[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 14]
[House]
[Pages 19407-19409]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                             WAR WITH IRAQ

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur) is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Ms. KAPTUR. Madam Speaker, this evening I would like to insert 
several articles into the Record dealing with the issue of war against 
Iraq and the gulf, and I wanted to remind those who are listening that, 
indeed, if we look at the foreign policy of the United States over the 
last 30 years or so, we have had more Americans killed at home and 
abroad as a result of rising terrorism than in the first 187 years of 
our country.
  So we have to begin to ask the question, why are we losing so many 
Americans in this way? Why is Washington becoming more barricaded? Why 
can we not go and ride in front of the White House anymore in our cars? 
Why are there bomb searches all over this city? Why are American 
embassies being built like bunkers all around the world? I would like 
to submit the following.
  If we think back to the time when President George Bush, Senior, 
prior to his election as President was director of the CIA, that was 
about 1977, the mid-1970s, before President Jimmy Carter became 
President of the United States, and at the time my colleagues might 
recall that the Shah of Iran was deposed in the late seventies. I think 
it was late 1979, and many American hostages were taken, including 
Terry Anderson.
  At the moment that Jimmy Carter's presidency reverted to Ronald 
Reagan after the election of 1980, the hostages were returned home. 
President Carter worked very, very hard, as history will record.
  Then when the Reagan-Bush administration, the new administration, 
took over, they essentially made a deal between our country and the 
Gulf states to go after Ayatollah Khomeini, the new leader in those 
days of Iran, who had taken our hostages. And who did they hire to do 
the dirty work for them? They hired none other than Saddam Hussein.
  They gave him weapons through the government of the United States, 
and, indeed, if we look back, and I am trying to find the exact set of 
hearings right now. In the Committee on Banking of the House of 
Representatives, a hearing was held regarding the extension of Treasury 
tax credits, agricultural tax credits to Saddam Hussein in order to buy 
fertilizers, in quotes, with chemicals from our country at the same 
time in our country's history when we would not even make those same 
extensions of credit to our farmers. Companies in Salem, Ohio, and 
Bedford, Ohio, were being asked by our Treasury to sell those same 
chemicals to Iraq; and, indeed, it was done.
  The Gulf states and the United States were afraid perhaps that the 
Ayatollah Khomeini at that time might bomb Mecca or try to spread his 
revolution throughout the Middle East and get control of the oil 
fields. So Saddam Hussein was promised access, better access from Iraq, 
which is landlocked, to a waterborne commerce through Kuwait, a slip of 
land, which in the end he never did get and, ultimately, he invaded in 
order to get that access.
  Then, of course, if we look back to the early 1990s, the United 
States went to war to defend the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, but, in fact, 
the very monster that we helped to create at that point was trying to 
fulfill what he had been promised as a result of U.S. assistance all 
through that period, especially when the Reagan and Bush administration 
took office and then President Bush himself elected in 1988 and taking 
us into the Gulf War.
  It is really important to remember and to ask ourselves the question, 
who encouraged Saddam Hussein? Who encouraged him to take on Iran? Who 
encouraged him to try to depose the Ayatollah, and who gave him the 
weapons and the credits to our Treasury Department to finance those 
initial actions inside of Iraq that created the monster that the 
President of the United States, the son of the first George Bush, 
talked about on the television tonight?
  My colleagues might also think about the fact, who armed Osama bin 
Laden to fight inside Afghanistan against the then Soviet Army? Who did 
that? Who was President of the United States when that happened? George 
Bush, Senior, was President of the United States when that happened; 
and, of course, the Russians went to certain defeat in Afghanistan 
after a long period of time. Where did al Qaeda learn some of those 
fighting techniques? Who helped them do that? Where did they get those 
rifles?
  So I just wanted to put that on the Record. I know there are other 
historians who will add to this, but I also

[[Page 19408]]

wanted to read from a veteran who wrote an editorial to the New York 
Times last week Wednesday entitled, Fighting the First Gulf War. The 
last sentence, and I will end with this, reads, ``I watched the fallout 
from the burning oil wells coat my uniform and I knew that I was 
breathing into my lungs the crude oil I was fighting for.'' I ask 
America to think about it.
  I will insert in the Record at this point the articles that I 
referred to earlier.

