[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 4]
[Senate]
[Pages 4573-4580]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mrs. CARNAHAN (for herself, Ms. Mikulski, and Mr. Jeffords):
  S. 2122. A bill to provide for an increase in funding for research on 
uterine fibroids through the National Institutes of Health, and to 
provide for a program to provide information and education to the 
public on such fibroids; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor 
and Pensions.
  Mrs. CARNAHAN. Madam President, today I am proud to introduce the 
Uterine Fibroids Research and Education Act 2002. This bipartisan 
legislation addresses a serious health problem that affects women 
during their reproductive years. At least twenty to thirty percent of 
all women aged 35 and older have symptomatic fibroids that require 
treatment. This number rises to approximately fifty percent for 
African-American women.
  I am pleased that two of my colleagues, Senator Jeffords and Senator 
Mikulski, are joining me in sponsoring this legislation. Both are 
strong advocates for women's health.
  Uterine fibroids are benign tumors that impact the reproductive 
health of women, particularly minority women. If they go undetected or 
untreated, uterine fibroids can lead to childbirth complications or 
infertility, among other things.
  For those who do seek treatment, the option prescribed most often is 
a hysterectomy. Uterine fibroids are the top reason for hysterectomies 
currently being performed in this country. A hysterectomy is a major 
operation--the average recovery time is six weeks. This is just the 
physical impact, the emotional impact lasts much longer.
  We need to invest additional resources in research, so that there are 
more treatment options for women, including options less drastic than a 
hysterectomy. We also need to increase awareness of uterine fibroids, 
so that more women will recognize the symptoms and seek treatment.
  To accomplish both of these goals we need a sustained Federal 
commitment to better understanding uterine fibroids. That is why I am 
introducing this legislation today.
  My bill has two components. First, it authorizes $10 million for the 
National Institutes of Health, (NIH), for each of our years to conduct 
research on uterine fibroids.
  Second, the bill supports a public awareness campaign. It calls on 
the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to 
carry out a program to provide information and education to the public 
regarding uterine fibroids. The content of the program shall include 
information on the incidence and prevalence of uterine fibroids and the 
elevated risk for minority women. The Secretary shall have the 
authority to carry out the program either directly or through contract.
  This legislation will make a meaningful difference in the lives of 
women and their families across this country. I encourage the entire 
Senate to support this important legislation.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. INOUYE:
  S. 2127. A bill for the relief of the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada 
for settlement of certain claims against the United States; to the 
Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, almost seven years ago, I stood before 
you to submit a resolution ``to provide an opportunity for the 
Pottawatomi Nation in Canada to have the merits of their claims against 
the United States determined by the United States Court of Federal 
Claims.''
  That bill was submitted as Senate Resolution 223, which referred the

[[Page 4574]]

