[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 10]
[House]
[Pages 14319-14348]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call 
up House Resolution 497 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 497

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule 
     XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 4628) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 2003 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The 
     first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points 
     of order against consideration of the bill are waived. 
     General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not 
     exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the 
     chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill 
     shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. 
     It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the 
     purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment 
     in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The 
     committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 
     considered as read. All points of order against the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived. No 
     amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute shall be in order except those printed in the 
     portion of the Congressional Record designated for that 
     purpose in clause 8 of rule XVIII and except pro forma 
     amendments for the purpose of debate. Each amendment so 
     printed may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be 
     printed or his designee and shall be considered as read. At 
     the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the 
     Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with 
     such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may 
     demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted 
     in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 
     amendments thereto to final passage without intervening 
     motion except one motion to recommit with or without 
     instructions.

                              {time}  2215

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Isakson). The gentleman from Florida is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of the debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Hastings), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. 
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the 
purposes of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the standard rule that we have used for many 
years on the intelligence authorization. As far as I know, it is not 
controversial in any way. As in past years, we have thought it best to 
allow Members good opportunity to review the bill and debate the issues 
they feel are important to our Nation's security. Of course, that is 
particularly appropriate now. Therefore, as has been the tradition, the 
rule is a modified open rule, providing for 1 hour of general debate, 
equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The rule further provides for the consideration of only pro forma 
amendments for the purpose of debate and those amendments printed in 
the Congressional Record prior to their consideration, as we heard in 
the Clerk's reading. This has allowed for vetting of amendments 
regarding classified matters in years past and has proved to be good 
practice.
  Finally, this rule provides for a motion to recommit with or without 
instruction. So I think it is a very clear, fair rule that suits the 
purpose well.
  Mr. Speaker, just one year ago we met to consider this bill in the 
wake of the tragic terrorist attacks and rallied support for our 
intelligence community and national security initiatives. Our country 
has come a long way since then, but there is still a lot more that 
needs to be done. This year's intelligence authorization bill contains 
the most significant investment by the administration for the 
intelligence community in more than 8 years. This is an important bill. 
These funds allow the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to 
continue the work that we have been promoting to address many of the 
longstanding shortfalls that have besieged our intelligence community 
throughout the 1990s.
  In the upcoming general debate, we will discuss in more detail some 
of the specific provisions of H.R. 4628. However, I would like to 
briefly highlight a few of the critical areas upon which the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence has focused in this year's bill.
  We have further enhanced efforts to rebuild our Nation's human 
intelligence capabilities, human, spies; and shortfalls in the 
intelligence community's analytic core, more analysis; as well as 
addressing longstanding recapitalization needs for technical 
intelligence, heavy investment in important equipment. Of specific note 
are actions we are taking to address critical needs in the area of 
linguistic capabilities, people who speak the languages we need to 
understand. Addressing these critical areas is crucial to meeting our 
immediate counterterrorism challenges and to correcting our longer-
range problems facing the intelligence community and the basic 
structure of the U.S. intelligence establishment.
  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence continues bold 
initiatives on these points, knowing that true intelligence community 
reform will be

[[Page 14320]]

necessary if our intelligence establishment is to successfully meet all 
of the national security challenges this Nation faces in today's 
puzzling and dangerous world. Through our regular oversight work and in 
our joint inquiry efforts with our Senate counterparts, the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence is and will be further addressing the 
pressing need for appropriate intelligence community reform.
  Meanwhile, this bill provides the President with the intelligence 
tools to win the war on terrorism and to remedy many other longstanding 
problems of the intelligence community, which we have pointed out 
several years in this process.
  In sum, this is a good, noncontroversial, bipartisan bill with very 
few, if any, contentious amendments to consider. The rule that has been 
crafted for its consideration is fair and will provide ample 
opportunity for debate. I urge support for the rule and the underlying 
bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume. First let me thank my good friend from Sanibel for 
yielding me the customary time. It is a pleasure to serve with the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) on the Committee on Rules, and I look 
forward to rejoining him on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence in the near future.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule providing for the 
consideration of H.R. 4628, the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003. The rule is a modified open rule, as Mr. Goss has 
said, requiring that amendments be preprinted in the Congressional 
Record. As we all know, the preprinting requirement for the 
intelligence authorization bill has been the accepted practice of this 
Chamber for several years because of the sensitive nature of much of 
the bill and the need to protect classified information.
  The underlying bill, H.R. 4628, is noncontroversial and it was 
reported from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence by a 
unanimous vote. Members who wish to do so can go to the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence office to examine the classified 
schedule of authorizations for the programs and activities of the 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the National 
Intelligence Program.
  This includes authorizations for the CIA, as well as the foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence programs within, among others, the 
Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, the Departments of 
State, Treasury and Energy and the FBI.
  I might add, for Members who have not done so at any point, as a 
Member having served most recently on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and hoping to rejoin it again in the future, I would urge 
them to take advantage of the opportunity to review the programs and 
activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for 
the tactical intelligence and related activities and joint military 
intelligence program of the Department of Defense.
  Today, more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and 
flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest priorities of this 
body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the 
continuing threat of further attacks, underscores the importance of 
this legislation, and I am pleased that it has been brought to the 
floor before the August recess.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, while this bill is noncontroversial, it is not 
closed to improvement. Today is not the first time that I have noted on 
the floor that experts in the intelligence community continue to argue 
that our intelligence operations must not only be a strong and flexible 
intelligence apparatus, but also a diverse one. For the past 15 years, 
Members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
directors of our country's largest intelligence agencies have labored 
to create a more diverse intelligence community. Although their efforts 
have borne some fruit, much more needs to be done.
  Later this evening I will be offering two amendments to H.R. 4628, 
both of which are aimed at increasing diversity in our Nation's 
intelligence agencies. The first of the two amendments expresses the 
sense of Congress that the CIA, DIA, NSA and NIMA make minority 
recruitment a priority in their hiring decisions. Of the 13 agencies 
that currently make up the U.S. intelligence community, only the DIA 
boasts a minority population that even comes close to the average 
percentage of minorities in the Federal workforce.
  The second amendment instructs the Director of Central Intelligence 
to issue an annual report to Congress on the hiring and retention of 
minorities by the intelligence community. Such a report will allow this 
body to monitor the progress of the intelligence community's efforts to 
recruit and retain minorities.
  I do hope that my colleagues will support both of the amendments, and 
I believe they will be supported, having spoken with the chairman in 
this regard.
  Further, I would also like to urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment which will be offered by my good friend, the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), and he is my good friend.
  The Roemer amendment establishes an independent commission to examine 
the events leading up to and ensuing the September 11 attacks. Though 
later this week the House may pass a bill creating a new Department of 
Homeland Security, the bill will in no way identify nor fix the 
problems that currently exist in the United States intelligence 
community. The Roemer amendment, in examining the intelligence failures 
of September 11, will provide a comprehensive examination and critique 
on this issue, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4628 provides authorizations and appropriations for 
some of the most important national security programs in this country. 
Any hesitation by this body in passing it would be a disservice to the 
American people.
  I urge my colleagues to support this rule, and I ask that they 
support my amendments, the Roemer amendment and the underlying bill.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am privileged to yield 5 minutes to the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), the chairman of the Committee 
on Science and a member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence.
  Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time, and I rise in support of a very fair rule.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is complex in its specific recommendations, 
but simple in its intent: To restore our Nation's intelligence 
capabilities so that we can absolutely minimize the possibility of 
another surprise terrorist attack on our homeland. Our goal; no more 
surprises, no more attacks.
  The President is absolutely correct; homeland security is and must 
continue to be the number one priority of government at all levels, and 
the first priority of the Federal Government is to guarantee, as much 
as humanly possible, the peace and security of the American people. 
They, we, all of us, have a right to live our lives without fear.
  The largest increase in spending for our national intelligence 
activities in over a decade is provided for in this bill.

                              {time}  2230

  For the first time in many years, the administration has requested an 
increase in intelligence operations and capabilities. We are providing 
the total funding the President requested, placing greater emphasis on 
areas which require the most attention.
  Specifically, this bill addresses not just with words, but with 
deeds, dollars to back up what we say: the shortfall in human 
intelligence with essential language capabilities. We must aggressively 
pursue a program to significantly increase a number of foreign

[[Page 14321]]

language-qualified individuals in the intelligence community. It adds 
significant funding for initial and follow-on training for linguists, 
and there is a provision to create a new language university for the 
entire intelligence community.
  I believe this is critical to developing the human intelligence 
officers of the future that will be able to collect and, more 
importantly, analyze information on those who would pose a threat to 
the United States of America. It does not serve our national interests 
if we are the best at collecting intelligence if we are lacking in our 
ability to analyze and disseminate to decision-makers sensitive 
information in a timely manner. That possibility exists today because 
of our deficiencies in language capabilities.
  This bill takes on, in a very direct way, the issues of intelligence, 
collection, analysis, and production against threats of terrorism. We 
do so by placing added emphasis and resources where I think they are 
most needed: on human intelligence, our eyes and ears with a global 
reach.
  Let me state the obvious. It does not do much good if we have the 
right people in the right places dealing with collecting or analyzing 
if they do not have the language ability to understand what is being 
collected or what is being analyzed.
  Mr. Speaker, as I said, the intent of this bill is simple. It is 
designed to provide the necessary resources, direction, and 
authorizations for the Nation's intelligence community to provide the 
best foreign intelligence possible to defend the United States against 
the many worldwide threats. The threats are not going to go away; and 
from my days as a boy scout, I know we must be prepared.
  Mr. Speaker, I will close with a thank you. Thank you to the 
dedicated men and women of the U.S. intelligence community. We owe them 
a debt of gratitude for the tough and unheralded work they do for all 
of us. The memory of a failure of intelligence to present something as 
horrific as September 11 will forever be seared in our minds. It is 
important to never forget the untold numbers of threats that never 
materialized into anything but words, with no action following, because 
of the endless number of intelligence success stories where the system 
worked as intended.
  The system is not perfect; it probably never will be. But we must 
continue to strive for perfection. This bill is a contribution toward 
that end. Thank you, all of you, in the intelligence community for 
quietly being there, working behind the scenes, to discover and counter 
the threats to our security and our liberties.
  I also want to thank the committee chairman, the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), for their leadership and hard work on this 
bill. And I want to express my respect and admiration for my colleagues 
on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and their very able 
professional staff. They work hard, very hard for the cause.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4628.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes 
to the distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), my good 
friend, and he is my friend.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding me this 
time and recognizing me.
  I want to talk about the need in this bill and in our intelligence 
community for diversity. Intelligence and the intelligence community 
has a mission for providing the best real-time information for our 
policymakers and our warfighters. It is about information. It is about 
having a heads-up; and if 9-11 has taught us anything, it certainly has 
taught us that we need to have a heads-up.
  All of the professionals, as has been stated already, have indicated 
to us that if we are to be the best that we can be in our intelligence 
community, we must have the best human assets for collecting 
information and the best technical assets for collecting information; 
and we must be able to process, analyze, and disseminate that 
information where it needs to go.
  But the problem that we face, the challenge we face, is that as hard 
as the men and women in our intelligence community are working to 
gather the necessary information so that when our servicemen and women 
go into harm's way they know what they will be facing, we still do not 
have adequate human assets and the kind of technical analysis assets 
that will allow us to have the information that we need real-time.
  Why should we not have diversity in the intelligence community? Every 
intelligence professional, the heads of the CIA, NSA, DIA, NIMA, Army 
intelligence, naval intelligence, all have indicated that we will be 
much more effective in our collection by our human assets, if our 
targets are hard to distinguish from our collectors. So if we need to 
have information about Islamic culture, our intelligence collectors 
need to be knowledgeable of that. Yes, if we are going into Rwanda and 
we need information of what is happening there, maybe some Rwandan-
Americans ought to be a part of our collection force, Somalians or 
Pakistanis or Afghans or Africans or Latinos; Asian Americans, Arab 
Americans, Indian Americans, Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, 
Turkish Americans, Nigerian Americans, Muslim Americans, Christian 
Americans, Jewish Americans, Irish Americans, human assets. We must 
have racial diversity, cultural diversity, and language diversity if we 
are to be effective in our efforts.
  When we put the men and women who fight and defend this country and 
who go all over the world protecting American interests, when we put 
them in harm's way, they need to know what they will be faced with, and 
the policymakers who send them there need to have that real-time 
information; and they need to have the best quality information. They 
need to be able to penetrate the sources of the information so that we 
can, indeed, have a heads-up.
  The creation of a more diverse intelligence workforce must be a 
priority, the intelligence agencies, the undergraduate training 
programs that use these programs to increase their minority efforts. I 
was proud this morning to be able to go out to one of the agencies and 
participate in the graduation ceremony of one of the programs designed 
to help create that diversity. But this is a start. We have a long way 
to go. We have challenges that we face, and unless we accelerate our 
efforts to create and maintain the kind of diversity in our 
intelligence community, we will not achieve the success that we desire.
  Racial diversity, cultural diversity, language diversity are 
necessities. They not only are the right thing to do, but they make 
good business sense for gathering and disseminating and analyzing and 
understanding the information that we must have.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a good rule; this is a good bill. With the 
amendments, it will be a better bill; and I urge my colleagues to 
support it so that we can have the best intelligence-gathering 
apparatus that our country can possibly have.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am very happy to yield 5 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Cunningham), a very valued 
member of our committee.
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, it is an honor to serve on the Committee 
on Intelligence with Members on both sides of the House. I also sit on 
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, two 
committees I think that work together in this House, together for 
national security and the best interests of the American people. That 
is why most of us came here, and we wish that all committees that we 
served on have that decorum to work in a single direction. It makes my 
heart soar like an eagle to serve on those kinds of committees and do 
the people's work.
  I think when we look at what the committee does, and the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of our committee, and I have seen 
chairmen and leaders that micromanage; he does not. He kind of gives 
you the reins and he says, go out there

[[Page 14322]]

and do your thing and do it for the betterment of both sides of the 
aisle and the American people. He does not micromanage; he gives us 
that free rein and for that I thank the chairman.
  The committee staff, I want to tell my colleagues that each Member 
has a right to go to the committee staff and get these briefings. I 
would recommend that my colleagues do it; and these staff members, some 
are the James Bonds of the world. Some work in technology; some work in 
administration. But if my colleagues want a brief on any area, ask, and 
they will be delighted to give it. That is the kind of committee that 
we serve on.
  A good example is that if you are going to best determine what the 
needs of the future, whether it is in defense or whether it is our 
intelligence agencies, you need to be able to know for a fact what the 
current threat is.
  I see the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and he looks to the 
B-2, because he knows what the future threat is, the F-22.
  So if we know what the threat is today through our intelligence 
agencies, then we know better what to plan. For example, why do we need 
a B-2 and its effectiveness with stealth? Why do we need the F-22? In 
my opinion, we ought to double the buy, because it is the only airplane 
in the system that can meet the threat of the SU-30 and the SU-37 and 
plus whatever they have now. If we shorten that buy in defense, as some 
are talking about in the White House, I think it is foolhardy.
  But the basis that we get in this committee in a bipartisan way to go 
forward with national security needs is laudatory.
  I would tell my colleagues that when people start going after 
defense, or they go after our intelligence services, most of us on the 
committee get very defensive. Because as a body, this body and the 
other body, in many cases we have not given our military or 
intelligence agencies the assets they need to do the job.
  In the last administration, we went on 149 deployments. That spread 
our military thin. We only had 22 percent re-enlistment, and people 
were stretched, and 25-year-old airplanes were stretched. The reason I 
bring it up is because every time we deployed, our intelligence 
agencies had to deploy also, and many of the systems that they had on 
the drawing board to give us SIGINT and ELINT and HUMINT information 
had to be scuttled because it went to pay for the war.
  This committee, in a bipartisan way, is attempting to rectify some of 
those things. We cannot make that up over the next 5 years. But the 
committee is doing the best they can, based on the testimony from our 
services. That is why it is such a neat deal to work on this committee. 
We are doing something very, very positive and something good for this 
country.
  Is the war on drugs dead? No. But we have problems there as well as 
with al Qaeda.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
  Mr. KIRK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule and this bill. 
No one is more qualified to guide our intelligence legislation than the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). Our intelligence community grew from 
World War I and the Cold War to be supremely able to monitor foreign 
militaries and governments.

                              {time}  2245

  No more Pearl Harbors and powerful support to the war fighter. I 
served for 13 years as a reserve Naval intelligence officer and 
received vital intelligence that saved American lives in Haiti, Bosnia, 
Kosovo and Iraq.
  Our intelligence community must now be upgraded to meet the terrorist 
threat. Our system is supremely designed to monitor foreign militaries, 
but has left ability to monitor clandestined terror organizations 
backed by familiar relations. We must upgrade our linguistic defenses. 
We have Russian linguists but now need to speak Pastoon, Dari, Urdu and 
dozens of other languages where terrorists are recruited from. Our 
defense language institute in Monterey will play a key part of that 
role.
  Analysts now receive huge numbers of messages but they need back up 
to rapidly translate and analyze information to develop actionable 
intelligence in time. We are all aware of the failures of September 11. 
We should know more about the successes of the intelligence community 
in defeating the millennium bombers and Hezbollah in Bosnia or dozens 
of other victories won, but not reported on the front page of The 
Washington Post.
  I want to thank the professionals from DIA, CIA, NSA, NIMA and the 
military services who are on watch tonight protecting America. This 
bill provides critical resources and, more importantly, new flexibility 
to meet the new challenge. We face terrorists, wealthy terrorists who 
may one day have weapons of mass destruction. Without the intelligence 
community, we would some day face a nuclear Pearl Harbor. With the 
community we will extend security and freedom for our people and 
allies. I urge adoption of the rule and the bill.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I 
may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, at this time in the interest of all the Members tonight, 
in spite of the fact that I feel I could talk about this matter for a 
substantial period of time, I would just urge the Members at this time 
to vote for this good rule and for the underlying bill which serves a 
great purpose for our Nation.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.


                             General Leave

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
and include extraneous material on H. Res. 497.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I would echo my colleague and friend's sentiment. This a 
fair and good rule. It deserves everybody's support.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the 
previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Tauzin). Pursuant to House Resolution 
497 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
bill, H.R. 4628.

                              {time}  2248


                     In the Committee of the Whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 4628) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Isakson in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop) each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise this evening in very strong support of this 
bill, which is the annual authorization for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities, as required by law. This is a unique 
authorization bill in that sense. This is a very good bill that was 
crafted on a bipartisan basis. In fact, I think it more appropriate, I 
should say, nonpartisan basis. And it passed unanimously from our 
committee.

