[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19693-19749]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




 AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES AGAINST IRAQ--
                               Continued

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I take the floor at this time to urge the 
joint leadership of the Senate to delay the vote on cloture which is 
set this moment for 10:15 tomorrow morning. I urge the leadership of 
this body to consider and to help bring about an order that will 
vitiate that vote on cloture tomorrow morning at 10:15.
  I make my plea on behalf of the mothers, fathers, grandmothers, and 
grandfathers of this country, the fate of whose sons, daughters and 
grandchildren hinges upon the outcome of the vote on cloture; shutting 
off the debate of this Senate, shutting it down to 30 hours, with each 
Senator to have

[[Page 19694]]

only 1 hour unless other Senators can be prevailed upon to seek 
unanimous consent to yield that Senator additional time, with the 
exception of the managers, the majority leader, and the minority 
leader, who have an additional 2 hours automatically.
  What is involved is the fate of the service men and women in this 
country who may have to go to Iraq, the fate of the reserves, the fate 
of our National Guardsmen and Guardswomen in this country who may have 
to go to Iraq.
  This decision is going to be made no later than 10:15 tomorrow 
morning unless it is changed. This is a fateful decision. It involves 
the treasure of this country. It involves the blood of our fighting men 
and women. It is too momentous and too far reaching a decision to be 
signed, sealed, and delivered by 10:15 tomorrow morning.
  I know it is in accordance with the rules of the Senate. Nobody knows 
the rules of the Senate more than I do, and nobody has used the rules 
of the Senate more than I have in past years. But I say that this rule, 
which is perfectly within order, should be set aside because of the 
fateful, momentous, and far-reaching implications and ramifications of 
this vote.
  If we go through with this vote, Senators are going to have 1 hour 
each, up to 30 hours, and only amendments which are germane can be 
offered. This is too much, and I appeal to the sense of justice, the 
sense of right, and the sense of our duties to our people. I appeal to 
all Senators and to the leadership that we seek to get unanimous 
consent to put off that vote, to delay it.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes, I yield.
  Mr. SARBANES. I ask the very able and distinguished Senator from West 
Virginia--it is my understanding that the motion to proceed to this 
resolution took place a week ago. Is that the Senator's understanding?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator for such a 
parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SARBANES. Parliamentary inquiry. When did the Senate proceed to 
this resolution?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It appears from the Journal, the Senate 
proceeded to this measure on October 4.
  Mr. SARBANES. October 4, and today is October 9. October 4, I am told 
by the Chair. Today is October the 9th, on a resolution that may take 
the Nation into war.
  Mr. BYRD. That includes Saturday and Sunday.
  Mr. SARBANES. The distinguished Senator, I think I am correct in 
recalling, was the leader of the Senate at the time we did the Panama 
Canal treaties.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. Did the Senator recall there were two treaties, the 
neutrality treaty and the canal treaty itself? We went to the 
neutrality treaty. Floor debate began on February 6 of 1978. We voted 
on March 16 of 1978. So we had a period from February the 6th until 
March 16 to consider that treaty.
  We then went to the Panama Canal treaty. We began debate on March 17 
of 1978 and we voted on that treaty on April 18 of 1978. In other 
words, roughly 6 weeks on one treaty and a month on the other treaty.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Neither of which involved the prospect of going to war.
  Mr. BYRD. Exactly.
  Mr. SARBANES. Now, as I understand it, we are facing the prospect of, 
in effect, terminating all debate, precluding a lot of potential 
amendments, and ending this matter in about one week's time, a matter 
of this grave import. I ask the Senator if that is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. Absolutely correct. Absolutely correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. I make this observation to my colleague. It seems to me 
it is a sad commentary.
  Mr. WARNER. Might I make an observation along the lines of the 
distinguished colleague now debating this?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. Then I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. SARBANES. The distinguished Senator from Virginia, I have been 
watching him. He is marshaling the war forces on the floor of the 
Senate.
  Mr. McCAIN. Is this regular order?
  Mr. SARBANES. I see as part of that process, any time anyone speaks, 
he wants to make an observation. I would be happy to hear it so I get 
an opportunity to respond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The regular order is the Senator from Maryland 
may ask a question of the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I share that feeling, and in due time we 
will get that explanation.
  At this moment I appeal, I appeal to the Members of the Senate to 
find a way to give unanimous consent to put aside this vote on tomorrow 
and delay it so as to give this Senate more time to debate and to act 
upon this resolution, which is so weighty, involving, as it does, the 
most serious, the most solemn question that can ever face this Senate, 
the question of peace or war. We are being hurried by the rules of the 
Senate, we are being hurried into reaching a decision that is 
premature.
  I appeal to my colleagues. I appeal to my colleagues. The people out 
there in the country deserve better than this. They deserve a decision 
taken after due time, due consideration, ample consideration, ample 
opportunities to offer amendments and to have them decided.
  As it is under the rules of the Senate, we will be forced tomorrow at 
10:15 a.m. to vote on cloture. If enough Senators voted against 
cloture, that would be one thing. If 41 Senators opposed it--or put it 
this way: If those who support this resolution cannot get 60 votes 
tomorrow, then we would automatically have additional time.
  I am concerned the way this Senate is being stampeded, stampeded. I 
don't blame any Senator in particular. Every Senator here is acting in 
accordance with the rules. I am asking that in this peculiar, unique 
situation involving so much of the country's treasury, in blood and in 
dollars, I am asking the Senators join with me in putting off this 
decision. It can be done. It can be done by unanimous consent. That is 
not asking too much. That is not asking too much.
  We are talking about people who are in the military of this country 
who may have to go to war in a foreign country, depending on this vote 
tomorrow.
  Mrs. BOXER. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Let me first yield to the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia for a question, without losing my right to the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague and dear friend from West Virginia.
  To both of my colleagues, the Senator from Maryland and the Senator 
from West Virginia, this debate, as stated, started on the 4th, which 
was last Friday.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Virginia 
and the Senator from Maryland that on further review of the Journal, 
this debate began on October 3, rather than October 4.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine.
  I had the privilege of being on the floor last Friday afternoon for 
over 5 hours with this debate on that side of that aisle, led by my 
distinguished colleague from West Virginia. The Senator from 
Massachusetts, Senator Kennedy, participated. The Senator from 
Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, participated. We had 5\1/2\ hours. I returned to 
the floor on Monday. We had another roughly 6 hours of debate. Tuesday 
is fresh in the minds of all. And here we are.
  This is the point I wish to make. I share with my distinguished 
colleague the seriousness of this vote. It is a vote, hopefully, to 
ensure a resolution which will act as a deterrent, I say most 
respectfully, a deterrent, to the use of force, a resolution that will 
support the United Nations that is this very hour working to possibly 
craft a 17th resolution which would call for inspections. It is timely 
that the United Nations hear from not only our President, who gave a 
brilliant speech, but a unified Congress with these resolutions.

[[Page 19695]]

  I can conclude my remarks by saying in 1990/1991, I and all of the 
Members here--most of us were involved in that debate--the record shows 
the debate began on January 10, 1991, on the Persian Gulf resolution. 
There were two resolutions, one submitted by myself and the 
distinguished Senator, Mr. Lieberman, the other by the then-majority 
leader, Mr. Mitchell. That debate started on the 10th. It concluded 2 
days later, just 2 days later, on January 12, 1991, concluding with 2 
votes on both resolutions.
  So that ended up sending men and women of the Armed Forces, ours and 
other nations', into harm's way. Let us hope we have had adequate time, 
having begun on the 3rd, as stated by the Chair, and now we are here 
today with 13 amendments which have just been submitted, which will be 
respectfully treated by this body in due course, I hope expeditiously.
  The rule is being complied with. This is clear. But it is 13 
amendments.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. I yield.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator agree with me the timetables which the 
Senator from Virginia just set out, both in 1991 and now, show a 
deterioration in the Senate's level of commitment in terms of debate on 
important matters of State?
  Now, we do not have to go back that far. The time period I cited was 
24 years ago, just shy of a quarter of a century. We took up an 
important matter of foreign policy, the Panama Canal treaty--two of 
them, 4 weeks on one and 4 weeks on the other. Now we are here with a 
resolution to take us to war, and we are told, Well, you know, we have 
been on it not quite a week. As the Senator pointed out, there was an 
intervening weekend. Then we are cited as a precedent, Well, in 1991 we 
did it in a few days.
  Not only, it seems to me, does it make my point in terms of the 
willingness of the Senate to carry on the great national debate that 
ought to take place on important issues of war and peace, but this is a 
matter of most fundamental importance.
  I ask the Senator. It seems to me it would require the kind of 
attention and debate that is warranted by an issue of that magnitude.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator is indubitably 
correct. There can be no more solemn, no more serious, no more far-
reaching a decision than the one which the Senate is approaching.
  All of the talk about how many hours or how many days we spent on 
some previous resolution or subject is entirely aside the point; 
entirely aside the point.
  What I am saying here--and every Senator here knows it--is tomorrow 
morning at 10:15, we will follow the rules of the Senate. We are going 
to vote on cloture on the Lieberman resolution, as modified. It has 
been modified. I don't know how many Senators know that. This 
resolution has been modified. I only learned about it today. It has 
been modified in such a way that there is no longer a preamble, or what 
is considered a preamble. The words ``whereas''--I would like to 
discuss each of these whereas clauses. The whereas clauses have all 
been changed to ``since,'' which means the preamble is now a part and 
parcel of the resolution. There is no separate preamble here.
  So the wheels have been greased. The wheels of legislative action of 
debate have been greased.
  So here we are now faced with a vote tomorrow morning at 10:15. How 
many of us are going to be here beyond 6:00 today? It is only 5 minutes 
to 3 now. How many of us will be here beyond 6:00 today? Then tomorrow, 
what time are we coming in? 9:00, 10:00?
  So we see how little time this Senate is going to be able to focus 
its full attention on this far-reaching resolution which carries within 
its pages the fate, the possible fate of this Nation; the fate of 
hundreds or thousands, or tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands 
of servicemen and our National Guardsmen throughout this country. We 
are holding their fate in our hands.
  I say that the rules of the Senate in this instance are being 
utilized so strictly they are made more demanding.
  Why do we have to rush these cloture motions on a matter of this 
great moment? Why couldn't we have waited and debated this? What is all 
the hurry?
  I say to Senators, and I appeal to the people out there who are 
watching through those lenses, I appeal to the people in the 50 States 
and the territory and possessions of this country to rise up and to let 
themselves be heard. Don't vote for cloture. Let us put off this 
cloture vote. That is not asking too much. That is not asking too much.
  I hope Senators will consider this seriously. Let's not vote on this 
tomorrow morning at 10:15.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. I yield for a question.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator for putting this debate in the proper 
context and for pointing out what the solemn duty really is in the 
Senate.
  I want to ask my friend a couple of questions.
  Has my friend heard, as I have, the President himself and many of his 
representatives, including Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Ari 
Fleischer, repeat over and over again that the President has not yet 
made a decision to go to war? Has my friend heard that?
  Mr. BYRD. There is no question. No farther back than August 21, I 
read in the newspapers that the President was concerned about the 
agitation, about all of the commotion--these are my words--that is 
taking place here concerning his--the President's--plan. Secretary 
Rumsfeld on that occasion referred to this agitation as a ``frenzy''. 
That is my recollection. Go back and check; no farther than August 23.
  Here we were being told there were no such plans. As we approach it, 
the drive is on. We are being stampeded. They are saying, Oh, the vote 
will take place this week.
  Why all the hurry?
  I hope we will have an opportunity to debate this resolution. We 
haven't had a full opportunity to debate this resolution. It has just 
been modified overnight. Nobody has really had an opportunity to debate 
each whereas clause.
  There are amendments that are going to be offered. We are not going 
to have a chance to debate those amendments. The distinguished Senator 
from Michigan has an important amendment.
  Mrs. BOXER. If I might ask just a couple of questions--I wanted to 
say to my friend that not only did they say in August this was a 
frenzy, and the press was paying so much attention to it, and 
chastising the press for talking about Iraq--no. They were in a frenzy. 
But just two nights ago, our President said he has not made a decision 
to go to war. Colin Powell said that before the Foreign Relations 
Committee, on which I proudly serve. Condoleezza Rice repeated it. Ari 
Fleischer repeated it. I tried to check out the history where the 
President has not made the decision to go to war--over and over again 
through his operatives, and he himself said it--yet he is coming to 
this Congress and quickly wants to have a resolution, not just backing 
a new United Nations resolution, which I think we all feel is very 
important, and with tough inspections. In fact, most of us believe 
there should be enforcement of inspections, if need be, which is in 
Carl Levin's amendment, which I look forward to voting on.
  But our President is asking us to give him the authority to go to war 
alone--alone, with no one else. Other Senators will say that is silly, 
Senator Boxer. We are not going it alone. Read the resolution of 
Senator McCain. He can go it alone. That is the deal.
  Some say we are doing it because we want to force the U.N. to act. I 
agree with Senator Levin. I think it takes the heat off the United 
Nations.
  But the question I ask of my friend is this: In closing, here we are 
being asked to give the President authority to take this country to war 
without any help, without any other nation, without any of our allies, 
before he has made a decision to do so. And I want to ask my friend 
this because I know he has been here a very long time. He is an Officer 
of the Senate.

[[Page 19696]]

  Has my friend been briefed on how many of our military people, men 
and women, it will take to go to this war?
  What will the casualties be? How much will it cost? How long will we 
have to stay there? What happens afterward? What is the impact in the 
region? Will Saddam Hussein use his weapons of mass destruction on the 
battlefield against our people? And what protections do they have?
  Those are just a few questions. I want to ask my friend, have those 
questions been answered? I have asked them. They have not been 
answered. Perhaps my friend, having so many more years here, might have 
the privilege of a response to that before we are asked to take our 
people to war.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, there are many questions the American people 
want answered. There are many questions the American people are 
entitled to have answers to.
  I am only pleading here that the Senate give itself time to explore 
these questions on behalf of the people whom we serve. Give ourselves 
time. We haven't had time. We have been rushed through this thing. Now, 
because of the rules of the Senate, we are going to have to vote 
tomorrow morning at 10:15 on a question that involves peace or war, a 
question that involves great sacrifices for this country.
  Nobody knows how great those sacrifices may be. And there are many 
questions that need to be answered. What will we do once Iraq is 
defeated? What will we do with Iraq? Will our service men and women be 
required to go there? Will they have to stay there 2 months after the 
defeat of Iraq? 6 months? 1 year? 2 years? 5 years? 10 years?
  Who is going to pay for reviving the economy of Iraq? Where are the 
moneys coming from to pay the costs of what may be a war of short 
duration? of what may be a war of long duration? What is the 
President's plan? What is the administration's plan? Are we going to 
use the heavy ground option or the heavy air option, or both the heavy 
ground option and the heavy air option?
  Go over to the hospitals surrounding this Capitol and take a look at 
the emergency rooms. See how many people are in those emergency rooms. 
See how short on personnel those hospitals are. I know. I have had my 
wife in a hospital just recently with an appendectomy. Those hospitals 
are short on beds.
  What about the veterans hospitals? What about an upsurge, if it 
comes, in casualties of Americans? Are we prepared for this? Are we 
prepared?
  What is going to happen on the war here at home, homeland security, 
the security of our country? Look around us here. Just look at the 
morning papers. The television is full of it. The people of this area 
are concerned about their children, about the public schools, and they 
are being asked not to come to school, not to have recesses.
  Here we are talking about war in Iraq, when the focus is being taken 
off the war here at home. The people's eyes are on home, what is 
happening around us. Here is a sniper in this area. He has already 
killed six people at least, and they don't know what he looks like, 
where he lives, nothing about him, except he is a marksman. He is sure 
a marksman.
  Here we are being told: Tomorrow morning at 10:15 we are going to 
come to the moment of decision. I say it is not right to the American 
people that we do that.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BYRD. I do not intend to hold the floor too much longer. I yield 
to this Senator, and then I will yield to my friend.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I have been listening to the Senator over 
several days. One of the points he makes so effectively is the fact 
that even if we have been on the resolution a few days, we were, I was 
reminded, on the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 21 days, the 
energy bill 23 days, the trade bill 19 days, and the farm bill 18 days.
  But even if we have been on this bill, would the Senator not agree 
with me that the principal debate has been on the resolutions, not the 
real impact of the war and what would happen to American troops who 
would be involved--the numbers of American troops who would be 
involved--what the impact is going to be on our battle with al-Qaida, 
what is going to be the impact in terms of the region, in terms of what 
Saddam may do?
  I would be interested in the Senator's comments on that.
  Secondly, I would be interested in the Senator's comments on the 
report this morning in the Washington Post--I am so glad it was 
declassified--in which the Central Intelligence Agency effectively has 
agreed that--quoting the paper----
       Unprovoked by a U.S. military campaign, Iraqi President 
     Saddam Hussein is unlikely to initiate a chemical or 
     biological attack against the United States, intelligence 
     agencies concluded in a classified report. . . .

  That is the first time we have seen that public. That has been 
classified. Those of us who have been briefed on it have been unable to 
use that or to say that. That is a major kind of factor, I think, if we 
are being asked to vote on a resolution of war: to find out, in our 
Intelligence Estimate, that the possibility of American troops being 
affected by the use of chemical warfare increases dramatically--
dramatically--when we are putting Saddam Hussein's back against a wall.
  This was a question that--I see in the Chamber the chairman of the 
committee, who was there at the time. I remember very clearly that 
moment.
  But does not the Senator believe that this kind of statement is worth 
the opportunity for discussion and explanation, that we ought to hear 
at least what the reality is, that the American people ought to 
understand, and the parents of those servicemen ought to understand 
what their children are going to be faced with?
  Does the Senator not agree with me that we have been talking about 
resolutions, and we ought to be talking about the whole issue of 
terror, the impact it is going to have on our society--whether we go to 
war--what the impact is going to be on our servicemen, on the region, 
and on our future?
  I welcome the Senator's response to the general question about what 
this debate, to date, has been about, and then the specific issue that 
has been raised in the newspapers that has to be of central concern to 
people in relation to authorizing the President to engage in war and 
the chances of the use of chemical and biological weapons being 
increased dramatically if Saddam's back is up against a wall in a 
conflict.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Massachusetts. He has put his finger on several important points, one 
of which is this: The American people are just now awakening to the 
fact that the Senate and the House are about to pass a resolution that 
turns the power of the people, as measured by their elected 
representatives in Congress, over to a Commander in Chief--the power to 
determine when to go to war, the power to declare war. They are just 
now becoming awake to that fact.
  The American people are just now beginning to focus on this. They 
have not been focused on this. They have not been focused on this. And 
they are just now beginning to.
  Also, the article that the Senator raises, from today's newspaper, 
indicates there are many things that have a bearing upon this question 
that are just now coming to the surface. Organizations, persons, people 
with expertise, scientists, and so on, are just now beginning to focus, 
and their story is just now beginning to get through.
  I think we owe it to ourselves. Why would we want to deny ourselves 
here in Congress the opportunity to have more facts, the opportunity to 
study this matter more seriously, the opportunity to debate it, the 
opportunity to draw up amendments?
  Here we are faced, under rule XXII, with having to offer our 
amendments by 1 o'clock today, in the first-degree amendments. Now, I 
had to rush to get two amendments ready. I have many other matters that 
are demanding my time. And other Senators are in the same situation, or 
even worse situations.
  So I plead with the Nation's representatives here in the Senate, with

[[Page 19697]]

the leadership in the Senate, with the leadership in the other body. I 
plead with Senators to make every effort to try to get a unanimous 
consent request to waive this cloture vote on tomorrow.
  We are shortchanging the American people. We are shortchanging 
ourselves as representatives of the American people. We are shutting 
ourselves out of the opportunity. And it is no fault of any particular 
Senator. It is the rule that we are up against here, and only by 
unanimous consent can we waive it.
  But I plead in the name of the people of this country, in the name of 
the young men and women whose lives may be put on the line by the 
decision that this Senate will make tomorrow morning at 10:15. It is 
too weighty. It is too far-reaching. It is only fair to the people of 
America, who are going to be asked to give, in some instances, 
everything they have, if a war ensues. I tell you my friends, I don't 
want that on my conscience, not I. I apologize to Senators who have 
been standing here waiting.
  I yield to the Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield for no more than 5 minutes?
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. BYRD. Of course, I am entitled to yield for a question, but I 
would like to yield to the Senator from South Carolina. He has been on 
his feet.
  Mr. LEVIN. Is the Senator yielding his right to the floor? If so, I 
would ask that before he does that, he open himself to a question.
  Mr. BYRD. I have no intention of holding the floor. I do intend to 
offer an amendment, however, before I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator intends to yield the floor before Senator 
Helms speaks, would the Senator yield for a question first?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield for a question.
  Mr. LEVIN. My question is this: In addition to the fact that cloture, 
if invoked, will close off debate and have the effect which has been 
described here, it has another effect, does it not, which is that 
amendments following cloture must be strictly germane?
  In preparation for the answer to that question, I want to say the 
following: The alternative amendment which I intend to offer is an 
amendment which says we should seek the U.N. to authorize force-to-
force inspections, to authorize member states to use force-to-force 
inspections--in other words, to go multilaterally with force--but does 
not at this time authorize a go-it-alone approach. That is my 
alternative.
  My alternative also specifically provides--this is the question----
  Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield, please? Can there be an 
understanding, when you have completed, that I be recognized for 5 
minutes? I won't take that long. Would that be agreeable with the 
Senator?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Carper). Is there objection to the 
unanimous consent request?
  Mr. KERRY. Reserving the right to object, I would simply request that 
after the Senator from North Carolina has spoken, I be recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. LEVIN. The rest of my question is this----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent 
request of the Senator from North Carolina?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. The alternative resolution which I intend to offer has a 
provision in it which will be prohibited from being included if cloture 
is invoked because even though it is obviously relevant to this debate, 
it is not strictly germane under our rules. I want to ask the Senator 
about this.
  Part of my alternative resolution says: Let us go to the U.N. Let us 
go together. Let us go multilaterally. Let's have the strength of the 
world community behind us because it avoids a lot of negative 
consequences and gives us great strength in proceeding against Saddam 
to go with the world. But part of my resolution is that Congress would 
not adjourn sine die so that the Congress could resume session, if 
necessary, to promptly consider proposals relative to Iraq if, in the 
judgment of the President, the U.N. Security Council does not promptly 
act on a resolution to enforce inspections. That is an important part 
of the resolution that I intend to offer.
  But is it not true, I ask my good friend from West Virginia, if that 
part of the resolution is ruled not strictly germane, although it is 
obviously relevant, that means I would not be able to offer the 
resolution in that form? And is that also not a very negative result of 
cloture being invoked? Does that not deny us an opportunity to vote on 
something which is so important to this debate?
  Mr. BYRD. It is, indeed, most unfortunate.
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be offering the resolution in two forms: One that 
contains this important language which would fall if cloture is 
invoked; one that does not contain it, which it seems to me would then 
be denying the Senate an opportunity to consider, debate, deliberate a 
full alternative to the President's go-it-alone approach.
  Mr. BYRD. That is one of the penalties this Chamber will pay, that 
the Senator will pay, that the American people will pay as a result of 
a rule, a rule which I support and have supported. But here we are, 
caught in a situation where without adequate debate, we have been 
pushed to a cloture vote in the drive--and I don't mean to criticize 
any person, it is a stampede--in the drive to have this decision made 
before the Members of Congress go home for the November elections.
  Mr. WARNER. Could I reply to the Senator from Michigan?
  Mr. BYRD. That is less than 4 weeks away. It is most unfortunate.
  Mr. WARNER. May I ask the Senator from Michigan a simple question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Could I just ask the Senator from Michigan a simple 
question? Did you not have the right to offer an amendment on Friday, 
Monday, Tuesday? That question has been open to the Senator.
  Mr. BYRD. I am going to give up the floor very shortly.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous consent request earlier, 
the Senator from North Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes, once the 
Senator from West Virginia has concluded.
  Mr. LEVIN. I believe there was only debate on Friday and Monday, no 
amendments. I am informed, debate only.
  Mr. McCAIN. I would ask my colleagues, please, let's observe the 
rules of the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia has the floor.


         Amendment No. 4868 To Amendment No. 4856, As Modified

  Mr. BYRD. Before I yield the floor, I call up amendment No. 4868 and 
ask that it be stated by the clerk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Byrd] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 4868 to amendment No. 4856, as modified:

    (Purpose: To provide statutory construction that constitutional 
authorities remain unaffected and that no additional grant of authority 
 is made to the President not directly related to the existing threat 
                             posed by Iraq)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. 5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this joint resolution--
       (1) is intended to alter the constitutional authorities of 
     the Congress to declare war, grant letters of Marque and 
     Reprisal, or other authorities invested in Congress by 
     Section 8, Article I of the Constitution; or
       (2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the 
     President to use the United States Armed Forces for any 
     purpose not directly related to a clear threat of imminent, 
     sudden, and direct attack upon the United States, its 
     possessions or territories, or the Armed Forces of the United 
     States, unless the Congress of the United States otherwise 
     authorizes.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, point of inquiry?

[[Page 19698]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from North Carolina yield?
  Mr. HELMS. I yield for that purpose.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from North 
Carolina, I be recognized, following the----
  Mr. McCAIN. I object. I will seek and obtain recognition after the 
Senator from North Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Arizona be 
recognized, after which I be recognized following the Senator from 
Nebraska, and I think the Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I would like to know what the request is. 
What is the request?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, who has the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has the floor 
and he yielded to the Senator from Massachusetts for an inquiry.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I used to be a sports writer. I know what 
freezing the ball is doing.
  I ask that it be in order for me to make my short statement seated at 
my desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the most fundamental and painful of 
decisions--whether to authorize the President to send U.S. military 
personnel to war--is being confronted by the Senate today, previous 
days, and maybe more days. I believe the decision is in good hands.
  I have had the privilege of serving in this body for nearly 30 years. 
The men and women in this chamber are the respected servants of the 
American people. I have faith in my fellow Senators.
  For 3 days in August and 2 days in September, the Foreign Relations 
Committee heard testimony on the possibility of American military 
action against Iraq. We heard 23 witnesses, including current and 
former Secretaries of State, former National Security Advisors, a 
number of experts on Iraq from academia and from prominent research 
institutes, an important defector from Iraq's nuclear weapons program, 
retired senior level military officers, and former members of U.N. 
inspections teams in Iraq.
  The chairman of the committee, Senator Biden, deserves our thanks for 
conducting these hearings in a fair and comprehensive manner.
  The hearings established some fundamental points that deserve 
repeating here on the floor.
  First, the threat posed by the Iraqi regime to American national 
security is serious and growing. Former Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright testified that after U.N. inspectors were banished by Iraq in 
1998, ``. . . the risk that Saddam Hussein will succeed in 
reconstituting deliverable weapons of mass destruction has increased. 
It is in the interest not only of the United States but also of the 
entire international community to act.''
  Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nationals Richard Holbrooke 
similarly stated: ``in my view, Saddam is even more dangerous than 
[former Serbian leader Slobodan] Milosevic, given his continuing quest 
for weapons of mass destruction. Left alone, he will only seek to 
become stronger.''
  Now, neither of these two eminent individuals share all of President 
Bush's foreign policy priorities. But both concede that the threat is 
real, and growing.
  Second, three former high-ranking members of the U.N. Special 
Commission agreed that inspections will fail to stop Iraq's development 
of weapons of mass destruction. Charles Deulfer stated that, in his 
opinion, inspections ``are only a short term palliative and do not 
address the fundamental problem. Saddam knows this.''
  Ambassador Robert Gallucci noted that ``We can assume that any regime 
that appeared as though it would be effective in blocking Iraqi WMD 
acquisition would also be resisted by Iraq. Therefore, the only way to 
impose such a regime short of war would be to pose to Iraq the credible 
alternative of a prompt invasion and regime change if the inspection 
regime change if the inspection regime resisted.''
  Lastly, Ambassador Richard Butler, the former head of the inspections 
team, warned that inspections were doomed to fail if Saddam succeeds 
once again in what Butler calls the ``shell game--phony inspections, 
more deceit, more concealment.'' ``That would,'' he concluded, ``be 
deeply dangerous, providing an illusion of security.''
  Third, a variety of witnesses, including Secretary Powell, agreed 
that containment of the Iraq threat, our policy since the end of 
Operation Desert Storm, is no longer suitable.
  Secretary Powell told the committee that the box that contains Saddam 
Hussein's murderous ambitions cannot last much longer. Secretary 
Powell, said, ``[Saddam] continues to bounce against the walls of that 
box. And one of these days he'll have a box cutter and he'll be out. 
And we don't want to wait and see that day.''
  Ambassador Butler also suggested that containment no longer works. He 
told the committee, ``we also need a specific solution to the specific 
problems posed by this particular and, I suggest, unique outlaw.'' 
Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, National Security 
Advisor Robert McFarlane, and Dr. Khidir Hamza, former Iraqi nuclear 
weapons designer, all noted Saddam's absolute commitment to the 
development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons.
  Secretary Weinberger also noted that Saddam's ability to smuggle 
goods in and out of Iraq, despite U.N. sanctions, earns him billions of 
dollars per year--money that goes to develop weapons of mass 
destruction.
  In hearings before other committees, our able Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld, has pointed out that the problem is not inspections 
but disarmament. Saddam has succeeded in circumventing sanctions and 
containment to the point where we no longer have the luxury of waiting 
idly by while he continues to develop the means to threaten us and our 
allies.
  The President's policy is the only way to deal with Iraq today, and 
we are obliged to give him maximum flexibility to carry it out. Even as 
the President develops a coalition, we cannot yield to a few countries 
like China or Russia that would allow Saddam to evade full disarmament.
  We can no longer countenance Saddam's delays and obfuscations. The 
President, in his speech to the Nation Monday night, articulated a 
series of options to deal with the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He 
displayed the essence of leadership, moving forward in the face of 
evil. Diplomacy absent demonstrated resolve--which was our policy too 
often in the past--will continue to prove absolutely ineffectual.
  I do hope Senators will stand with the President today. He has shown 
the leadership necessary to rid the world of Saddam Hussein. We should 
demonstrate that same leadership and authorize the President to do what 
is now so clearly necessary.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, we are trying to set up a couple of speakers 
on that side, and we are not going to go any more in advance of that. 
We should tell everybody that, after cloture is invoked, people still 
will have an opportunity to speak. It is not as if this is the last 
train out of the station. If people feel inclined to speak, they can do 
so.
  The leader will stay in session as long as people want to speak 
tonight. I ask unanimous consent that Senator McCain be recognized for 
20 minutes; Senator Kerry, up to 45 minutes--he said he may not use all 
of that time--Senator Hagel, for 25 minutes; Senator Dodd, for 20 
minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could we entertain the desire of the 
Senator from Kansas to speak?
  Mr. REID. The Democrats have used 20 minutes more during this time 
than the Republicans, so how long would Senator Roberts speak?
  Mr. ROBERTS. About 20 minutes.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Roberts may speak 
after Senator Dodd for 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page 19699]]

  The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, a lot of ground was covered in the time 
between the last vote and the time that I have been recognized, not 
necessarily in a structured fashion. I want to respond to some of the 
questions and comments that were made.
  First of all, very importantly, the Senator from West Virginia made 
an impassioned plea that we not vote for cloture, not move forward with 
the disposition of this resolution supporting the President of the 
United States of America to take action, if necessary, to bring about 
an elimination of the threat to the U.S. national security.
  I think it is worthy of a couple of observations, Mr. President. One 
is, in the recent past the Foreign Relations Committee has held 
numerous hearings and the Armed Services Committee has held numerous 
hearings. In reality, though, this issue has been with us for 11 years, 
and it is not possible to turn on your television set without seeing a 
discussion and debate over this issue. The night before last, the 
President of the United States spoke to the people of this country on 
this issue. Debate is taking place in the U.N. There are discussions in 
the U.N. Security Council as we speak. This issue, more than any other 
today, is known to the American people. As we, their representatives, 
debate and discuss it, it is to further inform them; but they are 
clearly aware of the major aspects of this issue.
  Since the year 1992, we have begun to be aware that Saddam Hussein 
would not be overthrown.
  We became even more aware over time that he was not going to comply 
with the cease-fire agreements he entered into and the Security Council 
resolutions requiring him to allow intrusive and comprehensive weapons 
inspections throughout his country.
  His obfuscation, his delay, his outright refusal to allow these 
inspections culminated in 1998 in ejecting those inspectors, and that 
resulted in the passage of legislation on August 14, 1998, which 
President Clinton signed into law, S.J. Res. 54, which declared that 
the Government of Iraq was in material and unacceptable breach of its 
international obligations, and urged the President:

     to take appropriate action in accordance with the 
     Constitution and relative laws of the United States to bring 
     Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.

  On October 31, 1998, then-President Clinton signed into law the Iraq 
Liberation Act, which stated:

       It should be the policy of the United States to support 
     efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from 
     power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a domestic 
     government to replace that regime.

  That was October 31, 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act, signed into law 
by the President of the United States.
  I have to say allegations or assertions that somehow the American 
people are not aware of this issue just do not ring true. Anyone who 
believes this issue is not being debated around kitchen tables and in 
restaurants and other social gathering places throughout America is 
simply not aware of what is going on in America.
  Yes, they pay attention to this debate, but the issue is well known, 
and there is no reason why we should not invoke cloture.
  It was interesting to me that my colleague from Virginia mentioned we 
really only spent 2 days of formal debate on the floor of the Senate in 
1991. The Senator from Connecticut and I were heavily involved in that 
debate. But the fact is, that issue was debated far and wide. By the 
time that vote was taken, the American people and the Members of this 
body were very well aware--very well aware--as to what was at stake and 
what, at that time, was a far more controversial issue than this one 
is, if you accept our predictions of an overwhelming vote.
  The Senator from Massachusetts asked the Senator from West Virginia 
if he knew about the stories carried in this morning's papers about 
Saddam Hussein being likely to use weapons of mass destruction if he is 
attacked.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement by George 
Tenet be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                     Statement by DCI George Tenet

       There is no inconsistency between our view of Saddam's 
     growing threat and the view as expressed by the President in 
     his speech. Although we think the chances of Saddam 
     initiating a WMD attack at this moment are low--in part 
     because it would constitute an admission that the possesses 
     WMD--there is no question that the likelihood of Saddam using 
     WMD against the United States or our allies in the region for 
     blackmail, deterrence, or otherwise grows as his arsenal 
     continues to build. His past use of WMD against civilian and 
     military targets shows that he produces those weapons to use 
     not just to deter.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I do not want to go through the whole 
debate again, but here is the point. Saddam Hussein continues to 
acquire, amass, and improve on his arsenal of weapons of mass 
destruction. He continues to attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon. These 
are all well-known facts. So if you believe that Saddam Hussein, after 
we go through this expression of approval, national debate, Security 
Council resolutions, is not going to abandon his request for his 
weapons, then the longer we wait, the more dangerous he becomes. In 
other words, if we attack Iraq tomorrow--and that is not clear yet; we 
have Security Council resolutions to go through--perhaps Saddam Hussein 
in his desperation may want to use a weapon of mass destruction, but if 
Saddam Hussein does not comply and continues the clear record of 
violations he has amassed over the last 11 years, then if we have to 
remove these weapons of mass destruction, each day that goes by he 
becomes more dangerous, his capabilities become better, and, in the 
case of nuclear weapons, it is not a question of whether, it is a 
question of when.
  Experts will debate whether it is 2 years when he acquires these 
weapons, whether it is 5 years, 7 years, 10 years, but there is no 
doubt over time he will acquire a nuclear weapon.
  Why do I mention a nuclear weapon? We have equipment that can protect 
our men and women in the military against biological and chemical 
attack. It is tough to fight, it is bulky equipment, but we do have 
that equipment. We have not invented any equipment yet that can protect 
our troops from a nuclear weapon.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments the Senator 
has made. I think they are right on target. Is there any reason from 
history or evidence to believe Saddam Hussein is developing these 
weapons of mass destruction for defensive purposes? Isn't the thought 
he might use them against someone else if attacked indication he would 
use them offensively as soon as he feels the opportunity to do so?
  Mr. McCAIN. I say to my friend, it is very clear he is not developing 
these weapons for defensive purposes. He has used them twice--once 
against his own people, once against troops of a neighboring country in 
a conflict.
  The fundamental point that seems to be lost in this debate sometimes 
is at any time in the last 11 years, Saddam Hussein could have avoided 
any threat to Saddam Hussein's illegitimate, terrible regime. It is a 
terrible and odious regime, but there are lots of bad guys around the 
world. He could have eliminated any threat if he had just come clean, 
taken out these weapons of mass destruction, taken out the 
laboratories, stopped, allowed the inspectors in, so he must have some 
other agenda. The longer we delay when he is in noncompliance, the more 
dangerous that threat becomes.
  There was no contradiction, in my view, of the comments of the 
Director of the CIA that were widely quoted in the media this morning. 
I can understand, by the way, without knowledge of Saddam Hussein, 
without the background we have of his record, without the knowledge of 
what he has tried to do over the last 11 years, why those comments 
might be misconstrued. But taken in the context of the history of this 
despot, I think it is very clear that if he fails to comply--and we are 
going to the United Nations and there will be

[[Page 19700]]

a Security Council resolution or resolutions--then obviously the longer 
we delay, if he continues on this reckless path, the more dangerous it 
becomes and, frankly, the more casualties accrue, in response to the 
Senator from West Virginia.
  I wish to make another comment about this debate. There is no Member 
of this body who has any priority or any franchise on the lives of 
American young men and women. All of us place that as our highest 
priority. All of us recognize the sacred obligation we have when we 
vote to send young men and women into harm's way, and no one's motives 
should be or will be impugned in this debate.
  I think it is important for the Senator from West Virginia to 
appreciate that I and others will object to any unanimous consent 
agreement that would delay a cloture vote tomorrow morning. We believe 
the American people have been informed, and the Members of this body 
have been informed.
  As the Senator from Virginia said, Friday we had debate, and we will, 
according to the majority leader, stay as late or as long as anybody in 
this body wants to talk or debate or discuss.
  With all due respect to the Senator from West Virginia, we will 
object.
  Mr. President, we are trying to dispose of 13 amendments. Obviously, 
people want to speak. I respect that, but I do feel compelled to 
comment on the amendment of the Senator from West Virginia briefly.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, could I ask a brief question before the 
Senator proceeds to the amendment?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to yield to the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. Our colleague from Connecticut raises a very valuable 
question: Is he manufacturing these weapons of mass destruction for the 
defense of his sovereign nation? The clearest evidence this Senator 
finds to show that he is not doing that is the excessive amounts.
  During the inspection regime, while it was somewhat functional in the 
early 1990s, they discovered records of clearly documented biological 
and chemical weaponry that had been made. To this day, it has never 
been unearthed, never been discovered, never been acknowledged by 
Saddam Hussein.
  So the question is important, and the Senator from Arizona answered 
it very carefully. I suggest that those who have any doubt address the 
excess quantities of all of these weapons. And for what reason would he 
need a nuclear weapon? That is a question to which none of us have an 
answer.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank my friend from Virginia.
  Mr. President, now I will make a few brief comments about the 
amendment of the Senator from West Virginia.
  The amendment is to provide constitutional authorities to the 
President of the United States. In the heart of the amendment, it says 
the President of the United States cannot use the Armed Forces for any 
purposes not directly related to a clear threat of imminent, sudden, 
and direct attack upon the United States, its possessions or 
territories.
  If this were 100 years ago, at the time of my hero, Theodore 
Roosevelt, who was ready to send the Great White Fleet around the 
world, I would vote for this amendment in a New York minute because 100 
years ago we had two oceans to protect us. One hundred years ago, we 
did not have in this world weapons of mass destruction that could 
strike continents away, travel thousands of miles and strike with 
incredible accuracy. We did not have a threat from a group of people 
who are yet somewhat unknown to us, who want to destroy our culture, 
who want to destroy our values, and indeed everything about Western 
civilization. They travel sometimes in secret without us being able to 
detect them, in the case of September 11, until too late.
  One hundred years ago, we had two oceans to protect us. We knew who 
our enemies might be, either real or potential, and we could afford to 
wait until there was an imminent, sudden, or direct attack upon the 
United States, its possessions or territories. Then I would have 
supported this amendment.
  The fact is, we all know if we wait until there is a direct attack on 
the United States of America, we pay a very heavy price. I hope the 
Senator from West Virginia, who I am sorry is not in the Chamber, would 
have appreciated that lesson from September 11; that we cannot wait 
until there is a direct, imminent, or sudden attack upon the United 
States of America. That is why if this amendment were to pass, it would 
completely prevent the President of the United States of America from 
addressing a clear and present danger to the United States of America 
in the form of Saddam Hussein's inventory of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to yield to the Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator makes a good series of points about the 
pending amendment introduced by the Senator from West Virginia.
  We have language in our resolution that authorizes the President to 
take action to protect the national security of the United States 
against the continuing threat from Iraq. I must say that in my opinion, 
and I ask the Senator for his reaction, the terms that the Senator from 
West Virginia has stated are literally being met now for this reason: 
As my friend from Arizona well knows, the Armed Forces of the United 
States are under direct attack from Iraq as they fly along with their 
British colleagues to enforce the no-fly zone.
  Approximately 7,500 American men and women in uniform are dispatched 
there, costing the American taxpayer a billion or more dollars a year. 
This year alone, there have been more than 400 occasions on which Iraqi 
forces have fired at the Armed Forces of the United States.
  Of course, I am opposed to this amendment, but I ask the Senator from 
Arizona if he would agree with me that there is a direct attack by Iraq 
going on right now, not on the United States or its possessions or 
territories but on the Armed Forces of our country?
  Mr. McCAIN. I respond to my friend and say that, yes, if this 
amendment said a clear threat of imminent, sudden, or direct attack 
upon the Armed Forces of the United States, clearly that is the case. 
We saw it in the USS Cole. We saw it in the attacks on our embassies. 
We have seen it in many places.
  If there has to be a clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct 
attack upon the United States, its possessions, or territories, in all 
due respect, I think Saddam Hussein would be very pleased if we passed 
this kind of resolution because that would allow him to continue to 
build up his inventory, to build his weapons of mass destruction, 
perhaps acquire a missile with sufficient range to reach the United 
States, and only then could we respond. That is not what I think our 
responsibilities and duties are to the American people.
  I am enjoying this debate. I think it is a good one. I look forward 
to hearing the next two speakers because both of them have played a 
very important and informative role, not only on the floor of the 
Senate but on talk shows and great programs throughout America, both 
written and in public.
  In fact, some of them have been accused of what I have been accused 
of from time to time, and that is seeking a camera, which is, of 
course, never true of me or my two colleagues.
  I certainly look forward to listening to their arguments. I think 
these next two speakers will contribute enormously to the debate. I 
think the American people, as well as our colleagues, will be better 
informed at the completion of their remarks.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized 
for up to 45 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Arizona for his 
introduction and for his generous comments about the role that Senator 
Hagel and I have played.
  My colleague, Senator Hagel, and I share seats on the Foreign 
Relations Committee. We have both followed this issue for a long period 
of time.
  Obviously, with respect to an issue that might take Americans to war, 
we

[[Page 19701]]

deserve time, and there is no more important debate to be had on the 
floor of the Senate. It is in the greatest traditions of this 
institution, and I am proud to take part in that debate now.
  This is a debate that should be conducted without regard to parties, 
to politics, to labels. It is a debate that has to come from the gut of 
each and every Member, and I am confident that it does. I know for 
Senator Hagel, Senator McCain, and myself, when we pick up the 
newspapers and read about the residuals of the Vietnam war, there is a 
particular sensitivity because I do not think any of us feel a residual 
with respect to the choices we are making now.
  I know for myself back in that period of time, even as I protested 
the war, I wrote that if my Nation was again threatened and Americans 
made the decision we needed to defend ourselves, I would be among the 
first to put on a uniform again and go and do that.
  We are facing a very different world today than we have ever faced 
before. September 11 changed a lot, but other things have changed: 
Globalization, technology, a smaller planet, the difficulties of 
radical fundamentalism, the crosscurrents of religion and politics. We 
are living in an age where the dangers are different and they require a 
different response, different thinking, and different approaches than 
we have applied in the past.
  Most importantly, it is a time when international institutions must 
rise to the occasion and seek new authority and a new measure of 
respect.
  In approaching the question of this resolution, I wish the timing 
were different. I wish for the sake of the country we were not here now 
at this moment. There are legitimate questions about that timing. But 
none of the underlying realities of the threat, none of the underlying 
realities of the choices we face are altered because they are, in fact, 
the same as they were in 1991 when we discovered those weapons when the 
teams went in, and in 1998 when the teams were kicked out.
  With respect to Saddam Hussein and the threat he presents, we must 
ask ourselves a simple question: Why? Why is Saddam Hussein pursuing 
weapons that most nations have agreed to limit or give up? Why is 
Saddam Hussein guilty of breaking his own cease-fire agreement with the 
international community? Why is Saddam Hussein attempting to develop 
nuclear weapons when most nations don't even try, and responsible 
nations that have them attempt to limit their potential for disaster? 
Why did Saddam Hussein threaten and provoke? Why does he develop 
missiles that exceed allowable limits? Why did Saddam Hussein lie and 
deceive the inspection teams previously? Why did Saddam Hussein not 
account for all of the weapons of mass destruction which UNSCOM 
identified? Why is he seeking to develop unmanned airborne vehicles for 
delivery of biological agents?
  Does he do all of these things because he wants to live by 
international standards of behavior? Because he respects international 
law? Because he is a nice guy underneath it all and the world should 
trust him?
  It would be naive to the point of grave danger not to believe that, 
left to his own devices, Saddam Hussein will provoke, misjudge, or 
stumble into a future, more dangerous confrontation with the civilized 
world. He has as much as promised it. He has already created a stunning 
track record of miscalculation. He miscalculated an 8-year war with 
Iran. He miscalculated the invasion of Kuwait. He miscalculated 
America's responses to it. He miscalculated the result of setting oil 
rigs on fire. He miscalculated the impact of sending Scuds into Israel. 
He miscalculated his own military might. He miscalculated the Arab 
world's response to his plight. He miscalculated in attempting an 
assassination of a former President of the United States. And he is 
miscalculating now America's judgments about his miscalculations.
  All those miscalculations are compounded by the rest of history. A 
brutal, oppressive dictator, guilty of personally murdering and 
condoning murder and torture, grotesque violence against women, 
execution of political opponents, a war criminal who used chemical 
weapons against another nation and, of course, as we know, against his 
own people, the Kurds. He has diverted funds from the Oil-for-Food 
program, intended by the international community to go to his own 
people. He has supported and harbored terrorist groups, particularly 
radical Palestinian groups such as Abu Nidal, and he has given money to 
families of suicide murderers in Israel.
  I mention these not because they are a cause to go to war in and of 
themselves, as the President previously suggested, but because they 
tell a lot about the threat of the weapons of mass destruction and the 
nature of this man. We should not go to war because these things are in 
his past, but we should be prepared to go to war because of what they 
tell us about the future. It is the total of all of these acts that 
provided the foundation for the world's determination in 1991 at the 
end of the gulf war that Saddam Hussein must:

     . . . unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or 
     rendering harmless under international supervision of his 
     chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile 
     delivery systems . . . [and] unconditionally agree not to 
     acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon-usable 
     material.

