[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 16279-16281]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                                 CHINA

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this week, which will be one Americans 
remember for a long time as the anniversary of the September 11 attacks 
of last year, a lot of second-guessing has been going on about what we 
might have done differently. Part of that is based on the fact that 
there was a lot of evidence that the United States should have been 
prepared to deal with the kind of attack that occurred, even if not at 
that precise time and place.
  I think history will show, notwithstanding all of the evidence, it 
would have been very difficult for us to actually defend against those 
attacks, but it should not dissuade us from acting on similar evidence 
in the future.
  I fear there is another situation developing which, both because we 
are focused on the war on terror and because it presents us with some 
unpleasant choices about what to do, is creating a similar situation 
where there is evidence that we should be paying attention to a 
problem, but either because we do not want to deal with it or because 
there is a lack of consensus about how to deal with it, the United 
States is not taking adequate precautions or taking adequate steps to 
deal with the situation.
  What I have in mind is a concern that has been now discussed in two 
very recently released Government reports on the threat that is posed 
by the nation of China against the United States.
  The first, produced by the congressionally-mandated United States-
China Security Review Commission, offers a sobering analysis of the 
national security implications of the economic relationship between our 
two countries. It flatly states that trade alone has failed to bring 
about serious political change in China.
  The second, the Defense Department's annual report on the military 
power of the People's Republic of China, paints an unsettling picture 
of China's military buildup, the main objective of which is to prepare 
that country for a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and to 
counter potential U.S. intervention in the conflict.
  Proponents of unconditional engagement with China opine that the 
Chinese people's access to the Internet, modern telecommunications, and 
free trade will make that country a more free and open society. They 
suggest that entrenched vestiges of the Communist system will 
eventually fade away as new leaders, who are committed to capitalism, 
take the reins of power. In other words, economic freedom will 
invariably translate into political freedom, and democracy will be the 
clear result.
  But, particularly with the release of these two reports, it seems 
more and more clear that China's willingness to engage in the world 
economy has not translated into evolution toward democracy. Indeed, the 
United States-China Security Review Commission concluded that:

     . . . Trade and economic liberalization have not led to the 
     extent of political liberalization much hoped for by U.S. 
     policymakers. The Chinese government has simultaneously 
     increased trade and aggressively resisted openness in 
     politically sensitive areas such as the exercise of 
     religious, human, and worker rights.

  Consider, for example, Chinese Government control over the Internet. 
While many expected that access to the Internet would facilitate the 
influx of Western ideas and values, the Commission stated that those 
hopes ``have yet to be realized.'' Indeed, Beijing has passed sweeping 
regulations in the past

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two years that prohibit news and commentary on Internet sites in China 
that is not state-sanctioned. The Commission noted that China has even 
convinced American companies like Yahoo! to assist in its censorship 
efforts, and others, like America Online, to leave open the possibility 
of turning over names, e-mail addresses, or records of political 
dissidents if the Chinese government demands them.
  It is impossible to predict China's future. That country has embarked 
on an uncertain path, opening its economy while simultaneously 
attempting to strengthen the Communist Party's political and social 
control. The consequences, given that Chinese policies run directly 
counter to U.S. national security interests, are potentially grave. 
Thus, the Commission established benchmarks against which Beijing's 
future progress can be measured, including China's proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction; its cozy relationships with terrorists 
states like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea; its bellicose posture toward 
Taiwan; and its pursuit of asymmetric warfare capabilities to counter 
U.S. military capabilities.
  China's proliferation of technology and components for ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction to terrorist-sponsoring 
states--including North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Sudan--is 
of serious concern. The Commission found that, despite numerous 
bilateral and multilateral pledges to halt that proliferation, 
``Chinese proliferation and cooperation with [such] states has 
continued unabated.''
  Just in the past year, the administration has sanctioned Chinese 
entities three times for their proliferation to Iran of equipment and 
materials used to make chemical and biological weapons. Yet these 
sanctions are unlikely to curb China's proliferation activities. As the 
Commission concludes, ``Current U.S. sanctions policies to deter and 
reform Chinese proliferation practices have failed and need immediate 
review and overhaul.''
  The Commission recommended that the United States expand the use of 
economic sanctions to apply against entire countries, rather than just 
individual entities. Suggested sanctions include import and export 
limitations, restrictions on the access of foreign entities to American 
capital markets, restrictions on direct foreign investments in an 
offending country, and restrictions on science and technology 
cooperation.
  I should note that these measures are very similar to those proposed 
by my distinguished colleague from Tennessee, Senator Thompson, in 2000 
during the debate on granting China permanent normal trade status. His 
amendment, which I strongly supported, was rejected by this body.
  As to Taiwan, Beijing is deadly serious about pursuing unification--
through force, if necessary--with our long-standing, democratic ally. 
The Chinese military is actively pursuing capabilities and strategies 
that it would need to accomplish that task, and according to the 
Commission, it is believed that the military has been directed to have 
viable options to do so by 2005 to 2007.
  Mr. President, let me repeat that: It is believed that the Chinese 
military has been directed by the Communist leadership to be prepared 
to move against Taiwan by 2005 to 2007. If there is one sentence in 
this report that ought to serve as a wake-up call, this is it.
  What is so significant about that time-frame is that, during those 
two years, a number of factors fall in line. First of all, the Defense 
Department has projected that the balance of power across the Taiwan 
Strait will shift toward China by 2005. Second, it is estimated that 
our theater missile defense system, which China fears we will share 
with Taiwan, will be up and running by 2007. Finally, it is estimated 
that China's myriad conventional weapons recently purchased from 
Russia--including submarines, fighter jets, and air-to-air missiles--
will become fully operational within that 2-year period.
  Indeed, the Defense Department, in its report, concluded that China's 
``ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over its declared 
preference for resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful 
means.'' The Pentagon observes that, over the past year, Beijing's 
military exercises have taken on an increasingly real-world focus aimed 
not only at Taiwan, but also at increasing the risk to U.S. forces and 
to the United States itself in any future Taiwan contingency.
  The Defense Department warns that China's ``military training 
exercises increasingly focus on the United States as an adversary.'' 
Its military modernization concentrates on weapons that could cripple 
our military strength, including anti-ship missiles to counter our 
naval fleet and cyber-warfare to disrupt our infrastructure. Beijing is 
also modernizing its ballistic missile program, improving its missile 
force across the board both quantitatively and qualitatively. Beijing 
currently has about 20 inter-continental ballistic missiles, ICBMs, 
capable of targeting the United States, is projected to add up to 40 
longer-range, road-mobile missiles by 2010.
  In light of the Pentagon's conclusions, it is more important than 
ever that the United States provide Taiwan in a timely manner with the 
equipment and training it needs to defend itself against a potential 
Chinese attack. That training should include joint operational 
training, which would facilitate an allied U.S.-Taiwan response to an 
attack on Taiwan by China. Taiwan is currently outnumbered 10 to 1 in 
combat aircraft, 2 to 1 in ships, 60 to 4 in submarines, and its air 
force is beginning to lose its qualitative edge over China.
  The United States should also expand and multilateralize its security 
relationships with Taiwan and other allies in East Asia to deter 
potential Chinese aggression. No doubt China is a very different 
country than the former Soviet Union, but there is something to be said 
for the deterrent factor that comes with a NATO-like coalition. As 
President Bush stated during his campaign, ``We should work toward a 
day when the fellowship of free Pacific nations is as strong and united 
as our Atlantic partnership . . .''
  Additionally, the United States needs to develop and deploy missile 
defenses at the earliest possible date. I am pleased that President 
Bush recognizes the importance of having such a defensive system, and 
has made it a top priority among our military objectives.
  What is frustrating is that the United States continues to play a 
facilitating role in China's military buildup and its proliferation of 
dual-use technologies--technologies that have civilian and military 
uses--to rogue states. China's buildup and its proliferation both harm 
U.S. national security. The United States China Security Review 
commission agreed with the conclusion of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission 
that:

