[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 17] [Extensions of Remarks] [Pages 22779-22780] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]CHINA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT ______ HON. BOB SCHAFFER of colorado in the house of representatives Thursday, November 14, 2002 Mr. SCHAFFER. Mr. Speaker, as we prepare to invade Iraq and ponder North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program, America must not overlook the greater threat posed by China and the transformation of the People's Liberation Army into a modern technological force capable of lightning attacks. Similar to how Germany used blitzkrieg or lightning warfare in World War II to demoralize its opponents, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is ready to unleash a new form of warfare using advances in accurate ballistic missiles, high-energy lasers, and information warfare. This transformation of the PLA has more than the capture of Taiwan in view. In December 1999 China's Defense Minister, General Chi Haotian, declared war between China and the United States ``is inevitable.'' He noted, ``The issue is that the Chinese armed forces must control the initiative in this war.'' To control the initiative, the PLA plans to mount a surprise attack, counting on the weight of its initial blow to stun an opponent into submission. Ballistic missile strikes, high energy lasers used against satellites, and information warfare provide the means by which the PLA can launch a surprise attack with little or no warning. Do we need to remind ourselves of the congressionally funded U.S.- China Security Review Commission that declared in August 2002, ``Despite overwhelming U.S. military and technological superiority, China can still defeat the United States by transforming its weakness into strength and exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities through asymmetric warfare . . . deception, surprise and preemptive strikes''. China's mild reaction to our plans to invade Iraq may indicate deception, laying the groundwork for a surprise attack. Even as we engage China in diplomacy to call a halt to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, we deceive ourselves as to the role China played in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology to North Korea, where Pakistan served as an intermediary by assisting North Korea in its nuclear weapons program in exchange for North Korean assistance with its ballistic missile program. Even our efforts to seek China's assistance in the war on terrorism contain an element of self-deception. We overlook how China supported the Taliban, signing a memorandum of understanding with Taliban leadership on September 11, 2001. Do we note how PLA military doctrine described in Unrestricted Warfare extolled Osama bin Laden as a new type of warrior to emulate? We deceive ourselves if we believe the PLA is not capable of mounting a powerful blow at our armed forces. Our satellites are vulnerable to laser attacks and information warfare--a fact carefully noted by Donald Rumsfeld before he became Secretary of Defense while serving as Chairman of the Space Commission. Our forces and military bases are vulnerable to ballistic missile strikes--we have no defense against ballistic missiles except for the short-range Patriot. Taiwan A picture of our vulnerability may be seen in Taiwan. For example, a Taiwanese defense ministry report concluded a PLA attack using ballistic missiles and cruise missiles supplemented by long-range artillery and other weapons aimed at nearly one hundred key targets such as airports, harbors, important highways, bridges and military command centers, missile bases and barracks would be successful within a very short time. Several dozen ballistic missiles could destroy over half its navy concentrated at the naval base of Tsuoying. In 2002 computerized war simulations in Taiwan's Han Kuang Number 18 military exercise showed it could lose much of its air force in the first wave of ballistic missile strikes. The launch of hundreds of ballistic missiles aimed at major air bases around Taiwan would damage 75 percent of its air force fighters on the ground. Furthermore, China has obtained technical information on the improved Patriot-2, enabling it to devise tactics for overwhelming the two hundred Patriot missiles guarding Taipei and its environs. Transformation Transformation is a result of new strategy and new weapons that can convey a sense of overwhelming defeat, enabling conventional military forces to conduct mopping-up operations against a demoralized enemy. In other words, while the bulk of PLA forces are not as technologically sophisticated as U.S. forces, if PLA laser and ballistic missile forces can create a sense of overwhelming defeat, the once vaunted technological superiority of U.S. forces would be swept aside. Similar to Taiwan, China's intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles could be used in a preemptive strike against U.S. air and naval forces, particularly in the Pacific. Indeed, China's intermediate-range ballistic missiles were developed for attacking U.S. forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The effect would be the same as an attack on Taiwan. U.S. air and naval strength would be devastated. The PLA is aware of the vulnerability of U.S. forces to ballistic missiles. The inability of U.S. forces to defend themselves against ballistic missiles can create a condition for intense psychological defeat, a feeling of utter helplessness against a foe that can strike at will. This is called asymmetric warfare--attacking an opponent's weakness. We will find our weapons, doctrine, and leadership outdated. For example, we have no weapons to counter a high-energy laser used to attack our DSP early warning satellites, which could otherwise warn of a PLA ballistic missile strike. Other key military satellites, upon which depends our Revolution in Military Affairs, are at risk. Our generals do not practice for war against an opponent that uses accurate ballistic missiles in a preemptive strike. China has developed accurate ballistic missiles. Its short-range M-11, which uses GPS guidance, is accurate to about 5 meters. Its DF-21 (CSS-5) intermediate-range ballistic missile is equipped with terminal, precision guidance and possibly GPS. China has the option of using ballistic missiles armed with non-nuclear warheads in a precision, long-distance strike. Our navy has no defense against a DF-31 ICBM that could be fired at a naval battle group shortly after leaving Pearl Harbor. The PLA large- scale exercise called Liberation 2 simulated landing on Taiwan and attacking U.S. aircraft carriers, including strikes by DF-31 nuclear- capable ICBMS. Our nuclear missiles are no defense against a preemptive ballistic- missile strike. The threat of retaliation under the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction is empty. Even though we possess a larger number of ICBMS, we have no defense against the PLA holding American cities hostage using a small number of missiles. Unlike the Cold War where Soviet ballistic missile forces were targeted at U.S. ballistic missile forces as well as other defense installations