Pottawatomi's claim to the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims and required the Chief Judge to report back to the Senate and 
provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable 
the Congress to determine whether the claim of the Pottawatomi Nation 
in Canada is legal or equitable in nature, and the amount of damages, 
if any, which may be legally or equitably due from the United States.
  Earlier this year, the Chief Judge of the Court of Federal Claims 
reported back that the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada has a legitimate 
and credible legal claim. Thereafter, by settlement stipulation, the 
United States has taken the position that it would be ``fair, just and 
equitable'' to settle the claims of the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada 
for the sum of $1,830,000. This settlement amount was reached by the 
parties after seven years of extensive, fact-intensive litigation. 
Independently, the court concluded that the settlement amount is ``not 
a gratuity'' and that the ``settlement was predicated on a credible 
legal claim.'' Pottawatomi Nation in Canada, et al. v. United States, 
Cong. Ref. 94-1037X at 28 (Ct. Fed. Cl., September 15, 2000) (Report of 
Hearing Officer).
  The bill I introduce today is to authorize the appropriation of those 
funds that the United States has concluded would be ``fair, just and 
equitable'' to satisfy this legal claim. If enacted, this bill will 
finally achieve a measure of justice for a tribal nation that has for 
far too long been denied.
  For the information of our colleagues, this is the historical 
background that informs the underlying legal claim of the Canadian 
Pottawatomi.
  The members of the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada are one of the 
descendant groups, successors-in-interest, of the historical 
Pottawatomi Nation and their claim originates in the latter part of the 
18th Century. The historical Pottawatomi Nation was aboriginal to the 
United States. They occupied and possessed a vast expanse in what is 
now the States of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. 
From 1795 to 1833, the United States annexed most of the traditional 
land of the Pottawatomi Nation through a series of treaties of cession, 
many of these cessions were made under extreme duress and the threat of 
military action. In exchange, the Pottawatomis were repeatedly made 
promises that the remainder of their lands would be secure and, in 
addition, that the United States would pay certain annuities to the 
Pottawatomi.
  In 1829, the United States formally adopted a Federal policy of 
removal, an effort to remove all Indian tribes from their traditional 
lands east of the Mississippi River to the west. As part of that 
effort, the government increasingly pressured the Pottawatomis to cede 
the remainder of their traditional lands, some five millions acres in 
and around the city of Chicago and remove themselves west. For years, 
the Pottawatomis steadfastly refused to cede the remainder of their 
tribal territory. Then in 1833, the United States, pressed by settlers 
seeking more land, sent a Treaty Commission to the Pottawatomi with 
orders to extract a cession of the remaining lands. The Treaty 
Commissioners spent two weeks using extraordinarily coercive tactics, 
including threats of war, in an attempt to get the Pottawatomis to 
agree to cede their territory. Finally, those Pottawatomis who were 
present relented and on September 26, 1993, they ceded their remaining 
tribal estate through what would be known as the Treaty of Chicago. 
Seventy-seven members of the Pottawatomi Nation signed the Treaty of 
Chicago. Members of the ``Wisconsin Band'' were not present and did not 
assent to the cession.
  In exchange for their land, the Treaty of Chicago provided that the 
United States would give to the Pottawatomis five million acres of 
comparable land in what is now Missouri. The Pottawatomi were familiar 
with the Missouri land, aware that it was similar to their homeland. 
But the Senate refused to ratify that negotiated agreement and 
unilaterally switched the land to five million acres in Iowa. The 
Treaty Commissioners were sent back to acquire Pottawatomi assent to 
the Iowa land. All but seven of the original 77 signatories refused to 
accept the change even with promises that if they were dissatisfied 
``justice would be done. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Chicago was 
ratified as amended by the Senate in 1834. Subsequently, the 
Pottawatomis sent a delegation to evaluate the land in Iowa. The 
delegation reported back that the land was ``not fit for snakes to live 
on.''
  While some Pottawatomis removed westward, many of the Pottawatomis 
particularly the Wisconsin Band, whose leaders never agreed to the 
Treaty, refused to do so. By 1836, the United States began to 
forcefully remove Pottawatomis who remained in the east with 
devastating consequences. As is true with many other American Indian 
tribes, the forced removal westward came at great human cost. Many of 
the Pottawatomi were forcefully removed by mercenaries who were paid on 
a per capita basis government contract. Over one-half of the Indians 
removed by these means died en route. Those who reached Iowa were 
almost immediately removed further to inhospitable parts of Kansas 
against their will and without their consent.
  Knowing of these conditions, many of the Pottawatomis including most 
of those in the Wisconsin Band vigorously resisted forced removal. To 
avoid Federal troops and mercenaries, much of the Wisconsin Band 
ultimately found it necessary to flee to Canada. They were often 
pursued to the border by government troops, government-paid mercenaries 
or both. Official files of the Canadian and United States governments 
disclose that many Pottawatomis were forced to leave their homes 
without their horses or any of their possessions other than the clothes 
on their backs.
  By the late 1830s, the government refused payment of annuities to any 
Pottawatomi groups that had not removed west. In the 1860s, members of 
the Wisconsin Band, those still in their traditional territory and 
those forced to flee to Canada, petitioned Congress for the payment of 
their treaty annuities promised under the Treaty of Chicago and all 
other cession treaties. By the Act of June 25, 1864 (13 Stat. 172) the 
Congress declared that the Wisconsin Band did not forfeit the annuities 
by not removing and directed that the share of the Pottawatomi Indians 
who had refused to relocate to the west should be retained for their 
use in the United States Treasury. (H.R. Rep. No. 470, 64th Cong., p. 
5, as quoted on page 3 of memo dated October 7, 1949). Nevertheless, 
much of the money was never paid to the Wisconsin Band.
  In 1903, the Wisconsin Band, most of whom now resided in three areas, 
the States of Michigan and Wisconsin and the Province of Ontario, 
petitioned the Senate once again to pay them their fair portion of 
annuities as required by the law and treaties. (Sen. Doc. No. 185, 57th 
Cong., 2d Sess.) By the Act of June 21, 1906 (34 Stat. 380), the 
Congress directed the Secretary of the Interior to investigate claims 
made by the Wisconsin Band and estabish a role of the Wisconsin Band 
Pottawatomis that still remained in the East. In addition, the Congress 
ordered the Secretary to determine ``the [Wisconsin Bands] 
proportionate shares of the annuities, trust funds, and other moneys 
paid to or expended for the tribe to which they belong in which the 
claimant Indians have not shared, [and] the amount of such monies 
retained in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the 
clamant Indians as directed the provision of the Act of June 25, 
1864.''
  In order to carry out the 1906 Act, the Secretary of Interior 
directed Dr. W.M. Wooster to conduct an enumeration of Wisconsin Band 
Pottawatomi in both the United States and Canada. Dr. Wooster 
documented 2007 Wisconsin Pottawatomis: 457 in Wisconsin and Michigan 
and 1550 in Canada. He also concluded that the proportionate share of 
annuities for the Pottawatomis in Wisconsin and Michigan was $477,339 
and that the proportionate share of annuities due the Pottawatomi 
Nation in Canada was $1,517,226. The Congress thereafter enacted a 
series of appropriation Acts from June 30, 1913 to May 29, 1928 to 
satisfy most of money owed

[[Page 4575]]