[[Page 14323]]

  This would not have been possible without the attention and 
involvement of all of our stellar members, and I truly mean that, but 
especially the tireless efforts of our ranking member, the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Pelosi), who, I am sorry to say, is on other 
duties before the Committee on Rules now which is never a great place 
to be if you can be on the intelligence community.
  I cannot say enough about her support and guidance in this process, 
all in the spirit of ensuring that our intelligence community is 
positioned in the best possible way to protect our Nation. I want to 
thank the gentlewoman for the number of hours that she has contributed 
to the committee's all-important work and for the good nonpartisan work 
you do and for the leadership she provides for her side.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill turns a corner on rebuilding our intelligence 
capabilities. The administration has requested a significant amount of 
investment into these capabilities which is frankly long overdue. More 
importantly, the bill lays the groundwork for sustained investment in 
programs that will take a while to rebuild, but they are crucial, 
absolutely crucial to our success against today's and tomorrow's 
threats, which we have begun to better recognize and this bill begins 
to address some of the issues that have heretofore been placed on a 
back burner, despite the fact that some of us have been urging they be 
moved to a more forward place.
  In some ways, I see this bill as emphasizing the needs to get back to 
the basics of intelligence. Often of the last decade especially, many 
have gotten overly enamored with technology and finding ways to collect 
data with the least amount of risks, the intelligence version of the 
no-casualties policy.
  Although, I will be the first to emphasize the need to keep on top of 
various technologies and the importance of them to our intelligence 
capabilities, our real security relies on some of the most fundamental 
aspects of intelligence. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, despite our 
concerns and warnings, we learned in a very tragic way how important 
these fundamentals really are, notwithstanding the extraordinarily good 
work a great many men and women representing our country are providing 
for us around the world in the intelligence community.
  The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 were well conceived; they 
were coordinated; they took advantage of liberties that we have come to 
rely on in our quality of life in this country. That also confirmed our 
fears that the world is, indeed, a very dangerous and very unstable 
place. And for the committee it unfortunately proved our worst fears 
that the Nation's intelligence community was not sufficiently robust or 
positioned to provide the first line of defense we need and do count 
on.
  Mr. Chairman, the price was much too high, and we owe it to those who 
lost their lives, some of whom were members of the intelligence 
community, I might add, to make sure we rebuild our capabilities and 
our people to the best of our ability is the mission of this bill.
  Other members of committee will highlight certain provisions of the 
bill, so I am not going through them. I will make the point, however, 
that certain lessons are involved in the getting back to the basics 
part of this. They include: That the way to gain the most vital 
information, plans and intentions of the enemy, what they are actually 
thinking of doing, is more often than not to be physically close to the 
target, that is the right way to do it, whether that is through the 
human agent assets or assets of other types, like technical assets or 
such things an unmanned aerial vehicles or manned aircraft, even.
  This involves taking risks, both in terms of who you may have to work 
with and in terms of, frankly, potential loss of life and tragically we 
have seen casualties in the intelligence community in the war on 
terrorism this year.
  Once you collect that data, you have the mechanisms and capabilities 
to analyze, understand and use the data, get it to the right people in 
a timely way, and that involves having the right people with the right 
training and the right skills and armed with the right tools to make 
sure those who get that information can get it, and the right 
management and guidance are available to you through the intelligence 
community, and that community is structured in such a way to allow the 
management to be effective.
  Those are all things that we need to work on.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill addresses many of these basics, save the 
structure question. And I want to emphasize that this is a task that is 
yet to be completed, but is every bit as important as the investment in 
the basics. This is an area that the committee hopes to address soon as 
has actually been somewhat sidetracked because of the 9-11 review, but 
it remains a major priority on the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence to deal with the intelligence architecture.
  Before I close, let me recognize two groups of people. First are the 
men and women of the intelligence community whom I referred to 
previously who are working tirelessly around the globe, and they are 
doing everything they can to protect us. They work 7-24, and they 
working in dangerous conditions and not very nice conditions and they 
do things that a lot of us would not be very happy to do, and they take 
up that work. They are the front lines of America. They are remarkable 
people. I think anyone on the committee would tell you, we owe them a 
great deal of gratitude and thanks. And I am sorry we cannot actually 
reveal some of the exploits and success of these people because it 
would make Americans proud, as it makes us on the committee proud when 
we get to know these things.
  The second group of people is close to home, Mr. Chairman. We would 
not be here tonight if it were not for our committee members and our 
committee staff. I have spoken my in the committee and my membership, 
my vice chairman, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) who does a 
great job taking care of me and pinch-hitting for me, and all the other 
members of committee. We have now broken down into subcommittee so we 
have more subcommittee chairman and ranking members and everybody has 
risen to the occasion and the extra tasks that our committees this year 
has been asked to take.
  We have expanded by something like 25 percent in terms of our 
membership and staff. We have been given many extra responsibilities 
because of 9-11 and everybody has risen to the task. I must say the 
committee staff has impressed me every day. When I arrive at the 
committee, I admire their work ethic and their understanding of the 
very complex and arcane activities of the Intelligence Community. I 
think they represent the committee and Congress very well. Special 
thanks to staff director Tim Sample, Mike Sheehy, the senior minority 
staffer who worked to make sure the functions of the committee occur in 
the least partisan atmosphere possible. And I am extremely proud of 
that accomplishment on their park. Thank to Chris Barton, our chief 
counsel, and Chris Healey, a minority counsel, as well as Michele Lang, 
our deputy chief counsel, and Mike Meermans, our budget coordinator for 
their tireless work on preparing this bill.
  Obviously, each and every person on this staff beyond those I named 
deserve our thanks and praise for jobs well done.
  In the atmosphere I want to particularly thank our security staff who 
have been given some extraordinary problems to cope with and I think 
have done an amazingly good job. Mr. Chairman, I ask my colleagues to 
support this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4628. The committee has 
worked hard to provide the resources that our military forces and the 
intelligence community require in order to prevail in the war on 
terrorism and to safeguard all of our other national security 
interests.
  This is a bipartisan bill for which the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss),

[[Page 14324]]

the ranking Democrat, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), my 
counterpart on the technical and tactical subcommittee, the gentleman 
from Delaware (Mr. Castle) and all of the other committee members 
deserve great credit.
  I want to thank the committee staff for the tireless hours and the 
hard work that they have put into the preparation of this bill. It is a 
good bill. And I urge all of my colleagues to support it.
  I want to emphasize a few points to my colleagues in the House as 
well as the administration about what the bill accomplishes, as well as 
some of my concerns for the future.
  As is well known from press accounts, unmanned aerial vehicles 
performed superbly in Afghanistan. With some exceptions in the past, 
reconnaissance systems flew over or passed the battlefields in a matter 
of seconds or minutes, and therefore provided only a sort of snapshot 
of what was going on. Given the time delays in getting that information 
to our tactical forces, it was extremely difficult to attack mobile 
targets. What these UAVs provide is persistence, a constant presence. 
Once targets are detected, UAV's can loiter and track them until an 
attack can be mounted as demonstrated repeatedly in Afghanistan.
  Now the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are 
advocating adding persistent surveillance capability from space. For 
example, by launching many small radar satellites that can detect and 
track moving vehicles. I believe this is the direction next generations 
collection systems must take. DOD is also right to plan on buying many 
UAV's and equipping them with capable sensor, but so far DOD has failed 
to plan to buy the communication and ground processing capacity 
necessary to support these platforms.

                              {time}  2300

  This makes no sense and clearly it must be corrected.
  The war also showed that no single sensor system alone is able to 
perform all of the functions necessary to attack mobile targets, wide 
area surveillance, target detection, identification, tracking and 
precise target location. The only solution is to work the separate 
sensor systems together in a network. Building this network of sensors 
is feasible and it is very affordable, but although DOD appears to 
understand its importance, progress has been slow.
  I was disappointed that the administration, despite the large budget 
increases, failed to request sufficient funds to support the contract 
award for NIMA's modernization program. The committee corrected this 
problem by redirecting other funds to that area. The committee also 
added funds to begin acquiring the capability to receive and process 
airborne imagery.
  I am encouraged with regard to commercial imagery by the NIMA 
director's progress in developing a rational strategy for the first 
time. However, NIMA to date has received funding adequate to support 
only one satellite collection company but no policy guidance to rely on 
a single source. If NIMA is to support multiple companies and meet 
DOD's readiness requirements for geospatial products, NIMA must receive 
more funding. It is as simple as that. That key issue must be resolved, 
and it must be resolved soon.
  Finally, a word about the National Security Agency. Unfortunately, 
NSA's serious acquisition management problems persist, preventing the 
agency from keeping pace with the global telecommunications industry. 
These problems contributed to limiting NSA's operational capabilities 
in key areas relevant to the war on terrorism and other so-called 
transnational threats as noted in the report of the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism and Homeland Security on the events of September 11. NSA's 
problems could have very serious consequences and, in my opinion, 
demand more attention from the Secretary of Defense.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am privileged to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the distinguished vice-chairman 
of the committee, who also takes care of all of the policy coordination 
on our committee, which always dazzles me.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, this Intelligence Authorization Act 
addresses a number of pressing intelligence needs. For example, the 
legislation takes steps to strengthen the intelligence community's 
absolutely critical analytical core.
  In recent years, the U.S. has been forced to focus on terrorists, 
proliferators and drug traffickers. These are far more difficult 
targets to track, and frankly, the intelligence community took too long 
to adapt to these new threats. It did not reach out aggressively to 
recruit the human intelligence sources that could have provided us with 
invaluable information. We lost far too many skilled analysts whose job 
was to provide early warning.
  This legislation provides much-needed funding to help rebuild a 
dynamic, wide-ranging, global analytical capability. It is an effort 
for which this committee has been serving a leading role for some years 
now.
  A second important component of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
relates to terrorist finances. One of the major intelligence 
initiatives in the wake of 9/11 has been a serious effort to attack the 
financial assets of terrorist organizations and their supporters. 
Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda obviously cannot function without 
significant financial backing.
  Al Qaeda, for example, is supported by, one, a shadowy network of 
fundraisers, money lenders and shakedown artists; two, businesses and 
charities serving as front organizations; and three, unscrupulous 
facilitators and middlemen. However, with the decision of the executive 
branch to fully exploit its existing authorities to target terrorist 
finances, and with the granting of additional authorities under the 
U.S. PATRIOT Act, we are now aggressively attacking the money flow. To 
date, over $100 million in suspected terrorist money has been seized or 
frozen by the United States and its allies.
  Mr. Chairman, this is an important and powerful set of financial 
tools in the war on terrorism.
  Mr. Chairman, there are other important initiatives here, but I want 
to say that I think one of the important things that we have done is 
close an important loophole caused by the Freedom of Information Act. 
Our adversaries were able to make requests that had to be dealt with 
for very sensitive information, and we have taken a commonsense 
approach to ending that loophole.
  Mr. Chairman, I would conclude by congratulating the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee and the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for the leadership they have 
demonstrated in bringing this genuinely bipartisan product to the 
floor. This legislation is a very serious effort and was unanimously 
approved by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Each and every member of the committee and our extraordinary staff 
dedicated long hours to the hearings and drafting of the bill. Each 
Member, I think, and the staff clearly recognizes the importance of our 
actions and our responsibilities to the body, and I think my colleagues 
can take, if I may say so, justifiable pride in the efforts of HPSCI 
and our staff and particularly the leadership of the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
  Mr. Chairman, I urge strong support and the adoption of H.R. 4628.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/4\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), the ranking member on the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding commend 
him for his leadership on the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence, and commend our colleagues for their strong bipartisan 
contributions to this committee.
  I rise in strong support of the Intelligence Authorization Act and 
join others in expressing my pride in the bipartisan way in which this 
committee works. For those who question whether this House can tackle 
the tough ones,

[[Page 14325]]

tonight proves it. Our actions over the past three hours in the 
Traficant matter were a somber and clear example of bipartisanship and 
facing up to our responsibilities. This bill is another such example.
  Members of this committee have traveled all over the world and have 
met U.S. intelligence personnel working in many shabby and often 
dangerous conditions. They do this despite their family's 
understandable fears that they are in harm's way. This bill is designed 
to give good people better tools, to fill gaps in performance. It is 
not about gaps in the dedication, commitment and patriotism of 
thousands of Americans who work in the intelligence agencies, both here 
and abroad.
  Many issues addressed in this bill, Mr. Chairman, were identified in 
a report that our Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security 
released last week. Our full intelligence committee wants no time to 
elapse before implementing that report's recommendations, and this bill 
recommends action, action that the families of those who died on 9/11 
deserve.
  Our report said, for example, that inadequate penetration of the al 
Qaeda target stemmed in large part from too few resources devoted to 
counterterrorism and an overreliance on assistance from allies to 
collect information. We fix that in this report; we insist that we 
invest more resources in human intelligence (humint), and we spell out 
how that should happen.
  Penetration of the al Qaeda target, our report says, requires 
multiyear investment and cutting edge technologies. This bill directs 
that mission-critical technology is available and improved.
  Our report said that watch lists were inadequate. This bill calls on 
the intelligence community to provide global coverage and common access 
to information, which should help fix the watch list problem.
  Our report said that we were concerned about the HUMINT career 
structure. Too often, individuals get promoted based on their broad and 
general knowledge in wide-ranging areas. Those who stay focused in one 
area or even one country, where an understanding of local political 
conditions is key to our fight against terrorism, are not being given 
the credit or rewards deserved. This bill recommends that those rewards 
be given.
  Regrettably, there is a huge language problem. This bill addresses 
that problem.
  As in past years, this bill also expresses continuing concern about 
the organizational framework in place to produce intelligence 
capabilities that can meet future national security demands. This bill 
addresses that problem.

                              {time}  2310

  Mr. Chairman, our language is terse, our calls for reform are urgent, 
but we also state that ``the successes of the intelligence community 
normally go unnoticed for obvious and correct reasons . . . The problem 
is not with the individuals, but with the tools and the organization 
with which they work.''
  This is a good bill. I urge its support, and I urge support later 
this week for a bipartisan homeland security bill.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), the chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, and former Governor of 
Delaware.
  Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for that introduction 
and for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4628, the fiscal year 
2003 intelligence authorization bill. Before I move to the substance of 
my statement, I would like to recognize and commend the gentleman from 
Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee, and the ranking 
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for the 
outstanding leadership they have provided to the Nation and 
particularly to the intelligence community during this past year.
  This has been a difficult time for our intelligence community. There 
have been failings, but there have been many successes that have not 
and should not be publicized. The gentleman from Florida and the 
gentlewoman from California have been at the forefront of efforts to 
ensure our professional intelligence offices get the resources 
necessary to do their vital work for our national security. I thank 
them both.
  Mr. Chairman, those of us on the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence are among the few who understand that the world has not 
changed, despite the tragedy that befell us on September 11. We have 
been painfully aware for a long time that while many regions of the 
world are working together with us to promote peace and stability, 
there are many elements that are committed to undermining such efforts.
  We are intimately familiar with the difficult tasks our intelligence 
professionals are up against, and, moreover, with the outstanding work 
they do day in and day out around the globe. For all they do, I would 
like to extend my gratitude to them for all their unheralded successes.
  Oddly, their past successes have resulted in the American public 
having a combination of a low awareness of the magnitude of the threats 
and the high expectation that the intelligence community would always 
be able to counter them. The difficulty of such a task is daunting. 
What makes this intelligence community all the more special is that 
they have done as well as they have, in spite of years of resource 
neglect.
  This year's funding request begins to restore the capabilities that 
have withered over the years. Today, the intelligence community's 
challenges remain large, but we will continually assess the 
intelligence community's ability to meet their challenges. Because this 
year represents a significant point in our history to consider the 
priorities and needs for intelligence activities and set a new course 
for the future, I am particularly concerned with how much the strategic 
vision has been dedicated toward our future collection needs and 
systems, and, more importantly, whether the administration is willing 
to sustain the investment through the duration necessary to deliver the 
new capabilities.
  As chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical 
Intelligence, I understand the critical need to invest in and modernize 
our technical intelligence systems. These systems take years to field 
and tens of thousands of highly skilled scientists and engineers to 
complete. In this bill, I am happy that we address the resource strain 
of the legacy programs in hopes that we avoid sacrificing our future.
  I am concerned that the U.S. technology industry has not held itself 
to a high enough standard of accountability. When the country needs 
special capabilities, we cannot be held captive to a single contractor, 
regardless of their performance, simply because there are no 
alternatives. I believe even the intelligence community must take some 
calculated risks in order to ensure we acquire the kinds of 
capabilities that future threats demand. The bill before us details how 
we intend to ensure the country is on an appropriate and sustainable 
technology path for the future.
  Although this budget represents a significant increase over the past 
years, we need to support it with the full knowledge and understanding 
that there is a great deal more work to be done. Rebuilding the 
intelligence capabilities of the United States is not going to be done 
with a single budget. Congress and the American people need to 
understand that these threats against our Nation will not be eliminated 
with the demise of al Qaeda. In order to close the gap between demands 
on intelligence and the complexity of the current and future threats, 
we must commit to a long-term intelligence capability restoration.
  The next attack against us may be to undermine our confidence in some 
critical part of our infrastructure, or may be chemical or biological 
warfare. We do not know. But what we do know is that the threats are 
real and we need to act accordingly. Mr. Chairman, this bill is a 
downpayment to provide our senior policymakers with the capabilities 
and tools for the near term. It is a responsible, reasonable, and 
appropriate request to fund our Nation's national security needs.

[[Page 14326]]

  The President, our policymakers, our military, the people of the 
United States, and al Qaeda deserve nothing less; and I ask the Members 
of the House to give H.R. 4628 their full support.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), who is a very hard-
working member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from the State of 
Georgia for yielding me this time; and I want to note, as some of my 
colleagues may have, that this is the first entire budget put together 
by the United States Congress since the horrific attacks on our people, 
our homeland, and our country on September 11. I could not be more 
proud to serve in this Chamber and with the people that have put this 
intelligence budget together: our chairman, the gentleman from the 
State of Florida (Mr. Goss), who it is a pleasure to work with; the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), who provides such strong 
leadership; the other members of the committee, who do such honorable 
work; and the bright and dedicated staff that we serve with and who 
serve us so well.
  Mr. Chairman, we have debated many bills this year. I am not sure we 
will debate a more important one for the security and the strength of 
our Nation. I want to thank the intelligence community for the hard 
work they do, the work on U.S. goals, U.S. programs, U.S. policies, and 
U.S. interests. Every day they make us a little bit more secure.
  I want to say, too, Mr. Chairman, that the events of 9-11 may not 
have been absolutely preventable; but mistakes were made, failures were 
made, there were gaps and cracks that the snakes crawled through on 9-
11, and we intend to fix them and to close those gaps. There are too 
many stovepipe agencies that make communication difficult across 
agencies, there is still too much outdated technology, there is still 
too many old structures and cultures, there is not enough emphasis on 
human intelligence and language skills and analytical capabilities; and 
we need to work on ways to turn information into knowledge to help 
mitigate and prevent future attacks.
  This bill takes significant steps forward in those areas. But there 
is a very important caveat written in our report that I encourage all 
Members to read on page 13: investment, but not in old structures. New 
resources, but not toward old ideas and old mistakes.
  We say on page 14, and I quote, ``The committee must emphasize, 
however, that investment alone, without reorganization or reform of 
some of the basic components and practices of the intelligence 
community, will not provide effective national intelligence 
capabilities.''
  President Lincoln, in one of the most dire times in our Nation's 
history, when we were fighting in the Civil War, said, ``As the times 
are new, we must think anew and act anew.'' That is certainly the 
challenge today as we are in a global war on terrorism. Let us think in 
new ways to reform the old structure and make it new so that these 
investments in language, in analytical capabilities, and in human 
intelligence pay off and make our country stronger.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 4 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), the chairman of 
our Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, and the partial 
author with the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) of the recent 
report that has been well received on the first outing of our efforts 
on counterterrorism.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for yielding me 
this time, and I say to my chairman and our ranking member what a great 
job they have done in leading our committee; and to the staff, I do not 
think I have ever worked with a greater staff on both sides of the 
aisle than what we have in the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, and I thank both for that.
  To my ranking member on my subcommittee, the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman), who has been such a great partner in this 
effort to fight this war on counterterrorism, what a great partner she 
has been in this.
  I rise today in support of H.R. 4628, the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 2003. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism 
and Homeland Security, I have spent considerable time these past months 
reviewing the capabilities, gaps, and needs of the intelligence 
community. In fact, last Wednesday we released the unclassified summary 
of our report to the Speaker on gaps in counterterrorism capabilities 
at CIA, FBI, and the National Security Agency.