  Saddam Hussein signed that agreement. Saddam Hussein is in office 
today because of that agreement. It is the only reason he survived in 
1991. In 1991, the world collectively made a judgment that this man 
should not have weapons of mass destruction. And we are here today in 
the year 2002 with an uninspected 4-year interval during which time we 
know through intelligence he not only has kept them, but he continues 
to grow them.
  I believe the record of Saddam Hussein's ruthless, reckless breach of 
international values and standards of behavior which is at the core of 
the cease-fire agreement, with no reach, no stretch, is cause enough 
for the world community to hold him accountable by use of force, if 
necessary. The threat of Saddam Hussein with weapons of mass 
destruction is real, but as I said, it is not new. It has been with us 
since the end of that war, and particularly in the last 4 years we know 
after Operation Desert Fox failed to force him to reaccept them, that 
he has continued to build those weapons.
  He has had a free hand for 4 years to reconstitute these weapons, 
allowing the world, during the interval, to lose the focus we had on 
weapons of mass destruction and the issue of proliferation.
  The Senate worked to urge action in early 1998. I joined with Senator 
McCain, Senator Hagel, and other Senators, in a resolution urging the 
President to ``take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to 
the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end his weapons of mass 
destruction program.'' That was 1998 that we thought we needed a more 
serious response.
  Later in the year, Congress enacted legislation declaring Iraq in 
material, unacceptable breach of its disarmament obligations and urging 
the President to take appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance. 
In fact, had we done so, President Bush could well have taken his 
office, backed by our sense of urgency about holding Saddam Hussein 
accountable and, with an international United Nations, backed a 
multilateral stamp of approval record on a clear demand for the 
disarmament of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. We could have had that and we 
would not be here debating this today. But the administration missed an 
opportunity 2 years ago and particularly a year ago after September 11. 
They regrettably, and even clumsily, complicated their own case. The 
events of September 11 created new understanding of the terrorist 
threat and the degree to which every nation is vulnerable.
  That understanding enabled the administration to form a broad and 
impressive coalition against terrorism. Had the administration tried 
then to capitalize on this unity of spirit to build a coalition to 
disarm Iraq, we would not be here in the pressing days before an 
election, late in this year, debating this now. The administration's 
decision to engage on this issue now, rather than a year ago or 
earlier, and

[[Page 19702]]

the manner in which it has engaged, has politicized and complicated the 
national debate and raised questions about the credibility of their 
case.
  By beginning its public discourse with talk of invasion and regime 
change, the administration raised doubts about their bona fides on the 
most legitimate justification for war--that in the post-September 11 
world the unrestrained threat of weapons of mass destruction in the 
hands of Saddam Hussein is unacceptable, and his refusal to allow U.N. 
inspectors to return was in blatant violation of the 1991 cease-fire 
agreement that left him in power. By casting about in an unfocused, 
undisciplined, overly public, internal debate for a rationale for war, 
the administration complicated their case, confused the American 
public, and compromised America's credibility in the eyes of the world 
community. By engaging in hasty war talk rather than focusing on the 
central issue of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, the administration 
placed doubts in the minds of potential allies, particularly in the 
Middle East, where managing the Arab street is difficult at best.
  Against this disarray, it is not surprising that tough questions 
began to be asked and critics began to emerge.
  Indeed over the course of the last 6 weeks some of the strongest and 
most thoughtful questioning of our Nation's Iraq policy has come from 
what some observers would say are unlikely sources: Senators like Chuck 
Hagel and Dick Lugar, former Bush Administration national security 
experts including Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, and distinguished 
military voices including General Shalikashvili. They are asking the 
tough questions which must be answered before--and not after--you 
commit a nation to a course that may well lead to war. They know from 
their years of experience, whether on the battlefield as soldiers, in 
the Senate, or at the highest levels of public diplomacy, that you 
build the consent of the American people to sustain military 
confrontation by asking questions, not avoiding them. Criticism and 
questions do not reflect a lack of patriotism--they demonstrate the 
strength and core values of our American democracy.
  It is love of country, and it is defined by defense of those policies 
that protect and defend our country.
  Writing in the New York Times in early September, I argued that the 
American people would never accept the legitimacy of this war or give 
their consent to it unless the administration first presented detailed 
evidence of the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and proved 
that it had exhausted all other options to protect our national 
security. I laid out a series of steps that the administration must 
take for the legitimacy of our cause and our ultimate success in Iraq--
seek the advice and approval of Congress after laying out the evidence 
and making the case, and work with our allies to seek full enforcement 
of the existing cease-fire agreement while simultaneously offering Iraq 
a clear ultimatum: accept rigorous inspections without negotiation or 
compromise and without condition.
  Those of us who have offered questions and criticisms--and there are 
many in this body and beyond--can take heart in the fact that those 
questions and those criticisms have had an impact on the debate. They 
have changed how we may or may not deal with Iraq. The Bush 
administration began talking about Iraq by suggesting that 
congressional consultation and authorization for the use of force were 
not needed. Now they are consulting with Congress and seeking our 
authorization. The administration began this process walking down a 
path of unilateralism. Today they acknowledge that while we reserve the 
right to act alone, it is better to act with allies. The administration 
which once seemed entirely disengaged from the United Nations 
ultimately went to the United Nations and began building international 
consensus to hold Saddam Hussein accountable. The administration began 
this process suggesting that the United States might well go to war 
over Saddam Hussein's failure to return Kuwaiti property. Last week the 
Secretary of State and on Monday night the President made clear we 
would go to war only to disarm Iraq.
  The administration began discussion of Iraq by almost belittling the 
importance of arms inspections. Today the administration has refocused 
their aim and made clear we are not in an arbitrary conflict with one 
of the world's many dictators, but a conflict with a dictator whom the 
international community left in power only because he agreed not to 
pursue weapons of mass destruction. That is why arms inspections--and I 
believe ultimately Saddam's unwillingness to submit to fail-safe 
inspections--is absolutely critical in building international support 
for our case to the world.
  That is the way in which you make it clear to the world that we are 
contemplating war not for war's sake, and not to accomplish goals that 
don't meet international standards or muster with respect to national 
security, but because weapons inspections may be the ultimate 
enforcement mechanism, and that may be the way in which we ultimately 
protect ourselves.
  I am pleased that the Bush administration has recognized the wisdom 
of shifting its approach on Iraq. That shift has made it possible, in 
my judgment, for the Senate to move forward with greater unity, having 
asked and begun to answer the questions that best defend our troops and 
protect our national security. The Senate can now make a determination 
about this resolution and, in this historic vote, help put our country 
and the world on a course to begin to answer one fundamental question--
not whether to hold Saddam Hussein accountable, but how.
  I have said publicly for years that weapons of mass destruction in 
the hands of Saddam Hussein pose a real and grave threat to our 
security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf region. Saddam 
Hussein's record bears this out.
  I have talked about that record. Iraq never fully accounted for the 
major gaps and inconsistencies in declarations provided to the 
inspectors of the pre-Gulf war weapons of mass destruction program, nor 
did the Iraq regime provide credible proof that it had completely 
destroyed its weapons and production infrastructure.
  He has continually failed to meet the obligations imposed by the 
international community on Iraq at the end of the Persian Gulf the 
Iraqi regime provide credible proof war to declare and destroy its 
weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems and to forego the 
development of nuclear weapons. During the 7 years of weapons 
inspections, the Iraqi regime repeatedly frustrated the work of the 
UNSCOM--Special Commission--inspectors, culminating in 1998 in their 
ouster. Even during the period of inspections, Iraq never fully 
accounted for major gaps and inconsistencies in declarations provided 
to the inspectors of its pre-gulf war WMD programs, nor did the Iraqi 
regime provide credible proof that it had completely destroyed its 
weapons stockpiles and production infrastructure.
  It is clear that in the 4 years since the UNSCOM inspectors were 
forced out, Saddam Hussein has continued his quest for weapons of mass 
destruction. According to intelligence, Iraq has chemical and 
biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of the 150 
kilometer restriction imposed by the United Nations in the ceasefire 
resolution. Although Iraq's chemical weapons capability was reduced 
during the UNSCOM inspections, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons 
effort over the last 4 years. Evidence suggests that it has begun 
renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably including 
mustard gas, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX. Intelligence reports show that 
Iraq has invested more heavily in its biological weapons programs over 
the 4 years, with the result that all key aspects of this program--R&D, 
production and weaponization--are active. Most elements of the program 
are larger and more advanced than they were before the gulf war. Iraq 
has some lethal and incapacitating agents and is capable of quickly 
producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, 
for delivery on a range of vehicles such as bombs, missiles, aerial

[[Page 19703]]

sprayers, and covert operatives which could bring them to the United 
States homeland. Since inspectors left, the Iraqi regime has energized 
its missile program, probably now consisting of a few dozen Scud-type 
missiles with ranges of 650 to 900 kilometers that could hit Israel, 
Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies in the region. In addition, Iraq is 
developing unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs, capable of delivering 
chemical and biological warfare agents, which could threaten Iraq's 
neighbors as well as American forces in the Persian Gulf.
  Prior to the gulf war, Iraq had an advance nuclear weapons 
development program. Although UNSCOM and IAEA International Atomic 
Energy Agency inspectors learned much about Iraq's efforts in this 
area, Iraq has failed to provide complete information on all aspects of 
its program. Iraq has maintained its nuclear scientists and technicians 
as well as sufficient dual-use manufacturing capability to support a 
reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Iraqi defectors who once worked 
for Iraq's nuclear weapons establishment have reportedly told American 
officials that acquiring nuclear weapons is a top priority for Saddam 
Hussein's regime.
  According to the CIA's report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree 
that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There is little question that 
Saddam Hussein wants to develop nuclear weapons. The more difficult 
question to answer is when Iraq could actually achieve this goal. That 
depends on its ability to acquire weapons-grade fissile material. If 
Iraq could acquire this material from abroad, the CIA estimates that it 
could have a nuclear weapon within 1 year.
  Absent a foreign supplier, it might be longer. There is no question 
that Saddam Hussein represents a threat. I have heard even my 
colleagues who oppose the President's resolution say we have to hold 
Saddam Hussein accountable. They also say we have to force the 
inspections. And to force the inspections, you have to be prepared to 
use force.
  So the issue is not over the question of whether or not the threat is 
real, or whether or not people agree there is a threat. It is over what 
means we will take, and when, in order to try to eliminate it.
  The reason for going to war, if we must fight, is not because Saddam 
Hussein has failed to deliver gulf war prisoners or Kuwaiti property. 
As much as we decry the way he has treated his people, regime change 
alone is not a sufficient reason for going to war, as desirable as it 
is to change the regime.
  Regime change has been an American policy under the Clinton 
administration, and it is the current policy. I support the policy. But 
regime change in and of itself is not sufficient justification for 
going to war--particularly unilaterally--unless regime change is the 
only way to disarm Iraq of the weapons of mass destruction pursuant to 
the United Nations resolution.
  As bad as he is, Saddam Hussein, the dictator, is not the cause of 
war. Saddam Hussein sitting in Baghdad with an arsenal of weapons of 
mass destruction is a different matter.
  In the wake of September 11, who among us can say, with any 
certainty, to anybody, that those weapons might not be used against our 
troops or against allies in the region? Who can say that this master of 
miscalculation will not develop a weapon of mass destruction even 
greater--a nuclear weapon--then reinvade Kuwait, push the Kurds out, 
attack Israel, any number of scenarios to try to further his ambitions 
to be the pan-Arab leader or simply to confront in the region, and once 
again miscalculate the response, to believe he is stronger because he 
has those weapons?
  And while the administration has failed to provide any direct link 
between Iraq and the events of September 11, can we afford to ignore 
the possibility that Saddam Hussein might accidentally, as well as 
purposely, allow those weapons to slide off to one group or other in a 
region where weapons are the currency of trade? How do we leave that to 
chance?
  That is why the enforcement mechanism through the United Nations and 
the reality of the potential of the use of force is so critical to 
achieve the protection of long-term interests, not just of the United 
States but of the world, to understand that the dynamic has changed, 
that we are living in a different status today, that we cannot sit by 
and be as complacent or even negligent about weapons of mass 
destruction and proliferation as we have been in the past.
  The Iraqi regime's record over the decade leaves little doubt that 
Saddam Hussein wants to retain his arsenal of weapons of mass 
destruction and, obviously, as we have said, grow it. These weapons 
represent an unacceptable threat.
  I want to underscore that this administration began this debate with 
a resolution that granted exceedingly broad authority to the President 
to use force. I regret that some in the Congress rushed so quickly to 
support it. I would have opposed it. It gave the President the 
authority to use force not only to enforce all of the U.N. resolutions 
as a cause of war, but also to produce regime change in Iraq, and to 
restore international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region. It 
made no mention of the President's efforts at the United Nations or the 
need to build multilateral support for whatever course of action we 
ultimately would take.
  I am pleased that our pressure, and the questions we have asked, and 
the criticisms that have been raised publicly, the debate in our 
democracy has pushed this administration to adopt important changes, 
both in language as well as in the promises that they make.
  The revised White House text, which we will vote on, limits the grant 
of authority to the President to the use of force only with respect to 
Iraq. It does not empower him to use force throughout the Persian Gulf 
region. It authorizes the President to use Armed Forces to defend the 
``national security'' of the United States--a power most of us believe 
he already has under the Constitution as Commander in Chief. And it 
empowers him to enforce all ``relevant'' Security Council resolutions 
related to Iraq. None of those resolutions or, for that matter, any of 
the other Security Council resolutions demanding Iraqi compliance with 
its international obligations, calls for a regime change.
  In recent days, the administration has gone further. They are 
defining what ``relevant'' U.N. Security Council resolutions mean. When 
Secretary Powell testified before our committee, the Foreign Relations 
Committee, on September 26, he was asked what specific U.N. Security 
Council resolutions the United States would go to war to enforce. His 
response was clear: the resolutions dealing with weapons of mass 
destruction and the disarmament of Iraq. In fact, when asked about 
compliance with other U.N. resolutions which do not deal with weapons 
of mass destruction, the Secretary said:

       The President has not linked authority to go to war to any 
     of those elements.

  When asked why the resolution sent by the President to Congress 
requested authority to enforce all the resolutions with which Iraq had 
not complied, the Secretary told the committee:

       That's the way the resolution is currently worded, but we 
     all know, I think, that the major problem, the offense, what 
     the President is focused on and the danger to us and to the 
     world are the weapons of mass destruction.

  In his speech on Monday night, President Bush confirmed what 
Secretary Powell told the committee. In the clearest presentation to 
date, the President laid out a strong, comprehensive, and compelling 
argument why Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs are a threat 
to the United States and the international community. The President 
said:

       Saddam Hussein must disarm himself, or, for the sake of 
     peace, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.

  This statement left no doubt that the casus belli for the United 
States will be Iraq's failure to rid itself of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  I would have preferred that the President agree to the approach 
drafted by Senators Biden and Lugar because that resolution would 
authorize the use

[[Page 19704]]

of force for the explicit purpose of disarming Iraq and countering the 
threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
  The Biden-Lugar resolution also acknowledges the importance of the 
President's efforts at the United Nations. It would require the 
President, before exercising the authority granted in the resolution, 
to send a determination to Congress that the United States tried to 
seek a new Security Council resolution or that the threat posed by 
Iraq's WMD is so great he must act absent a new resolution--a power, 
incidentally, that the President of the United States always has.
  I believe this approach would have provided greater clarity to the 
American people about the reason for going to war and the specific 
grant of authority. I think it would have been a better way to do this. 
But it does not change the bottom line of what we are voting for.
  The administration, unwisely, in my view, rejected the Biden-Lugar 
approach. But, perhaps as a nod to the sponsors, it did agree to a 
determination requirement on the status of its efforts at the United 
Nations. That is now embodied in the White House text.
  The President has challenged the United Nations, as he should, and as 
all of us in the Senate should, to enforce its own resolutions vis-a-
vis Iraq. And his administration is now working aggressively with the 
Perm 5 members on the Security Council to reach a consensus. As he told 
the American people Monday night:

       America wants the U.N. to be an effective organization that 
     helps keep the peace. And that is why we are urging the 
     Security Council to adopt a new resolution setting out tough, 
     immediate requirements.

  Because of my concerns, and because of the need to understand, with 
clarity, what this resolution meant, I traveled to New York a week ago. 
I met with members of the Security Council and came away with a 
conviction that they will indeed move to enforce, that they understand 
the need to enforce, if Saddam Hussein does not fulfill his obligation 
to disarm.
  And I believe they made it clear that if the United States operates 
through the U.N., and through the Security Council, they--all of them--
will also bear responsibility for the aftermath of rebuilding Iraq and 
for the joint efforts to do what we need to do as a consequence of that 
enforcement.
  I talked to Secretary General Kofi Annan at the end of last week and 
again felt a reiteration of the seriousness with which the United 
Nations takes this and that they will respond.
  If the President arbitrarily walks away from this course of action--
without good cause or reason--the legitimacy of any subsequent action 
by the United States against Iraq will be challenged by the American 
people and the international community. And I would vigorously oppose 
the President doing so.
  When I vote to give the President of the United States the authority 
to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein, it is because I 
believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his 
hands is a threat, and a grave threat, to our security and that of our 
allies in the Persian Gulf region. I will vote yes because I believe it 
is the best way to hold Saddam Hussein accountable. And the 
administration, I believe, is now committed to a recognition that war 
must be the last option to address this threat, not the first, and that 
we must act in concert with allies around the globe to make the world's 
case against Saddam Hussein.
  As the President made clear earlier this week, ``Approving this 
resolution does not mean that military action is imminent or 
unavoidable.'' It means ``America speaks with one voice.''
  Let me be clear, the vote I will give to the President is for one 
reason and one reason only: To disarm Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction, if we cannot accomplish that objective through new, tough 
weapons inspections in joint concert with our allies.
  In giving the President this authority, I expect him to fulfill the 
commitments he has made to the American people in recent days--to work 
with the United Nations Security Council to adopt a new resolution 
setting out tough and immediate inspection requirements, and to act 
with our allies at our side if we have to disarm Saddam Hussein by 
force. If he fails to do so, I will be among the first to speak out.
  If we do wind up going to war with Iraq, it is imperative that we do 
so with others in the international community, unless there is a 
showing of a grave, imminent--and I emphasize ``imminent''--threat to 
this country which requires the President to respond in a way that 
protects our immediate national security needs.
  Prime Minister Tony Blair has recognized a similar need to 
distinguish how we approach this. He has said that he believes we 
should move in concert with allies, and he has promised his own party 
that he will not do so otherwise. The administration may not be in the 
habit of building coalitions, but that is what they need to do. And it 
is what can be done. If we go it alone without reason, we risk 
inflaming an entire region, breeding a new generation of terrorists, a 
new cadre of anti-American zealots, and we will be less secure, not 
more secure, at the end of the day, even with Saddam Hussein disarmed.
  Let there be no doubt or confusion about where we stand on this. I 
will support a multilateral effort to disarm him by force, if we ever 
exhaust those other options, as the President has promised, but I will 
not support a unilateral U.S. war against Iraq unless that threat is 
imminent and the multilateral effort has not proven possible under any 
circumstances.
  In voting to grant the President the authority, I am not giving him 
carte blanche to run roughshod over every country that poses or may 
pose some kind of potential threat to the United States. Every nation 
has the right to act preemptively, if it faces an imminent and grave 
threat, for its self-defense under the standards of law. The threat we 
face today with Iraq does not meet that test yet. I emphasize ``yet.'' 
Yes, it is grave because of the deadliness of Saddam Hussein's arsenal 
and the very high probability that he might use these weapons one day 
if not disarmed. But it is not imminent, and no one in the CIA, no 
intelligence briefing we have had suggests it is imminent. None of our 
intelligence reports suggest that he is about to launch an attack.
  The argument for going to war against Iraq is rooted in enforcement 
of the international community's demand that he disarm. It is not 
rooted in the doctrine of preemption. Nor is the grant of authority in 
this resolution an acknowledgment that Congress accepts or agrees with 
the President's new strategic doctrine of preemption. Just the 
opposite. This resolution clearly limits the authority given to the 
President to use force in Iraq, and Iraq only, and for the specific 
purpose of defending the United States against the threat posed by Iraq 
and enforcing relevant Security Council resolutions.
  The definition of purpose circumscribes the authority given to the 
President to the use of force to disarm Iraq because only Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction meet the two criteria laid out in this 
resolution.
  Congressional action on this resolution is not the end of our 
national debate on how best to disarm Iraq. Nor does it mean we have 
exhausted all of our peaceful options to achieve this goal. There is 
much more to be done. The administration must continue its efforts to 
build support at the United Nations for a new, unfettered, 
unconditional weapons inspection regime. If we can eliminate the threat 
posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction through inspections, 
whenever, wherever, and however we want them, including in palaces--and 
I am highly skeptical, given the full record, given their past 
practices, that we can necessarily achieve that--then we have an 
obligation to try that as the first course of action before we expend 
American lives in any further effort.
  American success in the Persian Gulf war was enhanced by the creation 
of an international coalition. Our coalition partners picked up the 
overwhelming burden of the cost of that war. It is imperative that the 
administration continue to work to multilateralize the

[[Page 19705]]

current effort against Iraq. If the administration's initiatives at the 
United Nations are real and sincere, other nations are more likely to 
invest, to stand behind our efforts to force Iraq to disarm, be it 
through a new, rigorous, no-nonsense program of inspection, or if 
necessary, through the use of force. That is the best way to proceed.
  The United States, without question, has the military power to enter 
this conflict unilaterally. But we do need friends. We need logistical 
support such as bases, command and control centers, overflight rights 
from allies in the region. And most importantly, we need to be able to 
successfully wage the war on terror simultaneously. That war on terror 
depends more than anything else on the sharing of intelligence. That 
sharing of intelligence depends more than anything else on the 
cooperation of countries in the region. If we disrupt that, we could 
disrupt the possibilities of the capacity of that war to be most 
effectively waged.
  I believe the support from the region will come only if they are 
convinced of the credibility of our arguments and the legitimacy of our 
mission. The United Nations never has veto power over any measure the 
United States needs to take to protect our national security. But it is 
in our interest to try to act with our allies, if at all possible. And 
that should be because the burden of eliminating the threat posed by 
weapons of mass destruction should not be ours alone. It should not be 
the American people's alone.
  If in the end these efforts fail, and if in the end we are at war, we 
will have an obligation, ultimately, to the Iraqi people with whom we 
are not at war. This is a war against a regime, mostly one man. So 
other nations in the region and all of us will need to help create an 
Iraq that is a place and a force for stability and openness in the 
region. That effort is going to be long term, costly, and not without 
difficulty, given Iraq's ethnic and religious divisions and history of 
domestic turbulence. In Afghanistan, the administration has given more 
lipservice than resources to the rebuilding effort. We cannot allow 
that to happen in Iraq, and we must be prepared to stay the course over 
however many years it takes to do it right.
  The challenge is great: An administration which made nation building 
a dirty word needs to develop a comprehensive, Marshall-type plan, if 
it will meet the challenge. The President needs to give the American 
people a fairer and fuller, clearer understanding of the magnitude and 
long-term financial cost of that effort.
  The international community's support will be critical because we 
will not be able to rebuild Iraq singlehandedly. We will lack the 
credibility and the expertise and the capacity.
  It is clear the Senate is about to give the President the authority 
he has requested sometime in the next days. Whether the President will 
have to use that authority depends ultimately on Saddam Hussein. Saddam 
Hussein has a choice: He can continue to defy the international 
community, or he can fulfill his longstanding obligations to disarm. He 
is the person who has brought the world to this brink of confrontation. 
He is the dictator who can end the stalemate simply by following the 
terms of the agreement which left him in power.
  By standing with the President, Congress would demonstrate our Nation 
is united in its determination to take away that arsenal, and we are 
affirming the President's right and responsibility to keep the American 
people safe. One of the lessons I learned from fighting in a very 
different war, at a different time, is we need the consent of the 
American people for our mission to be legitimate and sustainable. I do 
know what it means, as does Senator Hagel, to fight in a war where that 
consent is lost, where allies are in short supply, where conditions are 
hostile, and the mission is ill-defined.
  That is why I believe so strongly before one American soldier steps 
foot on Iraqi soil, the American people must understand completely its 
urgency. They need to know we put our country in the position of 
ultimate strength and that we have no options, short of war, to 
eliminate a threat we could not tolerate.
  I believe the work we have begun in this Senate, by offering 
questions, and not blind acquiescence, has helped put our Nation on a 
responsible course. It has succeeded, certainly, in putting Saddam 
Hussein on notice that he will be held accountable; but it also has put 
the administration on notice we will hold them accountable for the 
means by which we do this.
  It is through constant questioning we will stay the course, and that 
is a course that will ultimately defend our troops and protect our 
national security.
  President Kennedy faced a similar difficult challenge in the days of 
the Cuban missile crisis. He decided not to proceed, I might add, 
preemptively. He decided to show the evidence and proceeded through the 
international institutions. He said at the time:

       The path we have chosen is full of hazards, as all paths 
     are . . . The cost of freedom is always high, but Americans 
     have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and 
     that is the path of surrender, or submission.

  So I believe the Senate will make it clear, and the country will make 
it clear, that we will not be blackmailed or extorted by these weapons, 
and we will not permit the United Nations--an institution we have 
worked hard to nurture and create--to simply be ignored by this 
dictator.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Cantwell). Under the previous order, the 
Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
  Mr. HAGEL. Madam President, the Senate is, by design, a deliberative 
institution. Over this past week, we have witnessed thoughtful debate 
and commentary on how to meet the challenge of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. 
Ours is not an academic exercise; debate informs our decision whether 
to authorize the President to use force if necessary to enforce U.N. 
Security Council resolutions dealing with Iraqi disarmament.
  There are no easy answers in Iraq. The decision to commit our troops 
to war is the most difficult decision Members of Congress make. Each 
course of action we consider in Iraq leads us into imperfect, 
dangerous, and unknown situations. But we cannot avoid decision on 
Iraq. The President cannot avoid decision on Iraq. The risks of 
inaction are too high. We are elected to solve problems, not just 
debate them. The time has come to chart a new course in Iraq and in the 
Middle East.
  History informs our debate and our decisions. We know tyranny cannot 
be appeased. We also know our power and influence are enhanced by both 
a nobility of purpose and the support of allies and institutions that 
reinforce an international commitment to peace and prosperity. We know 
war has its own dynamic, that it favors neither ideology, nor 
democracy, nor tyranny, that men and women die, and that nations and 
individuals who know war are never again the same.
  President Bush has rightly brought the case against Iraq back before 
the United Nations. Our problems with Iraq, as well as terrorism and 
the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are not 
America's alone. Israel, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq's own 
Kurdish population, and other nations and peoples are on the front 
lines of Saddam Hussein's ambitions for weapons of mass death.
  The United Nations, with American leadership, must act decisively to 
end Saddam Hussein's decade-long violations of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions.
  America's best case for the possible use of force against Iraq rests 
with the American and international commitment to enforcing Iraq's 
disarmament. The diplomatic process is not easy, and we face the 
competing interests and demands of Russia, France, China, and others, 
whose interests in Iraq may not always be the same as ours. A regional 
and international coalition is essential for creating the political 
environment that will be required for any action we take in Iraq, and 
especially for how we sustain a democratic transition in a post-Saddam 
Iraq. We cannot do it alone.
  America--including the Congress--and the world, must speak with one

[[Page 19706]]

voice about Iraqi disarmament, as it must continue to do so in the war 
on terrorism.
  Because the stakes are so high, America must be careful with her 
rhetoric and mindful of how others perceive her intentions. Actions in 
Iraq must come in the context of an American-led, multilateral approach 
to disarmament, not as the first case for a new American doctrine 
involving the preemptive use of force. America's challenge in this new 
century will be to strengthen its relationships around the world while 
leading the world in our war on terrorism, for it is the success of the 
first challenge that will determine the success of the second. We 
should not mistake our foreign policy priorities for ideology in a rush 
to proclaim a new doctrine in world affairs. America must understand it 
cannot alone win a war against terrorism. It will require allies, 
friends, and partners.
  American leadership in the world will be further defined by our 
actions in Iraq and the Middle East. What begins in Iraq will not end 
in Iraq. There will be other ``Iraqs.'' There will be continued acts of 
terrorism, proliferating powers, and regional conflicts. If we do it 
right and lead through the U.N., in concert with our allies, we can set 
a new standard for American leadership and international cooperation. 
The perception of American power is power, and how our power is 
perceived can either magnify or diminish our influence in the world. 
The Senate has a constitutional responsibility and an institutional 
obligation in this effort.
  Federalist Paper No. 63 specifically notes the responsibilities of 
the Senate in foreign affairs as follows:

       An attention to the judgment of other nations is important 
     to every government for two reasons: The one is that 
     independently of the merits of any particular plan or 
     measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should 
     appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and 
     honorable policy; the second is that, in doubtful cases, 
     particularly where the national councils may be warped by 
     some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or 
     known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide 
     that can always be followed. What has not America lost by her 
     want of character with foreign nations and how many errors 
     and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and 
     propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been 
     previously tried by the light in which they would probably 
     appear to the unbiased part of mankind?

  Remarkable words. The resolution before us today should be tried in 
that same light as the Federalist Papers points out. The original 
resolution proposed by the Bush administration, S.J. Res. 45, would 
have been a setback for this institution. It did not reflect the best 
democratic traditions of either Congressional-Executive relations, or 
the conduct of American foreign policy.
  S.J. Res. 46, sponsored by Senators Lieberman, Warner, McCain, and 
Bayh, is a far more responsible and accountable document than the one 
we started with 3 weeks ago. I congratulate my colleagues, especially 
Senators Lugar, Biden, and Daschle, and the four sponsors of this 
resolution, for their efforts and leadership in getting it to this 
point.
  S.J. Res. 46 narrows the authorization for the use of force to all 
relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq, and to defending our national 
interests against the threats posed by Iraq. It includes support for 
U.S. diplomatic efforts at the U.N.; a requirement that, before taking 
action, the President formally determines that diplomatic or other 
peaceful means will not be adequate in meeting our objectives; 
reference to the war powers resolution requirements; and periodic 
reports to Congress that include those actions described in the section 
of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 regarding assistance and support for 
Iraq upon replacement of Saddam Hussein. This resolution recognizes 
Congress as a coequal partner in dealing with the threat from Saddam 
Hussein's Iraq.
  If disarmament in Iraq requires the use of force, we need to consider 
carefully the implications and consequences of our actions. The future 
of Iraq after Saddam Hussein is also an open question. Some of my 
colleagues and some American analysts now speak authoritatively of 
Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds in Iraq, and how Iraq can be a test case for 
democracy in the Arab world.
  How many of us really know and understand much about Iraq, the 
country, the history, the people, the role in the Arab world? I 
approach the issue of post-Saddam Iraq and the future of democracy and 
stability in the Middle East with more caution, realism, and a bit more 
humility. While the people of the Arab world need no education from 
America about Saddam's record of deceit, aggression, and brutality, and 
while many of them may respect and desire the freedoms the American 
model offers, imposing democracy through force in Iraq is a roll of the 
dice. A democratic effort cannot be maintained without building durable 
Iraqi political institutions and developing a regional and 
international commitment to Iraq's reconstruction. No small task.
  To succeed, our commitment must extend beyond the day after to the 
months and years after Saddam is gone. The American people must be told 
of this long-term commitment, risk, and costs of this undertaking.
  We should not be seduced by the expectations of ``dancing in the 
streets'' after Saddam's regime has fallen, the kites, the candy, and 
cheering crowds we expect to greet our troops, but instead, focus on 
the great challenges ahead, the commitment and resources that will be 
needed to ensure a democratic transition in Iraq and a more stable and 
peaceful Middle East. We should spend more time debating the 
cost and extent of this commitment, the risks we may face in military 
engagement with Iraq, the implications of the precedent of United 
States military action for regime change, and the likely character and 
challenges of a post-Saddam Iraq. We have heard precious little from 
the President, his team, as well as from this Congress, with a few 
notable exceptions, about these most difficult and critical questions.
  We need only look to Afghanistan where the Afghan people joyously 
welcomed our liberation force but, months later, a fragile transition 
government grapples with rebuilding a fractured political culture, 
economy, and country.
  However, Iraq, because of its resources, geography, capabilities, 
history, and people, offers even more complications and greater peril 
and, yes, greater opportunities and greater promise. This is the vast 
unknown, the heavy burden that lies ahead.
  The Senate should not cast a vote in the hopes of putting Iraq behind 
us so we can get back to our campaigns or move on to other issues next 
year. The decision to possibly commit a nation to war cannot and should 
not ever be considered in the context of either party loyalty or 
campaign politics. I regret that this vote will take place under the 
cloud and pressure of elections next month. Some are already using the 
Iraq issue to gain advantage in political campaigns. It might have been 
better for our vote to have been delayed until after the elections, as 
it was in 1990. Authorizing the use of force against Iraq or any 
country for any purpose should always be weighed on its own merits, not 
with an eye on the politics of the vote or campaign TV spots. War is 
too serious, the human price too high, and the implications unforeseen.
  While I cannot predict the future, I believe that what we decide in 
this Chamber this week will influence America's security and role in 
the world for the coming decades. It will serve as the framework, both 
intentionally and unintentionally, for the future. It will set in 
motion a series of actions and events that we cannot now understand or 
control.
  In authorizing the use of force against Iraq, we are at the beginning 
of a road that has no clear end. The votes in Congress this week are 
votes for an intensification of engagement with Iraq and the Middle 
East, a world of which we know very little and whose destiny will now 
be directly tied to ours.
  America cannot trade a new focus on Iraq for a lesser effort in the 
Israeli-

[[Page 19707]]

Palestinian conflict. The bloodshed between Israel and the Palestinians 
continues, and the danger mounts. Stability in Afghanistan is not 
assured. We must carry through with our commitment. Stability in this 
region depends on it. America's credibility is at stake, and long-term 
stability in central and South Asia hangs in the balance.
  We must also continue to pay close attention to North Korea where 
there is no guesswork about nuclear weapons. There on the Korean 
peninsula reside nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and 37,000 
American troops. Despite setting the right course for disarmament in 
Iraq, the administration has yet to define an end game in Iraq or 
explain the extent of the American commitment if regime change is 
required, or describe how our actions in Iraq might affect our other 
many interests and commitments around the world.
  I share the hope of a better world without Saddam Hussein, but we do 
not really know if our intervention in Iraq will lead to democracy in 
either Iraq or elsewhere in the Arab world. America has continued to 
take on large, complicated, and expensive responsibilities that will 
place heavy burdens on all of us over the next generation. It may well 
be necessary, but Americans should understand the extent of this burden 
and what may be required to pay for it and support it in both American 
blood and trade.
  As the Congress votes on this resolution, we must understand that we 
have not put Iraqi issues behind us. This is just the beginning. The 
risks should not be understated, miscast, or misunderstood. Ours is a 
path of both peril and opportunity with many detours and no shortcuts.
  We in the Congress are men and women of many parts. For me, it is the 
present-day Senator, the former soldier, or concerned father who guides 
my judgment and ultimate vote? It is pieces of all, for I am pieces of 
all. The responsibilities of each lead me to support the Lieberman-
McCain-Warner-Bayh resolution, for which I will vote.
  In the end, each of us who has the high honor of holding public 
office has the burden and privilege of decision and responsibilities. 
It is a sacred trust we share with the public. We will be held 
accountable for our actions, as it must be.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Connecticut is recognized for 20 minutes.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, before he departs the floor, I commend my 
colleague from Nebraska. I regret--it is late in the day, and I am sure 
there is going to be more speechifying tomorrow on this subject 
matter--but I regret there were not more Members present to hear his 
comments.
  Senator Hagel is one of the most thoughtful Members of this body. 
When he talks about the sum of all our parts and talks about being a 
father and a soldier, it is always in our interest to listen to those 
who have worn the military uniform into combat when we debate the 
issues of war and peace because they know more than just intellectually 
and theoretically what the price can be.
  I believe I should give my remarks because I have written these 
things out, but I can associate myself with the comments of my friend 
from Nebraska. He pretty much couches a lot of my thinking on how this 
has evolved, where we are, what we have come to this evening, the pace 
at which we are moving, the regrets I feel about how I wish this debate 
were being conducted under circumstances other than on the eve of an 
election in this country where already the campaign spots are running 
wildly one way or the other in terms of where people are. So I commend 
the Senator for his comments this afternoon on this subject matter.
  I come this afternoon to speak about the subject which is on the 
minds not only of all of us but I think millions of our constituents 
across the country, the possibility of going to war against Iraq.
  On Monday night, President Bush, I think, spoke for all of us. I know 
of no one who really disagrees at all. He described Saddam Hussein as a 
homicidal dictator who is addicted to weapons of mass destruction. It 
is that addiction that demands a strong response. We all agree on that. 
There is no question that Iraq possesses biological and chemical 
weapons and that he seeks to acquire additional weapons of mass 
destruction, including nuclear weapons. That is not in debate. I also 
agree with President Bush that Saddam Hussein is a threat to peace and 
must be disarmed, to quote President Bush directly. I suspect virtually 
every Member of this Chamber would not vary too much with those 
conclusions.
  How imminent that threat is, unfortunately, has been extremely 
difficult to assess. This is because of a troubling new trend by the 
intelligence agencies to not just give us information and objective 
analysis but, in my opinion, too often to insert themselves into 
policymaking. That is not their job. It is not the job of the 
intelligence agencies to make policy. It is their job to provide others 
in the executive branch and the Congress with neutral information, with 
facts on which we will ultimately base our policy judgments.
  This is a very troubling trend, in my view, which I believe ought to 
stop. If we are to go to war, it is even more important that we trust 
the information given by the intelligence agencies.
  Nevertheless, this week we are debating because there are profound 
disagreements over how, when, and with whom we should act to deal with 
the threat posed by Iraq.
  To have a different answer to these questions than the President 
should not be considered unpatriotic or partisan. Unfortunately, that 
is the kind of rhetoric we are hearing too often today.
  Let's be honest. We are less than 30 days out from a national 
congressional election in this country. That is never an easy time for 
the Congress and the executive branch to come together on much of 
anything, let alone the question of war and peace.
  Some in this Chamber have said the eve of an election is in fact the 
best time for Members of Congress to make decisions such as these. I 
could not disagree more. As my good friend and colleague, Senator Byrd, 
has passionately reminded us every day this week, forcing a vote on 
this issue so close to an election will, whether we like it or not, 
embroil the issue in politics more than usual.
  The campaign ads running across this country speak for themselves. 
Forcing Congress's hand on this important matter does a disservice, I 
believe, to the American public and to this most profound and serious 
debate. But now we have no choice but to consider the matter and to 
vote on the issues of this utmost gravity, the issues of war and peace 
and of life and death, for those who will engage in it.
  The President has asked Congress to grant him the authority to use 
force against Iraq, if he deems it necessary, and Congress will provide 
the President with the authority to respond effectively to the threat 
posed by Iraq. But we will do so only after careful consideration of 
all of the stakes involved.
  My colleagues, Senator Byrd, Senator Kennedy, Senator Levin, and 
others, have done an outstanding job of highlighting their questions 
and concerns, reflecting the questions and concerns raised by millions 
of Americans across political and economic lines, across geographic 
lines in this country; questions and concerns regarding the use of 
force and the resolution the President originally sent to Congress, a 
number of these concerns which I think many of us share.
  Many of us believe the language of the President's original request 
was too far reaching, empowering the President to use all means 
necessary that he would determine appropriate, including force, to 
restore peace and stability to the region. That was an open invitation 
for an American military involvement in the broad context of the Middle 
East. And the language was far too unilateral. It did not even mention 
a role for the United Nations or our allies.
  Thanks to the efforts of our congressional leaders--and I commend 
specifically Senator Daschle and others--we

[[Page 19708]]

now have a compromise resolution, a modified resolution, correcting 
many of the evident flaws in the initial resolution that was sent to 
us.
  The resolution now before us is limited to Iraq, and it contemplates 
the possibility of resolving this threat peacefully through the use of 
diplomacy. It also acknowledges the importance of maintaining our focus 
on our continuing war on terrorism as we consider what action to take 
in Iraq.
  Despite these changes, of course, questions do remain. First and 
foremost, will the President use the authority granted by Congress to 
go it alone? Or will he take the time to build the international 
coalition that the overwhelming majority of Americans believe is the 
better course of action to follow?
  If he chooses to go it alone, I believe that will be a terrible 
mistake, and I think millions of others in this country do as well. 
Given the geography and the politics of the region in the Middle East, 
I do not see how the United States could engage Iraq militarily, 
without the help of others, without seriously undermining our chances 
of success. And it would be terribly destabilizing to the entire 
region.
  There are many reasons for acting with international support.
  I have already commended the President for his decision to look first 
to the United Nations to answer these questions. On September 12, 
speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush 
enumerated Iraq's repeated failures to meet its international 
obligations.
  The U.N. has been a valued body for the last one-half of the 20th 
century. It has not always done what we wanted. It has not always acted 
deliberately. It has not always acted with the kind of force and 
direction that many of us wish it would have. But think what the world 
would have looked like over the last 50 years had there not been a 
United Nations to have a forum where the world gathers to try to 
resolve the many conflicts that confront us.
  It has not served our interests well to have national leadership 
ridicule this institution. We are the founders, in many ways, of the 
U.N. system. It was the great leaders in the post-World War II period 
who insisted we try to frame an international body where we might 
resolve disputes other than going through what we did throughout World 
War II. My hope would be that as dark as these clouds may seem as we 
debate and consider the issue of Iraq, that this may be an opportunity 
for the institution of the United Nations to mature into the 21st 
century role it must if we are going to succeed in the efforts against 
terrorism, the efforts against Iraq or other problems that will emerge, 
without any question, in the coming years.
  My hope will be that this U.N. will look at what we are doing, listen 
to what we are saying as one nation, and consider how important its 
role must be in the coming weeks and months. If there ever were a set 
of circumstances that justified U.N. action, I believe it is now on 
Iraq, without any question.
  If the framework of international law, developed at the U.N. over the 
last 50 years to protect peace and security, is to stand, then the U.N. 
must act with leadership. It is my sincere hope that the President has 
the patience and staying power to make the U.N. work in support of our 
interests.
  There is also no question that the President's speech, in which he 
called for a more engaged U.N., got Saddam Hussein's attention. Iraq 
quickly announced its willingness to permit weapons inspections 
beginning as early as the middle of October.
  At the end of the day, I suspect Iraq will accept whatever terms are 
ultimately contained in a final version of the U.N. resolution now 
under consideration. To be credible, however, that resolution must have 
teeth. It must be enforceable, by military means, if necessary, should 
Iraq fail to comply with any new disarmament regime.
  I also have questions about the ultimate goal of U.S. strategy, what 
it is and what it ought to be. Is it the destruction of Iraqi weapons 
of mass destruction or the Iraqi regime itself? Secretary of State 
Colin Powell was definitive before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in saying--and I quote him--regime change for its own sake 
was not the administration's goal.
  Specifically, he stated:

       If Iraq was to disarm as a result of an inspection regime 
     that gave us and the Security Council confidence that it had 
     been disarmed, I think it unlikely that we would find a casus 
     belli.

