[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 10]
[Senate]
[Pages 13526-13540]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. CRAPO (for himself and Mr. Conrad):
  S. 2750. A bill to improve the provision of telehealth services under 
the Medicare program, to provide grants for the development of 
telehealth networks, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Finance.
  Mr. CRAPO. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise today to introduce, 
along with Senator Conrad of North Dakota, legislation that would 
greatly enhance the use of telehealth technology to bring badly-needed 
health care services to rural and underserved areas throughout the 
country.
  This bill would allow for greater reimbursement for telehealth 
services under Medicare and calls for a valuable investment in the 
development of new and more advanced telehealth networks in underserved 
areas. Telehealth is the future of rural health care. Access to quality 
health care in rural areas is at a critical stage. Today, many ill and 
disabled people must drive hundreds of miles, often in bad weather on 
dangerous roads, just to receive the most basic of health care. Access 
to specialists is even more prohibitive. However, by using much of the 
same technologies that we use to communicate with our constituents from 
here in Washington, we can bring quality health care, and specialty 
care, to their local health care provider.
  I would like to thank Senator Conrad, who has been a longtime 
supporter of telehealth services, for joining me in introducing this 
important legislation. Our bill would allow a wide variety of health 
care practitioners to provide telehealth services under Medicare. One 
of the biggest challenges for rural practitioners is obtaining the 
resources and infrastructure to provide technologically advanced 
telehealth services. Our bill would also provide valuable resources for 
the development of new telehealth networks in rural and underserved 
areas.
  Technology in America is booming. We must embrace this technology as 
a cost-effective way to improve health care in rural and underserved 
areas. This legislation takes a large step in providing a modest 
investment toward the improvement of rural health care.
                                 ______
                                 
       By Mr. JEFFORDS (for himself, Mr. Frist, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Breaux, 
        and Mr. Feingold):
  S. 2752. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to 
provide for the establishment of medicare demonstration programs to 
improve health care quality; to the Committee on Finance.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to speak 
today on an issue that has been and will continue to be important and 
vital to the health of all Medicare beneficiaries. Medicare's origins 
date back

[[Page 13527]]