and military bases, China has targeted U.S. conventional forces and bases, trusting that a small arsenal of ICBMs pointed at American cities could deter a U.S. nuclear retaliation. Not only are U.S. forces undefended from ballistic missile attack, the use of air power in retaliation or suppression would be slower in comparison to another ballistic missile strike. [[Page 22780]] Air power alone is not decisive in the age of missiles. Evidence Evidence of the PLA's transformation may be seen in the double-digit increases to its announced defense spending for over a decade; its purchase of advanced Russian arms such as Sovremenny destroyers, Kilo submarines, S-300 air defense missiles, supersonic cruise missiles, Su- 27 and Su-30 aircraft; and, its buildup of ballistic missiles and new doctrine. Once an army of peasants, the PLA has become an army of the technologically equipped with advanced degrees in science and engineering. To foster its acquisition of new weapons, the PLA has shrunk in numbers from approximately 3.5 million to 2.5 million while defense spending has increased. It has the world's second largest defense budget, amplified by the relatively low wages it pays. U.S. Force Disposition The concentration of U.S. forces in the Middle East and Persian Gulf is creating a condition for strategic attack and maneuver by the PLA. After a surprise attack using lasers, ballistic missiles, and information warfare directed at U.S. satellites and air and naval forces, a PLA force as small as 50,000 well equipped troops could create havoc. U.S. forces rely heavily on air power. Following a surprise attack there would be little to stop the PLA from invading other countries, including Taiwan and the island nations of the Pacific. PLA invasion forces against these tiny Pacific nations would not need to be large. The fractured nature of Indonesia could lead the PLA to extend its initiative to larger nations, perhaps focusing on oil and gas reserves. Guam and Hawaii would be at risk. While the Navy should be commended for basing three attack submarines on Guam, have we considered the defense of that island from the PLA, which has extended its grasp into the Spratly Islands and South China Sea? Guam is a strategic position for reinforcing U.S. defense commitments to Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and the other island nations of the Pacific. Its use against the PLA as a base for the projection of air and naval power would call for a concentration of military strength. This concentration of military strength on Guam should include theater missile defenses that can intercept intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Unfortunately, we have no theater missile defenses to deploy, although THAAD achieved successful interceptions several years ago. Yet Guam's strategic value would call for reinforcement, even with land forces presumably armed with tanks and mobile artillery such as the cancelled Crusader. The use of artillery has been proven in hundreds of years of warfare and should not be neglected against a heavily armed opponent such as the PLA. Hawaii, the crossroads of the Pacific, has been a key U.S. military base for nearly a century. Considering how China plans to engulf the Pacific in island chains that would extend to the Aleutians and Hawaiian Islands, Hawaii's defense and use as a base for projecting air and naval power should be considered essential. What steps have we taken to reinforce that key position, including the deployment of ballistic missile defenses capable of intercepting ICBMS? Preparation is key to a strong defense. Just as the PLA has engaged in an extensive and far-reaching military buildup for nearly fifteen years, we need to prepare and reinforce our defenses, especially against the PLA's weapon of choice, the ballistic missile. Without preparation in advance, the transportation of reinforcements may suffer, as well as the construction of defenses. The buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf should not blind us to the need for defensive preparations against the PLA. Such preparations may include a buildup of naval forces to counterbalance China's acquisition of Russian Kilo submarines, Sovremenny destroyers, and cruise missiles in addition to its buildup of ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile defenses would play a key role, especially space-based and naval defenses that can provide widespread, flexible coverage over the Pacific. Our preparations may include new weapons and defenses against to offset the PLA's acquisition of supersonic cruise missiles, Shkval rocket torpedoes, and wake homing torpedoes. Central America In preparing defenses to counter the PLA, the southern approach to the continental United States from Central America, Mexico, Cuba, or other Caribbean nations deserves our attention. To be of military significance, our planning should include the deployment of U.S. ground forces in the event of a PLA intrusion through our southern border or through ports such as Houston or Mobile. However unlikely it may seem to be, the southern approach is vulnerable, especially given the extensive nature of Chinese shipping interests. Commercial shipping could be used for the transport of military forces in the form of a Trojan horse. The PLA has conducted military exercises using freighters armed with artillery, similar to the German Q-ships used in World War II. While a small PLA invasion force would hardly be expected to conquer the United States, neither should we overlook the disruption and consternation that even a small PLA invasion force could cause. With its commercial influence at the ports of San Cristobal and Colon in Panama and friendship with the Marxist learning President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, China's reach could well include our southern approach. Yet an opportunity could arise to renew our relationship with Panama, including the stationing of military forces along the Panama Canal, as a number of Panamanians would like to see the Yankees return. This planning would need to include a sentry line and reserves. These reserves would need to be stationed within the United States, not the Middle East or Persian Gulf Reserves are for reserves. It is unreasonable to use Reserves and National Guard units in place of the regular armed forces, whether in scattered peacekeeping missions or the buildup for Iraq. Summary The PLA has developed similar attack capabilities to Germany's lightning warfare, using surprise as the key for a sudden and powerful launch. The tools the PLA will use in the spearhead of its attack-- ballistic missiles, high-energy lasers, and information warfare--are tools against which the United States have virtually no defense. For these reasons I wish to note for the record that we are woefully unprepared for a more serious and eminent war. I cannot stress enough the issues relating to the PLA's war threat. We must come to recognize the significant role our current actions in the Middle East play into China's aggressive military intentions. To further illustrate my points, I will offer subsequent remarks detailing the present danger China poses elsewhere in the Record. ____________________