                              {time}  2320

  It is true that the community was not adequately prepared for the 
events of September 11, 2001, and the report was very critical in some 
areas. By and large we found that in spite of the best efforts of this 
body and the many hard-working rank-and-file on the front lines in the 
intelligence community, not enough resources and effort were dedicated 
to key mission areas, such as HUMINT and SIGINT over a protracted 
period of time.
  Available resources, moreover, were sometimes redirected by senior 
community managers away from core collection and analytic activities to 
feed a growing bureaucracy at headquarters.
  There were not and still are not enough CIA agents on the streets of 
the world collecting against our enemies. NSA's signals intercept and 
exploitation capabilities, once second to none, are now badly in need 
of retooling.
  There are insufficient foreign language capabilities, both to conduct 
effective intelligence operations against terrorists and to exploit 
material acquired in such operations.
  The FBI lacked analytic capability to enable it to pursue preventive 
measures rather than simply to respond to crimes that have already been 
committed. And no one was sharing information in such a way that all 
the consumers with a need-to-know actually got everything relevant to 
their responsibilities.
  While no single authorization bill can hope to fix all of these 
problems, H.R. 4628 will give the community the means to get its 
collective house in order by addressing the most pressing of these 
shortcomings. The intelligence community will be in a position to hire 
more collectors, analysts, linguists, and technicians. It will be able 
to make long-needed investments in infrastructure, systems integration, 
and training that will pay significant dividends over the long-term and 
will, perhaps, make it possible to penetrate the hitherto impenetrable 
terrorist organization at a level sufficient to get at plans and 
intentions.
  Resources alone, however, will not be enough. Community managers will 
have to get moving on reform before new intelligence dollars will have 
full effect. The community must accept this criticism in the right way; 
and upon that being done, I am confident that long-needed reforms of 
the community will be hastened by this bill.
  As one notable example, DCI George Tenet, in response to our report, 
repealed the human rights guidelines that have had a chilling effect on 
counterterrorist recruitment operations since 1995.
  Will H.R. 4628 stop all future 9-11-type attacks? No one can make 
such a guarantee, but this bill will make it much more likely we will 
have the intelligence capabilities to identify and thwart such hostile 
actions in the future. We are going to be facing potentially 
catastrophic threats from terrorists and other adversaries over the 
long haul. This is not something we are going to be able to stop on a 
global basis all at once. Therefore, it is critically important that we 
move swiftly to make the necessary investments in our intelligence 
capabilities that H.R. 4628 provides.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge passage of this bill.
  The neglect of the 1990s in the form of decreasing resources and 
political support for intelligence can never be allowed to be repeated 
in this country. And it will necessarily require considerable time and 
effort on all our parts to correct. America needs and deserves

[[Page 14327]]

an intelligence capability that is second-to-none, and as 9-11 proved, 
we do not yet have that capability.
  Rather than the Cold War threats of old, today's threats are likely 
to be aircraft hijackings, suicide bombings, cyber attacks, the 
poisoning of agriculture or our water supply, the use of biological or 
chemical agents, or the use of radioactive materials to devastate 
cities. Such threats require a much more innovative and robust 
Intelligence Community than we have ever had before.
  I urge all of my colleagues to vote for H.R. 4628. This bill will 
move us towards the kind of Intelligence Community all Americans need 
and deserve. We simply cannot afford to wait any longer to make the 
necessary investments. H.R. 4628 will make America safer.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), the ranking member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman for 
managing this bill for the Democrats and for the gentleman's 
distinguished work on the committee.
  I have to be excused for having to be upstairs in the Committee on 
Rules speaking for the rule on the homeland security bill which will 
come to the floor hopefully tomorrow.
  I begin by complimenting the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) 
for the manner in which he has guided the committee. He has been 
consistently fair and always true to his word. I think that is a great 
compliment and one that he deserves completely. The committee's 
reputation for bipartisanship has been enhanced by his disposition 
toward encouraging and respecting the views of all of our members, as 
will be clear when we see how easy it is for this bill to pass on the 
floor.
  The chairman has explained well the provisions of the bill. It 
recommends substantially more money, many billions of dollars more, 
than was provided for the current fiscal year. If the amounts 
recommended in the bill are appropriated, the community will receive 
the largest one-year increase in funding on a percentage basis in at 
least the last two decades. Much of this increase is directly 
attributable to the September 11 attacks.
  Although no amount of money can guarantee that there will not be 
additional instances of terrorism, the funding recommended by this bill 
should make it harder to undertake in a successful way future terrorist 
attacks like those conducted on September 11. The committee's priority 
must be on making sure that this money is spent well on programs and 
activities that will produce results, not only against terrorism, but 
against other important intelligence targets as well.
  We have worked very closely in a bipartisan way on our committee 
under the leadership of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). I want 
to commend the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), the gentlewoman 
from California (Ms. Harman), the gentleman from California (Mr. 
Condit), the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), the gentleman 
from Minnesota (Mr. Peterson), and the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. 
Cramer) for their distinguished service on the committee as well, and 
join others in commending the staff for the excellence of their work 
and their service to our country.
  I leave it to the distinguished chairman to recognize the majority 
members, but every one of them makes a tremendous contribution to our 
country's security.
  Intelligence is integral to that security, to the protection of the 
American people and our national interests at home and abroad. Whether 
our interests are defined as providing security to a special operations 
team in Afghanistan or passengers in an airliner in the skies over 
California, timely and reliable intelligence is a necessity.
  Although there may be differences over the manner in which some 
intelligence activities are conducted, and indeed we have our 
differences, I think we all place a high value on the protective 
responsibility being discharged effectively by the intelligence 
community. To do that, a big investment in technology and in people is 
needed. The investments necessary to enhance mission success in this 
area are recommended in this bill.
  Mission success is produced by things other than money. The world has 
changed greatly since I joined the committee 10 years ago. I think I 
have served longer on the committee than anyone. Now my service is 
coming to an end. At that time, 10 years ago, the intelligence 
community was primarily focused on the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Today, as we know, it is primarily focused on fighting 
terrorism.
  I have been concerned that the intelligence agencies have not been 
quick enough to recognize the changes in training, tactics and methods 
of operation required to shift from dealing with a fixed target, like 
the Soviet Union, to more nimble targets like the terrorists and the 
proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. I think the record 
suggests that the shift has been harder to accomplish than had been 
presumed. In fact, in some areas it has not been fully implemented yet.
  For example, the pace toward creating a more diverse workforce in the 
intelligence community, and in improving the language capabilities of 
the workforce, have been too slow. Although I recognize that the 
relatively small number of new employees able to be hired across the 
community since the end of the Cold War made that a difficult 
challenge, today a significant increase in the workforce is happening 
through an acceleration in hiring, and it presents a tremendous 
opportunity for us to attract and reach out for the diversity that will 
make mission success more possible.
  I expect that community leaders will use this opportunity by 
redoubling their efforts to attract and advance people with diverse 
religious, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, and with capabilities in 
those languages in which the agencies have traditionally been weak.
  H.R. 4628 does much to emphasize language training and to provide 
incentives to maintain proficiency. Partnerships with entities outside 
the government to improve the language skills of current employees, as 
well as new hires, are encouraged. An amendment is expected to study 
the feasibility of establishing a reserve core of linguists. These are 
good initiatives which do much to address one of the intelligence 
community's biggest needs. I commend the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Roemer), the gentleman from California (Mr. Condit), the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes), the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert), and the 
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons) for their leadership within the 
committee on the language issue. Their efforts have been assisted from 
outside the committee by the gentleman from California (Mr. Farr). He 
knows well the importance of this issue, the Defense Language Institute 
is located in his district, and he has worked tirelessly to improve 
language training programs.
  The bill continues to emphasize the kind of human and technical 
collection programs necessary to deal with targets like terrorist 
groups. This emphasis, however, should not ignore the imbalance across 
the intelligence community between collection and the ability to make 
use of that which is collected through timely processing, exploitation, 
and dissemination.
  Progress has been made on dissemination, which was one of the most 
important intelligence shortcomings during the Gulf War, but not enough 
attention has been paid to making sure that analytic capabilities are 
sufficient.

                              {time}  2330

  Agencies need more analysts, more translators, and more equipment to 
speed the process of converting data into intelligence. This bill 
provides some much needed funding in these areas. I hope that the 
administration will sustain these important initiatives in future 
budget submissions.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, we are rapidly approaching the first 
anniversary of September 11. The terrorist attacks of that day are 
always on our minds. Although the World Trade Center site has been 
cleared and the rebuilding of

[[Page 14328]]

the Pentagon proceeds, the mourning for the victims continues and the 
life of the Nation has been affected profoundly. The committee is 
engaged in a process of evaluating the performance of the intelligence 
agencies in the months leading up to the attacks and in assessing how 
that performance can be improved to better ensure our security in the 
future.
  An important step in that process was taken last week with the 
release of the report on intelligence capabilities prepared by the 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, ably led by the 
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman). The report will be a valuable tool for the 
inquiry being conducted jointly by the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees. When the report of the joint inquiry is completed, I 
believe the Nation will have a better understanding of the strengths 
and weaknesses of our intelligence agencies on September 11 and how 
weaknesses can be addressed.
  The report of the joint inquiry, however, will be limited necessarily 
by the jurisdiction of the intelligence committees. Despite our best 
efforts, many of the questions of the families of the victims will not 
be answered by the committee's work. We owe those families the most 
thorough and independent investigation possible. Examining all of the 
issues raised by the attacks will require, in my judgment, an 
independent commission. I hope such a commission will be established 
soon. I commend the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) for his 
leadership on this issue. I look forward to discussing his amendment.
  In closing, I want to acknowledge, again the contributions of my 
colleagues. I will continue my remarks during the amendment process.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons), a decorated pilot from the 
services and the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Human 
Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence which covers quite a 
spectrum.
  Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence 
authorization bill and I thank my friend and colleague from Florida for 
yielding me this time.
  This is a good bill, Mr. Chairman. It addresses intelligence needs 
that were identified in past years by the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, but only now, after the deaths of many innocent 
Americans, are these needs getting the broad attention they deserve?
  Throughout much of the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, there 
was a debate about whether America really needed to spend so much on 
defense. As for intelligence, some people even said there was no longer 
any need for the CIA. I believe, and indeed I believe America believes, 
that this debate is now over. As we know now, prior to September 11, we 
simply did not have enough intelligence on the plans and intentions of 
foreign terrorist groups. We paid a high price for that lack of 
intelligence. The bill before you today will help the intelligence 
agencies build up their capabilities.
  If you want to know the plans and the intentions of terrorist groups, 
you have to have HUMINT, human intelligence. This is the information 
you get from human sources, known as ``assets'' or ``agents'' or just 
plain ``spies.'' I want to emphasize that this year's intelligence 
authorization bill does a great deal to strengthen our HUMINT 
capability.
  For one thing, there is money to hire more CIA operations officers. 
Last fall after the September attacks, our committee freed CIA's 
operations officers from the Deutch guidelines, implemented by former 
CIA Director John Deutch, which literally tied the hands of our CIA 
intelligence operatives working against so-called ``unsavory 
characters,'' such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers.
  Since last fall, America's intelligence operatives have been doing a 
great job, but they are now few and far between. We need more and this 
bill will help ensure that there will be more. This bill also provides 
money to hire more intelligence analysts and language specialists. 
Likewise, there is more funding for foreign language training. It is 
not hard to understand that if your operations officers and analysts 
have not learned the language of your enemy, you will not succeed in 
learning his plans and intentions.
  In addition, to help strengthen our linguistic expertise nationwide, 
my Intelligence Committee colleague the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Roemer) has offered an amendment to establish a nationwide linguistic 
reserve corps. I am happy to cosponsor his amendment. These HUMINT and 
foreign language-related items are just some of the good provisions in 
this intelligence authorization bill. They are long overdue.
  In sum, we have a good bill that provides the proper resources to the 
intelligence community for this year. The clock is ticking and 
America's enemies continue with their planning. I urge your support for 
our intelligence professionals, and I urge your support for this bill.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes), a very valuable member 
of our committee who has former ties to the Border Patrol.
  Mr. REYES. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this bill. First I want to 
thank both Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Pelosi for developing a 
bill that is designed to meet the intelligence challenges that our 
Nation is currently facing. Their leadership on critical intelligence 
issues has been an inspiration and very noteworthy for all of us on the 
committee.
  Since the events of September 11, we have been wrestling with many 
issues in our quest to enhance our intelligence-gathering capabilities. 
It is apparent now more than ever that intelligence is the cornerstone 
in successfully prosecuting the war on terror and securing our 
homeland. Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Pelosi have ensured that 
this outstanding bill provides for the funding and the policy guidance 
to get this job done. I thank them for their continued commitment to 
our Nation and to our committee.
  One of the things that we have also learned is the need for reliable 
human intelligence. The lives of our citizens are much too valuable to 
be trusted to proxy agents. This bill addresses this issue. We need 
analysts and case officers with language skills and expertise in 
foreign areas. At both the NSA and CIA, literally thousands of pieces 
of data are never analyzed, or are analyzed after the fact because 
there are too few analysts and even fewer with the necessary language 
skills.
  I am proud to have played a role in the construction of this bill, 
especially the components of it that exemplify the mindset of thinking 
out of the box, something that will be essential in our future success 
in fighting terrorism. If we do not innovate and ride the dragon of 
change, then surely that dragon will ride us. That is why I am 
especially proud to be a cosponsor of the gentleman from Indiana's 
amendment to authorize additional funding for the national security 
education program and to establish the national flagship language 
initiative.
  One of the lessons we have learned in the current conflict is a 
shortage of qualified linguists who are central to intelligence-
gathering operations such as interrogations and signals intelligence. 
This bill will alleviate that shortage.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge all my colleagues to support this bill.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to 
the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. LaHood).
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the intelligence 
authorization bill and thank our good friend and colleague, the 
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for the good work that he does and 
also the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for the good work 
that she does and all the members of the committee and the staff.
  I would like to take just a couple of minutes also to praise the 
dedicated men and women of our intelligence agencies. America's rank 
and file intelligence specialists were working hard

[[Page 14329]]

prior to September 11. Since then they have been working overtime and 
in overdrive, and there is no let-up in sight. Our intelligence 
authorization bill gives these dedicated professionals the resources 
they need. I strongly urge colleagues to support it. I am proud of our 
committee's work. It has been a strong bipartisan effort that we can 
all be proud of.
  This year's bill helps build its human intelligence capabilities. 
HUMINT, the information we get from individual human sources overseas, 
is something we need a lot more of. We need to know a lot more about 
the internal workings and plans of terrorist groups. Every American 
understands that we have enemies who are plotting future attacks. We 
need to maximize our ability to neutralize these plots, and this bill 
provides funding and resources to do just that. The bill helps address 
the crying need for more foreign language expertise in the intelligence 
agencies. Each agency has traditionally been responsible to hire and 
train an adequate number of linguists, but no agency has ever been able 
to meet its goals, and the lack of foreign language capability remains 
a community-wide problem.
  Ladies and gentlemen, it stands to reason that if America's 
intelligence officers cannot understand what our enemies are saying to 
each other, we will never be able to adequately protect our citizens 
and our interests.

                              {time}  2340

  However, with our bill Congress steps into increased resources for 
language training and for transition efforts across the entire 
intelligence community.
  Let me just say that when the amendment of the gentleman from Indiana 
(Mr. Roemer) to establish a commission comes before the floor, I will 
strongly oppose that amendment and speak against it as strongly as I 
can. I think it is an ill-timed amendment, and I hope we do not pass 
it.
  In conclusion, I repeat I am proud of America's rank-and-file 
intelligence professionals, and I likewise am proud of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence's work to provide them the resources 
they need. I urge strong support of all Members for this bill.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), and all of the 
members of the committee for bringing forward an excellent bill. I 
encourage all of my colleagues to support the legislation.
  I wholeheartedly agree with the committee's report that the success 
of intelligence normally goes unnoticed, for obvious and correct 
reasons, while failures seem to be immediately brought to the public's 
eye.
  I want to commend the dedicated and hard-working employees of the NSA 
in my district who work tirelessly in secret with little public reward 
or praise for their many accomplishments.
  Mr. Chairman, I have visited NSA on many occasions, and I agree with 
the committee report that there are two critical challenges that NSA 
faces. One is sufficient linguists. We have talked about that already 
today, the fact is that the inability of budget support to attract 
sufficient linguists has compromised NSA's mission and that we need to 
improve the current language programs. The legislation before us 
authorizes additional funds for us to be able to accomplish that very 
important challenge.
  The second issue is how to deal with the buy-versus-make policy for 
the outsourcing of nonmission critical programs. I think the committee 
report addresses that issue appropriately.
  Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is that this legislation provides the 
additional resources to our intelligence community so they can collect 
and analyze the necessary information, set the priorities as to what is 
important for national security, and do that in a timely way. It also 
at NSA provides resources for additional research to protect U.S. 
communications.
  I think this is a very balanced bill. It is a bill that responds to 
the security challenges of our Nation, providing the resources and 
providing the direction that is necessary, and I urge my colleagues to 
support the legislation.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), a very valuable 
member of the committee.
  Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 4628, 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. Over the past 
decade, Americans have witnessed extraordinary changes in the 
international security environment. To the average American, some of 
these new threats were unforeseen. To others, they were simply 
unimaginable.
  We live in a different world than that which existed prior to 
September 11, 2001; and this body is obligated to ensure that every 
step is taken to protect our Nation against all threats, new and old.
  Mr. Chairman, H.R. 4628 provides important funding that permits the 
intelligence community to better confront these threats and ensure 
greater security of Americans at home and abroad.
  It is a good, a bipartisan bill. H.R. 4628 addresses numerous 
intelligence needs, some of which have been underscored by the dramatic 
events of the past year.
  One of the country's most important weapons in the war on terrorism 
is a diverse, well-trained and experienced intelligence personnel. 
Intelligence officers, whether they are collectors, analysts, linguists 
or support personnel, have been working in an overload capacity since 
9-11. These brave, patriotic men and women deserve the recognition of 
this body, and H.R. 4628 takes steps to encourage these officers to 
continue their tireless service to the country by recommending for them 
fair compensation, benefits and stronger career planning.
  In addition to receiving enhanced specialized training and collecting 
and analyzing critical intelligence, these officers need strong foreign 
language skills to operate effectively in parts of the world where our 
adversaries might lurk. H.R. 4628 addresses the intelligence 
community's critical need for better language training, targeting 
specific training for its officers as well as the long-standing issue 
of the recapitalization of specific technological intelligence 
platforms.
  Mr. Chairman, this Member urges support for H.R. 4628.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Burr.)
  Mr. BURR of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of 
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. As a member of 
the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, I am particularly 
eager for this bill to be voted into law.
  During the course of the 107th Congress, the subcommittee, which 
began as a Speaker's working group in January 2001, heard testimony 
from dozens of intelligence officials, both at home and abroad, from 
counterterrorism commissioners, foreign officials and hosts of other 
terrorism experts. In the end, we found an intelligence community that 
has suffered severely over the protracted period from budget shortfalls 
and poor internal management decisions about the allocation of 
available resources. Significant collection gaps, not just in the realm 
of counterterrorism, were identified, and many of these problems have 
proven to be systemic.
  H.R. 4628 provides a significant new resource for the most neglected 
areas of the community and guidance for how the most pressing gaps can 
be expeditiously closed. The community's most crucial counterterrorism 
shortcomings, as we judged in a classified report released in 
unclassified summary form last Wednesday, are as follows: a chronic 
linguistic shortfall across the community; a shortage of core human 
intelligence collectors out on the streets in bazaars hunting potential 
terrorist spies; a culture of risk aversion that has permeated 
collection operation and is manifest in the CIA's

[[Page 14330]]

1995 ``Internal Human Rights Guidelines'' promulgated by Director of 
Central Intelligence John Deutch. These management-generated guidelines 
have tied the hands of those brave men and women on the front lines for 
far too long.
  George Tenet finally repealed these guidelines just last Thursday, 
the day after the counterterrorism gaps report was released, and some 7 
months after he was directed to do so in the fiscal year 2002 
intelligence authorization.
  The community also lacks analysts in sufficient numbers and with 
sufficient skills at the CIA, FBI, and NSA to connect all the dots out 
there that are being unearthed and examined in isolation. The FBI needs 
to change its culture and traditional methods of operating from 
emphasis on after-the-fact.
  Does H.R. 4628 solve all the problems? No one authorization could 
possibly do that. But this bill takes us further in terms of targeting 
resources than we have seen in some time. I submit this bill is 
critical in getting the intelligence community on the right track and 
that there is no time to waste in this endeavor.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett), a valued member of 
the committee as well.
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise today in strong support of 
H.R. 4628, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2003. I 
am proud of the bipartisan work that went into the crafting of this 
bill. The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the ranking 
member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), deserve a great 
deal of credit for this bipartisan effort and the great product that we 
have before us today.

