[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 11]
[Senate]
[Pages 15166-15169]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                              ARMS CONTROL

  Mr. KYL. Madam President, I thank the distinguished assistant 
majority leader and would note that Senator Specter also wanted to 
address the Senate, but since he is not here, I will go ahead with my 
remarks.
  Mr. KYL. Madam President, on June 13 the United States officially 
withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile, ABM, Treaty, closing a 
chapter in U.S.-Soviet relations, and beginning another with Russia. 
The lapsing of the ABM Treaty, combined with the Senate's defeat of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 and the signing of a new type of 
nuclear reduction treaty with Russia in May, represent a fundamental 
shift in the way the United States approaches strategic security. We 
have moved away from reliance on traditional arms control treaties 
toward a reliance on our own capabilities--namely missile defenses and 
a credible nuclear deterrent.
  Proponents of the ABM Treaty were convinced that it was the 
``cornerstone of strategic stability,'' and that U.S. withdrawal would 
damage the improving U.S.-Russia relationship, spark a new arms race, 
and even lead, as one of my colleagues remarked, to ``Cold War II.'' 
Those predictions were wrong. Yet some still cling to the notion that 
arms control is the key elements in U.S. national security.
  Over the past 6 months, I have addressed the Senate on the strategic 
justification for U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the question of 
how much a missile defense system will cost, and the President's 
constitutional authority to exercise the right of withdrawal without 
legislative consent. And, today, in response to those who continue to 
believe in the utopian aims of

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traditional arms control agreements, I rise to address the President's 
decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty, this time in the broader context 
of the utility of such measures as a means to protect U.S. security 
interests.
  The past 10 years have completely changes the Cold War strategic 
environment that gave rise to the ABM Treaty and other traditional arms 
limitation and arms reduction agreements. First, the United States and 
Russia have moved beyond enmity toward a more cooperative relationship. 
Second, the threats we face today are far more numerous and complex 
than those we faced during the Cold War.
  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become one of 
our most pressing national security challenges. As many as three dozen 
countries now have or are developing ballistic missiles. Used by once 
between 1945 and 1980, such weapons have become an increasingly common 
component in regional conflicts. In fact, thousands of shorter range 
missiles have been used in at least six conflicts since 1980. And, as a 
recent National Intelligence Estimate NIE, on foreign ballistic missile 
developments warned, ``The probability that a missile with a weapon of 
mass destruction will be used against U.S. forces or U.S. interests is 
higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will continue to 
grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries mature.''
  Iran, for example, continues to place much emphasis on its missile 
activities. According to the recent NIE, that country's ``longstanding 
commitment to its ballistic missile program . . . is unlikely to 
diminish.'' In early May, Tehran conducted a successful test of its 
1,300 km-range Shahab-3 missile--capable of reaching Israel, as well as 
U.S. troops deployed in the Middle East and South Asia--and some press 
reports indicate that Iran is now set to begin domestic production of 
the missile. Additionally, on May 7, the Associated Press, citing an 
administration official, reported that Iran is continuing development 
of a longer-range missile, the Shahab-4. With an estimated range of 
2,000 km, the Shabab-4 will be able to reach well into Europe.
  North Korea's missile programs are also of great concern. That 
country has extended its moratorium of testing its intercontinental-
range Taepo Dong missiles until 2003; however, its surprise August 1998 
test flight over Japan of the Taepo Dong 1 missile should serve as a 
clear indication of its intent to develop missiles with 
intercontinental ranges. Indeed, Pyongyang is continuing its 
development of the longer-range Taepo Dong 2 missile, capable of 
reaching parts of the United States with a nuclear weapon-sized 
payload. According to the NIE:

       The Taepo Dong 2 in a two-stage ballistic missile 
     configuration could deliver a several-hundred kg payload up 
     to 10,000 km--sufficient to strike Alaska, Hawaii, and parts 
     of the continental United States. If the North uses a third 
     stage similar to the one used on the Taepo Dong 1 in 1998 in 
     a ballistic missile configuration, then the Taepo Dong 2 
     could deliver a several hundred kg payload up to 15,000 km--
     sufficient to strike all of North America.

