[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19200-19203]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                  IRAQ

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, we face no more serious decision in our 
democracy than whether or not to go to war. The American people deserve 
to fully understand all of the implications of such a decision.
  The question of whether our Nation should attack Iraq is playing out 
in the context of a more fundamental debate that is only just 
beginning--an all-important debate about how, when and where in the 
years ahead our country will use its unsurpassed military might.
  On September 20, the administration unveiled its new National 
Security Strategy. This document addresses the new realities of our 
age, particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorist networks armed with the agendas of fanatics. The Strategy 
claims that these new threats are so novel and so dangerous that we 
should ``not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right 
of self-defense by acting pre-emptively.''
  In the discussion over the past few months about Iraq, the 
administration, often uses the terms ``pre-emptive'' and ``preventive'' 
interchangeably. In the realm of international relations, these two 
terms have long had very different meanings.
  Traditionally, ``pre-emptive'' action refers to times when states 
react to an imminent threat of attack. For example, when Egyptian and 
Syrian forces mobilized on Israel's borders in 1967, the threat was 
obvious and immediate, and Israel felt justified in pre-emptively 
attacking those forces. The global community is generally tolerant of 
such actions, since no nation should have to suffer a certain first 
strike before it has the legitimacy to respond.
  By contrast, ``preventive'' military action refers to strikes that 
target a country before it has developed a capability that could 
someday become threatening. Preventive attacks have generally been 
condemned. For example, the 1941 sneak attack on Pearl Harbor was 
regarded as a preventive strike by Japan, because the Japanese were 
seeking to block a planned military buildup by the United States in the 
Pacific.
  The coldly premeditated nature of preventive attacks and preventive 
wars makes them anathema to well-established international principles 
against aggression. Pearl Harbor has been rightfully recorded in 
history as an act of dishonorable treachery.
  Historically, the United States has condemned the idea of preventive 
war, because it violates basic international rules against aggression. 
But at times in our history, preventive war has been seriously 
advocated as a policy option.
  In the early days of the cold war, some U.S. military and civilian 
experts advocated a preventive war against the

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Soviet Union. They proposed a devastating first strike to prevent the 
Soviet Union from developing a threatening nuclear capability. At the 
time, they said the uniquely destructive power of nuclear weapons 
required us to rethink traditional international rules.
  The first round of that debate ended in 1950, when President Truman 
ruled out a preventive strike, stating that such actions were not 
consistent with our American tradition. He said, ``You don't `prevent' 
anything by war . . . except peace.'' Instead of a surprise first 
strike, the nation dedicated itself to the strategy of deterrence and 
containment, which successfully kept the peace during the long and 
frequently difficult years of the Cold War.
  Arguments for preventive war resurfaced again when the Eisenhower 
administration took power in 1953, but President Eisenhower and 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles soon decided firmly against it. 
President Eisenhower emphasized that even if we were to win such a war, 
we would face the vast burdens of occupation and reconstruction that 
would come with it.
  The argument that the United States should take preventive military 
action, in the absence of an imminent attack, resurfaced in 1962, when 
we learned that the Soviet Union would soon have the ability to launch 
missiles from Cuba against our country. Many military officers urged 
President Kennedy to approve a preventive attack to destroy this 
capability before it became operational. Robert Kennedy, like Harry 
Truman, felt that this kind of first strike was not consistent with 
American values. He said that a proposed surprise first strike against 
Cuba would be a ``Pearl Harbor in reverse.''
  For 175 years, [he said] we have not been that kind of country.
  That view prevailed. A middle ground was found and peace was 
preserved.
  Yet another round of debate followed the Cuban Missile Crisis when 
American strategists and voices in and out of the administration 
advocated preventive war against China to forestall its acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. Many arguments heard today about Iraq were made then 
about the Chinese communist government: that its leadership was 
irrational and that it was therefore undeterrable. And once again, 
those arguments were rejected.
  As these earlier cases show, American strategic thinkers have long 
debated the relative merits of preventive and pre-emptive war. Although 
nobody would deny our right to pre-emptively block an imminent attack 
on our territory, there is disagreement about our right to preventively 
engage in war.
  In each of these cases a way was found to deter other nations, 
without waging war.
