[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Page 4240]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                            IRAQ'S MISSILES

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the danger of 
Iraq's development of medium range ballistic missiles in violation of 
United Nations Resolution 687. I recently chaired a hearing of the 
Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, 
Proliferation, and Federal Services on Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction programs. Two of our witnesses were weapon inspectors in 
Iraq during the 1990s as part of United National Special Commission, 
UNSCOM, Inspection Teams. Their candid statements painted a dark 
picture and outlined some difficult decisions we have to make.
  When the gulf war ended, and the United National Security Council 
passed Resolution 687, Iraq agreed to destroy, remove or render 
harmless all ballistic missiles, related parts, and repair and 
production facilities with a range greater than 150 kilometers. 
Further, Iraq agreed to not develop or acquire them in the future. The 
dedicated men and women of UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency ferreted out and destroyed a large share of Iraq's prohibited 
weapons and related infrastructure in the 1990s. Despite the remarkable 
job they did, significant disarmament tasks and compliance issues 
continued through UNSCOM's departure from Iraq in December 1998.
  Before the gulf war, Iraq had a variety of missile programs. These 
programs were more than missile components and hardware. Iraq had a 
trained team of missile experts, capable of reverse engineering a 
Soviet SCUD missile and moving into indigenous production of an Iraqi 
version 2 years after initial acquisition. Their indigenous production 
capability depended upon low reliability, low technology, low safety, 
and a sophisticated foreign assistance and supplier network.
  Iraq has retained a great deal of this knowledge. Its team remains 
largely intact working on permitted U.N. missile programs, which 
provide cover for proscribed missile development. The liquid-fueled Al-
Samoud missile most likely is capable of exceeding the range threshold 
set by U.N. resolutions and is widely believed to be a precursor for 
longer-range missiles. The short-range Abhabil-100 missile program is 
providing Iraq with a solid-propellant infrastructure and other 
important technologies that could be applied to a longer-range missile 
in the future.
  At what point do allowed programs fall under the heading of related 
parts or production capability for longer-range missiles? I think the 
answer in Iraq's case is, now.
  Likewise, Iraq maintains expertise in converting aircraft to unmanned 
aerial vehicles, lately demonstrated in modifications to L-29 trainer 
aircraft. These unmanned aerial vehicles could be used to attack Israel 
or American forces in the region.
  Iraq has persistently deceived, evaded, and concealed its weapon 
programs. In spite of this, UNSCOM believed that it had accounted for 
the elimination of all but a handful of Iraq's SCUD missiles. So why 
are we faced with this on-going threat to American security? It is true 
that Iraq was able to hide some assets. More importantly, though, Iraq 
was able to maintain its technical expertise and industrial base under 
the guise of U.N. permitted missile programs.
  Iraq built its missile programs over a number of years with 
assistance from companies in many countries. We must work with our 
allies and international partners to contain the missile program. We 
must get inspectors back into Iraq and re-establish the U.N. monitoring 
program, and we must keep Saddam Hussein bottled up and force him to 
confront obstacles in every direction. An U.N. inspection team with 
full international support and access can complicate, constrain, and 
slow Iraq's clandestine efforts and give us a better understanding of 
what Iraq can do. But an inspection team, at its best, can contain or 
manage, not eliminate, the threat.
  We are now faced with the possibility that Saddam Hussein could 
deploy weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors. We also must 
consider under what conditions would Hussein give a biological or 
chemical agent or short-range ballistic missile to a terrorist group? 
This January marked the 11th anniversary since the start of the gulf 
war. As the war on terrorism evolves, we cannot forget our past 
attempts, successes, and failures in Iraq.
  President Bush is right to continue to make Iraq an issue for the 
international community. We will need international support if we are 
going to have an effective strategy for eliminating Saddam Hussein as a 
threat to world peace.

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