[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 17]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 22782-22784]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                       CHINA WILL ATTACK AMERICA

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. BOB SCHAFFER

                              of colorado

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, November 14, 2002

  Mr. SCHAFFER. Mr. Speaker, I previously submitted remarks concerning 
America's defense against China, North Korea and Iraq.

[[Page 22783]]

Given the eminent military action against Iraq by the United States and 
its allies, along with our outlook on North Korea's nuclear missile 
capabilities, we must also recognize China's capabilities to attack the 
U.S. and its national interests.
  As mentioned in my previous remarks, in December 1999 China's Defense 
Minister, General Chi Haotian, declared war ``is inevitable'' between 
China and the United States. He noted, ``The issue is that the Chinese 
armed forces must control the initiative in this war.'' Outlined in my 
remarks were considerations for the United States in recognizing 
China's threat and our ability to control initiative during battle. Yet 
there are several other matters of equal importance that must be 
considered by U.S. leaders and officials influencing policy regarding 
China and its oppressive People's Liberation Army (PLA).


                             Oil Belt Storm

  Planning for PLA aggression as well as planning for an invasion of 
Iraq must consider the flow and supply of oil. From China's 
perspective, the flow of oil from Indonesia, the Middle East, and 
potentially Russia must be assured to support its continued economic 
growth, which is needed to maintain the legitimacy of its communist 
government. Without oil, China's economic growth may be compromised.
  In this regard, U.S. diplomacy with Sudan may be cast in a new light. 
We may seek to supplant Chinese oil interests. While other 
considerations need to be factored into our diplomacy such as its civil 
war, it may be asked if a more humane treatment of the inhabitants of 
the south could be given to respect private property rights if a U.S.-
led initiative were established. It is noteworthy how the Sudanese 
government did proffer cooperation for the capture of Al Qaeda 
terrorists, but its offer was turned down by the Clinton 
administration.
  We should ask ourselves about our ability to defend the supply of oil 
from the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and the development of new 
supplies of oil, perhaps from equatorial Africa to develop alternatives 
to the problematic Middle East. In this light, our relationships with 
African countries, and Latin American neighbors and Mexico may be given 
a new impetus. In fact, I just returned yesterday from the Republic of 
Cote d'Ivoire where I held meetings with President Laurent Gbagbo, his 
Prime Minister and Members of Parliament. The recent discovery of 
significant off-shore oil fields there have the potential to 
dramatically reshape the economic strength of the region.
  The question of foreign oil supplies should affect our planning for 
naval strength, especially escort vessels that could protect oil 
tankers and convoys in time of war. This planning may embrace domestic 
policy on oil and gas production and exploration, and the development 
of alternative energy sources as well as the efficient use of coal.


                       Ballistic Missile Defense

  One of the lessons of the 1991 Persian Gulf War was the need for more 
effective ballistic missile defenses. The success of the improved 
Patriot-2 was incomplete. Its range was limited. It was a single-layer 
defense. It could not intercept Scuds during their boost phase.
  More than a decade has passed since the Gulf War ended. Since that 
time we have begun to field a new version of the Patriot, the Patriot-
3, for use against short-range ballistic missiles. But we have yet to 
deploy a defense against intermediate or long-range ballistic missiles, 
or a defense capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in their boost 
phase.
  While, for example, on October 14, 2002 we completed the fifth 
successful interception test of a ground-based interceptor against an 
ICBM target and decoys, we have yet to deploy a defense that can 
intercept ICBMs.
  Instead, we have canceled several effective ballistic missile defense 
programs since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. In 1993 the Clinton 
administration canceled Brilliant Pebbles, a program for building 
space-based interceptors that could intercept theater and long-range 
ballistic missiles. In 2001 the younger Bush administration canceled 
Navy Area Wide, which would provide coverage similar to Patriot-3 but 
based on Aegis ships. In 2002 we all but canceled the Space-Based 
Laser, ending its existence as an active program when it could provide 
a very effective boost-phase defense with global coverage in contrast 
to the limited coverage of the Air Borne Laser.
  For over a decade we have cut effective ballistic missile defense 
programs, especially restricting space-based defenses. This regressive 
policy continues today. The proposed ground-based interceptor for a 
national missile defense, while absorbing billions of dollars, will 
afford only a modest capability. It will, for example, be less capable 
and more expensive than Brilliant Pebbles, and be susceptible to decoys 
and countermeasures directed at its ground-based radar and centralized 
command and control center.
  The deployment of Patriot-3, a very modest accomplishment for ten 
years of development, does not compensate for the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles that has occurred since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 
Since 1991 North Korea has built and tested the long-range Taepo Dong 
ballistic missile that can reach the United States. Iran has developed 
the intermediate-range Shahab-3, and is developing the Shahab-4 with 
even longer range. China has engaged in a ballistic missile buildup of 
all types with improved accuracy. The proliferation of ballistic 
missiles has extended to India and Pakistan, creating conditions for a 
nuclear exchange. With the exception of the draw down of the former 
Soviet arsenal, the ballistic missile threat has increased, and 
Russia's missiles are still capable of massive destruction.