  Many Members are still very concerned that President Bush has regime 
change on his mind. If anything, Monday night's speech clarified this 
position when he said that ``regime change in Iraq is the only certain 
means of removing a great danger to our Nation.''
  I hope the President will heed the advice of his Secretary of State 
and keep our eye on the ball. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction should 
be our immediate threat or seen as our immediate threat, not some two-
bit dictator that Saddam Hussein is. It is the weapons of mass 
destruction; but for those we would not be here debating or discussing 
the matter we are this evening.
  Finally, I still have concerns about how the President intends to 
manage the war on terrorism if we confront Iraq militarily. September 
11 revealed Saddam Hussein is not the only or perhaps even the greatest 
threat to our national security. Those who hold no allegiance to any 
state, who have no name or return address, are a far greater threat to 
America and the American way of life. As recent arrests in Buffalo, NY, 
and Portland, OR, remind us, these threats are not always in some 
distant land. The United States acting without global support could 
divert our military intelligence assets away from our global effort to 
combat terrorism and to uproot terrorist organizations. It could also 
weaken the multilateral coalition forged over the last 12 months to 
combat this international scourge.
  I state for the record I do not hold some ironclad view that the 
United States should never use force or act alone. And I believe that 
the President of the United States already has the authority as 
Commander in Chief to deploy military force to protect America against 
all imminent threats. The pending resolution recognizes this reality. 
The fact is, unless force is a real option, our resolution will not 
have the credibility needed to, once and for all, get Saddam Hussein's 
full attention on this matter.
  As I said earlier, I accept the proposition that we must deal with 
the Iraqi threat. I stand prepared, as almost all of our colleagues do, 
to support the unilateral use of force against Iraq but only if U.N. or 
other multinational efforts prove ineffective, or if Saddam Hussein is 
using them as a guise to rebuild his offensive weapons capabilities.
  We still have time to do this right.
  Mr. WARNER. At the appropriate time, could I pose a question on the 
United Nations to my colleague?
  Mr. DODD. After I complete my remarks.
  We still have time to do this right. We should have an opportunity to 
debate and vote on all meaningful alternatives to the pending 
resolution, regardless of parliamentary technicalities. For that 
reason, I join with my colleague, Senator Byrd, in opposing cloture 
when we vote on this issue tomorrow. I am not persuaded that the 
situation is so dire that a few more days or an additional week of 
deliberations at the U.N. will be harmful to our interests.
  I have been in this body 22 years. The unique role of the Senate is 
the role of debate, unlimited debate. It is what makes us fundamentally 
different from the Chamber down the hall. If there are Members of this 
body who wish to be heard and wish to offer meaningful ideas to 
something as critical as this, then asking this body to take a few more 
days to weigh and discuss those matters ought not to be denied. We are 
invoking cloture too often. I know people are interested in efficiency, 
but if efficiency was the only goal of the Founding Fathers, they never 
would have created this body to begin with. They understood the 
importance of debate and discussion when a matter of this magnitude and 
this significance is before the American public.

[[Page 19709]]

  I don't know how many others intend to support my colleague from West 
Virginia, but I do, not because I necessarily agree with him in his 
final conclusion, but I stand to defend his right to be heard and to 
see to it that he has the opportunity to exhaust his ideas, to share 
them not only with Senators but with the American people. I hope 
cloture will not necessarily be invoked prematurely.
  Our own CIA Director states the likelihood of Iraq using weapons of 
mass destruction against the United States or passing them off to 
terrorists to do so is currently long. The real risk emerges should 
Saddam Hussein believe an attack by the United States is imminent. That 
is according to press accounts today.
  I hope the President does not see the passage of a resolution in the 
Congress as a termination state for his efforts at the United Nations 
but rather as a sign of unity and support of continued effort by the 
United States to elicit further action by the United Nations.
  Senators Biden, Lugar, Senator Hagel and others crafted an approach 
to this issue that I found extremely constructive. I regret the 
administration did not endorse their ideas. This week's debate would be 
far less contentious had they done so. Their idea was, of course, to 
focus on the weapons of mass destruction, a multilateral force, 
unilateral action if the U.N. efforts or multilateral efforts failed 
and serious thoughts about what you do to win the peace after the 
conflict is over. That idea will not be offered as an alternative. I 
regret that is the case. It is an idea that I found potentially rather 
attractive.
  Some very important elements of the Biden-Lugar draft resolution have 
been incorporated in the White House compromise language. I commend the 
White House, those that have been involved in crafting this resolution 
for including this language.
  First in this resolution there is an acknowledgment of U.S. efforts 
within the United Nations Security Council to forge international 
agreement on a prompt and decisive strategy to compel Iraqi compliance 
and the explicit congressional endorsement of such evidence.
  Second, the requirement that the President make several important 
determinations before exercising any military option; namely, ``that 
further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone will not adequately 
protect the national security of the United States.'' And that our 
efforts to fight international terrorism will not be undermined by 
military action against Iraq. Those determinations are going to be 
extremely important.
  Third, and most importantly, the narrowing of the President's 
authority to use force to specifically defend the national security of 
the United States against a threat posed by Iraq's possession of 
weapons of mass destruction. As I noted earlier, Secretary Colin Powell 
made it clear in testimony before the Senate and in remarks elsewhere, 
that it is Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that is the threat to our 
national security. If Iraq disarms or is disarmed, then the immediate 
threat to our security would evaporate and force would not be 
necessary. The benefits of that outcome should be obvious to all.
  Finally, the new language recognizes the need to have in place an 
effective exit strategy should military force prove unavoidable. These 
changes in the original text of the resolution are extremely important. 
Without them, I would not be able to consider support of this 
legislation.
  Let me sum up where this Senator stands on this. I support Senator 
Byrd's motion because more time is needed. It is not a burden on this 
body to consider questions and to listen to Members. We should not be 
cut off in debate in being heard on a matter of this importance and 
significance. I regret Senators Biden and Lugar and others have not 
moved forward with their proposal. It was the most comprehensive 
approach, in my view, to dealing with the questions of weapons of mass 
destruction, U.N. involvement in the aftermath of the conflict.
  Third, I think every effort ought to be made to resolve this threat 
as peacefully as possible.
  Fourth, that if military force becomes necessary, every effort must 
be made to do it multilaterally either through the U.N. or multilateral 
coalitions.
  Fifth, I believe the more immediate threat is international 
terrorism, and that such a threat can only be contained through 
collective action.
  Sixth, if we must act unilaterally, then the threat must be clear, 
grave, and imminent.
  Last, in cases of preemptive action, we must be even more sure the 
threat is immediate and grave for the obvious reasons of setting 
precedent that other nations may model in conflicts that threaten 
everyone around the globe.
  The context within which I deliberated over the difficult decision on 
how I would vote on this imperfect resolution has been hard, always 
being mindful of the dangers that could result from granting authority 
contained in this resolution. Ultimately, my main reason for supporting 
the resolution is that I believe the chances of avoiding war with Iraq 
are enhanced substantially if this country is united as a nation.
  I know members of the United Nations Security Council are listening 
to this debate very intently and are going to watch this vote very 
carefully. American unity will strengthen, I believe, the President's 
hand in convincing members of the Security Council that the civilized 
world must act and must unite in its action.
  Today, in joining with many of my colleagues in support of this 
resolution, I do so in the fervent hope that this show of unity in 
authorizing the President to use force will reduce the likelihood that 
force will ultimately be necessary.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Nebraska). The Senator from 
Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I see the distinguished assistant leader. 
I apologize to the Chair. I understand he has a unanimous consent 
request.
  Mr. REID. Yes. Thank you. I know the Senator from Kansas is to be 
recognized next.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the statement 
of the Senator from Kansas, Mr. Roberts, that Senator Dayton be 
recognized for 15 minutes; following that, Senator Frist be recognized 
for 15 minutes; following Senator Frist, Senator Domenici be recognized 
for 20 minutes; and, following that, Senator Levin be recognized for 30 
minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there is no objection.
  While the leader is in the Chamber--I had the opportunity to speak 
with the leader just a minute ago--the pending amendment is by the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd. I hope, in order to 
keep the momentum going on this bill, that we can move forward towards 
debate on that amendment and its terms such that, should there be those 
on our side who wish to table or otherwise move along--we have 13 
amendments here, and a number of them have been determined by the 
Parliamentarian to be germane. Given cloture tomorrow, of which the 
assistant leader is familiar, I am just suggesting strongly that the 
Byrd amendment be the pending amendment.
  Is there a possibility in the assistant leader's mind that we might 
address that amendment tonight by way of a vote?
  Mr. REID. I will be speaking to Senator Byrd momentarily.
  I also say--to make sure everyone understands--that the majority 
leader, after the last vote, announced that we are going to finish this 
legislation tomorrow. Tomorrow takes us into Friday morning. But he has 
indicated we are going to finish this. There is a lot of work to do. 
But it can be done--it will be done. There is no question but that we 
are going to do it. If any Senators are waiting around until next week 
to give their speech, there will be no next week.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it is obvious to the leader, but the 
amendments, I respectfully say, are on his side of the aisle. 
Therefore, his assistance is vital in helping us move these

[[Page 19710]]

amendments along so that they can be given a proper amount of 
consideration, and before they are acted upon by a vote, for those that 
require a vote.
  Mr. REID. The reason we have two Republicans is in order to balance 
out the time. The Senator from Massachusetts spoke for longer than 
others have spoken.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Nevada, the 
assistant leader, has been eminently fair in working with Senator 
McCain and myself in the management of this, as well as Senator 
Lieberman who also has taken quite an active role in the management. I 
think we have had a good debate. The pending amendment laid down by the 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia is a matter that I think 
should be addressed as early as we can possibly arrange, and possibly 
dispose of it tonight, one way or the other, so that we can move on 
with this volume of some 13 amendments, many of which are germane.
  Mr. REID. I will speak to Senator Byrd. Senator Lieberman has an 
amendment on which he has talked for about a week or more. We will have 
to get consent to set Senator Byrd's amendment aside, or dispose of 
Senator Byrd's amendment prior to that time.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will work in consultation with 
leadership on that side.
  Does the Senator think there is an option by which Senator Levin's 
amendment can be disposed of?
  Mr. REID. Yes. He follows Senator Domenici.
  Mr. WARNER. Just a rough calculation--would that be at approximately 
8 o'clock?
  Mr. REID. No. That will be approximately an hour from now, or an hour 
and twenty minutes from now. It would be about a quarter to 7.
  Mr. WARNER. Give or take an hour here or there. Nevertheless, what 
the leader is indicating is that there is a possibility that amendment 
could be acted upon tonight by vote.
  Mr. REID. Senator Levin has indicated he would like to dispose of 
that tonight.
  Mr. WARNER. Once again, I think Senator Levin has several amendments. 
Do we know which one that might be in this batch of 13?
  Mr. REID. It is the amendment he has spoken about for several days. I 
don't know how to identify it more than that. But it is the 
alternative--I think is a good way to put it--to the Lieberman 
amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. Perhaps Senator Levin, through his staff or others, 
could indicate at the earliest possible time which of the several 
amendments it is so we can be prepared to reciprocate in an active 
debate and perhaps reach a conclusion.
  Mr. President, I was going to direct a question to my colleague from 
Connecticut.
  Mr. REID. Was the unanimous consent request agreed to?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the previous unanimous 
consent request is agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the leader for his assistance.
  My respect for my colleague from Connecticut is predicated on many--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair reminds the distinguished Senator 
from Virginia that Senator Roberts is to speak next.
  Mr. WARNER. That is right. We are trying to encourage some colloquy 
and questioning. I will not take a long time.
  Mr. DODD. I will be brief in my answer.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator. That will be a salutary moment. We 
will get quickly to it.
  I read to my friend a quote by President John F. Kennedy in 
connection with the Cuban missile crisis of 1962:

       This Nation is prepared to present its case against the 
     Soviet threat to peace and our own proposal for a peaceful 
     world, at any time, in any forum, in the Organization of 
     American States, in the United Nations, or in any other 
     meeting that could be useful without limiting our freedom of 
     action.

  In looking at the amendments, certainly one of them proposed by the 
distinguished Senator from Michigan says very clearly that 
authorization for the use of armed forces is predicated on action by 
the United Nations. To me, that contravenes what President Kennedy laid 
down as a form of this.
  Does the Senator think there is any basis for subordinating the right 
of our President to use the Armed Forces, if he deems it necessary, to 
action by the United Nations?
  Mr. DODD. I do not know if my colleague was listening to my remarks.
  Mr. WARNER. I listened very carefully.
  Mr. DODD. I made the point. Certainly my point is that we should try 
to resolve this matter without conflict, if possible.
  There was some confusion about that, when I listened to the Secretary 
of State and the President, as to whether it is regime change or 
weapons of mass destruction. There is a lot of confusion in the 
American public about that as well.
  Let us assume they are going to come together and try to resolve that 
without any conflict. It ought to be done. I think the President's 
father did it well and right back in 1991 with a coalition. It worked 
better than imagined. It certainly set a precedent for how we are going 
to deal or should deal with matters in the future.
  I have said the reason I am supporting the resolution is that I 
believe it will strengthen our hand at the United Nations to get them 
to act with some assertiveness. But I also have said, at the end of the 
day, if the security interests of the United States are in jeopardy and 
there is nothing else to be done in the United Nations, or if other 
coalitions would not support us, we will never leave the security of 
this country, this Nation, vulnerable and solely dependent upon the 
willingness of the international organizations to support us.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank my colleague. I share that view. I say to my good 
friend that acting on it now and not further delaying, with this 
Chamber and that of the House of Representatives, hopefully, acting on 
identical language, can in a strong voice say to the United Nations 
that we stand foursquare behind our President in his remarks and his 
request that the United Nations take strong action.
  Mr. DODD. Let me respond very quickly on that.
  I understand the management of bills here. I spent 9 days on election 
reform with 46 amendments; 100 were offered. I think election reform is 
a pretty important issue. But I don't think it is more important than 
the issue we are discussing today.
  My point simply was to say, on matters such as this, that the role of 
the Senate is so critically important and the Founders intended it to 
be such that if Members of this body, elected to this body, feel 
strongly and passionately about being heard on this matter and have 
ideas they wish to contribute to the debate, we ought to be most 
reluctant to deprive a Member of this body of the opportunity to be 
heard.
  I understand the significance of moving quickly. But it is dangerous 
indeed on a matter of this gravity to curtail debate to merely try to 
get a resolution adopted quickly. I want to hear what my colleagues 
have to say. I know we are going to come to a conclusion on this fairly 
quickly. But to cut off debate prematurely I think would be a mistake.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I share that sentiment. But I remind my 
colleague, this Senator was privileged to be on the floor last Friday 
for 5 hours. You were present. You recall that debate. Senator Kennedy 
was present. And Senator Byrd was most active. And again there was 
debate another 5 or 6 hours on Monday and Tuesday. So there has been 
adequate opportunity. And there remains opportunity for Senators to be 
heard. I hope we do not cut off any Senator from the opportunity to 
speak to this important matter.
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor. I know another Senator is 
about to speak.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their very 
learned colloquy to make sure all Senators have an opportunity to speak 
on this extremely important issue.

[[Page 19711]]

  As we debate whether to authorize the President, basically, to use 
military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power and to neutralize 
his emerging weapons of mass destruction capability, I would like to 
offer several observations.
  The first is that the United Nations, as an institution, has 
completely and unequivocally failed to disarm Iraq consistent with its 
own resolutions--the resolutions agreed to also by Saddam Hussein--
following the Persian Gulf war of 1991. The key word here is to 
``disarm.''
  During debate on this very crucial issue, I think we have 
concentrated too much on the concept of ``inspections'' and the 
possibility of trying to really somehow initiate a new inspections 
regime. As a matter of fact, if you read all of the newspaper accounts 
on this issue, and if you pay attention to the television, the radio, 
and the debate, it seems to me ``inspections'' becomes the key word. I 
don't think that is the case. The key issue is not inspections. The key 
issue is disarmament.
  Again, both Iraq, under the heavy hand of Saddam Hussein, and the 
United Nations, have failed in the agreed-upon mandate to follow or 
take action consistent with resolutions following the Persian Gulf war 
over a decade ago. And we are talking about actual, transparent, real--
real--disarmament.
  The second observation I would like to make is that one of the 
crucial reasons both Houses of Congress should support the Warner and 
the Lieberman resolution, on behalf of the President, as opposed to, I 
guess, 13 amendments we are going to be considering--and I do not 
challenge or wish to impugn any intent on the part of any Member who 
has an amendment on this important issue--but basically one of the 
crucial reasons we should really do our business and support this 
resolution is that it will, I think, strengthen the hand of Secretary 
of State Powell--he told that to us as of this week, both sides of the 
body--in his efforts to convince the U.N. Security Council to adopt new 
resolutions, resolutions whose goal would be to produce tangible--
again, not inspections--but inspections that would lead to disarmament. 
There is always that hope, and, obviously, that would be the preferred 
outcome as opposed to military action.
  So it seems to me that is the goal of the resolution we are now 
considering.
  In that regard, let me stress that we should act prior--prior--to the 
U.N. deliberations. We should act first. We should act in concert. To 
tie the hands of this President, or any future President with regard to 
matters of vital national security interests where war or peace hang in 
the balance, to subject him to U.N. approval or action, will constrain 
the freedom of action on the part of the United States by the very 
countries that are now responsible for a decade of U.N.--U.N.--inaction 
and almost irrelevance.
  Let us be realistic. Let us be realistic. Saddam Hussein has 
demonstrated ad nauseam over the last 10 years that he will never 
permit the removal or destruction of his weapons of mass destruction 
capability. Here is my personal view on this. He cannot, and he will 
not. Now, why?
  They are the very source of his authority in Iraq as well as the 
Persian Gulf. All of his ambitions--I perceive that he perceives 
himself as perhaps the heir apparent or maybe even the reincarnation of 
King Nebbuchadnezzar, Pan-Arabia. He has demonstrated a willingness to 
use weapons of mass destruction both against his own countrymen and 
against other nations. He is a student and protege and follows the 
example of Stalin. And he rules by fear.
  So wishful thinking aside--and I have wishful thinking--but wishful 
thinking aside, I do not believe he is ever going to give up and 
disarm--ever.
  Third, any notion that the United States itself is off limits to a 
massive attack by groups that are cooperating with or supported by 
Baghdad should now be gone. It is called sanctuary for further 
terrorist attacks against our homeland. We are not off limits. We are 
now terrorist targets, as proved by 9/11 and previous attacks.
  Fourth, any notion that we have time left to coast along as 
governments in Iraq, Iran, or elsewhere continue to pursue their 
weapons of mass destruction programs with the possibility, if not 
intent, to distribute these technologies to fundamentalist terrorist 
cells should be gone as well.
  I know, while ``hard evidence'' of an Iraqi role in the attacks of 9/
11 may be hard to prove--the so-called smoking gun--I do not think we 
can afford to be naive. Particularly in the Middle East, terror groups 
and states work together when and where their interests are common. And 
their intent is the destruction of the United States, the murder of our 
citizens, and the elimination of our influence, real and perceived.
  Just yesterday, in the continuing investigation of the September 11 
attack, in an unclassified--let me stress, unclassified--and public 
hearing, I asked the panel of witnesses--the expert witnesses--what, 
after 9/11, still kept them up at night. And I asked them what policy 
drum they could or would beat to bring about a change in policy to 
safeguard our own country.
  The answer was to take away the terrorists' sanctuary; that we 
mistakenly think that if we can only bring bin Laden to justice, render 
the al-Qaida harmless, then we can somehow go back to business as 
usual.
  That simply is not the case. I think an error is being made in the 
debate on this most important topic when we say, now, on one hand, if 
we do not take action in regard to Iraq we can then continue the war 
against terrorism. The action against Iraq is to prevent further 
sanctuary for terrorism. It is inseparable.
  The stark fact of the matter is that danger of another terrorist 
attack on this country is still not a matter of if, it is a matter of 
when. The distinguished then-chairman of the Armed Services Committee, 
Senator Warner, remembers full well creating a subcommittee called the 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats. Three years ago we predicted this 
would happen, citing past attacks. It is not a matter of if, but when. 
That condition still exists today. It is transnational in terms of the 
threat. It involves many terrorist organizations and cells. And, yes, 
it is ongoing.
  Yesterday, under the heading of lessons learned from past terrorist 
attacks, the Intelligence Committee once again heard from experts 
citing a common thread of transnational, interconnected terrorism. At 
our peril, difficult connect-the-dots intelligence analyses did not 
meet the threshold of a threat warning and were ignored. We were risk 
averse. The terrorists who conducted past attacks attacked again. There 
were warnings. They were not heeded. They did not meet the criterion of 
a threshold of a threat warning, and we suffered the consequences. They 
attacked at the 1993 World Trade Center, Khobar Towers, our embassies, 
the thwarted--thank goodness--attack in regard to the Millennium, and, 
finally, the U.S.S. Cole. The attacks are a microcosm of the challenge 
we face.
  If Iraq and, indeed, other regimes are left unchallenged, my 
colleagues, it is only a matter of time before they transfer the 
capability for weapons of mass destruction to a terrorist cell that 
will use that capability against the United States.
  Now, remember, the criminal justice model of gathering evidence and 
presenting a case does not apply here. By the time you have evidence, 
it is too late. We will not lose buildings and thousands of people when 
that happens. We will lose whole cities and hundreds of thousands of 
people.
  Iraq is absolutely a component in the war against terrorism. Let me 
try to make that point. In light of the events of September 11, 2001, I 
believe this body has more reason to support action against Iraq than 
it had in the winter of 1991. That is a pretty strong statement. 
Because preventing weapons of mass destruction from being acquired by 
terrorist cells should be the No. 1 policy priority of this Federal 
Government. This means neutralizing regimes that possess or seek such 
weapons and are predisposed to harboring, assisting, sympathizing with 
the bin Ladens of the world. That is a real priority for us.

[[Page 19712]]

  Yes, there is more than one fundamentalist maniac with a significant 
and diverse following.
  I support the resolution endorsed by the White House and sponsored by 
Senators Lieberman and Warner because I think our President realizes--
most Senators realize--what leaders like Abraham Lincoln and Harry 
Truman realized: No matter what the short-term consequences would be in 
regards to politics, American survival must be assured. It is a first 
priority. It is our highest agenda.
  There is reasonable concern about downside risk. You bet there is. I 
have those concerns. I share those concerns. I have been listening to 
these concerns during the debate on this subject. We have had several 
days of very good debate. The President and his national security team 
know that. All Members of the House and Senate and all thinking 
Americans know that. Yes, there is real concern.
  I am a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. I have asked question after question after 
question in the ``what if'' category. What if Saddam Hussein uses his 
weapons of mass destruction--of course, that means he has reconstituted 
his weapons of mass destruction capability, posing an ever-increasing 
threat--what if he uses those reconstituted weapons of mass destruction 
against our troops, against Gulf State partners that will support us, 
against Israel, or against his own people? He has done that before. 
Will Israel, if attacked, simply remain on the sidelines? Will we see 
prolonged combat? Will there be a violent upheaval in the Mideast, in 
the Arab nations?
  What happens if we win? There has been a lot of discussion about 
that. How long will we have to stay? What kind of infrastructure 
improvements will we have to pay for if, in fact, that is the case? 
What do we win? How do you win a war against a tyrant who may well 
destroy his own country and kill his own people, blame us, or who would 
launch or sponsor a terrorist attack in the United States as a result 
of our involvement, all in the name of self-preservation?
  Those are tough questions. Those are very real concerns. The 
distinguished Senator from West Virginia indicated we need more time to 
answer these concerns. How many casualties if, in fact, we go into 
military action against Iraq? Mrs. Boxer, the distinguished Senator 
from California, asked the question, how much will it cost? Maybe it 
was reversed. Maybe Senator Byrd asked that question, and Senator Boxer 
asked about casualties. What about military tactics? I must say that is 
probably the last thing I hope the Pentagon would share with the 
Congress, for obvious reasons. What about the sacrifices in regards to 
the American people? How much will it cost?
  All of these concerns and all of these dangers are real. But, my 
colleagues, there are no specific and easy answers to these questions. 
As much as we would like otherwise, the intelligence community and the 
President and the administration, our military cannot provide absolute, 
specific answers. They can try to be specific, but absolute answers? I 
am sorry. They do provide estimates, based upon the best collection and 
analysis that is possible.
  This debate and the issues at hand demand candor. President Bush has 
been candid. As the President said, the hope is we don't have to take 
military action. But if that becomes necessary, it will be difficult. 
Time after time in history, and in repeated testimony from those within 
our intelligence community, we see the greatest risk is to do nothing. 
We are not free unless we are free from fear. Americans have known 
fear--be it during the Cuban missile crisis or in the aftermath of 
Pearl Harbor or the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. We 
must not, however, accept fear as our destiny. We must be proactive in 
regards to national security.
  We must be preemptive. Yes, preemptive, that new doctrine that is 
causing a rethink of our foreign policy, our military strategy, our 
politics, our foreign relations. It is a brand new world. It is an 
asymmetrical world. It is a world that was written about by Samuel P. 
Huntington when he wrote the book ``The Clash of Civilizations and the 
Remaking of the World Order,'' the preemption doctrine. Here we are and 
we are debating it.
  Make no mistake, this has nothing to do with partisan rivalry. This 
is about our future, both immediate and long term. This is the state of 
affairs we leave for our children and our grandchildren.
  Senator Warner just made a statement on the floor I am going to quote 
again, almost 40 years ago to this date, when President John F. Kennedy 
addressed the Nation in regard to the Cuban missile crisis. He said:

       This nation is prepared to present its case against the 
     Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful 
     world, at any time and in any forum--in the Organization of 
     American States, in the United Nations, or in any other 
     meeting that could be useful--

  Here is the key phrase:

       . . . without limiting our freedom of action.

  In that regard, I hope we follow President Kennedy's advice. I urge 
my colleagues to support the resolution introduced by Senators Warner 
and Lieberman and to oppose the various 13 amendments that would weaken 
the resolution and our resolve.
  I ask unanimous consent that an article entitled ``A Chronology of 
Defiance'' by Michael Kelly; an article called ``The Myth of U.N. 
Support'' by Charles Krauthammer; and an article, ``The Weight of 
American Empire,'' which talks in detail about the new policy of 
preemption, by John Keegan, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Sept. 18, 2002]

                        A Chronology of Defiance

                           (By Michael Kelly)

       ``U.N. Inspectors Can Return Unconditionally, Iraq Says,'' 
     the headline reads. This, to put it mildly, and in the words 
     of an old and apt phrase, shall not stand.
       Consider the following darkly comic tale, mostly taken from 
     the Congressional Research Service:
       On March 3, 1991, the coalition forces of the Persian Gulf 
     War signed the Safwan accords, ending hostilities in the 
     insane conflict Iraq had forced. On April 3, the United 
     Nations passed Security Council Resolution 687 requiring Iraq 
     to end its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs, recognize 
     Kuwait, account for missing Kuwaitis, return Kuwaiti property 
     and end support for international terrorism. Iraq immediately 
     began a decade-long pattern of defiance, alternating with 
     stalling, tactical capitulation and more defiance. This was 
     particularly so concerning what remains the central issue: 
     the demand that it destroy its weapons of mass destruction 
     and stop developing new ones.
       To enforce and conduct inspections, the United Nations 
     created a special commission, UNSCOM, which went to work in 
     April 1991. Almost immediately, Iraq began impeding the 
     inspections. The United Nations responded by passing its 
     first resolution-to-enforce-the-resolution, Resolution 707, 
     on Aug. 15, which ordered Iraq to comply with unfettered 
     inspections of all sites and to make full disclosure of all 
     of its suppliers to its program for weapons of mass 
     destruction. On Oct. 11, the United Nations also passed 
     Resolution 715, which established a long-term monitoring 
     program.
       Some success ensued, but Iraq resumed impeding inspections 
     in March 1996. The Security Council responded with Resolution 
     1060, on June 12, 1996, demanding, again, Iraqi cooperation, 
     which was not forthcoming. So, on June 21, 1997, the august 
     body duly passed Resolution 1115, which threatened 
     noncooperating Iraqi government officials with travel 
     restrictions. This was followed on Oct. 23, 1997, by 
     Resolution 1134, which threatened travel restrictions--
     again--and which banned consideration of lifting the U.N. 
     sanctions against Iraq until April 1998.
       On Oct. 29, Iraq barred American inspectors assigned to 
     UNSCOM from conducting any inspections. So, on Nov. 12, 1997, 
     the United Nations went right darned ahead and imposed those 
     mean old travel restrictions. The next day, Iraq expelled all 
     the American inspectors. The U.S. House of Representatives 
     passed a resolution authorizing the use of unilateral U.S. 
     military action if necessary. But the measure died in the 
     Senate, of inattention.
       In November 1997, Russia brokered a compromise that allowed 
     UNSCOM to resume some temporary and sharply limited 
     inspections. In February 1998, U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
     Annan put together a second compromise, by which Iraq agreed 
     to allow inspections with the proviso that it be allowed to 
     protect ``presidential sites'' from undue indignity. Iraq 
     designated eight large tracts of land (containing more than 
     1,000 buildings) as ``presidential sites.'' Inspectors

[[Page 19713]]

     could visit these sites only after announcing the visit in 
     advance and informing the Iraqis of the composition of the 
     visiting team--nuclear, chemical or biological inspectors. In 
     appreciation of this joke, the Clinton administration 
     supported lifting the travel ban on Iraq and resuming 
     sanction reviews.
       In August 1998, Iraq barred UNSCOM from inspecting any new 
     facilities. The Senate and House passed a resolution, signed 
     on Aug. 14, declaring Iraq to be in ``material breach'' of 
     the cease-fire. On Sept. 9, the Security Council adopted 
     Resolution 1194, suspending sanction reviews. On Oct. 30, the 
     council offered Iraq yet another chance to have the sanctions 
     lifted if it complied with inspections, but Iraq spurned the 
     offer and announced the cessation of all cooperation with 
     UNSCOM. A very angry Security Council passed the very fierce 
     Resolution 1205, which called Iraq's action a ``flagrant 
     violation'' of the February 1998 agreement. A very, very 
     angry President Clinton very, very fiercely threatened 
     airstrikes. On Nov. 14, Iraq agreed to cooperate. President 
     Clinton promptly canceled the airstrikes.
       On Dec. 15, 1998, UNSCOM announced that Iraq had refused to 
     hand over key weapons-program documents and was, again, 
     impeding inspections. UNSCOM inspectors withdrew from the 
     country and the United States and Britain bombed Iraqi 
     military and security targets for several days. UNSCOM never 
     went back into Iraq. On Dec. 17, 1999, the Security Council 
     passed Resolution 1284 establishing a new inspection body, 
     UNMOVIC, and offering Iraq the suspension of most sanctions 
     in exchange for a resumption of inspections. In February 
     2001, Iraq entered into talks with the U.N. secretary general 
     on this basis, ``but the talks made little progress.''
       I'd say the current Iraqi offer can be dispensed with, oh, 
     now.
                                  ____


                [From the Washington Post, Oct. 4, 2002]

                        The Myth of U.N. Support

                        (By Charles Krauthammer)

       ``This nation is prepared to present its case against the 
     Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful 
     world, at any time and in any forum--in the Organization of 
     American States, in the United Nations, or in any other 
     meeting that could be useful--without limiting our freedom of 
     action.''--President John F. Kennedy, Cuban missile crisis, 
     address to the nation, Oct. 22, 1962
       ``I'm waiting for the final recommendation of the Security 
     Council before I'm going to say how I'm going to vote.''--
     Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Iraq crisis, address to the Johns 
     Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Sept. 27, 
     2002
       How far the Democrats have come. Forty years ago to the 
     month, President Kennedy asserts his willingness to present 
     his case to the United Nations, but also his determination 
     not to allow the United Nations to constrain America's 
     freedom of action. Today his brother, a leader of the same 
     party, awaits the guidance of the United Nations before he 
     will declare himself on how America should respond to another 
     nation threatening the United States with weapons of mass 
     destruction.
       Ted Kennedy is not alone. Much of the leadership of the 
     Democratic Party is in the thrall of the United Nations. War 
     and peace hang in the balance. The world waits to see what 
     the American people, in Congress assembled, will say. These 
     Democrats say: Wait, we must find out what the United Nations 
     say first.
       The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carl 
     Levin, would enshrine such lunacy in legislation, no less. He 
     would not even authorize the use of force without prior U.N. 
     approval. Why? What exactly does U.N. approval mean?
       It cannot mean the U.N. General Assembly, which is an empty 
     debating society. It means the Security Council, Now, the 
     Security Council has five permanent members and 10 rotating 
     members. Among the rotating members is Syria. How can any 
     senator stand up and tell the American people that before 
     deciding whether America goes to war against a rogue state 
     such as Iraq, it needs to hear the ``final recommendation'' 
     of Syria, a regime on the State Department's official 
     terrorist list?
       Or maybe these senators are awaiting the wisdom of some of 
     the other nonpermanent members. Cameroon? Mauritius? Guinea? 
     Certainly Kennedy and Levin cannot be saying that we must not 
     decide whether to go to war until we have heard the 
     considered opinion of countries that none of their colleagues 
     can find on a map.
       Okay. So we are not talking about these dots on the map. We 
     must be talking about the five permanent members. The United 
     States is one. Another is Britain, which support us. That 
     leaves three. So when you hear senators grandly demand the 
     support of the ``international community,'' this is what they 
     mean: France, Russia and China.
       As I recently asked in this space, by what logic does the 
     blessing of these countries bestow moral legitimacy on 
     American action? China's leaders are the butchers of 
     Tiananmen Square. France and Russia will decide the Iraq 
     question based on the coldest calculation of their own 
     national interest, meaning money and oil.
       Everyone in the Senate wants a new and tough inspection 
     regime in Iraq: anytime, anywhere, unannounced. Yet these 
     three countries, whose approval the Democrats crave, are 
     responsible for the hopelessly diluted and useless inspection 
     regime that now exists.
       They spent the 1990s doing everything they could to 
     dismantle the Gulf War mandate to disarm Saddam Hussein. The 
     Clinton administration helplessly acquiesced, finally 
     approving a new Security Council resolution in 1999 that gave 
     us the current toothless inspections regime. France, Russia 
     and China, mind you, refused to support even that resolution; 
     they all abstained because it did not make yet more 
     concessions to Saddam Hussein.
       After a decade of acting as Saddam Hussein's lawyers on the 
     Security Council, these countries are now to be the arbiters 
     of America's new and deadly serious effort to ensure Iraqi 
     disarmament.
       So insist leading Democrats. Why? It has no moral logic. It 
     has no strategic logic. Forty years ago, we had a Democratic 
     president who declared that he would not allow the United 
     Nations or any others to tell the United States how it would 
     defend itself. Would that JFK's party had an ounce of his 
     confidence in the wisdom and judgment of America, deciding 
     its own fate by its own lights, regardless of the wishes of 
     France.
       Or Cameroon.
                                  ____


                [From the Washington Post, Oct. 6, 2002]

                     The Weight of American Empire

                            (By John Keegan)

       Warminster, England.--The statement of principles that will 
     guide the national security strategy of the United States 
     during the war on terrorism, and against states that acquire 
     weapons of mass destruction for nefarious purposes, is 
     presented in the language of American statecraft at its most 
     traditional. The allusions from the past proliferate--
     allusions to the Four Freedoms, to the Atlantic Charter, even 
     to President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. The values 
     that President Bush promises to defend with all the power at 
     his disposal are central to the American way--democratic 
     self-government, free association, freedom of expression, 
     equal rights for individuals. It is a very American, and very 
     old-fashioned, document.
       At the same time, it makes commitments that are 
     unprecedented in the language of American national policy. To 
     put it bluntly, the president makes threats. He warns 
     terrorists that they will be opposed by every weapon and 
     every means at America's disposal. That might be expected and 
     is no more than terrorists deserve.
       But he also warns that states that harbor terrorists--or 
     are compromised by terrorism--will be held to account, by 
     which he means military account. He goes on to say that 
     enemies of the United States who are preparing weapons of 
     mass destruction (enemies unspecified but by implication 
     already identified by the Pentagon and State Department) will 
     find themselves targets of U.S. action, even if--and this is 
     a particularly menacing note--such preparations are not 
     complete and the threats to American and its allies are not 
     fully formed.
       No doubt it is America's readiness to make threats that 
     contributes to the anti-Americanism now rampant in Europe. 
     Fifty years of peace have skewed the European outlook on the 
     world. Apart from some minor Balkan troubles, Europeans have 
     not known war since 1945, and they have fallen into the habit 
     of viewing war as an alien activity to which they have found 
     a superior alternative--the building of pan-European 
     institutions, free trade and the convening of tedious 
     international conferences. They conveniently forget the 
     threat posed until 1990 by the vanished Soviet Union and they 
     show no appreciation at all of the effort and expense 
     undertaken by the United States in acting as the leading 
     military member of NATO during the Cold War.
       There can be no doubt that the American approach to the 
     future is far more realistic than the European and would have 
     been so, if stated, even before the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed, 
     the logic of President Bush's statement depends less on the 
     emergence of terrorism as a serious threat to civilized 
     states, or even on Saddam Hussein's specific defiance of U.N. 
     resolutions requiring him to admit weapons inspectors, than 
     it does on factors already apparent as the Cold War was 
     drawing to its close.
       Students of the Cold War perceived that it imposed, for all 
     the rhetoric of nuclear threat and counter-threat, an 
     artificial stability in international relations. The 
     existence of two superpowers, and the confrontation between 
     them, obliged almost all states to choose sides--and, having 
     chosen, to accept a consequent restraint on their foreign 
     military power. The superpowers offered protection to their 
     clients. But they also expected and got a measure of 
     obedience.
       In no respect was that more true than in the acquisition of 
     weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. On 
     whatever else they did not agree, the United States and 
     Soviet Union--as the world's only fully equipped nuclear 
     powers--concurred that possession of nuclear weapons should 
     be confined to the smallest possible number of states. From 
     their points of view, the ideal number would have been two. 
     But failing America's ability to constrain its wartime

[[Page 19714]]

     nuclear partner, Britain (which had acquired most of the 
     necessary expertise to build bombs), and then France (which 
     could not bear the indignity of nuclear inferiority to its 
     ancient enemy), the United States reluctantly accepted a 
     troika of Western nuclear powers. The Soviet Union would have 
     preferred to remain the only communist nuclear power, but 
     China's size and strength prevented Moscow from constraining 
     Beijing.
       Thus the nuclear balance of the Cold War years was 
     established on a basis of five powers; and, as each was a 
     stable state, experienced in the ways of the world, the tacit 
     agreement between the superpowers to maintain world order 
     worked. Indeed, it survived even unilateral superpower 
     efforts to win local wars at the boundary between the spheres 
     of influence--Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola.
       The more farsighted observers perceived, however, that, 
     should the Cold War ever come to and end, so would the 
     stability it had imposed. While most states, particularly the 
     richer and longer-established ones, would choose to go on as 
     before, a minority of others, those with grievances against 
     their neighbors or with their standing in the world order, 
     would rebel. They would try to become local superpowers and 
     they would challenge the right of the United States and 
     Russia, the Soviet Union's successor, to maintain the old 
     Cold War order.
       So it has turned out. The emergence of India and Pakistan 
     as nuclear powers, though undesirable, was predictable and is 
     containable. They deter each other. The dissidences of Iraq 
     and of Chechnya are of a different order. Chechnya, 
     traditionally disruptive of Russia's efforts to maintain 
     order in its borderlands, is a menace and Moscow deserves 
     Washington's support in its effort to bring the Chechens 
     under control. Iraq is a far more serious problem, since it 
     is a comparatively advanced state and potentially very rich. 
     Under a regime that would cooperate with the international 
     community, it would be nothing but a force for good in the 
     Middle East. Its society is not Islamic and its population is 
     well educated. But because power in Iraq has, lamentably, 
     passed to a megalomaniac and his hometown clique, it has 
     become exactly what students of post-Cold War politics feared 
     the future might bring at its worst.
       Unspoken in Bush's national security document is the idea 
     that small, unstable, self-seeking states under dictatorial 
     control must not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq 
     happens merely to be the first in that category to appear. 
     Its pretensions to nuclear power must be quashed. But--and 
     this is the real import of the president's statement--so must 
     similar pretensions, if and when they appear, forever. The 
     president has committed his country to a fearsome duty. It 
     will never go away.

  Mr. ROBERTS. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time that 
Senator Dayton had under the order that had been entered be given to 
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Biden.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have time tomorrow to speak, too. I will 
make a much longer speech on my views on this subject.
  There used to be a trial lawyer I practiced law under. I used to sit 
in the counsel chair next to him and watch how he tried cases. He used 
to say to the jury, when he started the case, his opening statement, he 
would say: I want you to keep your eye on the ball. I want you to focus 
on the issue at hand.
  He would turn to his client, who sometimes was not the most admirable 
of people, who may have been innocent but not admirable. And he would 
say: I want you to take a look at my client. You wouldn't invite my 
client home for dinner. You wouldn't want your daughter going out with 
my client. As a matter of fact, I wouldn't even go have a cup of coffee 
with him after this. The question is not whether or not he is a homely 
guy or a bad guy, or whether or not he is a guy who you would like to 
have as a friend.
  The question is, did he kill Cock Robin? Keep your eye on the ball. 
What is going to happen here is you are going to have the State coming 
in saying this is a bad guy. He is an ugly guy. Look at him, he doesn't 
dress very well. Look at him, he is not very amiable. Keep your eye on 
the ball.
  Just listening to my friend from Kansas and others today, I think we 
are kind of taking our eye off the ball. Tomorrow I will go into this 
in great detail. But let's remind ourselves why are we here right now. 
Why are we here, notwithstanding the fact Senator Lieberman and 
Congressman Gephardt went down and stood with the President of the 
United States and said they adopted a resolution? That is not why we 
are here today. We are not here because of that. We are here because of 
what the President told us. Everybody remember, keep your eye on the 
ball.
  The President said he has not decided whether or not we are going to 
go to war. He said it is his hope that we not go to war. It is his hope 
it can be avoided. Yet, for the first time in the history of the United 
States of America, in my judgment, the President of the United States 
is asking for the Congress to give him the equivalent of a declaration 
of war--to go to war--before the President has made up his mind. He has 
not made up his mind.
  Keep your eye on the ball. Follow the bouncing ball like in the old 
Lawrence Welk days. A, the President has not decided whether or not to 
go to war; B, the President says give me the authority to go to war; C, 
we say on what basis do you want to go to war, Mr. President?
  The details matter. If, for example, we leave here, setting a 
precedent, suggesting the reason we might go to war is because of this 
new doctrine of preemption, which no one has explained--no one has 
explained it. I sat at the White House, I say to my friend from 
Virginia, with Dr. Rice for hours. Dr. Rice said it is no different 
than what has always been the policy of the U.S.
  Well, if that is the case, then I don't have any problem. The 
President always has the right to act preemptively if we are in 
imminent danger. If they are coming up over the hill, he can respond; 
if troops are coming out of Tijuana, heading north, we can respond; if 
they are coming down from Toronto, we can respond; if missiles are on 
their way, we can respond. But that is not the way I hear it being used 
here. We are talking about preemption, as if we are adopting a policy. 
As Dr. Kissinger said before our committee, that will undo an agreement 
the Western World made in the early 1640s at the end of the religious 
wars in Europe, which said no country has a right to preemptively move 
against another country because they think they are going to be bad 
guys.
  So this is a pretty big deal. Words matter. And so I say to my 
friends, let's go back. Why did the President ask us for a resolution 
when he sent up the draft resolution? Why? He stated forthrightly why. 
He said: Because I need to demonstrate that I have support in order not 
to go to war. That is what he said. He said: You, the Congress, give me 
overwhelming support. Then the U.N. will know I mean it. Then the 
Security Council will say if we don't, he will, so we better. That is 
the reason why we are here. That is the reason, I remind my colleague 
from Connecticut and my friend from Virginia, why we are here. 
Otherwise, it is ridiculous--a President saying I don't know whether I 
want to go to war yet, but declare it.
  So I hope people don't start confusing things on this floor. I may 
not be around here after November--I hope I am; I am up for reelection, 
but I don't want to be on this floor 6 years from now and have someone 
stand up and inaccurately say, by the way, back in the year 2002, in 
October, we adopted a policy of preemption. Therefore, even though we 
are in no imminent danger, even though there is no violation of any 
international rule, we think the country of Xanadu are bad guys and we 
are invading. That would be a serious mistake. Let me tell you why--not 
because as an American and as President, if I were President, or as a 
Senator, or as a Congressman, I would like to have that ability. But, 
guess what, I don't want Beijing waking up one morning and saying, you 
know, we have a right to preemptively attack Taiwan. I don't want India 
waking up one morning and saying, by the way, we have a right 
preemptively to attack Pakistan. In case you are all wondering--and I 
know my colleagues are not, because they know the score and they are 
thinking about both of those things--both of those countries could 
conceivably reach that conclusion. It's not an impossibility, if the 
most powerful Nation in the world establishes an unnecessary doctrine. 
So let's keep our eye on the ball.