  In Iraq, Saddam Hussein continues to obstruct the international 
verification of commitments made to the United Nations, and still fails 
to comply with arms control agreements he accepted at the end of the 
gulf war. The recent NIE concluded that, ``Despite U.N. resolutions 
limiting the range of Iraq's missiles to 150 km, Baghdad has been able 
to maintain the infrastructure and expertise to develop longer range 
missile systems.'' And Iraq's ability to surprise us in the past with 
the scale of its missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological programs 
should serve as a warning. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently 
discussed Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, stating:

       They have them, and they continue to develop them, and they 
     have weaponized chemical weapons. They've had an active 
     program to develop nuclear weapons. It's also clear that they 
     are actively developing biological weapons. I don't know what 
     other kinds of weapons fall under the rubric of weapons of 
     mass destruction, but if there are more, I suspect they're 
     working on them, as well.

  China presents an even more complex case. While not a member of the 
axis of evil, that country's exceedingly belligerent attitude toward 
the United States and our longstanding, democratic ally Taiwan requires 
a clear-eyed approach to our relationship with the communist government 
in Beijing. China currently has about 20 intercontinental ballistic 
missiles capable of reaching the United States, and is in the midst of 
a long-running modernization program to expand the size of its 
strategic nuclear arsenal and to develop road-mobile and submarine-
launched ICBMs. According to the NIE, by 2015, ``Chinese ballistic 
missile forces will increase several-fold.'' Additionally, by that 
time, ``Most of China's strategic missile force will be mobile.'' As 
Secretary Rumsfeld stated on September 6 in reference to China's 
strategic missile modernization and buildup, ``It is a long pattern 
that reflects a seriousness of purpose about the People's Republic of 
China with respect to their defense establishment.''
  President Bush's fresh approach to strategic security with Russia--
called the ``New Strategic Framework''--takes into account these 
changed circumstances. The President's framework entails unilateral 
reductions in offensive nuclear weapons and the development and 
deployment of defensive systems to deter and protect against missile 
attacks. President Bush outlined this approach before his election, and 
upon taking office, immediately began to develop a plan for action.
  The central component of that framework is the development of missile 
defenses, critical to which is U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty 
which totally prohibits deployment of a national missile defense. 
Indeed, our withdrawal represents a fundamental shift away from 
reliance on consensual vulnerability, perpetuated by arms control 
treaties, and a move toward prudent defensive measures.
  The ABM Treaty was a classic example of arms control--promising much 
more than it was ever able to deliver. The theory was that by ensuring 
mutual vulnerability to nuclear missile attack, the incentive to build 
increasing numbers of offensive forces would be removed. History proved 
that theory wrong. Between the treaty's signing in 1972 and 1987, the 
Soviet Union's inventory of strategic nuclear warheads grew from around 
2,000 to about 10,000; and the U.S. arsenal grew from around 3,700 to 
8,000. In fact, strategic nuclear forces expanded not just 
quantitatively, but also qualitatively. The decade following the ABM 
Treaty's signing witnessed the introduction into the Soviet arsenal of 
entire generations of new long-range missiles, not just in 
contradiction of the intent of the ABM Treaty, but in contravention of 
the accompanying SALT I accord as well. Clearly, deliberate 
vulnerability did not promote arms control; rather, it fueled the arms 
race.
  It is important to reiterate the history of the ABM Treaty because 
those who purport that it was the ``cornerstone of strategic 
stability'' seem to misunderstand the original impetus for it. The 
truth is that the United States gave up the right to field defensive 
systems because the Nixon administration was faced, in 1971, with a 
Congress that refused to fund more than two of the original 12 sites 
that the Administration had proposed in 1969. This, in addition to a 
rapid Soviet offensive buildup, caused the Nixon administration to 
acquiesce in the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, to be coupled with the 
SALT agreement. And I should note that, two years after the ABM Treaty 
was negotiated, it was amended to limit to one the number of sites 
allowed because Congress did not even continue to fund the second site.
  Thus, making necessity a virtue, political theorists embraced the 
notion that, in order to deter a nuclear attack, the threatened 
response had to be the murder of millions of innocent civilians. 
President Reagan once referred to this philosophy, named Mutual Assured 
Destruction, as ``a sad commentary on the human condition.'' And, in my 
view, its acronym ``M-A-D'' describes it well.
  It is debatable whether that theory explains the absence of a nuclear 
exchange in the second half of the 20th century. Whatever the case, 
this idea certainly seems mad today, when we

