[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 12]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 16748-16749]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                ACT NOW

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                      Thursday, September 12, 2002

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, last Friday (September 6, 2002), an 
outstanding article by our distinguished former Secretary of State, 
George P. Shultz, was published in a number of American newspapers. 
Secretary Shultz eloquently explained why he believes we must act 
decisively against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.
  As Secretary of State for President Ronald Reagan, George Schultz 
exhibited remarkable experience in foreign affairs. Since leaving the 
Department of State, Secretary Shultz has continued to deal with 
international relations as a Distinguished Fellow at Stanford 
University's Hoover Institution, an institution dedicated to public 
policy analysis of international and domestic questions. In recognition 
of Secretary Schultz's outstanding commitment to education and public 
service, the Hoover Institution's Foreign Service Institute was 
recently renamed in his honor.
  Mr. Speaker, I believe that all of our colleagues in the United 
States Congress would benefit from reading Secretary Schultz's 
excellent analysis on the issue of Iraq, and I ask that it be placed in 
the Record.

    Act Now--The Danger Is Immediate Saddam Hussein Must Be Removed

                         (By George P. Shultz)

       Are we to be the Hamlet of nations, debating endlessly over 
     when and how to act? Saddam Hussein's performance as ruler of 
     Iraq is a matter of grave concern not just for the United 
     States but for the international community as a whole. The 
     major debate going on in the media, in Congress and with our 
     friends and allies is necessary. But it is also necessary to 
     move beyond debate and create the clarity that is the basis 
     for action.
       The world now has entered the third decade of crises and 
     dangers to international peace and security created by Saddam 
     Hussein. In 1980 he launched an eight-year war

[[Page 16749]]