[[Page 19715]]

  Why are we being asked to do this--to give the President the kind of 
momentum he needs to allow the Secretary of State to convince the 
Security Council to do what they should do in the first place?
  The second point I would like to make is this: We are, right now, 
talking about preemption, when there is no need for any doctrine of 
preemption to justify us going against Iraq with others, or alone, if 
need be. Let's get the facts straight. There is a guy named Saddam 
Hussein who, in the early 1990s, broke international law, invaded 
another country, violating every rule of international law. The world, 
under the leadership of a President named Bush, united and expelled him 
from that country. Upon expulsion, he said a condition for your being 
able to remain in power, Saddam Hussein, is you sue for peace and you 
agree to the following terms of surrender. Those terms of surrender, 
unlike with the Treaty of Versailles and other treaties where surrender 
comes about, were in the form of concessions to the U.N., to the world. 
So he signed onto a number of resolutions.
  If the world decides it must use force for his failure to abide by 
the terms of surrender, then it is not preempting, it is enforcing. It 
is enforcing, it is finishing a war he reignited, because the only 
reason the war stopped is he sued for peace.
  So, for Lord's sake, anybody who decides to vote for this resolution, 
please do not rest it on this cockamamie notion of preemption. You will 
rue the day. If that is the precedent we establish for our own safety's 
sake, you will rue the day.
  The third point I want to make about keeping your eye on the ball 
here is--the fact of the matter is the President of the United States 
has not yet, A, made the decision about going to war and, B, if he 
decides to go to war, he has not made the case to the American people.
  Let me explain what I mean by that before my colleagues jump all over 
it. He made a clear case to the U.N. that by the standards of the 
United Nations, this man, Saddam Hussein, has flouted the rules of the 
U.N.--absolutely an overwhelming case. Then he came along on Monday and 
he made a clear case, in the minds of many, to the American people that 
Saddam Hussein is a danger to the United States.
  But there is one more case he has to make. Those of us out of the 
generation of Vietnam, and those who were in power during the 
generation of Vietnam, know that no matter how well articulated, no 
matter how well formulated a foreign policy is, it cannot be sustained 
without the informed consent of the American people. What is being 
asked of them? The American people do not know what is going to be 
asked of them yet.
  I am fully confident if the President decides, in concert with 
others, war is necessary, he will have to inform them before he 
launches it. I say that because he personally told me that. I asked 
him. My friend from Virginia may have been at the leadership meeting 3 
weeks ago in the cabinet room when the President turned to me after 
others had spoken and said, ``Mr. Chairman, will you be with me?'' I 
said, ``Mr. President, I will be with you on the condition that you do 
two things: One, you make every effort possible to do this under the 
auspices of the U.N. or the coalition, like we did in Kosovo; and you 
inform the American people that it is going to require substantial 
American forces and substantial American money to stay in Iraq after 
Saddam Hussein is down.'' He looked at me in the presence of everybody 
and said, ``I will do that.'' So I take him at his word.
  I lay you 8 to 5, if you go home and ask your constituents who say 
they are for war--ask them the following question: How long do you 
think we are going to have to keep American forces in Iraq? I will lay 
you 8 to 5 that 90 percent will look at you with a blank stare and ask: 
What do you mean, stay in Iraq? What are you talking about, stay in 
Iraq? They have no notion. Senator Dodd, Senator Sarbanes, and I, and 
the Foreign Relations Committee held several very good hearings. At one 
hearing, we had the fellow who headed up the office in the Pentagon as 
to what we do after we win the war--planning. We had two other military 
experts.
  Do my colleagues know what they told us? They probably told you the 
same thing in Armed Services Committee. It is probable we will have to 
keep at least 75,000 American forces in Iraq for at least 1 year at a 
cost of $19 billion. Maybe it will not be 75,000. Maybe it will be 
25,000; maybe 105,000. I do not know. But we have an obligation to tell 
our constituents.
  As I said to my good friend, Mr. Brownback, who is on our committee, 
in one of our hearings: Everything may go smoothly. And I think there 
is a possibility it could happen. If we have to go to war, everything 
may go smoothly, and once he is down and does not use chemical weapons, 
the army surrenders and the Republican Guard crumbles, and he is 
assassinated on the way out of town, and we get our hands on the 
weapons of mass destruction quickly, we identify where they are, we 
destroy them, and the rest of the world comes in to help us with the 
burden of keeping Iraq from splitting into at least three separate 
pieces--that could all happen. That is possible.
  What happens if it does not? Big nations cannot bluff. We should tell 
the American people straight up, and I am prepared to do it and support 
it: If, in fact, we are forced to go into Iraq with other nations, for 
his failure to comply, say goodbye for a while to the new permanent tax 
cut; say goodbye for a while to significant increases in health care 
funding; say goodbye for a while to a whole lot of issues for those who 
vote for this.
  This is the time for a little honesty in advertising. This is the 
time the American people are strong, they are bright, and they are 
willing to take this on. The one thing I believe they will not stand 
for is being sold a bill of goods. We are not stopping 400 miles short 
of Baghdad this time if we go. We are not. The Senator from West 
Virginia has said repeatedly, this is a considerable undertaking.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BIDEN. As I said, I will tomorrow go into much greater detail. 
Again, keep your eye on the ball and level with the American people as 
we go through this process because I think if Saddam Hussein is around 
5 years from now, we are in deep trouble as a country--we are in deep 
trouble.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Tennessee is to be recognized.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, can I inquire what the parliamentary 
situation is?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee is to speak for 15 
minutes, followed by the senior Senator from New Mexico for 20 minutes, 
and the senior Senator from Michigan for 30 minutes.
  Mr. SARBANES. For what?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The senior Senator from Michigan for 30 
minutes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Is this all being done through unanimous consent 
requests?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is.
  Mr. SARBANES. I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to speak 
after the senior Senator from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have to object at this time. I have been 
in consultation with the senior Senator from West Virginia who had 
expressed some interest in taking that slot. Without losing my right to 
the floor, does the senior Senator from West Virginia wish to speak to 
his desires? He has the pending amendment, and I think it is very 
important that the Senate have the opportunity tonight to vote on your 
amendment. Of course, the Senator will desire to speak for a period of 
time prior to, I anticipate, a motion to table.
  I have the floor, but I yield for a question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland has the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Beg your pardon?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland has the floor.

[[Page 19716]]


  Mr. SARBANES. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Virginia for a 
comment or an observation he wants to make, but I do not yield the 
floor.
  Mr. WARNER. I reserved the right to object to the Senator's unanimous 
consent request.
  Mr. SARBANES. But that does not give the Senator the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. No, I reserved the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. BYRD. He did not yield for that purpose.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator does not have the floor and cannot 
make that request.
  Mr. BYRD. May I respond now?
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, it is my understanding, under the order, the 
Senator from Tennessee is to be recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct, under the unanimous consent 
agreement. The Senator from Maryland proposed a unanimous consent 
request. Is there an objection?
  Mr. WARNER. Objection.
  Mr. BYRD. Reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The Senator from Tennessee 
has the floor and is recognized.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield, 
without losing his right to the floor?
  Mr. FRIST. I will be happy to yield.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I had indicated to the distinguished Senator 
from Virginia that I would like to be recognized after Mr. Levin. I 
believe he is last on the list. I have no problem with the Senator--if 
the Senator will agree to allow him--Mr. Sarbanes to follow Mr. Levin 
and then I would like to be recognized at that time.
  Mr. REID. If I can ask a question of the Senator from West Virginia, 
who proposed a unanimous consent request.
  Mr. BYRD. Yes.
  Mr. REID. If people have a question as to the position we are in 
today, yesterday we tried lining up speakers, and that did not work. 
Today we lined up two speakers on each side so people do not come to 
the Chamber and have to wait. That is what we did. That is the position 
we are in now. Both cloakrooms received requests from people who wanted 
to speak. That is what we have done.
  There is a question as to who is going to be the next speaker. I will 
only say there is no requirement to do so. We have been going back and 
forth: Senator Levin and then I assume we will go to a Republican. 
After Senator Levin, anybody could get the floor.
  Mr. SARBANES. Can I inquire who follows Senator Frist?
  Mr. REID. After Senator Frist is Senator Domenici.
  Mr. SARBANES. That does not strike me as going back and forth.
  Mr. REID. We had Senator Kerry, who spoke for 45 minutes. These two 
Senators are speaking for a total of 35 minutes. That is the amount of 
time Senator Kerry had.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator from Nevada yield? I ask unanimous 
consent to speak with the Senator from Nevada.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Without interfering with the Senator from Tennessee, is 
it his predilection to continue this debate tonight until all speakers 
are finished, or is the desire of the majority leader and the majority 
whip to have a vote on the Byrd amendment, or put it off until 
tomorrow? We have 13 amendments pending.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, as we all know, I say to my friend, anyone 
who has the floor can move to table the amendment of the Senator from 
West Virginia.
  Mr. McCAIN. Yes.
  Mr. REID. I assume that because of the respect people have for 
Senator Byrd, before that happens someone will give him the opportunity 
to speak. I am sure that will happen.
  Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will yield further, it is not our desire 
to propose a motion to table until the Senator from West Virginia has 
had ample time to discuss his amendment. I do not think that would be 
appropriate. But at some point, I hope we can reach a point where we 
can have a motion to table or an up-or-down vote on the amendment. For 
the benefit of all Senators, perhaps we can try to ascertain that.
  Mr. REID. The answer to your question, from my perspective, the best 
thing to do for an orderly process is to dispose of the Byrd amendment 
and then move to the Levin amendment for which we have been waiting a 
long time.
  Before we dispose of the Byrd amendment, I am sure, as I indicated--
whether it is Domenici, whoever it is--will give the Senator from West 
Virginia ample opportunity to discuss his amendment.
  The Senator from Arizona asked me if that should happen. That is what 
should happen.
  Mr. McCAIN. If I can finish. So we will dispose of the Byrd amendment 
tonight, if it is agreeable with the Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. REID. I will put it another way. Senator Byrd's amendment, as he 
knows, being the mother of all parliamentarians, can be disposed of at 
any time.
  Mr. McCAIN. Yes.
  Mr. REID. I think we would like to move this along. I hope Senator 
Byrd's amendment will be disposed of before we move to the Levin 
amendment. That is not a necessity, but it would make it a little more 
orderly.
  Mr. McCAIN. Finally, could I ask Senator Byrd's predilections on this 
issue?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona for his question. I say to the Senator, he has amendments, and 
he has already submitted his amendments. I would like to have a chance 
to vote on these amendments before the cloture vote. I hope we will get 
the cloture vote delayed at least a few hours tomorrow until Senators, 
such as Mr. Levin, who have amendments will have a fair shot at 
explaining their amendments and have a vote on them before cloture. I 
do not know whether the Senate will be disposed to do that or not.
  Let me see if I can answer the distinguished Senator from Arizona. I 
have another amendment I would like to get voted on, too. I would like 
to offer it to the amendment that is pending. I say to the 
distinguished Senator from Arizona--and he is a very distinguished 
Senator--the other amendment would be to provide a sunset provision.
  So if the Senate is going to waive its constitutional powers to the 
extent that I think would be required if the Lieberman amendment were 
to be agreed upon, I would like at least for the Senate to have a 
sunset provision so there would be a time limit when the Lieberman 
amendment would run its course. If the Congress wanted to renew that, 
Congress could do it, of course, but at least my amendment would say 12 
months, and the President could extend that for 12 months.
  That is a rough explanation of my amendment. So that would be 12 
months for the President under my amendment, providing for the 
President on his own to extend that for an additional 12 months, but at 
the end of that time it is over unless the Congress renews or extends 
it. I would like to have that amendment also voted upon.
  I am very willing to enter into some kind of an agreement, say, to 
vote up or down on both amendments. There would be a vote on the 
Lieberman amendment and then a vote on cloture tomorrow at some point.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we have been endeavoring to accommodate 
the pending amendment with the time agreement such that it could be 
brought up as soon as possible.
  The Senator from West Virginia and I have had no discussion about a 
second amendment, and I urge that we allow the Senator from Tennessee 
to speak, and in the interim let's gather and see whether or not we can 
reconcile honest differences and motives.
  Mr. REID. If I could just suggest one thing, maybe we could have all 
of this taken care of by not having a cloture vote. Cloture is going to 
be invoked by

[[Page 19717]]

a large margin. Maybe we would not need a cloture vote.
  Mr. WARNER. There are Senators on this side who wish to leave intact 
this present procedure, which is working well. It has produced 13 
amendments, 7 of which have been ruled germane thus far by the 
Parliamentarian. This debate is well underway, well structured, and can 
proceed.
  At the moment, we have a pending amendment, and I urge that we allow 
the Senator from Tennessee----
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the 15 minutes allocated to 
the Senator from Tennessee be given in its entirety. We have taken most 
of that time. Then during that time, we will confer as to how we can 
proceed.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dayton). The Senator from Tennessee has 
the floor.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, the Members of this body will soon vote on 
authorizing the President to use the military might of this Nation 
against Saddam Hussein. This decision has weighed heavily on me, as it 
has on us all. No one takes lightly the prospect of young Americans 
risking their lives on the battlefield of war, but we and they swear an 
oath to defend our rights and freedoms against all enemies. And so our 
duty we must now do.
  Saddam Hussein is a direct and deadly threat to the American people 
and to the people of the world. He holds the power to murder not just 
hundreds or thousands or tens of thousands, but millions. He defies all 
international efforts to restrain that power and keep world peace, and 
he disdains the value of human life, even the lives of his own people. 
This is an evil, lawless, and murderous man.
  The resolution before the Senate is carefully constructed to 
encourage the widest possible international support for unified action 
against Saddam Hussein. The nations of the world need to show him they 
will no longer tolerate his arrogant contempt for United Nations 
resolutions, requiring him to give up his weapons of mass destruction 
and cease the gross human rights violations he has committed on his own 
people. I support the President's intensive efforts to build such a 
coalition, and I pray for his success.
  No one wants to avoid a war more than I do. I am a physician. I have 
devoted my life to a profession that is centered on saving lives. Only 
when we have exhausted all reasonable efforts at keeping peace should 
we consider waging war. The President shares a firm commitment to this 
principle. I consider this resolution a strong statement of support for 
peace and, if the Nation must, for war as well. For if the safety of 
our people, the security of our Nation, and the stability of the world 
remain so threatened, we must risk war for peace. To do anything less 
would leave a grave and growing danger looming over the lives of 
millions.
  This evening I will talk about Saddam Hussein's past, his present, 
and what I consider his greatest danger, a robust biological weapons 
program. More than chemical and nuclear weapons, Saddam's biological 
weapons pose a unique and immediate threat. Unlike other conventional 
weapons, they are easily made. They can be readily concealed and are 
beyond the reach of inspectors and can readily be delivered across 
borders and, yes, even across oceans. In the hands of a madman, 
biological weapons literally threaten us all.
  I refer to the words on this chart concerning Iraq's weapons of mass 
destruction, excerpts from an October 2002 unclassified CIA report, 
which reads:

       Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW--

  Biological weapon--

     agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a 
     variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by 
     bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers and covert operatives, 
     including potentially against the U.S. homeland.

  Indeed, these biological weapons literally threaten us all--
``potentially against the U.S. homeland.''
  Saddam Hussein has pursued the most deadly weapons known to man, with 
brutal determination. His arsenal has included tens of thousands of 
tons of chemical agents and biological agents. He has come within 
months of acquiring nuclear weapons, and he has developed many means, 
both in number and type, to deliver his desired destruction.
  History shows that dictators do not amass such weapons without the 
intent to use them. Indeed, Saddam Hussein has accumulated chemical 
weapons and used them to attack his neighbors and even murder his own 
people. During the Iran-Iraq war, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, 
Saddam Hussein inflicted 20,000 casualties by striking with chemicals--
mustard gas, sarin, and tabun. He also used mustard and nerve agents to 
murder as many as 5,000 Iraqi Kurds and inflict the misery of chemical 
warfare on another 10,000.
  I show this chart briefly to demonstrate the impact of these 
chemicals. Saddam Hussein used the chemicals on his own people. We can 
see the effects of this tragedy among the victims, who are women and 
children in this picture.
  Saddam Hussein was fully prepared to use biological weapons during 
the gulf war. In 1995, Iraq admitted it had produced 19,000 liters of 
botulinum toxin, 8,500 liters of anthrax, and 2,200 liters of 
aflatoxin. That is enough botulinum toxin--remember, that is the most 
potent poison known to man--to kill every man, woman and child on 
Earth.
  Iraq also admitted it had loaded thousands of liters of agents into 
bombs, into munitions, into dozens of warheads and aircraft spray 
tanks, just as American and allied forces prepared to liberate Kuwait. 
Before the gulf war, intelligence experts believed Saddam Hussein was 
at least 8 to 10 years from having a nuclear weapon. That estimate was 
way off. Iraq had already assembled many of the pieces needed to build 
a nuclear weapon. What it lacked was fissile material that makes up the 
explosive core of a nuclear device. If Saddam Hussein had been able to 
obtain that material, either by making it or buying it, he would likely 
have had a nuclear bomb by no later than 1993.
  Indeed, Iraq has gone to great lengths to acquire weapons of mass 
destruction. Its efforts to hide the weapons have been equally 
ambitious. Saddam Hussein has defied the international community almost 
from the moment he came to power in 1979. His rule has been a constant 
threat to peace among the Iraqi people, in the Middle East, and 
throughout the world.
  Saddam Hussein has twice invaded sovereign nations. In 1980, he 
launched the Iran-Iraq war solely for territorial gain. Eight years, 
one million casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars later, the 
war ended with Iraq gaining nothing. In 1990, Saddam Hussein started 
the gulf war by invading Kuwait. His objective? Seize control of his 
neighbor's oil fields. We expelled him. As we did, he fired dozens of 
Scud missiles into Israel and into Saudi Arabia and the waters off 
Qatar.
  Iraq has shown as much contempt for the international community as it 
has shown aggression toward its neighbors. Since 1990, Iraq has 
violated 16 United Nations Security Council resolutions. Inspectors 
charged with enforcing those resolutions have been deceived, they have 
been obstructed, they have been intimidated by Saddam Hussein and his 
henchmen.
  Saddam Hussein has funneled as much as $9 billion from the United 
Nations Oil-for-Food program into his weapons of mass destruction 
program and other illegal activities, starving his people and 
strangling the economy.
  To Saddam Hussein international treaties are worth less than the 
paper on which they are written. Iraq is the only nation publicly cited 
for violating the Geneva Convention ban on using chemical weapons. Its 
biological weapons program has directly violated the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention. And Iraq has utterly ignored the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which has been signed by 187 countries since its 
inception in 1968.
  Saddam Hussein said in a recent speech, ``The present of any nation 
or people cannot be isolated from its past . . .'' Indeed. What Saddam 
has done in the past is reckless, lawless and appalling. But what he is 
doing now should frighten us all and compel the world to action. Not 
only does he continue to

[[Page 19718]]

develop and produce weapons of mass destruction, but he's more likely 
to use them than ever before. I am particularly concerned about the 
unique and immediate threat Saddam's biological weapons program 
presents.
  Iraq has lethal and incapacitating biological weapons agents 
potentially to use against the United States homeland.
  Iraq likely produced two to four times more biological agents than it 
publicly admitted in 1995. United Nations inspection teams could not 
account for biological culture growth media that would have easily 
tripled Saddam's stocks of anthrax--a bacteria that can be rapidly and 
easily produced as a weapon of mass destruction. Mr. President, 30,000 
munitions designed solely for chemical and biological agents were also 
unaccounted for. Missing biological agents, missing biological 
munitions and Iraq's pattern of deception lead to only one conclusion: 
Saddam Hussein today retains a large arsenal of deadly living 
microorganisms available as weapons of mass destruction.
  That arsenal likely contains stocks of live viruses and bacteria 
produced not only before the Gulf War, but also after, especially since 
weapons inspectors left Iraq in 1998. Saddam has expanded so-called 
``dual-use'' facilities--laboratories, research centers and 
manufacturing plants that have civilian or commercial uses, but are 
likely used to build his arsenal of microbiological terror, as well.
  Iraq has rebuilt known biological weapons facilities that were 
destroyed during the Gulf War, by our military, or after, by weapons 
inspectors. Also, Saddam retains the equipment and, even more crucial, 
the human expertise to continue building his biological weapons 
capability. Unlike nuclear weapons, which take years and massive 
resources to make, biological weapons are inexpensive, can be made 
easily, within weeks, in a small room, with minimal equipment and 
manpower. That is what makes biological weapons so unique and capable 
of causing such death and destruction.
  To that end, our intelligence community believes Iraq has built 
mobile germ warfare production laboratories. Iraq has learned a lot 
about weapons inspections since the Gulf War. Saddam hid his biological 
weapons program from inspectors for 4 years. Mobile biological labs are 
the ideal weapon of deception. They can be quickly moved in 
inconspicuous trailers and hidden in very small spaces, including, for 
example, in a single room in one of Saddam Hussein's presidential 
palaces. Such laboratories would be almost invisible to the outside 
world.
  There is also evidence that Iraq may be developing and producing a 
new generation of more virulent biological agents. Defectors allege 
that Iraq is developing an agent called ``Blue Nile''--which may be a 
code name for the ebola virus. Ebola is a deadly virus for which there 
is no treatment and there is no vaccine. And many experts believe 
Saddam Hussein may have stocks of the smallpox virus. One of the last 
naturally occurring smallpox outbreaks occurred on Iraqi soil in the 
early 1970s, which is precisely when Iraq launched its weapons of mass 
destruction program.
  Though U.S. defenses against smallpox are now much stronger, a 2001 
study by Johns Hopkins University found that a smallpox attack launched 
at three locations in the United States could kill in a worst case 
scenario one million and infect another two million Americans within 
two months.
  Saddam has invested not only in developing and producing new viruses 
and bacteria, but also new means to deliver those agents. Iraq has 
experimented with a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles as part of its 
longstanding weapons of mass destruction program. But intelligence 
experts believe Iraq has vastly improved its designs and now has a 
drone aircraft that can carry and spray up to 80 gallons of anthrax. 
Such an airplane would be the most effective way to deliver biological 
weapons over a vast area and would represent a dire threat to the Iraqi 
people, its neighbors and the international community.
  The danger of germ weapons is not merely that Saddam Hussein has 
them, but that he would use them . . . even against the United States. 
Biological agents are ideal terrorist weapons. Unlikely other weapons 
of mass destruction, one cannot hear them or taste them or smell them. 
They can be invisible to the human eye.
  They can be transported long distances without detection in, for 
example, a terrorist's pocket. They can take hours and even days to 
take effect, allowing a terrorist to be long gone--to escape.
  Thus, Saddam's robust biological weapons program, combined with the 
support of terrorism, is a deadly force capable of exceeding the death 
and destruction of even a nuclear bomb.
  Saddam does support terrorism. Iraq harbors several terrorist groups 
that have targeted and murdered American citizens. The Iraqi regime has 
been in contact with al-Qaida for at least a decade and, as recently as 
this year, allowed a senior leader to receive medical treatment in 
Baghdad.
  I am hopeful that inspectors will return to Iraq with totally 
unfettered access to all suspected biological weapons sites. But, 
remember, such a site can be an 8-by-12-foot room deep in the basement 
of a huge Presidential palace.
  I am hopeful that Saddam Hussein will disarm and destroy his ability 
to develop and produce such weapons in the future. But I am not 
optimistic. Saddam Hussein knows his chemical and biological stocks are 
the source of his power at home and in his region and can be a tool of 
blackmail. Weapons of mass destruction are as much a part of Saddam 
Hussein as freedom and democracy are of America.
  The test of our resolve in the war on terror was Afghanistan. There 
we fought the terrorist group and its supporting regimes that murdered 
more than 3,000 of our own citizens. We were attacked, and, as any 
capable nation would do, we responded.
  Now we face a second test. Saddam Hussein has not yet struck, and we 
hope he doesn't. We hope he disarms his weapons of mass destruction and 
chooses peace over war. It is his choice. But should he force us to 
war, we will fight for a noble and a just cause--to prevent a future 
and far worse attack than that of September 11, 2001. America will be 
victorious in this next phase of the war on terror, for the worst of a 
dictator cannot defeat the will of a free people.
  Saddam Hussein will fight to preserve his grip on power and protect 
weapons that murder millions. But if we must fight, we will do so for 
love of country, for respect of humanity, and for the rights and 
freedoms that all people deserve to enjoy, including the Iraqi people.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico, under the 
previous order, is to be recognized.
  The Chair wants to say that it is his view that the subject matter is 
of enormous gravity, and the subject matter and statement of the 
Senator is most compelling. So anyone who does not share that view will 
leave the Chamber. And that will be pursued by those officers. And the 
Sergeants at Arms in the galleries are requested to ensure the gallery 
follows the same.
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, before I proceed, I would like to 
congratulate the distinguished Senator from Tennessee. When he writes 
his name uses the title ``Senator'' followed by ``M.D.'' I think you 
will always be a doctor even if you are not always a Senator. I am 
happy to know you in both capacities--as a member of the medical 
profession--and among our ranks as senators. We in the Senate are very 
fortunate that a few years ago at the peak of your profession you 
decided to come here, and your people there in Tennessee sent you. I 
have been here 30 years--roughly five times, I think, that you have 
been here. I have gotten to know you very well. I consider you among 
one of my very best friends--not only here but in the world. I am very 
proud of what you had to say here tonight.
  I am not going to speak about the technical matters. If anybody wants 
proof about the quantity and the tremendous damage that the weapons

[[Page 19719]]

which Saddam probably possesses can cause humankind, they can read 
Senator Bill Frist's statement just ahead of mine.
  I have difficulty when speaking on a subject such as this to 
disengage from being a full-blooded American and try to see the issue 
from a global perspective. It is very hard for me to see the world and 
see this issue in any way other than from the eyes of an American who 
grew up here and has lived here for the years I have been on this 
Earth. I am prejudiced by my great confidence in America being the 
right country to see that the Middle East stops being a tinderbox. I 
think we are the right country, and probably the only country that can 
keep Saddam Hussein from using those weapons of mass destruction. We 
are the only country that will see to it that he brings minimal damage 
to this world.
  I have concluded, after much study, that we must give our President 
this authority--not because he is going to use it, but quite to the 
contrary: to raise hopes he won't have to use it.
  I am voting aye on giving the President this authority because I am 
convinced that the one and only way to prevent Saddam Hussein from 
doing tremendous damage to humankind and to the Earth is to say to our 
President, You have the full strength of the American military to keep 
him from doing anything of great harm.
  That sounds like a terribly simple proposition, but I don't think it 
is. I think if one wanted to write a 30- or 40-page speech about what I 
just said, one could devote 5 pages just to the history of the United 
States. They could about how our country started and what our first 
wars were all about. They could talk about the First World War and the 
horror of chemical weapons used in that conflict.
  Do you know I had an uncle in the First World War in 1919? I wondered 
when I was growing up how come an aunt of mine used to get a little 
check in the mail--$19.80, or something. Finally, I said to my mother: 
What does my auntie do with that money? She said: She gets it for all 
of the life of her husband--she then told me in Italian--because your 
uncle, mio zio, was gassed by the Kaiser in the First World War with 
mustard gas.
  You see, how many years ago was that?--80 or 90?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators on the floor will kindly take 
their conversations off the floor so the Senator from New Mexico may 
have the full attention of the Senate.
  The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Thank you very much.
  So one could write at length about the parallels in our country's 
history and how it relates to today. Then follow every war we have been 
in, and then ask, What country is the most just throughout its history? 
Would there be any question? It would be the United States. Yet, we 
have people saying we shouldn't get involved in this, as if we are some 
big bamboozling country wrought on doing damage. History will tell us 
and tell the world that that is not why America would get involved in 
this situation. Isn't that right? Historically, the United States has 
only used military force when we can do some good. We stand for some 
principle or concept that we really think is tremendous--in this case, 
democracy versus dictatorship, democracy and freedom versus the kind of 
despicable character about whom our President has been speaking to us 
for a long time. The world is seeing a new kind of war that started 
with the destruction of our towers and our Pentagon.
  This war has its origins right there in that Middle East where, if 
action is not taken, humankind is going to have some big problems. And 
I concluded that if we want to make sure our military personnel are 
safe, we would have to get them out of the Middle East, bring them all 
home. But guess what? If we did that there would be a war in the Middle 
East without question. It would not take Saddam Hussein very long 
before he would attack Israel. And if he wasn't successful, who else 
might join to help him? Perhaps two or three other nations who would be 
willing to take up arms against Israel. So I believe there is a real 
reason for us to work through the United Nations to try to bring peace 
to that area.
  So I do not intend to go into all the details about the threat Iraq 
poses, rather, I just want to talk about the conclusions I tried to 
draw about dealing with that threat. One that I just talked to Senator 
Frist about, is that we are probably as good a nation as any in the 
world to decide that action needs to be taken. I have also concluded 
that to be successful, we had better give our President the authority 
he needs to act. In this way can better negotiate so as to maintain the 
peace.
  I guess I am going to stop for a minute and ask, is something going 
on I should know about? I have 20 minutes to speak. If people are not 
waiting, I am going to speak for 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President: The Senator from New 
Mexico has the floor; is that right?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. BIDEN. How much time does the Senator have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 12 minutes remaining, and he 
is followed by the Senator from Michigan for 30 minutes.
  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I think we are 32 minutes away from 
someone on that side being recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has the floor.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I say to the Senator from Tennessee, I 
am delighted to have found you on the floor just before my remarks. As 
always, you eloquently in describing what terrible things this man can 
wrought on this world and how we need to be careful. If we are going to 
get involved, we ought to be prepared. And what I added tonight, is 
that if we are going to do anything about it, we have to give our 
President the authority he needs. And he may well need our Army, our 
military to do it.
  So, Mr. President, I rise today in support of the Lieberman-Warner-
Bayh-McCain amendment because I am convinced that without clear 
authority to act decisively, it is not possible for the President of 
the United States to effectively confront the growing threat in Iraq.
  As I just said in talking with my friend from Tennessee, I do not 
think it is going to be very effective for us to say: Mr. President, 
stay involved, go to the U.N., talk to everybody about the despicable 
character who is now the head of Iraq.
  I don't think that is going to do anything if the President is not 
backed up with real authority to take military action. I don't want our 
President to engage in an effort that, from the onset, will not allow 
him to achieve intervention by the U.N. with a resolution of 
consequence.
  What I want for the American people is for our President to be able 
to effectively work with the U.N. to the maximum extent, as this 
resolution allows.
  This resolution makes certain that if the United States is involved, 
our President, after trying negotiations--and the words are voluminous 
on how hard he must try to resolve this matter peacefully and to keep 
Congress informed, he must give us reports--that he has the strength of 
the U.S. military if that does not work. And, frankly, I repeat, I 
think that is more apt to preserve peace than if we do not give the 
President the power.
  I am concerned that the world is already set up for a major war in 
the Middle East. And the only way to prevent it is to give our 
President the authority he needs to negotiate effectively, to go to the 
U.N., to go to our friends, to use diplomacy, but to be ready to say: 
The people of the United States, through our Congress, gave me 
authority to do more than that. They gave me authority to intervene and 
use the full power of the United States.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will please suspend.
  Will Senators kindly take their conversations off the floor.
  I thank the Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Maybe while they are gone, and the only one here is 
Senator Byrd, I could ask unanimous consent that I have an additional 
hour.

[[Page 19720]]

  I am just joking, so you don't have to object.
  In any event, it is clear to me that in the absence of this 
authority, Saddam Hussein will continue to assume that America's 
warnings are not serious. He will continue with all manner of delay and 
defiance, and he will continue to buy time for further development of 
weapons of mass destruction. And that is what we are talking about.
  Mr. President, while I will associate myself with the technical 
remarks of my friend, the doctor from Tennessee, I know a little bit 
about nuclear weapons. It is my subcommittee on appropriations that 
funds them, and has for the last 6\1/2\ years. So I know a little bit 
about that.
  But I also remember when we went and talked to groups about weapons 
of mass destruction, and we described gas and biological weapons of 
mass destruction by holding up a jar. It was not like this glass I hold 
in my hand, but what we actually used was a mayonnaise jar, the size 
jar that most people associate with a jar of mayonnaise that you would 
have in a refrigerator.
  And we held that up and said: If you know how to make real poisonous 
gas, and real biological killers, you can put them in a bottle this 
small. The chemistry needed to produce these poisons could be 
accomplished in a little room about the size of a kitchen. And the 
destruction that could be caused is beyond perception.
  So we will find that it is not as easy as to deter these weapons as 
were nuclear weapons for all the years we were standing head to head 
and toe to toe with the Soviet Union. We knew everything about their 
nuclear weapons; they knew everything about ours. But this batch of 
terrorists, who are bent on mass destruction, have us much more over a 
barrel than the Soviet Union did with nuclear weapons when we faced 
mutual assured destruction, sometimes called MAD, as the premise that 
would prevent war.
  So it is clear that weapons of mass destruction are going to 
continue, under the auspices and direction of the scientists who have 
been brought into Iraq, and be shipped around the world by Iraqi 
leaders, to put these terrible kinds of things in the hands of others, 
who are the ``minutemen'' of Saddam around the world.
  So I say again, by enacting the resolution that is before us, we 
emphasize our resolve to act in the event that Saddam impedes the work 
of U.N. weapons inspections. We will emphasize by this our resolve to 
act. So let's be clear. Saddam Hussein only understands the language of 
force. This resolution provides unambiguous authority for the President 
to use force. It is this authority, and Congress's support, that gives 
us the best hope of avoiding confrontation in pursuit of Iraq's 
disarmament.
  So it is the expectation of New Mexicans and all Americans that 
wherever their President considers sending U.S. troops to battle, that 
he does so in full consultation with the Congress and our allies in the 
war on terrorism. The American people also expect that the President 
will commit U.S. forces only after diplomatic avenues have been 
exhausted. And this resolution says that.
  This resolution underscores those concerns by imposing unambiguous 
responsibilities on our President.
  I am sure that resolution has been read to the American people and 
those watching us more than once.
  But let me just state a couple of them. Prior to using force or 
within 48 hours after exercising the authority, the President is 
required to certify to Congress that diplomatic and other peaceful 
means cannot protect our national security against the threat posed by 
Iraq. Also, he must certify that such means are not likely to bring 
Iraq into compliance with all relevant U.N. resolutions.
  Second, only in the event that diplomatic efforts fail and Iraq 
continues to breach its international obligations and the inspectors 
are given every opportunity for unimpeded access, then our President 
can use the military. He doesn't have to come back to us under those 
circumstances.
  Believe me, Saddam Hussein and his military and his scientists will 
immediately understand what it means if we give our President the 
authority to use force. There is no longer the delay in communications. 
Iraq will know we are serious, and we can be more effective in our 
diplomacy. If it doesn't work, we leave it in the hands of our 
President.
  Some observers think this resolution gives the President too much 
authority. In fact, the resolution gives the President no more 
authority than he already has as Commander in Chief to provide for the 
national security for the United States. What the resolution does is to 
recognize the clear and present danger of Saddam Hussein with weapons 
of mass destruction. It says he is a weapon of mass destruction. It 
calls the President to exercise this authority as a last resort, and 
only in the event that all negotiations are fruitless, and with the 
added condition that he explain his actions to the Congress.
  I believe the best way to prevent the Middle East, in this moment of 
history, from exploding into a war is for us to recognize how important 
we are to achieving peace, how important it is that we ask our 
President to be our instrument of peace in this very troubled part of 
the world.
  Even a person as culpable and as lacking in human decency as Saddam 
Hussein will understand that our President, once given the proper 
authority, will take all necessary action to ensure the security of 
America and humankind against the destruction of weapons of mass 
destruction. I believe he is far less likely to unleash weapons of mass 
destruction when he knows that the American military, with the full 
support of Congress, is poised to stand in his way.
  We have just today approved the biggest Defense bill ever in the 
history of America. We have given the President most of what he asked 
for in that bill. I believe it could not be worse news for Saddam 
Hussein than to learn that the U.S. Congress has approved the money 
needed to bolster our military and then, to learn shortly thereafter, 
that it has approved a resolution giving our President the real 
authority he needs to use military force to disarm Iraq. I believe this 
is the best way to secure peace.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, let me just say we have spent a lot of time, 
and we have a plan. It is not one that is going to finish quickly. We 
have a lot of work to do tonight. But this is a tremendous step 
forward. I ask everybody to listen. We have worked with a number of 
Senators for some time. I will just say I also have permission from the 
minority to allow Senator Sarbanes to speak for up to 30 minutes 
following the statement of the Senator from Michigan, Senator Levin. I 
ask unanimous consent that that be the case.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that immediately 
after the pledge tomorrow morning, following the 9:15 a.m. convening of 
the Senate, Senator Byrd be recognized to offer an amendment No. 4869; 
that there be a time limitation of 20 minutes, with the opposition 
controlling 5 minutes and Senator Byrd controlling 15 minutes; that 
following the use or yielding back of that time, the Senate vote on the 
amendment; that following the disposition of that amendment, there be 
30 minutes of debate equally divided between the leaders, with Senator 
Lott controlling the first 15 minutes and Senator Daschle controlling 
the final 15 minutes, and upon completion of that time, the Senate vote 
on Senator Lieberman's amendment, and that will be cloture on the 
Lieberman amendment; that following that vote, there be a time 
limitation of 45 minutes on Senator Byrd's amendment No.

[[Page 19721]]

4868, with Senator Byrd controlling 30 minutes, Senator Lieberman, or 
his designee--the only change would be Senator Biden would control the 
15 minutes in opposition. Upon the use or yielding back of that time, 
the Senate vote on Senator Byrd's amendment; further, that no second-
degree amendments be in order to either of the above-listed amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, reserving the right to object. I am 
perfectly agreeable to everything that has been said with reference to 
my amendments. I wonder if we can get a little more time for debate on 
the motion to invoke cloture. We have nothing but 15 minutes for Mr. 
Lott and 15 minutes for Mr. Daschle. I would like to have a few minutes 
to express opposition to cloture. I know it will be futile, but can we 
work out an additional 30 minutes? The two leaders can close, but this 
agreement only gives the two leaders a chance to talk on cloture. That 
is a key vote. I would like to have a few minutes on that, and perhaps 
other Senators would like time on either side.
  Mr. REID. The question is, prior to the cloture vote, would the 
minority have objection--or would anybody object to Senator Byrd having 
more time? How about 10 minutes, because the leaders only get 15?
  Mr. BYRD. Is the time so short?
  Mr. REID. Senator Byrd, I say respectfully the two leaders have 
indicated they are going to finish this tomorrow. Each minute we stall 
means that much later we have to go.
  Mr. BYRD. I am not stalling.
  Mr. REID. No one said the Senator is stalling. Each minute that we do 
not move forward means it will be that much later. Will the Senator 
agree to 10 minutes?
  Mr. BYRD. This is a question of life or death. Can I not get more 
than 10 minutes?
  Mr. SARBANES. If the Senator will yield, does each leader get 15 
minutes?
  Mr. REID. That's right.
  Mr. SARBANES. Why don't we give Senator Byrd 15 minutes?
  Mr. WARNER. Senator McCain is going to handle the Byrd amendment--
  Mr. REID. This is on cloture. Prior to cloture. Why don't we do that.
  Mr. WARNER. Our leader will speak prior to cloture.
  Mr. REID. I modify the request to that effect.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the distinguished Senator to recast 
what he is now seeking to achieve.
  Mr. REID. Yes. In the morning, at 9:15, we are going to come in. 
Senator Byrd would be recognized to offer amendment No. 4869, and there 
will be 20 minutes. He has 15 minutes and the opposition has 5 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Could Mr. McCain's name be put next to that?
  Mr. REID. Yes, 5 minutes to Senator McCain. And then following that, 
there would be a vote on that amendment. Then there will be a vote on 
cloture. Prior to vote on cloture, Senator Daschle would have the last 
15 minutes, Senator Lott would be the middle speaker, and Senator Byrd 
would be recognized for the first 15 minutes prior to the cloture vote. 
After that, Senator Byrd's other amendment would be brought up, with 
the time as indicated.
  Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator repeat the time.
  Mr. REID. There will be 45 minutes for Senator Byrd and 15 minutes 
for Senator McCain.
  Mr. WARNER. Make that McCain-Warner.
  Mr. REID. Senator Dayton wants to speak for 15 minutes on the Byrd 
amendment after cloture.
  Mr. WARNER. How about the Senator from Michigan?
  Mr. REID. We are going to work that out further. Please don't go any 
further.
  Mr. WARNER. I say to the leader that the Senator from Michigan is a 
vital part of the UC.
  Mr. REID. We are going to work on him, Senator Durbin and Senator 
Boxer.
  Mr. WARNER. That would be along the lines we agreed to in our 
conference.
  Mr. REID. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. I have no objection to the Senator's request.
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object. 
Pursuant, then, to this unanimous consent agreement, I understand it 
would then be in order for me to proceed and to lay down my amendment 
tonight.
  Mr. REID. The amendment we have spoken about, that's right. The 
Senator is next in order, anyway.
  Mr. LEVIN. The Byrd amendment has not been disposed of.
  Mr. REID. There is a gentlemen's agreement that will be set aside for 
you to offer your amendment because there is a time--I guess you would 
say a gentlemen's and ladies' agreement.
  Mr. BYRD. Reserving the right to object. I have no intention of 
objecting. Following the cloture vote, if cloture is invoked, what--
  Mr. REID. We go immediately to your amendment. You have 45 minutes on 
that, and there are 15 minutes in opposition.
  Mr. BYRD. On that amendment. And then--
  Mr. REID. Then we are going to work things out after that. We have 
talked to Senator Levin and we will talk to Senators Boxer and Durbin. 
I think we can work something out per the conversation we all had in 
the cloakroom.
  Mr. BYRD. Assuming cloture is invoked on this serious question--which 
it will be--there will be 30 hours for debate.
  Mr. REID. Yes. As I indicated, we will work with the Senator tomorrow 
on the time the Senator can have.
  Mr. BYRD. I beg the Senator's pardon.
  Mr. REID. We will work with the Senator on time so he can have some 
time yielded to him.
  Mr. BYRD. I hope so.
  Mr. REID. I indicated I will work on that.
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator is an honorable man and I thank him for all of 
his good work. I hope I am not limited tomorrow to 3 hours and 4 hours. 
I hope whatever Senators want to yield time to me may be allowed to do 
so.
  Mr. REID. I respectfully say to my friend, I would love to get over 
this hurdle, and we will worry about that tomorrow. I will do my best.
  Mr. BYRD. I know about getting over the hurdles. I was always afraid 
something would crawl out of the woodwork before I would get the Chair 
to put the question. I have nothing further.
  Mr. SARBANES. Will the Senator yield for a question.
  Mr. REID. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Upon the disposition of the second Byrd amendment, 
which would be after cloture--
  Mr. REID. We are working on that now, what will happen on that.
  Mr. SARBANES. How about the Levin amendment?
  Mr. REID. We tentatively have that worked out. I need to get off the 
floor and we can work that out. I am certain we have an agreement.
  Mr. SARBANES. I understand that now the Byrd amendment will be laid 
aside so that the Levin amendment can be called up.
  Mr. REID. Following his statement, the Senator from Maryland would be 
recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Did the Chair enter the order? I don't know if the Chair 
entered the order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Michigan is recognized for a period of 30 minutes. The Senator from 
Michigan.