                              {time}  2350

  It would be disingenuous to state that all is well within the United 
States intelligence community. The House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence has been for a number of years identifying a number of 
major shortfalls and providing for our foreign intelligence needs. We 
have identified shortfalls, major limitations in human intelligence 
officers and assets. We have pointed out the limited capabilities this 
Nation has with respect to foreign language specialists. We have 
identified problems with aging systems and capabilities. And we have 
identified a serious problem with respect to taking calculated risks in 
collecting critical intelligence against those who would do our Nation 
harm.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill represents a major step forward in correcting 
many of these problems by funding programs, operations, and personnel 
that are vital to the security of this Nation. This bill is important 
in particular in that it begins to focus on modernization and upgrading 
our signals intelligence capacities. It provides funding authorizations 
to modernize capabilities that have long been ignored.
  Although I am supportive of the fund recommendations and policy 
directions of this bill, I have been personally concerned that it may 
be difficult for a national security agency to effectively obligate the 
large infusion of funding. Therefore, the bill directs executive 
oversight actions for these acquisition programs of the National 
Security Agency. I believe the guidance and direction in the bill will 
result in honest appraisals and recommendations to the Congress to 
ensure the taxpayers' dollars are most effectively spent. I feel this 
is a good bill that balances the increased investments against critical 
priorities with procedures, and I recommend its passage to my 
colleagues.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 4628, the 
Intelligence Authorization Bill for fiscal year 2003.
  I am proud of the bipartisan work that went into the crafting of the 
bill. Chairman Goss and our Ranking Member, Nancy Pelosi deserve a 
great deal of credit for this bipartisan effort and for the great 
product that we have before us today.
  It would be disingenuous to state that all is well within the United 
States Intelligence Community. The House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence has been for a number of years systematically identifying 
a number of major shortfalls in providing for our foreign intelligence 
needs. We have identified funding shortfalls, major limitations in 
human intelligence officers and assets. We have pointed out the limited 
capabilities this nation has with respect to foreign language 
specialists. We have identified problems with aging systems and 
capabilities. And, we have identified a serious problem with respect to 
taking calculated risks in collecting critical intelligence against 
those who would do our nation harm.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill represents a major step forward in correcting 
many of these problems by funding programs, operations, and personnel 
that are vital to the security of the United States. This bill 
represents the largest increase for foreign intelligence funding in our 
a decade, and provides the necessary resources for improving our 
efforts to protect the homeland and support our forces--civilian, 
military and diplomatic--waging the current war on terrorism. The 
policies and programs in this bill will enable us to strengthen our 
intelligence capabilities to ensure the best foreign intelligence 
efforts possible.
  This bill is important, in particular, in that it begins to focus on 
modernizing and upgrading our signals intelligence capabilities. It 
provides funding authorizations to modernize capabilities that have 
long been ignored. While focusing on modernization, it maintains a fair 
balance to ensure that current and legacy capabilities continue to be 
viable and contribute to our national security efforts by providing the 
necessary collection and analysis capabilities.
  Although I am supportive of the funding recommendations and policy 
directions in the bill, I have been personally concerned that it may be 
difficult for the National Security Agency to effectively obligate the 
large infusion of funding. Therefore, the bill directs specific 
executive oversight actions for these acquisition programs of the 
National Security Agency. I believe the guidance and direction in the 
bill will result in honest appraisals and recommendations to the 
Congress to ensure the taxpayers' dollars are most effectively spent.
  Mr. Chairman, this bill puts a great deal of emphasis on getting the 
Intelligence Community ``back to the basics.'' In short, this bill 
begins to correct the systemic problems that left us under-prepared for 
warning against the terrorist attacks on America.
  I feel that this is a good bill that balances the increased 
investment against critical priorities with procedures for effectively 
monitoring the wise investment of the taxpayers money. Mr. Chairman, I 
urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4628.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, we have no further requests for time. I 
think the bill has been very adequately explained and debated. It is a 
good bill, and I urge my colleagues in the House to support it.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of our time
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate the Members for their 
participation and their help in explaining what this bill does for the 
American people and our national security.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank my colleagues, 
Congressmen Farr, Roemer, Gibbons, and Reyes, for their leadership in 
taking steps to establish a Civilian Linguistic Reserve Corps. As we 
search for ways to improve the functioning of our intelligence 
agencies, we must take advantage of our existing resources, including 
individuals highly trained in linguistics. In fact, the idea of 
utilizing citizen linguists was presented to me by one of my 
constituents who is a former U.S. Army Arabic linguist. He shared 
useful suggestions regarding how we can benefit from the skills of 
linguists, such as himself.
  The Civilian Linguist Reserve Corps would be comprised of United 
States citizens with advanced levels of proficiency in foreign 
languages who would be available to perform services using these 
foreign languages as the President may specify.
  I compliment my colleague Sam Farr for working to establish a 
registry of these linguists, which the Civilian Linguistic Reserve 
Corps builds upon. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) is located in 
Monterey, California in Rep. Farr's district. The DLI trains many 
members of our military in languages such as Dari, Pashto, Urdu, Uzbek, 
Georgian, Chechen, and Albanian. We cannot afford to lose these 
capabilities and the Civilian Linguistic Reserve Corps is a perfect 
solution to facilitate the continued service of these linguists.
  Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the 
fiscal year 2003 Intelligence Authorization bill (H.R. 4628). Since the 
end of the Cold War we have permitted our intelligence community to 
grow weak by under funding accounts and imposing politically correct 
restrictions. Our nation cannot afford to keep its guard down. The live 
of our citizens are at stake.

[[Page 14331]]

  This legislation moves us forward in reconstructing our intelligence 
gathering and analytical capabilities. H.R. 4628 builds on the progress 
of last year's authorization measure adding more money in critical 
areas we have now identified as deficient in the analysis of the 
attacks on our country last September 11.
  This week the House will vote on the biggest restructuring of our 
government in 50 years so that we better meet the challenges of 
terrorism. But we should never think that structural changes alone 
could bring security. H.R. 4628 addresses a critical dimension of our 
security needs--better intelligence for early warning.
  This legislation enhances efforts to rebuild our Nation's human 
intelligence capabilities: sharpening skills and expertise and 
strengthening presence and reach. The measure addresses shortfalls in 
our intelligence community's analytical abilities so that we might 
fortify that capability and provide consumers of intelligence the 
precise data and thorough analysis they require.
  The measure also shores up shortfalls in the Defense Department's 
signals intelligence and Unmanned Airborne Vehicle programs. Directly 
addressing the shortage of capability in interrogation, the measure 
enhances our ongoing efforts to acquire valuable information from 
combatant detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
  Finally, the measure addresses the essential need to upgrade our 
intelligence community's language skills programs. I spent 10 years as 
an operation officer in the CIA. Five of those years were spent 
overseas in the Far East where my language training and ability was an 
important tool in my daily routine and success. I know that language 
skills are critical to operational effectiveness. Not only must we 
improve these skills for our operations officers but also for our 
communications specialist and analysts.
  Mr. Chairman, recently the Greek police arrested ten members of the 
Revolutionary Organization November 17. This elusive group has 
terrorized Greece for over 25 years killing more than a dozen 
diplomats, civilians and police officers.
  One person killed by that group was Richard Welch, the CIA station 
chief in Athens, whose name had been exposed by an anti-intelligence 
publication. Masked gunmen had cut him down in front of his home, a few 
days before Christmas. I remember his murder well. Later I would meet 
his widow and work with the late Senator John H. Chafee to pass the 
Intelligence Identities Protection Act in 1982 to protect other 
clandestine operatives from similar assassination.
  The dismantlement of this group is timely in that it reminds us of 
the importance of intelligence work today, and the risks involved for 
many who serve in our intelligence community. I find comfort that the 
assassins of Richard Welch have been captured, that Greek citizens are 
free of its terrors, and that justice may finally be served.
  Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community remains on the front lines 
of the war on terrorism. Many of them serve with great courage and 
without recognition. Many of them gather information at great risk to 
their lives and those of their families. They provide information of 
great value to the defense of our nation. This bill brings more 
resources, tools, skills, and more assets to the people whose tireless 
and courageous efforts help protect our nation.
  I strongly support this legislation and applaud the members of the 
committee and the staff on their fine work.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I too am happy to yield back the balance of 
our time.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Petri). All time for general debate has 
expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill is considered as an original bill for 
the purpose of amendment, and is considered read.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is 
as follows:

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Authorization of emergency supplemental appropriations for 
              fiscal year 2002.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
              law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist 
              assets (FITA).
Sec. 305. Modification of excepted agency voluntary leave transfer 
              authority. 
Sec. 306. Additional one-year suspension of reorganization of 
              Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office.
Sec. 307. Prohibition on compliance with requests for information 
              submitted by foreign governments.
Sec. 308. Cooperative relationship between the National Security 
              Education Program and the Foreign Language Center of the 
              Defense Language Institute.
Sec. 309. Establishment of National Flagship Language Initiative within 
              the National Security Education Program.
Sec. 310. Deadline for submittal of various overdue reports.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Sec. 401. Two-year extension of Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
              Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 402. Prohibition on implementation of compensation reform plan.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Sec. 501. Use of funds for counter-drug and counterterrorism activities 
              for Colombia.
Sec. 502. Protection of operational files of the National 
              Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 503. Eligibility of employees in intelligence senior level 
              positions for Presidential Rank Awards.

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 2003 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
       (12) The Coast Guard.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2003, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4628 of the One Hundred 
     Seventh Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     2003 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
     intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of 
     civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2003 the 
     sum of $176,179,000. Within such amount, funds identified in 
     the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in 
     section 102(a) for

[[Page 14332]]

     the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain 
     available until September 30, 2004.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
     Community Management Account of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence are authorized 350 full-time personnel as of 
     September 30, 2003. Personnel serving in such elements may be 
     permanent employees of the Community Management Account or 
     personnel detailed from other elements of the United States 
     Government.
       (c) Classified Authorizations.--
       (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community 
     Management Account by subsection (a), there are also 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management 
     Account for fiscal year 2003 such additional amounts as are 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall 
     remain available until September 30, 2004.
       (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the 
     personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the 
     Community Management Account as of September 30, 2003, there 
     are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such 
     elements as of that date as are specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations.
       (d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during 
     fiscal year 2003 any officer or employee of the United States 
     or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff 
     of the Community Management Account from another element of 
     the United States Government shall be detailed on a 
     reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee, 
     or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a 
     period of less than one year for the performance of temporary 
     functions as required by the Director of Central 
     Intelligence.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
       (1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated in subsection (a), $34,100,000 shall be 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within 
     such amount, funds provided for research, development, 
     testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until 
     September 30, 2003, and funds provided for procurement 
     purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2004.
       (2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds 
     available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under 
     paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so 
     transferred for the activities of the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center.
       (3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug 
     Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the 
     provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act 
     of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
       (4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the 
     operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.

     SEC. 105. AUTHORIZATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL 
                   APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002.

       (a) Authorization.--Amounts authorized to be appropriated 
     for fiscal year 2002 under section 101 of the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108) 
     for the conduct of the intelligence activities of elements of 
     the United States Government listed in such section are 
     hereby increased, with respect to any such authorized amount, 
     by the amount by which appropriations pursuant to such 
     authorization were increased by the following:
       (1) The Emergency Supplemental Act, 2002 (contained in 
     division B of Public Law 107-117), including section 304 of 
     such Act (115 Stat. 2300).
       (2) An emergency supplemental appropriation in a 
     supplemental appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 that is 
     enacted after May 1, 2002, amounts as are designated by 
     Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 
     251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 901(b)(2)(A)).
       (b) Ratification.--For purposes of section 504 of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414), any obligation 
     or expenditure of those amounts deemed to have been 
     specifically authorized by the Act referred to in subsection 
     (a)(1) and by the supplemental appropriations Act referred to 
     in subsection (a)(2) is hereby ratified and confirmed.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 2003 the sum of $351,300,000.

                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                   CONTRACTING.

       It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central 
     Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the 
     intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national 
     security interests of the United States and consistent with 
     operational and security concerns related to the conduct of 
     intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should 
     competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the 
     procurement of products properly designated as having been 
     made in the United States.

     SEC. 304. SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON 
                   TERRORIST ASSETS (FITA).

       (a) Semiannual Report.--
       (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:


   ``semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets

       ``Sec. 118. (a) Semiannual Report.--On a semiannual basis, 
     the Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head of the 
     Office of Intelligence Support) shall submit a report to the 
     appropriate congressional committees (as defined in 
     subsection (c)) that fully informs the committees concerning 
     operations against terrorist financial networks. Each such 
     report shall include with respect to the preceding six-month 
     period--
       ``(1) the total number of asset seizures, designations, and 
     other actions against individuals or entities found to have 
     engaged in financial support of terrorism;
       ``(2) the total number of applications for asset seizure 
     and designations of individuals or entities suspected of 
     having engaged in financial support of terrorist activities, 
     that were granted, modified, or denied;
       ``(3) the total number of physical searches of offices, 
     residences, or financial records of individuals or entities 
     suspected of having engaged in financial support for 
     terrorist activity; and
       ``(4) whether the financial intelligence information seized 
     in these cases has been shared on a full and timely basis 
     with the all departments, agencies, and other entities of the 
     United States Government involved in intelligence activities 
     participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Unit 
     (managed and coordinated by the Counterterrorism Center of 
     the Central Intelligence Agency).
       ``(b) Immediate Notification for Emergency Designation.--In 
     the case of a designation of an individual or entity, or the 
     assets of an individual or entity, as having been found to 
     have engaged in terrorist activities, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury shall report such designation within 24 hours of 
     such a designation to the appropriate congressional 
     committees.
       ``(c) Definition.--In this section, the term `appropriate 
     congressional committees' means the following:
       ``(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
     Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on Financial 
     Services of the House of Representatives.
       ``(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee 
     on Appropriations, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
     Urban Affairs of the Senate.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents contained in 
     the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 117 the following new item:

``Sec. 118. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist 
              assets.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 501(f) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(f)) is amended by 
     inserting before the period the following: ``, and includes 
     financial intelligence activities''.

     SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF EXCEPTED AGENCY VOLUNTARY LEAVE 
                   TRANSFER AUTHORITY.

       (a) In General.--Section 6339 of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking subsection (b);
       (2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b); and
       (3) by inserting after subsection (b) (as so redesignated 
     by paragraph (2)) the following:
       ``(c)(1) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (b), 
     the head of an excepted agency may, at his sole discretion, 
     by regulation establish a program under which an individual 
     employed in or under such excepted agency may participate in 
     a leave transfer program established under the provisions of 
     this subchapter outside of this section, including provisions 
     permitting the transfer of annual leave accrued or 
     accumulated by such employee to, or permitting such employee 
     to receive transferred leave from, an employee of any other 
     agency (including another excepted agency having a program 
     under this subsection).
       ``(2) To the extent practicable and consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods, any program 
     established under paragraph (1) shall be consistent with the 
     provisions of this subchapter outside of this section and 
     with any regulations issued by the Office of Personnel 
     Management implementing this subchapter.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 6339 of such title is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) (as so redesignated 
     by subsection (a)(2)), by striking ``under this section'' and 
     inserting ``under this subsection''; and

[[Page 14333]]

       (2) in subsection (d), by striking ``of Personnel 
     Management''.

     SEC. 306. ADDITIONAL ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF 
                   DIPLOMATIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM 
                   OFFICE.

       Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-108; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note; 
     115 Stat. 1401) is amended--
       (1) in the heading, by striking ``ONE-YEAR'' and inserting 
     ``TWO-YEAR''; and
       (2) in the text, by striking ``October 1, 2002'' and 
     inserting ``October 1, 2003''.

     SEC. 307. PROHIBITION ON COMPLIANCE WITH REQUESTS FOR 
                   INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS.

       Section 552(a)(3) of title 5, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A) by inserting ``and except as 
     provided in subparagraph (E),'' after ``of this 
     subsection,''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(E) An agency, or part of an agency, that is an element 
     of the intelligence community (as that term is defined in 
     section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4))) shall not make any record available under this 
     paragraph to--
       ``(i) any government entity, other than a State, territory, 
     commonwealth, or district of the United States, or any 
     subdivision thereof; or
       ``(ii) a representative of a government entity described in 
     clause (i).''.

     SEC. 308. COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM AND THE FOREIGN 
                   LANGUAGE CENTER OF THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE 
                   INSTITUTE.

       Section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security 
     Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended by adding 
     at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(h) Use of Awards To Attend the Foreign Language Center 
     of the Defense Language Institute.--(1) The Secretary shall 
     provide for the admission of award recipients to the Foreign 
     Language Center of the Defense Language Institute 
     (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as the `Center'). 
     An award recipient may apply a portion of the applicable 
     scholarship or fellowship award for instruction at the Center 
     on a space-available basis as a Department of Defense 
     sponsored program to defray the additive instructional costs.
       ``(2) Except as the Secretary determines necessary, an 
     award recipient who receives instruction at the Center shall 
     be subject to the same regulations with respect to 
     attendance, discipline, discharge, and dismissal as apply to 
     other persons attending the Center.
       ``(3) In this subsection, the term `award recipient' means 
     an undergraduate student who has been awarded a scholarship 
     under subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student who has been 
     a fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B) who--
       ``(A) is in good standing;
       ``(B) has completed all academic study in a foreign 
     country, as provided for under the scholarship or fellowship; 
     and
       ``(C) would benefit from instruction provided at the 
     Center.''.

     SEC. 309. ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL FLAGSHIP LANGUAGE 
                   INITIATIVE WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
                   EDUCATION PROGRAM.

       (a) National Flagship Language Initiative.--
       (1) Expansion of grant program authority.--Subsection 
     (a)(1) of section 802 of the David L. Boren National Security 
     Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1902) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (B)(ii);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (C) 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) awarding grants to institutions of higher education 
     to carry out a National Flagship Language Initiative 
     (described in subsection (i)).''.
       (2) Provisions of national flagship language initiative.--
     Such section, as amended by section 308, is further amended 
     by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(i) National Flagship Language Initiative.--(1) Under the 
     National Flagship Language Initiative, institutions of higher 
     learning shall establish, operate, or improve activities 
     designed to train students in programs in a range of 
     disciplines to achieve advanced levels of proficiency in 
     those foreign languages that the Secretary identifies as 
     being the most critical in the interests of the national 
     security of the United States.
       ``(2) An undergraduate student who has been awarded a 
     scholarship under subsection (a)(1)(A) or a graduate student 
     who has been awarded a fellowship under subsection (a)(1)(B) 
     may participate in the activities carried out under the 
     National Flagship Language Initiative.
       ``(3) An institution of higher education that receives a 
     grant pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(D) shall give special 
     consideration to applicants who are employees of the Federal 
     Government.
       ``(4) For purposes of this subsection, the Foreign Language 
     Center of the Defense Language Institute and any other 
     educational institution that provides training in foreign 
     languages operated by the Department of Defense or an agency 
     in the intelligence community is deemed to be an institution 
     of higher education, and may carry out the types of 
     activities permitted under the National Flagship Language 
     Initiative.''.
       (3) Waiver of funding allocation rules.--Subsection (a)(2) 
     of such section is amended by adding at the end the following 
     flush sentences:

     ``The funding allocation under this paragraph shall not apply 
     to grants under paragraph (1)(D) for the National Flagship 
     Language Initiative described in subsection (i). For the 
     authorization of appropriations for the National Flagship 
     Language Initiative, see section 811.''.
       (4) Board requirement.--Section 803(d)(4) of such Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1904(d)(4)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(E) which foreign languages are critical to the national 
     security interests of the United States for purposes of 
     section 802(a)(1)(D) (relating to grants for the National 
     Flagship Language Initiative).''.
       (b) Funding.--The David L. Boren National Security 
     Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 811. ADDITIONAL ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION OF 
                   APPROPRIATIONS.

       ``(a) In General.--In addition to amounts that may be made 
     available to the Secretary under the National Security 
     Education Trust Fund (under section 804 of this Act) for a 
     fiscal year, there is authorized to be appropriated to the 
     Secretary for each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 
     2003, $10,000,000, to carry out the grant program for the 
     National Flagship Language Initiative under section 
     802(a)(1)(D).
       ``(b) Availability of Appropriated Funds.--Amounts 
     appropriated pursuant to the authorization under subsection 
     (a) shall remain available until expended.''.

     SEC. 310. DEADLINE FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS OVERDUE REPORTS.

       (a) Deadline.--The reports described in subsection (c) 
     shall be submitted to Congress not later than 180 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Noncompliance.--(1) If all the reports described in 
     subsection (c) are not submitted to Congress by the date 
     specified in subsection (a), amounts available to be 
     obligated or expended after that date to carry out the 
     functions or duties of the following offices shall be reduced 
     by \1/3\:
       (A) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
       (B) The Office of Community Management Staff.
       (2) The reduction applicable under paragraph (1) shall not 
     apply if the Director of Central Intelligence certifies to 
     Congress by the date referred to in subsection (a) that all 
     reports referred to in subsection (c) have been submitted to 
     Congress.
       (c) Reports Described.--The reports referred to in 
     subsection (a) are reports mandated by law for which the 
     Director of Central Intelligence has sole or primary 
     responsibility to prepare, or coordinate, and submit to 
     Congress which, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     have not been submitted to Congress by the date mandated by 
     law.

                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. TWO-YEAR EXTENSION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
                   VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PAY ACT.

       Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
     Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (f), by striking ``September 30, 2003'' 
     and inserting ``September 30, 2005''; and
       (2) in subsection (i), by striking ``or 2003'' and 
     inserting ``2003, 2004, or 2005''.

     SEC. 402. PROHIBITION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPENSATION 
                   REFORM PLAN.

       No plan by the Director of Central Intelligence that would 
     revise the manner in which employees of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, or employees of other elements of the 
     United States Government that conduct intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities, are compensated may be 
     implemented until the plan has been specifically authorized 
     by statute.

         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTER-DRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
                   ACTIVITIES FOR COLOMBIA.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds 
     designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes 
     for assistance to the Government of Colombia for counter-drug 
     activities for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and any 
     unobligated funds available to any element of the 
     intelligence community for such activities for a prior fiscal 
     year, shall be available to support a unified campaign 
     against narcotics trafficking and against activities by 
     organizations designated as terrorist organizations (such as 
     the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the 
     National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense 
     Forces of Colombia (AUC)), and to take actions to protect 
     human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, 
     including undertaking rescue operations.