to those Wisconsin Band Pottawatomis residing in the United States. 
However, the Wisconsin Band Pottawatomis who resided in Canada were 
never paid their share of the tribal funds.
  Since that time, the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada has diligently and 
continuously sought to enforce their treaty rights, although until this 
congressional reference, they had never been provided their day in 
court. In 1910, the United States and Great Britain entered into an 
agreement for the purpose of dealing with claims between both 
countries, including claims of Indian tribes within their respective 
jurisdictions, by creating the Pecuniary Claims Tribunal. From 1910 to 
1938, the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada diligently sought to have their 
claim heard in this international forum. Overlooked for more pressing 
international matters of the period, including the intervention of 
World War I, the Pottawatomis then came to the U.S. Congress for 
redress of their claim.
  In 1946, the Congress waived its sovereign immunity and established 
the Indian Claims Commission for the purpose of granting tribes their 
long-delayed day in court. The Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA) 
granted the Commission jurisdiction over claims such as the type 
involved here. In 1948, the Wisconsin Band Pottawatomis from both sides 
of the border, brought suit together in the Indian Claims Commission 
for recovery of damages. Hannahville Indian Community v. U.S., No. 28 
(Ind. Cl. Comm. Filed May 4, 1948). Unfortunately, the Indian Claims 
Commission dismissed Pottawatomi Nation in Canada's part of the claim 
ruling that the Commission had no jurisdiction to consider claims of 
Indians living outside territorial limits of the United States. 
Hannahville Indian Community v. U.S., 115 Ct. Cl. 823 (1950). The claim 
of the Wisconsin Band residing in the United States that was filed in 
the Indian Claims Commission was finally decided in favor of the 
Wisconsin Band by the U.S. Claims Court in 1983. Hannahville Indian 
Community v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 445 (1983). The Court of Claims 
concluded that the Wisconsin Band was owed a member's proportionate 
share of unpaid annuities from 1838 through 1907 due under various 
treaties, including the Treaty of Chicago and entered judgment for the 
American Wisconsin Band Pottawatomis for any monies not paid. Still the 
Pottawatomi Nation in Canada was excluded because of the jurisdictional 
limits of the ICCA.
  Undaunted, the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada came to the Senate and 
after careful consideration, we finally gave them their long-awaited 
day in court through the congressional reference process. The court has 
not reported back to us that their claim is meritorious and that the 
payment that this bill would make constitutes a ``fair, just and 
equitable'' resolution to this claim.
  The Pottawatomi Nation in Canada has sought justice for over 150 
years. They have done all that we asked in order to establish their 
claim. Now it is time for us to finally live up to the promise our 
government made so many years ago. It will not correct all the wrongs 
of the past, but it is a demonstration that this government is willing 
to admit when it has left unfulfilled an obligation and that the United 
States is willing to do what we can to see that justice, so long 
delayed, is not now denied.
  Finally, I would just note that the claim of the Pottawatomi Nation 
in Canada is supported through specific resolutions by the National 
Congress of American Indians, the oldest, largest and most-
representative tribal organization here in the United States, the 
Assembly of First Nations, which includes all recognized tribal 
entities in Canada, and each and every of the Pottawatomi tribal groups 
that remain in the United States today.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. LINCOLN (for herself and Mr. Hutchinson):
  S. 2128. A bill to designate the United States courthouse located at 
600 West Capitol Avenue in Little Rock, Arkansas, as the ``Richard S. 
Arnold United States Courthouse''; to the Committee on Environmental 
and Public Works.
  Mrs. LINCOLN. Madam President, I am pleased to introduce legislation 
today with my colleague from Arkansas, Senator Hutchinson, to name the 
Federal courthouse in Little Rock after the Honorable Richard S. 
Arnold, a beloved Federal judge from our home state. Our legislation 
has strong support from members of the Federal judiciary in Arkansas 
and I am honored to help lead this effort in the Senate. Like so many 
Arkansans who have the good fortune to know Judge Arnold personally, I 
believe it is appropriate to recognize such a respected scholar and 
member of the legal community in this manner.
  Judge Richard Arnold has served his country and the judiciary with 
rare distinction first at the District Court level and more recently as 
Chief Judge for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Arnold was 
appointed by President Carter in October 1978 to the District Bench for 
the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas and was elevated to the 
Court of Appeals in 1980. Judge Arnold took senior status in April, 
2001 after he turned 65.
  While serving as a member of the Federal judiciary, Judge Arnold has 
earned a national reputation as a brilliant, fair and effective judge. 
In 1999, Judge Arnold was the winner of the highly prestigious Edward 
J. Devitt Distinguished Service to Justice Award. This honor is 
presented annually to a Federal judge who has achieved an exemplary 
career and has made significant contributions to the administration of 
justice, the advancement of the rule of law, and the improvement of 
society as a whole.
  Judge Arnold has also received the prestigious Meador-Rosenberg Award 
from the American Bar Association for his work and dialogue with 
members of Congress about the problems facing the Federal courts during 
his service as Chairman of the Budget Committee of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. The award, which has only been 
presented three times since its inception in 1994, was presented 
through the ABA's Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements.
  Judge Arnold received a Classical Diploma from Phillips Exeter 
Academy in 1953. He graduated from Yale with a B.A., summa cum laude, 
in 1957. Afterwards, Judge Arnold attended the Harvard Law School where 
he received the Sears Prize for achieving the best grades in the first-
year class and the Fay Diploma for being first academically in his 
graduating class. Judge Arnold concluded his formal education upon 
receiving his LL.B. from Harvard magna cum laude in 1960.
  After law school, Judge Arnold served as a law clerk to Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr. Arnold then practiced law in Washington, D.C., 
and Texarkana, Arkansas. Prior to his appointment to the bench, Judge 
Arnold worked for the Honorable Dale Bumpers while Bumpers was Governor 
of Arkansas and a United States Senator.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of this legislation be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2128

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF RICHARD S. ARNOLD UNITED STATES 
                   COURTHOUSE.

       The United States courthouse located at 600 West Capitol 
     Avenue in Little Rock, Arkansas, and any addition to the 
     courthouse that may hereafter be constructed, shall be known 
     and designated as the ``Richard S. Arnold United States 
     Courthouse''.

     SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

       Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, 
     or other record of the United States to the United States 
     courthouse referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a 
     reference to the Richard S. Arnold United States Courthouse.