         Amendment No. 4862 to Amendment No. 4856, As Modified

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Senator Reed, Senator 
Bingaman, Senator Boxer, Senator Mikulski, and Senator Stabenow, I call 
up amendment No. 4862, which is at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to laying aside the pending 
amendment?
  Mr. BYRD. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:


[[Page 19722]]

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself, Mr. 
     Reed, Mr. Bingaman, Mrs. Boxer, Ms. Mikulski, and Ms. 
     Stabenow, proposes an amendment numbered 4862 to amendment 
     No. 4856, as modified.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces, 
pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security Council, to 
destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 
  nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range ballistic missiles, and 
              related facilities, and for other purposes)

       In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the 
     amendment, insert the following:

     SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This joint resolution may be cited as the ``Multilateral 
     Use of Force Authorization Act of 2002''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) In accordance with United Nations Security Council 
     Resolution 687 (1991), Iraq made a commitment--
       (A) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all chemical and 
     biological weapons and stocks of agents and all related 
     subsystems and components and all research, development, 
     support, and manufacturing facilities related thereto;
       (B) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all ballistic 
     missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and 
     related major parts and production facilities;
       (C) not to acquire or develop any nuclear weapons, nuclear-
     weapons-usable material, nuclear-related subsystems or 
     components, or nuclear-related research, development, 
     support, or manufacturing facilities; and
       (D) to permit immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's 
     biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, and assist 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the 
     destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all nuclear-
     related items and in developing a plan for ongoing monitoring 
     and verification of Iraq's compliance.
       (2) The regime of Saddam Hussein consistently refused to 
     cooperate with United Nations Special Commission weapons 
     inspectors in Iraq between 1991 and 1998 by denying them 
     access to crucial people, sites, and documents.
       (3) On October 31, 1998, Iraq banned the United Nations 
     weapons inspectors despite its agreement and obligation to 
     comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 
     (1991).
       (4) Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, 
     in violation of its commitments under United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions, and 
     the regime of Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass 
     destruction against its own people and other nations.
       (5) The development of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq 
     is a threat to the United States, to the friends and allies 
     of the United States in the Middle East, and to international 
     peace and security.

     SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL POLICY FOR UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
                   COUNCIL ACTION ON IRAQ.

       Congress--
       (1) supports the President's call for the United Nations to 
     address the threat to international peace and security posed 
     by Saddam Hussein's continued refusal to meet Iraq's 
     obligations under resolutions of the United Nations Security 
     Council to accept the destruction, removal, or rendering 
     harmless of its weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-
     usable material, ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 
     150 kilometers, and related facilities, and to cease the 
     development, production, or acquisition of such weapons, 
     materials, and missiles;
       (2) urges the United Nations Security Council to adopt 
     promptly a resolution that--
       (A) demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and 
     unrestricted access of the United Nations weapons inspectors 
     so that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-
     usable material, ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 
     150 kilometers, and related facilities are destroyed, 
     removed, or rendered harmless; and
       (B) authorizes the use of necessary and appropriate 
     military force by member states of the United Nations to 
     enforce such resolution in the event that the Government of 
     Iraq refuses to comply;
       (3) affirms that, under international law and the United 
     Nations Charter, the United States has at all times the 
     inherent right to use military force in self-defense; and
       (4) will not adjourn sine die this year and will return to 
     session at any time before the next Congress convenes to 
     consider promptly proposals relative to Iraq if in the 
     judgment of the President the United Nations Security Council 
     fails to adopt or enforce the resolution described in 
     paragraph (2).

     SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES 
                   PURSUANT TO A NEW UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
                   COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

       (a) Authorization.--Pursuant to a resolution of the United 
     Nations Security Council described in section 3(2) that is 
     adopted after the enactment of this joint resolution, and 
     subject to subsection (b), the President is authorized to use 
     the Armed Forces of the United States to destroy, remove, or 
     render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear 
     weapons-usable material, ballistic missiles with a range 
     greater than 150 kilometers, and related facilities, if Iraq 
     fails to comply with the terms of the Security Council 
     resolution.
       (b) Requirements.--Before the authority granted in 
     subsection (a) is exercised, the President shall make 
     available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
     the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination 
     that the United States has used appropriate diplomatic and 
     other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with a 
     resolution of the United Nations Security Council described 
     in section 3(2) and that those efforts have not been and are 
     not likely to be successful in obtaining such compliance.
       (c) War Powers Resolution Requirements.--
       (1) Specific statutory authorization.--Consistent with 
     section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, Congress 
     declares that this section is intended to constitute specific 
     statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of 
     the War Powers Resolution (22 U.S.C. 1544(b)).
       (2) Applicability of other requirements.--Nothing in this 
     joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers 
     Resolution.

     SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

       Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this 
     joint resolution, and at least once during every 60-day 
     period thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a 
     report containing a summary of the status of efforts--
       (1) to have the United Nations Security Council adopt the 
     resolution described in section 3(2); or
       (2) in the case of the adoption of such resolution, to 
     obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolution.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment will provide an alternative 
to the Lieberman amendment. This amendment will authorize the President 
to use military force supporting the U.N. resolution that he seeks, but 
then provides that if he seeks to go it alone, if he wants authority to 
proceed unilaterally, he would then call us back into session.
  This amendment provides that if the President then seeks authority to 
unilaterally go it alone without the authority of the United Nations, 
not in support of a U.N. resolution, he would then call us back into 
session and seek that authority from the Congress.
  This is an alternative to the unilateral approach which is in the 
White House-supported resolution. This gives the same authority to the 
President to use military force of the United States in support of the 
U.N. resolution that he seeks, but does not at this time address the 
issue of going it alone and authorizing unilateral action or saving 
that for a later time should the United Nations not act.
  President Bush described in Cincinnati in detail the threat that 
Saddam Hussein's regime poses.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I wonder if my friend will yield for a 
moment. I just discovered in the haste of activities that the 
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee has 30 minutes 
to present his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. And then there is no time reserved for the Senator from 
Virginia to do any rebuttal following that amendment, but there is now 
time given to the Senator from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes, immediately 
following the Senator from Michigan; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. How much time is that?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Nelson of Florida). Thirty minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, President Bush described in Cincinnati in 
detail the threat that the Saddam Hussein regime poses. I have 
relatively few differences with that description, and I believe if 
Saddam Hussein continues to refuse to meet his obligation to destroy 
his weapons of mass destruction and his prohibited missile delivery 
systems, that the United Nations should

[[Page 19723]]

authorize member states to use military force to destroy those weapons 
and systems and that the United States Armed Forces should participate 
in and lead a United Nations authorized force. That is what my 
amendment provides.
  The issue that is in dispute is whether unilateral force should be 
authorized by Congress at this time in case the United Nations does not 
act--whether we should authorize the President now to go it alone 
without U.N. authorization if the United Nations does not act. How we 
answer that question could have a profound and lasting effect on the 
safety of our children and grandchildren for decades to come because 
the difference between attacking a nation with the support of the world 
community or attacking it without such support is fundamental.
  The President answers the question by seeking a resolution from 
Congress that gives him the authority to use force under the auspices 
of the United Nations or to go it alone if the United Nations fails to 
act. He seeks this unilateral authority even though he does not 
condition its use on the threat to the United States by Saddam as being 
imminent.
  Indeed, the President stated in the national security strategy that 
was released by the White House last month that preemptive attacks to 
forestall or prevent hostile acts by our adversaries can now be 
undertaken although a threat is not imminent.
  The new strategy the President has adopted explicitly states:

       We just adapt the concept of imminent threat to the 
     capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue 
     states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using 
     conventional means.

  The President's Iraq resolution and the national security strategy, 
therefore, both take the position that an imminent threat is no longer 
required as a basis for our military action in self-defense. The 
President is explicitly seeking to modify the traditional concept of 
preemption by deleting the need for ``imminent'' and substituting that 
of ``sufficient threat'' in the strategy document and ``continuing 
threat'' in the proposed resolution--dropping the requirement for 
``imminent''--that the threat be imminent--and substituting something 
far less--``sufficient'' or ``continuing.''
  That the President is seeking authorization for a unilateral 
preemptive attack without U.N. authorization or requirement of imminent 
threat is at the heart of the Senate debate that is presently taking 
place.
  Under the traditional international law concept of preemption in 
self-defense, the United States would be justified in acting alone in 
the case of a serious threat to our Nation that is imminent. In a case 
where a threat is not imminent, military action would also be justified 
if it were carried out pursuant to the authorization for the use of 
force by member states of the United Nations.
  The choice facing the Senate is whether Congress should now, at this 
time, give the President the authority to go it alone, to act 
unilaterally against Iraq if the United Nations fails to act.
  Congress is being presented with this issue at the very same time our 
Secretary of State is trying to get the United Nations to back a tough 
new resolution authorizing member states to use military force to 
enforce Iraqi compliance with inspections and disarmament.
  On Monday, the President said:

       I have asked Congress to authorize use of America's 
     military if it proves necessary to enforce U.N. Security 
     Council demands.

  That sounds like my alternative, but in fact the White House 
resolution asks for much more.
  The resolution the White House seeks is not limited to the use of 
force if the United Nations authorizes it. On the contrary, it 
specifically authorizes now the use of force on a unilateral, go-it-
alone basis, that is, without Security Council authorization. The 
President's rhetoric does not match the resolution before us.
  The White House approach also authorizes the use of force beyond 
dealing with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery, which is also a difference from my resolution.
  The resolution which I offer on behalf of those cosponsors and myself 
is consistent with how I think most Americans want us to proceed. It 
emphasizes the importance of dealing with Iraq on a multilateral basis, 
and it withholds judgment at this time on the question of whether the 
United States should go it alone, that is, whether we should act 
unilaterally against Iraq if the United Nations fails to act.
  This resolution I am offering does the following: First, it urges the 
United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution promptly that 
demands unconditional access for U.N. inspectors so Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction and prohibited ballistic missiles may be located and 
destroyed, and within that same U.N. resolution authorizes the use of 
necessary and appropriate force by U.N. member states as a means of 
enforcement in the event that Iraq refuses to comply.
  Our resolution also specifically authorizes use of United States 
Armed Forces pursuant to that U.N. Security Council resolution if Iraq 
fails to comply with its terms and the President informs the Congress 
of his determination that the United States has used appropriate 
diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain Iraqi compliance with 
such a U.N. resolution. Our resolution affirms that under international 
law and under the U.N. charter, especially article 51, the United 
States has at all times the inherent right to use military force in 
self-defense. This affirms the fact that there is no U.N. veto over 
U.S. military action.
  I repeat that because some of our colleagues have suggested otherwise 
about our resolution. The resolution we are offering explicitly affirms 
the fact there is no U.N. veto over U.S. military action because we 
state explicitly the United States has at all times an inherent right 
to use military force in self-defense. Our resolution also provides 
Congress will not adjourn sine die so that Congress can return to 
session, if necessary, and promptly consider proposals relative to Iraq 
if, in the judgment of the President, the U.N. Security Council does 
not promptly act on the resolution I have described above.
  Our resolution therefore supports the President's appeal to the 
United Nations and it approves now the use of our Armed Forces to 
support the action of the United Nations to force compliance by Saddam 
Hussein with inspections and disarmament. However, it does not 
authorize now, before we know whether or not we have the world 
community on our side, U.S. Armed Forces going alone. Should we need to 
consider that possibility at a future time, the resolution provides for 
the immediate recall of Congress to do so.
  Our resolution does not, on the matter of war and peace, life and 
death, exceed the grant of authority needed by the President at this 
time.
  If Congress instead endorses the White House approach, allowing the 
unilateral use of force at this time, even in the absence of a U.N. 
authorization, we will be sending an inconsistent message. We will be 
telling the United Nations that if they do not act, we will, at the 
same time we are urging them to act. We would be taking the U.N. off 
the hook if we adopt the go-it-alone resolution. We would be telling 
the United Nations they are not particularly relevant at the same time 
we are urging them to be very relevant. If we want the United Nations 
to be relevant and credible, if we want the United Nations to succeed, 
if we want the United Nations not to be limited to humanitarian and 
disaster relief and other tasks that are mighty useful but not 
essential--and I think most of us do--then we have to focus our efforts 
there and give those efforts a chance to succeed.
  If we act wisely, authorizing the use of our forces pursuant to a 
U.N. resolution authorizing member States to use force, we will not 
only unite the Congress, ultimately we will unite the world community 
on a course of action that will seek the elimination of Saddam 
Hussein's ability to threaten the world with weapons of mass 
destruction. That is where our focus should be,

[[Page 19724]]

uniting the world, not dividing it. Moreover, a going-alone approach, 
in which we attack Iraq without the support and participation of the 
world community, entails serious risks and could have serious 
consequences for us in the Middle East and around the world. It makes a 
difference, when deciding to use force, whether that use of force has 
the support of the world community. It makes a difference for us in the 
current situation involving a possible attack on Iraq. If we go it 
alone, will we be able to use air bases, ports, supply bases, 
overflight rights in the region? Those rights and capabilities are 
important to the success of a military operation against Saddam.
  The Saudis have said publicly that without the U.N. authorization, we 
will not have access to important bases, and that is just one country. 
Others have said something very similar. If we go it alone, will there 
be a reduction in the broad international support for the war on 
terrorism, including the law enforcement, financial and intelligence 
cooperation that is so essential? If we go it alone, will that 
destabilize an already volatile region and undermine governments such 
as Jordan and Pakistan? Could we possibly end up with a radical regime 
in Pakistan, a country which has nuclear weapons? If we go it alone, 
will Saddam Hussein or his military commanders be more likely to use 
weapons of mass destruction against other nations in the region and 
against our military forces in response to our attack? That would be 
the case if he faced a U.N.-authorized coalition, particularly if that 
coalition included Muslim nations as the coalition did during the gulf 
war.
  If we go it alone, will we be undercutting efforts to get other 
countries to help us with the expensive and lengthy task of stabilizing 
Iraq after Saddam is removed? Beyond the current situation relative to 
using force in Iraq, going it alone without U.N. authorization, based 
on a modified concept of preemption that no longer requires the threat 
to be imminent, will lead to a serious risk to international peace and 
security. If we act unilaterally, without U.N. authority or an imminent 
threat, that will create a dangerous situation for international peace 
and stability in the long term. We will be inviting other nations to 
forego an important rule of international law requiring a serious and 
imminent threat before one nation can attack another nation in the name 
of self-defense.
  India and Pakistan have a continuing threat, in their view, from each 
other. Even Greece and Turkey at times view each other as a continuing 
threat. If that becomes the test, and if we set the precedent in this 
resolution to authorize that kind of attack, in the absence of an 
imminent threat, we will be setting the world on a very different 
course, and we must consider a long time before doing that. That is 
what we should be called back into session to consider if the U.N. does 
not authorize force.
  By seeking a U.N. resolution that will authorize U.N. member States 
to use force if Iraq does not comply with its terms, we are not giving 
the United Nations a veto over the conduct of our foreign policy. What 
we are doing is getting from the United Nations strength and 
international support should military force be necessary. We should be 
seeking to unite the world against Saddam Hussein, not dividing it. Our 
immediate objective should be to get the United Nations to act, locate, 
and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the means of 
delivering them. The threat Saddam presents is real and we should deal 
with it. But authorization for preemptive, unilateral U.S. action in 
Iraq does not need to, and should not be granted at this time. If the 
U.N. does not act, Congress can be called back promptly to consider a 
request to authorize force unilaterally and to consider the serious and 
different risks involved in pursuing the unilateral course.
  Last Monday's Washington Post carried a story in which a senior 
European official's response to the U.S. going it alone was:

       A lot of Europeans would feel they had been put in an 
     intolerable position.

  For those who would agree to participate militarily:

       . . . it would be less a coalition of the willing than of 
     the dragooned.

  Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary-General, currently the EU's top 
foreign policy official, in an address at NATO headquarters last week 
stated:

       Ad hoc coalitions of docile followers to be chosen or 
     discarded at will is neither attractive nor sustainable.

  Just last week, after hearing from Prime Minister Blair and Foreign 
Minister Straw, the ruling Labor Party's conference in Britain issued a 
formal position on Iraq that included the following:

       The conference believes that the authority of the U.N. will 
     be undermined unless it is enforced, and recognizes that in 
     the last resort this could involve military action but 
     considers that this should be taken within the context of 
     international law and with the authority of the U.N.

  Just last Friday, Turkey's Presidential spokesman said his nation 
would participate in a campaign against Iraq only if the world body 
blessed them, stating ``an operation not based on international law 
cannot be accepted.''
  The best chance of having Saddam Hussein comply with U.N. Security 
Council resolutions is to make sure when he looks down the barrel of a 
gun that he sees the world at the other end, not just the United 
States. I believe he will not open up to inspections without looking 
down the barrel of a gun. I think only the credible threat of force 
will, indeed, disarm Saddam Hussein. But the question remains whether 
or not we want that force to be the world's authorized, supported 
force, or whether or not we at this time want to say, well, if they 
don't, we will. We will go it alone. When we do not need to address 
that issue at this time when the President is going to the United 
Nations, when it undermines our argument at the United Nations that we 
want them and need them to adopt a strong resolution, to enforce it, to 
authorize member states to use military force to enforce it. That is 
the direction we should be going, that is the focus we should have, and 
it should be strong and undiluted, the question of whether we authorize 
at this time a go-it-alone approach, when that is not what is needed at 
this time.
  Congress should give the President what he said in Cincinnati he was 
asking for: The authority to use U.S. military force to enforce U.S. 
Security Council demands; not what the resolution that is supported by 
the White House provides, which is going-it-alone authority. Our focus 
then would be where it belongs, securing a United Nations resolution 
that can unite the world; that has the best chance of forcing 
compliance and avoiding war; that reduces the risk to our forces and to 
our interests throughout the world; that avoids to the maximum extent 
possible the negative consequences if force is required, including the 
loss of cooperation on the war on terrorism. That is the best chance of 
isolating Saddam Hussein, rather than isolating the United States.
  I wonder how much time I have remaining?
  Ms. STABENOW. Will the Senator yield?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 10 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield 4 minutes to my colleague from 
Michigan.
  Ms. STABENOW. Mr. President, I thank my colleague and friend from 
Michigan for his thoughtful approach. I believe what Senator Levin has 
put forward is the right approach. It minimizes the risk to our 
country, to our troops, and maximizes the ability for the world 
community, including the United States, to come together, to make sure 
that Saddam Hussein does not have the opportunity to use weapons of 
mass destruction against us or against anyone else in the world.
  I would, just to support Senator Levin, quote again as I did last 
week on the floor of the Senate in my own statement, Brent Scowcroft, 
former National Security Adviser to President Bush, who wrote in the 
Wall Street Journal: An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously 
jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorism campaign we 
have undertaken. Ignoring that clear world sentiment against

[[Page 19725]]

an attack would result in a serious degradation in international 
cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply 
cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, 
especially on intelligence.
  I believe Senator Levin's approach guarantees we keep our focus on 
the coalition that has come together to fight terrorism in the world 
and at the same time gives us the opportunity to build that same 
coalition to turn attention to the threats of Saddam Hussein. We can do 
both. We can do it correctly. And we can minimize the risk that I 
believe will be there if we, in fact, rush to act alone.
  I thank Senator Levin, again, certainly as Chair of the Armed 
Services Committee, for his continual service to our country and his 
understanding of what it takes to make sure we are able to keep our 
focus on terrorism and take the time and the opportunity to build that 
same coalition to address the threats of Saddam Hussein's weapons of 
mass destruction.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Levin approach. I believe this is 
the approach that will allow us to make sure we do this right. I urge 
its adoption.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 6 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my 
amendment No. 4868 to remove paragraph 2, and further I ask consent to 
modify my amendment No. 4869 to change the references to Sec. 3(a) to 
4(a).
  Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, could the Senator from West 
Virginia tell us what these changes mean?
  Mr. BYRD. Yes. The second one is just a technical change in 
paragraphs, from 3(a) to 4(a). It makes no change in the substance of 
the amendment.
  The other change, I asked unanimous consent to modify my amendment 
No. 4868 to remove paragraph 2. This amendment is not affected by 
germaneness, no matter what happens. As submitted to the desk earlier, 
paragraph 2 is as follows--I want to take this out. Here is what I am 
moving to do. I can best clarify it by reading the entire amendment, 
and then I will state to the Senate where I want it cut off.
  My amendment would be Sec. 5. Statutory Construction.

       Nothing in this Joint Resolution--
       (1) is intended to alter the constitutional authorities of 
     the Congress to declare war, grant letters of Marque and 
     Reprisal, or other authorities invested in Congress by 
     Section 8, article I of the Constitution; or

   that is straightforward.Now, the part I wanted to take out says:

       Or, (2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the 
     President to use the United States Armed Forces for any 
     purpose not directly related to a clear threat of imminent, 
     sudden, and direct attack upon the United States, its 
     possessions or territories, or the Armed Forces of the United 
     States, unless the Congress of the United States otherwise 
     authorizes.

  I am asking to lop off that second paragraph. I had some concerns 
expressed by several of my colleagues on this side with respect to that 
part.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, respectfully and regrettably, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Is there objection to both requests?
  Mr. WARNER. The Chair is correct, to both requests.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I hope the Senator will reconsider that.
  I withdraw my request for the moment.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, it is my understanding the time of the 
Senator from West Virginia has not been off the time of the Senator 
from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. REID. The Senator from Michigan now has 6 minutes. Is that right?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. LEVIN. I understand my friends have some questions which I would 
be happy to try to answer on my 6 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague for 
permitting my colleague from Connecticut and myself to ask questions. I 
think the Senator from Connecticut can go first with his question.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from Michigan.
  Let me ask this question. The Senator's amendment provides the Senate 
not adjourn this year and return to session at any time before the next 
Congress convenes to consider promptly proposals relative to Iraq if, 
in the judgment of the President, the United Nations Security Council 
fails to adopt or enforce the resolution described in paragraph 2.
  My question to the Senator from Michigan is whether he has decided 
under those circumstances whether he would support a resolution 
authorizing the President to use force and the Armed Forces of the 
United States to enforce the United Nations resolutions.
  Mr. LEVIN. I think the circumstances would determine the answer to 
that question that exists at the time. But the risks of going it alone 
are so much greater than going multilateral support. It seems to me we 
should consider those risks before reaching a decision. Tonight I have 
laid out some of those risks which I believe are serious risks of going 
it alone. That is what I think we would all need to consider at great 
length before authorizing going-it-alone authority.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I say to my good friend, regrettably we 
have to very forcefully object to your amendment before the vote. But I 
say that our President, at the urging of everybody who said go to the 
United Nations, went to the United Nations. He gave a brilliant speech. 
The Secretary of State met with us yesterday. I met with him 
personally. The Secretary of State is doing everything possible to 
avoid a two-step process. I say regrettably to my good friend, were we 
to adopt this amendment, it would completely dislodge the efforts 
ongoing at this time in the United Nations to get, if possible, one 
single No. 17 resolution and put it in place.
  Mr. LEVIN. I turn that into a question, whether or not I agree. It 
seems to me the opposite is true. We are asking the United Nations to 
take action. We want them to do it with one step. My resolution urges 
one step--impose the obligation on Saddam Hussein, and authorize force 
to enforce that mandate. It is one step in my resolution.
  If we go to the U.N., as we are now doing, and say we really need 
you, it is really important we have United Nations support, that is 
what we are saying, the President said we want you to be credible, it 
is totally inconsistent at the same time in your resolution to say, by 
the way, if you do not do it, we will. It just takes the United Nations 
off the hook. It sends the opposite message to the U.N. from what we 
should be saying to the United Nations and I thought the President was 
saying to the United Nations: We want you to be credible. We need the 
world to come together for Saddam Hussein.
  The resolution that the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from 
Connecticut supports is basically to say, if you do not do it, we will 
go it alone.
  That is the wrong message to the world for many reasons.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to do that.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator.
  My friend from Michigan knows one of the reasons I cosponsored the 
resolution underlying it is I believe the best way for us to get the 
United Nations to act to enforce its own resolutions is if we make 
clear we are prepared to do so ourselves, although that is not our 
preference.
  Here is my question: In section 3(3) of the Senator's amendment, you 
do affirm under international law the U.S. has at all times the 
inherent right to use military force itself. You argued tonight that is 
an indication that those who have said your amendment gives a veto to 
U.N. over U.S. actions are not correct. But isn't it true the section 
just below, section 4(a) of your amendment, says the President is 
authorized to use the Armed Forces of the U.S. to destroy, remove, or 
render harmless

[[Page 19726]]

Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons material, ballistic 
missiles, et cetera, only pursuant to a resolution of the United 
Nations Security Council as described above?
  So while you recognize the inherent right of the U.S. to defend 
itself, to take military action in self-defense, isn't it true your 
amendment does give the United Nations a veto over the authority of the 
United States to take action to enforce the resolutions of the United 
Nations?
  Mr. LEVIN. It is quite the opposite. The good Senator from 
Connecticut read the language which makes it clear there is no veto. We 
can always have the inherent right to use military force in self-
defense, period. We never will yield that to the United Nations or to 
anyone else.
  My good friend from Connecticut was the author of a resolution back 
in 1991. He led the way on this authorization in the gulf war. The 
Senator was correct in his analysis, that we should move in the gulf 
war, and my good friend from Virginia was as well. That resolution the 
Senator from Connecticut offered to support military action in the gulf 
war said the following: The President is authorized, subject to 
subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 678.
  The Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Virginia in the 
gulf war resolution had language which was adopted by a close majority, 
but nonetheless adopted, which said the President is authorized to use 
United States Armed Forces pursuant to the United Nations Security 
Council resolution. Nobody suggested then that the Senator from 
Connecticut was giving the United Nations a veto over U.S. military 
force. That was a grant of authority to enforce a United Nations 
resolution. That is the same language we are using.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator from Michigan is quite correct. The 
difference, I want to respectfully suggest, is in the context--in the 
historical context. There was an invasion by Iraq of Kuwait. There had 
already been a United Nations Security Council resolution. That is why 
the authority was as described.
  Here, this resolution by Senators Warner, McCain, Bayh, and I have 
introduced is based on a record now of 11 years in which everything 
else has been tried to get Iraq to comply with those resolutions, and 
they haven't.
  I think the difference here--I ask the Senator if he would react--is 
that the Senator has acknowledged the obvious inherent right of the 
United States to act in self-defense. That is a higher standard than 
the question of acting to enforce United Nations Security Council 
resolutions. In other words, it may be I might argue that is not in 
self-defense because I believe if we do not disarm Saddam Hussein, he 
will eventually strike us and our allies. But, in any case, in 
affirming a right of self-defense, the Senator has set a standard that 
is not carried out in a later section which makes our ability to 
enforce those resolutions pursuant to United Nations authorization.
  So to that extent, your amendment would give the United Nations a 
veto over whether the President of the United States could take action 
against Iraq to enforce outstanding U.N. resolutions.
  Mr. LEVIN. I will put that in the form of a question.
  I vehemently disagree. I urge the Senator from Connecticut to read 
the language, which flat out says: We affirm ``the United States has at 
all times the inherent right to use military force in self-defense. . . 
.'' We affirm that.
  The Senator from Connecticut, in the resolution in 1991, did not even 
affirm that. It just simply authorized the President to use military 
force pursuant to the United Nations Security Council resolution. No 
one suggested then that anyone was ceding the power to use our force to 
the United Nations. Yet in our resolution, the alternative resolution, 
the multilateral resolution, for some reason, the folks who are 
supporting the go-it-alone resolution are suggesting we are ceding 
something to the U.N. when we explicitly reaffirm our right to self-
defense.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I do not think we will ever go it alone because we are 
going to the United Nations. But how then does the Senator read section 
4(a) of his amendment, which says clearly that the President can only 
use the Armed Forces of the United States to destroy, disarm Iraq's 
weapons of mass destruction if there is U.N. permission?
  Mr. LEVIN. Where does the word ``only'' appear in that resolution?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will read it:

       Pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security 
     Council described in section 3(2) that is adopted after the 
     enactment of this joint resolution . . . the President is 
     authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States. . . 
     .

  Mr. LEVIN. Where does the word ``only'' appear in this resolution? 
That is my question to my dear friend from Connecticut. The Senator 
added a word that is not in the resolution and ignores a paragraph, 
saying we have an inherent right of self-defense, that is in the 
resolution.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Now we have joined the issue.
  Then I ask the Senator this final question: Would it be the Senator's 
opinion that enforcement of outstanding U.N. Security Council 
resolutions would amount to an act of self-defense and, therefore, the 
President of the United States could do that without an authorizing 
resolution from the United Nations?
  Mr. LEVIN. We have an inherent right to use military force in self-
defense, and that means, under law which is well established, that if 
there is an imminent threat to the United States, we do not have to 
wait for that threat to be implemented. We can act against any imminent 
threat whether or not there is a U.N. resolution covering that threat. 
If it is an imminent threat, we may act in self-defense.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. In that case, is it not true the Senator from Michigan 
is adding a word, which is the word ``imminent''?
  Mr. LEVIN. No. You have asked me to interpret the words ``inherent 
right of self-defense.'' What I am saying is, under international law, 
self-defense requires that a threat be imminent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Connecticut.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state his inquiry.
  Mr. SARBANES. What is the parliamentary situation?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Maryland is to be recognized for up to 30 minutes.
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I ask unanimous 
consent that the time not run against the Senator from Maryland for a 
unanimous consent request that we would like to have adopted.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator for the purposes 
of his unanimous consent request, with the understanding I not lose my 
right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. I would also say we have a number of people who want to 
speak. It is a little bit difficult because we have Senator Levin and 
Senator Sarbanes for an hour. So I know that some of my colleagues on 
this side have been waiting a long time. But we have also had people 
over here waiting a long time.
  So this would be my suggestion as to the time: That following the 
statement of Senator Sarbanes, Senator Hutchinson be recognized for 25 
minutes; following that, Senator Thompson be recognized for 20 minutes; 
following that, Senator Murray be recognized for 20 minutes; Senator 
Enzi for 20 minutes; Senator Reed for 40 minutes; Senator Chafee for 7 
minutes; and then Senator Durbin for 30 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Now, if my friend from Maryland would withhold, we have a 
unanimous consent request that I gave

[[Page 19727]]

to be copied, and it has not shown up. Here it comes. I would really 
like to get that done.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I understand, under the unanimous 
consent agreement, this time is not being charged against my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. REID. I suggest the absence of a quorum. As soon as the quorum 
call is called off, I will do the unanimous consent request and give 
the time to the Senator that he is entitled to anyway.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, let me, just as a background, indicate that 
Senators Levin, Boxer, and Durbin have been most cooperative. They have 
amendments that have been filed in the appropriate form. They have 
indicated they will offer each amendment tomorrow. Senator Levin's is 
pending tonight. We will dispose of these amendments, and they will 
offer no other amendments tomorrow.
  Senator Boxer's is going to be disposed of at some length. She is 
always very deliberate in what she does. She recognizes this amendment 
is good, recognizes that the best way to handle this, though, is to 
have a colloquy tomorrow. I have spoken to the minority manager on this 
matter. He has agreed to enter into a colloquy with her. We have 
discussed what that would be.
  Mr. WARNER. That is correct. Senator McCain and I will engage in a 
colloquy.
  Mr. REID. I therefore ask unanimous consent that following the 
disposition of Senator Byrd's amendment No. 4868, the Senate resume 
consideration of Senator Levin's amendment No. 4862; that the amendment 
be in order notwithstanding the provisions of rule XXII; that there be 
50 minutes under the control of Senator Levin and 45 minutes in 
opposition divided as follows: 15 minutes for Senator Biden, 15 minutes 
for Senator Warner, and 15 minutes for Senator McCain--this would be in 
opposition to the Levin amendment--that upon the use or yielding back 
of that time, the Senate vote without any intervening action on, or in 
relation to, Senator Levin's amendment; that upon disposition of his 
amendment, Senator Durbin be recognized to call up amendment No. 4865; 
that Senator Durbin control 40 minutes for debate and 10 minutes for 
Senator Biden and 15 minutes for Senators Warner and McCain in 
opposition, a total of 35 minutes, plus the 10 minutes for Senator 
Biden--it would be 10 minutes for Senator Biden, 15 minutes combined 
for Senators Warner and McCain--that upon the use or yielding back of 
that time, the Senate vote without any intervening action on or in 
relation to Senator Durbin's amendment; that no second-degree 
amendments be in order to either of these above-listed amendments.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. The only change I would make in the request I just made is 
that Senator Durbin have an up-or-down vote on his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, having done that, I really appreciate very 
much Senator Sarbanes yielding. I would ask that after Senator Sarbanes 
finishes his statement, Senator Chafee, who has agreed to speak for 
only 7 minutes--rather than his waiting at the bottom of the list, I 
wonder if we could get him up at the top of the list to speak, and 
hopefully maybe Senators Hutchinson or Thompson may not use all their 
time. That may work out OK anyway.
  My question is, Does anyone object to Senator Chafee speaking first?
  Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object--I won't object--I wanted 
to take a second to thank Senator Reid for arranging the disposition of 
this very difficult issue in an equitable fashion to all. I thank him 
for a masterful job that a few hours ago did not seem likely.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. May I join Senator McCain. Also, there is reference in 
here to time allocated to Senator McCain and myself. We will assure our 
distinguished Senator from Connecticut that that time will be given to 
him as allotted between Senator McCain and myself.
  Lastly, Mr. President, we still have a number of Members who have 
been attempting to make statements relative to the underlying bill. I 
assure Senators DeWine, Collins, Specter, and others that we will be 
working with them with regard to scheduling tomorrow.
  Mr. REID. I would also say, I appreciate very much the cooperation of 
everyone. But before we start doing too much back slapping here, 
tomorrow is going to be a really difficult day. We have to be prepared 
for that.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we recognize that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Reserving the right to object, would the Senator clarify 
the list of speakers following Senator Sarbanes with the change 
regarding Senator Chafee?
  Mr. REID. Senators Chafee, Hutchinson, and Thompson would be before 
you, and Senator Chafee has 7 minutes. Senator Hutchinson has 25, and 
Senator Thompson has 20. I would say to my friend from Washington, you 
have been here for at least 4 hours that I know of. But the point is, 
we are using up a lot of time with Senator Levin and Senator Sarbanes. 
They are really entitled to that time only from an equitable 
standpoint, not from the fact that anyone could object to it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. REED. Reserving right to object----
  Mr. REID. You are already in the queue.
  Mr. REED. You did agree to the list?
  Mr. REID. Following Senator Thompson, Senator Reed is recognized for 
40 minutes, Senator Enzi, 20 minutes, and then Senator Durbin for 30 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Maryland is recognized under the previous order.
  Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for a unanimous consent request?
  Mr. SARBANES. I yield to the Senator.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Akaka be added as a 
cosponsor of our amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I first want to commend, in the very 
strongest terms, the very able Senator from Michigan, chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, for the powerful statement he just made and 
for the analysis he has brought to this critically important issue.
  In my judgment, he has drawn the essential lines of distinction and 
differentiation. They are reflected in the amendment that is now before 
us, which I hope will be adopted tomorrow when it is offered as a 
substitute to the pending Lieberman proposal.
  At the end of World War II, the United States stood astride the world 
like a colossus. We were preeminently the most powerful nation--in some 
respects, more powerful even than we are today, although we are once 
again certainly the most powerful nation. At the end of World War II, 
the United States had an overwhelming military capacity and 
overwhelming economic strength, but at that time we chose to act 
multilaterally, to make our way in the world on the basis of 
cooperation, to help found the United Nations. The United States played 
a leading role in creating the U.N. framework and has

[[Page 19728]]

exercised extraordinary influence within it ever since.
  The question of how we are to exercise our power is a critically 
important question. We need to recognize that, for it is at issue here. 
We face a real dividing line: are we going to seek to exercise our 
power in cooperation, in coordination with others, which in the current 
context means working through the United Nations; or are we going to 
move down the path of asserting a unilateral preemptive prerogative, in 
effect, asserting our right to do what we want anywhere, anytime, to 
anyone. The comprehensive strategic doctrine that the administration 
issued only a short while ago would take us down that unilateral path.
  It goes without saying, as the able Senator from Michigan pointed 
out, that the United States has an inherent right of self-defense; this 
right is recognized in his amendment. In fact, international law and 
the United Nations Charter both recognize that inherent right to use 
military force in self-defense.
  But as the Senator very carefully pointed out in his most thoughtful 
statement, under international law that inherent right to use military 
force in self-defense is justified in response to an imminent threat. 
Now we have an effort to change that standard. I think such a change is 
fraught with danger both for our position in the world and for our 
leadership status.
  We have to re-affirm the long-standing principle that the most 
effective way to accomplish our goals is to work in concert with 
others. No one is proposing to give away our ultimate authority to act. 
The President can always come back to us to seek such an authorization. 
In fact, if the Senator from Michigan will yield for a question----
  Mr. LEVIN. Yes.
  Mr. SARBANES. As I read the amendment, the Senator provides that the 
President could come back to Congress to seek authority if he decided 
it was necessary to proceed on the unilateral path; is that correct?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. On the other hand, his amendment provides an authority 
to act in support of multilateral action, as reflected in the adoption 
of a U.N. resolution, which would seek to deal with the threat Saddam 
Hussein presents to the region and to the world; is that correct?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator is absolutely correct.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, this is an extremely important point. It 
is not enough to be strong; you have to be smart as well. You have to 
be both strong and smart. If we insist on acting alone, the potential 
consequences are obviously very great.
  First of all--although it has been asserted by some to the contrary--
many believe it will impede and adversely affect the war against 
terrorism. Why do they believe that? Because the war against terrorism, 
as Brent Scowcroft has pointed out in a number of articles, requires 
the cooperation of other nations, the broadest possible coalition of 
nations. We need the contributions of their intelligence services. We 
need their cooperation in tracing and cutting off money that is going 
to fund terrorist activities. We need other nations to help us monitor 
and control the movement of people across frontiers and borders. If the 
United States says to the rest of the world that we are just going to 
go our own way, we will be hard put to turn around and expect a high 
degree of cooperation and participation when we need it badly. We have 
to work with others. There is no question about that.
  Efforts are underway at the U.N. now to develop a very strong 
resolution as the basis for sending the inspectors back into Iraq. I 
support that effort. I don't understand those who seem to just dismiss 
the possibility of what the inspectors might accomplish. Others have 
said that the inspection system was futile, that Saddam played games 
with the inspectors and made it impossible for them to see the total 
picture. I don't differ with that. But I want to emphasize that the 
inspectors did a very good job. They discovered and destroyed a lot of 
weaponry, and they very substantially reduced Saddam's capabilities.
  I fail to understand why, if we have the opportunity to send them 
back under terms that will enable them to do their job, we would not 
pursue that option before resorting to military force. Why would we not 
do that? Why would we not explore to the limit the possibility of 
resolving the situation without having to resort to war?
  Think of the experience of the past fifty-plus years. International 
cooperation has worked brilliantly for the United States for over half 
a century. President Truman, President Eisenhower, and their 
successors, faced grave provocations at critical turning points but 
refrained from taking unilateral military action. There were some who 
argued at the end of World War II that the United States should attack 
the Soviet Union, at a time when the United States had a nuclear 
capability and the Soviet Union did not. That argument was rejected, 
rightly, by President Truman.
  We had the foresight and the wisdom at the time to see the importance 
of cooperative international relationships to protecting our security 
broadly defined. Our security is not one-dimensional: it encompasses 
military matters, of course, but also economic and political matters. 
The United States must work in a world environment in which we seek to 
maximize cooperation. We run great dangers if we proceed unilaterally.
  This amendment says, in effect, that at the present time the Congress 
is not going to provide an authority for unilateral action. It also 
says that if the President concludes that such action is necessary, he 
can come back to the Congress and request the necessary authority. This 
is an effort to support a multilateral effort.
  Does anyone seriously contest the proposition that if we act in 
concert with other nations, if the U.S. action has the support of the 
international community, then the possibility of turbulence in other 
countries in the region, with which we have had important longstanding 
relationships, will be much less, and the support that will come from 
elsewhere in the world will be much greater?
  Furthermore, consider for a moment the precedent we are setting if we 
adopt this model of unilateral preemptive action.
  We have worked very hard to try to develop international law in the 
United Nations institutions which can check the danger that countries 
will seek to attack others, but if we assert our right to undertake 
preemptive action on a unilateral basis, act and do a unilateral 
preemption, what will keep other countries from doing the same, and 
using our action as their justification?
  A very tense situation exists between India and Pakistan, and in 
other parts of the world. What message do we send by acting 
unilaterally? This is a very important question for us, especially as 
we are now so powerful.
  Interestingly enough, the more powerful you are, the more urgent this 
question becomes. Stanley Hoffmann has made this point in a very 
thoughtful and provocative article, and I ask unanimous consent the 
article be printed in the Record at the end of my remarks----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr Schumer). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SARBANES. Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out it is precisely the 
most powerful state that has the greatest interest in links of 
reciprocity, international law, and mutual restraint; that a superpower 
must take special care not to provoke the united resistance of lesser 
powers. The challenge, and it is a challenge, is to work cooperatively, 
through the international institutions. In doing so we join with others 
to register a judgment of the entire international community, and we 
can then use our strength to carry out this judgment of the 
international community, again in cooperation with others. Failure to 
do that, I think, is fraught with dangers for our continued leadership 
position in the world.
  It seems to me the distinction made in this amendment is a critical 
one. It reserves to the United States the power

[[Page 19729]]

to act in self-defense. It provides authority to back a U.N. action and 
it leaves open, of course, the possibility of the President's coming 
back to the Congress to request an authority to act unilaterally, which 
would then enable us to assess the circumstances and the consequences 
under those circumstances of granting such an action.
  We have an opportunity here to achieve our ends--the destruction of 
this program of weapons of mass destruction, assuming that is our end--
without resorting to unilateral military action, and I think that is 
the option we should pursue at this time.
  As a matter of fact, the authority contained in the underlying 
resolution cites Iraq's violation of all previous U.N. resolutions as a 
basis for acting. Some of those previous resolutions did not deal with 
the issue of weapons of mass destruction at all. One dealt with 
violations of the oil embargo. Another dealt with accounting for 
missing prisoners of war. Is it intended that we authorize the use of 
military force to achieve the objectives of these and other resolutions 
not directed to the issue of weapons of mass destruction? I would hope 
not. But in fact that is precisely what the underlying resolution, the 
Warner-Lieberman resolution, provides, and what the administration 
supports.
  I am not going to address the very broad resolution that the 
President originally sent here. I find it difficult to understand the 
administration's reasoning in sending such a proposal to the Congress, 
given the thinking it represented about the role of the Congress in 
making a decision with respect to the use of military force. On a 
matter as grave and momentous as this, it is a matter of great concern.
  That resolution was apparently written in the White House counsel's 
office. It was not written at the State Department. It was not written 
by those who have had to deal with these difficult and complex issues. 
It created such concern when it was first sent to the Hill that efforts 
were subsequently made to modify it somewhat. But the basic difficulty 
remains: like its predecessor, the revised resolution posits unilateral 
and not multilateral action.
  I think the United States at this point needs to focus all its 
energies on acting in concert with the international community to send 
a very strong message to Saddam Hussein. That message will be much 
stronger for having the support of the international community and 
representing the judgement of the international community. To those who 
say, Suppose they don't act? I would respond that we will consider the 
matter in the light of that circumstance. But the chances are better, I 
think, that the international community will act through the United 
Nations if the U.S. makes its case and calls upon other nations to join 
in the effort.
  To those who say that by seeking multilateral, U.N. action we are 
giving the U.N. a veto over the right of the U.S. to use its military 
power to defend itself, I say that is absolutely not the case. Under 
international law the inherent right to self-defense is precisely 
defined and recognized. We seek a U.N. resolution to reflect the 
judgement of the international community, and through that resolution 
we seek to accomplish our objectives.
  Congressman Houghton of New York had an interesting statement on the 
floor of the House last night. He said: The right decision at the wrong 
time is the wrong decision. I think we should keep that in mind as we 
think about how the United States ought to proceed.
  Mr. President, I strongly urge my colleagues to think through very 
carefully the implications of a go-it-alone strategy. We need to work 
with others. We ought to join in a common effort. Other nations can be 
supportive in numerous ways. Anyone who talks about the situation knows 
that if force is eventually used against Iraq, there will have to be 
major reconstruction afterwards. Everyone acknowledges this. Who will 
do it? Will the U.S. do it alone? We can hardly draw much comfort from 
what we are doing in Afghanistan. We had an amazing, very successful 
military action, and yet we now run the risk of having success turn 
into failure. Afghanistan is in the very earliest stages of 
reconstruction: its entire infrastructure needs to be rebuilt; the 
central government has no effective control of the country and barely 
of the capital. Its elected President Hamid Karzai is a man of great 
courage. He has asked for continuing international support. He said 
over the weekend:

       I believe the presence of the international forces here 
     should be for as long as the Afghan people need them. The 
     essential thing here is to help Afghanistan stand back on its 
     feet to defend itself and defend against terrorism and 
     radicalism.
       And then the rest of the world can go and we will be able 
     to manage on our own.''