       The U.S. has been and is today a major, albeit 
     unintentional, contributor to the proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction [through] foreign student training in the 
     U.S., by wide dissemination of technical information, by the 
     illegal acquisition of U.S. designs and equipment, and by the 
     relaxation of U.S. export control policies.

  Our progressive relaxation of controls on the export of high 
performance computers is just one example. These computers can assist 
China in its efforts to rapidly design modern nuclear weapons and their 
delivery systems.
  Our lax controls over the export of these computers allow China to 
legally obtain U.S. technology that helps to improve its military 
capabilities. Indeed, the Commission concluded that, despite the 
existence of nominal controls, most high performance computers are no 
longer licensed and monitored.
  Not only is China using U.S. technology to build its own military 
capabilities, it is transferring this technology to countries that 
support international terror networks. The China Commission found that:

       Chinese firms have provided dual-use missile-related items, 
     raw materials, and/or assistance to Iran, North Korea, and 
     Libya.

  Chinese companies have also exported substantial dual-use 
telecommunications equipment and technology to countries like Iraq. 
Media reports indicate that the Chinese firm Huawei Technologies--an 
important

[[Page 16281]]

player for many U.S. firms who want to reach the Chinese telecom and 
data communications market--assisted Iraq with fiber-optics to improve 
its air-defense system. This was not only a violation of U.N. sactions, 
it also greatly increased the danger to U.S. and British pilots 
patrolling the no-fly zones.
  Despite the serious concerns of some policymakers, Members of this 
body, and others about the national security implications of transfers 
of such technology to China, the Senate, in September 2001, passed S. 
149, the Export Administration Act. If enacted, this legislation would 
significantly relax our export control regulations and make it far 
easier for China to obtain sensitive U.S. technology. it would 
decontrol a number of items--including electronic devices used to 
trigger nuclear weapons and materials used to build missiles and 
produce nuclear weapons fuel--by giving these items ``mass market 
status.''
  Mr. President, it is my hope that, as the anniversary of September 11 
approaches, the administration and Congress recognize the potential 
danger of allowing business interests to continue to trump our national 
security needs. I am a strong proponent of free trade and open markets. 
But our national security should not be sacrificed for potential 
commercial gain. The federal government's first responsibility is the 
protection of the American people.
  How the United States chooses to manage its relationship with China 
will have a far-reaching impact on our long-term national security. As 
that country continues to play a more prominent role on the world 
stage--no doubt a product of its economic liberalization--it is 
imperative that U.S. policy appropriately address not only our trade 
relationship, but also the threat posed by China to U.S. national 
security. Our actions should be based not on wishes, but on facts--even 
if they are unpleasant.
  I thank the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Wyoming.

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