  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Madam President, throughout a long career on the 
Federal bench, Judge Richard Sheppard Arnold has exhibited tremendous 
integrity and commitment to public service. I am honored to join my 
colleague from Arkansas in introducing legislation to designate the 
Federal Courthouse in Little Rock, Arkansas, as the Judge

[[Page 4576]]

Richard S. Arnold United States Courthouse.
  Finishing toward the top of his class both at Yale College and at 
Harvard Law School, Judge Arnold began his legal career as a Law Clerk 
to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. In October of 1978, President Carter appointed him to the 
District Bench for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, and 
he was soon elevated to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit in 1980. There he served as Chief Judge from 1992 
through 1998. Since April of 2001, Judge Arnold has served as Senior 
U.S. Circuit Judge for the Eight Circuit.
  For the duration of his service on the bench, Judge Arnold has 
maintained a reputation as a true gentleman who possesses a keen 
intellect. Perhaps the finest measure of a man, however, is found in 
his friends. Judge Arnold has many. It was the entire bench of the 
Eastern District of Arkansas that came up with the proposal to name the 
courthouse in his honor, and nearly every day my mail includes a letter 
from a Judge in Arkansas championing this designation. Such unqualified 
support at the end of a long career is truly remarkable.
  Judge Arnold has certainly earned the honor this legislation would 
bestow. I hope my colleagues will join us in supporting the designation 
of the Little Rock, Arkansas, Federal Court House as the Judge Richard 
S. Arnold United States Courthouse.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BINGAMAN:
  S. 2129. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to clarify 
that any home-based service worker is an employee of the administrator 
of home-based service worker program funding; to the Committee on 
Finance.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BINGAMAN:
  S. 2130. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to allow 
self-employed individuals to deduct health insurance costs in computing 
self-employment taxes; to the Committee on Finance.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BINGAMAN:
  S. 2131. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to adjust 
the dollar amounts used to calculate the credit for the elderly and the 
permanently disabled for inflation since 1985; to the Committee on 
Finance.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Madam President, I rise today to introduce three pieces 
of legislation that combined are an important step in creating a fairer 
and simpler Internal Revenue Code. These bills simplify the tax filing 
process and/or reduce the tax burden for the self employed, home-based 
service workers, the elderly and the disabled. These proposals are 
consistent with recommendations contained in the 2001 Taxpayer 
Advocate's Report and need our attention in Congress this year.
  The first piece of legislation will address a problem that negatively 
impacts many recipients and providers of state supported home-based 
service programs. Under current law, depending on the manner in which 
States manage their home-based service programs, these workers are 
sometimes treated for Federal income tax purposes as independent 
contractors instead of employees. This improper classification results 
in these workers being responsible for paying all of the payroll taxes 
owed on payments received for their services instead of paying only 
half as would be required if they were properly treated as employees. 
In other States, the home-based service worker is treated as an 
employee, but the recipients of the service, generally the disabled 
and/or elderly, are treated as the employer thereby making them 
responsible for remitting payroll taxes for the worker. My first 
proposal would correct these inconsistent treatments and, for tax 
purposes, deem all home-based service workers to be employees. At the 
same time, it would deem the State or State-funded organization to be 
the employer. These changes will significantly reduce inadvertent tax 
filing errors and make certain that the elderly and disabled are not 
responsible for payroll taxes for their State supported home-based 
care. It will also guarantee that home-based care service workers will 
only pay their share of payroll taxes and not be burdened with paying 
the employer's share as well.
  The second piece of legislation that I am introducing would allow 
self-employed workers to treat their expenses related to the purchase 
of health insurance in the same fashion as those workers who receive 
their health insurance on a pre-tax basis through their employer. Under 
current law, self-employed workers are required to remit payroll taxes 
on the amounts they pay for their health insurance coverage. This 
legislation would remove this inequity and allow the self-employed to 
reduce their net earnings by the cost of their health insurance for 
purposes of determining their payroll tax liability for the year. This 
proposal is another step in an effort to make sure that health 
insurance is an affordable option for all self-employed workers and 
their families.
  The final piece of legislation that I am introducing would increase 
the number of taxpayers who would be eligible for the existing tax 
credit for the elderly and disabled as well as raise the amount that 
some would receive. This tax credit was created to guarantee that the 
elderly and disabled are able to support themselves when their Social 
Security or other non-taxable pensions are insufficient to cover their 
modest expenses. Since 1983, however, the amounts used to calculate the 
availability and amount of this credit have not been increased. By not 
indexing this provision for inflation, the number of taxpayers claiming 
this credit has dropped substantially. In 1998, the most recent year 
available from the IRS, 180,473 taxpayers claimed the credit as 
compared to 339,818 in 1990. This proposal would raise the limits of 
this credit to the level it would currently be at if the provision had 
been indexed for inflation starting in 1983 as well index it going 
forward.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the 
aisle in advancing these pieces of legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the three bills be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bills were ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2129

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF EMPLOYEE STATUS OF HOME-BASED 
                   SERVICE WORKERS.

       (a) In General.--Section 3121(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 (defining employee) is amended by striking 
     ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C), by adding ``or'' at 
     the end of subparagraph (D), and by inserting after 
     subparagraph (D) the following new subparagraph:
       ``(E) any qualified home-based service worker;''.
       (b) Definition.--Section 3121(d) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new flush sentence:
     ``For purposes of paragraph (3)(E), the term `qualified home-
     based service worker' means an individual providing in-home 
     household or personal care services for disabled and elderly 
     individuals under a program the funding of which is 
     administered by a State, State agency, or an intermediate 
     services organization.''.
       (c) Program Agent Treated as Employer of Qualified Home-
     Based Service Worker.--Section 3504 of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 (relating to acts to be performed by agents) is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``In case a fiduciary'' and inserting:
       ``(a) In General.--In case of a fiduciary'', and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(b) Home-Based Service Worker Programs.--For purposes of 
     subsection (a), in the case of any program under which is 
     provided funding for the employment of qualified home-based 
     service workers (as defined in section 3121(d)), the 
     administrator of such funding shall be treated as the agent 
     for any employer of such worker and such employer shall not 
     remain subject to the provisions of law (including penalties) 
     applicable in respect of such an employer.''.
       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to services performed after December 31, 2002.
                                  ____


                                S. 2130

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

[[Page 4577]]



     SECTION 1. DEDUCTION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COSTS IN COMPUTING 
                   SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAXES.