     SEC. 502. PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE NATIONAL 
                   RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
     section 105C (50 U.S.C. 403-5c) the following new section:


``protection of operational files of the national reconnaissance office

       ``Sec. 105D. (a) Exemption of Certain Operational Files 
     From Search, Review, Publication, or Disclosure.--(1) The 
     Director of the

[[Page 14334]]

     National Reconnaissance Office, with the coordination of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, may exempt operational 
     files of the National Reconnaissance Office from the 
     provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, 
     which require publication, disclosure, search, or review in 
     connection therewith.
       ``(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), for the purposes of 
     this section, the term `operational files' means files of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office (hereafter in this section 
     referred to as `NRO') that document the means by which 
     foreign intelligence or counterintelligence is collected 
     through scientific and technical systems.
       ``(B) Files which are the sole repository of disseminated 
     intelligence are not operational files.
       ``(3) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), exempted operational 
     files shall continue to be subject to search and review for 
     information concerning--
       ``(A) United States citizens or aliens lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence who have requested information on 
     themselves pursuant to the provisions of section 552 or 552a 
     of title 5, United States Code;
       ``(B) any special activity the existence of which is not 
     exempt from disclosure under the provisions of section 552 of 
     title 5, United States Code; or
       ``(C) the specific subject matter of an investigation by 
     any of the following for any impropriety, or violation of 
     law, Executive order, or Presidential directive, in the 
     conduct of an intelligence activity:
       ``(i) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.
       ``(ii) The Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       ``(iii) The Intelligence Oversight Board.
       ``(iv) The Department of Justice.
       ``(v) The Office of General Counsel of NRO.
       ``(vi) The Office of the Director of NRO.
       ``(4)(A) Files that are not exempted under paragraph (1) 
     which contain information derived or disseminated from 
     exempted operational files shall be subject to search and 
     review.
       ``(B) The inclusion of information from exempted 
     operational files in files that are not exempted under 
     paragraph (1) shall not affect the exemption under paragraph 
     (1) of the originating operational files from search, review, 
     publication, or disclosure.
       ``(C) The declassification of some of the information 
     contained in exempted operational files shall not affect the 
     status of the operational file as being exempt from search, 
     review, publication, or disclosure.
       ``(D) Records from exempted operational files which have 
     been disseminated to and referenced in files that are not 
     exempted under paragraph (1) and which have been returned to 
     exempted operational files for sole retention shall be 
     subject to search and review.
       ``(5) The provisions of paragraph (1) may not be superseded 
     except by a provision of law which is enacted after the date 
     of the enactment of this section, and which specifically 
     cites and repeals or modifies its provisions.
       ``(6)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), whenever 
     any person who has requested agency records under section 552 
     of title 5, United States Code, alleges that NRO has withheld 
     records improperly because of failure to comply with any 
     provision of this section, judicial review shall be available 
     under the terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, 
     United States Code.
       ``(B) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner 
     provided for under subparagraph (A) as follows:
       ``(i) In any case in which information specifically 
     authorized under criteria established by an Executive order 
     to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or 
     foreign relations is filed with, or produced for, the court 
     by NRO, such information shall be examined ex parte, in 
     camera by the court.
       ``(ii) The court shall, to the fullest extent practicable, 
     determine the issues of fact based on sworn written 
     submissions of the parties.
       ``(iii) When a complainant alleges that requested records 
     are improperly withheld because of improper placement solely 
     in exempted operational files, the complainant shall support 
     such allegation with a sworn written submission based upon 
     personal knowledge or otherwise admissible evidence.
       ``(iv)(I) When a complainant alleges that requested records 
     were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of 
     operational files, NRO shall meet its burden under section 
     552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by demonstrating 
     to the court by sworn written submission that exempted 
     operational files likely to contain responsible records 
     currently perform the functions set forth in paragraph (2).
       ``(II) The court may not order NRO to review the content of 
     any exempted operational file or files in order to make the 
     demonstration required under subclause (I), unless the 
     complainant disputes NRO's showing with a sworn written 
     submission based on personal knowledge or otherwise 
     admissible evidence.
       ``(v) In proceedings under clauses (iii) and (iv), the 
     parties may not obtain discovery pursuant to rules 26 through 
     36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except that 
     requests for admissions may be made pursuant to rules 26 and 
     36.
       ``(vi) If the court finds under this paragraph that NRO has 
     improperly withheld requested records because of failure to 
     comply with any provision of this subsection, the court shall 
     order NRO to search and review the appropriate exempted 
     operational file or files for the requested records and make 
     such records, or portions thereof, available in accordance 
     with the provisions of section 552 of title 5, United States 
     Code, and such order shall be the exclusive remedy for 
     failure to comply with this subsection.
       ``(vii) If at any time following the filing of a complaint 
     pursuant to this paragraph NRO agrees to search the 
     appropriate exempted operational file or files for the 
     requested records, the court shall dismiss the claim based 
     upon such complaint.
       ``(viii) Any information filed with, or produced for the 
     court pursuant to clauses (i) and (iv) shall be coordinated 
     with the Director of Central Intelligence prior to submission 
     to the court.
       ``(b) Decennial Review of Exempted Operational Files.--(1) 
     Not less than once every 10 years, the Director of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office and the Director of Central 
     Intelligence shall review the exemptions in force under 
     subsection (a)(1) to determine whether such exemptions may be 
     removed from the category of exempted files or any portion 
     thereof. The Director of Central Intelligence must approve 
     any determination to remove such exemptions.
       ``(2) The review required by paragraph (1) shall include 
     consideration of the historical value or other public 
     interest in the subject matter of the particular category of 
     files or portions thereof and the potential for declassifying 
     a significant part of the information contained therein.
       ``(3) A complainant that alleges that NRO has improperly 
     withheld records because of failure to comply with this 
     subsection may seek judicial review in the district court of 
     the United States of the district in which any of the parties 
     reside, or in the District of Columbia. In such a proceeding, 
     the court's review shall be limited to determining the 
     following:
       ``(A) Whether NRO has conducted the review required by 
     paragraph (1) before the expiration of the 10-year period 
     beginning on the date of the enactment of this section or 
     before the expiration of the 10-year period beginning on the 
     date of the most recent review.
       ``(B) Whether NRO, in fact, considered the criteria set 
     forth in paragraph (2) in conducting the required review.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents contained in 
     the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 105C the following new item:

``Sec. 105D. Protection of operational files of the National 
              Reconnaissance Office.''.

     SEC. 503. ELIGIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES IN INTELLIGENCE SENIOR 
                   LEVEL POSITIONS FOR PRESIDENTIAL RANK AWARDS.

       Section 1607 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(c) Award of Rank to Employees in Intelligence Senior 
     Level Positions.--The President, based on the recommendations 
     of the Secretary of Defense, may award a rank referred to in 
     section 4507a of title 5 to employees in Intelligence Senior 
     Level positions designated under subsection (a). The award of 
     such rank shall be made in a manner consistent with the 
     provisions of that section.''.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. No amendment to that amendment shall be in 
order except those printed in the designated place in the Congressional 
Record and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Amendments 
printed in the Record may be offered only by the Member who caused it 
to be printed or his designee and shall be considered read.
  Are there any amendments to the bill?


                 Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Roemer

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 9 offered by Mr. Roemer:
       At the end (page 30, after line 7), add the following new 
     title:

  TITLE VI--NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
                                STATES.

     SEC. 601. ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMISSION.

       There is established the National Commission on Terrorist 
     Attacks Upon the United States (in this title referred to as 
     the ``Commission'').

     SEC. 602. COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) Members.--Subject to the requirements of subsection 
     (b), the Commission shall be composed of 10 members, of 
     whom--
       (1) 3 members shall be appointed by the majority leader of 
     the Senate;
       (2) 3 members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives;
       (3) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of 
     the Senate; and
       (4) 2 members shall be appointed by the minority leader of 
     the House of Representatives.
       (b) Qualifications.--
       (1) Political party affiliation.--Not more than 5 members 
     of the Commission shall be from the same political party.
       (2) Nongovernmental appointees.--No member of the 
     Commission shall be an officer or employee of the Federal 
     Government or any State or local government.

[[Page 14335]]

       (3) Other qualifications.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     individuals appointed to the Commission should be prominent 
     United States citizens, with national recognition and 
     significant depth of experience in such professions as 
     governmental service and intelligence gathering.
       (c) Chairperson; Vice Chairperson.--
       (1) In general.--Subject to the requirement of paragraph 
     (2), the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Commission 
     shall be elected by the members.
       (2) Political party affiliation.--The Chairperson and Vice 
     Chairperson shall not be from the same political party.
       (d) Initial Meeting.--If 60 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, 6 or more members of the Commission 
     have been appointed, those members who have been appointed 
     may meet and, if necessary, select a temporary Chairperson 
     and Vice Chairperson, who may begin the operations of the 
     Commission, including the hiring of staff.
       (e) Quorum; Vacancies.--After its initial meeting, the 
     Commission shall meet upon the call of the Chairperson or a 
     majority of its members. Six members of the Commission shall 
     constitute a quorum. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not 
     affect its powers, but shall be filled in the same manner in 
     which the original appointment was made.

     SEC. 603. FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) In General.--The functions of the Commission are to--
       (1) review the implementation by the intelligence community 
     of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of--
       (A) the Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives regarding the 
     terrorist attacks against the United States which occurred on 
     September 11, 2001;
       (B) other reports and investigations of the House Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate; and
       (C) other such executive branch, congressional, or 
     independent commission investigations of such the terrorist 
     attacks or the intelligence community;
       (2) make recommendations on additional actions for 
     implementation of the findings, recommendations and 
     conclusions referred to in paragraph (1);
       (3) review resource allocation and other prioritizations of 
     the intelligence community for counterterrorism and make 
     recommendations for such changes in those allocations and 
     prioritization to ensure that counterterrorism receives 
     sufficient attention and support from the intelligence 
     community;
       (4) review and recommend changes to the organization of the 
     intelligence community, in particular the division of 
     agencies under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense 
     and the Director of Central Intelligence, the dual 
     responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as 
     head of the intelligence community and as head of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, and the separation of agencies with 
     responsibility for intelligence collection, analysis, and 
     dissemination; and
       (5) determine what technologies, procedures, and 
     capabilities are needed for the intelligence community to 
     effectively support and conduct future counterterrorism 
     missions, and recommend how these capabilities should be 
     developed, acquired, or both from entities outside the 
     intelligence community, including from private entities.
       (b) Definition of Intelligence Community.--In this section, 
     the term ``intelligence community'' means--
       (1) the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 
     which shall include the Office of the Deputy Director of 
     Central Intelligence and the National Intelligence Council;
       (2) the Central Intelligence Agency;
       (3) the National Security Agency;
       (4) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
       (5) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency
       (6) the National Reconnaissance Office;
       (7) other offices within the Department of Defense for the 
     collection of specialized national intelligence through 
     reconnaissance programs;
       (8) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the 
     Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department 
     of Energy, and the Coast Guard;
       (9) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the 
     Department of State; and
       (10) such other elements of any other department or agency 
     as are designated by the President, or designated jointly by 
     the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the 
     department or agency concerned, as an element of the 
     intelligence community under section 3(4)(J) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(J)).

     SEC. 604. POWERS OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) Hearings and Evidence.--The Commission may, for 
     purposes of carrying out this title--
       (1) hold hearings, sit and act at times and places, take 
     testimony, receive evidence, and administer oaths; and
       (2) require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and 
     testimony of witnesses and the production of books, records, 
     correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents.
       (b) Subpoenas.--
       (1) Service.--Subpoenas issued under subsection (a)(2) may 
     be served by any person designated by the Commission.
       (2) Enforcement.--
       (A) In general.--In the case of contumacy or failure to 
     obey a subpoena issued under subsection (a)(2), the United 
     States district court for the judicial district in which the 
     subpoenaed person resides, is served, or may be found, or 
     where the subpoena is returnable, may issue an order 
     requiring such person to appear at any designated place to 
     testify or to produce documentary or other evidence. Any 
     failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the 
     court as a contempt of that court.
       (B) Additional enforcement.--Sections 102 through 104 of 
     the Revised Statutes of the United States (2 U.S.C. 192 
     through 194) shall apply in the case of any failure of any 
     witness to comply with any subpoena or to testify when 
     summoned under authority of this section.
       (c) Closed Meetings.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law which would require meetings of the Commission to be 
     open to the public, any portion of a meeting of the 
     Commission may be closed to the public if the President 
     determines that such portion is likely to disclose matters 
     that could endanger national security.
       (d) Contracting.--The Commission may, to such extent and in 
     such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter 
     into contracts to enable the Commission to discharge its 
     duties under this title.
       (e) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may 
     secure directly from any department, agency, or 
     instrumentality of the United States any information related 
     to any inquiry of the Commission conducted under this title. 
     Each such department, agency, or instrumentality shall, to 
     the extent authorized by law, furnish such information 
     directly to the Commission upon request.
       (f) Assistance From Federal Agencies.--
       (1) General services administration.--The Administrator of 
     General Services shall provide to the Commission on a 
     reimbursable basis administrative support and other services 
     for the performance of the Commission's functions.
       (2) Other departments and agencies.--In addition to the 
     assistance prescribed in paragraph (1), departments and 
     agencies of the United States are authorized to provide to 
     the Commission such services, funds, facilities, staff, and 
     other support services as they may determine advisable and as 
     may be authorized by law.
       (g) Gifts.--The Commission may, to such extent and in such 
     amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, accept, use, 
     and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property.
       (h) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United 
     States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions 
     as departments and agencies of the United States.
       (i) Powers of Subcommittees, Members, and Agents.--Any 
     subcommittee, member, or agent of the Commission may, if 
     authorized by the Commission, take any action which the 
     Commission is authorized to take by this section.

     SEC. 605. STAFF OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) Director.--The Commission shall have a Director who 
     shall be appointed by the Chairperson and the Vice 
     Chairperson, acting jointly.
       (b) Staff.--The Chairperson, in consultation with the Vice 
     Chairperson, may appoint additional personnel as may be 
     necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its 
     functions.
       (c) Applicability of Certain Civil Service Laws.--The 
     Director and staff of the Commission may be appointed without 
     regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, 
     governing appointments in the competitive service, and may be 
     paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and 
     subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to 
     classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that no 
     rate of pay fixed under this subsection may exceed the 
     equivalent of that payable for a position at level V of the 
     Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United 
     States Code. Any individual appointed under subsection (a) or 
     (b) shall be treated as an employee for purposes of chapters 
     63, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, and 90 of that title.
       (d) Detailees.--Any Federal Government employee may be 
     detailed to the Commission without reimbursement from the 
     Commission, and such detailee shall retain the rights, 
     status, and privileges of his or her regular employment 
     without interruption.
       (e) Consultant Services.--The Commission is authorized to 
     procure the services of experts and consultants in accordance 
     with section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, but at 
     rates not to exceed the daily rate paid a person occupying a 
     position at level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 
     5315 of title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 606. COMPENSATION AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.

       (a) Compensation.--Each member of the Commission may be 
     compensated at not to exceed the daily equivalent of the 
     annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at

[[Page 14336]]

     level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of 
     title 5, United States Code, for each day during which that 
     member is engaged in the actual performance of the duties of 
     the Commission.
       (b) Travel Expenses.--While away from their homes or 
     regular places of business in the performance of services for 
     the Commission, members of the Commission shall be allowed 
     travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, 
     in the same manner as persons employed intermittently in the 
     Government service are allowed expenses under section 5703(b) 
     of title 5, United States Code.

     SEC. 607. SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR COMMISSION MEMBERS AND 
                   STAFF.

       The appropriate executive departments and agencies shall 
     cooperate with the Commission in expeditiously providing to 
     the Commission members and staff appropriate security 
     clearances in a manner consistent with existing procedures 
     and requirements, except that no person shall be provided 
     with access to classified information under this section who 
     would not otherwise qualify for such security clearance.

     SEC. 608. REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION; TERMINATION.

       (a) Initial Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
     of the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall 
     submit to the President and Congress an initial report 
     containing--
       (1) such findings, conclusions, and recommendations for 
     corrective measures as have been agreed to by a majority of 
     Commission members; and
       (2) such findings, conclusions, and recommendations 
     regarding the scope of jurisdiction of, and the allocation of 
     jurisdiction among, the committees of Congress with oversight 
     responsibilities related to the scope of the investigation of 
     the Commission as have been agreed to by a majority of 
     Commission members.
       (b) Final Report.--Not later than 6 months after the 
     submission of the initial report of the Commission, the 
     Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a final 
     report containing such updated findings, conclusions, and 
     recommendations described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
     subsection (a) as have been agreed to by a majority of 
     Commission members.
       (c) Noninterference With Congressional Joint Inquiry.--
     Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Commission shall not 
     submit any report of the Commission until a reasonable period 
     after the conclusion of the Joint Inquiry of the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks against the 
     United States which occurred on September 11, 2001.
       (d) Termination.--
       (1) In general.--The Commission, and all the authorities of 
     this title, shall terminate 60 days after the date on which 
     the final report is submitted under subsection (b).
       (2) Administrative activities before termination.--The 
     Commission may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph 
     (1) for the purpose of concluding its activities, including 
     providing testimony to committees of Congress concerning its 
     reports and disseminating the second report.

     SEC. 609. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission 
     to carry out this title $3,000,000, to remain available until 
     expended.

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment which is bipartisan, 
by Democrats and Republicans, to create a bipartisan commission, a blue 
ribbon commission, to look back at what happened prior to 9-11 and fix 
the problems, not through a political witch hunt, not through blame, 
but looking back to fix mistakes so we can move forward and prevent 
future terrorist attacks.
  This is a bipartisan amendment offered by the gentleman from New 
Jersey (Mr. Smith), the gentlewoman from New Jersey (Mrs. Roukema), the 
gentleman from New York (Mr. Quinn), the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
Ferguson), the gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher), the 
gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Taylor), the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi), the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Shows), 
and a host of other 108 Members, including the gentleman from 
Washington (Mr. Dicks), distinguished former chairman; and the 
gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), distinguished ranking member 
from Defense.
  Back on 9-11, I distinctly remember just a few days after our Twin 
Towers were hit in New York City, going up to that site with members of 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. We were talking to 
emergency workers, family members, people affected in New York directly 
by these attacks. It is one of the most difficult things I think 
anybody can do in public life, and I can only imagine what the people 
themselves have been through, losing wives and husbands, brothers and 
sisters.
  Now, we might say, why should we create this blue ribbon commission? 
The United States, after Pearl Harbor was attacked, it took them 11 
days to create a commission to look into what happened. President 
Roosevelt acted and acted immediately. After Kobar Towers were 
attacked, we put a commission together. When the Marines were killed in 
Lebanon, we put a commission together. When the embassies were attacked 
in Africa, we put a commission together.
  Why have we not put a commission together yet after we lose 3,000 
Americans in the worst terrorist attack in the Nation's history? That 
is what I am asking. We need to do it.
  Second, we will hear some arguments, maybe from some of my 
colleagues, that we are doing a joint inquiry with the House and the 
Senate. I serve on that joint inquiry, and I am very proud of it. But 
when we have lost 3,000 people, when this report that we read today on 
the House floor says that we see a host of different intelligence 
problems out there, language, human intelligence, analytical 
capabilities, too much stovepiping, not enough communications between 
Departments, not enough good communication between Washington and field 
offices, a host of problems across the board, we are not going to take 
another 18 months to look at these and fix them? We cannot get Lee 
Hamilton or George Schultz or people that know the right answers and 
questions and have worked on these things without elections 
intervening, without timelines in the way, without politics, to look at 
this, when we have done it almost every other time?
  I think we need two looks. The joint inquiry will do a nice job, and 
so can this blue ribbon commission.
  We also, thirdly, Mr. Chairman, will be creating a Homeland Security 
Department tomorrow or the next day; 170,000 people, $20 billion, $30 
billion. We should get it right. We should make sure that that can 
attack our enemy who is not a sovereign state, but comprised of cells 
across the world, of four people. Let us make sure this commission can 
get it right.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude. I recently met with a woman, 
Kristen Breitweiser, who lost her husband in the attacks in 9-11. In my 
office, she handed me a ring that was around her finger, just like the 
one I have. And she said, Mr. Roemer, I want you to help create this 
commission. This is my husband's ring who died at the World Trade tower 
when it collapsed. This is all I have left. Congress has not done 
anything yet to answer the questions. My daughter does not have the 
answers. You have done it every time in U.S. history. Why not now? Why 
not today, and why not build better intelligence for the future?
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan blue 
ribbon commission.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentleman's 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I wish I could agree with everything that my colleague, 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), just said. I agree with a 
great deal of what he just said. The problem is, this is the wrong 
vehicle, and this is the wrong type of blue ribbon committee.

