[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 3]
[Senate]
[Pages 3803-3806]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




        STAYING THE COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN: THE NEED FOR SECURITY

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, about 2 months ago I spent half a week in 
the Afghan capital city of Kabul, and virtually every conversation I 
had during my time there revolved around a single question: Would 
America stay the course?
  After all our successful military actions, after all our promises on 
reconstruction, after all our commitments to prevent Afghanistan from 
relapsing into chaos and warlordism, would we really have the stomach 
to get the job done?
  Whether I was talking to refugees living in bestial squalor, or to 
Chairman Karzai in a palace where the electricity barely functione;
  Whether I was talking to NATO soldiers in the international security 
force, to representatives of the U.N. and international humanitarian 
groups, or to our own American servicemen and servicewomen so valiantly 
risking their lives for a just cause; whoever I was talking to, the 
questions remained basically the same: Would we have the steadiness, 
determination, and commitment to remain engaged? Would we demonstrate 
the leadership necessary to keep the international coalition together? 
Would we maintain our resolve for the long haul, once the immediate 
battles had been won and our nation's attention had started to turn 
away from this remote and forbidding part of the world?
  I will tell you now what I told them then: We can, we must, and we 
will.
  Let me take a few minutes to explain what I mean, and how I see our 
role in Afghanistan over months and, yes, the years to come. But first, 
I suggest that we all remember just why we sent troops to Afghanistan 
in the first place. I can sum it up in three syllables: 9-1-1.
  Our rationale for entering the fray was very simple: Our Nation had 
come under attack, the most horrific single attack we had ever 
experienced in all our history, and the de facto rulers of Afghanistan 
were actively sheltering the terrorists who orchestrated this deed. We 
gave the Taliban every opportunity to surrender Usama bin Laden and his 
band of thugs, but the Taliban chose instead to link themselves ever 
more closely to al Qaeda.
  The decision to go to war is never easy, but in this case it was 
inevitable.

[[Page 3804]]