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have friendly relations with Russia, and are confronted with an 
entirely different set of threats. It simply does not make sense to 
remain deliberately vulnerable to the increasing threat of a ballistic 
missile attack, especially when alternatives, such as missile defenses, 
now exist.
  Surely a sign of the changed times, President Bush returned from 
Russia in May having signed a new treaty under which both sides intend 
to reduce strategic warheads to 1,700-2,200. Just three pages long, 
this treaty merely states what both sides intend to do. There are no 
interim limits, no sub-limits, or verification schemes. More 
importantly, the treaty simply affirms what the United States had 
already decided were its strategic requirements--President Bush 
announced that we were unilaterally going to this level of warheads 
last November. This is important enough to repeat: this treaty 
memorialized what President Bush determined were our strategic 
requirements. Thus, this treaty is a complete break with the arms 
control orthodoxy of the past, which made each side's limitations or 
reductions dependent on the other, required difficult verification and 
enforcement provisions, and artificially pre-determined our strategic 
levels.
  Recognizing that we no longer live in a bipolar world, we must shift 
our attention to the threat to our security from a number of rogue 
states that already have, or are seeking to obtain, weapons of mass 
destruction capabilities. Despite the existence of a plethora of 
multilateral arms control agreements, the threat to the United States 
and its allies from chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons has not 
been limited. The fundamental flaw of such measures lies in the fact 
that they focus on weapons, rather than on the real problem: the 
dangerous regimes that possess them. And whether they've signed these 
treaties or not, the rogue regimes cannot be trusted to comply.
  Historians have traced that flawed approach back to the Catholic 
Church's attempt to ban the crossbow--the terrible new weapon of the 
1100s--in 1139. That endeavor proved as ineffective as the arms control 
efforts that followed in later centuries. Perhaps there is no better 
example of this futility than the attempts after World War I to outlaw 
war altogether. The 1928 Kellog-Briand Pact, to which the Senate 
provided its advice and consent on January 25, 1929 by a vote of 85 to 
1, was signed by all of the major countries. It renounced war as ``an 
instrument of national policy.'' It also paved the way for other arms 
control treaties and negotiations that left the Western democracies 
unprepared to fight and unable to deter World War II, a mere decade 
later.
  Indeed, in looking back at the arms control efforts of the 1920s and 
1930s, Walter Lippman, the celebrated historian who championed the 
agreements when they were signed, wrote that, ``The disarmament 
movement was, as the event has shown, tragically successful in 
disarming the nations that believed in disarmament. The net effect was 
to dissolve the alliance among the victors of the first World War, and 
to reduce them to almost disastrous impotence on the eve of the second 
World War.''
  Mr. Lippman's assessment offers an important lesson. Arms control 
works best where it is needed least--among honorable, morally 
upstanding nations. It does not work where it is needed most--against 
rogue nations. Countries that act clandestinely and in bad faith will 
simply ignore the legal requirements of arms control agreements when it 
suits their interests. Moreover, morally-upstanding nations depending 
upon these agreements for security and stability have often lacked the 
will to respond forcefully to violations. Even when evidence is clear, 
there are almost always overriding diplomatic reasons for overlooking 
or treading lightly on the violating parties.
  The international community's response to Iraq's use of chemical 
weapons is a prime example. When that country used chemical weapons 
against Iran in the 1980's in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
banning the use of such weapons, the U.N. Security Council passed a 