                              {time}  0000

  In fact, in order to be germane to this bill, this blue ribbon 
committee will be limited in what it can do to just what the oversight 
and intelligence committees actually do. Otherwise, this would be a 
nongermane amendment, as we all know, and actually the intelligence 
committees are planning to continue doing just what they are doing. 
And, in fact, they are not only doing their daily job but we are doing 
a joint bicameral 9-11 review.
  So virtually actually everything that the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Roemer) said this blue ribbon commission could do, is being done by the 
committee in their daily work and the joint committee, the 9-11 review.
  I would also point out that while I agree with the gentleman's idea 
to have a genuine bona fide blue ribbon national committee that has 
much

[[Page 14337]]

broader scope to deal with this as they did in Pearl Harbor, that would 
include such things as Presidential appointees in addition to the 
congressional appointees, that would include such things as looking 
into the oversight of how Congress does its job. We should be held 
accountable too on the oversight committees. And a true blue ribbon 
commission could do that. This commission is not going to be able to do 
that.
  What we basically have is a proposal that is a little strangulated in 
order to comply with the germaneness rules. So what we have is a lot of 
duplication to what we are already doing. In fact, a lot of work that 
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) and their subcommittee did so well and so 
proudly, and I think it is being digested now. So we have duplicative 
work in part of this. Then we have a part of this that talks about a 
lot of provisions that I do not think are very well crafted. I am not 
sure how the noninterference provision works, and we do not want to 
have interference with the 9-11 work that is ongoing because it is 
extremely important.
  I know a good faith effort was made to make sure there is no 
interference but I am not sure that is actually the result. I think 
there does need to be an executive branch appointment to this. I do not 
think Congress should reserve the right to make all the appointees.
  I think back to the Aspen Brown Commission and how it profited from 
having outsiders come in. I think that was a valuable lesson that I 
learned because that is sort of what we are looking for here, another 
9-11.
  I would also point out there are other committees of jurisdiction 
that should be involved in appointing a blue ribbon committee. We have 
not had hearings on that. I know there is a freestanding bill which I 
believe deserves to be heard by those committees. They should go 
through the process, and we should come out with a blue ribbon 
committee that actually provides the views of the working standing 
committees of this House and all of those who have equity in it, rather 
than to try at midnight on this lovely day to put together what is 
really sort of a jury-rigged proposal. Well-intended, I take nothing 
away from that.
  I think, finally, the one thing I want to congratulate the gentleman 
for is I agree entirely with him. He is doing something which is very 
important here which is requiring that there be a look at intelligence 
architectural reform. I totally support him in that effort. I think 
that part of this is good, but when you add it all up, I do not think 
this is the right place to do what he wants to do. And I am afraid his 
co-sponsors from New Jersey are going to be very disappointed. They are 
going to be delivering a product to those survivors who are also 
talking to me, believe me, and we have some in my district. This is not 
going to do the job they want because it does not have the scope to do 
it.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. ROEMER. As the Chairman knows, if we had crafted the amendment 
the way the gentleman would have suggested to be a bit broader, he 
probably would have objected to it on a point of order. And the 
Committee on Rules did not protect my amendment to do those very 
things. Does the gentleman have a suggestion?
  Mr. GOSS. Reclaiming my time, there are four other chairmen and four 
other ranking committee members, and all the members of those 
committees who are counting on the rules of the House to make sure that 
they get their equities protected in what the gentleman is trying to 
propose.
  And the gentleman knows, and as we have talked before, I am not 
opposed to what he is trying to do. I am opposed to trying to do it in 
this restricted scope way that does not accomplish his purpose and adds 
a burden to my bill and which, frankly, I do not think will serve the 
purpose either of us wants.
  Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, last fall the committee approved a creation of an 
independent commission to examine all aspects of the September 11 
attacks. In the course of the legislative process, that proposal was 
first weakened and ultimately eliminated. I supported the commission 
concept not because I was concerned that the intelligence committees 
could not review adequately the performance of the intelligence 
agencies in the months leading up to September 11, but because I knew 
that review would be limited necessarily to those agencies.
  The September 11 story extends beyond the intelligence agencies, and 
to be told comprehensively, needs to assess the performance of agencies 
outside the intelligence community. A commission that is unencumbered 
by jurisdictional concerns could take that kind of comprehensive look 
at September 11.
  I would hope that the House tonight would have a chance to again 
consider a commission proposal like the one that was approved by the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence last year. Although that 
will apparently not be the case, I believe the commission amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) will make a valuable 
contribution to a better national understanding of the September 11 
events and what is being done within the intelligence community to 
respond to them. Therefore, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  We have a blue ribbon commission. It has already been established. 
The gentleman is a member of it. We are standing around here for an 
hour praising each other about what great experts we are, what a great 
chairman we have, what a great ranking member we have. Does the 
gentleman know why? Because they are all experienced people. Some of 
the people having doing the work for years.
  I have only been on it for 2\1/2\ years. I know the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has been on it longer than that. You are an 
expert. In certain areas you are an expert. Yes, you are. You know you 
are.
  I certainly think the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and 
the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss) are experts after the work 
they did on the anti-terrorism report that they just came out with. And 
no one would deny that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) are experts.
  We have a blue ribbon commission and it has been working. We have 25 
professional staff people from both sides that are working very hard on 
this. And the last thing we need to do is establish another commission 
that would take a year to establish, to hire staff. You talk about 
being behind the eight ball and getting answers for people, it is not 
going to happen.
  What about the leaks? The two chairmen just sent a letter to the FBI 
asking for an investigation of leaks. So what are we going to do? Share 
information with the world? Under the Roemer amendment, they can 
subpoena people. They will have public hearings. They can bring in the 
CIA director, the FBI director, they will testify before the whole 
world. What purpose will that serve, particularly when we are trying to 
help the intelligence community become better at what they are doing? 
Not by sharing it with the world, not by having subpoena power, not by 
allowing people to hold public meetings.
  This is a ridiculous idea, particularly given the fact that we have a 
blue ribbon commission by the people that are already experts in it 
anyway.
  We had this debate a year ago in the committee. We had a real, real 
spirited debate and we had it here on the floor. And eventually when 
the bill, the conference committee from the Intelligence Committee came 
forward, this was not included because I think people realize what a 
bad idea it is. There is really a bad idea.
  The gentleman talked about four commissions, and he cited them very 
well but what did they accomplish? I guarantee that their reports are 
sitting on shelves somewhere around here.

[[Page 14338]]

What the recommendations they made, nobody could probably really cite. 
So I do not know what purpose they really have served.
  This is a bad idea because it would take too long to establish, to 
hire the staff. This is a bad idea because they do have good people 
working on this. And the last thing I think we want is to really 
infringe on the ability of the intelligence community, to be 
subpoenaed, to testify in public, to reveal the secrets.
  If people wanted to see the bill that we are going to pass here, it 
is not here. Do you know why? If you want to go up to the committee you 
can see it, but it is not here because we do not want people to know 
how much money we are spending, how many more people we are going to 
hire because that really infringes on the ability of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence to do their work. And yet the 
gentleman wants to have a commission established to shine light on 9-
11.
  We all want answers, and I think we will get answers. We have gotten 
some answers from the good report that was done by the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Harman) and the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss). 
We will get answers from our joint staff committee. We have great staff 
people working on that. I think the last thing we need to do is ask 
distinguished Americans, who would take a long time to appoint, to come 
forward and do this.
  I really ask Members to think about this. This is very bad for the 
intelligence community. It is very bad for our ability to keep secrets. 
It is very bad for the professional people who would have to come and 
testify and swear under oath, the CIA director, the FBI director, 
people who work in these agencies. This is just unworkable. We are 
going to get the answers we want. We are going to get the answers for 
the families of victims. I have no doubt of that because we have good 
people working on this. And I think in the end, we will come out with a 
report that will shed light and give answers to many of the things that 
we need to know.

                              {time}  0010

  I hope Members will vote against this; and I hope when we do vote it 
down, this will be the end of it, and we will not have to revisit this 
again because this just does not make any sense for the kind of work 
that we do in the intelligence-gathering community.
  So I ask Members to vote against this very, very bad amendment. It is 
a lousy amendment. It is not going to serve any purpose, and it really 
does not make any sense in light of all the other things we are doing 
around here, all the activity that is going on, all the staff that are 
hired and collecting information and trying to figure out what is 
happening.
  All the members of the committee have been sitting through those 2-
day-a-week full-day hearings that are going on by our joint committee. 
There is a lot of information. Members really have to pay attention, 
and to think that some blue ribbon group from around the country is 
going to get up to speed on this, it is going to take a year to appoint 
them, and then to get up to speed, it will be another 2 years with a 
recommendation.
  Bad idea, bad amendment. Vote it down. My colleagues will be doing a 
favor to the intelligence community.
  Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise in very strong support of this well-thought-out amendment. Let 
me preface my remarks by saying how much respect and admiration I have 
for the members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I 
want to acknowledge the hours and hours of work they have put in, their 
integrity, their dedication to this process. I think they have done 
their country a great service, and I commend each and every member of 
the committee for that.
  Many Members of the Chamber will remember a lot about the events of 
September 11, 2001, as do I. I also remember how I felt on the morning 
of September 12, 2001. I woke up, and the first thought that came to my 
mind was that in the 11 years that I had served in this body I had 
voted to spend about a half a trillion dollars' worth of taxpayers' 
money on building an intelligence establishment; and I asked myself 
what role I had, what responsibility I had in what seemed to me to be a 
failure of that establishment to defend our country against the 
calamities of September 11.
  I am not here tonight to point any fingers at any agency or any 
person. I do not know what the chain of causation was that led to the 
events of September 11, but here is one thing that I do know. I do know 
that each one of us and each Member in the other body and each 
institution in American government has questions that need to be asked 
about it and about its role.
  I want to reemphasize, the leadership and work of the individuals who 
served on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence is not the 
point of my remarks. I wish that we all had the degree of expertise and 
effort that these individuals have put in, but I think we have to ask 
some hard questions about the House and about the other body, about 
what we have done, about what we have failed to do, about what policy-
making institutions in this country have done dating back to 1995 and 
some of the other controversial decisions and policies that have been 
implemented.
  I think we are never going to be able to go forward and put together 
a prospective strategy to do everything we can to avoid another 
calamity like the one we saw last September unless every institution is 
subjected to scrutiny; and with all due respect to my colleagues in 
this House, I do not believe that we can subject ourselves to that same 
kind of scrutiny because we have a vested interest in the answer to 
that question.
  No impugning of anyone's integrity or ability, but I would simply 
make the point that part of this assessment of the future strategy of 
success for our intelligence capability must include answering the hard 
question, What responsibility do we have to bear for the decisions that 
led up to September 11? I think the question needs to be evaluated by 
people outside of this institution who do not stand for election and do 
not stand for the back and forth of the legislative process that we do.
  So, again, in full respect for and commendation for the work of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and its various 
subcommittees, I believe we need the gentleman from Indiana's (Mr. 
Roemer) proposal. I think we need to have people outside of our own 
structure take a look at our own responsibility, and I think is the way 
to do it.
  I would urge a ``yes'' vote in favor of this amendment.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, today we have an opportunity to take an important step 
for the security of our Nation to establish an independent, and I want 
to emphasize that, bipartisan, and I want to emphasize that, 
commission, external commission that will determine where our defense 
and intelligence systems failed on September 11, so that we can prevent 
future tragedies and we can say with assurance that there were defense 
and intelligence system failures on September 11, and in order to 
identify those, we need help, for people to step back and look at it.
  There is a place for the kinds of studies that the committee has 
done. There is a place for internal evaluations in each of the Federal 
agencies involved, but with the Roemer amendment, we would establish an 
independent commission consisting of, say, 10 Members, appointed in a 
bipartisan way, and the commission would report its findings and 
conclusions in a way that would earn the trust of the American public; 
and believe me, we need to do that if we are going to come up with 
conclusions that will be useful to America in preventing future 
calamities.
  Some would say that investigations will be used to play politics, but 
this amendment is not about politics. This independent commission is 
about fact finding, not fault finding. We need to look at our 
government's weaknesses and correct them. It is our duty as 
legislators.

[[Page 14339]]

  A few weeks ago, I joined a group of central New Jerseyians, 
principally widows and surviving family members of those who were 
killed in the attack on the World Trade Center. I joined them at a 
rally here in Washington where they were calling for just this kind of 
commission, and I would say any of my colleagues who spoke with those 
family members that day or since would understand why passing this 
amendment is so important.
  Our government leaders from the White House keep telling the public 
that another terrorist attack is inevitable. It is not a question of 
whether, but when, they say. Well, another attack would be inevitable 
only if we do not learn from our previous mistakes, if we do not fully 
examine what went wrong prior to September 11, 2001.
  I urge my colleagues to pass this amendment.
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I may be in a minority of one on this floor on this 
subject. I was not a fan of the broad commission proposal. I am a fan 
of the narrower version that the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) is 
offering. I believe I am the only person on this floor and I may be the 
only person in the House to have served on an independent, bipartisan, 
external national commission on terrorism.
  I was appointed by the minority leader in 1999 to serve on a 10-
member commission, sounds a lot like this one, that was to investigate 
the terrorist threat. It was ably chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, 
called the Bremer Commission, and I became one of the 10 commissioners.
  We reported in 2000 that we believed there could be a major terrorist 
attack on U.S. soil in the near future. We recommended suspending the 
guidelines on recruiting human assets, that have been discussed 
earlier, that we thought hampered their recruitment. We recommended 
strengthening legal authorities for FBI investigations. We recommended 
better monitoring of students in the U.S.
  Guess what, Mr. Chairman. These were good recommendations. We 
testified to them in the Senate. They were printed up all over and 
praised on the editorial pages, and they were ignored. So I would say 
to the survivors of the horrific September 11 attacks that setting up a 
new commission may be a good idea, but it may also raise expectations 
that will ultimately be dashed.
  That is why I like the narrow version of the commission because what 
the narrow version says is this commission, if it is enacted, will 
focus on whether the recommendations of prior commissions and the joint 
inquiry and the Chambliss subcommittee will be implemented.

                              {time}  0020

  That, it seems to me, is a function we ought to be undertaking.
  It also will talk about additional ways to make certain that the 
counterterrorism mission is central to all our intelligence agencies. 
And then it will do the thing that our chairman has just said needs 
doing, which is tackle the tough organizational questions of our 
intelligence community, which too often get ignored because they are 
long range and they are too hard for anyone to deal with.
  So I would say to this body that in its narrower form, this 
commission makes a very good contribution to our work. It is not 
duplicative. It will not disappoint people. And I think that the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has been very flexible here in 
revising it so that, at least in the view of this Member, it performs a 
more useful function than his earlier drafts. And so I am going to 
support the Roemer amendment.
  Mr. BURR of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I truly believe tonight that none of the debate will 
change people's minds about how they vote on this amendment, but I 
think it is important that we read from the amendment itself.
  In fact, this amendment says that the responsibility of this 
commission is to review the implementation by the intelligence 
community of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of, A, the 
Joint Inquiry of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and 
the Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence of the House of 
Representatives regarding the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001;
  B, other reports and investigations of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
  C, other such executive branch, congressional, or independent 
commission investigations of such terrorist or the intelligence 
community; and make recommendations on additional actions for 
implementation of such findings, recommendations and conclusions. In 
fact, the mission of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
  It goes on in point (2) to say, review resource allocation and other 
prioritizations of the intelligence community for counterterrorism, 
which are current missions of the House and Senate intelligence 
committees;
  (3) to review and recommend changes to the organization of the 
intelligence community, in particular the division of agencies under 
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
Central Intelligence. In fact, now current responsibilities of the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  (4) determine what technologies, procedures and capabilities are 
needed for the intelligence community to effectively support and 
conduct future counterterrorism missions, and recommend how these 
capabilities should be developed, acquired, or both from entities 
outside the intelligence community, including from private entities. 
Again, a current mission of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Let me just say to my colleagues that I commend the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer). The gentleman is impassioned on this. We have a 
joint inquiry currently in progress of the House and Senate committees. 
Our hope is that by the end of the year to come to this body, the 
Senate, and the American people with a report, and it will be the 
responsibility, then, of the House and Senate committees to make sure 
the recommendations, to make sure the findings, to make sure the 
changes, to make sure the resources, and to make sure the technologies 
that have been identified are incorporated.
  It is the core responsibility of the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence today 
to take up practically every point of this amendment. I would urge my 
colleagues, let us do our work on the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence without the burden of people looking over our 
shoulders, questioning what we are doing. Let us get to the facts, let 
us keep the focus that we have, let us make progress at fixing those 
things that we find are broken, and we will air it to the American 
people in the correct way.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong support of this amendment by the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer). I served for 8 years on the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I have no doubt that 
the chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), and the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) can do a fine investigation.
  What I think is important for the credibility for the American people 
is an independent commission, standing alone, with experts who can take 
a longer view. We all know what the schedule around here is like, and 
that Members have multiple responsibilities, and we understand the time 
it takes to do one of these jobs, to focus in on this and get it right.
  President Roosevelt understood this after Pearl Harbor. He set up a 
commission, a public commission. I think that is a very good model for 
this.

[[Page 14340]]

  And I would say to my friends tonight, late in the evening, does 
anyone have a doubt that this debate might be reversed if Al Gore were 
the President of the United States or if Bill Clinton were still 
President? I can remember all of the investigations of President 
Clinton, one after another. There was great energy on the other side of 
the aisle to have every imaginable investigation.
  I can remember the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence looking 
into Haiti, looking into Iranian arms to Bosnia, technology transfer to 
China, campaign finance reform, and impeachment.
  I think the American people understand the politics of this body, and 
I think we will do ourselves a great service to have an independent 
commission looking at this so that the people of this country will have 
confidence that objective people have looked at it not from a political 
perspective.
  The gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) and I did a great job with 
our select subcommittee regarding the transfer of technology. We had a 
unanimous recommendation. But I could still see a commission having 
dealt with that. And I think on this issue, because of its importance 
to the country, the importance to our history, having a commission look 
at this that the American people can have complete faith in, I believe, 
is the right way to go, and I think we should all support the Roemer 
amendment.
  Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words, and I apologize to my colleagues, because the time is getting 
late.
  Mr. Chairman, I have 80 families who lost loved ones in 9-11; sons, 
daughters, fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, husbands, wives, best 
friends, and they want to know why. And I want to know why.
  I know it is beyond just a little part. It is Congress, it is the 
White House, it is a whole host of things that have to be looked at. 
And with no disrespect, no disrespect to the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, they are one part of this issue. And, frankly, they 
are a part of it. They are not independent.
  I chair the Subcommittee on National Security, and we had 19 hearings 
before 9-11. We tried as hard as we could to get someone from the CIA 
to testify. They came with a permission slip from the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence that said they did not have to testify. We 
wanted them to come testify because we wanted to know how was the CIA 
talking to the FBI. My committee has jurisdiction of terrorism at home 
and abroad. We had jurisdiction. We wanted to know how did they 
communicate, and we could not get them before the committee because 
they had a permission slip from one of our committees saying they did 
not have to come.
  We need an independent commission. And the gentleman from Indiana 
(Mr. Roemer) is on target in what he wants to accomplish. 
Unfortunately, his amendment does not allow him to offer the kind of 
amendment he needs to, given its jurisdiction. We need a presidential 
commission that is independent that will tell us ultimately what we all 
know.
  If we had just listened to what the terrorists said in Arabic, we 
would have known about this attack.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SHAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, on the point that the gentleman made about 
that this amendment is not perfect. This amendment could be perfected 
in the conference committee between the House and the Senate.
  I would suggest to the chairman and the ranking member, if they have 
some problems with this particular amendment, work it out in the 
conference committee. That is what we have done over the years.
  Mr. SHAYS. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I think there are many 
ways to work it out. I ultimately believe this should be a commission 
of people outside Congress and outside working for the administration. 
It needs to be people totally independent; people like a Sam Nunn or a 
Warren Rudman, or some others of that status.