to 1965; since that time little has changed in the relationship between 
incentives to provide care and quality of care received. The current 
system does not reward or provide incentives for providing quality 
health care. Instead, what has evolved over the last years is a 
perplexing data base of well documented facts concerning quality and 
utilization. This information is very difficult to explain but hard to 
ignore. Why is it that the utilization of some surgical procedures 
varies tremendously from one part of the country to the next? Why is it 
that the cost of care per beneficiary varies from location to location 
without clear differences in outcomes, survival, or quality? Today, 
after much work with numerous health systems, patient advocacy 
organizations, and medical quality researchers, my colleagues Senators 
Frist, Gregg, Breaux and Feingold and I are pleased to announce the 
introduction of legislation to create Medicare demonstration projects 
to address these issues.
  The incentives, both financial and non-financial, to provide best 
healthcare to Medicare beneficiaries are complex and poorly understood. 
These incentives have historically been rooted in the longstanding 
Medicare fee-for-service payment model. In an effort to better align 
the incentives to provide care with best practice guidelines, 
appropriate utilization, adherence to best medical information, and 
best outcomes we have written legislation to address these issues 
through a Medicare demonstration project. This project will implement 
continuous quality improvement mechanisms that are aimed at integrating 
primary care, referral care, support care, and outpatient services. The 
bill will encourage patient participation in care decisions; strive to 
achieve the proper allocation of health care resources; identify the 
appropriate use of culturally and ethnically sensitive services in 
health care delivery; and document the financial effects of these 
decisions on the medical marketplace.
  As we enter an era of rapidly increasing numbers of Medicare 
beneficiaries, it will be increasingly important that we re-evaluate 
the Medicare program to insure that the quality of care received is 
uniformly exceptional in its delivery and quality. It is appropriate 
that we continue to find better ways to insure that the norms of 
quality health care are established and followed. It is my sincere hope 
that my colleges will join me in this endeavor.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Medicare 
Quality Improvement Act--a bill to help revitalize the Medicare Program 
by providing for the alignment of payment and other incentives. I want 
to thank Senators Jeffords, Gregg, and Breaux for their work in helping 
craft this crucial legislation.
  To meet the needs of the 21st century health care system, it is 
critical that payment policies be aligned to encourage and support 
quality improvement efforts. Even among health professionals motivated 
to provide the best care possible, the structure of payment and other 
incentives may not facilitate the actions needed to systematically 
improve the quality of care, and may even prevent such actions. For 
example, redesigning care processes to improve follow-up for 
chronically ill patients through electronic communication may reduce 
office visits and decrease revenues for a medical group under some 
payment schemes.
  Current payment practices are complex and contradictory; and although 
incremental improvements are possible, more fundamental reform will be 
needed. In this report, ``Crossing the Quality Chasm,'' the Institute 
of Medicine encouraged the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality to develop a 
research agenda to identify, test, and evaluate options for better 
aligning payment methods with quality improvement goals. The 
demonstration project authorized by this legislation is part of that 
larger research agenda--to help us understand the appropriate alight of 
payment and other incentives and improve the quality of health care in 
a way that will not increase the overall costs of Medicare.
  We already have identified appropriate ways to align provider 
incentives. Research supported by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
has noted at least 11 different incentive models--models that can be 
implemented by a wide variety of organizations and applied to a range 
of medical groups, providers, and health plans. In many circumstances, 
key components of these models have been implemented in several health 
care markets, and the research has shown that both financial and 
nonfinancial incentives, such as technical assistance, are important in 
motivating appropriate care. However, we do not know how these 
incentives might apply to Medicare, and that is why this demonstration 
is so vital.
  It has been an honor and a pleasure to work closely with my 
distinguished colleagues on this bill, and I look forward to continuing 
to work with them and others as we move forward on the debate about how 
to more appropriately reform Medicare.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. KERRY (for himself, Mr. Bond, Mr. Cleland, Ms. Cantwell, 
        Mr. Bingaman, and Mrs. Carnahan:
  S. 2753. A bill to provide for a Small and Disadvantaged Business 
Ombudsman for Procurement in the Small Business Administration, and for 
other purposes; to the Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am pleased today to introduce a critical 
piece of legislation intended to help small businesses receive their 
fair share of the Federal procurement pie and to ensure that they are 
being treated fairly within the Federal procurement system. I would 
like to thank my cosponsors, Senators Bond, Cleland, Cantwell, Bingaman 
and Carnahan for working with me and small business groups to craft 
this legislation, as well as Congressman Albert Wynn, for his 
partnership on this legislation. Congressman Wynn will soon be 
introducing companion legislation in the House.
  In my time as Chairman of the Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship and previously as Ranking Member, two facts regarding 
small business procurement have made themselves very clear, small 
businesses are not getting their fair share of Federal procurement and 
there is no one in the entire Federal Government with the sole 
responsibility of advocating for small businesses, governmentwide, in 
the procurement process and ensuring that Federal agencies and large 
business prime contractors treat small businesses fairly. Some 
individuals are responsible for portions of this job, but no one 
performs this role as their primary job function or has the authority 
to do so solely.
  I felt this was a glaring oversight and looked to the current make-up 
of the SBA to see if it could be rectified. My solution is a new 
position modeled along the Small Business Administration's, SBA, 
regulatory ombudsman, which could focus solely on procurement matters. 
A new ombudsman for small business procurement, or the Small and 
Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman, is needed to fill this role for 
procurement matters, just as the SBA's National Ombudsman does for 
regulatory issues. By creating a parallel position, each ombudsman can 
focus on his or her key mission, without detracting from either 
regulatory or procurement issues important to the small business 
community.
  While no legislation alone can ever solve the complex problems faced 
by small businesses in today's Federal procurement environment, I 
believe the creation of a Small and Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman at 
the SBA will put us firmly on the right track and address several 
procurement issues raised through program oversight and communication 
with small business owners.
  For example, small businesses frequently contact my office to report 
problems they are having with a prime contractor or a contracting 
agency. Too often, these businesses are afraid to come forward and make 
an official complaint for fear of being blackballed