  International forces are in Afghanistan, and the world has registered 
a judgment there. I frankly think the United States could and should be 
doing more than it currently is to assure the progress of the Afghan 
reconstruction. We have an important stake there, much too important to 
relegate to a back seat. On the contrary, we must remain focused, to 
make sure that it is carried through to success.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. SARBANES. How much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland has 6 minutes and 56 
seconds.
  Mr. SARBANES. I will yield briefly.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. First, I want to say I agree with the Senator totally 
concerning his comments about Afghanistan, and I hope if the time 
comes, as I hope and pray it will, that there is a post-Saddam Iraq, we 
will learn from the mistakes that were made in post-Taliban Afghanistan 
and devote ourselves to broad peacekeeping which will be necessary in 
the economic and political redevelopment of the country 
internationally. But my question----
  Mr. SARBANES. Let us keep the focus on the situation in Afghanistan. 
That chapter is far from finished. We have an opportunity to correct at 
least some of the mistakes we have made in Afghanistan, but 
unfortunately we are not doing so. The administration is very 
resistant.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. In Afghanistan?
  Mr. SARBANES. In Afghanistan, absolutely.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I agree with the Senator from Maryland. And, of 
course, I agree with his----
  Mr. SARBANES. If we do not meet our commitments in Afghanistan, what 
lessons will we draw with respect to our obligations in Iraq?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. That we must do it in Iraq.
  Mr. SARBANES. By ourselves? Is it your view that we do not need the 
efforts of the international community alongside our own?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. We do, and that is the question. I view the underlying 
resolution I have introduced with Senators Warner, McCain, and Bayh as 
an international resolution. It is all about enforcing the resolutions 
of the United Nations. It acknowledges, appreciates, encourages the 
President to go forward at the United Nations, but it is based on the 
premise that if we indicate a willingness to lead, even in leading an 
international coalition, to enforce U.N. resolutions if someone 
exercises a veto against doing that at the Security Council, that 
others will follow. I think the strength in our underlying resolution 
is the best way to guarantee that either through the U.N. or after----
  Mr. SARBANES. My perception of the underlying resolution is that it 
says to the world the following: we are here, we want to get this 
resolution, we want to work together, but if you will not do it our 
way, then we are going to do it unilaterally, and in any event we 
assert the right to act unilaterally. It is part and parcel of the new 
strategic doctrine that has just been announced.
  For the life of me I do not understand why the administration chose 
this particular moment to proclaim this doctrine, which obviously 
raises all sorts of additional red flags about what their intentions 
with respect to the U.S. role around the world.
  There is no question that the United States is the most powerful 
country in the world. I do not recall the precise figure, but the 
American military budget is more than the sum of I do not

[[Page 19730]]

know how many countries that follow along behind us. Yes, we have 
incredible military resources and power. We can go around the world and 
whack anybody we choose. We can brush almost anyone aside.
  But is that what we want for our nation? Is that the way we choose to 
conduct ourselves? Why would we make such a choice when we have an 
opportunity, if we are smart and skillful and have the underlying 
military strength, to work in a way that brings the rest of the 
international community into concert with us?
  We have an opportunity to help formulate the judgement of the 
international community against someone who has clearly violated 
international norms and standards, and to have that judgement carried 
out. Why would we not seek to do so?
  That is the path the Levin proposal lays out. It avoids the downside 
of having the United States asserting a unilateral right as the basis 
for its action. We should not throw away the opportunity to work 
through the United Nations and in concert with others to accomplish our 
objectives with respect to disarming Iraq, and also to set very 
important precedents and standards for the international community in 
dealing with problems of this kind. It is frustrating to think that we 
might not avail ourselves of this opportunity.
  What will we say when some other country decides to engage in pre-
emptive action on a unilateral basis? If we condemn the action, arguing 
that it aggravates tensions and creates chaos in the international 
world, the response will be that we have no basis for criticism--if we 
did it, why should other countries be kept from doing it? What message 
will our actions send to countries in other parts of the world where 
tensions run very high?
  I close with a plea to my colleagues to recognize the fundamental 
distinction between unilateral and multilateral action. I ask my 
colleagues to consider how important it is for our future, in so many 
ways--not just in military and security terms, but also for our 
economic and political and indeed the whole range of our interests--
that we seek to work with others and not set out on a path of 
unilateral action. That the U.S. has such great military resources at 
its command makes the decision that much more urgent. It may seem 
paradoxical, as Stanley Hoffman has observed, so powerful a nation 
should choose to work in concert with other nations rather than through 
willful imposition of its power on others. But that principle has 
served our national interests well, and that is where our long-term 
interests lie.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

              [From the American Prospect, Sept. 23, 2002]

                       America Alone in the World

                         (By Stanley Hoffmann)

       The horrors of September 11 confronted the United States 
     with an extraordinary challenge and an extraordinary 
     opportunity. The challenge was to increase our ``homeland 
     security'' by measures that might have averted disaster, had 
     they been implemented before the attacks, and that would 
     minimize the risk of similar assaults in the future. The 
     opportunity was to build on the sympathy and shock of other 
     nations in order to construct a broad coalition against the 
     sort of terrorism the United States had suffered.
       Alas, it cannot be said that the year was well used. As the 
     great Oxford and Yale historian of war Sir Michael Howard 
     predicted, the notion of a ``war'' on terrorism proved a 
     pernicious one. The very word ``war'' suggests military 
     measures and, of course, victory--rather than the difficult, 
     slow and partly clandestine operations that fighting 
     terrorism entails. So, too, does war allow for suspending or 
     violating citizens' liberties, holding foreigners without due 
     process and resorting to other arbitrary new forms of 
     justice.
       Moreover, by defining the fight as one against global 
     terrorism--including the supposed axis of evil--President 
     George W. Bush was able to endow his controversial and highly 
     partisan agenda with a heroic dimension. Using his new 
     popularity and his global war, he sought to silence or enlist 
     the opposition. It's not exactly the newest trick in 
     politics. The problem, however, was twofold. Conceptually, 
     global terrorism is the sum of many individual terrorist acts 
     (most of them local) with very different inspirations, 
     dynamics and scopes. One size does not fit all. Indeed, some 
     of our allies against al-Qaeda had been terrorists or had 
     encouraged terrorists in the past--or even the present. 
     Useful as it was against the Taliban, the idea of taking 
     action against not only terrorists but also the states that 
     harbored them posed insoluble political problems with some 
     allies (such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) that had supported 
     terrorism. It also posed problems with democratic countries 
     that had tolerated terrorists on their soil (Germany, Spain 
     and the United States itself).
       The strategy posed yet another set of problems with nations 
     that used the American war and its rhetoric as a pretext for 
     getting dangerously tougher with their own enemies. These 
     enemies were charged (often correctly) with terrorism, but 
     their circumstances were radically different from those under 
     which Osama bin Laden deployed his rabid theological and 
     anti-Western global network. In the case of Kashmir, the 
     cynical exploitation of the antiterrorist cause put the 
     United States in an embarrassing position, especially given 
     Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf's indispensable 
     role in the assault on Afghanistan. In the case of the 
     Palestinian intifada, the logic of antiterrorism pushed Bush 
     into supporting Ariel Sharon--a stance that shored up Israeli 
     repression and helped justify Sharon's clever policy of 
     destroying the Palestinian Authority while accusing it at 
     once of impotence and of encouraging extremists.
       By the end of the Clinton era, Palestinian and Israeli 
     negotiators in Taba, Egypt, had been very close to an 
     agreement on all important issues. Indeed, the Israel-
     Palestine conflicts is one that cannot be resolved without 
     strong American input and pressure. Washington's post-9-11 
     tilt toward Sharon, however, has rendered the United States 
     ineffectual on this crucial issue--one that many friendly 
     Muslims regard as a test of American goodwill. The ability to 
     resolve the Palestinian issue was one casualty of the 
     relentless anti-terrorism priority. But there were at least 
     two others that Harvard professor and journalist Michael 
     Ignatieff has noted. An administration that had already 
     declared its distaste for ``nation building'' and for 
     humanitarian interventions (except on narrow calculations of 
     national interest) has become even more indifferent toward 
     humanitarian considerations. To be sure, the administration 
     spouts pro-democracy rhetoric. But it views humanitarian 
     concerns as mere distractions from the war on terrorism. 
     Similarly, the concern for human rights that has occasionally 
     animated U.S. foreign policy would have embarrassed or 
     annoyed many of our allies in the war, including Pakistan, 
     Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. A foreign policy that took 
     human rights seriously might have helped, in the long run, to 
     limit the appeal of terrorism; but human rights are no longer 
     even an ornament of U.S. diplomacy.
       The coherence and consistency that the war was supposed to 
     lend U.S. foreign policy have not materialized. The attempts 
     to link Saddam Hussein's regime to 9-11 and other terrorist 
     plots have failed; a rational for attacking him and had to be 
     sought elsewhere. The administration is still looking for a 
     convincing one.
       Iraq's quest for weapons of mass destruction is not unique. 
     But the new doctrine of preventive action against countries 
     that work on acquiring such weapons and are hostile to the 
     United States is very different from other breaches of state 
     sovereignty as sanctioned by modern international law. In the 
     past, collective efforts to curb excessive aggression on the 
     part of sovereign powers have been pursued with the 
     benediction of the United Nations. In the current instance, 
     we risk acting on our own and creating a dangerous moral and 
     political precedent.
       Deterrence worked well against the Soviet Union, a much 
     more potent and, at one point, malevolent adversary. If 
     applied consistently, energetically and with the support of 
     allies, deterrence could still work against Iraq. Replacing 
     deterrence and collective humanitarian efforts with 
     unilateral, preemptive intervention is a license for chaos. 
     Henry Kissinger's acrobatics in his Washington Post article 
     of Aug. 12, which attempts to reconcile a U.S. doctrine of 
     preventive attack with the notion of world order, can only be 
     described as pitiful.
       This brings us to the most distressing aspect of the year 
     since 9-11: America's growing isolation in the world. The war 
     against terrorist networks that threaten the United States, 
     its allies and even non-allies such as Russia, cannot be won 
     by the United States alone. For one thing, we need the 
     cooperation of other governments in arresting, trying or 
     delivering to use suspects and possible plotters. And if 
     military action becomes necessary, as it did last year in 
     Afghanistan, we need the participation and endorsement of as 
     many countries as possible. Bush Senior succeeded in 
     obtaining that kind of cooperation in the Gulf War. A 
     coalition is both a help and a constructive source of 
     restraint. For a short while immediately after 9-11, the 
     current Bush administration seemed to understand that it 
     unilateralism was an obstacle. This did not last.
       Instead, the administration has alienated allies and 
     inflamed adversaries repeatedly over the last year. The 
     multiple, half-baked

[[Page 19731]]

     rationales for action against Iraq have confused and 
     disturbed even old allies such as Germany and Britain. The 
     notion that the United States retains a prerogative to act 
     alone in its own purported interests or those of the whole 
     ``world community'' is clearly incompatible with the UN 
     charter and international law. The self-perception of a 
     unique and benevolent American empire charged with 
     maintaining order in the world irritates allies and 
     adversaries alike. And the oft-expressed contempt for 
     international institutions except those controlled by the 
     United States--the view that only weak powers should be 
     constrained by them or could benefit from them--has alienated 
     and exasperated many of our best friends.
       The fact is that the United States took the lead in 
     creating these institutions of collective security after 
     1945, precisely when it was the strongest superpower. That 
     generation understood that it is the hegemonic state, 
     paradoxically, that has the greatest interest in links of 
     reciprocity, international law and mutual restraint.
       Imperial hubris on issues such as the Anti-Ballistic 
     Missile Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol and the International 
     Criminal Court have further isolated the United States just 
     when it needs allies most. The administration's case against 
     the court is based on an offensive assumption that a UN 
     institution will necessarily be unfair to the United States--
     and on an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that places 
     it above international law. Worse, we have bullied other 
     countries to prevent them from signing or applying the 
     protocol establishing the court.
       This ``we don't need you'' posture is very risky for the 
     United States, insulting to others and mistakenly based on 
     the premise that others can never really proceed without us. 
     A superpower must take special care not to provoke the united 
     resistance of lesser powers. But the Bush administration 
     fails to appreciate the importance of what Harvard professor 
     Joseph Nye calls America's ``soft power''--a power that 
     emanates from the deep sympathies and vast hopes American 
     society has inspired abroad.
       The shift from beacon to bully is rife with potential 
     disaster. Because a hegemon cannot rule by force alone, it is 
     vital for the United States to take an interest in other 
     societies and cultures. Since 9-11, that interest has grown 
     only with regard to Islam and terrorism. But an American 
     foreign policy guided exclusively by narrow self-interest is 
     not one our allies find terribly reassuring; and it is 
     downright offensive to assert that the United States alone 
     can decide what is good for others.
       Particularly frightening to outside observers is the 
     impression that U.S. foreign policy has been captured by a 
     small group of hawks who, frustrated in 1991, are now 
     ideologically committed to changing ``evil'' regimes--even in 
     countries that have no past experience of democracy and where 
     repressive regimes face no experienced or cohesive 
     opposition. There were comparable fears after the election of 
     Ronald Reagan, but divisions within his administration 
     preserved a kind of balance. Today's pragmatists are 
     singularly weak and seem to lack the president's ear.
       Bush continually describes himself as a patient man who 
     will consult and listen. Let us hope that he means what he 
     says and isn't just trying to prevent a real debate until all 
     the important decisions have been made. Because one year 
     after 9-11, three things are clear: First, the war against 
     terrorism cannot be the alpha and omega of a foreign policy; 
     second, it cannot be waged by military means alone; and 
     finally, even a state endowed with overwhelming superiority 
     in all the ingredients of ``hard'' force cannot substitute 
     that for eyes, ears and brains. Decisions based on dubious 
     assumptions, overconfidence and intelligence reports risk 
     ending in imprudence and fiasco.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized 
for 7 minutes.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, the American people need and deserve a 
thorough, reasoned discussion on the question of going to war against 
Iraq. I appreciate the opportunity to share with my colleagues my 
thoughts during this momentous debate.
  A great deal of the justification for a United States military 
intervention in Iraq centers on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. I 
recognize that there are international criminals capable of unspeakable 
horrors and Saddam Hussein is one of those. President Bush has urged us 
to believe the threat from Saddam Hussein is urgent and immediate, and 
thus this impending vote. I have listened carefully to every shred of 
evidence presented by the administration.
  And I have also listened carefully to other world leaders. Of 
particular concern to me is the position of those nations that share a 
border with Iraq--Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and 
Iran.
  The Turkish Prime Minister said, ``We're trying to dissuade the 
American Administration from a military operation.''
  King Abdullah of Jordan said, ``In all the years I have been in the 
international community, everybody is saying this is a bad idea. Our 
concern is
. . . that a miscalculation in Iraq would throw the whole area into 
turmoil.''
  The Kuwaiti Defense Minister said, ``Kuwait will participate in the 
military campaign to remove the Iraqi regime only if the military 
action came in compliance with a United Nations' resolution.'' This in 
Kuwait, a country that suffered greatly under the hands of the Iraqi 
dictator. These nations share a border with Iraq. Their leaders know 
their neighborhood and they have expressed their opposition to our 
intervention at this time.
  I would also like to quote President Mubarak of Egypt who said, ``If 
you strike Iraq . . . not one Arab leader will be able to control the 
angry outburst of the masses.'' And President Mussharaf of Pakistan 
said, ``this will have very negative repercussions around the Islamic 
world.'' I believe it is wise to heed the concerns of our friends. And 
our friends are telling us that we are ratcheting up the hatred.
  In two nations' recent elections the defining issues seemingly 
revolved around American arrogance. The fact that the two countries are 
our friends, Germany and Brazil, is alarming.
  What Congress does this week and next will have very serious 
implications throughout the world.
  Demagogues in the Middle East and elsewhere are surely ready and 
willing to exploit a U.S. invasion of Iraq. And today the CIA is 
warning Americans of the connection between a rise in terrorism and 
military activity in Iraq. Certainly it is preferable to address the 
threat posed by any international criminal in concert with our allies 
and within the confines of the United Nations. This is the preference 
outlined in the amendment offered by Senator Levin--an amendment I 
support.
  We need to provide people susceptible to anti-Americanism with a 
positive message that respects international cooperation and 
friendship. The Levin substitute upholds the values I have heard in 
discussions with the people of Rhode Island; it recognizes the benefit 
of an international coalition in taking on the tremendous challenge of 
disarming the Iraqi regime. It authorizes military force against Iraq 
only as part of a new UN-approved resolution, and failing that, allows 
Congress to return to session to consider an alternative approach.
  As a nation, we are united in opposing the tyranny and repression of 
Saddam Hussein. But there are real disagreements both here at home and 
abroad as to how best to ensure that this man cannot threaten world 
peace. Adoption of the Levin amendment would not give Saddam Hussein a 
chance to further obstruct and delay--it is the prudent idea most 
consistent with the values that have made the United States a great 
nation. I urge all of my colleagues to support the Levin amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Arkansas is recognized for 25 minutes.
  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I am pleased this evening to rise in 
strong support of the underlying resolution. I am pleased this 
bipartisan resolution Senators Lieberman and McCain and Senator Warner 
have introduced is before the Senate. I am pleased to be able to 
cosponsor that. I believe after a full debate, the Senate will pass 
this resolution in its current version, and I urge it to do that.
  The decision to authorize the use of force is a very serious, grave 
decision. I will further acknowledge that some Members of Congress, men 
and women of good conscience, have very significant concerns about this 
resolution. They have been articulated well. They have been argued 
well. I also acknowledge that when we take a vote on anything that 
deals with war and peace and life and death, that it must be done in 
the most sober and serious manner. I have had a number of moms and dads 
who have come to me concerned about what this might mean for their 
children, their young men and women who may face war. I see the tears 
in their eyes. I have heard their anxieties and worries. I approach 
this with a great

[[Page 19732]]

deal of serious contemplation and prayer.
  However, I believe this resolution is not only warranted but 
necessary in order to protect our Nation. We are rapidly reaching a 
point at which the risk of utilizing military force is far outweighed 
by the danger that Saddam Hussein poses to the American people. I have 
heard that we are setting a dangerous precedent. There are concerns 
about what this new strategic policy might mean, and how other nations 
might interpret it.
  I respond, with all respect, the case of Saddam Hussein, the case of 
Iraq, is in every way unique. It is unique in law because here is a man 
and here is a nation that has stood now for a decade in defiance of the 
world community; that is in violation and defiance of resolution after 
resolution from the United Nations. They are, as they have rightly been 
called this evening, an international outlaw. How is it that enforcing 
the resolutions of the United Nations, and in doing so defend our 
Nation, set a dangerous precedent?
  Not only is Iraq in violation of resolutions, and in defiance of the 
civilized world, but Iraq is also unique in the threat it poses to the 
civilized world in amassing weapons of mass destruction.
  It is not at all that the United States is some kind of international 
bully wanting to throw its weight around the world. It is, rather, we 
are the one Nation in the world that is capable of doing something 
about this threat to the civilized world. Not only do we have the 
ability to do it, but we have the will to do it.
  The President has come to Congress as he was asked. He believed, I 
believe, that he had the legal authority already from previous 
resolutions from this Congress to have acted without coming to us. But 
Congress said: We want to be involved in this, we want to be consulted. 
So he came to Congress and laid out his case.
  Administration officials have appeared before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Briefings 
have been provided for all Senators. Certainly, this issue has been a 
matter of public discourse now for months.
  It is time now for this distinguished body to act. As we continue 
debate on this resolution, we must remember this debate is not about 
arms inspectors, it is not primarily about United Nations resolutions, 
and it is not about assuaging the international community. History has 
not looked well upon those who fail to act for fear of provoking a 
tyrant.
  What this debate is about is the protection of the American people, 
the protection of our national security. The best way for the Senate to 
do that is to provide the President with the authority he has 
requested.
  It is helpful to recount what has brought us to this point, to the 
brink of being forced to use military force. For over a decade, the 
United States has pursued diplomatic and economic avenues to deal with 
the threat that Saddam Hussein poses.
  We have tried to contain, we have tried to deter. But in truth, we 
have been in a virtually unbroken state of conflict with Iraq since the 
beginning of the gulf war in 1991. After the American military along 
with coalition allies routed the Iraqi military, the international 
community pledged to ensure that Saddam Hussein would never have the 
capability to threaten the region again.
  Toward that end, the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 687. This resolution, which Iraq accepted as part of the 
cease-fire, required Iraq to end its pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction, destroy its stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, 
and end its support of terrorism.
  As we convene this evening, more than a decade later, Saddam Hussein 
stands in violation of this agreement in virtually every point. To 
ensure that Iraq was complying with its commitments, the United Nations 
established a weapons inspection program. In recent times, there has 
been a great deal of discussion about the inspectors. Forgotten in the 
debate is the original purpose of the inspectors. Inspections were only 
supposed to confirm that Iraq was living up to its commitment to cease 
the development of weapons of mass destruction. Inspectors were not 
sent in to play a cat-and-mouse game. Saddam Hussein used every means 
at his disposal to thwart the inspections.
  In the past decade, Iraq has stood in violation of 16 different 
resolutions. The world community has spoken strongly and frequently 
against Saddam Hussein. Saddam's response has been continual deception 
and defiance. Saddam Hussein has made every attempt to accelerate his 
development of weapons, biological and nuclear weapons.
  Based on intelligence we have a very frightening picture of Iraq's 
capabilities. We have had the briefings. I had the most recent briefing 
this afternoon. We have solid information, public information, that 
Iraq currently has a large stockpile of chemical weapons. In the 
initial aftermath of the gulf war, the U.N. inspectors were able to 
ensure that some chemical weapons were destroyed. A disturbing amount 
were not uncovered. In fact, 31,600 chemical munitions, 550 mustard gas 
bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors were unaccounted for by 
the U.N. inspectors. Even more disturbing is the likelihood that Iraq 
retained the means to produce chemical weapons. The U.N. has stated 
Iraq has imported enough raw materials to produce 200 tons of the VX 
gas.
  Since inspectors were ejected from Iraq in 1998, there is a 
substantial body of evidence that Saddam Hussein has reconstituted his 
ability to produce VX and other chemical weapons. People question 
whether there is an imminent threat? People question the currency of 
the threat that faces us? They think we have time to burn? Time to 
delay? Perhaps even more terrifying, Iraq continued virtually unabated 
to produce biological weapons. Senator Frist spoke of this earlier 
today. In fact, the Iraqi Government has admitted in the past to the 
weaponization of anthrax, botulism, and aflatoxin on Scuds and on 
aircraft.
  United Nations inspectors never accounted for at least 4 tons of raw 
material that can be used to produce biological weapons. Recent reports 
are that the Iraqis are testing unmanned vehicles that could be used to 
deliver these weapons over wide territories.
  I am told these unmanned vehicles would be almost impossible to be 
detected or to be shot down.
  We also have reason to believe that Saddam Hussein has developed 
mobile biological weapon laboratories that would be virtually 
impossible for inspectors, were they to get back in, to detect, to 
locate, and to destroy.
  In this debate, it is important that we have an appreciation for the 
terrible power of these kinds of weapons. VX nerve gas is one of the 
most dangerous chemicals known to man. It operates by cutting off a 
person's nervous system, making it impossible for them to breath. 
Exposure to only a few drops can kill in minutes.
  The danger of anthrax was made shockingly clear during last year's 
attacks. Over 20 Americans were infected, and 7 were killed, and it 
could have been much, much worse. The letter that was sent to Senator 
Leahy's office contained enough spores to kill tens of thousands of 
people, in one single envelop. There is every indication that Saddam 
Hussein has enough anthrax to kill millions of Americans.
  Iraq has accelerated work on its missile development program. In 
fact, some of his chemical and biological weapons are deployable with 
45 minutes warning.
  According to the dossier recently released by the British Government, 
Iraq currently has ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel, 
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. He is actively working to extend the range of 
his armaments, with the ambition of being able to strike as far as 
Europe in the coming years.
  Even with his success in developing chemical and biological weapons, 
Saddam Hussein continues to pursue the ultimate weapon of mass 
destruction . . . a nuclear bomb.
  He has scoured the world attempting to procure enriched uranium to 
finalize his development of a nuclear weapon. Estimates are that, 
should Iraq be successful in getting this material, a nuclear weapon 
would take no longer

[[Page 19733]]

than a few months to produce. We can't be sure he hasn't succeeded 
already.
  It is evident that Saddam Hussein has the capabilities to inflict 
great devastation. His intentions are even clearer.
  His hatred of the United States is only matched by his hunger for 
power. The Iraqi Government has repressed its own people, committed 
acts of aggression against its neighbors, and been an active supporter 
of international terrorism. In a very unstable region, Saddam Hussein 
has taken every opportunity to add to the turmoil in the Middle East.
  He has plotted to assassinate a former U.S. President. In 1993, the 
Iraqi Government plotted to kill former President George Bush during 
his trip to Kuwait.
  American pilots are taking fire from the Iraqi military virtually 
every day during patrols of the no-fly zones. Unprovoked? Hardly. It 
does not set a dangerous precedent to act in a preemptive way in light 
of his violations of international law and his continual firing upon 
American aircraft.
  So far this year, American and British aircraft have been fired on 
over 406 times. In the past 2 weeks alone they have been fired on over 
60 times.
  Until his recent death, Iraq harbored Abu Nidal, who masterminded 
terrorist attacks in 20 countries, resulting in the deaths of 900 
people.
  There are credible reports that members of al-Qaida have found 
sanctuary in Iraq. It is becoming increasingly clear that Iraq has 
provided training to al-Qaida, including instruction on the use of 
chemical weapons.
  Earlier this year, Saddam Hussein offered $25,000 to each of the 
families of Palestinian suicide bombers. The only condition is that the 
bomber has a full belt of explosives when he blows himself up. This 
despicable offer essentially provides a bounty for the deaths of 
innocent Israelis and establishes a perverse incentive program for 
terror.
  His invasion of Kuwait is well-documented. However, I would like to 
take a moment to discuss the atrocities he has committed against his 
own people. I believe that it will shed further light on the horrors of 
which Saddam is capable.
  The U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the U.N. General Assembly has 
issued a report criticizing ``systematic, widespread, and extremely 
grave violations of human rights,'' and cited ``all-pervasive 
repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and 
widespread terror.''
  That is the diplomatic language of the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights.
  In ``The Threatening Storm,'' Kenneth Pollack puts it a little 
plainer. He said:

       This is a regime that will gouge out the eyes of children 
     to force confessions from their parents and grandparents. 
     This is a regime that will crush all of the bones in the feet 
     of a two-year-old girl to force her mother to divulge her 
     father's whereabouts. This is a regime that will hold a 
     nursing baby at arm's length from his mother and allow the 
     child to starve to death to force the mother to confess. This 
     is a regime that will burn a person's limbs off to force him 
     to confess or comply. This is a regime that will slowly lower 
     its victims into huge vats of acid, either to break their 
     will or simply as a means of execution. This is a regime that 
     applies electric shocks to the bodies of its victims, 
     particularly their genitals, with great creativity. This is a 
     regime that in 2000 decreed that the crime of criticizing the 
     regime, which can be as harmless as suggesting Saddam's 
     clothing would not be matched, would be punished by cutting 
     off the offender's tongue.

  And on and on it goes.
  I ask unanimous consent that this citation from ``The Threatening 
Storm'' by Kenneth Pollack be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       This is a regime that will gouge out the eyes of children 
     to force confessions from their parents and grandparents. 
     This is a regime that will crush all of the bones in the feet 
     of a two-year-old girl to force her mother to divulge her 
     father's whereabouts. This is a regime that will hold a 
     nursing baby at arm's length from its mother and allow the 
     child to starve to death to force the mother to confess. This 
     is a regime that will burn a person's limbs off to force him 
     to confess or comply. This is a regime that will slowly lower 
     its victims into huge vats of acid, either to break their 
     will or simply as a means of execution. This is a regime that 
     applies electric shocks to the bodies of its victims, 
     particularly their genitals, with great creativity. This is a 
     regime that in 2000 decreed that the crime of criticizing the 
     regime (which can be as harmless as suggesting that Saddam's 
     clothing does not match) would be punished by cutting out the 
     offender's tongue. This is a regime that practices systematic 
     rape against its female victims. This is a regime that will 
     drag a man's wife, daughter, or other female relative and 
     repeatedly rape her in front of him. This is a regime that 
     will force a white-hot metal rod into a person's anus or 
     other orifices. This is a regime that employs thalium 
     poisoning, widely considered one of the most excruciating 
     ways to die. This is a regime that will behead a young mother 
     in the street in front of her house and children because her 
     husband was suspected of opposing the regime. This is a 
     regime that used chemical warfare on its own Kurdish 
     citizens--not just on the fifteen thousand killed and maimed 
     at Halabja but on scores of other villages all across 
     Kurdistan. This is a regime that tested chemical and 
     biological warfare agents on Iranian prisoners of war, using 
     the POWs in controlled experiments to determine the best ways 
     to disperse the agents to inflict the greatest damage.

  Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, freedom of speech does not exist in 
Iraq, and summary executions are commonplace.
  Torture is seen as a legitimate tool of control, and violence against 
women is not just condoned but perpetrated by the Iraqi government.
  Political opponents of Saddam Hussein are subject to unimaginable 
cruelty. They are jailed without cause. Amnesty International reports 
``Detainees have been threatened with bringing in a female relative, 
especially the wife or the mother, and raping her in front of the 
detainee. Some of these threats have been carried out.''
  In 1997, the U.N. reported that Iraq executed more than 1,500 people 
for political reasons. There are even reports that the victims families 
are forced to pay the cost of the execution.
  Saddam stays in power through fear. It is terror--sheer terror--that 
sustains his evil regime.
  Saddam Hussein has never been called to account for the Kuwaitis that 
are still missing from the Gulf War. There are still 609 cases of 
missing Gulf War POW/MIAs.
  Included in that number is one American Navy Pilot. The Iraqi 
government continues to refuse to provide full information about his 
fate.
  The passage of this resolution will provide the President with 
authority he requires in order to address the grave threat posed by 
Iraq.
  I fully support his efforts to rally the international community, and 
believe that a strong vote on this resolution will strengthen his case 
before the United Nations.
  It is the hope of all of us that military action will not be 
necessary. However, after a full decade of effort, we have almost 
completely exhausted diplomacy.
  There are some who believe that preemptive military action against 
Iraq represents a break from our nation's traditions.
  My colleagues, unfortunately, we are facing untraditional threats. We 
have tried containment. It was built upon the idea of inspection and 
sanction. The inspectors were thrown out, and the sanctions have been 
broken.
  Again, from Kenneth Pollack and from ``The Threatening Storm,'' he 
says:

       Unfortunately, it is difficult to know exactly what is 
     going into Iraq. This is the main problem; if the United 
     States and United Nations knew, they might be able to stop 
     it. As it is, we know only that between the smuggling and the 
     surcharges Saddam is making $2 billion to $3 billion per year 
     that he can spend as he likes. In addition, we have been able 
     to intercept some shipments and get intelligence on others 
     that give at least a sense of what Saddam is using his 
     illegal revenues to import. For instance, in June 2002, the 
     Indian government brought charges against the executives of 
     an Indian company for selling atomized aluminum powder and 
     titanium engine parts to Iraq in such quantity and of such 
     quality that India's Defense and Research Development 
     Organization concluded they could only have been intended for 
     chemical warfare and ballistic missile production.
  We tried inspections. The sanctions have been eroded, and deterrence 
only

[[Page 19734]]

works with a rational person. It assumes rationality. And the fact that 
he can transmit weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who could 
inflict enormous damage upon the United States with no fingerprints--
with Saddam's fingerprints not even being on it--is evidence that the 
idea of containment to no longer be a workable approach.
  The attacks of 9/11 tore our hearts and left us with a grief that 
will never be forgotten. At the same time, those acts of evil have 
brought forth a new resolve and a new commitment.
  It is the responsibility of the U.S. Government, and it is the 
responsibility of this Senate to ensure that the heartbreak of 
September 11 is not repeated.
  Our enemies have grown more cunning and their methods more sinister. 
We must move swiftly and decisively to deny them the opportunity to 
attack us. When the threat is real, preemption is not just tactically 
critical, but, I believe, it is a moral imperative.
  In Saddam Hussein we are facing a menace that has long expressed 
hatred of the United States, established links to international 
terrorists, and has amassed large stockpiles of weapons of mass 
destruction. He has been accorded every opportunity to cooperate with 
the international community, and he has refused.
  Every day that goes by, the threat grows. He continues to amass his 
stockpile and strengthens his ties to terrorists. We cannot--we must 
not--stand by and allow this to continue. And we must not delay. There 
have been many people quoted in this debate, so let me add one more to 
the record. Winston Churchill said:

       There is no merit in putting off a war for a year if, when 
     it comes, it is a far worse war or one much harder to win.

  The world is watching us. And freedom-loving people across the globe 
are waiting to see if America will answer the challenge that history 
has put before us. They are waiting to see if our Nation will assume 
the mantle of leadership in dealing with a tyrant with maniacal 
ambitions.
  Our enemies are hoping we falter. They hope we will continue to be 
mired in the web of deception spun by Saddam Hussein. They need to be 
shown that our resolve to protect the American people has never been 
stronger.
  While my greatest hope is that military action will not be necessary, 
it may be unavoidable. Others have come to this floor to talk about the 
cost of such an operation. They rightly cite estimates ranging in the 
tens of billions of dollars. Some may discuss the damage that might be 
done to our relationships with other nations. More gravely, some have 
spoken about the cost of human life that any military action would 
entail. These risks are real, but these risks must be weighed against 
the very real risks of delay.
  The price of inaction is far too high. Mr. President, 9/11 taught us 
that. We will never know the complete economic damage of the terrorist 
attacks of last year. Some have estimated it at more than $600 billion, 
but the true cost can only be seen by looking in the eyes of those who 
lost loved ones. The true impact is only realized with the 
understanding that over 3,000 families are still grieving.
  Saddam Hussein has the capacity to wreak even more destruction than 
that which we saw last year. He has weapons that could kill millions, 
and he consorts with terrorists who would unflinchingly do so if they 
had the means.
  So again, I remind you, opponents say this resolution sets a 
dangerous precedent of preemption. I remind my colleagues of sixteen 
U.N. resolutions defied, rejected, ignored by Saddam Hussein. The 
dangerous action would be to do nothing. The dangerous precedent would 
be to back down in the face of a tyrant who dares us.
  The resolution put forth by Senator Lieberman, and endorsed by our 
President, is a statement by this body that the risk posed by Iraq is 
unacceptable. It is a statement that we will not allow international 
outlaws to threaten our Nation. It is a statement that we will not sit 
back in the face of the growing danger that our country faces.
  Thus, I call on my colleagues for their support of S.J. Res. 46.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Reed). The Senator from Tennessee is 
recognized under the previous order for 20 minutes.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I congratulate my friend, the Senator 
from Arkansas, for an excellent presentation covering all the points. 
And if I had not been persuaded before I listened to him tonight, I 
would have been persuaded tonight.
  This Nation has spent many dollars and many lives in defense of 
others around the world. Tonight, we are considering a resolution that 
has to do with the defense of ourselves.
  People say that because our country does not go against another 
country without provocation that we should make the case of the need to 
take action, and that is true. We need to make that case before the 
world and before the American people.
  I believe that case has been made. It is a case that has been made 
upon, basically, facts we have known for a long time and have chosen to 
ignore and sweep under the rug. It is based on a shared history that we 
have had together now for many years. And looking back on it, we must 
ask ourselves, How were we able to ignore what is so obvious and 
pending for so long?
  We know Saddam's willingness to attack sovereign nations. We know 
Saddam's willingness to murder innocent individuals. We know he is in 
possession of weapons of mass destruction. We know he is developing 
missile capability that is beyond what is allowable by the United 
Nations resolutions and will rapidly be able to reach further and 
further. The only thing we do not know is how soon it is going to take 
him to develop nuclear weapons.
  I think that is essentially, from a factual standpoint, what this 
entire debate is about, because if, in fact, it is true that he, in the 
foreseeable future, will have nuclear weapons, do any of these other 
points that we have been discussing really stand?
  I think I have listened to many valid points and valid arguments of 
problems connected with moving against Saddam Hussein. I think the 
points that were made that the aftermath is going to be very difficult 
are very valid. I think the point that he might lash back against us in 
some way is a very valid concern. I think the point that in some places 
in the world they will be taking to the streets against us is a valid 
considerations.
  But if, in fact, it is true that in the foreseeable future he might 
or probably will develop nuclear weapons of mass destruction, do any of 
these other considerations really stand up or do they together stand up 
to that consideration? Can we afford not to defend ourselves against 
that consideration?
  What is the evidence pertaining to that? We are debating, again, not 
over whether or not he is going to have it, but how soon he is going to 
have it.
  Unfortunately, when we have made estimates in times past with regard 
to Saddam's nuclear capability in the early 1990s, with regard to 
missile capabilities of rogue nations, when we have gone back and 
thoroughly examined the situation--where, in Saddam's case, we have 
gotten inspectors in there because of defectors' information--we have 
found that we have grossly underestimated the capability of our 
adversaries, time and time again.
  Yet we are told by the entire world, those who have looked at this, 
that it is just a matter of time, a few years, if he has to develop his 
own fissile material, and perhaps as early as a few months or a year if 
he can buy it on the open market.
  I was privileged to listen to some of the weapons inspectors who went 
down to Iraq. I listened to some of the experiences they had. It caused 
me great concern to hear their lament about the way they were thwarted 
before and how hopeless their mission turned out to be because of what 
Saddam was doing, and how inspections in the future really will not 
work unless you actually get active cooperation from the people you are 
inspecting. I am talking about a country, what, the size of California, 
with an ability to hide anything almost anywhere.
  And they talked about the fact that when they went in before, they 
did not

[[Page 19735]]

think Saddam had much in the way of nuclear. And they even were almost 
to the point of being able to certify that when a defector gave them 
some information. They went back. They found that not only had Saddam 
developed nuclear infrastructure, but he had a virtual ``Manhattan 
Project'' is the way they put it, a virtual ``Nuclear Manhattan 
Project'' when they went in there before.
  They said they had a facility there that was based on the facility 
down in Tennessee in Oak Ridge in terms of enriching uranium.
  This is what was there before. We do not know what he has now because 
he has made the decision to keep out inspectors. And we know from the 
CIA--a letter has been introduced in this Record--that the likelihood 
of Saddam using weapons of mass destruction for blackmail, deterrence, 
or otherwise grows as his arsenal builds.
  Now he has been down there for 4 years. We know he has the science. 
We know he has the know-how. We know he has the scientists. We know he 
has the desire. We know he has a history of knowing how to build 
facilities that will ultimately produce results for him. And we are 
standing here debating as to whether or not we should do something 
about that because we might have a little more time and we don't have 
eyewitness testimony as to precisely where he is at precisely this 
particular time.
  Those are things that have been on the record along with his 
violation of U.N. demands for many years. We have taken them for 
granted. We have taken for granted that hundreds of times our airmen 
have been shot at in the no-fly zone during all of this time. I have 
always wondered what the parents of someone shot down under those 
circumstances must feel like, being that far away, defending the 
interests of your country. Nobody knows about it. Nobody talks about 
it. Nobody seemingly cares that much about it. That has been going on 
continually ever since we left the gulf.
  These are things that are on the public record. They have been on the 
public record for a long time. We now have some additional facts that 
have not been on the public record that long, such as the fact he is 
busily trying to obtain dual-use equipment that can be used for uranium 
enrichment.
  We know more about his relationship with al-Qaida than we knew in 
times past.
  Again, according to the CIA director:

       We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between 
     Iraq and al-Qaida going back a decade.

  He says:

       Credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qaida have 
     discussed safe havens and reciprocal nonaggression.

  He says:

       Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of 
     the presence in Iraq of al-Qaida members, including some that 
     have been in Baghdad.

  He goes further and says:

       We have credible reporting that al-Qaida leaders sought 
     contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire [weapons of mass 
     destruction] capabilities. The reporting also stated that 
     Iraq has provided training to al-Qaida members in the areas 
     of poison and gases and making conventional bombs.