       (a) In General.--Section 161(l) of the Internal Revenue 
     Code of 1986 (relating to special rules for health insurance 
     costs of self-employed individuals) is amended by striking 
     paragraph (4) and by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph 
     (4).
       (b) Effective date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
                                  ____


                                S. 2131

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. INFLATION ADJUSTMENT FOR ELDERLY AND DISABLED 
                   CREDIT DOLLAR AMOUNTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 22 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
     1986 (relating to credit for the elderly and the permanently 
     disabled) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(g) Inflation Adjustment.--
       ``(1) In general.--In the case of any taxable year 
     beginning after 2002, each of the dollar amounts contained in 
     subsections (c) and (d) shall be increased by an amount equal 
     to--
       ``(i) such dollar amount, multiplied by
       ``(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined under 
     section 1(f)(3) for such calendar year, by substituting 
     `1983' for `1992' in subparagraph (B) thereof.
       ``(B) Rounding.--If any increase determined under 
     subparagraph (A) is not a multiple of $50, such increase 
     shall be rounded to the nearest multiple of $50.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section 
     shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 
     2002.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Bayh, Mr. Lott, Mr. 
        Breaux, Mr. Allard, Mr. Cleland, Mr. Bunning, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. 
        Craig, Mrs. Lincoln, Mr. DeWine, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Frist, Mr. 
        Hagel, Mr. Helms, Mr. Hutchinson, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Inhofe, 
        Mr. McCain, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Smith of Oregon, and Mr. Warner):
  S.J. Res. 35. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States to protect the rights of crime 
victims; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, National Crime Victims' Rights Week 
begins on Sunday.
  Next week, communities across the country will be holding 
observances, candlelight vigils, rallies, and other events to honor and 
support crime victims and their rights.
  Also, in just a few days--specifically, April 19--we will mark the 
7th anniversary of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City.
  That attack resulted in the deaths of 168 people.
  And it was just over seven months ago that, over a period of two 
hours and three minutes, we suffered the deadliest act of domestic 
terrorism in our history.
  Over 3,000 people died in the attacks on that day--more than died at 
Pearl Harbor.
  Thus, it seems appropriate for all of us in this esteemed body to 
stop a minute and think about victims' rights.
  Last year, the Senate debated a proposed constitutional amendment 
drafted by Senator Kyl and me to protect the rights of victims of 
violent crime.
  The amendment had been reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
on a strong bipartisan vote of 12 to 5.
  After 82 Senators voted to proceed to consideration of the amendment, 
there was a vigorous debate on the floor of the Senate.
  Some Senators raised concerns about the amendment, saying that it was 
too long or that it read too much like a statute.
  Ultimately, in the face of a threatened filibuster, Senator Kyl and I 
decided to withdraw the amendment.
  We then hunkered down with constitutional experts such as Professor 
Larry Tribe of Harvard Law School to see if we could revise the 
amendment to meet Senators' concerns. We also worked with 
constitutional experts at the Department of Justice and the White 
House.
  And we have come up with a new and improved draft of the amendment.
  This new amendment provides many of the same rights as the old 
amendment.
  Specifically, the amendment would give crime victims the rights to be 
notified, present, and heard at critical stages throughout their case.
  It would ensure that their views are considered and they are treated 
fairly.
  It would ensure that their interest in a speedy resolution of the 
case, safety, and claims for restitution are not ignored.
  And it would do so in a way that would not abridge the rights of 
defendants or offenders, or otherwise disrupt the delicate balance of 
our Constitution.
  There are many reasons why we need a constitutional amendment.
  First, a constitutional amendment will balance the scales of justice.
  Currently, while criminal defendants have almost two dozen separate 
constitutional rights--fifteen of them provided by amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution--there is not a single word in the Constitution about 
crime victims.
  These rights trump the statutory and state constitutional rights of 
crime victims because the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land.
  To level the playing field, crime victims need rights in the U.S. 
Constitution.
  In the event of a conflict between a victim's and a defendant's 
rights, the court will be able to balance those rights and determine 
which party has the most compelling argument.
  Second, a constitutional amendment will fix the patchwork of victims' 
rights laws.
  Eighteen states lack state constitutional victims' rights amendments. 
And the 32 existing state victims' rights amendments differ from each 
other.
  Also, virtually every state has statutory protections for victims, 
but these vary considerably across the country.
  Only a federal constitutional amendment can ensure a uniform national 
floor for victims' rights.
  Third, a constitutional amendment will restore rights that existed 
when the Constitution was written.
  It is a little know fact that at the time the Constitution was 
drafted, it was standard practice for victims--not public prosecutors--
to prosecute criminal cases.
  Because victims were parties to most criminal cases, they enjoyed the 
basic rights to notice, to be present, and be heard.
  Hence, it is not surprising that the Constitution does not mention 
victims.
  Now, of course, it is extremely rare for a victim to undertake a 
criminal prosecution.
  Thus, victims have none of the basic procedural rights they used to 
enjoy.
  Victims should receive some of the modest notice and participation 
rights they enjoyed at the time that the Constitution was drafted.
  Fourth, a constitutional amendment is necessary because mere state 
law is insufficient.
  State victims' rights laws lacking the force of federal 
constitutional law are often given short shrift.
  A Justice Department-sponsored study and other studies have found 
that, even in states with strong legal protections for victims; rights, 
many victims are denied those rights. The studies have also found that 
statutes are insufficient to guarantee victims' rights.
  Only a federal constitutional amendment can ensure that crime victims 
receive the rights they are due.
  Fifth, a constitutional amendment is necessary because federal 
statutory law is insufficient.
  The leading statutory alternative to the Victims' Rights Amendment 
would only directly cover certain violent crimes prosecuted in Federal 
court. Thus, it would slight more than 99 percent of victims of violent 
crime.
  We should acknowledge that Federal statutes have been tried and found 
wanting. It is time for us to amend the U.S. Constitution.
  The Oklahoma City bombing case offers another reason why we need a 
constitutional amendment.
  This case shows how even the strongest Federal statute is too weak to 
protect victims in the face of a defendant's constitutional rights.
  In that case, two Federal victims' statutes were not enough to give 
victims of the bombing a clear right to