[[Page 13528]]

and denied future contracting opportunities. The SDB Ombudsman will 
provide one solution for these small businesses who fear being 
blacklisted by allowing them to submit confidential complaints. The SDB 
Ombudsman will have the responsibility of tracking these complaints and 
trying to rectify them.
  The SDB Ombudsman will also work to change the culture at Federal 
procuring agencies by tracking and reporting on the training of 
procurement personnel and working to ensure that this training not only 
includes the ``How to's'' of small business participation, but also 
includes training on why small business participation is crucial to 
agency success and the national economy.
  Until the Federal Government, at all levels, realizes the importance 
of doing business with small business, small business participation in 
Federal procurement will continue to decline, our Nation will lose its 
access to a wide range of small business suppliers, and small 
businesses across the country will continue to lose billions of dollars 
in procurement opportunities year after year. Of critical importance in 
the legislation is the first statutory consequence of an agency failing 
to meet its small business goals. Under the legislation, if an agency 
fails to meet any small business goal, the agency would be required to 
submit a report and an action plan to the SDB Ombudsman detailing why 
the agency failed to meet its small business goal or goals, and what 
the agency intends to do to remedy the situation.
  The SDB Ombudsman will also be responsible for tracking compliance 
with Section (k) of the Small Business Act, which stipulates, in part, 
that the Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business 
Utilization at each Federal agency shall report to the head or deputy 
head of the agency. Late last year, with the support of Ranking Member 
Bond, I sent a letter to 21 Federal agencies to gauge compliance with 
this provision. Using a very lenient standard of compliance, I have 
concluded that at least nine of the Federal agencies surveyed are in 
violation of Section (k) of the Small Business Act. This is 
unacceptable.
  On June 19, 2002, the Committee on Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship held a roundtable to discuss Federal procurement 
policies. The roundtable, title ``Are Government Purchasing Policies 
Hurting Small Business?'' was attended by a wide range of small 
business advocates, small business owners and government officials. One 
of the topics discussed during the roundtable was my draft proposal, 
the SDB Ombudsman Act, to create a new position at the SBA to monitor 
Federal agency compliance with certain provisions of the Small Business 
Act and serve as a focal point to assist small businesses that were 
treated unfairly in the Federal procurement process.
  During the Roundtable, I asked the participants for their 
recommendations on how to improve the legislation to ensure that the 
SDB Ombudsman serves as the most effective advocate possible for small 
business. The Committee record was also kept open for two weeks so that 
participants could submit further comments.
  I have now reviewed the Committee record and further submissions and 
am pleased to say that the responses were very positive. Several 
important suggestions were made to strengthen the Office of Small and 
Disadvantaged Business Utilization at each Federal agency as an 
important corollary to the creation of the SDB Ombudsman, since the SDB 
Ombudsman would be relying on each OSDBU to fulfill his or her 
statutory responsibilities.
  Many other small businesses have come to the Committee on Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship and requested that we strengthen the 
OSDBUs at each agency as well. This legislation fulfills that request 
by including six new provisions.
  First, the legislation clarifies that OSDBU Directors shall report to 
the highest level at each agency. In the study I mentioned previously, 
too often, an agency cited a bifurcated reporting system whereby the 
OSDBU Director reports to the head or deputy head on small business 
matters, but to other, lower-ranking personnel for budgetary or 
personnel matters. The Small Business Act does not envision such a 
system. Therefore, I felt it necessary to clarify, in no uncertain 
terms, that the OSDBU Director must report to the head or deputy head 
of his or her agency only, for all matters.
  Second, the legislation requires that all OSDBU Directors now be 
career personnel. The Director's position is one of advocacy, which 
often entails challenging co-workers and political personnel, including 
superiors. Under current law, OSDBU Directors may be political 
appointees. While this has worked in some instances, I believe the 
small business community would be better served by career personnel 
with job protections.
  Third, the legislation requires the OSDBU Director to be well-
qualified in assisting small businesses with procurement matters. No 
one disputes the expertise of Federal procurement officials; however, 
procurement expertise does not always translate to small business 
procurement expertise. This provision will help ensure that small 
businesses are being served by those who understand their particular 
procurement needs.
  Fourth, the legislation requires that, at major Federal agencies, the 
OSDBU Director have no job responsibilities outside the scope of the 
authorizing legislation. This provision was included because far too 
many agencies assign the OSDBU Director title to their procurement 
chief or another official with similar responsibilities, while the 
actual OSDBU program is run by someone else. This provision will stop 
this abuse.
  Fifth, the legislation requires that a procurement chief not serve as 
the Director of the OSDBU program at a Federal agency. I firmly believe 
that the OSDBU Director's goal is fundamentally different from, and at 
times even opposed to, that of a chief procurement official who must be 
fair to all Federal contractors. An OSDBU Director's role is one of 
advocacy. He or she must take the side of small business, and no 
procurement chief can do this and perform both jobs fairly and 
effectively. While OSDBU Directors at major Federal agencies are barred 
from having additional responsibilities under this legislation, non-
major Federal agency OSDBU Directors may. This provision will help 
ensure that at our non-major Federal agencies, the OSDBU Director can 
act fairly on behalf of small businesses.
  Sixth, the legislation provides statutory authority for the OSDBU 
Council. Under the legislation, each OSDBU Director will have 
membership on the Council, which will meet at least once every two 
months. The Council's role is to discuss issues of importance to the 
OSDBUs and the small business community they serve. OSDBU Directors 
serving at major Federal agencies have as a part of their 
responsibilities an obligation, under this legislation, to attend 
Council meetings. This provision was included to once again prevent 
Federal agencies from circumventing the Small Business Act. Attendance 
at Council meetings will help ensure that Federal agencies are 
complying with the law and that OSDBU Directors are small business 
advocates, not simply procurement personnel with two hats.
  One final note on the legislation is that the inclusion of a 
provision to increase the governmentwide small business prime 
contracting procurement goal from 23 percent to 30 percent has been 
retained, although it will now be phased in over three years: 26 
percent in FY 2004, 28 percent in FY 2005 and 30 percent in FY 2006 and 
thereafter.
  When I first made the suggestion that the small business procurement 
goal should be increased seven percentage points, my office received 
numerous calls, both in support of the increase and in opposition. Some 
even suggested raising the goal to a level of 40 percent. But, by and 
large, those in opposition pointed to one fact: The Federal Government 
has never achieved such a level of small business procurement 
participation. And while that is true, no one said that it was 
impossible. Given the disappointing achievement of the Federal 
Government on the current small business