                [From the New York Times, Oct. 2, 2002]

                      Fighting the First Gulf War

                         (By Anthony Swofford)

       Portland, Ore.--In August 1990 my Marine infantry 
     Battalion, deployed to Saudi Arabia to defend the country 
     from invasion by the Iraqi army. Iraqi soldiers had invaded 
     Kuwait during the early morning of Aug. 2. For more than a 
     week afterward we sat atop our rucksacks on the parade field 
     at the Marine base at Twenty Nine Palms, Calif., waiting for 
     transportation to Riyadh. From where we sat, the world looked 
     amazingly black and white, with little room or need for 
     diplomacy or cowardice. We were excited to retaliate against 
     Saddam Hussein, to enter combat.
       When we finally arrived on the tarmac at Riyadh, everything 
     looked and felt extremely hot, a mirage on high boil, the 
     heat warping the terrain into a violent storm of sand and 
     weaponry and thirst. We spent the next six months living and 
     training in the Arabian Desert, in constant fear of the nerve 
     gas our commanders had warned us Saddam Hussein would use. 
     Even when I slept, the gas mask was there, a reminder of the 
     horrors of sarin gas. To negate the effects of the sarin, we 
     were ordered to take pyridostigmine bromide pills, now 
     considered a possible cause of the mysterious gulf war 
     syndrome. But worse than the pills was the constant ringing 
     in our ears--``Gas! Gas! Gas!''--the warning call we 
     practiced at all hours to don and clear our gas masks in less 
     than 10 seconds. Under a gas attack we'd also have to wear 
     Mopp suits, 10-pound charcoal-lined garments that were 
     unwieldy and hot--and were only available in a jungle-
     camouflage pattern (not much help hiding in the desert).
       On Jan. 16, 1991, the American-led coalition against Iraq 
     started the bombing campaign that would, over about six 
     weeks, devastate Iraq's military. Our colonel informed us 
     that Operation Desert Shield had changed to Storm, that we 
     were now at war. Two days later the Iraqis launched a few 
     Scud missiles into Israel and Saudi Arabia. Despite the fact 
     that my unit operated in the middle of the desert and that 
     Iraq's air force had been destroyed, and with it most of 
     Saddam Hussein's intelligence apparatus, we spent our 
     evenings jumping in and out of fighting holes for Scud alerts 
     that turned out to be false. During the air campaign we 
     traveled around the desert in our Humvees much the way we had 
     prior to the bombing--bored, tired, dehydrated, anxious and 
     afraid of what the future might bring.
       We wanted to live, even though the way we'd been living was 
     unpleasant. We hadn't had proper showers in 10 or more weeks. 
     My friend Troy insisted one morning that I pour a five-gallon 
     water jug over his head while he scoured his body with Red 
     Cross soap. The water and soap and filth poured off Troy and 
     soaked the ground in a large damp circle, and for a moment, 
     while standing in this circle, I thought that I'd somehow 
     been made safe. I thought that with our little ring of water 
     and Troy's simple desire to be clean, we'd created a gap 
     between ourselves and the rest of the desert and the enemy 
     lurking there, and that we could sink into the earth, into 
     our small safe space. But in the distance I saw a Marine tank 
     battalion roaring across the desert, and I knew again that 
     safety had ended months before.
       On Feb. 18, when my unit moved to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, 
     the ground war was imminent. Combat engineers had built a 15-
     foot-high earth berm between the two countries. On the other 
     side of the berm, we were told, were Iraqi antipersonnel 
     mines. My platoon dug fighting holes in a perimeter around 
     the command post. Before we completed our task, the Iraqis 
     attacked with artillery.
       The incoming rounds were confusing, frightening and 
     ineffective. Someone incorrectly called out, ``gas.'' Had the 
     enemy's forward observer walked his rounds 100 yards north he 
     would've scored a direct artillery hit on our command post. 
     But he hadn't. At the border, while we awaited our orders to 
     fight, helicopters outfitted with tape players and powerful 
     speakers flew overhead and played 1960's rock music--Jimi 
     Hendrix, The Doors, the Rolling Stones--all day, to harass 
     the nearby enemy. As the music blasted, coalition propaganda 
     pamphlets blew across our side of the border like useless, 
     retired currency.
       A few days later, we entered Kuwait and fought the Iraqi 
     Army. The tankers experienced the most combat. At one point, 
     another Marine task force mistook my task force for the 
     enemy. Those devastating tank round passed over my head and I 
     watched them explode. For a split second I imagined myself 
     the victim of my own country's firepower. My team leader 
     screamed into his radio handset to stop the friendly attack. 
     One of my platoon mates, a burly Texan, folded himself into a 
     ball and wept and cursed quietly. I knelt, stung by shock, a 
     statue of fear. At least 35 of the 148 United States service 
     members killed during the Persian Gulf war died at the hands 
     of allied forces.
       My six-man night patrol passed near enough to an Iraqi 
     troop carrier to hear the troops speaking. We were outgunned, 
     so we listened and didn't shoot. I urinated down my legs and 
     into my boots. The next morning, in my wet boots and useless 
     Mopp suit, I marched 20 miles north from the Saudi border. I 
     put on and took off my gas mask dozens of times for false gas 
     alerts. We marched past Marine artillery battalions busy 
     sending their fierce rounds 10,000 yards north. The men 
     screamed and clapped as each round left their powerful 
     weapons.
       From the ground, I witnessed the savage results of American 
     air superiority: tanks and troop carriers turned upside down 
     and ripped inside out; rotten, burned, half-buried bodies 
     littering the desert like the detritus of years--not weeks--
     of combat. The tails of unexploded bombs, buried halfway or 
     deeper in the earth, served as makeshift headstones and 
     chilling reminders that at any moment, the whole place could 
     blow.
       On the last day of the war, from a sniper hid I observed a 
     confused Marine infantry battalion attempt to overtake an 
     airfield while smoke from burning oil wells hampered command 
     and control. Across the radio frequency I heard medevac 
     calls, after two Marines shot each other with rifles; on the 
     other side of the airfield hundreds of Iraqi soldiers 
     surrendered, their boots hanging around their necks, white 
     towels and propaganda surrender pamphlets clutched in their 
     hands like jewels. I watched the fallout from the burning oil 
     wells coat my uniform, and I knew that I was breathing into 
     my lungs the crude oil I was fighting for.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, Oct. 7, 2002]

