[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Page 10333]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             THE ABM TREATY

  Mr. REED. Madam President, I rise to acknowledge the fact that today, 
6 months after President Bush announced the U.S. intention to withdraw 
from the ABM Treaty, the Treaty lapses. The 30-year old treaty, which 
most consider to be the cornerstone of arms control, now no longer 
exists.
  The significance of today has gone largely unnoticed. Press coverage 
has been minimal so most American will likely not realize what happens 
today. The objections of Russia and China to the withdrawal have been 
muted. Our European allies have reluctantly accepted the withdrawal. 
Some would say that this lack of fanfare proves that the ABM Treaty was 
a relic of the cold war and needed to be renounced. I would argue that 
while today's withdrawal seems insignificant at this moment, it has 
profound implications for the future.
  When President Bush announced his intention to withdraw from the 
treaty, he stated: ``I have conclude the ABM Treaty hinders our 
government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future 
terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks.'' I would argue that this 
statement is incorrect. First, the greatest threat from terrorists is 
not from a long range missile but from methods we have witnessed and 
watched for since September 11 conventional transportation like planes 
and cargo ships, used as weapons.
  Secondly, any testing of missile defenses that could be planned for 
the next several years would not violate the ABM Treaty. We simply do 
not have the technology yet to test a system in violation of the 
treaty. An article in today's New York Times states that on Saturday, 
ground will be broken for a missile test site in Fort Greely, Alaska. 
The article states that this test site would violate the treaty. That 
is not correct. Under Article IV of the ABM treaty and paragraph 5 of a 
1978 agreed statement, the U.S. simply has to notify Russia of U.S. 
intent to build another test range. As a matter of fact, the fiscal 
year 2002 Defense authorization act authorized the funding for the 
Alaska test bed prior to the President's announcement to withdraw from 
the treaty. As a supporter of the ABM Treaty and a member of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, I can assure you that Congress clearly had no 
intent to authorize an action that would violate the treaty. The 
technologies which would indeed violate the ABM Treaty, sea-based and 
space-based systems, are mere concepts that are years away from 
constituting an action that would violate the treaty. In sum, despite 
the claims of the President, there was no compelling reason to withdraw 
at this time.
  In addition, today, the United States becomes the first nation since 
World War II to withdraw from a major international security agreement. 
In the past 50 years only one other nation has attempted such an 
action. In 1993 North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty which caused an international 
crisis until North Korea reconsidered. The U.S. withdrawal has not 
caused an international crisis, but it does send a subtle signal. If 
the U.S. can withdraw from a treaty at any time without compelling 
reasons, what is to stop Russia or China from withdrawing from an 
agreement? Furthermore, what basis would the U.S. have for objecting to 
such a withdrawal since our nation began the trend? This administration 
must keep in mind that other nations can also take unilateral actions, 
but we might not be as comfortable with those decisions. Indeed, as we 
seek to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction, this 
withdrawal sends the opposite signal.
  As I mentioned before, the ABM treaty was the cornerstone of arms 
control. With the cornerstone gone, there are worries about an increase 
in nuclear proliferation. As Joseph Cirincione said, ``No matter what 
some people may tell you, each side's nuclear force is based primarily 
on the calculation of the other side's force.'' If China believes its 
force could be defeated by a U.S. missile shield, China may decide it 
is in its best interest to increase the number of weapons in its 
arsenal to overwhelm the shield. If China increases its nuclear missile 
production, neighboring rival India may find it necessary to 
recalculate the size of its force. Of course, Pakistan would then 
increase its inventory to match India. So, while there seems to be 
little consequence to cessation of the ABM Treaty today, if we are not 
careful it could be the spark of a new arms race.
  As of today, the ABM Treaty no longer exists. But our work has just 
begun. Withdrawing from this treaty dictates that we redouble our 
efforts on other nonproliferation and arms control agreements. Since 
September 11, every American has become acutely aware of the need to 
eliminate and secure nuclear materials so that they do not become the 
weapon of a terrorist. The only way we will not regret today's action 
is to prove by future actions that the U.S. is truly committed to arms 
control and nonproliferation. The United States should robustly fund 
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. The United States should pursue 
further negotiations with the Russians and agree to actually dismantle 
some weapons rather than simply place them in storage. The United 
States should also ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
  In his withdrawal announcement last December 13, President Bush said, 
``This is not a day for looking back, but a day for looking forward . . 
. '' I agree. We cannot look back to a treaty that no longer exists, 
but we must work diligently from this day forward to ensure that the 
United States is taking the steps necessary to maintain the peace and 
security once sustained by the ABM Treaty.

                          ____________________