[[Page 4578]]

watch the trial and still testify at the sentencing--even though one of 
the statutes was passed with the specific purpose of allowing the 
victims to do just that.
  Let me quote from the first of these statutes: the Victims of Crime 
Bill of Rights, passed in 1990. That Bill of rights provides in part 
that:
  A crime victim has the following rights: The right to be present at 
all public court proceedings related to the offense, unless the court 
determines that testimony by the victim would be materially affected if 
the victim heard other testimony at trial.
  That statute further states that Federal Government officers and 
employees ``engaged in the detection, investigation, or prosecution of 
crime shall make their best efforts to see that victims of crime are 
accorded the[se] rights.''
  The law also provides that ``[t]his section does not create a cause 
of action or defense in favor of any person arising out of the failure 
to accord to a victim the[se] rights.''
  In spite of the law, the judge in the Oklahoma City bombing case 
ruled--without any request from Timothy McVeigh's attorneys--that no 
victim who saw any portion of the case could testify about the 
bombing's impact at a possible sentencing hearing:
  The Justice Department asked the judge to exempt victims who would 
not be ``factual witnesses at trial'' but who might testify at a 
sentencing hearing about the impact of the bombing on their lives.
  The judge denied the motion.
  The victims were then given until the lunchbreak to decide whether to 
watch the proceedings or remain eligible to testify at a sentencing 
hearing.
  In the hour that they had, some of the victims opted to watch the 
proceedings; others decided to leave to remain eligible to testify at 
the sentencing hearing.
  Subsequently, the Justice Department asked the court to reconsider 
its order in light of the 1990 Victims' Bill of Rights. Bombing victims 
then filed their own motion to raise their rights under the Victims' 
Bill of Rights.
  The court denied both motions. With regard to the victims' motion, 
the judge held that the victims lacked standing.
  The judge stated that the victims would not be able to separate the 
``experience of trial'' from the ``experience of loss from the conduct 
in question.'' The judge also alluded to concerns about the defendants' 
constitutional rights, the common law, and rules of evidence.
  The victims and DOJ separately appealed to the Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit.
  That court ruled that the victims lacked standing under Article III 
of the Constitution because they had no ``legally protected interest'' 
to be present at trial and thus had suffered no ``injury in fact'' from 
their exclusion.
  The victims and DOJ then asked the entire Tenth Circuit to review 
that decision.
  Forty-nine members of Congress, all six attorneys general in the 
Tenth Circuit, and many of the leading crime victims' organizations 
filed briefs in support of the victims. All to no avail.
  The Victims' Clarification Act of 1997 was then introduced in 
Congress.
  That act provided that watching a trial does not constitute grounds 
for denying victims the chance to provide an impact statement. This 
bill passed the House 414 to 13 and the Senate by unanimous consent.
  Two days later, President Clinton signed it into law, explaining that 
``when someone is a victim, he or she should be at the center of the 
criminal justice process, not on the outside looking in.''
  The victims then filed a motion asserting a right to attend the trial 
under the new law.
  However, the judge declined to apply the law as written.
  He concluded that ``any motions raising constitutional questions 
about this legislation would be premature and would present questions 
issues that are not now ripe for decision.''
  Moreover, he held that it could address issues of possible 
prejudicial impact from attending the trial by interviewing the 
witnesses after the trial.
  The judge also refused to grant the victims a hearing on the 
application of the new law, concluding that his ruling rendered their 
request ``moot.''
  The victims then faced a painful decision: watch the trial or 
preserve their right to testify at the sentencing hearing.
  Many victims gave up their right to watch the trial as a result.
  A constitutional amendment would help ensure that victims of a 
domestic terrorist attack such as the Oklahoma City bombing have 
standing and that their arguments for a right to be present are not 
dismissed as ``unripe.''
  A constitutional amendment would give victims of violent crime an 
unambiguous right to watch a trial and still testify at sentencing.
  There is strong and wide support for a constitutional amendment.
  I am pleased that President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft have 
endorsed the amendment. I greatly appreciate their support.
  And I am also pleased that both former President Clinton and former 
Vice President Gore have all expressed support for a constitutional 
amendment on victims' rights.
  Moreover, in the last Congress, the Victims' Rights Amendment was 
cosponsored by a bipartisan group of 41 Senators.
  I have spoken to many of my colleagues about the amendment we 
introduce today and I am hopeful that it will receive even more support 
in this Congress. In addition:
  Both the Democratic and Republican Party platforms call for a 
victims' rights amendment.
  Governors in 49 out of 50 states have called for an amendment.
  Four former U.S. Attorneys General, including Attorney General Reno, 
support an amendment. Attorney General Ashcroft supports an amendment.
  Forty state attorneys general support an amendment.
  Major national victims' rights groups--including Parents of Murdered 
Children, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, MADD, and the National 
Organization for Victim Assistance--support the amendment.
  Many law enforcement groups, including the Nation Troopers' 
Coalition, the International Union of Police Associations AFL-CIO, and 
the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, support an amendment.
  Constitutional scholars such as Harvard Law School Professor Larry 
Tribe support an amendment.
  The amendment has received strong support around the country. Thirty-
two states have passed similar measures--by an average popular vote of 
almost 80 percent.
  I am delighted to join my good friend Senator Jon Kyl in sponsoring 
the Victims' Rights Amendment, and I look forward to its adoption by 
this Congress.
  I think it is probably well known in this body that Senator Kyl and I 
have authored what is called the victim's rights constitutional 
amendment. One of the most perplexing things about the history of this 
amendment has been that everybody outside of this Chamber supports it. 
Governors support it. Attorneys general support it. Democratic 
candidates support it. Republican candidates support it. But when it 
came down to the fine discussion on this floor, we were told, well, it 
is too pedantic. Well, there are too many words--well, well.
  Senator Kyl and I have hunkered down. We have gone back to our 
constitutional experts on this side of the aisle: Professor Larry 
Tribe, who has been a very active participant in drafting this, and 
Steve Twist representing the victims, and many victims' organizations, 
as well as Paul Cassell, show has worked with us on this amendment.
  We have essentially redone the victims' rights constitutional 
amendment, really based on comments made on the floor. It is now 
succinct. It has a much more poetic flow to it. We believe it is an 
improved amendment. We are introducing it at this time because next 
week communities around the country will be holding observances, 
candlelight vigils, rallies, and other events to honor and support 
crime victims and their rights.