            Sharon Tells Cabinet To Keep Quiet on U.S. Plans

                           (By James Bennet)

       Jerusalem, Oct. 6.--Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, 
     warned his cabinet ministers today not to talk about American 
     plans for Iraq, urging them to overcome for the good of the 
     possible war effort what often seems a national compulsion to 
     share one's insights as widely as possible.
       Prodded by the Bush administration, Mr. Sharon concluded 
     that it was time to address what one senior Israeli official 
     today called ``the blabbering thing that occurs here.''
       Given the rollicking tumult of Israeli politics, it is not 
     uncommon to see leaks in the news media about official anger 
     over leaks, or to read an inside account of one high official 
     dressing down another for talking too much to reporters. The 
     Israeli media have been awash recently with officials' views 
     on Iraq.
       The Israeli media have also been reporting that the Bush 
     administration is furious about the chatter.
       ``Everybody wants to voice his opinion on any lively 
     subject,'' the senior Israeli official said. ``This is 
     healthy. But there are times when you need to be responsible, 
     to take responsibility, and to shut up.''
       Late last week, Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, who 
     in the past has shared too much for the Bush administration's 
     taste, ventured that the Americans would attack Iraq at the 
     end of November. His comment captured banner head-lines, even 
     though his hasty clarification said that he was merely 
     voicing a ``personal assessment'' and that he meant the 
     attack would begin at the end of November or later.
       Mr. Sharon is planning to go to Washington this month, at 
     President Bush's invitation, to discuss Iraq and the Israeli-
     Palestinian conflict.
       After today's cabinet meeting, the official public summary 
     reported tersely, ``Prime Minister Sharon requested that 
     ministers cease making remarks about Iraq.''
       Even as Mr. Bush has sought in recent days to play up the 
     imminence and potency of the Iraqi threat, some of Israel's 
     top security officials have played both down.
       Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon, Israel's chief of staff, was quoted 
     in the newspaper Maariv today as telling a trade group in a 
     speech over the weekend, ``I'm not losing any sleep over the 
     Iraqi threat.'' The reason, he said, was that the military 
     strength of Israel and Iraq had diverged to so sharply in the 
     last decade.
       Israel's chief of military intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aharon 
     Farkash, disputed contentions that Iraq was 18 months away 
     from nuclear capability. In an interview on Saturday with 
     Israeli television, he said army intelligence had concluded 
     that Iraq's time frame was more like four years, and he said 
     Iran's nuclear threat was as great as Iraq's.
       General Farkash also said Iraq had grown militarily weaker 
     since the Persian Gulf war in 1991 and had not deployed any 
     missiles that could strike Israel.
       The torrent of newspaper articles continued today with 
     Yediot Ahronot elaborating on reports in the United States 
     about the details of American-Israeli plans for coordination 
     in the event of war. It said that Mr.