The decision was made for us, as I and the rest of the Members here 
were assembling for morning business on a Tuesday in September.
  Our troops have done a truly outstanding job fighting this war, as 
the recent battle in Shahi-kot demonstrates, the Taliban and al Qaeda 
are scattered and on the run.
  But we always knew that this would be the easy part. As President 
Bush, Secretary Powell, and Secretary Rumsfeld have correctly noted, 
our war on terror will be a long one, and we can't expect our early 
victories to be the final word.
  Let's remember that in 1979, it took the Soviet forces no more than 
10 days to establish control over every major population center in 
Afghanistan. The really tough part, we knew from the beginning, 
wouldn't be ousting the Taliban and al Qaeda--the tough part would be 
making sure that they stayed ousted.
  That is why we have no choice but to stay the course. If Afghanistan 
returns to a state of lawlessness and disorder, two things are pretty 
much certain to happen.
  First, the Taliban, or some new and equally brutal group, will 
establish control over all or part of the country, and they will 
provide safe haven to any terrorists, drug-traffickers and violent 
insurgents willing to pay their price;
  Second, these terrorists will once again use Afghanistan as a base to 
launch attacks on the United States to destabilize regimes all around 
the world.
  If we don't do the job right, mark my words: U.S. troops will be 
right back in Afghanistan a year or two down the line, only this time, 
we will be doing the fighting all by ourselves.
  Let us think about that for a moment. The victories we've seen over 
the past 5 months have been American victories--but they are not only 
American victories. At every step along the way, we have relied on our 
Afghan allies for the bulk of the troops on the ground.
  Whether we're talking about battles for Kabul or Kandahar, for Mazar-
e Sharif or Tora Bora, the pattern has generally been hundreds of 
American troops spearheading thousands of Afghan fighters.
  This pattern is far from perfect--as the porousness of our cordon at 
Tora Bora and, most recently, Shahi-kot demonstrate, sometimes Afghan 
troops are no substitute for U.S. infantrymen.
  But without our Afghan allies, imperfect as they have sometimes been, 
we would not have been able to achieve our impressive victories in 
anything like the time-frame we have achieved them.
  And that point is vital to our future strategy: As many people in 
Kabul told me, from Chairman Karzai right on down to mud-on-the-boots 
G.I.s patrolling the airbase at Bagram, we have only got one chance to 
do it right.
  As I was constantly reminded, the U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan 
abruptly in 1989, just as soon as our short-term objectives had been 
met. If we do so again, I was told time after time, then we had better 
not expect any Afghans to fight on our side when a new nest of 
terrorists requires military action in the future.
  The stakes, in short, could not be higher. Some people are of the 
opinion that we can pull out relatively soon, that any future military 
action would be as ``easy'' as the present one.
  ``We've got the most powerful military out there,'' they say, ``we 
don't need the help of unreliable Afghan and incompetent Europeans--we 
can go it alone.'' To anyone who labors under this delusion, I say, 
take a trip to Afghanistan.
  Go there, talk to the people, have a look at the terrain. Anybody who 
does, I suggest, will return firmly convinced that we must stay the 
course. We have got to do the job right this time--because it may be 
the last chance we get.
  So what does ``doing the job right'' entail? There are several parts 
to the equation--economic reconstruction, building political 
institutions, clearing minefields, creating the educational, medical, 
and other infrastructure necessary for long-term self-sufficiency.
  But none of these elements are possible without security on the 
ground. That's the central piece of the puzzle. If we establish 
security, all else can follow--and without it, nothing else can grow.
  For the long term, according to the plans of the U.S. administration 
and the U.N. organizers, Afghanistan's internal and external security 
will be provided by a national army and police force.
  This is the right way to go, and I fully support all the efforts 
currently under way to create these institutions. But you can't create 
them overnight. It takes time to recruit, train, equip, and solidify a 
truly capable, professionalized force.
  In Kabul I received an extensive briefing from Maj. Gen. McColl, the 
British commander of the International Security force authorized by the 
U.N. to maintain order in the capital.
  Gen. McColl's planners have worked up a detailed strategy for 
creating an Afghan army and taking at least the heavy weaponry away 
from local warlords. Even to create a bare-bones force of a few 
brigades, he found, would take up to 2 years.
  So what happens in the meantime? What is happening right now? I am 
afraid the answer isn't very encouraging. In the meantime--right now--
Afghanistan is not-so-slowly falling back into chaos.
  The interim government of Hamid Karzai exerts very little control 
over most of the country: In Herat, Gen. Ismail Khan rules as a semi-
independent baron--and entertains emissaries from Iran, who are anxious 
to expand their sphere of influence.
  In Mazar-e Sharif, the brutal warlord Gen. Abdurrashid Dostum has 
picked up where he left off when he was ousted by the Taliban--and his 
record suggests that he will take his current duties as Deputy Defense 
Minister no more seriously than his past promises to virtually every 
party in the conflict.
  In Kabul itself, Defense Minister Fahim maintains the fiction that 
his own militia, basically the Northern Alliance troops, is serving as 
a nonpartisan national army.
  It is clear to all observers, however, that these soldiers owe their 
allegiance to Fahim and various sub-commanders--and not to the legally-
constituted civil authority.
  In the Pasthun areas, a wide array of local warlords play all sides 
against every other--accepting money and arms from the U.S. and the 
Taliban alike, even attempting to use American air power to settle 
their own petty feuds.
  There have even been credible reports of various warlords falsely 
identifying their local rivals as al Qaeda in order to call in American 
airstrikes--putting U.S. servicemen in harm's way to advance their own 
sordid objectives.
  Meanwhile, Afghanistan's predatory neighbors sit on the sidelines--
but not for long. Afghanistan's bloody civil war has long been fueled 
by arms, money, and recruits drawn from the surrounding nations.
  The neighboring meddlers include Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Russia, but a variety of other nations slightly further afield have got 
into the game at one time or another. Each has attempted to reshape 
Afghan politics for its own narrow interests--to the detriment of the 
people, and the instability of the region.
  All have basically kept their hands off while U.S. troops have ruled 
the roost. But the moment the last troop transport takes off, expect 
the jockeying to begin all over.
  Ever had a neighbor who pops in to borrow a cup of sugar and invites 
himself to dinner? Maybe a distant relative who stops by to say 
``hello,'' and never seems to leave? Well, the Afghans know how it 
feels.
  They have had to suffer with unwelcome houseguests for thirty years. 
And they know that as soon as the door is open--as soon as the American 
troops leave--all of these unsavory interlopers will come flocking 
back.
  So what's the solution? How do we--together with the rest of the 
world community--provide Afghanistan with a year or two of breathing 
room to let it build up a national army and police force of its own? 
There are basically two possible paths.
  Have American troops continue to serve as the de facto security 
force, or