  Now, the Bush Administration says we must take pre-emptive action 
against Iraq. But what the Administration is really calling for is 
preventive war, which flies in the face of international rules of 
acceptable behavior.
  There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is a despicable dictator and 
that he must be disarmed. But the Administration has not made a 
persuasive case that the threat is so imminent that we should risk 
going it alone. We should resort to war only as a last resort. If we 
work through the United Nations for free, unfettered inspections, we 
strengthen our hand with our allies, our hand against Saddam Hussein 
and our ability to disarm him.
  The Administration's new National Security Strategy states ``As a 
matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such 
emerging threats before they are fully formed.''
  The circumstances of today's world require us to rethink this 
concept. The world changed on September 11, and all of us have learned 
that it can be a drastically more dangerous place. The Bush 
administration's new National Security Strategy asserts that global 
realities now legitimize preventive war and make it a strategic 
necessity.
  The document openly contemplates preventive attacks against groups or 
states, even absent the threat of imminent attack. It legitimizes this 
kind of first strike option, and it elevates it to the status of a core 
security doctrine. Disregarding norms of international behavior, the 
Bush strategy asserts that the United States should be exempt from the 
rules we expect other nations to obey.
  I strongly oppose any such extreme doctrine and I'm sure that many 
others do as well. Earlier generations of Americans rejected preventive 
war on the grounds of both morality and practicality, and our 
generation must do so as well. We can deal with Iraq without resorting 
to this extreme.
  It is impossible to justify any such double standard under 
international law. Might does not make right. America cannot write its 
own rules for the modern world. To attempt to do so would be 
unilateralism run amok. It would antagonize our closest allies, whose 
support we need to fight terrorism, prevent global warming, and deal 
with many other dangers that affect all nations and require 
international cooperation. It would deprive America of the moral 
legitimacy necessary to promote our values abroad. And it would give 
other nations--from Russia to India to Pakistan--an excuse to violate 
fundamental principles of civilized international behavior.
  The administration's doctrine is a call for 21st century American 
imperialism that no other nation can or should accept. It is the 
antithesis of all that America has worked so hard to achieve in 
international relations since the end of World War II.
  This is not just an academic debate. There are important real world 
consequences. A shift in our policy toward preventive war would 
reinforce the perception of America as a ``bully' in the Middle East 
and would fuel anti-American sentiment throughout the Islamic world and 
beyond.
  It would also send a signal to governments the world over that the 
rules of aggression have changed for them too, which could increase the 
risk of conflict between countries such as Russia and Georgia, India 
and Pakistan, and China and Taiwan.
  Obviously, this debate is only just beginning on the administration's 
new strategy for national security. But the debate is solidly grounded 
in American values and history.
  It will also be a debate among vast numbers of well-meaning Americans 
who have honest differences of opinion about the best way to use United 
States military might. The debate will be contentious, but the stakes, 
in terms of both our national security and our allegiance to our core 
beliefs, are too high to ignore.
  I look forward to working closely with my colleagues in Congress to 
develop an effective, principled policy that will enable us to protect 
our national security, and respect the basic principles that are 
essential for the world to be at peace.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oregon.
  (The remarks of Mr. Wyden and Mr. Hatch pertaining to the 
introduction of S. 3063 are located in today's Record under 
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition, as noted, to 
discuss the pending resolution. At the outset, I commend the President 
for coming to Congress. Originally the position had been articulated by 
the White House that congressional authority was not necessary. The 
President, as Commander in Chief, has the authority under the 
Constitution to act in cases of emergency. But if there is time for 
discussion, deliberation, and debate, then in my view it is a matter 
for the Congress.
  Senator Harkin and I introduced a resolution on July 18 of this year 
calling for the President to come to Congress before using military 
force.
  When the President made his State of the Union speech and identified 
the axis of evil as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, followed by the 
testimony of Secretary of State Powell that there was no intention to 
go to war against either North Korea or Iran, it left the obvious 
inference that war might be in the offing as to Iraq.