  These are recent things that are not as well known, have not been 
known over the years. Put all of that information together and you have 
a consensus on many things. As usual, we are spending a lot of time 
arguing over the things we disagree on. They are important. But I think 
we all agree the leader of Iraq is dangerous; that he is a threat; that 
that threat is growing, not diminishing; and that he is in violation of 
international law.
  The real issue is whether or not it is going to be easier to deal 
with this situation once he gets stronger than he is today. The 
question answers itself.
  The other question is whether or not we will show a reluctance to 
defend our own interests. We are rightfully concerned about acting 
precipitously. But did we act precipitously after the first World Trade 
Center bombing? Did we act precipitously after our men and women were 
killed in the Khobar Towers bombing? What was the message we sent after 
our two embassies were bombed and hundreds of people were killed? Were 
we acting precipitously after that? What did we do to avenge that or to 
set an example? What did we do after the Cole incident? Were we acting 
precipitously there? Or have we announced to the world, basically, or 
led Osama bin Laden to believe that we can be attacked that the 
response will not be commensurate with the attack? That is Osama bin 
Laden. We are talking about Saddam Hussein here, but the lesson is the 
same for tyrants throughout the world who pose a threat to this 
country. It has been a bad lesson that we have given for well over a 
decade now.
  Some say we should wait until there is an imminent danger; that we 
should calibrate carefully as to when that danger we know is growing 
becomes imminent; that we should tell Saddam Hussein on the front end 
we will not attack him until we know he poses not only a danger but an 
imminent threat. That, of course, is basically consistent with the 
United Nations charter. It has been the law of nations for a long time. 
We have to recognize that. The Treaty of Westphalia was mentioned, back 
in the 1600s, where the sovereign nations got together and decided that 
sovereign nations would not be attacked. We have perfected that 
somewhat.
  We have talked about imminent danger because traditionally we lived 
in a world where armies amassed on a border and that was the imminent 
danger. September 11 changed all that. That is not the kind of world we 
live in anymore. The imminent danger facing this country now does not 
amass itself on the border and give everybody time to debate and make 
up their minds as to what they are going to do. The threats we face 
today hide their activities. The threats we face today are not always 
apparent.
  Let there be no mistake about it, the United States is the target. It 
is the primary target. No one likes the sound of the word 
unilateralism. But is there anyone who disagrees with the action the 
Israelis took in 1981, when they took out the Osiraq nuclear plant in 
Iraq? I am really curious. There is a case of unilateralism if there 
ever was one. Was there any imminent threat? I don't even know if the 
plant was finished yet. But either way, there was no imminent threat 
that I know of that they were getting ready to produce material out of 
there to put in a bomb to attack Israel.
  They took it out. The United Nations condemned them. We condemned 
them. But is there anyone today who is really regretful the Israelis 
took that action?
  I would think under that theory, if we had to wait for imminent 
danger, we would have to ask ourselves, imminent with regard to our 
allies, would that count? With regard to our troops in the area, would 
that count? With regard to the homeland only? Those would be questions 
we would have to ask.
  We would have to ask ourselves: Does that not mean, under the 
philosophy of waiting for the imminent threat, we would have to wait 
not only until we had ironclad proof Saddam had nuclear capability and 
the means to deliver it, but that he was planning on actually hitting 
us with it? I don't think we have thought that fully through. Surely 
that is not what we are suggesting, that we almost have to have a 
missile in the air before we could act.
  It is somewhat of a precedent. It would be, if it comes to that. But 
we are in a position no other country has ever been in, as the Senator 
from Arkansas pointed out. We are living in a world no one has ever 
lived in before, where a handful of people can take modern technology 
and create a mortal threat to millions of people on the other side of 
the world. We simply have to address the fact that is the world we live 
in.
  Some say we should wait on the United Nations. That essentially goes 
to the heart of the amendment we are considering. I respectfully 
suggest if we pass this amendment, it would be a guarantee the United 
Nations would never act, because they would know they didn't have to. 
And so many who would rather avoid this because the United States is 
the target, and for other reasons, would never, ever face up to it, if 
they knew they didn't have to. Then I would ask: Where would we

[[Page 19736]]

be? Some say, come back to the Senate in that weakened condition.
  Would we be in better shape having been turned down by the U.N. if we 
then went ahead in contravention of what they said or would it be 
better to stand tall on the front end, with the assurance that many 
countries in the United Nations are going to support us in our effort?
  The President has gone there and he has made the case. He has talked 
to our allies. The Secretary of State has been busy around the world. 
When people say we are going it alone, do not the British count? Does 
not Spain count? Does not Italy count? Do not the Arab nations I read 
about today in the paper, who are reluctantly coming along, count?
  I think we should go back and look at where former President Bush was 
at this stage of the proceedings. I think the first thing that happened 
there was he said this will not stand. Then he went internationally, 
and then the British came first, and then there was a period of time 
before very many people came forward after the British.
  Speaking of the British, I think it is ironic that the head of that 
government, in many respects, sees things more clearly than many of us 
do.
  The problem--as difficult as it is to acknowledge, but it is the 
plain truth--is we have lost the coalition we had before. We would like 
to go right back and say: Remember how we were together before, and 
remember how we made such progress, military progress, and there for a 
while we had Saddam Hussein on the ropes and we laid down all these 
requirements. In order for us to go home, he had to make all these 
agreements, and he did make those agreements. Remember how we were 
together then before he violated each and every one of them, and 
gradually, year by year, we not only allowed that to happen, but one 
ally after another started doing business with him. We are now asked to 
go before a Security Council containing the country of China, which is 
now furnishing fiberoptics communications systems to Saddam to help 
shoot our airplanes down. Are they the ones we are supposed to ask 
permission to defend our self-interests?
  We are looking at a Security Council with our friends, the Russians 
and the French, who want to do business with Saddam, and Saddam owes 
them money and they want that money back. Sure, the Arabs are kind of 
reluctant right now. And we are dealing with our now German friends who 
are led by an individual who will demagog his way to reelection on the 
backs of our country and, presumably, international relations.
  It is not an easy thing to say, but it is a true thing to say. We 
want our friends, our allies, and especially our NATO partners; but as 
they continue to let their defense budgets slide and the American 
taxpayer continues to have to foot the bill for the free world, 
essentially, should they be given a veto when our interests are so 
directly involved? I think not.
  I think we have to learn the lessons of the past, as difficult as it 
is. My friend from Arkansas mentioned Churchill. They didn't listen to 
Churchill after World War I. The result of their not listening to him 
was called World War II. Back when Hitler was on the move everything he 
did was not sufficient in and of itself to act. The allies thought they 
could always act later, and other countries should do other things--
excuse after excuse.
  That is not the message we want to send this time, Mr. President. I 
think it is clear that strength is the only hope we have for peace, and 
if we cannot have peace, we must do what is in the vital interest of 
this country.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Washington is recognized.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise this evening to address the 
President's request for authority for military action in Iraq. I have 
spent weeks thinking about this issue and listening. I have sat across 
the table from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor 
Rice, Governor Ridge, CIA Director Tenet, FBI Director Mueller, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Vice President Cheney. I have 
listened closely to the President's speeches and I have listened openly 
to the many questions my constituents have raised over the past few 
weeks.
  Mr. President, I understand the consequences of war and I don't 
shrink from them. My father was among the first to land on Okinawa as a 
GI. Growing up, we always knew that our country may need to project 
force to defend our freedoms. I know we have high obligations to the 
men and women of our Armed Forces who undertake the hard work of 
securing our freedom. In college, I volunteered at the Seattle Veterans 
Hospital. Most of the patients were young men, my age, who had returned 
from Vietnam. I carry that experience with me as the first woman on the 
Senate Veterans Affairs Committee.
  When I look at decisions like this one, I take the time to consider 
all sides, with the full knowledge this decision will have serious 
consequences for our country, our world, and our future.
  This evening, I want to share with my colleagues and my constituents 
my thoughts and my decision on this difficult issue. But most of all, I 
want to share my reasoning because I want everyone to know how I 
arrived at this conclusion. First, I looked to the threat posed by 
Saddam Hussein. Then I looked at the many questions that must be 
considered before our country begins military action. Then I looked at 
the President's case, the role of the U.N. and our allies, the impact 
war could have on the Middle East, and the impact it would have on the 
war on terrorism. Finally, I looked at the context in which we are 
being asked to make this decision, including our economy and the 
political climate.
  Mr. President, let me first address the threat. There is no doubt 
Saddam Hussein poses a serious threat to our interests, to his own 
people, and to the world. Under his rule, Iraq has been an aggressor 
nation. It has started conflict with its neighbors and it has sought to 
stockpile conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction.
  Over the years, Iraq has worked to develop nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons. During 1991 through 1994, despite Iraq's denials, 
U.N. inspectors discovered and dismantled a large network of facilities 
Iraq was using to develop nuclear weapons. Various reports indicate 
Iraq is still actively pursuing nuclear weapons capability. There is no 
reason to think otherwise.
  Beyond nuclear weapons, Iraq has actively pursued biological and 
chemical weapons. U.N. inspectors have said Iraq's claims about 
biological weapons is neither credible nor verifiable. In 1986, Iraq 
used chemical weapons against Iran and later against its own Kurdish 
population.
  While weapons inspections have been successful in the past, there 
have been no inspections since the end of 1998. There can be no doubt 
Iraq has continued to pursue its goal of obtaining weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Mr. President, we know from history and experience that Iraq poses a 
danger to the region, to our interests, and perhaps to ourselves. It 
will continue its aggression and its pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  This leads us to a second set of questions. What should we do about 
this threat? The President has now asked Congress to authorize him to 
make war on Iraq. The goals of military action have shifted from regime 
change one day to disarmament, to enforcing any number of U.N. 
resolutions. The list of crimes to which the administration says Iraq 
must be held accountable varies widely. They include: attempting to 
assassinate a former President; holding prisoners of war after the gulf 
war, including one American; firing on aircraft enforcing the no-fly 
zone; seeking weapons of mass destruction; and violating U.N. 
resolutions.
  All of these are serious crimes; not all of them deserve the same 
response; not all of them call for war.
  Without a clear objective, victory cannot be measured. Indeed, it 
appears the administration established a solution--going to war--before 
it defined the problem or the goal.
  Our most important goal is disarmament. Given Iraq's history and

[[Page 19737]]

Saddam's madness, there can be no doubt the world will be safer if we 
dismantle Iraq's ability to produce and use weapons of mass 
destruction. On this goal, the President receives complete support from 
the American people, the Congress, and the world community.
  Disarmament of Iraq is unquestionably the right thing to do. The 
means of achieving this goal are what is up for debate.
  In the past few weeks, the Bush administration unveiled its new 
preemption doctrine. This marks a shift from our longstanding national 
policy, and so far we have not been told how it applies to the world 
beyond Iraq. Obviously, if troops or tanks are amassing at the border, 
we have the right to defend ourselves, but to strike on the basis of 
suspicion alone is another matter. It is something this Congress and 
the American people need to fully explore and debate before we endorse 
the preemption doctrine.
  The United States is not alone in facing the threat of Saddam 
Hussein, but unfortunately our Government is acting that way. I am very 
concerned that a unilateral race to make war on Iraq will weaken the 
support we need worldwide to win the war on terrorism.
  In the aftermath of September 11, the international community helped 
us heal and supported our efforts to respond. Their support has 
provided critical intelligence keys to disrupting international 
terrorist networks. But today our allies are as confused about 
America's objectives in Iraq as the American people are. Like the 
American public, our allies woke up one day to find that the 
administration was making plans for war. Like the Congress, they were 
not consulted. Like the American people, they had nothing explained to 
them. They saw, as did the rest of us, that a course of action had 
apparently been determined before the reasons were clear.
  Recently, the administration has done a better job working with our 
allies. Secretary of State Powell is to be commended for his work, but 
we still have a long way to go. It would greatly benefit the Congress 
and the American people to know where our allies stand and what they 
are willing to do before we take action.
  While we welcome the support of our allies and the United Nations, we 
do not hand them or anyone else the ultimate power to decide America's 
security demands. Only the United States can determine our interests 
and what steps are required to defend them.
  That said, before we jump into a fight, we should know who is with us 
and what we are getting into, and today we do not.
  Another key part of the international response to the Iraqi threat is 
the United Nations. Efforts at the U.N. have been met with both success 
and failure. To date, our greatest failure has been the ending of 
weapons inspections in 1998 and the U.N.'s failure to hold Iraq 
responsible for its obligations.
  Today, the United States is working with our ally Britain to pass 
through the U.N. Security Council a new, tough resolution regarding 
Iraqi weapons inspections. I believe we need a new, strong U.N. 
resolution that provides for complete transparency of Iraq's weapons of 
mass destruction programs. This new resolution must allow inspectors to 
search all sites without roadblocks. Iraq should know that the U.N. and 
the international community are serious about enforcing this resolution 
even with force, if necessary.
  One of the reasons U.N. support is critical is that it shapes how 
other nations will look upon our action in Iraq. There is a difference 
between going it alone and having the support of a broad coalition. We 
have a stated goal of working to achieve peace in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. We have strong ties to other states in the 
region--Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other gulf states. What action 
we take and how we take it will have a direct impact on our other 
stated foreign policy goals of achieving peace in the Middle East, 
maintaining friendly relations with our allies in the region, and 
contributing to the stability of the region.
  In addition to the impact of war on the Middle East, we must 
understand how action in Iraq will affect the war on terrorism.
  On September 11 last year, we were reminded again of the dangerous 
world in which we live. After bombing our embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania and attacking the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, al-Qaida has pulled 
off the most horrific crime our Nation has ever known.
  In the aftermath of these tragic events, the President declared war 
on terrorism. We dispatched our troops to Afghanistan and its 
neighbors. We worked closely with our allies. We even got help from 
some unexpected quarters. Most of the world joined our effort, but 
there are places where we do not have relations where terrorists hide, 
and to reach those dark corners we rely on intermediaries. Today, those 
intermediaries are providing us with intelligence information to help 
our efforts.
  We have to ask: Will unilateral action in Iraq undermine the support 
we need from other countries in the war on terrorism? The answer to 
that question should help inform us on our decision on military action 
in Iraq.
  If we do take action in Iraq, there is no doubt that our Armed Forces 
will prevail. We will win a war with Iraq decisively, and, God willing, 
will win it quickly. But what happens after the war? That will have 
just as big an impact on our future peace and our security. Will we be 
obligated to rebuild Iraq, and, if so, how? Our economy at home is 
reeling, our budget is in deficit, and we have no estimate of the cost 
of rebuilding. And with whom?
  As New York Times columnist Tom Friedman points out, there is a 
retail store mentality that suggests to some: If you break it, you buy 
it.
  How will the Iraqis get back on their feet? Iraq's leadership has led 
its people through two decades of misery. The people of Iraq have paid 
a terrible price for Saddam Hussein's military campaigns. What promises 
is the international community prepared to make to help restore the 
health of the Iraqi people? What promise is implicit in a unilateral 
attack?
  If we must disarm Iraq by force, we will, but we cannot achieve peace 
through occupation alone. It costs money and energy and time, and like 
building anything else, it is better as a shared responsibility than a 
solo effort.
  Again, the answers to these questions should not be the only factors 
in play as we make decisions on how to protect our security interests, 
but they are not insignificant and they have not been answered.
  We do not have a clear policy. We do not have a clear path to 
implementing that policy. We do not yet know what level of assistance 
we are going to get from our allies and the broader international 
community. We have not factored in all of the implications this may 
have on our other foreign policy objectives. We have not factored in 
all the implications this may have on our own economy.
  Not having a well-defined policy or proper preparations for 
contingencies that may result from whatever action we take is a 
dangerous situation on the eve of the war this administration says we 
must have.
  With all of these unanswered questions, how do we get here today? The 
administration has said it wants a vote on this resolution ``before the 
election.'' In this debate, many in Congress and many of our citizens 
are asking: What is special about November 5 in deciding this question?
  The question of war should not be placed in the context of trying to 
influence the outcome of an election, and surely that cannot be the 
case today. The question is too grave for that to be the motivation, 
even for that to be a motivation. The question of war should be placed 
squarely in the context of what is the right policy to achieve our 
Nation's security goals.
  With all of these questions in mind, I look to the resolution that is 
before us. Does this resolution address the question this Nation must 
answer in order to succeed? Does it clearly articulate a policy 
objective? What course of action does it sanction in our Nation's 
pursuit of that goal?

[[Page 19738]]

  While this resolution is a marked improvement over the President's 
original proposal, S.J. Res. 46 does not provide the information--and 
the objectives--needed at this time.
  It is overly broad in defining the objectives of military action.
  After considering the threat, the cost, and the unanswered questions, 
I have reached a decision. I will vote against the underlying 
resolution; I will vote against going to war at this time.
  I am committed to fighting and winning the war on terrorism, 
including eliminating Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
  I support wholeheartedly our men and women in uniform. I admire their 
heroism. And I will continue to do all I can to provide them with the 
resources they need for whatever mission they are asked to carry out on 
our behalf.
  Today we are being told we have no choice; that we have to grant the 
President war-making authority immediately, without knowing the 
ultimate goal or the ultimate cost, and without knowing whether we are 
going it alone.
  It may well be that someday our country needs to take military action 
in Iraq, but the decision right now to give the President this broad 
authority, without focusing it narrowly on weapons of mass destruction, 
without the support of our allies, without defining the costs to our 
country today and tomorrow, is not something I can support given what 
we know today.
  The constituents I hear from want to know:
  Why are we racing to take this action right now, alone, with so many 
questions unanswered?
  The administration could answer those questions with clear, 
compelling facts and goals, but so far we have not heard them.
  We are being asked to endorse a policy that has not been thought out, 
and one that could have dramatic consequences for our citizens and our 
future.
  While we may need to take action in Iraq down the road, today I 
cannot support sending our men and women into harm's way on an ill-
defined, solo mission with so many critical questions unanswered.
  If, in the coming weeks or months, we learn that Saddam's 
capabilities are more advanced than we now realize, or if Saddam defies 
U.N. resolutions, we will certainly have the right to take appropriate 
action.
  Looking back over the past year, it is clear that we can respond to 
September 11 several ways.
  We can act out of fear, casting aside our principles, and taking 
action without sufficient planning. Or we can stick to our principles 
and draw strength from them in tough times. That is the course I 
advocate today.
  In closing, let me be clear. Despite my reservations today, I will 
always stand with and support those who serve our country, wherever and 
whenever their Commander in Chief sends them.
  If American troops are called to fight in Iraq, I will stand with the 
President and I will support our troops not only during the conflict, 
but afterward.
  The international community, and those who would do us harm, need to 
know without exception that while we may have our disagreements before 
military action, once our troops are on the ground, we are all on the 
same side.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Wyoming is recognized.
  Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I want to answer some of these questions 
about why we are now considering a resolution and what proof we have 
about Iraq. Senator Sarbanes and I are the two delegates to the United 
Nations this year for the House and Senate. I was on the floor of the 
United Nations General Assembly when the President made his speech and 
presented his case to the General Assembly. I have to say I was so 
proud of him.
  Before he even gave the speech, there had been a lot of hype in the 
papers that was unfavorable to him. When he was introduced, the tension 
in the crowd could be felt, and there was no applause. I did learn 
later that there is seldom applause when a head of state is introduced.
  When he gave his speech the body language could be seen on the other 
delegates. At the end of the speech--also untypical--they gave him 
applause.
  I also want to tell my colleagues what happened after that. As we 
wandered about and met other delegates, we heard lots of positive 
comments about what the President said. Not only that, virtually every 
head of state who followed him had the same message for the U.N.: Be 
useful or be done. That is the message that the President delivered.
  Why now? Right now because we are trying to strengthen the resolve of 
the United Nations. Discussions are going on right now in the Senate 
and throughout the nation about what should be done with Iraq. We are 
the ones who provide the leadership in this country. We are the ones 
who set the tone. We are the ones who have to approve what the 
President is doing.
  What proof do we have? I hope everyone is attending the classified 
briefings that are available. The things that are not classified are 
enough to scare us. The reports of Iraq that gave to the United Nations 
show many chemical weapons they had left at the end of the war--their 
report, their numbers, their chemicals, their weapons of bioterrorism. 
Subtract out the numbers that they destroyed, and we wind up with a 
huge supply of chemical and biological weapons. Weapons that could be 
used against us now.
  One of the things the other countries of this world appreciate is the 
patience our President had after September 11. Bombs were going off in 
Afghanistan that very night, and the press covering it said: The United 
States is retaliating. But it was not us. The President was busy 
sending envoys to nations all over the world, setting up a coalition--
the same kind of coalition we are being asked about now. Some have 
asked: Shouldn't we see if there is a coalition first? No. First we 
should show our resolve, and then we can build coalitions.
  This is the President who built coalitions. This is the President who 
went into Afghanistan with war plans, with a method, with cooperation, 
and he did in 1 month what Russia was not able to do in 7 years. It is 
a President who knows what he is doing. It is a President with 
patience. Now he is asking us to pass a resolution.
  How strange and unheard of is this request to pass a resolution? In 
1998, a Republican-controlled Senate for a Democrat President 
recognized that this was not Democrat versus Republican. We then said 
that it was very important to bring up a resolution that would show our 
resolve. That is exactly what a resolution does--show resolve. We 
passed a resolution in 1 day. We passed a resolution with no 
amendments. The President asked us. We did it. We showed unity. We 
showed the country we were behind the President and we were ready to do 
whatever was necessary for the same despot we are talking about now.
  Do we think he has gotten better? No. He has gotten worse. Do we 
think he has gotten less prepared? No. He has gotten more prepared. It 
is time we did something about it, and time we did it through the right 
channels--that is exactly what the President is doing. Part of that 
process is to ask us, ask Congress, to help.
  In 1998, we did it with no questions. We did it with no amendments. 
We did it with no filibuster. What do we have in the Senate today? We 
have a filibuster. We have amendments. We have people giving all kinds 
of excuses so they can vote against an amendment that is necessary to 
get the resolve of the Security Council. That way the United Nations 
will have the backbone to say to this despot, this tyrant, this killer 
of babies, that it is time he straightened out, got rid of his chemical 
weapons, got rid of his biological weapons, and let us in to make sure 
there were not any nuclear weapons. It is time he becomes part of the 
community of nations or gets out of office. It is that simple.
  If we could do pass a resolution for Bill Clinton, we ought to be 
able to do it for President Bush. Again, I want to remind my colleagues 
of the patience

[[Page 19739]]

and resolve we had going into Afghanistan. I think parts of this 
discussion came up from the fact that somebody heard that we had plans 
for attacking Iraq. Well, we better have. We have a Defense Department 
that we pay a lot of money to plan for events so that they never 
happen. They have a plan on Iraq, and they have a plan on another dozen 
countries.
  Every once in awhile, we even have exercises or war games so our 
Defense Department can see how to move people and have the right 
equipment in the right place at the right time. That way we know that 
the training is good for the people we have in the armed services. 
Anybody who commits to the service of this country must be assured that 
we are also committed to providing them with the training and 
everything under the Sun we can give them to keep them safe. Keep them 
safe so they can do their job and to com home alive. That is absolutely 
essential.
  Today we have half a dozen amendments, we have substitutes amendments 
to substitute amendment. We do have a resolution, a resolution the 
President asked us to pass. It is one that is considerably more 
detailed and one that has more hoops to jump through than the one we 
approved in 1998. This is the resolution we need to pass. We must give 
President Bush the authority we gave President Clinton in 1998 without 
limiting authority or amendments.
  In July of 1998, as I mentioned, we considered a resolution urging 
the President to take appropriate action to bring Iraq in compliance 
with international obligations. The Senate debated that for one day, 
without amendments. We approved the resolution by unanimous consent. 
That means no one objected and no one wanted to add an amendment. We 
just said yes. The House debated that one for day, had no amendments, 
and approved it by a vote of 407 to 6.
  In October of 1998, we considered legislation that, in addition to 
authorizing the President to provide assistance to the Iraqi democratic 
opposition, declared it should be the policies of the United States to 
seek the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime and replace it with a 
democratic government. What did we do on that? The Senate debated that 
legislation for one day without amendments and we approved it by 
unanimous consent. Once again, no one wanted to amend it, no one 
disagreed. We gave President Clinton the authority. The House debated 
that legislation for one day and approved it by a vote of 360 to 38. 
One day in each Chamber--one day in each Republican-controlled Chamber 
giving authority to a Democratic president. One day in 1998. How many 
days will it take in 2002? We are already days into debate. How many 
days are needed by my colleagues to undermine the ability of the United 
States to address a security threat?
  The President has been criticized for asking for a Congressional 
resolution prior to achieving a United Nations Security Council 
resolution. I believe the United Nations does have an important role in 
the future of Iraq. If the UN does its job, and member states do what 
is right, we can address the threat within the realm of the United 
Nations, which I am sure would be everyone's preference. As an 
independent nation, however, the United States cannot sit idly by while 
the Security Council debates the validity of pledges made by a known 
liar. If the General Assembly and Security Council are not prepared to 
defend the security of the world and the legitimacy of this 
organization, the United States must be prepared to act. A strong 
resolution with strong support is the best effort to prevent a war 
later. Afghanistan made the U.S. credible. It proved our patience and 
capability. Those traits go a long way to moving Saddam--as long as 
Congress shows resolve and then the UN shows resolve.
  It is also important to note that the passage of a Congressional 
Resolution would not prevent the Administration from continuing its 
work at the United Nations. Rather, I believe it will help the 
President gain support for an appropriate Security Council resolution. 
As Congress, our actions must show a united front with the strong 
resolve of the American people. We will not wait to be attacked. We 
will not wait for inaction and discord. We will not tolerate an Iraqi 
President who flouts the authority of an organization only to cower 
under its umbrella when convenient.
  Saddam Hussein is not crazy or an idiot. He is dangerous because he 
is cunning and very calculated. Repeatedly, he pushes the international 
community to the brink point and then backs down and says--sure, let 
the weapons inspectors come back. How many times are we going to let 
him play this game? Do we wait for him to attack with nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons? Do we wait for yet another 
international inspector team to be denied access to weapons stockpiles? 
Do we wait for another attack on the United States? Iraq has a despot 
leader, chemical and biological weapons, and a proven willingness to 
use anything. Iraq is the only country in the world with all three 
components. We must have changes immediately or regret it soon.
  Many have asked why now, and I must ask why have we not acted sooner? 
We have considered action in Iraq before. We decided in 1991 that we 
should defend Kuwait. We sent in planes and bombs in 1998 and brought 
the inspectors home, but we have been silent since then. It is 
worthwhile to look at a few of the 16 Security Council resolutions that 
Saddam has chosen to ignore:
  Resolution 687, adopted April 3, 1991, called for Iraq to accept the 
destruction, removal or rendering harmless of all chemical and 
biological weapons and unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop 
nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons useable material;
  Resolution 707, adopted August 15, 1991, condemned Iraq's violation 
of Resolution 687, adopted only four months before;
  Resolution 1051, adopted March 27, 1996, called for Iraq to comply 
with weapons inspectors;
  Resolution 1115, adopted June 21, 1997, condemned the repeated 
refusal of Iraqi authorities to allow access to UN inspectors; and
  Resolution 1194, adopted September 9, 1998, condemned the decision by 
Iraq to suspend cooperation with inspectors and oppose its obligations 
under Security Council resolutions.
  In 1991, we knew Saddam Hussein was producing weapons of mass 
destruction. We knew it in 1995. We knew it in 1998. We know now--he 
has these weapons today. There is no reason he would stop producing 
them--no one has been there to stop him. The United States and Great 
Britain have been enforcing the no-fly zones, but no one has been 
enforcing Saddam's commitments to disarm. No one can believe he would 
simply stop producing these evil weapons out of the goodness of his 
heart.
  When and if we do use our armed forces, we must show one of the vast 
differences between the US and Saddam: a value for human life. To him, 
soldiers are expendable. To us, each and every life has value and 
worth. Any military action inherently puts the lives of our brave 
soldiers at risk, and the American people know this far too well, but 
we must explore all possibilities and attempt to act with as little 
American and even Iraqi lives lost as possible.
  When Congress approved authorization for forays into Iraq in 1998, in 
one days debate, no amendments, former President Clinton, said, ``Let 
there be no doubt, we are prepared to act.'' This is the same message 
we are again debating today. We must allow this President--President 
George Bush--to stand up and say ``We are prepared to act.'' He must be 
able to state that to our allies with the authority and Congressional 
support, without limitation, that we gave in 1998.
  When we act with our allies or through the United Nations, we should 
go into Iraq with a plan--actually, several plans: a plan for how to 
disarm Saddam and his guard; a plan for how to remove Saddam from 
power; a plan for when and how American troops should leave Iraq. The 
United States, however, should not have a plan for installation of a 
hand-picked successor.

[[Page 19740]]

The Iraqi people must ultimately choose their leader. The United States 
and the international community must work with the people of Iraq just 
as we worked with the people of Afghanistan. If we choose a leader for 
Iraq, we will not be allowing the Iraqis to form an independent and 
democratic nation. The United States should have a plan for encouraging 
the various factions to work together, but we cannot choose a future 
leader before the battle begins.
  The President and Congress have both been accused of trying to 
politicize the issue of Iraq. This is not a political issue. It wasn't 
in 1998 and should not be now. It is an issue of national security and 
international stability. The truth is respected individuals from both 
parties have expressed support for taking action and, more importantly, 
support having a plan for action. On September 12 this year, former 
Senator Bob Kerry, a Democrat from Nebraska, wrote in the Wall Street 
Journal, ``The real choice is between sustaining a military effort 
designed to contain Saddam Hussein and a military effort designed to 
replace him.'' He also pointed out that the United States has spent 
more than a billion dollars in the last 11 years on simply containing 
Saddam. What return have the American people received from that 
investment? Saddam is still in power, the Iraqi people are still 
oppressed, and the security and stability of the region are still 
threatened.
  This is the choice we have today. Do we keep the status quo and 
continue to spend money without any change in Iraq or do we authorize 
the President to take action and make some changes? I support change. 
Without any serious action by either the United States or the 
international community, we are telling Saddam that his game can go on. 
He stays where he is and continues his shell game. We lose again. 
Saddam is more than willing to keep the game going as long as the 
United States and the world are willing to lose.
  The people of Iraq, the people of the United States, and the people 
of the world have not need for the leadership of Saddam Hussein--we can 
all agree on that. If he cannot abide by his international obligations 
and if he will not disarm then, simply put, he needs to go. We need to 
be rid of him and the President needs the authority to use armed forces 
to remove Saddam if necessary.
  I firmly believe that firm resolve under this resolution--this 
resolution that does give some pretty broad powers--will keep us from 
having to go to war.
  Without it, I think we may have to go to war.
  I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting the language included 
in the Lieberman-Warner substitute without any amendments--just as we 
did for President Clinton in 1998--with the same resolve, with the same 
unity, and with the same straightforwardness we had then.
  We can't quite do that, though, can we? We have already debated a 
couple of days. We have already had amendments put in. But we can still 
have the kind of unity we need to show our resolve so we can get the 
U.N. to do something which will keep us from going to war.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Corzine). The Senator from Rhode Island is 
recognized for 40 minutes.
  Mr. REED. Mr. President, The Senate is engaged in a momentous and 
historic debate. The President seeks the authority to use force in our 
on-going confrontation with Iraq.
  The Constitution entrusts the Congress with the exclusive power to 
``declare War.'' It is our Constitutional obligation to consider the 
President's request carefully and conscientiously, to review the 
evidence thoroughly, to weigh the costs and the consequences. We are 
called upon by the Constitution to make an independent judgment, not an 
automatic acquiescence.
  I begin this debate acknowledging several unassailable conclusions.
  First, we are already in a confrontation with Iraq. Since the Persian 
Gulf War, we have maintained military forces in support of 
international sanctions against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Our 
pilots are routinely fired upon as they enforce the ``No Fly'' Zones. 
Thus, the question is not whether we should confront Iraq. The question 
is how best to thwart this outlaw regime and for what ultimate purpose.
  Second, Saddam Hussein is a despicable person who oppresses his 
people as he threatens his neighbors. Despite his military defeat in 
the Persian Gulf War and the imposition of sanctions, Saddam continues 
to defy United Nations resolutions and, of most concern, continues to 
develop and attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. But, our 
judgment cannot rest simply on his unalloyed evil. We must consider our 
actions more broadly. Will we enhance the stability and security of the 
region? Will we strengthen our security not just for the moment, but 
for the future as well? What kind of precedent will we establish?
  Third, we will decisively defeat Iraqi military forces in any 
conflict. The skill and courage of our forces, aided by superb 
technology, will overwhelm Iraqi resistance. The military outcome is 
certain, but the costs and the consequences are uncertain and could be 
quite grave.
  As I consider the proper course of action, as I weigh the 
uncertainties as well as recognize what is apparent, I return again and 
again to one further conclusion. Whatever we do will be better done 
with others. Thus, it is imperative that we commit all of our energies 
to encourage the United Nations to live up to its founding principles: 
to be more than just an international forum for discussion; indeed, to 
be a force for collective action in the face of common dangers. 
President Bush said it very well when he addressed the United Nations' 
General Assembly:

       We created a United Nations Security Council so that, 
     unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more 
     than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes. After 
     generations of deceitful dictators and broken treaties and 
     squandered lives, we've dedicated ourselves to standards of 
     human dignity shared by all and to a system of security 
     defended by all.

  Acting alone will increase the risk to our forces and to our allies 
in the region. Acting alone will increase the burden that we must bear 
to restore stability in the region. Acting alone will invite the 
criticism and animosity of many throughout the world who will 
mistakenly dismiss our efforts as entirely self-serving. Acting alone 
could seriously undermine the structure of collective security that the 
United States has labored for decades to make effective. Acting alone 
today against the palpable evil of Saddam may set us on a course, 
charted by the newly announced doctrine of preemption, that will carry 
us beyond the limits of our power and our wisdom.
  For these reasons, I will vote against the Lieberman-Warner 
resolution granting the President the permission to take unilateral 
military action against Iraq regardless of the immediacy of the threat. 
And I will support the resolution proposed by Senator Levin.
  The Levin resolution recognizes the inherent right of the President 
to use our military forces to defend the United States. This resolution 
supports the President's demands that the United Nations promulgate a 
tough, new framework of inspections to disarm Iraq, and this resolution 
gives the President the right to use American military forces to 
enforce the resolve of the United Nations. The Levin resolution 
recognizes Congress' responsibility to promptly consider the 
President's request to unilaterally employ American forces if the 
United Nations fails to take effective action.
  On Monday in Cincinnati, President Bush said, ``Later this week the 
United States Congress will vote on this matter. I have asked the 
Congress to authorize the use of America's military, if it proves 
necessary, to enforce U.N. Security Council demands.'' That is what the 
Levin resolution provides.
  Those who advocate unilateral action assume that time has run out in 
dealing with Iraq. They see an immediate threat that will yield only to 
immediate military action. Thus, it is important to assess the Iraqi 
threat as best we can.

[[Page 19741]]

  Iraqi conventional forces have been seriously degraded since the Gulf 
War. Saddam does have a cadre of Republican Guards that are capable and 
fought with determination in the Gulf War. One cannot totally discount 
Iraq's conventional forces, but they are not capable of defeating 
United States forces. The most dangerous aspect of Saddam's military 
power is the possession of chemical and biological weapons and his 
aspiration to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.
  Today, Iraq has the capability to use chemical and biological weapons 
within the region to augment conventional forces that have been 
seriously degraded since the Gulf War. These capabilities, however, 
must be viewed in terms of intentions in order to fully evaluate the 
threat
  An assessment of Iraq intentions reveals areas of consensus and areas 
of disagreement. It seems clear that Saddam is intent on rebuilding his 
military and acquiring weapons of mass destruction including nuclear 
devices. His expulsion of U.N. inspectors certainly supports this view. 
Moreover, it may suggest that the inspectors posed a very difficult 
obstacle to his plans and their future utility cannot be summarily 
dismissed. Saddam continues to aspire to be a regional power. 
Unchecked, Saddam would threaten his neighbors and endeavor to claim 
the mantel of leadership in the Gulf and, perhaps, in the greater 
Muslim world.
  There is, however, a lack of consensus on two significant points. 
Will Saddam risk the survival of his regime by threatening or 
conducting attacks on his neighbors? Will Saddam provide weapons of 
mass destruction to terrorist groups who can or will use them against 
the United States or any other nation?
  At the heart of discussions of Saddam's possible plans is the general 
question of whether deterrence and containment will work against Iraq 
as it did in the Cold War. Saddam certainly has a lot to lose in any 
conflict with the United States. Both his life and his lifestyle would 
be in great jeopardy. Saddam also seems to be devoid of any ideology 
other than self-preservation and self-aggrandizement. Saddam is a 
secular thug, not a messianic leader. There is evidence that he will 
not put his regime at risk. During the Gulf war, the United States 
clearly signaled that any use by Iraq of chemical or biological weapons 
against Coalition forces would result in his destruction. Saddam 
accepted a humiliating defeat rather than risk losing power.
  Of course, there are many who accurately point out that Saddam has 
already attacked his neighbors, Iran and Kuwait. He has used chemical 
weapons against the Iranians and the Kurds. Still, one is left with the 
question whether even this despicable behavior is a product of 
calculation rather than delusion.
  And complicating the record of his actions against Iran is mounting 
evidence of our covert support both before and after he had begun to 
employ chemical weapons.
  The second issue involves Saddam's willingness and ability to 
cooperate with terrorists. After September 11, this issue takes on a 
new and powerful emphasis. Despite extraordinary and justifiable 
efforts to establish a connection between the Iraqi regime and the 
attacks on New York City and the Pentagon and the downed aircraft in 
Pennsylvania, no such links have been established. Indeed, if credible 
links exist, the President, in my view, could employ unilateral force 
under the terms of the congressional resolution passed on September 14, 
2001.
  Recently, however, administration officials are publicly, but 
cryptically, trying to make the case that there is a definite 
connection between the Iraqi regime and al-Qaida. Secretary Rumsfeld 
and Condolezza Rice have asserted at various times that Iraq is 
harboring al-Qaida fighters in Iraq, that information from detainees 
indicates that Iraq provided chem-bio weapons training to al-Qaida, and 
that senior-level contacts between the Iraq regime and al-Qaida have 
increased since 1998. They have offered few details beyond Secretary 
Rumsfeld's claims that the information is ``factual,'' ``extremely 
accurate'' and ``bulletproof.''
  But according to the Philadelphia Inquirer, these claims are disputed 
by ``a growing number of military officers, intelligence professionals 
and diplomats.'' The article quotes an unnamed official declaring:

     analysts at the working level in the intelligence community 
     are feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon to cook 
     the intelligence books.

  The Inquirer article examined some of these administration claims and 
found that ``the facts are much less conclusive.''
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this article printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 8, 2002]

                 Officials' Private Doubts on Iraq War

      (By Warren P. Strobel, Jonathan S. Landay and John Walcott)

       Washington.--While President Bush marshals congressional 
     and international support for invading Iraq, a growing number 
     of military officers, intelligence professionals and 
     diplomats in his own government privately have deep 
     misgivings about the administration's double-time march 
     toward war.
       These officials say administration hawks have exaggerated 
     evidence of the threat that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein 
     poses, including distorting his links to the al-Qaeda 
     terrorist network; have overstated the amount of 
     international support for attacking Iraq; and have downplayed 
     the potential repercussions of a new war in the Middle East.
       They say that the administration squelches dissenting views 
     and that intelligence analysts are under intense pressure to 
     produce reports supporting the White House's argument that 
     Hussein poses such an immediate threat to the United States 
     that preemptive military action is necessary.
       ``Analysts at the working level in the intelligence 
     community are feeling very strong pressure from the Pentagon 
     to cook the intelligence books,'' said one official, speaking 
     on condition of anonymity.
       A dozen other officials echoed his views in interviews with 
     the Inquirer Washington Bureau. No one who was interviewed 
     disagreed.
       They cited recent suggestions by Defense Secretary Donald 
     H. Rumsfeld and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice 
     that Hussein and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network working 
     together.
       Rumsfeld said Sept. 26 that the U.S. government had 
     ``bulletproof'' confirmation of links between Iraq and al-
     Qaeda members, including ``solid evidence'' that members of 
     the terrorist network maintained a presence in Iraq.
       The facts are much less conclusive. Officials said 
     Rumsfeld's statement was based in part on intercepted 
     telephone calls in which an al-Qaeda member who apparently 
     was passing through Baghdad was overheard calling friends or 
     relatives, intelligence officials said. the intercepts 
     provide no evidence that the suspected terrorist was working 
     with the Iraqi regime or that he was working on a terrorist 
     operation while he was in Iraq, they said.
       Rumsfeld also suggested that the Iraqi regime had offered 
     safe haven to bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed 
     Omar.
       While technically true, that, too, is misleading. 
     Intelligence reports said the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, a 
     longtime Iraqi intelligence officer, made the offer during a 
     visit to Afghanistan in late 1998, after the United States 
     attacked al-Qaeda training camps with cruise missiles to 
     retaliate for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
     Tanzania. But officials said the same intelligence reports 
     said bin Laden rejected the offer because he did not want 
     Hussein to control his group.
       In fact, the officials said, there is no ironclad evidence 
     that the Iraqi regime and the terrorist network are working 
     together, or that Hussein has ever contemplated giving 
     chemical or biological weapons to al-Qaeda, with whom he has 
     deep ideological differences.
       None of the dissenting officials, who work in a number of 
     different agencies, would agree to speak publicly, out of 
     fear of retribution. Many of them have long experience in the 
     Middle East and South Asia, and all spoke in similar terms 
     about their unease with the way that U.S. political leaders 
     were dealing with Iraq.
       All agreed that Hussein was a threat who eventually must be 
     dealt with, and none flatly opposed military action. But, 
     they say, that U.S. government has no dramatic new knowledge 
     about the Iraqi leader that justifies Bush's urgent call to 
     arms.
       Some lawmakers have voiced similar concerns after receiving 
     CIA briefings. Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D., Ill.) said some 
     information he had seen did not support Bush's portrayal of 
     the Iraqi threat. ``It's troubling to have classified 
     information that contradicts statements made by the 
     administration,'' Durbin said. ``There's more they should 
     share with the public.''
       Several administration and intelligence officials defended 
     CIA Director George Tenet,

[[Page 19742]]

     saying Tenet was not pressuring his analysts but was quietly 
     working to include dissenting opinions in intelligence 
     estimates and congressional briefings.
       In one case, a senior administration official said, Tenet 
     made sure that a State Department official told Congress that 
     the Energy and State Departments disagreed with an 
     intelligence assessment that said hundreds of aluminum tubes 
     Iraq tried to purchase were intended for Baghdad's secret 
     nuclear-weapons program. Analysts in both departments 
     concluded that the Iraqis probably wanted the tubes to make 
     conventional artillery pieces.
       Other examples of questionable statements include: Vice 
     President Cheney said in late August that Iraq might have 
     nuclear weapons ``fairly soon.'' A CIA report released Friday 
     said it could take Iraq until the last half of the decade to 
     produce a nuclear weapon, unless it could acquire bomb-grade 
     uranium or plutonium on the black market.
       Also in August, Rumsfeld suggested that al-Qaeda operatives 
     fleeing Afghanistan were taking refuge in Iraq with Hussein's 
     assistance. ``In a vicious, repressive dictatorship that 
     exercises near-total control over its population, it's very 
     hard to imagine that the government is not aware of what's 
     taking place in the country,'' he said. Rumsfeld apparently 
     was referring to about 150 members of the militant Islamic 
     group Ansar al Islam (``Supporters of Islam'') who have taken 
     refuge in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. However, one of 
     America's would-be Kurdish allies controls that part of this 
     country, not Hussein.
  Mr. REED. In addition, a full assessment of the assertions of 
Secretary Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Rice is hampered by 
the failure of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide an updated 
National Intelligence Estimate of the current situation in Iraq.
  Given the subjective nature and inherent difficulty of evaluating the 
intentions of such an opaque structure as the Iraqi regime, much more 
weight must be given to their capabilities. Saddam does not deserve the 
benefit of the doubt. But looking at Iraqi capabilities alone, the 
threat is not immediate. If unchecked, the threat is inevitable and 
dangerous. But, at time have the opportunity to pursue a collective 
solution to Iraq. This is an approach that offers a greater chance of 
success and a greater chance of long-term stability.
  Whatever course of action that we choose, we cannot absolutely ignore 
or disregard the views and opinions of other countries. With the 
exception of Great Britain, there are few nations that are supportive 
of unilateral action.
  The nations that surround Iraq are critical to the success of any 
military operation and to the long-term success of our policy. And, 
regional support for unilateral American military operations is 
equivocal at best.
  Turkey seems likely to allow use of its airbases but without great 
enthusiasm and with great concern about the Kurds. Saudi Arabia opposes 
toppling Saddam and has stated it will allow the use of its bases only 
if the operation is authorized by the United Nations. The potential 
loss of Saudi bases and overflight rights will limit our flexibility. 
King Abdullah of Jordan has described a military confrontation with 
Iraq as a ``catastrophe'' for the region. His reluctant support is 
based on our commitment not to seek permission to introduce American 
forces into Jordan.
  The Iranians have declared their intentions to remain aloof from the 
conflict. Iran is a bitter foe of Iraq, but its government is no friend 
to America. The gulf states seem resigned to the possibility of war. 
Mubarak of Egypt has repeatedly spoken out against a unilateral attack, 
and it is unclear whether Egypt will allow the use of its airfields.
  As the New York Times pointed out with regard to the Gulf Region and 
the Middle East:

       The support for the United States is not enthusiastic, and 
     is based on any American military action having the backing 
     of a United Nations resolution.

  As we debate, the Iraqis are preparing their responses to our 
diplomatic and military initiatives. Their options are shaped by their 
capabilities and, I believe, the lessons learned in their disastrous 
defeat in the gulf war and their study of the success of American 
military forces in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.
  Their first option is the one that they are currently pursuing; the 
admission of U.N. weapon inspectors under the most lenient conditions 
possible. The Iraqis are not unmindful that inspectors in Baghdad are 
the best insurance that they can have against a military attack by the 
United States. Even if this Congress authorized the President to use 
military force against Iraq at his sole discretion without regard to 
the United Nations, it is difficult to conceive of the President 
ordering an attack with U.N. inspectors in Iraq carrying out a U.N. 
resolution and presumably telling CNN that their mission is proceeding.
  The State Department is engaged in difficult negotiations to broker a 
new resolution while at the same time delaying the entry of inspectors 
into Iraq. If these negotiations fail, the United States would find 
itself in a precarious position. Not only will we be deprived of a new 
and strengthened enforcement mechanism, we likely will be exerting all 
our formal and informal influence to prevent the reintroduction of 
inspectors. Blocking the reentry of inspectors would further isolate us 
in the world. If we succeed in brokering a new and more effective 
inspection scheme, there is a significant probability that Iraq, 
despite it repeated defiance and rejection of tougher standards, will 
initially comply. Saddam has consistently practiced the politics of 
survival. Accepting inspectors, even inspectors with unconditional and 
unconstrained access, will buy time. If Saddam refuses to accept 
inspectors in accord with a more robust U.N. resolution, he seals his 
fate.
  The recognition by the administration that Iraq may capitulate in the 
face of a strong Security Council resolution might tempt them to 
halfhearted pursuit of United Nations authority. They should resist 
those temptations. It is clearly preferable to operate with a U.N. 
authorization whether it is contained in one resolution that 
promulgates a new inspection scheme backed by the explicit 
authorization of force or a two-staged process that introduces 
inspectors with enhanced powers but defers the question of enforcement 
until Iraqi non-compliance is established.
  If inspectors are not reintroduced into Iraq and Iraq is convinced of 
a pending American-led attack, then the possibility of terrorist 
attacks by Iraq within the United States must be considered. In a 
letter read before a hearing of the Senate and House Intelligence 
Committees, CIA Director, George Tenet, stated that:

       Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of 
     conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or chemical or 
     biological weapons.