resolution calling for both sides in the conflict to exercise 
restraint. After Saddam Hussein again used chemical weapons--this time 
against his own Kurdish population--the Security Council again passed a 
resolution of condemnation that failed even to mention the use of 
chemical weapons. International resolve was so weak that when the 
United States proposed a resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
in 1989 condemning Iraq's use of those weapons against the Kurds, the 
initiative was defeated by a vote of 17 to 13.
  Unwilling to enforce the existing Geneva Protocol when Iraq had, 
without dispute, violated its terms, the international community, in an 
effort to demonstrate its commitment to arms control, agreed upon a new 
ban on the possession of chemical weapons. Yet possession is inherently 
harder to verify than already-banned use. This new ban--the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, CWC--unrealistically aims to control states that 
are confident that they can violate its terms without detection and 
without punishment. And while the United States is destroying its 
chemical deterrent under the requirements of the CWC, chemical weapons 
programs in other states that have signed the treaty--like Iran--have 
not been curbed. Still others, like Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria 
have not even joined the convention.
  There is no moral equivalence between Western democracies and rogue 
regimes like those in place in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Yet arms 
control treaties like the Biological Weapons Convention BWC and the CWC 
assume that all participants operate with the same objectives in mind. 
They place under one umbrella--under a unitary set of constraints--
states that are certain to comply and those that are certain to cheat. 
And therein lies their failure to serve any meaningful purpose. As 
Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated in a 1999 
speech, ``The failure to distinguish guns in the hands of cops and guns 
in the hands of robbers is not just a practical absurdity, it is a 
profound moral failure.''
  Other arms control efforts like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
NPT, while more realistic in terms of their objectives, have also had 
questionable success. Under the terms of the NPT, the five declared 
nuclear weapons states--the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, 
France, and China--agreed ``not in any way to assist'' any nonweapons 
state to acquire nuclear weapons. Other parties to the treaty agree not 
to develop nuclear weapons and to allow the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, IAEA to inspect their nuclear facilities.
  Just a brief examination of the records of parties to the treaty 
illustrates that its objectives are not supported equally by all.
  The United States intelligence community suspects that Russia and 
China, despite their NPT obligations, may be providing assistance to 
the nuclear weapons programs of certain states.
  North Korea--despite the optimism of some that the 1994 Agreed 
Framework would curb that country's nuclear weapons program--continues 
to evade certain IAEA inspections needed to ensure that country is in 
full compliance with the NPT and the Framework. And yet, the United 
States continues to support the Agreed Framework with U.S. taxpayer 
dollars.
  The U.S. intelligence community suspects that Russian nuclear-related 
assistance to Iran--ostensibly for Tehran's civilian nuclear program 
may, indeed, be contributing to Iran's nuclear ambitions.
  And the full extent of Iraq's covert nuclear programs, after years 
without inspections, is not fully known. In fact, even when inspectors 
were in the country, Saddam made use of information provided by Iraqi 
IAEA inspectors to evade detection.
  It is clear that multilateral arms control agreements have not 
delivered on their promise to make the world a safer place. As such, 
prudence demands that we take steps to ensure the safety of the 
American people--this will involve a combination of defense and 
deterrence.
  Though the ABM Treaty was bilateral agreement between the United