                              {time}  0030

  There should not be so many from the Speaker or the minority leader. 
We should not be saying these are our people and the other side of the 
aisle's people.
  I believe the victims, the families of September 11, are ultimately 
going to get a commission because they deserve it, and so do the 
American people. I salute my colleague for bringing this forward, but 
it is not the kind of commission that I would hope we would have.
  Mr. KIND. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I too want to voice my strong support of the Roemer 
amendment being offered this evening. I believe it is the right thing 
to do because this is what great democracies do; they let the sunshine 
in. It is never easy to air dirty laundry for anyone, or to admit to 
certain shortcomings or failings, but there are still many unanswered 
questions that the American people have.
  A great democracy that derives our power by the consent of the 
people, that can only function if we have the faith and confidence of 
the people, need an independent review of what happened to our Nation 
on September 11. This is not without precedence. Prior Presidents have 
called for this when great tragedy was visited upon this country. As 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) acknowledged, 11 days after the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt called for an independent 
commission based on the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. President Reagan 
did the same thing after the Marine barracks incident in Lebanon.
  Let me also state that this is not an easy amendment for the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) to bring. He is a distinguished 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He, as do I, 
has a great deal of respect for all of our colleagues serving and 
working on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, along with 
the very capable and bright staff working on that committee. This is 
not an indictment or questioning the work that they are doing. Yes, 
there is a joint review and an investigation taking place between the 
Senate and the House looking into the events of September 11. We should 
be doing that, and it is being done.
  But what is a little bit sad in the course of this debate this 
evening is that we are having to have this discussion at 12:30 in the 
morning within the House of Representatives when the President of the 
United States himself should have been calling for the establishment of 
a nonpartisan, outside independent commission looking into the events 
of September 11. That is the type of leadership that we need right now 
in this country, and it can only be provided by the President of the 
United States.
  I appreciate the concerns of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) 
regarding the wording of this amendment and certain restrictions that 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) had to meet in order to make 
this amendment germane so we could at least have a discussion of this 
important topic this evening; but if the President were to move forward 
by calling for a commission, certain accommodations can be made so that 
the commission can be comprised of a distinguished group of 
individuals, and we all have a list of who those people could be 
serving on it, that could approach this subject in a cool, 
dispassionate, and nonpartisan fashion.
  They could conduct their work without interfering with the ongoing 
duties and responsibilities taking place in the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. They could also conduct their work so that 
it protects the basic operation and methods of intelligence gathering 
so we do not air to the rest of the world, especially our enemies and 
future terrorists, how we gather this type of information.
  These things can be done because they have been done in the past. 
That is why I think this amendment has merit. I think ultimately the 
American people will not be satisfied unless they get an objective 
answer by a distinguished panel of outside experts that

[[Page 14341]]

can come in, take a look at this, take the time that they need to 
analyze what happened on September 11, not with the purpose to assess 
blame or point fingers, but to find answers so the changes that we have 
to make will be made.
  In the next 24 hours we may be debating the greatest single change of 
the Federal Government in the last 55 years. The President is 
requesting $40 billion for a new homeland security agency. I agree with 
that. We need to restructure the government to deal with current 
threats; but all of this will not matter if we do not get the 
intelligence aspect of defending our Nation and preventing future 
terrorist attacks right.
  That has to be done. I think there is a great deal of wisdom in 
calling upon a group of outside experts, those who have served in the 
Congress, those who have devoted a lifetime of study and analysis of 
intelligence gathering, to give them the authority on a parallel track 
along with the investigation, the review that is currently taking place 
between the Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence, and working 
with the administration to learn from the mistakes of the past and then 
recommend the policy changes, the structural changes that we have to 
make and move forward on in order to enhance our intelligence-gathering 
capabilities in order to prevent another tragedy from occurring against 
the United States of America. I encourage my colleagues to support the 
Roemer amendment.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong support of the Roemer amendment. 
I hope that our colleagues will join a bipartisan group of Members in 
voting ``aye'' at the end of this debate. This is a very important 
debate for our country. Not only do I support the Roemer amendment for 
an independent commission, I authored legislation for an independent 
commission last year. Indeed, that commission was accepted by the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It was not until we came to 
the floor when others chimed in that my commission was changed and then 
struck from the bill in conference.
  But I want to read from the committee bill from last year because I 
think it is important for the committee to know why an independent 
commission is necessary. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
said, ``The committee believes that the commission will only be 
successful if it is seen to be truly independent of any perceived 
notions about the effectiveness of the activities of the departments 
and agencies it will review. Appointing members with a reputation for 
challenging conventional wisdom, wide perspective, bold and innovative 
thought and broad experience in dealing with complex problems will 
contribute directly to instilling the commission with an independent 
spirit which will enhance the credibility of its work. Those given the 
authority to appoint members of the commission are urged to be 
especially sensitive to the committee's concerns in this regard.''
  I read this, Mr. Chairman, because I think it speaks directly to the 
difference between what this commission's product could be and the work 
of our joint inquiry. As one who has served 10 years, longer than 
anyone on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and I do not 
mean to equate longevity with expertise, certainly our distinguished 
chairman's reputation for knowledge in the intelligence community is 
unsurpassed, but that does not mean that we cannot have a disagreement 
about how we should go forward.
  In our committee we are engaged in a joint inquiry into September 11. 
We owe the families affected by that tragedy some answers. We need to 
reduce risk to the American people, and finding out how September 11 
happened will help us protect the American people.
  Tomorrow we will start debate on the floor on the Department of 
Homeland Security which too has as its goal to reduce risk and increase 
safety for the American people. But there is more that we can do to 
give some answers to the families affected and indeed to every person 
in America about how we can increase safety as much as is humanly 
possible in the world that we live in today.
  What is the harm, I ask Members, of finding out more? What is the 
disadvantage of having fresh eyes look at a situation? When we have had 
some of the family members come to visit us about the September 11 
tragedy, they tell us that just a simple thing like a plane flying 
overhead or a warning of a suspected terrorist attack, and that is not 
ordinary, fills them with terror.

                              {time}  0040

  That is the goal of terrorists, of course, to fill people with 
terror, so that a country changes the way it conducts itself. We are a 
strong country. We will protect and defend the American people as we 
protect and defend the Constitution. In order to do that, we need the 
best possible information. Our joint inquiry is an excellent inquiry. 
Great people are at work on it. I know that we will produce an 
excellent report, largely because of the leadership of the gentleman 
from Florida (Mr. Goss) in the House and Senator Graham in the Senate 
and the rest of us working closely in a bipartisan fashion. We know 
firsthand the excellent work of the people in the intelligence 
community. They need answers, too, I believe, from an independent 
commission with fresh eyes and an entrepreneurial look at what the 
possibilities are.
  We have reviewed in our committee the intelligence aspects. That is 
what the gentleman from Indiana's amendment serves to do as well. I 
would have hoped that he could have gotten a waiver from the Committee 
on Rules for a broader investigation so that we could assess the 
performance of every agency of government which had every 
responsibility. Since that is not the case, I urge our colleagues to 
support this narrower commission, fresh eyes, more safety. Vote ``aye'' 
on the Roemer amendment.
  Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment. There has been 
some comparison with what happened at Pearl Harbor and what happened in 
another number of incidents around the world in recent decades, 
comparing that to September 11.
  September 11 was not a military failure. September 11 was a massive 
intelligence failure. There is a marked difference. There is a 
difference because our intelligence community operates behind closed 
doors. It operates in a fashion where it needs to operate in order to 
gather information on terrorist groups and criminal organizations 
around the world. The terrorist groups around the world would love for 
us to open up our intelligence community to their eyes. I think that is 
a terrible mistake that we would be making and a bad precedent that we 
would be setting.
  Our subcommittee has been working for the last 8 months on a report. 
We have a 142-page classified report on record in the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. We issued a nine-page summary of that 
report. That is the difference. There are nine pages out of 142 pages 
that we can talk to the American public about. In our report, we did 
not pat the intelligence community on the back. We criticized the 
intelligence community where they needed to be criticized and we 
pointed out where their shortfalls existed leading up to September 11.
  The current bicameral committee, the joint inquiry committee, is 
focusing now on the plot. Our committee was a broader investigation, 
but the joint committee is focusing on the plot of September 11. The 19 
hijackers involved, we are looking into exactly where they came from, 
how they got here, what their mindset was and what they did leading up 
to September 11.
  I assure you at the end of the day when that inquiry is completed, 
there will be another classified report that will be a massive 
document. But there will also be a summary report that the American 
people will have that will

[[Page 14342]]

focus on the plot and the American people will have a very good idea of 
what happened leading up to September 11 in the minds of those 19 
hijackers.
  There has been conversation, also, publicly and it has been stated 
over and over here tonight that we may be subject to another attack. 
God forbid that we are, and our intelligence community is working 
better than ever today to ensure that we are not. But what if we are? 
Are we going to have another commission? Where is this going to lead? 
How many commissions are we going to wind up having for any number of 
particular incidents? Suppose we have successes. Are we going to have a 
commission to look into what we did right to disrupt a terrorist act 
that might have been prevented? I think we are asking ourselves tonight 
for the setting of a bad precedent if we do have this commission 
established and this commission moves towards looking at what the joint 
inquiry is looking at today.
  I think at the end of the day when the joint inquiry is completed, 
every single family is going to get satisfaction out of that report in 
knowing what did happen leading up to September 11 and why we were 
unable to prevent it more so than what we were able to see in the 
report that was issued last week. I urge a ``no'' vote on this 
amendment, even though my friend the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
Roemer) is very passionate and I respect his opinion on this, but I 
think it is the wrong way to go.
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  I appreciate the chants of my colleagues, but I think you do 
disservice to the families when we discuss this when you suggest that 
somehow we should vote without a discussion of the Roemer proposal.
  I cannot think of anything more important to the American people with 
the loss that they suffered, that all of us suffered on 9/11, than an 
effort to determine what happened, an effort to determine what happened 
by, as Ranking Member Pelosi said, fresh eyes. To simply have the same 
community looking at itself to make those determinations is 
insufficient.
  The Roemer proposal is not new, radical or mysterious because the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has commissioned many 
independent studies. The gentleman suggested if you have the Roemer 
proposal, then everything has to be public. No, we would have 
classified annexes just like you have a classified annex in the report 
that the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and others put out 
the other day.
  The suggestion is that it is not perfect. Gee, it has been on the 
table for 4 months and I have not seen anybody reach across and say, 
this is what we could do, this would be better, we will help you, we 
could get a waiver because this would be an improvement. Maybe you do 
not see that as your burden. But those are all institutional arguments 
for not doing this and they are the arguments of great institutions in 
decline because great institutions in decline become more and more 
insular. They refuse to listen to the outside. They refuse to seek 
outside knowledge.
  The suggestion was that this would be one more report that Congress 
would ignore. Maybe this report would tell us that Congress failed in 
its duty to the American people by ignoring Hart-Rudman. Maybe there 
was negligence in this body by not addressing Hart-Rudman, because 
apparently it indicated a lot of things that we should have been paying 
attention to in the intelligence community but we were not.
  Think of when NASA lost the space shuttle and the argument was, in 
and out of NASA, how this was going to be done and what had to be done 
to correct it and get the fleet back up and get it flying and return to 
our missions; all laudable goals. But think of the moment when the 
member of the independent commission, Dr. Feynman, took the O-ring and 
put it into the ice water. Think of that moment and what that meant to 
the American people about what was wrong with the shuttle program and 
assumptions that were made about temperature and launches and weather 
conditions, all of which could be justified but turned out to be 
catastrophically wrong. When other great systems, complicated systems 
and sophisticated systems suffer catastrophic failures, in the business 
world they generally turn immediately to outside experts.
  When we suffered the catastrophic failure of the oil rigs in the 
North Sea, we immediately turned to outside experts. The Alaska 
pipeline. The catastrophic fire in the London subway. You say, well, 
that is not 9/11. But when they turned to outside experts, they found 
everyday practices that every day put people's lives at risk in the 
subway. I think it was a Georgia company that did the studies, experts 
in catastrophic failures. Why? Because over time they had built up 
practices that were at odds with the safe passage of people in the 
subway and it had to be redesigned.
  What is the other reason this is important? There are a number of 
them. One, an obligation to the families as has been mentioned by so 
many already. There is also another obligation to the American people. 
The American people have a lot at stake. They have a lot on the table 
with the outcome of this study. What do they have on the table? They 
have their freedoms, because there has been much suggestion that this 
is simply a failure of laws, new laws that need to be enacted or old 
laws, and that is simply the failure.

                              {time}  0050

  That may be the case. But we do not know that yet. Yet people are 
being asked to given up their freedoms, people are being asked to let 
their neighbors spy on them, people are being asked to have their 
freedom of travel changed, all of which appears necessary to me. But we 
do not know that, because we do not know the threat assessment versus 
those freedoms and the failures of the system prior to that.
  But somehow we cannot do this. Somehow we are told that if we have an 
independent review, that would be catastrophic for this system, because 
all of the arguments are interesting, they just do not go to the point 
of whether or not we are going to participate.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The time of the gentleman 
from California (Mr. George Miller) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. George Miller of California was allowed to 
proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, the suggestion that 
somehow when we all know the list of Americans who could participate in 
this system and their credentials and their experiences and their 
expertise, to suggest that somehow those Americans would be less loyal, 
more subject to leaks, than the existing system, I mean, the best kept 
secret apparently was Hart-Rudman, the best kept secret in the Nation 
until 9/11.
  So I think we have to think about what this means. I think we have to 
think about what it means for the American people, what it means for 
the families and what it means for this institution. The day we start 
to suggest after a catastrophic failure like 9/11 that we cannot have 
an independent review of that event is the day that democracy is in 
decline.
  We all know the mechanisms are in place to provide for the secrecy 
and the classification and the right to know and all the rest of that, 
and we all respect the importance of what that means. But those cannot 
be excuses for failing to discharge our obligation to the American 
people.
  We need the Roemer amendment. We need the Roemer amendment to be 
perfected. That is within the purview of the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence. I would not pretend that I could perfect it, but that 
is your expertise. But it is that expertise applied to the notion of a 
public independent review that is so important to the families of 
victims of 9/11, to the American people, and, ultimately, to this 
institution, to this institution, because it is about whether or not we 
will have the credibility to proceed with the very difficult choices 
that we have yet to

[[Page 14343]]

make about our homeland security, about our national defense and about 
our intelligence capabilities.
  I urge support of the Roemer amendment.


  Amendment Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey to the Amendment No. 9 
                         Offered by Mr. Roemer

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey to Amendment 
     No. 9 offered by Mr. Roemer:
       At the end of section 602(b), as proposed to be added by 
     the amendment, insert the following:
       (4) Representation of family members of victims of 
     terrorist attacks.--Of the members appointed under paragraphs 
     (1) and (2) of subsection (a), at least one member appointed 
     under each such paragraph shall be a member of the family, or 
     a representative designated by such a family or families, of 
     an individual who died in the terrorist attacks against the 
     United States which occurred on September 11, 2001.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask 
unanimous consent that the amendment to the amendment be considered as 
read and printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New Jersey?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is a friendly 
amendment that I offer to the Roemer amendment. It modifies the makeup 
of the blue ribbon commission to ensure that at least two members of 
the commission are family members of those who lost their lives because 
of the murderous attacks on September 11. This idea came out of 
meetings that I had and my staff had with specific widows, Kristen 
Breitweiser, who lost her husband Ronald, Patty Casazza, who lost her 
husband John, Mindi Kleinberg, who lost her husband Alan, and Lorie Van 
Auken, who lost her husband Kenneth.
  They have asked, as have other family members, to be included, to be 
a part of this investigation. Why wait until conference, or some later 
time that may or may not materialize. The families should be included 
right at the passage of this legislation. They are part of this and 
should not be left on the outside.
  They feel, frankly, after numerous meetings, that they have been 
neglected, that their concerns have not been adequately addressed. That 
is why I am offering this amendment.
  I support the Roemer amendment. As a matter of fact, I just testified 
before the Committee on Rules asking that the more expansive version 
that he has proposed to be made part of the Homeland Security Act.
  I would say to my colleagues, I chaired the Subcommittee on 
International Operations and Human Rights for 6 years. We did the 
Embassy Security Act. I was a prime sponsor of the bill, a $6 billion 
authorization to try to beef up our embassies. That came out of the 
specific recommendations that Admiral Crowe made as part of the 
Accountability Review Board that met after the two terrible bombings of 
our embassies in Africa.
  What we found was there were all kinds of mistakes that were made, 
ones that should have been anticipated, some that had been anticipated 
by Admiral Inman, many, many years before that, but had not been acted 
upon.
  A blue ribbon commission, I would respectfully suggest, will give us 
the opportunity to bring it all together.
  I was just in Berlin heading up the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly there 
with many Members on both sides of the aisle. I met with one of our 
consulars who worked in Bangladesh. He told me that 31 people had come 
to our consulars in Bangladesh and had requested visas for flight 
training. They wanted to come to the United States to learn how to fly. 
That was in 1999. We do not know who they are. Those records were done 
away with 2 years later, because of the statute of limitations on 
retaining those records. They may have been the very same people who 
found their way into this country and ended up doing the terrible deeds 
they did on 9/11.
  This is a good amendment. Still I do not think it goes far enough. I 
would disagree with the gentlewoman from California about narrowing the 
scope. We need to expand it. We need to investigate other law 
enforcement agencies, the FAA, INS and all of the others. Then we could 
come up with a very, very comprehensive set of recommendations so there 
is a lesson learned.
  Let me also tell my colleagues the anthrax problem hit my district, 
in Hamilton Township, New Jersey. Hamilton was shut down and is still 
shut down. I am amazed how much we still have not done in follow-up to 
what happened as a result of the anthrax.
  I sat in on those meetings. The left hand did not know what the right 
hand was doing time and again. Very, very competent people, but, again, 
the left hand very often was unaware of what the right hand was doing, 
whether it be CDC, NIH, or other agencies of government. This is a good 
amendment. I hope you will back it.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend from New Jersey for 
sponsoring our amendment, for supporting it, and take his amendment not 
only as a friendly amendment, but a family amendment that represents 
many of the victims of this, and I would encourage my colleagues to 
support this amendment.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, just let 
me conclude, I hope that this language in this amendment grows, is 
expanded upon, and is more inclusive as it relates to other agencies of 
government. For purposes of germaneness, it had to be narrow, but this 
is a good place holder and a good first step.
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I represent the district that had perhaps the most 
impact here. The World Trade Center used to stand in the middle of it, 
and the catastrophe that was visited on my district and on the entire 
country represented, among other things, a monumental and catastrophic 
failure of intelligence. When such a thing happens, I think it behooves 
us to take a complete and fresh look at it.
  Look at every aspect of it. Look at every aspect of every 
establishment that we have to deal with that, and that includes, 
frankly, the way this Congress and its intelligence and other 
committees that are relevant deal with it. That is why I support the 
Roemer amendment for an independent blue ribbon commission.
  Now, maybe we have not spent enough on intelligence. I have joined in 
the past in voting for amendments to cut the intelligence budget. Maybe 
we were wrong. Maybe, on the other hand, we have spent enough but we 
have not spent it properly. Maybe we spent too much on electronic 
intelligence and not enough on human intelligence. Maybe people were 
not talking to each other who should have been. Maybe the analytical 
capability was neglected in favor of just collecting huge amounts of 
information which could not then be analyzed in time. I do not know.
  Maybe the Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence of this 
Congress have functioned perfectly and wonderfully, and maybe they have 
not, and maybe there are changes we could make in our own establishment 
and how we set up things. That is why we need a totally new and outside 
and independent look and why I support the Roemer amendment.

                              {time}  0100

  Let me also say one word in opposition to the amendment by the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith). There are plenty of survivors 
and family members of victims in my district, and they certainly have a 
very great interest in all of this. I have supported the role of 
victims in commissions and on committees and so forth in determining 
the type of memorial to be erected in New York and the rebuilding and 
so forth. But the fact that someone is a relative of someone who died 
in the World Trade Center does not make that person an expert on 
intelligence, does not make that person an expert on the

[[Page 14344]]

military; and, frankly, this commission ought to be not a commission of 
people who we put there sentimentally because we sympathize with their 
loss. It ought to be a commission of people who are experts in the 
things that have to be examined, experts determined by the President, 
by the leadership of the House and the Senate, the other body, and so 
forth.
  So I urge Members, do not add sentimentality to this commission which 
will not really accomplish anything, but do approve the Roemer 
amendment.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words, and I rise in opposition to the Roemer amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I think I know the direction of the debate here, but I 
think it is important that we not deceive ourselves. All of the 
impassioned comments that I have heard here in the last few minutes are 
for a commission that would not be created by the Roemer amendment. The 
Roemer amendment is a very narrow shadow of the commission that the 
gentlewoman from California described, a broad-based commission. And I 
would say, to the gentleman's credit, he understands this, because he 
had to craft something that would be germane to this legislation.
  This legislation, if we take a look at the four points that are 
covered here, focuses exclusively on the intelligence community. The 
first element is to make sure that the inquiry, the joint inquiry under 
way is implemented. Well, that can take place only after we have seen 
it; but I will tell my colleagues one thing, a joint committee, or a 
joint inquiry by the two intelligence committees' recommendations to 
itself cannot be ignored by the two intelligence committees.
  Now, what happened on 9-11 was certainly representative of 
deficiencies in the intelligence community, no doubt about that; and 
there may be some failures. But the biggest deficiencies, the biggest 
failures were in the law enforcement community, I say to my colleagues, 
and the relationship of the law enforcement community to the domestic 
agencies.
  In the particular terrorist event that ravished this country on that 
day, both here across the river and in New York City, of course, it was 
the failure, the link between the FAA and the commercial airlines and 
the law enforcement agencies, at least the Federal law enforcement 
agencies. That was the failure.
  The gentleman from New Jersey, just a few minutes ago, said some 
things that he would like to see it broadened. Well, if we are going to 
have a commission here, and I am not opposed to it, it is going to have 
to look at the whole array of problems that we had. We cannot simply 
look at the intelligence community. We have to look at where the 
response to information would be acted upon.
  If we take a look at all of the agencies, a part of which are being 
merged under the proposed homeland security agency or department, those 
are all of the elements of domestic response and law enforcement that 
have to be there to do something with the intelligence we hope we have. 
We were surprised. We had deficiencies in intelligence.
  I say to my colleagues, it is not going to give us the Commission 
that everybody here is talking about. It is not going to give us that 
comprehensive examination. I say it is a cruel hoax to suggest to the 
families of the victims of what happened across the river and in New 
York City that such a commission is going to give us those answers. It 
is too narrowly focused. It had to be, to be offered by way of this 
amendment. So we may vote for it, but let us not kid each other. This 
is not going to do it, I say to my colleagues. It is a part of it; it 
is not the significant part, in my judgment.
  The biggest failures that took place on 9-11 were in the law 
enforcement and domestic agency fronts.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. But does the gentleman not agree, Mr. Chairman, that we 
could fix it in the conference committee between the House and Senate 
committees? We have done that many times in the past. If the committee 
wants to change this commission and make it broader, make it more 
effective, and cover the broad range, we could do that in the 
conference between the House and the Senate, and we could agree to it 
when the conference report comes back.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the gentleman from 
Florida has already pointed out the problems that this creates for the 
other committees of this Congress, that they should have some input in 
the preparation of a conference report.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I have not heard much that I disagree with. As one of 
the more recent persons to serve on the Committee on Intelligence, I 
certainly would not come here to the floor of the House of 
Representatives and suggest that the joint select committee or the 
joint committee of the House and Senate that is doing the work now of 
looking back with reference to what happened on 9-11 will not do a good 
job. But a good job is not good enough in this particular situation. We 
need the very best.
  The fact of the matter is that this group of persons who are doing 
the work are from inside this body and the other body. We tend to think 
we know everything, and no one else can tell us that we do not know 
everything. It is sort of like as an aside and not meant to impugn 
either of the States, but I lived in New York and California, and I 
left California thinking that Californians thought they knew 
everything, but I knew that New Yorkers knew they knew everything.
  The fact is, we do not. And in this instance when the report is 
finished, which will be a magnificent work, it can become the starting 
point for an independent group.
  Now, let me give my colleagues three things that have taken place in 
our history in addition to those that have pointed out how swiftly 
President Roosevelt, after Pearl Harbor, appointed an independent 
commission. We have had in our lifetimes three significant, and there 
are others kinds of reports about what happens, in our government. When 
President Kennedy was killed, we had a select committee to do an 
investigation. When we found ourselves with President Nixon's problems 
in Watergate, we had a select committee of the House and Senate. But 
when we had civil rights disturbances and immense destruction in this 
country, we went to an independent commission that is called the 
Kernell Report that all of us that are old enough to remember know as 
the seminal report on race in America that is still looked to by all 
intellectuals in academia and otherwise.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I object. The Committee is not in order. The 
gentleman deserves to be heard. He is making a very eloquent statement 
and I think the Members ought to pay attention.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The gentleman is correct. 
The House will be in order.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I thank my good friend and 
colleague from Washington and the Speaker for seeing to it that this 
debate itself is carried on in a manner consistent with all of our 
thoughts. Everybody has made major contributions and has had something 
here to say, and our feelings and passions run high.
  What I was saying is that the Kernell Commission became the seminal 
report for all in America and is still looked to as the most definitive 
matter that has undergone a survey of race in America. That said, what 
have we from Watergate from our inside baseball select committee still 
puzzled by what transpired? I do not even have to begin to tell my 
colleagues the conspiracy theories that have been spawned by virtue of 
yet another of those inside groups of people who made a determination.
  Now, I do not think we have anything to hide, and I do not think we 
should try to hide anything, and none of us are going to do that. None 
of the Members of the committee that is presently