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  I spoke extensively on the subject back on February 13, 2002, raising 
a number of issues: What was the extent of Saddam Hussein's control 
over weapons of mass destruction? What would it cost by way of 
casualties to topple Saddam Hussein? What would be the consequence in 
Iraq? Who would govern after Saddam was toppled? What would happen in 
the region, the impact on the Arab world, and the impact on Israel? I 
believe it is vastly preferable on our resolution to focus on the 
question of weapons of mass destruction as opposed to the issue of 
regime change. When we talk about regime change, there is a sense in 
many other nations that the United States is seeking to exert its will 
on another sovereign nation. Much as Saddam Hussein deserves to be 
toppled, when we move away from the focus of containing weapons of mass 
destruction, it is my view we lose a great deal of our moral authority.
  There is no doubt Saddam Hussein has been ruthless in the use of 
weapons of mass destruction with the use of chemicals on his own 
people, the Kurds, and in the Iran-Iraq war. There is very substantial 
evidence Saddam Hussein has storehouses of biological weapons, and 
there is significant evidence he is moving as fast as he can toward 
nuclear weapons. So when we talk about self-defense, when we talk about 
ridding the world of the scourge, that is a very high moral ground. 
When we talk about regime change, it raises the concern of many leaders 
of many nations as to who is next--maybe they are next.
  I suggest it is possible to achieve regime change in a way superior 
to articulating or planning an attack with the view to toppling Saddam 
Hussein. I believe the way to achieve regime change, consistent with 
international principles, is to try Saddam Hussein as a war criminal. I 
introduced a resolution on March 2, 1998, which was passed by the U.S. 
Senate on March 13, 1998, calling for the creation of a military 
tribunal, similar to the war crimes tribunal at The Hague, similar to 
the war crimes tribunal in Rwanda, so that Saddam Hussein could be 
tried as a war criminal. There is no doubt on the evidence available 
that Saddam Hussein has committed war crimes. Without going into all of 
the details set forth in the resolution, I ask unanimous consent that 
it be printed at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. Herein, there is a very ample statement for the basis 
for trying Saddam Hussein and trying him successfully as a war 
criminal. In doing that, we would be following the precedent of trying 
former Yugoslavian President Milosevic as a war criminal. I have made 
some seven visits to The Hague and have participated in marshaling U.S. 
resources from the Department of Justice, also specifically from the 
FBI, also from the CIA during the 104th Congress back in 1995 and 1996, 
when I was chairman of the Intelligence Committee; and we now see the 
head of state, Slobodan Milosevic, on trial.
  We had the experience of the war crimes tribunal in Rwanda, which 
achieved an international precedent in convicting former Prime Minister 
Jean Kambanda of Rwanda, the first head of state to be convicted. He is 
now serving a life sentence.
  So it is my suggestion that the objective of regime change can be 
accomplished in accordance with existing international standards, on a 
multilateral basis, without having other nations in the world saying 
the superpower United States is trying to throw its weight around. It 
might take a little longer, but as is evidenced from the proceedings in 
Rwanda as to the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, and as evidenced from 
the proceedings of Milosevic, that is an ordinary successful progress 
of the law. The most difficult issue pending on the resolutions as to 
the use of force on Iraq, the most difficult issue, in my opinion, is 
the question of whether the United Nations authorizes the use of force.
  I commend the President for his efforts to organize an international 
coalition. President George Herbert Walker Bush did organize an 
international coalition in 1991, and prosecuted the war against Iraq 
with great success, enlisting the aid of the Arab nations, including 
Egypt, Syria, and other countries. That is the preferable way to 
proceed, if it can be accomplished.
  The obvious difficulty in conditioning the President's authority to 
use force on a United Nations resolution is the United States would be 
subjecting itself to the veto by either China, or Russia, or even 
France, and we prize our sovereignty very highly--justifiably so. The 
conundrum, then, is whether we will get that kind of an international 
coalition that would have the weight of world public opinion, would 
have the weight of the U.N. behind them.
  The difficulties of having the United States act alone would be the 
precedent that would be set. It could be a reference point for China, 
for example, looking at Taiwan, where China has made many bellicose 
warlike statements as to its disagreements with Taiwan. If the United 
States can act unilaterally, or without United Nations sanction, there 
would be a potential argument for a country like China proceeding as to 
Taiwan. There would be a potential argument for a nation like India 
proceeding as to Pakistan, or vice versa, Pakistan proceeding as to 
India, which could be a nuclear incident. Both of those countries have 
nuclear power.