[[Page 3805]]

get the international community to share our burden.
  Fortunately, a mechanism exists to make this second option a 
reality--it's the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF for 
short, and it can save us from the necessity of being Afghanistan's 
only policeman.
  Right now, ISAF is strictly limited by its U.N. mandate. Its 5,000 
troops are confined to Kabul, and even there they have to tread 
gingerly. The unit is currently under the command of the British, but 
the Brits plan to transfer command as soon as April.
  The entire mandate ends in June--precisely when its continuing 
presence is most needed to safeguard the Loya Jirga, or Great Council 
to be convened as the next step in the process of political rebuilding.
  So here, in a nutshell, is what we have to do.
  First, this international security force must be extended from Kabul 
to several key sites throughout the country.
  It should be expanded to Mazar, Kandahar, and perhaps other cities 
such as Jalalabad or Gardez. Such an expansion would entail an increase 
in troop strength from the current 5,000. Some sources say 25,000 
troops would be needed, others say the mission could be accomplished 
with a more modest increase.
  I will not presume to venture an opinion on the precise number, I 
will just say that we should make sure the military planners have as 
many troops as they deem necessary to do the job right.
  This expansion should not and will not interfere with ongoing U.S. 
operations against Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants.
  Currently, the ISAF commander is subordinate in theater to the U.S. 
commander, and there has been no question of ISAF troops encroaching on 
American operations. Quite the opposite--ISAF troops are a force 
multiplier, and free up American assets that would otherwise have to be 
used to guard and protect bases at transport hubs such as Bagram.
  Second, the mandate of the international security force must be 
extended for 2 years. This would provide sufficient time for the 
creation of an indigenous Afghan army and police force, and insure a 
smooth transition to the new Afghan government.
  Third, the international security force must be given robust rules of 
engagement, and all the equipment, airlift, and intelligence necessary 
to accomplish its mission.
  Let's make no mistake here--the troops on the ground are not and must 
not be blue-helmeted peacekeepers. These are, and must be, peacemakers. 
We need rough, tough, combat-ready forces, with the ability to take 
names and impose order.
  Fourth, the U.S. must be fully engaged as the mission's guarantor of 
last resort. That does not necessarily mean we have to send U.S. 
troops, although we shouldn't rule it out off the bat.
  What it does mean, however, is that we commit ourselves to insuring 
the mission's success.
  Maybe we can achieve this goal by providing airlift, intelligence, 
funding, and diplomatic support.
  Maybe we also have to provide the promise of troops extraction, air 
combat assets, and the ultimate ace-in-the-hole of sending the cavalry 
to the rescue if things get too hot.
  But, one way or another, this is a goal we must achieve--not merely 
for the sake of Afghanistan, but for the national security interest of 
the United States.
  When I go around the country talking about the need for a robust 
security force, with the U.S. providing the ultimate guarantee of 
success, I'm often asked whether that's an implicit call for the 
participation of American ground troops. It is a fair question, but 
it's putting the cart before the horse.
  I would prefer it if we could accomplish our mission without 
deploying a single U.S. soldier.
  I would prefer it if other nations could do the job without our 
troops on the ground. And maybe they can.
  But my past experience, both in the Balkans and elsewhere, leads me 
to doubt that this will be possible.
  First, there aren't a whole lot of countries out there with the 
military assets--both human and technological--necessary to get the job 
done right.
  Other countries may be able to provide the bulk of the force, but the 
presence of even relatively small numbers of American troops can mean 
the difference between success and failure.
  Look at our battlefield results in Afghanistan--the military 
effectiveness of our Afghan allies has been increased exponentially by 
the presence of very small numbers of U.S. Special Operations Forces.
  These troops not only brought in the heavy artillery, by calling in 
and targeting airstrikes, they stiffened the spine of the brave, but 
often young, inexperienced, and poorly trained, Afghan fighters.
  Second, and just as important, is the political side of the equation. 
Without U.S. boots on the ground, the commitment of other nations often 
starts to falter.
  As Maj. Gen. McColl, the British commander of ISAF, said to me in 
Kabul, ``Once you Americans pull your troops out of Afghanistan, how 
long do you think my Parliament will authorize the deployment of 
British soldiers?''
  Let me be clear: I'm not advocating any specific deployment of 
American troops. The specifics of any troop deployment is a decision 
best left to the President, based on a military assessment of what is 
needed to get the mission accomplished.
  My point is merely that we have a mission to accomplish in 
Afghanistan, and if the deployment of American troops as part of an 
international force is deemed necessary, we should certainly step up to 
the plate.
  Perhaps we'll be able to continue the status quo--to have U.S. troops 
currently serving in Operation Enduring Freedom serve as the de facto 
back-up squad for ISAF troops.
  Some voices decry using American troops as ``policemen,'' and urge 
that peace operations be left to other nations. But every big-city 
police force needs a SWAT team to handle the real bad characters. 
Perhaps the U.S. can serve as the SWAT team for an expanded U.N.-
mandated security force.
  But we shouldn't be afraid to have our troops integrated to an 
international force of peacemakers in Afghanistan. Our experience in 
the Balkans shows that we can work with our NATO allies, and other 
countries, to make such forces the instrument of U.S. policy.
  And, as a survey of top brass recently released by the ``Peace 
Through Law Education Fund'' argues, such operations can be a huge 
benefit to American military and political objectives.
  Not all of the generals quoted in the report will agree with all of 
its recommendations, and the survey was undertaken prior to the 
campaign in Afghanistan. The opinions expressed related to peace 
operations in general, not to ISAF in particular.
  But I think the most valuable part of the report is the wide 
selection of direct quotes from some of our most respected military 
commanders.
  I would like to share a few of these observations--all of them made 
by American commanders with far more military expertise than I would 
ever claim to possess.
  Taken together, they make what I believe is a convincing case for 
American leadership on--and, if necessary, participation in--a 
significantly beefed-up international peacemaking force to be deployed 
at various sites throughout Afghanistan.
  On American involvement in multinational peace operations:

