[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 11]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 15237-15238]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                     AN ACCURATE HISTORY OF CYPRUS

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. DAN BURTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Friday, July 26, 2002

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, recently several Members of 
Congress came to the House floor to attack Turkey and enumerate all the 
bad things that have happened to Cyprus as a result of the 1974 Turkish 
intervention on Cyprus. As has happened in the past, only one-sided, 
inaccurate, and incomplete information was provided, which not only 
ignored the historical reasons for the division of Cyprus, but also 
ignored the international laws that legitimized the Turkish 
intervention. For the sake of historical accuracy, I would like to 
insert in the Record an article authored by the Honorable Osman Ertug, 
the Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus here in 
Washington, DC. I commend it to anyone who has a sincere desire to 
understand why Cyprus stands divided today.

                           Is It All History?

       The month of July is marked by mourning and protestations 
     in Cyprus on the one side, while by jubilations and 
     celebrations on the other. Even this sharp contrast in public 
     mood shows the depth of the division between the two peoples 
     of this eastern Mediterranean island--the Turkish Cypriots 
     and Greek Cypriots. We believe the 28th Anniversary of the 
     events of 1974 in Cyprus is an appropriate time to reflect on 
     the background of the conflict and the prospects for its 
     peaceful resolution.
       Contrary to common belief, the origin of the Cyprus 
     conflict dates back not to 1974,

[[Page 15238]]

     but to December 1963, when the Greek Cypriots, aided and 
     abetted by Greece, launched an all-out attack on the Turkish 
     Cypriot people aimed at annexing the island to Greece 
     (Enosis).
       Turkish Cypriots resisted Greek attempts to ``hellenize'' 
     Cyprus and, with the help of Turkey, which is a Guarantor 
     Power under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, succeeded in 
     defending and maintaining their existence in Cyprus as one of 
     the two equal peoples of the island. Yet, this defense came 
     at a heavy cost to the Turkish Cypriots, with thousands of 
     them being killed, wounded or missing; a quarter of the 
     Turkish Cypriot population evicted from their homes and 
     properties in 103 villages; and the entire Turkish Cypriot 
     population condemned to live in enclaves on 3% of the 
     territory of Cyprus deprived of all human rights. The 
     suffering of the Turkish Cypriots prompted a prominent US 
     official, Mr. George W. Ball, former US Undersecretary of 
     State, to write the following in his memoirs entitled ``The 
     Past Has Another Pattern'':
       ``Makarios' central interest was to block off Turkish 
     intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on 
     happily massacring Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots just 
     want to be left alone to kill the Turkish Cypriots.''
       The severity of Greek Cypriot attacks was such that The 
     Washington Post of 17 February 1964 reported in a relevant 
     article that ``Greek Cypriot fanatics appear (ed) bent on a 
     policy of genocide. . . .''
       The years-long campaign of the Greek Cypriots to annex the 
     island to Greece culminated in the coup d'etat of 15 July 
     1974, which was described as ``an invasion of Cyprus by 
     Greece'' even by the then Greek Cypriot leader Makarios in 
     his dramatic admission before the UN Security Council on 19 
     July 1974.
       Turkey exercised its right of intervention under these 
     circumstances, in order to prevent the wholesale massacre of 
     the Turkish Cypriots; stop the bloodshed on the island and 
     prevent the colonization of Cyprus by Greece. Turkey's 
     legitimate and justified intervention did not only achieve 
     all these aims, but also led to the downfall of the military 
     junta in Greece. The legitimacy of the Turkish intervention 
     was confirmed by prominent outside sources, including the 
     Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the 
     Council of Europe, which, in its decision dated 29 July 1974, 
     stated the following:
       ``Turkey exercised its right of intervention in accordance 
     with Article IV of the Guarantee Treaty.''
       Even the Athens Court of Appeal, in its decision of March 
     21, 1979, also held that the intervention of Turkey in Cyprus 
     was legal:
       ``. . . The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus which 
     was carried out in accordance with the Zurich and London 
     Agreements was legal. Turkey, as one of the Guarantor powers, 
     had the right to fulfill her obligations. The real culprits . 
     . . are the Greek Officers who engineered and staged a coup 
     and prepared the conditions of this intervention.''
       Decision No. 2658/79 dated 21 March 1979.
       The events of 1974 were followed by a population exchange 
     between the North and the South, formally agreed between the 
     two sides in August and implemented in September 1975, 
     enabling the Turkish Cypriots to regroup and reorganize 
     themselves in the North, and the Greek Cypriots in the South. 
     This created the geographical basis for a permanent 
     settlement of the Cyprus issue on a ``bi-zonal'' basis--a 
     term that has since become a permanent feature of the UN's 
     Cyprus vocabulary.
       Is this all history? Perhaps; but it is a history from 
     which we must learn so as not to repeat it. A forward-looking 
     strategy in Cyprus must necessarily take into account the 
     above background of events, the existing mistrust between the 
     two peoples of the island and the realities of today, that is 
     the two-state situation on the island evolved in the course 
     of time. The possibility of a just, realistic and viable 
     settlement depends on the acknowledgement of these facts, not 
     a rejection of them. The Turkish Cypriots deserve to have 
     their own State and, what is more, they already have it, 
     albeit without international recognition.
       The current face-to-face negotiations, started at the 
     initiative of the Turkish Cypriot side, could produce the 
     desired result if the Greek Cypriots were to accept the 
     Turkish Cypriots as their true partners and equals. However, 
     pampered by the European Union and a world that has come to 
     view the question largely from a Greek Cypriot perspective, 
     treating them as the ``Government of Cyprus'', the Greek 
     Cypriots have little or no reason to settle their scores with 
     their Turkish Cypriot neighbors for a shared future. In view 
     of these realities, it is evident that for the current 
     negotiations to have a real chance of success, third parties 
     need to encourage the Greek Cypriot side to accept that there 
     is no going back to the old days in Cyprus, and that the aim 
     of the talks is the establishment of a NEW PARTNERSHIP on the 
     basis of the sovereign equality of the two parties.
       Perhaps we could then reach an outcome in Cyprus that all 
     can celebrate.

     

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