[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 17]
[Senate]
[Pages 22756-22757]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




      REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF SECRECY--TREATY DOCUMENT NO. 107-21

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous 
consent that the injunction of secrecy be removed from the following 
treaty transmitted to the Senate on November 15, 2002, by the President 
of the United States:
  Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Treaty 
Document No. 107-21; I further ask that the treaty be considered as 
having been read the first time; that it be referred, with accompanying 
papers, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be 
printed; and that the President's message be printed in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The message of the President is as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:
  I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, 
with a declaration, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for 
Nuclear Damage done at Vienna on September 12, 1997. This Convention 
was adopted by a Diplomatic Conference convened by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and was opened for signature at Vienna on 
September 29, 1997, during the IAEA General Conference. Then-Secretary 
of Energy Federico Pena signed the Convention for the United States on 
that date, subject to ratification. Also transmitted for the 
information of the Senate is the report of the Department of State 
concerning the Convention.
  The Convention establishes a legal framework for defining, 
adjudicating, and compensating civil liability for nuclear damage that 
results from an incident in the territory of a Party, or in certain 
circumstances in international waters, and creates a contingent 
international supplementary compensation

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fund. This fund would be activated in the event of an incident with 
damage so extensive that it exhausts the compensation funds that the 
Party where the incident occurs is obligated under the Convention to 
make available.
  The international supplementary fund would be made up largely of 
contributions from Parties that operate nuclear power plants. The 
improved legal certainty and uniformity provided under the Convention 
combined with the availability of additional resources provided by the 
international supplementary fund create a balanced package appealing 
both to countries that operate nuclear power plants and those that do 
not. The Convention thus creates for the first time the potential for a 
nuclear civil liability convention with global application.
  Prompt U.S. ratification of the Convention is important for two 
reasons. First, U.S. suppliers of nuclear technology now face 
potentially unlimited third-party civil liability arising from their 
activities in foreign markets because the United States is not 
currently party to any international nuclear civil liability 
convention. In addition to limiting commercial opportunities, lack of 
liability protection afforded by treaty obligations has limited the 
scope of participation by major U.S. companies in the provision of 
safety assistance to Soviet-designed nuclear power plants, increasing 
the risk of future accidents in these plants. Once widely applied, the 
Convention will create for suppliers of U.S. nuclear equipment and 
technology substantially the same legal environment in foreign markets 
that they now experience domestically under the Price-Anderson Act. It 
will level the playing field on which they meet foreign competitors and 
eliminate the liability concerns that have inhibited them from 
providing the fullest range of safety assistance.
  Second, under existing nuclear liability conventions many potential 
victims outside the United States generally have no assurance that they 
will be adequately or promptly compensated in the event they are harmed 
by a civil nuclear incident, especially if that incident occurs outside 
their borders or damages their environment. The Convention, once widely 
accepted, will provide that assurance.
  United States leadership is essential in order to bring the 
Convention into force soon. With the United States as an initial Party, 
other countries will find the Convention attractive and the number of 
Parties is likely to grow quickly. Without U.S. leadership, the 
Convention could take many years to enter into force. The creation of a 
global civil liability regime will play a critical role in allowing 
nuclear power to achieve its full potential in the diverse and 
environmentally responsible world energy structure we need to build in 
the coming decades.
  The Convention is consistent with the primary existing U.S. statute 
governing nuclear civil liability, the Price-Anderson Act of 1957. 
Adoption of the Convention would require virtually no substantive 
changes in that Act. Moreover, under legislation that is being 
submitted separately to implement the Convention, the U.S. contingent 
liability to contribute to the international supplementary fund would 
be completely covered, either by funds generated under the Price-
Anderson Act in the event of an accident covered by both that Act and 
the Convention, or by funds contributed to a retrospective pool by U.S. 
suppliers of nuclear equipment and technology in the event of an 
accident covered by the Convention but falling outside the Price-
Anderson system. In either case, U.S. taxpayers would not have to bear 
the burden of the U.S. contribution to the international supplementary 
fund.
  The Convention allows nations that are party to existing nuclear 
liability conventions to join the new global regime easily, without 
giving up their participation in those conventions. It also permits 
nations that do not belong to an existing convention to join the new 
regime easily and rapidly. The United States in particular benefits 
from a grandfather clause that allows it to join the Convention without 
being required to change certain aspects of the Price-Anderson system 
that would otherwise be inconsistent with its requirements.
  The Convention, without relying on taxpayer funds, will increase the 
compensation available to potential victims of a civil nuclear 
incident, strengthen the position of U.S. exporters of nuclear 
equipment and technology, and permit us to provide safety assistance to 
the world's least-safe reactors more effectively.
  I urge the Senate to act expeditiously in giving its advice and 
consent to ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation 
for Nuclear Damage, with a declaration as set forth in the accompanying 
report of the Department of State.

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