       The nation that has the most influence . . . has to play a 
     number of roles. Peacekeeping, peacemaking or peace 
     enforcement is one of those roles. To walk away from those 
     responsibilities, in my judgment, is to invite questioning of 
     your overall leadership character. As a result, people will 
     start to question you and your resolve for the principles for 
     which you stand.

  Gen. James Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

       If the United States doesn't participate, the United States 
     can't lead . . . You can't ask other nations to take risks 
     that you won't take yourself.


[[Page 3806]]


  Gen Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1997-2000).

       In order for us to have influence, we must be engaged . . . 
     If you're not there on the ground . . . you are not able to 
     really influence what's happening on the ground.

  Maj. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of a NATO multinational brigade 
in Kosovo, 1999-2000.

       Whether we like it or not, we're the big dog. If someone 
     calls 911, . . . it's the United States of America that 
     answers.

  Air Force Lt. Gen. Robert Fogelsong, Assistant to the Chairman of the 
Joint Chief of Staff, 1997-1999.

       I do not believe that any major humanitarian or 
     peacekeeping effort can be successful, long-term, without the 
     support of the U.S.

  Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, now Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then 
CinC of South Com. On unit morale.

       The re-enlistment numbers are far higher in units in Bosnia 
     and Kosovo than they are in units of the U.S. army overall.

  Air Force Gen. Joseph Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

       The re-enlistment rates in [US Army, Europe], which has 
     been involved to the greatest extent in peacekeeping 
     operations in the Balkans, are the highest in the Army.

  Gen. Montgomery Meigs, commander of NATO's force in Bosnia (SFOR), 
1998-1999.
  Gen. Jones, Lt. Gen. Fogelsong, and Adm. Dennis Blair say the same 
thing for Marines, Air Force, and Navy.

       Forget the baloney about people being upset about being 
     down range . . . morale's higher than in garrison.

  Gen. Meigs (Bosnia)

       Troops that deploy to Bosnia and Kosovo and other 
     operations like that, have high morale . . . our troops are 
     happiest, morale is highest, when they are out in the world 
     doing what they signed up to do.

  Gen. Tommy Franks, CinC of CentCom, now commander of the U.S. 
campaign in Afghanistan.
  On unit readiness and military training.

       I feel very strongly that our operation, let's say in 
     Kosovo, is a very positive net effect for the following 
     reasons. The training that the young NCO and younger officer 
     gets is far superior to what he or she would be getting if 
     they were in Germany--because they are dealing with real 
     world problems, 24 hours a day . . . That's what being a 
     troop leader is all about. Their individual, small unit 
     skills, squad level, company, battalion--it's far better 
     training than what they get back in garrison.

  Gen. Joseph Ralston

       The small unit leader's development in peace operations is 
     phenomenal.

  Gen. Meigs--The type of training that isn't available during peace 
operations is brigade and division level training, but Gen. Ralston 
notes that this large-scale training is given to troops on a relatively 
infrequent basis--typically only once every year and a half. He notes 
that when troops who have served in peace operations are put back in 
the regular training cycle, they have no troubling picking up where 
they left off.
  The words of these American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines say 
it far better than I can. The military and strategic objectives of the 
United States are often best served by American troops participating in 
multinational peace operations.
  I am not saying we should send U.S. soldiers on such missions merely 
for their training or diplomatic value. I AM saying that we should 
recognize the pro's as well as the con's of U.S. involvement in peace 
operations.
  Yes, there are dangers--as President Bush has said, the war against 
terror will be long, and there will be casualties in the months and 
years ahead. But the dangers of abdication of our responsibilities is 
far greater than the dangers of leadership.
  We must stay the course in Afghanistan--the whole world is watching. 
Friends and enemies alike want to know whether we'll follow through in 
Afghanistan, and if we fail to follow through here, how can we ever 
convince them that we'll follow through in Yemen, the Philippines, or 
Indonesia--let alone in Iraq.
  But that is the topic for another day.

                          ____________________