  This is a question I believe has to be debated on the floor of the 
U.S. Senate. I have not made up my mind as to whether it is preferable 
to condition the use of force on a United Nations resolution, and I am 
cognizant of the difficulties of giving up sovereignty and being 
subject to the veto of China, which I don't like at all, or being 
subject to the veto of Russia, which I don't like at all, or being 
subject to the veto of France, again something I do not like. But I 
think we have to recognize when we are authorizing the use of force, 
and if the President takes the authorization and is not successful 
going to the U.N. to get a coalition, we will be establishing a 
precedent that may have ramifications far into the future, at some 
point in time when the United States may not be the superpower 
significantly in control of the destiny of the world with our great 
military power.
  I am glad to see the President is moving ahead with an effort to get 
inspections in the United Nations, and Secretary of State Powell met 
last Friday with the U.N. inspection chief, who agreed there ought to 
be broader authority for the U.N. inspection than that which was in 
place in 1998 when Iraq ousted the U.N. inspectors. Hans Blix supported 
the position the United States has taken. Yesterday, on a Sunday talk 
show, the Iraqi Ambassador to the U.N. made a comment to the effect 
there was no huge problem on having U.N. inspectors come, even to the 
Presidential compounds.
  That is probably a typical Iraqi statement: holding out an offer one 
day and revoking it the next. I do believe it is important that we 
exhaust every possible alternative before resorting to the use of our 
armed forces, and to have the inspectors go back into Iraq is obviously 
desirable. We must have the inspectors, though, go into Iraq in a 
context where there are no holds barred.
  In August, Senator Shelby and I visited the Sudan. The Sudan is now 
interested in becoming friendly with the United States. Our former 
colleague, Senator Jack Danforth, has brokered the basic peace treaty 
which still has to be implemented in many respects. But as a part of 
the new Sudanese approach, the Government of Sudan has allowed U.S. 
intelligence personnel to go to Sudanese factories, munitions plants, 
and laboratories with no announcement or minimal announcement of just 
an hour, break locks, go in, and conduct inspections. That would be a 
good model for the inspection of Iraq. If, in fact, the Iraqis will 
allow unfettered, unlimited inspections, it is conceivable that would 
solve the problem with respect to the issue of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Certainly that ought to be pursued to the maximum extent possible. 
If, and/

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or when the Iraqis oust the U.N. inspectors or limit the U.N. 
inspectors, raising again the unmistakable inference that Saddam 
Hussein has something to hide, then I think there is more reason to 
resort to force as a last alternative and, in that context, a better 
chance to get other countries, perhaps countries even in the Arab 
world, to be supportive of the use of force against Iraq at the present 
time as they were in the gulf war in 1991.
  Extensive consideration has to be given, in my judgment, to the 
impact on the Arab world. Egyptian President Mubarak has been emphatic 
in his concern as to what the impact will be there. So we ought to make 
every effort we can to enlist the aid of as many of the nations in the 
Arab world as possible.
  If Saddam Hussein rebuffs the United Nations, again raising the 
unmistakable inference that he has something to hide, then I think the 
chances of getting additional allies there would be improved.
  With respect to the situation with Israel, there is, again, grave 
concern that a war with Iraq will result in Scud missiles being 
directed toward Israel. Some 39 of those Scud missiles were directed 
toward Israel during the gulf war. Their missile defense system was not 
very good. Now we know that Israel has the Arrow system, but still all 
of Israel is not protected. The Arrow system has not been adequately 
tested.
  In the gulf war in 1991, the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir 
honored the request of President Bush not to retaliate. It is a 
different situation at the present time with Israeli Prime Minister 
Sharon having announced if Israel is attacked, Israel will not sit back 
again.
  When former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft published a 
very erudite op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal in August, he 
raised the grave concern that with Israeli nuclear power, there could 
be an Armageddon in the Mideast. Former National Security Adviser Brent 
Scowcroft was advising caution; that we ought not proceed without 
exhausting every other alternative.
  A similar position was taken by former Secretary of State James Baker 
in an op-ed piece, again in August, in the New York Times urging that 
inspections be pursued as a way of possibly avoiding a war.

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