     against Iran. Chemical weapons were used, and at least 1.5 
     million people were killed or severely wounded. In 1990 he 
     invaded Kuwait in a war aimed at eradicating another state's 
     legitimate sovereign existence. As he was forced out, he 
     deliberately created environmental degradation of gigantic 
     proportions. He has used chemical weapons against the Kurdish 
     people in an attack on a genocidal scale, and he has sent his 
     forces into Kurdistan to conduct widespread slaughter. He has 
     relentlessly amassed weapons of mass destruction and 
     continues their development. He has turned Iraq into a state 
     that foments, supports and conducts terrorism. No other 
     dictator today matches his record of war, oppression, use of 
     weapons of mass destruction and continuing contemptuous 
     violation of international law, as set out by unanimous 
     actions of the U.N. Security Council.
       Against this background, much of the current debate ignores 
     the facts of the United Nations' long series of steps to rein 
     in Saddam Hussein and authorize action against his regime. A 
     strong foundation exists for immediate military action 
     against Hussein and for a multilateral effort to rebuild Iraq 
     after he is gone.
       A remarkable series of U.N. Security Council resolutions in 
     1990 and 1991 authorized war to oust Hussein's forces from 
     Kuwait. This was the basis for the Desert Storm campaign that 
     won the Gulf War in 1991. With that military victory, a 
     Security Council resolution declared the ``suspension'' of 
     offensive operations, deliberately leaving intact the 
     original authorization to use force. Then Security Council 
     Resolution 687 imposed a series of demands upon Iraq with the 
     objective of restoring peace and security in the area. This 
     carried the case against Hussein beyond the matter of 
     liberating Kuwait to focus on the elimination, under 
     international inspection, of his weapons of mass destruction. 
     In other words, the threat to the region and the world of a 
     decisively armed Iraq was fully recognized and declared 
     unacceptable.
       In the first years after Desert Storm, U.N. inspectors 
     uncovered Iraqi facilities used to manufacture weapons of 
     mass destruction. They dismantled uranium-enrichment and 
     other nuclear weapons installations and destroyed a chemical 
     weapons plant and hundreds of missile warheads armed with 
     poison gas. Threats of Iraq's noncooperation were countered 
     by U.S. airstrikes. But even limited Iraqi compliance 
     decreased sharply over time.
       The U.N. inspectors did what they could. They found a lot, 
     but they missed even more. In 1995 Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel 
     Hassan Majeed, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, defected and 
     revealed that Hussein was making biological weapons at a 
     center where inspectors had found nothing. The center, which 
     had produced 30,000 liters of biological agents, including 
     anthrax and botulinum toxins, was destroyed, but the 
     inadequacy of inspections in Iraq was demonstrated.
       In 1997 Saddam Hussein escalated his campaign of 
     harassment, obstruction and threats against the inspection 
     effort. He activated ground-to-air missile systems to deter 
     inspection flights. He expelled all American members of the 
     inspection teams. In early 1998 Hussein refused access to 
     ``presidential sites''--the numerous palaces he had built for 
     himself around Iraq. The United States responded with a 
     military buildup, including ground troops deployed to Kuwait. 
     In a speech at the Pentagon in February 1998, President 
     Clinton gave details of Iraq's violations and declared that 
     Hussein must grant ``full, free and unfettered'' access to 
     inspectors or the United States would launch attacks to 
     compel his compliance.
       In an attempt to defuse the crisis, U.N. Secretary General 
     Kofi Annan negotiated that same month a Memorandum of 
     Understanding between Iraq and the United Nations, which 
     pledged ``immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access'' 
     for inspections. A Security Council resolution endorsed the 
     Memorandum of Understanding and warned Iraq of the ``severest 
     consequences'' if the memorandum was violated.
       In September 1998, the chief U.N. inspector informed the 
     Security Council that Iraq was again barring inspections, and 
     the council, in yet another resolution, condemned Iraq for 
     suspending its cooperation. A further U.N. effort to regain 
     Iraq's cooperation failed as Iraq declared that it was 
     suspending all cooperation with U.N. inspections. In an 
     emergency session, the Security Council passed Resolution 
     1205 on Nov. 5, 1998, condemning Iraq's action as ``a 
     flagrant violation'' of the original resolutions of 1990-91. 
     Since then, nothing consequential has been done. The failure 
     to take military action against Hussein after his flagrant 
     violation in 1998 has given him nearly four years to continue 
     unencumbered in his development and accumulation of weapons 
     of mass destruction.
       Iraq by its own actions has, in effect, terminated the 
     cease-fire established in 1991 at the end of the Gulf War and 
     reactivated the ``suspended'' authorization to use military 
     force against Iraq. No longer can anyone plausibly claim that 
     Iraq's weapons of mass destruction can be eliminated by an 
     inspection program. The Security Council's judgment still 
     stands: A Saddam Hussein armed with weapons of mass 
     destruction is not acceptable. Military force against Hussein 
     is both necessary and authorized to rid Iraq of weapons of 
     mass destruction.
       The full range of reasonable legal, diplomatic and other 
     alternatives has been exhausted. All conceivable forms of 
     leverage have been employed: sanctions; embargoes; massive 
     military buildups to threaten him into compliance; limited 
     military operations in the form of air and cruise missile 
     strikes; the encouragement of internal opposition; positive 
     inducement through the ``oil for peace'' program; and 
     diplomacy in all forms--unilateral, multilateral, private, 
     public, direct and through intermediaries. Nothing has 
     worked. Any further steps will only provide him with more 
     time and heighten the danger.
       Self-defense is a valid basis for preemptive action. The 
     evidence is clear that Hussein continues to amass weapons of 
     mass destruction. He has also demonstrated a willingness to 
     use them against internal as well as external targets. By 
     now, the risks of inaction clearly outweigh the risks of 
     action. If there is a rattlesnake in the yard, you don't wait 
     for it to strike before you take action in self-defense.
       The danger is immediate. The making of weapons of mass 
     destruction grows increasingly difficult to counter with each 
     passing day. When the risk is not hundreds of people killed 
     in a conventional attack but tens or hundreds of thousands 
     killed by chemical, biological or nuclear attack, the time 
     factor is even more compelling.
       The moment is racing toward us when Hussein's possession of 
     nuclear weaponry could transform the regional and 
     international situation into what, in the Cold War, we called 
     the balance of terror. Some argue that to act now might 
     trigger Hussein's use of his worst weapons. Such self-imposed 
     blackmail presumes easier judgments when he is even better 
     equipped than now. Time is his ally, not ours.
       Concern over the future of Iraq is legitimate. Following 
     the end of the current Iraqi regime, a new Iraq can emerge as 
     a territorially integral sovereign state with a federal-style 
     form that respects the Kurdish, Sunni and Shia communities. A 
     set of phased transitional steps, including referendums and 
     elections, can be carried out and involve the range of Iraqi 
     political parties, factions and groups in exile and 
     internally opposed to the Hussein regime over the years.
       For the Middle East, a major source of and support for 
     terror and instability will have ended. Those who argue that 
     the Iraq crisis should be deferred until progress is achieved 
     between Israelis and Palestinians are proposing an impossible 
     task. For the Arab world as a whole, a new Iraq offers the 
     opportunity to start a reversal of the stagnation detailed in 
     the ``Arab Human Development Report 2002'' recently released 
     by the United Nations. The report describes how Arab 
     societies are being crippled by a lack of political freedom, 
     repression of women and isolation from the world of ideas 
     that stifles creativity.
       The history of Iraq, the achievements of its peoples, its 
     high civilization of the past, and its extensive natural 
     resources all point to the possibility of a positive 
     transformation once Hussein's yoke is lifted. In the process, 
     a model can emerge that other Arab societies may look to and 
     emulate for their own transformation and that of the entire 
     region. The challenge of Iraq offers an opportunity for a 
     historic turning point that can lead us in the direction of a 
     more peaceful, free and prosperous future.
       This is a defining moment in international affairs. 
     Authorization for action is clear. We have made endless 
     efforts to bring Saddam Hussein into line with the duly 
     considered judgments of a unanimous U.N. Security Council. 
     Let us go to the Security Council and assert this case with 
     the care of a country determined to take decisive action. And 
     this powerful case for acting now must be made promptly to 
     Congress. Its members will have to stand up and be counted. 
     Then let's get on with the job.
       The writer was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. He is 
     the Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow at 
     Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

     

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