[[Page 14345]]

working for the House and the Senate are going to do anything other 
than the best that they can. These are the finest Americans that 
anybody could possibly expect that will look at this matter. But I can 
assure my colleagues that when they finish, they will not have made a 
determination that an independent commission of people could make, and 
it will not allow for the kind of credibility that all of us deserve in 
this country.
  What happened to us is mind-numbing. It boggles the mind, as the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Lantos) is fond of saying, and all of us 
are stunned by what transpired. We need to get beyond ourselves, and 
the only way to do that is to allow some other people who have an 
approach to this situation that may not be one that is politically 
motivated in some respects, yet out of the conviction of our beliefs, 
we think that we will have done all that is necessary.

                              {time}  0110

  We will do something, and the American public will still have 
questions. Let us give them more input than just those of us who 
represent them.
  I urge this body to help us learn how we can identify and fix the 
problems that all of us know have been created by virtue of this awful 
tragedy.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Roemer amendment. Let us note 
tonight the gravity of what we are talking about. America has been 
relying on an arrogant, bloated and incompetent intelligence 
bureaucracy to protect us against foreign threats. We spend billions of 
dollars and the likes of bin Laden blindsides us and slaughters our 
people; 3,000 Americans were slaughtered on 9-11. And it was not a 
tragedy not beyond our control. It was a failure of the system and a 
failure of the people in the system.
  bin Laden was, let us note, the number one target of American 
intelligence prior to that attack, the number one target of American 
intelligence for a year or more before that attack. Yet this operation, 
an operation of this magnitude with millions of dollars being spent, 
being transferred from one account to another, hundreds of people being 
involved in many different countries, yet it went undetected. The FBI, 
the CIA, the National Security Agency, the DIA, our intelligence 
community let us down.
  And let us note this, they let us down in such a way that we deserve 
to know that everything has been done to straighten the situation up so 
it cannot happen again. We should all know about a major house-cleaning 
that has been going on in our intelligence community. I know nothing 
about a major house-cleaning. In fact, it appears to me that the same 
people are in charge in the intelligence community today as were in 
charge before.
  We cannot go on with business as usual; and I am sorry, relying on 
those in this body, in the legislative branch, whose job it was to 
oversee American intelligence before 9-11, is not good enough. We need 
some outside people of prestige who we can trust to focus on this, who 
are not part of the system and do not feel compelled to watch out for 
whose turf they are standing on in terms of getting on this committee 
or that committee.
  A new homeland defense committee is not business as usual. A new 
homeland defense department is not business as usual. A blue ribbon 
commission is not business as usual.
  Tonight we heard in this discussion we heard that this proposal by 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) described as not a favor to the 
intelligence community. Well, I am not interested in doing favors to 
the intelligence community. The CIA and the State Department played 
down the threat that the Taliban posed to the United States and to the 
free world. They have played down the importance of the heroin crop 
that was being harvested every year in Afghanistan. They have played 
down the role of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan with bin Laden and his 
terrorist gang that was becoming a fixture in Afghanistan.
  And let us note, we all had briefings during that time period. Over 
the last several years we all had briefings by the CIA and over there 
in our secret room up here. How many of us felt insulted by those 
intelligence briefings because there was nothing secret given to us? 
There was nothing that gave us any more insight than what we could read 
in the newspaper. It is time for Congress to reassert that we are not 
going to stand by with ``business as usual'' after a tragedy of this 
magnitude.
  This was a catastrophic failure of American intelligence. Those 
people who have been running American intelligence should have the 
decency to step down, but at the very least we need to hold them 
accountable. You hear time and again people saying, oh, this commission 
will not be assigning blame or pointing fingers? Oh, yeah. Why not? We 
should be assigning blame and pointing fingers. Three thousand of our 
citizens have been slaughtered. We have let the intelligence community 
keep us at arm's length for too long.
  This is a free society and we will remain free as long as they know 
that we, as the elected officials of this land that make the policy, 
and not the intelligence community that will lead us around like they 
think we were dumb bells.
  Tonight, by passing the Roemer amendment, whether or not it is the 
specific wording and the specific outline, we send a message that we 
will do something about this failure.
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Might I thank the Chairman for the leadership he is showing this 
evening on a very important debate.
  Mr. Chairman, might I associate myself with the words of my colleague 
from California (Mr. George Miller), that there can be no time limit on 
expressing the need to tell the truth to the American people; and that 
is what this debate is about, Mr. Chairman. The American people need to 
know and deserve to know the truth. And whether or not this amendment 
is narrowly drawn, I agree with the gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
Dicks) that the wise people who will be assigned to the conference 
committees can expand the definition of this commission.
  And might I read to my colleagues the definition or the establishment 
of this commission. The language says, ``There is established a 
national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States.''
  It is important that we realize that after September 11, and even 
before that, we turned a new page in American history. We are subject 
to terrorist attacks. Before I came to this Congress I represented the 
family of someone who was lost in Pan Am 103, before we even understood 
about the terrorism that struck America through that explosion and that 
airplane crash. Today the family does not know all the details as to 
what happened and whether or not that was a terrorist attack on the 
United States of America.
  The family of those Marines who were lost in Beirut, Lebanon, today 
do not know the facts about that terrorist attack.
  We are in need, Mr. Chairman, of the truth. We are in need of 
understanding the impact on families, if you will, by investigation on 
what happens or what the follow-up is, if you will, on families who 
have been subjected to terrorist attacks by those who they lost. We 
need to know that. We need to understand what Coleen Rowley was 
speaking about.
  And even though my good friend indicated that the way this is framed 
we will not find about why law enforcement agencies did not communicate 
with each other, I have confidence we can decide that in the conference 
committee. We need to understand why the FBI and CIA were not talking 
to each other, and we have the procedures in a commission structure to 
make sure that classified documents are not released.
  Mr. Chairman, some few years ago I served as a staff person on the 
Select Committee on Assassination because the people wanted to know 
about the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. And they wanted to 
understand

[[Page 14346]]

even better the assassination of one of their dearest Presidents, 
President John F. Kennedy. The American people wanted to know, and even 
today we realize that there are still questions about those two 
terrible acts.
  I do not believe we get anything, Mr. Chairman, by hiding the ball. 
And the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has drafted a very 
reasonable, very reasonable amendment that frames this commission 
seeking the expertise of those in America who understand intelligence 
but understand societal issues, understand psychological issues that 
deal with the failing that we have experienced.

                              {time}  0120

  So, Mr. Chairman, I believe that this legislation will add to that 
question, though I had different legislation and still believe that the 
Committees of Armed Services, Judiciary and International Relations 
should have their opportunity to review this question.
  We need to know the truth, Mr. Chairman, and let me share something 
with my colleagues for a moment that went almost unnoticed a few days 
ago or maybe a week ago.
  About a week ago, the U.S. attorney decided in the Virginia District 
to agree to a plea bargain by John Walker Lindh. It was under the 
pretense that his trial would open up his opportunities or the 
opportunities for the American people to see and hear issues that they 
should not hear, that the intelligence community would be paraded 
before the American people in an open court. They know full well, Mr. 
Chairman, that they could have prevented classified information and 
witnesses that should not have been shown from being shown.
  A decision was made. They gave Mr. John Walker Lindh 20 years. Right 
after that decision was made or that plea bargain was accepted, to the 
shock of the judge, it leaked out that he may not know that much 
anyhow.
  What do we say to the Spann family, a member of the CIA who lost his 
life? What do we say to those who could have benefited from 
understanding and getting information that might have been helpful to 
us by an open airing of what happened?
  I understand that this young man's family loves him and I expect for 
them to support him, but when his father came out and suggested that 
this young man was Nelson Mandela, I think we stretched it beyond 
recognition. It is important, Mr. Chairman, that we support this 
commission, support the gentleman from Indiana's (Mr. Roemer) 
amendment, because the American people need to know the truth.
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I was not going to speak on this issue, but as my 
colleagues know, I devote a great deal of time to our national security 
and issues in emerging threats, and I have done so for the past 16 
years.
  I heard some accusations made earlier that the problem with 9/11 was 
basically a domestic problem of the FBI. That is just not true, Mr. 
Chairman, and therefore, I rise to support this amendment.
  We think we have all the answers. Let me tell my colleagues 
something. I think back to NIE 95-19 where the intelligence community 
told us that the emerging threat to our security was 15 years away. We 
challenged that. We challenged that through an independent commission. 
It was not challenged through our intelligence committee. It was 
challenged through the Rumsfeld Commission, five members appointed by 
the Republican side and four Members appointed by the Democrat side, 
and what did they prove? They proved the intelligence community was 
wrong, that NIE 95-19 was politicized, that the threat was going to be 
much sooner than 15 years.
  The Rumsfeld Commission shared by Donald Rumsfeld led to the passage 
of H.R. 4, my bill on missile defense, which passed with bipartisan 
support and a veto-proof margin. What does that have to do with the 
issue at hand?
  As far back as 1997, Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Armed Services 
proposed that we merge together 33 Federal classified systems into one 
integrated national operations and analysis center or national 
collaborative capability. We proposed it in writing. Two successive 
defense bills had language in those bills, telling the Defense 
Department, the CIA and the FBI to lead the other agencies, the NRO, 
the NSA, Commerce State Justice, DIA to have a collaborative capability 
to do massive data mining, using new software tools like Starlight and 
Spires to do analysis, including unclassified information.
  What would that have given us? Let me give my colleagues an example. 
When the CIA does analysis, Mr. Chairman, the CIA does an analysis but 
do not include open source information. In September of 2000, there was 
an interview in an Italian newspaper of an al Qaeda leader who publicly 
said that they were training Kamikaze pilots. If we would have had a 
data mining capability, that open source information would have been 
fused with the raw data of the immigration service, of the Customs 
Department, of the CIA and the FBI, and we would have seen the picture 
of what was about to occur, and this Congress called for that for three 
years.
  Why did we not do it? Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre said to 
me, Curt, I agree with you; the problem is the CIA and the FBI will not 
go along with it. He said, So I have a suggestion for you, why do you 
not bring over the CIA and the FBI counterparts to me and let us have a 
meeting in your office. So I did in 1999.
  The deputy director of the CIA and the deputy director of the FBI and 
John Hamre, deputy director of Defense, and John Hamre said I will pay 
the bill, I will foot the bill for this new data fusion center but the 
agencies have to go along. The CIA's response was we are doing CI 21, 
that is all we need and that was not what we were talking about. We 
were talking about an integrated capability of all 33 Federal 
classified systems.
  When General Downing just stepped down at the White House, the top 
adviser to President Bush, what did General Downing say? He said that 
his top priority when he was there was to build a national data fusion 
center. What did he say when he left? The FBI and the CIA did not want 
it. So General Downing left his job and walked away.
  The CIA is not above this institution. I have held myself back for 
too long because I have seen on the inside the agencies manipulating 
the process, and as someone who cares desperately about emerging 
threats, I am not satisfied that we in this body can do service to an 
investigation of our intelligence, and therefore, I come to the 
conclusion that the gentleman from Indiana's (Mr. Roemer) idea is a 
good one because we need to send a signal to the CIA and the FBI. They 
are not the end all and the cure-all. They do not determine the end 
result of analysis and they can fuse data and they can do it and vet 
information so that we do not affect an individual's civil liberties of 
people whose names may surface.
  In fact, every major defense company, Lockheed Martin, Northup-
Grumman, Boeing, the Army at their LIWA Center down at Fort Belvoir, 
the Air Force, Navy and SPAWAR, special forces command down in Florida 
all have data fusion capabilities. They are all doing it now, but do my 
colleagues know who does not do it? The CIA and the FBI because they do 
not want to share their data. They do not want raw intercepts being 
provided to other agencies, and that does not give us the best 
intelligence analysis for the war fighter or the policy-makers.
  So I urge my colleagues to do the right thing and support the Roemer 
amendment.
  Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I rise in support of the Roemer amendment. Mr. Chairman, 3,000 
Americans died on September 11, and I think that the gravity of this 
situation requires the kind of an approach that the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has taken in asking for the creation of a national 
commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States.
  I have been listening to this debate both in the Chamber and from my 
office, and as the ranking Democrat on

[[Page 14347]]

the oversight subcommittee that has jurisdiction over national 
security, I well understand the concerns that have been articulated 
here this evening regarding an intelligence failure, but I will also 
say to my friends who have advanced that position here tonight, that 
they can support this amendment even if they strongly believe in the 
capabilities of our intelligence community.
  As a matter of fact, I am certain that the Roemer amendment does not 
stem from lack of appreciation for the work of the men and women of the 
CIA and the FBI. I happen to believe that our FBI and our CIA are 
actually very competent, and it may be and they may be working under 
constraints which would be of interest to the American people which 
could be determined by this kind of a commission.
  So this debate does not have to be interpreted as an attack on our 
intelligence community, and I do not seek to attack those agencies. It 
would be helpful to determine how they can function more effectively.
  One of the things that I would hope that would come from not only 
this debate but also the Roemer amendment, if passed, is a renewed 
sense of what we can do to help heal our country because I think one of 
the things we have to come to a conclusion about is that Americans do 
not need to attack each other. We have already been attacked. Let us 
not attack each other. If there have been failures, we can face those. 
We are strong enough.
  One of the things that has concerned me, Mr. Chairman, is there seems 
to have been some kind of a disconnect on matters of causality relating 
to 9/11. There are people who seem to have an aversion to looking at 
the actual reasons behind 9/11, and in a sense, the homeland security 
bill, which this House will vote on, has been brought to this House 
without a strategy, without a risk assessment, but with a raft of 
legislative initiatives preceding it such as the PATRIOT Act and acts 
that deal with cyber security which have caused broad-based 
restructuring of criminal justice principles in our society and in a 
challenge to civil liberties themselves, even without the analysis that 
a commission could offer.

                              {time}  0130

  So I certainly think that such a commission is warranted. And then 
maybe we can take another look at proposals to create a national spy 
network through the TIPS program, the proposal that the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Armey) fortunately rejected for a national ID card through 
drivers licenses; raise questions about cameras that have been put all 
over this campus and in other cities; questions about barricades that 
go up everywhere; questions about military tribunals and suspension of 
habeas corpus.
  I mean, our way of life has been dramatically changed, and we have 
lacked a sufficient evaluation as to whether or not those changes have 
been essential to be able to challenge the root causes of 9-11. The 
approach has been totally reactive.
  Now, I say America is a Nation of strength, and it is weakness which 
does not seek to know the truth. America is a Nation of courage, and it 
is fear which seeks not to know the truth. America is a Nation of 
light, and it is darkness where the truth is not asked. You shall know 
the truth and the truth shall set you free.
  Freedom is what we seek. Freedom is what we seek to protect, freedom 
is what we seek to reclaim, and we will reclaim our freedom when we 
have a commission that will enable us to get to the truth.
  Mr. WU. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. 
The hour is late, Mr. Chairman, and I am sicker than a dog, so brevity 
will have to substitute for eloquence.
  It has been an aphorism in American culture, at least since the days 
of Benjamin Franklin, that those who will not learn from the past are 
doomed to repeat it. If we do not support this common sense amendment 
to form an independent commission to investigate exactly what happened 
around September 11, will we have done everything within our power to 
learn what happened and to avert future tragedies?
  I would like each Member who is considering voting against this 
amendment to ask themselves to search in their heart. If there is a 
future recurrence, will you be able to look in your heart and say to 
yourself we did everything we could to learn from the past and to 
prevent future recurrences?
  I ask you to vote for this commonsense amendment to fully investigate 
September 11 and prevent future tragedies from occurring.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. WU. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  As the gentleman from Washington started to say, it is time to vote. 
We have had a good lively debate for 1:30 in the morning. We started 
out on a bipartisan bill in a bipartisan way with comity and respect 
toward one another. We have had bipartisan agreement with much of this 
amendment. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the honorable way you have 
conducted yourself in the chair at this late hour and this long day.
  Mr. Chairman, I put the question on the Smith amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Whitfield). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith) to the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), as amended.
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             Recorded Vote

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 219, 
noes 188, not voting 27, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 347]

                               AYES--219

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Andrews
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett
     Bartlett
     Becerra
     Bentsen
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Borski
     Boswell
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Burton
     Capito
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardin
     Carson (IN)
     Carson (OK)
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doyle
     Duncan
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Ferguson
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank
     Frelinghuysen
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gephardt
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Green (TX)
     Gutknecht
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Jones (NC)
     Jones (OH)
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kleczka
     Kucinich
     Lampson
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     LaTourette
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Lucas (KY)
     Luther
     Lynch
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Phelps
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Rivers
     Rodriguez
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Shows
     Skelton
     Smith (NJ)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Tancredo
     Tauscher
     Taylor (MS)
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)

[[Page 14348]]


     Udall (NM)
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watson (CA)
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Weldon (PA)
     Wexler
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn

                               NOES--188

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barton
     Bass
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilirakis
     Boehlert
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boyd
     Brady (TX)
     Brown (SC)
     Bryant
     Burr
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Coble
     Collins
     Cooksey
     Crane
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Cunningham
     Davis, Jo Ann
     Deal
     DeLay
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Flake
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gillmor
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Graves
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Grucci
     Hall (TX)
     Hart
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Istook
     Jenkins
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Keller
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MN)
     Kerns
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Latham
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lucas (OK)
     Manzullo
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Mica
     Miller, Dan
     Miller, Gary
     Miller, Jeff
     Moran (KS)
     Myrick
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Osborne
     Ose
     Oxley
     Paul
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Saxton
     Schaffer
     Schrock
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simmons
     Simpson
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Sullivan
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Toomey
     Upton
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins (OK)
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--27

     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonior
     Boucher
     Callahan
     Clay
     Combest
     Condit
     Cox
     Davis, Tom
     Gordon
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hansen
     Issa
     Knollenberg
     LaFalce
     McCarthy (MO)
     Murtha
     Otter
     Roukema
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Stearns
     Stump
     Turner
     Young (AK)

                              {time}  0158

  Mr. Walsh, Mr. Ehlers and Mrs. Kelly changed their vote from ``aye'' 
to ``no.''
  Mr. Hill changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated for:
  Ms. McCARTHY of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, during rollcall vote No. 347, 
I was unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted, 
``aye.''
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Simpson) having assumed the chair, Mr. Whitfield, Chairman pro tempore 
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
4628) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2003 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, 
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, had come to 
no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________