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States and the Soviet Union, President Bush's decision to withdraw the 
United States was, in fact, necessitated by our need to deal with other 
states that are developing ballistic missiles. Deterrence is simply 
inadequate in dealing with rogue dictators. To depend on nuclear 
deterrence alone with a dictator like Saddam Hussein, for instance--a 
man who used chemical weapons against his own people--would be to place 
American lives in the hands of a madman. As Winston Churchill warned in 
his 1955 ``Balance of Terror'' speech, ``The deterrent does not cover 
the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found 
himself in his final dugout.''
  The alternative--which will be permitted now that we have withdrawn 
from the ABM Treaty--is to develop and deploy missile defenses. A 
missile defense system will give us more flexible options in a crisis. 
First, defenses against missiles will help the United States to avoid 
nuclear blackmail, intended to freeze us into inaction by the very 
threat of a missile attack. Imagine the impact on our decision to go to 
war against Saddam Hussein in 1991 had he been able to threaten the 
United States or our allies with nuclear missiles. Additionally, 
missile defense will reduce the incentive for ballistic missile 
proliferation by de-valuing offensive missiles. Finally, missile 
defenses, in a worst-case scenario, will save American lives.
  The development of missile defenses and the end of the superpower 
rivalry does not obviate the need for traditional deterrence, however. 
As the world's remaining superpower, we need to maintain maximum 
flexibility and the ability to play the ultimate trump card if need be. 
Deterrence and defenses--with neither, of course, being 100 percent 
fail-safe--will be mutually reinforcing. The prudence of maintaining a 
nuclear deterrent was shown during the Gulf War when we hinted that we 
might draw on that capability if Iraq attacked allied troops with 
chemical or biological agents. As then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
warned during a visit to the Middle East on December 23, 1991: ``Were 
Saddam Hussein foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction, the 
U.S. response would be absolutely overwhelming, and it would be 
devastating.'' Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz acknowledged several 
years later that Iraq did not attack the forces of the U.S.-led 
coalition with chemical weapons because such warnings were interpreted 
as meaning nuclear retaliation.
  Of course, with the end of the U.S.-Soviet standoff, we can maintain 
our deterrent at lower levels--thus President Bush's decision to 
unilaterally reduce our arsenal. But lower levels require greater 
attention to the safety and reliability of our remaining arsenal. This 
will, I believe, require renewed testing of that arsenal at some point.
  Thankfully, this body defeated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
CTBT--which would have obligated the United States to give up for all 
time the option of testing our nuclear weapons--in October 1999. The 
Bush administration has made it clear that it strongly opposes the 
treaty. While it has no plans to do so, the administration has retained 
the option of nuclear testing to assure the safety and reliability of 
our nuclear arsenal. It is also moving to improve the test readiness 
posture. As Assistant Secretary of Defense J.D. Crouch stated during a 
briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, NPR, the ``NPR does state . . . 
that we need to improve our readiness posture to test from its current 
two to three year period to something substantially better.'' I am 
pleased that the House version of the Defense authorization bill 
contains a provision that requires the Department of Energy to reduce 
to one year the time between the Presidential decision to conduct a 
nuclear test and the test itself, and I hope that the Senate will 
ultimately choose to include such a provision, as well.
  The threats to the United States today are more complex and difficult 
to predict than those we faced during the cold war. Recognizing their 
inherent limitations, it is therefore time to move beyond traditional 
arms control treaties as a means to protect American lives from these 
threats. President Bush has committed to do just that. He has set the 
United States on a course that unequivocally places faith not in 
traditional arms control, but in the time-honored philosophy that led 
to the West's victory without war over the Soviet Empire: Peace through 
strength. As a result, we will be able to pursue the development of 
missile defenses and maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. These 
demonstrations of strength, coupled, of course, with the maintenance of 
robust conventional capabilities--not more pieces of paper--are what 
will keep this nation secure.
  President Bush's overall security strategy rightly focuses on the 
root of the problem--the dangerous regimes that possess the weapons. As 
Margaret Thatcher once stated, ``. . . the fundamental risk to peace is 
not the existence of weapons of particular types. It is the disposition 
on the part of some states to impose change on others by resorting to 
force.'' The heart of the matter is that our strategy should seek to 
change the regimes themselves, whether through military, diplomatic, or 
economic means. The United States has made clear its intention to 
pursue that objective, and I have no doubt that our efforts will lead 
to success.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Miller). The Senator from Utah.

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