[[Page 19409]]

     Bush would give Mr. Sharon 72 hours notice and that the two 
     nations had agreed on targets in Iraq. It also mentioned 
     previously published reports that the Americans would offer 
     Israel a satellite to provide early warning of Iraqi missile 
     strikes and that spare parts and other American equipment 
     would be stored in Israel.
       The Bush administration wants to dissuade Israel from 
     responding should Iraq attack it after an American invasion, 
     fearing that Israeli action would rally Arab support for the 
     Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, Oct. 7, 2002]

                      A Hidden Cost of War on Iraq

                          (By Shibley Telhami)

       Washington.--One of the most appealing thoughts about a 
     possible war with Iraq is that it could help spread 
     democracy, transforming a rotten political order in the 
     Middle East. But more likely, such a war would render the 
     Middle East more repressive and unstable than it is today. 
     Democracy cannot be imposed through military force, even if 
     force is used successfully to oust antidemocratic dictators. 
     And our vital aims in fighting terrorism, securing oil 
     supplies and protecting the lives of American soldiers will, 
     in the context of the Middle East, almost certainly ensure 
     that the spread of democracy will again take a back seat to 
     our national priorities.
       Aside from the significant challenges in Iraq itself, the 
     picture in the rest of the region will be troubling. 
     Regardless of our real objectives, most Arabs and Muslims 
     will see in the war American imperialism. Governments in the 
     region may support the war for fear of being on the losing 
     side, or may simply stay neutral. Because support goes 
     against the over-whelming sentiment of their citizenry, they 
     will likely endorse our course through political repression. 
     If King Abdullah of Jordan, like other rulers in the Middle 
     East, has to face a choice between supporting the war while 
     repressing his people and yielding to Jordanian public 
     opinion by opposing our effort, it's clear what our 
     preference will be. For that we need not dig deep into 
     history; our commitment to fighting al Qaeda has 
     understandably defined our current relationship with Pakistan 
     in a way that has caused us to put aside democratic values in 
     order to achieve a more vital goal. These values will likely 
     be sacrificed in our relationship with other nations in the 
     Middle East, even with the best of intentions.
       At the same time, we would not be comfortable if democratic 
     change in the region results in the victory of radical 
     Islamist groups, as happened in Algeria a decade ago. Nor is 
     it likely that we would be willing to accept democratically 
     elected militant Islamist groups to run the Saudi government 
     and control the world's largest oil reserves as well as the 
     pulpit of Mecca.
       The political order in the Middle East is bankrupt today, 
     and if stability means the continuation of the status quo, 
     that would not be appealing. Change is necessary for the good 
     of the people of the Middle East and for the good of the 
     world. But not any change, and not through any means. The use 
     of military force may be necessary for other reasons, but it 
     is more likely to stifle than to nurture democracy movements 
     in authoritarian Arab states.
       America's political success has undoubtedly been bolstered 
     by its superior military power. But our military power itself 
     is a product of a successful economic and political system. 
     Those around the world who sought change of their political 
     and economic systems did so in large part on their own--and 
     in many cases with America's political and economic success 
     as a model. Those who want to achieve that success will have 
     to emulate the model. And those who don't will likely fail.
       Powerful ideas are willingly accepted because they inspire, 
     not threaten. Even those who are reluctant to embrace 
     democracy, like the leaders in Beijing, have understood the 
     need to emulate much of America's economic approach lest they 
     be left further behind. And in embracing a new economic 
     approach, they have also unleashed a political process they 
     will not be able fully to control.
       Ultimately, America's role is to assist in the spread of 
     democracy and, above all, to inspire. Wars may simultaneously 
     open up new opportunities for change, as in Afghanistan, and 
     close others, as in Pakistan. But democracy cannot be 
     dictated through war, especially when war is opposed by 
     people of the region. The thought that, because America has 
     unequaled power, we know what is best for others--even better 
     than they do themselves--would not be comforting to most 
     Americans. Certainly, such a notion is not compatible with 
     the very ideal of democracy we seek to spread.

                          ____________________