                              New Weapons

  As the PLA began its transformation in the late 1980's, recognizing 
the technological impetus of President Reagan's Strategic Defense 
Initiative and the importance of technology in the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, we began a procurement holiday, living off our forces from the 
Gulf War.
  We reduced the acquisition of new weapons. We cut, for example, the 
number of B-2 bombers from 132 to 22. In ballistic missile defense, we 
denigrated Brilliant Pebbles from approval for acquisition in 1991 to a 
follow-on technology, leading to its termination in 1993. In 1995 or 
earlier, when we could have engaged major aerospace contractors to 
build a Space-Based Laser defense, we funded it at a nominal amount, 
leaving it as a future technological option instead of recognizing how 
the future was in our hands.
  Today, as the Bush administration considers cutting the acquisition 
of F-22 stealth fighters and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, China's 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) technology is advancing based on Russian 
SAMS, which are reportedly capable of intercepting stealth aircraft, 
and pose a difficult defense for F-15 and F-16 fighters.
  We have yet to develop hypersonic aerospace vehicles even though they 
have been proposed since the 1960's. No small part of our failure to 
build aerospace vehicles--military space planes--may be attributed to a 
reluctance to embrace the Space Age, including its applications for 
ballistic missile defense and long-range strike vehicles.


                               Technology

  Research and development has lagged for years, especially in physics, 
engineering, and aerospace. Our development and application of high-
energy laser technology has been hindered by a lack of willingness to 
use this technology, whether for ballistic-missile defense or anti-
satellite operations, although the Air Borne Laser program would be an 
exception--the Air Force sponsored its development for tactical air 
superiority as well as missile defense.
  Our use of lasers--directed energy weapons--could be quickened. For 
example, instead of consigning the high-energy gas-chemical Alpha laser 
used in the Space-Based Laser program to a museum or trash bin, as is 
perhaps contemplated by the Missile Defense Agency, we should build 
such a defense. We should use advanced technology, not throw it away.
  The use of medium-power lasers in aircraft, equipping them with 
another countermeasure against SAMs or air-to-air missiles could be 
hastened. Realizing the potential of lasers to irradiate the heat-
seeking element of a SAM or air-to-air missile, Russia is planning to 
equip jet fighters with laser pods. China's use of laser technology for 
anti-satellite or air-defense applications should not be discounted. In 
July, 2002, a Department of Defense report on the PLA noted how it 
excels in lasers.
  Other technological developments could be highlighted, including our 
reluctance to build military space vehicles with rapid launch access. 
Both NASA and the Air Force declined to finish development of the X-33, 
leaving behind another half-finished reusable rocket program like the 
DC-X/Delta Clipper. An emphasis on space technology and reusable launch 
vehicles is needed to counter the PLA, which recognizes the importance 
of establishing superiority in space.


                                Summary

  In World War II, Germany defeated France using blitzkrieg warfare. 
The French Army was demoralized by its lightning attacks while the 
British escaped at Dunkirk. The PLA has developed a similar but modem 
capability for lightning attacks, planning to seize and retain the 
initiative. Surprise is key to its planning to launch a sudden, 
powerful blow.
  The tools the PLA will use in the spearhead of its attack--ballistic 
missiles, high-energy lasers, and information warfare--are tools

[[Page 22784]]

against which we have virtually no defense, with information warfare 
being a possible exception. A preemptive ballistic-missile strike, 
aimed at our air and naval forces would cause widespread devastation, 
as would the use of high-energy lasers against our satellites.
  Should China launch an attack--and the only plausible situation where 
we would engage China--the resulting depth of warfare would be the same 
magnitude as found in World War II. Not a minor skirmish as in Special 
Forces deployed in Afghanistan, or a replay of the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, war with China would involve an all-out commitment to victory and 
the re-allocation of federal resources to achieve that victory.
  For these reasons I wish to note for the record that we are woefully 
unprepared for the more serious and eminent war. As detestable as 
Saddam Hussein is, Iraq lacks the tools for a long-distance, preemptive 
strike as are possessed by the PLA.

                          ____________________