[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 11]
[Senate]
[Page 14460]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                          U.S. POLICY ON IRAQ

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I am pleased to cosponsor S.J. Res 41. 
As the resolution makes clear, the time is ripe for an open debate on 
our plans for Iraq.
  Some are concerned that an open debate on our policy toward Iraq 
could expose sensitive intelligence information or that such a debate 
would tip our hand too much. Others fear that a meaningful debate could 
back the administration into a corner, and in so doing encourage the 
administration to adopt a tougher military response.
  Ultimately, all of these arguments against an open and honest debate 
on Iraq could be made with respect to nearly any military decision, and 
if taken to their extreme, these arguments would challenge the balance 
of powers in the Constitution by excluding Congress from future war-
making decisions. Moreover, to answer some of these concerns more 
directly, I would also note that the almost daily leaks from the 
administration on our Iraq policy have tipped our hand even more than 
responsible congressional hearings and debate would. It is hardly a 
secret that the United States is considering a range of policy options, 
including military operations, when it comes to Iraq. And the argument 
that an open discussion of military action could, in effect, become 
self-fulfilling is too circular to be credible.
  I am concerned with the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein, as well as 
with the humanitarian situation in Iraq. But I am also very concerned 
about the constitutional issues at stake here. This may well be one of 
our last opportunities to preserve the constitutionally mandated role 
of Congress in making decisions about war and peace.
  On April 17, 2002, I chaired a hearing before the Constitution 
Subcommittee on the application of the War Powers Resolution to our 
current anti-
terrorism operations. The focus of that hearing was to explore the 
limits of the use of force authorization that Congress passed in 
response to the attacks of September 11. At the hearing, leading 
constitutional scholars concluded that the use of force resolution for 
September 11 would not authorize a future military strike against Iraq, 
unless some additional evidence linking Saddam Hussein directly to the 
attacks of Sept. 11 came to light. Many of the experts also questioned 
the dubious assertion that congressional authorization from more than 
10 years ago for Desert Storm could somehow lend ongoing authority for 
a new strike on Iraq.
  On June 10, I delivered a speech on the floor of the Senate in which 
I outlined my findings from the April hearing. As I said then, I have 
concluded that the Constitution requires the President to seek 
additional authorization before he can embark on a major new military 
undertaking in Iraq. I am pleased that S.J. Resolution 41 makes that 
point in forceful legislative terms.
  So this is indeed an appropriate time to consider our policy toward 
Iraq in more detail. I look forward to hearings that Senator Biden will 
chair before the Foreign Relations Committee. I also look forward to 
additional debate and discussion on the floor of the Senate, and, when 
appropriate, in secure settings, where the administration can make its 
case for a given policy response, and the Congress can ask questions, 
probe assumptions, and generally exercise the oversight that the 
American people expect of us.
  Through these hearings and debates, it will be important to assess 
the level of the threat that exists, along with the relative dangers 
that would be posed by a massive assault on Iraq--dangers that include 
risks to American soldiers and to our relations with some of our 
strongest allies in our current anti-terror campaign. And it will be 
crucially important to think through the aftermath of any military 
strike.
  We don't have to divulge secret information to begin to weigh the 
risks and opportunities that confront us. But the American people must 
understand the general nature of the threats, and they must ultimately 
support any risks that we decide to take to secure a more peaceful 
future. I don't think the American public has an adequate sense yet of 
the threats, dangers or options that exist in Iraq. I don't think 
Congress has an adequate grasp of the issues either. And that is why 
additional hearings and debates are so necessary.
  Finally, I have always said that another military campaign against 
Iraq may eventually become unavoidable. As a result, I am pleased that 
S.J. Res 41 is neutral on the need for a military response, while 
recognizing the intrinsic value of open and honest debate. Following a 
vigorous debate, if we decide that America's interests require a direct 
military response to confront Iraqi aggression, such a response would 
be taken from a constitutionally unified, and inherently stronger, 
political position. We must also remember that constitutional unity on 
this question presents a stronger international image of the United 
States to our friends and foes, and, at the same time, a more 
comforting image of U.S. power to many of our close allies in the 
campaign against terrorism.
  I am pleased to cosponsor S.J. Res. 41, and I look forward to a 
vigorous debate on this issue.

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