder 
his ability to control the floor in normal circumstances.
  This situation, however, is not one in which we often find ourselves. 
In this rather extraordinary case, we find ourselves governed not by 
the usual rules and traditions of the Senate but, rather, by a very 
specific and limited expedited procedure--a procedure set out in law, a 
law that was passed by this body.
  Senator Daschle chooses to call this fast-track procedure--he 
mentioned ``a violation of the Senate rules.'' I choose to call it an 
``exception.'' But whatever it is, whatever you want to call it, it is 
the same thing. It is a statutory fast track to consider a type of 
measure that is not ordinarily before the Senate, nor ordinarily 
treated in this manner. Extraordinary circumstances often call for an 
extraordinary procedure, and I think that is what we have before us.
  Despite what Senator Daschle has indicated in a press conference 
earlier this week:

       This whole procedure, as you know--we locked in a procedure 
     many, many years ago--I believe it was in 1982--

  And he continued later in the statement:

       But this is what we are faced with. And so given the fact 
     that we're faced with a very un-Senate-like procedure, I have 
     no objection to that concept. (Here he is referring to a 
     Republican making the motion to proceed) in terms of who 
     would raise the issue on the floor.

  Certainly I appreciate the leader's recognition that this measure 
must come up, and should the majority leader not make the motion, 
obviously some other Member will. If that is what will happen, it does 
not in any manner undercut the authority of our majority leader. No 
Senator, however, has come running to interrupt the present schedule of 
proceedings by bringing up this resolution.
  We have, in fact, had discussions between the majority and minority 
leaders. We would like to enter into a unanimous consent agreement to 
minimize any potential disruption to the Senate, but that may not be 
possible, given the objection of the Senators from Nevada.
  I quote from an article that appeared in one of the publications that 
I was given, in the ``Hill Briefs,'' a reference by Emily Pierce, 
Congressional Quarterly staff writer, on 6-19 of this year, third 
paragraph:

       And Senator Ensign and Senator Reid said they aimed to 
     persuade enough Members of both parties to reject the 
     procedural motion, contending it would set a bad precedent. 
     They contend the majority leader should control the agenda 
     rather than leave that task to another Senator.

  That is really incidental, but I think it points out that we have two 
Senators from Nevada who rightly are going to object to moving this 
matter before the Senate.
  Barring what would be any further delays, we can find an appropriate 
time that is convenient to the schedule of our two leaders to resolve 
this matter. As to who makes the motion to proceed, I do not know that 
it really matters very much.
  When I was chairman of the Energy Committee, I occasionally came to 
the floor to move to proceed to some measure reported from the 
committee. I certainly think it would be equally appropriate for our 
present chairman to make the motion to proceed to the consideration of 
this resolution. However, he may not want to do so.
  I commend Senator Bingaman for an excellent committee report and the 
deliberate approach that he took to the consideration of the 
resolution. I commend him. But the bottom line is that, if the majority 
leader does not want to make the motion, for substantive or whatever 
reason, the statute explicitly deals with the situation to ensure that 
the Senate can take action.
  As I have said before, the State veto and the congressional joint 
resolution are extraordinary provisions. A vote on the resolution is 
essential to the compromise in the agreement of 1982 to go to a two-
House resolution.
  It offers no precedent for any other situation and by its terms is 
limited to this specific situation. There are enough substantive issues 
that we can

[[Page 10901]]

discuss. We do not need to suggest that somehow an explicit provision 
in a statute should be ignored and does not mean precisely what it 
says.
  It is time we focus on substance and I sincerely hope that the two 
leaders can find a time before the July recess for us to take up this 
important Yucca Mountain resolution.
  I would note that all debate is limited to 10 hours, so it would be 
possible to take up the resolution one afternoon or evening and have a 
vote the next morning. That would create very little inconvenience to 
the leaders' schedule, but I look forward to whatever they can work 
out.
  It is time for either the majority leader or his designee--perhaps 
the chairman of the Energy Committee who introduced the resolution and 
so ably guided it through committee--to make the motion to proceed and 
establish, under the rules of the Senate and the procedures laid out in 
the act, a time and date certain when the Senate can debate and vote on 
this resolution--as the act intended.
  This matter is long overdue. It is the obligation of this body. The 
House of Representatives has done its job, and the Senate should do its 
job.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

                          ____________________