[[Page 13529]]

goal of 23 percent, I believe it is time to raise the bar.
  When Congress enacted goals as part of the Small Business act, the 
goals were intended to be a minimum standard of achievement. For too 
long, the goals have been treated as a target for attainment, not a 
minimum level of acceptable small business participation. This too must 
change. Almost every year the Federal Government comes very close to 
hitting the small business prime contracting goal of 23 percent right 
on the head. Some years it does slightly better, and some years, 
unfortunately, it does slightly worse. However, this trend demonstrates 
one important principle, the government is firmly shooting for 23 
percent, no more--no less.
  By raising the statutory goal, it is my hope that the Federal 
Government will shoot for the higher target and succeed. But I ask my 
colleagues to look at this critically in that the goal for small 
business isn't so much being raised as the 77 percent of Federal 
procurement that now goes to large businesses, which represent only a 
tiny portion of all Federal contractors, is being reduced to 70 
percent. So if the small business goal should increase to 30 percent, 
70 percent of all Federal procurement will still be awarded to a 
relatively small number of all Federal contractors. Is this fair to 
small business? No. But it is an improvement.
  I am pleased to say that my legislation is supported by groups 
representing primarily small businesses or small business contractors, 
such as the National Small Business United, NSBU, Women Impacting 
Public Policy, WIPP, and the Association of Small and Disadvantaged 
Business, as well as advocacy groups such as the Latin American 
Management Association, LAMA, the Minority Business Enterprise Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, MBELDEF, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, 
VFW.
  I thank them as well as the cosponsors of this legislation, Senators 
Bond, Cleland, Cantwell, Bingaman and Carnahan for their assistance, 
input and support, and I look forward to continuing to work with them 
on this and other important issues.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Small and Disadvantaged 
Business Ombudsman Act be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Small and Disadvantaged 
     Business Ombudsman Act''.

     SEC. 2. SBA SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS OMBUDSMAN FOR 
                   PROCUREMENT.