  But, Tenet went on to warn:

       Should Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack against his 
     country could not be deterred ``he probably would become much 
     less constrained in adopting terrorist action.''

  And, if Iraq is contemplating terror in America, then Iraqis are more 
than likely to be considering preemptive strikes on our forces as we 
build up prior to an attack. One of the most compelling lessons of the 
gulf war and subsequent American military operations is that letting 
the United States build up its military forces is tantamount to victory 
for the United States. If we can assemble in sufficient numbers the 
best warfighters in the world with the best military technology in the 
world, we will win the military battle every time and certainly in the 
case of Iraq.
  If Hussein's goal is to kill U.S. soldiers and slow down an invasion, 
he might strike in the early days of a campaign at regional ports or 
airfields when those facilities are filled to capacity with U.S. forces 
gathering for the fight. In 1997, a Pentagon team of 18 generals and 
admirals projected different ways such an attack could take place. In 
one scenario, small teams of Iraqi infiltrators unleashed mustard gas 
from an old bread truck outfitted with agricultural sprayers. In the 
projected scenario, the truck was mistakenly let on base by troops who 
thought it was delivering food. In another scenario, a helicopter took 
off from a barge floating about 15 miles from the Indian Ocean island 
of Diego Garcia and sprayed cholera into the air, infecting thousands 
of U.S. Marines preparing to board ships. The Marines

[[Page 19743]]

didn't fall ill until they were at sea. Finally, the generals 
envisioned speedboats, loaded with chemical and biological weapons, 
ramming into docks near key U.S. ports in Bahrain and Kuwait. Added to 
these scenarios is the possibility of a missile attack similar to the 
one launched against our rear areas during the gulf war.
  A chemical or biological attack on our forces as they assemble would 
disrupt our operations but not ultimately defeat them. It would 
increase our casualties and costs. It also has the potential to sow 
panic in civilian ranks and make our presence a greater burden on 
supportive governments.
  If Saddam does not choose to launch preemptive attacks on our build-
up, there is increasing evidence that he will use chemical and 
biological weapons against our forces as they commence the attack. Last 
Tuesday Prime Minister Blair released a report, which stated that 
Saddam might have already delegated authority to employ chemical and 
biological weapons to his youngest son, Qusai, who leads the Republican 
Guard. Reportedly, Saddam had, prior to the start of the 1991 Persian 
Gulf ground war, issued specific orders for the use of WMD if the 
allies were winning the ground war and crossed a line 200 miles south 
of Baghdad.
  Once again, Iraqi chemical or biological attacks against United 
States forces will not halt our attack. American units are trained and 
equipped to operate in chemical or biological environments. However, 
such attacks can cause delay, disruption and increased casualties. 
General Hoar, former CENTCOM Commander, testified before the Armed 
Services Committee that prior to offensive operations in 1991, he was 
briefed on a simulation conducted at Quantico that indicated the 
possibility of 10,000 casualties to the assaulting Coalition forces due 
principally to the potential use of chemical and biological weapons. We 
have improved our protective equipment and monitors since the gulf war. 
We have devoted great effort to developing techniques to target and 
suppress opposing systems that could deliver chemical and biological 
weapons. Nevertheless, chemical and biological attacks would pose 
serious risks to our forces and to the civilian population.
  It is important to note that both General John Shalikashvili and 
General Wesley Clark in testimony before the Armed Services Committee 
agreed that operating under United Nations authority would tend to 
raise the threshold for the Iraqis to use weapons of mass destruction. 
Operating alone, the United States runs the risk of Iraqi gambling that 
international opinion will not be as critical of Iraq in the employment 
of these weapons.
  If the first lesson of the gulf war is don't let the United States 
build up its forces, the second lesson is don't fight the United States 
at long range in open terrain. Our troops, training and technology give 
us decisive advantages to locate and destroy targets with integrated 
fires at great range. The deserts of Iraq are ideally suited for our 
forces and will be the graveyard of the Iraqi army if they chose to 
fight us there.
  Unless the Iraqis learned nothing from their defeat, they will not 
fight our forces in the open. They likely will conduct a strategic 
withdrawal to Baghdad.,fighting at choke points like rivers and urban 
areas. But, they may also conduct a scorched earth policy as they 
withdraw to slow us down and deny us speedy avenues of approach to 
Baghdad. Suddam ordered the oil fields of Kuwait destroyed as his army 
fled. He may do the same as his forces withdraw. Moreover, since our 
major avenue of approach is through Southern Iraq, the traditional home 
of Iraqi Shiites, Saddam is unlikely to have any reluctance to inflict 
damage on a community that he has always suppressed.
  If Iraq forces can maintain any coherence in the face of our assault, 
particularly our air assaults, then they will most likely make their 
major stand in Baghdad. In the streets and alleys of Baghdad, our 
technological advantages are reduced. It would become a more difficult 
battle.
  The International Institute of Strategic Studies reports that Iraq's 
``wisest course would be to hunker down in cities, distribute and hide 
its forces, and fight from those places. It cannot be assumed that the 
Iraqi Army would deploy armour in the open desert, as in 1990-91, 
firing from static positions and presenting an immobile target for 
airpower, as the Taliban did. Many Iraqi weapons and command and 
control centers will be placed near apartments, hospitals, schools, and 
mosques.''
  General Hoar testified at the Armed Services Committee of a 
``nightmare scenario'' that needs to be planned for--six Iraqi 
Republican Guard divisions and six heavy divisions reinforced with 
several thousand antiaircraft artillery pieces defending the city of 
Baghdad, resulting in urban warfare with high casualties on both sides, 
as well as the civilian populace.
  We are all mindful that, during the Gulf War, Saddam launched 39 Scud 
missiles against Israel as a means to provoke the Israelis to 
retaliate. It was a desperate attempt to change the dynamic of a war 
that was leading to a humiliating defeat. He hoped that Israel could be 
drawn into the war and their involvement would cause the Muslim world 
to abandon the international coalition and rally to Saddam. The 
Israelis did not take the bait. They endured missile attacks, refrained 
from retaliation and watched as coalition forces dictated terms to a 
defeated Iraq.
  Given Saddam's history and his options, it is highly probable that he 
will once again seek to draw Israel into the conflict as a means of 
rallying the Muslim world to his cause. He has a limited number of 
missiles to fire at Israel. However, it is likely that Palestinian 
forces like Hamas and Hezbollah will launch either sympathetic or 
explicitly coordinated attacks against Israel. This later dimension was 
not such a formidable factor in 1991. Today, the potential for suicide 
attacks and widespread violence in the West Bank and elsewhere in 
Israel is more pronounced.
  According to Western and Israeli intelligence sources, Hezbollah 
militants in southern Lebanon are reported to have amassed thousands of 
surface-to-surface rockets with ranges sufficient to strike cities in 
northern Israel.
  The administration hopes that the government of Israel will exercise 
the same restraint that it showed in 1991. That might be a forlorn 
hope. On September 26, Prime Minister Sharon said, ``If Iraq attacks 
Israel, but does not hit population centers of cause casualties, our 
interest will be not to make it hard on the Americans. If on the other 
hand, harm is doneto Israel, if we suffer casualties or if non-
conventional weapons of mass destruction are used against us, then 
definitely Israel will take the proper action to defend its citizens.'' 
We all recognize the right of Israel to defend itself. The Prime 
Minister's first responsibility is to his people.
  But we also understand that Israeli retaliation would put great 
pressure on Muslim countries to either end any support for United 
States efforts or to actively oppose our efforts. Here again, a strong 
argument can be made that an operation sanctioned by the United Nations 
might give these countries sufficient justification to participate with 
the international community rather than oppose efforts to decisively 
deal with Saddam.
  We are prepared militarily to counter all of these Iraqi threats. Our 
first priority will be to establish an air defense system to protect 
our forces as they enter the region. Our ground based air defense 
batteries and active aerial patrolling will help mitigate any potential 
Iraqi threat from the air. We have had extensive collaboration with 
Israel on the development of their Arrow air defense system. This 
collaboration and other collaborative efforts will be accelerated to 
help ensure that any potential Iraqi attack on Israel will be 
frustrated.
  In the conduct of offensive operations, we will prepare the 
battlefield with intensive air strikes. But, one of the factors that 
must be considered in this air campaign is the inadvertent release of 
chemical or biological agents as a result of our bombing. Press stories 
suggest that the Iraqis have placed sensitive installations in urban 
areas

[[Page 19744]]

as a way to protect them from the expected air campaign. We could 
discover that we have unwittingly created a chemical or biological 
release that would be exploited by the Iraqi government not as 
confirmation of their treachery but as an attack on our conduct of the 
operation.
  Indeed, the potential use of chemical and biological weapons is one 
of the great uncertainties of a battle against Iraq. The President and 
Secretary Rumsfeld are trying to dissuade Iraqi field commanders from 
deploying these weapons by sternly and correctly warning them that they 
will be held accountable for war crimes.
  It is an open question whether this warning will be effective with 
individuals who owe their position and lives to Saddam and who would 
likely face swift and fatal retribution from Saddam before they would 
be subject to international law.
  We are prepared to counter Iraqi responses to our military 
operations. But, there are certainly no guarantees that we can do so 
without significant casualties to our forces and to the civilian 
population. Much of the Iraqi response turns on the willingness of his 
forces to resist and to follow his supposed orders to employ weapons of 
mass destruction. It is difficult to predict these dimensions of 
loyalty and morale. But, this battle seems likely to produce more 
causalities and costs than the Persian Gulf war for the simple reason 
that the President has repeatedly associated our use of force with 
regime change. In a battle to remove Saddam from power, his desperation 
and the desperation of his loyalists will cast this as a battle to the 
death. Unfortunately, one of the hallmarks of dictators is that many 
people suffer and die, many innocent people, before they meet their 
demise.
  We will prevail in any battle against Iraq. But, military victory 
brings with it a host of other problems. Again, an examination of these 
issues strongly suggests that our tasks would be immensely aided if we 
initiated our operations with the broadest possible international 
coalition vested with the authority of the United Nations.
  The Administration's avowed policy of ``regime change'' combined with 
the discretion to wage a unilateral attack on Iraq will inevitably lead 
to the indefinite occupation of Iraq by United States forces. Such an 
occupation will be expensive and will impose significant stress on our 
military forces that are already ``stabilizing'' Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and other areas across the Globe.
  Moreover, governing Iraq is not one of the easiest tasks. It is a 
country with at least three major factions; the Kurds in the North, 
Sunni Muslims in the Center and Shiite Muslims in the South. The 
potential for disintegration along ethnic and religious lines is 
significant.
  Our tasks in Iraq will be immensely complicated by the probable 
damage resulting from the military campaign. Although we will deploy 
precision missions and will be acutely conscious of minimizing 
collateral damage, a ``scorched earth'' policy by the Iraqis compounded 
by the possible release of toxic agents and the possibility of 
extensive combat in built-up areas may lead to significant damage and 
significant civilian casualities.
  Again, after the battle, we would look for international assistance 
to rebuild Iraq. That assistance would be more forthcoming if we 
initiated operations with international support rather than without it.
  Even before calculating the costs of postwar reconstruction of Iraq, 
we must recognize that military operations in Iraq will be expensive in 
direct costs and could have significant and detrimental effects on our 
economy.
  Estimates of the direct cost of an attack on Iraq range from $50 
billion to $200 billion. For perspective, the gulf war cost about $80 
billion in direct incremental costs, and our allies paid much of this 
expense.
  Indirect effects on our economy are hard to estimate, but there is 
great concern that military operations in Iraq will further complicate 
a fragile economy.
  One of the most potentially volatile economic aspects of a war in 
Iraq will be its effect on the price of oil. According to the 
Congressional Research Service, ``the effect of a sudden and sustained 
increase in the price of oil could deepen an existing recession or push 
an already weak economy into recession.''
  Our occupation of Iraq will place us in control of the world's second 
largest oil reserves. Directly or indirectly, we will become a major 
force in the international politics of oil. That fact will not be lost 
on other producing nations and the world at large. There is a real 
danger that our motivation to remove Saddam will be ignored or quickly 
forgotten, and our attack on Iraq will be seen as old fashion 
imperialism. Once again, this perception is most likely to develop if 
we conduct our operations unilaterally.
  To date, the administration has not publicly suggested how they 
intend to deal with Iraqi oil. This is a major issue of international 
importance touching the economic, diplomatic and security priorities of 
the world.
  A unilateral attack by the United States will engender worldwide 
criticism as already suggested by the comments of many leaders around 
the world and reflected in public opinion in many countries. A swift 
victory without significant casualties or damage will mute this 
criticism in many quarters, but it will not easily extinguish the 
resentment of our ``go it alone'' policy. A difficult and costly 
struggle will accelerate this criticism and create problems that will 
inhibit diplomatic and economic progress on other fronts.
  One of the unintended consequences of a unilateral assault on Iraq 
may be our efforts on the War on Terror; the unfinished business of 
completely destroying Al Qaida before they strike us again. Despite all 
the good faith assurances of military leaders that they will not lose 
focus on the War on Terrorism, the scale of the proposed operation, the 
notoriety and the huge risks involved will inevitably draw resources 
and attention from the War on Terror. Further complicating our efforts 
on the War of terror is the real possibility that many countries that 
are now assisting us will greet future requests with studied 
indifference or denial.
  The President asks for the authority to use force unilaterally. This 
request must be viewed in the context of the newly promulgated National 
Security Strategy. The core of this new strategy rejects deterrence and 
embraces preemption.
  According to this strategy, the United States has long maintained the 
option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our 
national security. The greater the threat, the greater the risk of 
inaction--and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory 
action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time 
and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile 
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively.
  There is no argument that the United States, like every nation, 
retains the right to defend itself from an imminent hostile act. But, 
this strategy goes much further. It appears to be based not on the 
immediacy of a hostile act but simply on the ``sufficiency'' of the 
threat. It fails to make any distinction based on the nature or timing 
of the threat. As such, it can be applied or misapplied to a wide range 
of adversaries.
  There is no question that the United States must act preemptively 
against terrorist like al-Qaida. The nature of the threat and the 
immediacy of the threat leave no other option. Al-Qaida has no 
significant and identifiable institutions, resources or assets to hold 
hostage as a means of changing behavior. Al-Qaida has no significant 
and identifiable institutions, resources or assets to hold hostage as a 
means of changing behavior. Al-Qaida makes on pretense of attempting to 
participate in the international system of nation states. Al-Qaida is 
not motivated by calculated self interest as much as it is motivated by 
an apocalyptic impulse for the destruction of its enemies and the 
ritual sacrifice of its adherents. There is no choice but to seek out

[[Page 19745]]

these terrorists and destroy them before they attack us again.
  But al-Qaida is different that many threats that face us. And, 
extending this notion of preemption and bolstering it in resolutions 
that give the President authority at his discretion to conduct 
unilateral military operations starts us down a potentially dangerous 
path.
  We are debating Iraq today, but will we apply this preemptive 
doctrine to Iran or North Korea tomorrow? How do we prevent others from 
adopting this same strategy if we have enshrined it as the centerpiece 
of our policy? For example, how to we counsel the Indians to refrain 
from preemptively attacking Pakistan or vice versa? From New Delhi or 
Islamabad, the threat looks ``sufficient'' and striking first is 
enticing.
  In this first test of the President's new National Security Strategy, 
we should be very careful to define the scope of his authority to avoid 
being swept up in a doctrine that appears to have few limits.
  Our continuing confrontation with Iraq is fraught with danger and 
challenge. Much is uncertain, but I believe that one point is quite 
clear. Leading an international coalition to enforce United Nations 
resolutions, as the President spoke of in Cincinnati, is the surest way 
to reduce the dangers and ensure the long-term success of our policy. 
It is for this reason that I support the Levin resolution.
  Great events will turn on our deliberations. But, at this moment, my 
thoughts are not on historic forces. Rather, I think about the young 
Americans who will carry out our policies. They are prepared to 
sacrifice everything. We owe them more than we can ever repay. One 
thing that we certainly owe them is our best judgment. I have tried to 
give them mine.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Reed). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. CORZINE. I thank the Chair. I thank the distinguished Senator 
from Oklahoma for the opportunity to go forward.
  I rise tonight to express my views on what has become the overriding 
issue before the Senate and our Nation as we close out the 107th 
Congress: the authorization of the use of military force against Iraq 
and in what context and under what circumstances such an operation 
might take place.
  This issue has been one on which I have given much thought and 
careful analysis. This decision quite literally has life-and-death 
implications, not just for our courageous men and women in uniform but 
for all Americans across our homeland, for your family and mine.
  No decision we take can weigh more heavily on our hearts and minds, 
particularly in light of the exposed vulnerabilities and tragic events 
of September 11, 2001. This is as important an issue as any of us will 
ever face. It requires a sober and calculating weight of the costs and 
benefits to our Nation.
  Ultimately, our decision will shape the nature of the U.S. leadership 
as the first among equals in the post-cold-war world, and our decision 
sets a precedent for ourselves and for those who take our lead in the 
21st century for good or evil.
  No one argues that Saddam Hussein's brutal and criminal regime should 
be tolerated. He and his regime are evil. We all accept that Hussein 
uses torture and terrorism to advance his political goals. He 
constructs palaces while his people starve. He stockpiles biological 
and chemical weapons. At times, these weapons of mass destruction have 
been unleashed against the Iraqi people and his enemies.
  All of us are concerned that the Iraqi regime is seeking to develop 
nuclear weapons contrary to international law and U.N. resolutions. 
With deference to these circumstances and probable facts, the United 
Nations and the world community must act swiftly and decisively in 
response to the Iraqi threat.
  As my colleague Senator Kerry said earlier today: The question is not 
whether Saddam Hussein should be held accountable to disarm; the 
question is how. Should disarmament be imposed by the United States 
alone or with the weight of global public opinion behind it? To answer 
the question how, one needs to consider the context of the broader role 
America plays as a single remaining superpower.
  As I see it, America should make every effort to build a global 
coalition to achieve our objective of disarming Iraq. This effort 
should be considered our first priority in these grave circumstances. 
Building an international coalition will give moral authority to our 
challenge, share the sacrifices that will be incurred, and set a 
positive precedent for the future in foreign relations among nations.
  The benefits of working cooperatively with other countries have been 
a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy since the end of World War II. 
That is why the United States worked to create the United Nations in 
the very first instance.
  Strangely, this administration has sometimes appeared to consider 
multilateral support for a military campaign to be an unnecessary 
inconvenience. Even in light of our unprecedented international support 
and cooperation following the tragedy of 9/11--some 90 nations if I am 
not mistaken--it was only after the President delivered his September 
12 speech at the United Nations that he began visible and serious 
outreach to the global community.
  This week, the President in his speech in Cincinnati went further to 
embrace a multilateral approach. I support what he expressed in that 
speech. In my view, we must reinforce his recent instincts. We all know 
at the end of the day the United States always retains the inherent 
right to act unilaterally in self-defense. With that understanding, I 
believe strongly we must not stop pursuing, however, the support of the 
world community before acting alone.
  The United States may be the strongest country in the world 
militarily. We still need allies. We need help with logistics. We need 
intelligence cooperation and overflight rights to help us succeed. That 
is in the short run. And after the military campaign is over, we will 
need help in the long run reconstructing Iraq and rebuilding a civil 
society. But if the world community is not with us when we take off, it 
will be hard to ask for their help when we land.
  Our Nation has been well served if we share the human and financial 
sacrifices required to prosecute the war and keep the peace, and we 
will be well served in the future if we follow that pattern. Unless we 
have the support of our allies, it will be difficult to ask them for 
humanitarian assistance in helping to feed, clothe, and heal the Iraqi 
people or reestablishing the rule of law.
  It will be difficult to ask for assistance for peacekeeping and 
nationbuilding activities. In the past, the current administration has 
been somewhat reticent to support these kinds of operations. As a case 
in point, we relied on the armed forces of other countries, for 
example, to restore law and order in Afghanistan. Yet if other 
countries had not been committed from the beginning, they would have 
been much less likely to participate once the fighting was over.
  Unilateralism also brings with us great costs--most importantly, 
costs in the precious lives of our men and women in uniform, people who 
serve us bravely.
  It also brings us costs as we saw in the gulf war. The United States 
had relatively low out-of-pocket expenses. The reason was, we had a 
coalition of nations. Although the Congressional Research Service notes 
that war cost about $80 billion, much of that was covered by allied 
contributions.
  Without allies, the United States, it is projected, will have to 
shoulder by itself the $100 billion to $200 billion pricetag suggested 
by the administration for the current war. I have seen

[[Page 19746]]

higher estimates. It really depends on how long our participation in 
the peacekeeping and nationbuilding efforts will go on afterwards.
  It should not be lost on the American people that we are still in 
Korea, 50 some years after our intervention. In other words, 
unilateralism is expensive and its cost--crowd out other priorities on 
the Nation's agenda from our first responders to our first graders.
  Unfortunately, by authorizing force before a multilateral approach 
has been devised, the President's resolution provides no assurance that 
the world community will be actively involved in either the military 
campaign or, more importantly, the reconstruction efforts.
  In the long run, the Bush doctrine of unilateral preemption embedded 
in the underlying resolution would set an awful example for the world 
community--a precedent based on the concept of survival of the fittest.
  For generations, the United States has decried the aggression of 
foreign governments across the globe. We fought the patriotic and just 
fights against the Nazis and Communists who sought world domination. 
How in the future can we criticize Russia for attacking Georgia or stop 
India from taking action against Pakistan or believe Taiwan will be 
safe from China? Many countries may feel threats, continuing or 
imminent. They, too, could argue preemptive rights. The underlying 
resolution would codify the Bush preemption doctrine in precedent and 
could undermine our moral authority and leadership credibility in 
limiting future conflicts around the globe.
  Furthermore, by advancing a policy of unilateral preemption, we could 
be encouraging state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and Syria to 
form unholy alliances with just the kinds of agents of terror that 
caused the horrific events of September 11. Iran, Iraq's mortal enemy, 
actually opposes a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Why is that? Perhaps because 
Iran fears that if the U.S. attacks Iraq today, we might attack Iran 
tomorrow. Clearly, the thawing of relations between these two U.S. 
adversaries should give us pause. One can only wonder what Iran's 
instructions to their agents of terror will be in a world where they 
feel threatened under a preemption doctrine.
  Earlier this week, Senator Graham introduced an amendment which 
authorized the President to use force against several identified 
dangerous terrorist groups, including Iranian-linked Hezbollah and 
Hamas. I supported that amendment because I believe that those foreign 
terrorist organizations represent an even higher order risk to American 
security than Iraq.
  Like al-Qaida, these organizations have the clear means of delivery. 
These terrorist groups may already be operating in our homeland. I am 
concerned that, at some level, Iraq may be a dangerous distraction from 
America's war on terrorism. While the United States military has 
certainly disrupted the activities of the al-Qaida network, no one 
should doubt that al-Qaida and its sympathizers continue to operate. 
The administration tells the American people this almost every week.
  These groups continue to plot ways to undermine the American way of 
life and our security. As the United States considers its future course 
of action with respect to Iraq, a potential threat, we must assure the 
American people that we will not be distracted from the effort to 
destroy a proven threat, al-Qaida and these other terrorist 
organizations. That should be our No. 1 priority. It certainly has been 
in repeated statements by the President. I am also concerned that the 
resolution we have before us is structured with an overly broad scope. 
It refers to UN Security Council resolutions that are unrelated to the 
primary goal of disarming Iraq and eliminating its delivery capacity of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  We must remember that the threat we feel is not from the Iraqi people 
but from the criminal regime's control of weapons of mass destruction. 
And second, because the underlying resolution refers to UN Security 
Council Resolution 678, a resolution that discusses the importance of 
returning security to the ``area,'' we may inadvertently be permitting 
military action beyond Iraq. Potentially, some of these structural 
concerns were addressed by other resolutions that were circulated 
including one drafted by Senators Biden and Lugar.
  There were attempts to define away some of the broader aspects of the 
concerns I relate to in the underlying Lieberman-Warner resolution, but 
I am fearful, as I have suggested, that by their reference to other 
U.N. resolutions that may not be the case.
  I certainly believe we could have done better through the Biden-Lugar 
approach.
  Finally, I am troubled my the fact that Congress is being asked to 
make a decision on a matter of this gravity without being fully 
informed with all relevant intelligence. It is an unfortunate fact but 
many of us, and I can speak for myself, have often learned more by 
reading the New York Times and the Washington Post than by attending 
the secret briefings provided to Senators.
  Even today, we hear about a conflict between what it is the CIA says 
is the likely response of the Saddam Hussein regime when they no longer 
have other options and would be the case as presented by the 
administration.
  In the future, I hope that the administration will be more open 
earlier with secure briefings in the process so that Members of 
Congress can make fully informed decisions. I think they should be 
built upon true intelligence.
  It is in this overarching context, that I will cosponsor and strongly 
support the Levin amendment which authorizes the use of force pursuant 
to a new UN security council resolution demanding swift council 
resolution demanding swift, certain, and unconditional inspections and 
Iraqi disarmament. The Levin amendment in no way comprises the US' 
inherent right to self-defense or Congress' ability to authorize 
unilateral actions if the UN fails to act. But it embraces the 
multilateral approach as a first priority.
  This course of action, will bring with it all the benefits I have 
sought to outline, a multilateral approach, without giving up the right 
of unilateral approach as a last resort. In my judgment, the Levin 
amendment embraces the need for the U.S. to lead a dangerous world to 
disarm Saddam Hussein today with a multilateral approach, while setting 
a pattern and precedent that provides for greater security to the 
people of the United States and around the world.
  That security will be in today's circumstances but it will equally be 
true as a guide to the future by its precedent. As a matter of 
conscience, barring substantive changes, I intend to oppose the 
underlying Lieberman-Warner resolution.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. REED. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I do think our distinguished Senator from 
New Jersey stressed the sense of urgency that is upon us right now when 
he said perhaps the greatest decision we will have to make during the 
terms we are serving is going to be tomorrow. I think that is probably 
right. Even though I disagree with many of the things he stated, I 
certainly respect him for the commitment and belief he has in his 
interpretation of the facts and the course we should take.
  I have been listening for quite a number of hours now, and I quite 
frankly have to say it has not been all that easy. I believe tomorrow 
we will give the President of the United States the full support of 
this body in order to send the right message to Saddam Hussein and to 
terrorists all over the world, and that message is this: The United 
States of America will not live in fear.
  I have ended every speech I have made since 1995 with one sentence, 
and I feel compelled to start this speech with that sentence. That 
sentence is that we today are in the most vulnerable and threatened 
position we have been in in our Nation's history.
  In January 2002, our President gave a magnificent State of the Union 
address. He said:

       Our enemies send other people's children on missions of 
     suicide and murder. They embrace tyranny and death as a cause 
     and a

[[Page 19747]]

     creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago, on the 
     day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose 
     freedom and the dignity of every life.

  The handwringers have already marshaled their special interest groups 
to delay this body from giving our President the homeland security bill 
he asked for way back in June. And just like the homeland security 
bill, they are trying to weaken the President's ability to protect this 
Nation with a hollow resolution against Iraq.
  We are going to have to give the President the flexibility he needs 
to protect this Nation. Making the potential use of U.S. military force 
contingent upon the current deliberations of the U.N. Security Council 
is absurd. Our national security must not be tied to the actions of the 
``mother of all handwringers,'' the United Nations.
  I keep hearing a grinding noise. It is our forefathers turning over 
in their graves. Can they really believe this Nation would get into the 
position where we would have to ask some multinational organization 
before our President had the right to defend America? I think not. And 
why are we letting the same groups of individuals that have prevented 
us from getting a homeland security bill, during a time of war, by the 
way, from supporting the President of the United States? What is next? 
Do they want us to go to the United Nations to get a homeland security 
bill?
  The American people have to wonder about this one simple question: 
Why do those who oppose the President's resolution trust the United 
Nations more than they trust the President of the United States?
  The United Nations did not stop in 1992 the threat of 100 servicemen 
in Yemen. The United Nations did not stop the 18 rangers from dying in 
Somalia or their naked bodies from being dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu. The United Nations did not stop the World Trade Center, the 
first bombing in 1993. They did not stop Khobar Towers in 1996. They 
did not stop the Embassy bombings of Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. They 
did not stop or prevent the loss of 17 sailors' lives in Yemen in 2000. 
The United Nations did not stop the airplanes from flying into the 
World Trade Center, into the Pentagon, and the field in Pennsylvania. 
The United Nations will not stop Saddam Hussein from giving a nuclear 
device to a terrorist, putting it on an airplane and flying it into an 
American city. Of course, this time, instead of 3,000 deaths, there 
could be hundreds of thousands of deaths.
  I often remember the television scenes, the horrible scenes from New 
York City of the airplanes hitting into the World Trade Center. Then I 
thought, if that had been the weapon of choice of a terrorist--in other 
words, a nuclear warhead on a missile--there would be nothing left but 
a piece of charcoal. We would not be talking about 3,000 lives, we 
would be talking about 2 or 3 million lives.
  Why should the President of the United States delegate his 
responsibility of protecting this Nation to the United Nations? We made 
a similar mistake back in 1998. Look where it has gotten us. In 1998, 
in an attempt to get the Iraqi regime to comply with the U.N. 
resolutions--doesn't that sound familiar--the administration blessed 
Secretary Annan's trip to Baghdad, and in doing so let the United 
Nations negotiate on behalf of the United States, which proved to be a 
very serious mistake. Part of that particular agreement was the 
recognition of the eight palaces as special sites. And that compromise 
continues to haunt us today. The administration should not have let the 
United Nations negotiate and compromise for the United States in 1998. 
And the current administration should not do it now and will not do it 
now.
  My distinguished colleague, the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, likes to say: Saddam is looking down the barrel of a gun. He 
should be looking at the international community at the other end, not 
the United States.
  While I respect my friend and colleague and admire his passion behind 
his convictions, I could not disagree more. Saddam Hussein has been 
looking down the gun barrel of the international community for 11 
years. The problem is that he knows the gun is full of blanks. The 
Iraqi regime knows the United States does not shoot blanks, which is 
why they continue to manipulate and deceive the United Nations.
  I know our Secretary of State is working very closely with the 
members of the Security Council in order to get a U.N. resolution 
against Iraq that is not full of blanks. I hope he has already 
expressed to the Security Council this Nation is united, and with the 
overwhelming support of the American people and this Congress in the 
form of support of the President's resolution, we choose to exercise 
our right to defend ourselves. How unreasonable of us.
  We have the right under international law to defend ourselves. 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states: Nothing in the present 
charter shall impair the inherent right of an individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United 
Nations.
  The current Iraqi regime has been harboring and supporting terrorist 
networks since the early 1990s. We know that, maybe before that. We 
have been under attack ever since. I challenge any of my colleagues to 
tell any of our brave soldiers who fly combat planes over Iraq every 
day that the surface-to-air missiles Iraq has been firing is not a 
hostile act. Iraq forces have fired on U.S. and British pilots 1,600 
times since 2000. Since September 18--remember what happened on 
September 18 of this year--hours after Saddam Hussein promised to allow 
the return of U.N. inspectors without conditions, he fired on American 
and British pilots 67 times. That is 67 times since September 18 when 
he made the promise. Is anyone home? What message are we sending our 
brave men and women in uniform if we only consider it a hostile act 
when one of those missiles hits an aircraft?
  The message we must send our military, our allies, the United 
Nations, and those who support the current Iraqi regime is that the 
United States of America chooses not to live in fear and we will defend 
ourselves. That message will be sent with the overwhelming passage of 
the President's resolution.
  The Armed Services Committee recently had a series of hearings with 
former civilian and military leaders regarding the Iraqi issue. My 
fellow colleagues on the other side of the aisle have been using some 
of the testimony of witnesses to make their case that the United States 
must wait for the United Nations to make a decision. A lot of people do 
not realize, but there are over 4,000 retired generals floating around 
the country today. They have only found three who would agree with 
them. So they went out and found the three who said we have to continue 
to wait for the United Nations to solve the Iraqi issue.
  The fourth member of that panel, not quoted by any of my fellow 
colleagues, disagreed with the other three generals. Lieutenant General 
McInerney had the following comments about the suggestion of weakening 
the President's authority. Members have not heard this from anyone, 
just the other three generals.
  He said: If you water this down--talking about the President's Iraqi 
resolution--you are going to send a signal to al-Qaida. You may not 
want to, but you are going to send it to Saddam and say, well, we don't 
quite trust them. The signal you want to send is this nation is united. 
You want to send that to the U.N. because I happen to believe--which is 
different than General Clark--I happen to believe this strong signal 
will ensure that we have a better chance of getting it through the 
United Nations.
  That is what General McInerney said at the same time the other three 
generals said we need to decide what fate the United Nations will give 
this great country.
  Saddam Hussein is an evil man. He butchered his own people. Everyone 
agrees. He butchered members of his own family, two of his own sons-in-
law. He must be stopped. He will be stopped. Each day that goes by he 
gets stronger. There are those who believe the President has not made a 
strong enough

[[Page 19748]]

case. They say: Where is the evidence? Why now? Additional inspections 
will work, and we do not want another Vietnam.
  To them I ask, Are they more concerned about a war that took place 
over 30 years ago, or the tragic events that took place on September 
11?
  As I stand here today, is there more likely to be another Vietnam or 
another September 11?
  The President asked a critical question the other night. He said, if 
we know Saddam has dangerous weapons today, and we do, does it make any 
sense for the world to wait to confront him as he grows even stronger 
and develops even more dangerous weapons? I know what the people of 
Oklahoma are more concerned about. The people of Oklahoma are well 
aware of what can happen when evil people unleash weapons of terror.
  Go back and listen to the speeches the President gave to the U.N. on 
September 12 and in Cincinnati on October 7. He has made his case. He 
has made it to the United Nations, the Congress, and most importantly 
to the people of the United States. The threat is real. And with every 
day of delay and deceit the menace grows stronger.
  The current Iraqi regime will continue to use the United Nations as 
his tool until he gets what he may be close to having--a nuclear 
weapon. It may have been the right decision not to go after Saddam 
Hussein in 1991, just like it may have been the right decision for the 
previous administration not to go after Osama bin Laden in the 1990s 
when they had the opportunity to do so. But is it right to go after 
them both today? I believe it is.
  The big question is does he have a nuclear weapon? The scary thing 
is, no one is able to say that he does not. Does he have a delivery 
system? Nobody is in a position to say that he doesn't. This Congress 
is going to do the right thing. This Nation is united. We will defend 
ourselves. This Congress must once again unite as we did following the 
tragic events of 9/11.
  There is another statement a President made following another tragic 
event in our history. Some of you may remember. The President was 
motored from the White House to the Capitol under heavy security. The 
American people were full of emotions, from apprehension to anger. 
After being greeted by rounds of loud applause, the President of the 
United States addressed the Joint Session of Congress. Here is a quote 
from that speech. You have to listen to this, Mr. President. This is a 
long quote. This is what the President said:

       The facts . . . speak for themselves. The people of the 
     United States have already formed their opinion and well 
     understand the implications to the very life and safety of 
     our Nation. As Commander in Chief, I have directed that all 
     measures be taken for our defense. Always will we remember 
     the character of the onslaught against us. No matter how long 
     it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the 
     American people in their righteous might will win through to 
     absolute victory. I believe I interpret the will of Congress 
     and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend 
     ourselves to the uttermost but will make very certain that 
     this form of treachery shall never endanger us again. 
     Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our 
     people, our territory, and our interests are in danger. With 
     confidence in our armed forces--with the unbounded 
     determination of our people--we will gain the inevitable 
     triumph--so help us God.

  The date of that speech was December 8, 1941. President Franklin 
Roosevelt gave the speech. Pearl Harbor and the war that followed led 
to the restructuring of our national security structure.
  Today, more than 1 year since 9/11, an ongoing war against terror, 
and a possible conflict with Iraq, we, the Congress, have not given the 
American people a homeland security bill and some Members of Congress 
want to put the security of this country in the hands of the United 
Nations.
  I repeat, did our forefathers ever believe we would have to go to a 
multinational organization in order to defend America?
  The President of the United States during a time of war has asked 
Congress to give him support to show the world that this Nation is 
united. He has requested the Congress give him the necessary 
flexibility to protect the homeland, to protect the Nation. Telling the 
President that he must first bow to the will of the United Nations is 
the wrong message. Here we are today, just like with the homeland 
security issue, letting the hand wringers drive the debate in a 
direction that has nothing to do with the task at hand.
  We are going to have to and will give the President an Iraqi 
resolution that does not tie his hands. The Secretary of Defense has 
said--and I think this is so important for us to understand today, for 
all of us, for all Americans to understand. He said:

       If the worst were to happen, not one of us here today will 
     be able to honestly say it was a surprise. Because it will 
     not be a surprise.

  Mr. President, I remember so well--I am old enough to remember World 
War II. I was a very small child. I remember going to a country 
schoolhouse named Hazel Dell. It was way out in the country. We had 
eight grades in one room with a pot-bellied stove there and a 
schoolteacher named Harvey Beam. He was a giant of a man, but I suspect 
he wasn't quite as big as I thought he was at the time.
  I remember studying American history and studying about how we won a 
war and won the freedom in this country against impossible odds, and 
how the greatest army on the face of this Earth was coming over from 
Great Britain and marching toward Lexington and Concord, and here we 
were, a handful of hunters and trappers with homemade weapons. We fired 
that shot heard round the world.
  A speech was made that I remember so well, in the House of Burgesses, 
when a tall redhead stood up and said:

       Sir, we are not weak, if we make a proper use of those 
     means which the God of nature has placed in our power. Three 
     millions of people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and 
     in such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by 
     any force which our enemy can send against us. Besides, sir, 
     we shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who 
     presides over the destinies of nations; and who will raise up 
     friends to fight our battles for us.

  At that time, we fired the shot heard around the world. We knew we 
were one nation depending on God to give us the strength to win a 
battle that now historians say could not have been won. That was the 
sublime courage we had in this country, and now the hand wringers are 
back.
  In 1996, we had an opportunity to end this whole thing, to get Saddam 
Hussein. I suggest to you, if George W. Bush had been President in 
1996, we would not be here today. It is a no-brainer. It would have 
been done.
  We had the opposition, including about 100,000 troops, well trained, 
and the Kurds in the north ready to join us, and we implied to them 
that we would do that and we would together take out Saddam Hussein. 
What did we do? We turned our backs on them, and we walked away. 
Several thousand Kurds died as a result of that. Now they are back. 
They are willing to join us again.
  I wonder about this. Why is it that so many of the people I have 
heard on the floor of this Senate objecting to giving the President the 
recognition he needs to do what he has to do, what is his 
constitutional obligation--where were they in 1998, back when we had 
another President, President Clinton, and he wanted to go after Saddam 
Hussein? They were in line, saying: That's fine; let's go get him. Our 
distinguished majority leader Senator Daschle said:

       Saddam Hussein must understand that the United States has 
     the resolve to reverse that threat by force if force is 
     required. And I must say it has the will.

  Senator Biden--I have the utmost respect for him. He came down to the 
floor, and he is now saying we don't want to move too fast. Then he 
said we risk sending a dangerous signal to other proliferators if we do 
not respond decisively to Iraq's intransigence. That was 1998. What is 
different now? Nothing, except Saddam Hussein is stronger.
  Does he have the weaponry? Does he have the weapons of mass 
destruction? Does he have a nuclear warhead? We don't know for sure, 
but we don't know he does not.
  Let's go back to the Rumsfeld Commission. This is 1998. The Rumsfeld 
Commission was made up of, I don't know, 16 or 18 of the very top 
military

[[Page 19749]]

experts in this country. They said that U.S. intelligence was shocked 
by a 1990 Iraqi test of a long-range booster rocket, showing Iraq was 
involved in an extensive, undetected, covert program to develop nuclear 
capability ballistic missiles with intercontinental range. That was 
1990.
  People keep saying: Oh, no, this is not going to happen; they don't 
have this. I remember in 1998, it was August 24 when our intelligence 
said that it would be something like 5 to 15 years before North Korea 
would have a multiple-stage rocket. That was August 24, 1998.
  Seven days later, on August 31, North Korea fired one. We know when 
the weapons inspectors came back in 1998 after Saddam Hussein kicked 
them out, they came before our committee. I can tell you exactly--I 
have the transcript over here--what they said. By and large, this was 
it. For the sake of time, I say in response to our question, in 1998--
this is the weapons inspectors who were over there:

       How long would it be until Saddam Hussein has the weapons 
     of mass destruction capability, including nuclear, and a 
     missile with intercontinental range to deliver those?

  The answer was he could have it in 6 months. That was 1998. George 
Tenet at that time said:

       I agree with that testimony.

  Unclassified intelligence told us that China was transferring 
technology of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and missiles to 
Iraq.
  On August 24, in the Washington Times, it was revealed the 
intelligence community warned President Bush that weapons of mass 
destruction could be on their way in a very short period of time.
  Just 2 weeks ago, 3 weeks ago, from a satellite image, we were able 
to photograph trucks, 60 trucks that were moving around--a biological 
lab that we knew was a weapons lab. They are up to something. Every day 
something has happened. The intelligence report to the administration 
was that Saddam Hussein is preparing to use weapons of mass 
destruction.
  On September 27, Rumsfeld said there is solid evidence that Saddam 
Hussein is negotiating for weapons of mass destruction with al-Qaida--
they are negotiating with each other, I mean.
  With all these things that we know are going on today, why is it that 
we are sitting around, wringing our hands? We don't know that he 
doesn't already have it, but we do know this. Every day that goes by, 
every week that goes by, he has a greater opportunity to have these.
  So, I look at this and I think that we have to remember what 
Secretary Rumsfeld said when he talked about the consequences. He said:

       The consequences of making a mistake during the days of 
     conventional warfare meant that we might lose 100, maybe 200 
     lives. But the consequences of making a mistake now could 
     mean hundreds of thousands of lives.

  I think tonight we have the Churchills and the Chamberlains. Tomorrow 
we are going to have a lot more Churchills than Chamberlains and we are 
going to stop the hand wringing. It will all stop tomorrow, and we are 
going to give the President of the United States the resolution that he 
knows he needs in order to have the full support of Congress and the 
American people behind him to do what he knows he must do in defending 
America.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Corzine). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


              Modification to Submitted Amendment No. 4869

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, this has been cleared with the minority.
  Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Byrd, I ask unanimous consent to 
modify his amendment No. 4868 to remove paragraph 2, and further I ask 
consent to modify amendment No. 4869 to change references to section 
3(a) to 4(a).
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment (No. 4869), as modified, is as follows:

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:

     SEC. 5. TERMINATION OF THE AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

       (a) In General.--The authorization in section 3(a) shall 
     terminate 12 months after the date of enactment of this joint 
     resolution, except that the President may extend, for a 
     period or periods of 12 months each, such authorization if--
       (1) the President determines and certifies to Congress for 
     each such period, not later than 60 days before the date of 
     termination of the authorization, that the extension is 
     necessary for ongoing or impending military operations 
     against Iraq under section 4(a); and
       (2) the Congress does not enact into law, before the 
     extension of the authorization, a joint resolution 
     disapproving the extension of the authorization for the 
     additional 12-month period.
       (b) Congressional Review Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--For purposes of subsection (a)(2), a joint 
     resolution described in paragraph (2) shall be considered in 
     the Senate and the House of Representatives in accordance 
     with the procedures applicable to joint resolutions under 
     paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 8066(c) of the 
     Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (as contained 
     in Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1936-1937), except that--
       (A) references in those provisions to the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the House of Representatives shall be 
     deemed to be references to the Committee on International 
     Relations of the House of Representatives; and
       (B) references in those provisions to the Committee on 
     Appropriations of the Senate shall be deemed to be references 
     to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
       (2) Joint resolution defined.--For purposes of paragraph 
     (1), the term ``joint resolution'' means only a joint 
     resolution introduced after the date on which the 
     certification of the President under subsection (a)(1) is 
     received by Congress, the matter after the resolving clause 
     of which is as follows: ``That, pursuant to section 5 of the 
     Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, the 
     Congress disapproves the extension of the authorization under 
     section 4(a) of that joint resolution for the additional 12-
     month period specified in the certification of the President 
     to the Congress dated __.'', with the blank filled in with 
     the appropriate date.

                          ____________________