[[Page 4579]]

  In just a few days--specifically April 19--we will mark the seventh 
anniversary of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City. That attack resulted in the deaths of some 168 people.
  I would like to very quickly read from a study that was conducted by 
the Department of Justice, the Office of Justice Programs, on this 
particular subject because I think their findings are significant.
  Let me read one of them. I quote:

       Nevertheless, serious deficiencies remain in the nation's 
     victims' rights laws as well as their implementation.

  The Presiding Officer will remember when we passed two statutes to 
clarify victims' rights as a product of the Oklahoma City bombing. The 
judge ignored them. Then we passed another one. It went to the 
appellate court, and the appellate court found that the victims were 
without standing in the Constitution. Of course, that is what we are 
trying to remedy here. Thirty-two States have passed victims' rights 
State amendments. They are all different. Sometimes they are observed 
and sometimes they are not.
  Their report goes on to say:

       The rights of crime victims vary significantly among States 
     and at the Federal level. Frequently, victims' rights are 
     ignored. Even in States that have enacted constitutional 
     rights for victims, implementation is often arbitrary and 
     based on the individual practices and preferences of criminal 
     justice officials. Moreover, many States do not provide 
     comprehensive rights for victims of juvenile offenders.

  Let me go on to the recommendation of the Department of Justice. I 
quote:

       A Federal constitutional amendment for victims' rights is 
     needed for many different reasons, including: One, to 
     establish a consistent floor of rights for crime victims in 
     every State and at the Federal level; two, to ensure the 
     courts engage in a careful and conscientious balancing of the 
     rights of victims and defendants; three, to guarantee crime 
     victims the opportunity to participate in proceedings related 
     to crimes against them; and, four, to enhance the 
     participation of victims in the criminal justice process.
       A victims' rights constitutional amendment is the only 
     legal measure strong enough to rectify the current 
     inconsistencies in victims' rights laws that vary 
     significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction on the State 
     and Federal level.

  I know Senator Kyl would like to address himself to this measure. His 
leadership has been unparalleled. It has been a great delight for me to 
work with him.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I thank Senator Feinstein for her work on 
this amendment for several years now. She was tremendously helpful in 
working with the past administration. She and I have both worked with 
various victims groups. I think they rightly regard her as a champion 
of victims' rights in this country.
  She mentioned that next week is National Crime Victims' Rights Week. 
It begins Sunday. It is fitting that we could introduce this 
legislation today because tomorrow, at a ceremony at the Department of 
Justice, it is my understanding there will be a very important 
announcement by the President and the Attorney General with respect to 
this amendment.
  Just to be very brief about our support for this amendment at this 
time, I will simply address the differences between this year's 
amendment and last year's amendment.
  Even though last year's amendment to the Constitution had 40 
cosponsors and was bipartisan, and was considered--incidently, I 
appreciate the efforts of the distinguished Presiding Officer as 
chairman of the committee, the Judiciary Committee. We had a strong 
bipartisan vote of 12 to 5 for this amendment out of the Judiciary 
Committee last year. I appreciate the Presiding Officer's assistance in 
that, notwithstanding some differences of opinion with respect to the 
specifics of the amendment.
  We withdrew the bill from consideration on the floor when we knew it 
would be the subject of prolonged discussion--we shall put it that 
way--and agreed to consider the criticism of some of the opponents at 
that time that the phrasing of the language was not elegant enough and 
perhaps too wordy.
  Now, the constitutional amendment contains 12 key lines of text with 
respect to the rights of victims. There are another 10 lines of text 
that provide for exceptions or caveats to that grant of constitutional 
protection. I think the language much more closely approximates the 
other amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
  I thank Professor Laurence Tribe for his consideration, expertise, 
and assistance in developing the language toward that end. I am hopeful 
my colleagues will give a close look at this new protection. The rights 
protected are essentially the same, but I think the way in which it is 
done is more in line with other constitutional amendments. I am hopeful 
we will have an opportunity to make a substantive case for this 
amendment and to discuss in detail, with our colleagues, the reasons 
for our desire that we get a vote on it this year.
  I will just conclude by noting--especially because starting Sunday we 
will be celebrating National Crime Victims' Rights Week--the number of 
groups that are represented here in Washington to participate in 
various presentations and celebrations of National Crime Victims' 
Rights Week and who will also be participating in the meeting tomorrow 
at the Department of Justice.
  Supporters include the National Governors Association, which has 
voted in favor of an amendment. Both the Republican and Democratic 
Party platforms of the last Presidential election and their nominees 
supported such an amendment. It is supported by major national victims' 
rights groups, including Parents of Murdered Children, Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving, and the National Organization for Victim Assistance, in 
addition to the Stephanie Roper Foundation, the Arizona Voice for the 
Crime Victims, Crime Victims United, and Memory of Victims Everywhere.
  And especially, in addition to Senator Feinstein and the Attorney 
General of the United States, who has been very helpful in helping us 
formulate the specific wording of the amendment, I thank the National 
Organization for Victims Assistance, the National Constitutional 
Amendment Network, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Parents of Murdered 
Children, Roberta Roper, and the Stephanie Roper Foundation, and Steve 
Twist, who has been enormously supportive in working the language and 
coordinating the efforts with these various victims' rights groups. 
Steve is a lawyer in Phoenix, AZ, and has been indispensable in my 
efforts.
  Finally, Mr. President, Senator Feinstein has asked that I have 
printed in the Record a letter dated April 15, 2002, from Laurence H. 
Tribe to Senator Feinstein and myself. I will just read two excerpts 
from it, conclude my remarks, and submit it for the Record.
  Professor Tribe says:

       Dear Senators Feinstein and Kyl:
       I think that you have done a splendid job at distilling the 
     prior versions of the Victims' Rights Amendment into a form 
     that would be worthy of a constitutional amendment--an 
     amendment to our most fundamental legal charter, which I 
     agree ought never be altered lightly. . . .
       How best to protect that right without compromising either 
     the fundamental rights of the accused or the important 
     prerogatives of the prosecution is not always a simple 
     matter, but I think your final working draft of April 13, 
     2002, resolves that problem in a thoughtful and sensitive 
     way, improving in a number of respects on the earlier drafts 
     that I have seen. Among other things, the greater brevity and 
     clarity of this version makes it more fitting for inclusion 
     in our basic law. That you achieved such conciseness while 
     fully protecting defendants' rights and accommodating the 
     legitimate concerns that have been voiced about prosecutorial 
     power and presidential authority is no mean feat. I happily 
     congratulate you both on attaining it.

  I would say, editorially, not without substantial help from Professor 
Tribe himself.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:


[[Page 4580]]


                                                Harvard University


                                                   Law School,

                                    Cambridge, MA, April 15, 2002.
     Hon. Dianne Feinstein,
     U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Jon Kyl, U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators Feinstein and Kyl: I think that you have done 
     a splendid job at distilling the prior versions of the 
     Victims' Rights Amendment into a form that would be worthy of 
     a constitutional amendment--an amendment to our most 
     fundamental legal charter, which I agree ought never to be 
     altered lightly. I will not repeat here the many reasons I 
     have set forth in the past for believing that, despite the 
     skepticism I have detected in some quarters both on the left 
     and on the right, the time is past due for recognizing that 
     the victims of violent crime, as well as those closest to 
     victims who have succumbed to such violence, have a 
     fundamental right to be considered, and heard when 
     appropriate, in decisions and proceedings that profoundly 
     affect their lives.
       How best to protect that right without compromising either 
     the fundamental rights of the accused or the important 
     prerogatives of the prosecution is not always a simple 
     matter, but I think your final working draft of April 13, 
     2002, resolves that problem in a thoughtful and sensitive 
     way, improving in a number of respects on the earlier drafts 
     that I have seen. Among other things, the greater brevity and 
     clarity of this version makes it more fitting for inclusion 
     in our basic law. That you achieved such conciseness while 
     fully protecting defendants' rights and accommodating the 
     legitimate concerns that have been voiced about prosecutorial 
     power and presidential authority is no mean feat. I happily 
     congratulate you both on attaining it.
       A case argued two weeks ago in the Supreme Judicial Court 
     of Massachusetts, in which a woman was brutally raped a 
     decade and a half ago but in which the man who was convicted 
     and sentenced to a long prison term has yet to serve a single 
     day of that sentence, helps make the point that the legal 
     system does not do well by victims even in the many states 
     that, on paper, are committed to the protection of victims' 
     rights. Despite the Massachusetts Victims' Bill of Rights, 
     solemnly enacted by the legislature to include an explicit 
     right on the part of the victim to a ``prompt disposition'' 
     of the case in which he or she was victimized, the 
     Massachusetts Attorney General, to who has yet to take the 
     simple step of seeking the incarceration of the convicted 
     criminal pending his on-again, off-again motion for a new 
     trial--a motion that has not been ruled on during the 15 
     years that this convicted rapist has been on the streets--has 
     taken the position that the victim of the rape does not even 
     have legal standing to appear in the courts of this state, 
     through counsel, to challenge the state's astonishing failure 
     to put her rapist in prison to begin serving the term to 
     which he was sentenced so long ago.
       If this remarkable failure of justice represented a wild 
     aberration, perpetrated by a state that has not incorporated 
     the rights to victims into its laws, then it would prove 
     little, standing alone, about the need to write into the 
     United States Constitution a national commitment to the 
     rights of victims. Sadly, however, the failure of justice of 
     which I write here is far from aberrant. It represents but 
     the visible tip of an enormous iceberg of indifference toward 
     those whose rights ought finally to be given formal federal 
     recognition.
       I am grateful to you for fighting this fight. I only hope 
     that many others can soon be stirred to join you in a cause 
     that deserves the most widespread bipartisan support.
           Sincerely yours,
     Laurence H. Tribe.

                          ____________________