       Section 30 of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 657) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'';
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and adding a 
     semicolon; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(3) `SDB Ombudsman' means the Small and Disadvantaged 
     Business Ombudsman for Procurement, designated under 
     subsection (e); and
       ``(4) `Major Federal agency' means an agency of the United 
     States Government that, in the previous fiscal year, entered 
     into contracts with non-Federal entities to provide the 
     agency with a total of not less than $200,000,000 in goods or 
     services.''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) SBA Small and Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman for 
     Procurement.--
       ``(1) Appointment.--
       ``(A) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of enactment of the Small and Disadvantaged Business 
     Ombudsman Act, the Administrator shall designate a Small and 
     Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman for Procurement (referred to 
     in this section as the `SDB Ombudsman').
       ``(B) Qualifications.--The SDB Ombudsman shall be--
       ``(i) highly qualified, with experience assisting small 
     business concerns with Federal procurement; and
       ``(ii) designated from among employees of the Federal 
     Government, to the extent practicable.
       ``(C) Line of authority.--The SDB Ombudsman shall report 
     directly to the Administrator.
       ``(D) Senior executive service.--The SDB Ombudsman shall be 
     paid at an annual rate not less than the minimum rate, nor 
     more than the maximum rate, for the Senior Executive Service 
     under chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(2) Duties.--The SDB Ombudsman shall--
       ``(A) work with each Federal agency with procurement 
     authority to ensure that small business concerns are treated 
     fairly in the procurement process;
       ``(B) establish a procedure for receiving comments from 
     small business concerns and personnel of the Office of Small 
     and Disadvantaged Business Utilization of each Federal agency 
     regarding the activities of agencies and prime contractors 
     that are not small business concerns on Federal procurement 
     contracts; and
       ``(C) establish a procedure for addressing the concerns 
     received under subparagraph (B).
       ``(3) Annual report.--
       ``(A) In general.--No later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the 
     SDB Ombudsman shall provide a report to the Committee on 
     Small Business of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship of the 
     Senate.
       ``(B) Contents.--The report required under subparagraph (A) 
     shall contain--
       ``(i) information from the Federal Procurement Data System 
     pertaining to contracting and subcontracting goals of the 
     Federal Government and each Federal agency with procurement 
     authority;
       ``(ii) a copy of the report submitted to the SDB Ombudsman 
     by each major Federal agency and an evaluation of the goal 
     attainment plans submitted to the SDB Ombudsman pursuant to 
     paragraph (5);
       ``(iii) an evaluation of the success or failure of each 
     major Federal agency in attaining its small business 
     procurement goals, including a ranking by agency on the 
     attainment of such goals;
       ``(iv) a summary of the efforts of each major Federal 
     agency to promote contracting opportunities for small 
     business concerns by--

       ``(I) educating and training procurement officers on the 
     importance of small business concerns to the economy and to 
     Federal contracting; and
       ``(II) conducting outreach initiatives to promote prime and 
     subcontracting opportunities for small business concerns;

       ``(v) an assessment of the knowledge of the procurement 
     staff of each major Federal agency concerning programs that 
     promote small business contracting;
       ``(vi) substantiated comments received from small business 
     concerns and personnel of the Office of Small and 
     Disadvantaged Business Utilization of each Federal agency 
     regarding the treatment of small business concerns by Federal 
     agencies on Federal procurement contracts;
       ``(vii) an analysis of the responsiveness of each Federal 
     agency to small business concerns with respect to Federal 
     contracting and subcontracting;
       ``(viii) an assessment of the compliance of each Federal 
     agency with section 15(k) of the Small Business Act (15 
     U.S.C. 644(k); and
       ``(ix) a description of any discrimination faced by small 
     business concerns based on their status as small business 
     concerns or the gender or the social or economic status of 
     their owners.
       ``(C) Notice and comment.--
       ``(i) In general.--The SDB Ombudsman shall provide notice 
     to each Federal agency identified in the report prepared 
     under subparagraph (A) that such agency has 60 days to submit 
     comments on the draft report to the SDB Ombudsman before the 
     final report is submitted to Congress under subparagraph (A).
       ``(ii) Inclusion of outside comments.--

       ``(I) In general.--The final report prepared under this 
     paragraph shall contain a section in which Federal agencies 
     are given an opportunity to respond to the report contents 
     with which they disagree.
       ``(II) No response.--If no response is received during the 
     60-day comment period from a particular agency identified in 
     the report, the final report under this paragraph shall 
     indicate that the agency was afforded an opportunity to 
     comment.

       ``(D) Confidentiality.--In preparing the report under this 
     paragraph, the SDB Ombudsman shall keep confidential all 
     information that may expose a small business concern or an 
     employee of an Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business 
     Utilization to possible retaliation from the agency or prime 
     contractor identified by the small business concern, unless 
     the small business concern or employee of the Office of Small 
     and Disadvantaged Business Utilization consents in writing to 
     the release of such information.
       ``(4) Interagency coordination.--Each Federal agency, 
     through its Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business 
     Utilization, shall assist the SDB Ombudsman to ensure 
     compliance with--
       ``(A) the Federal procurement goals established pursuant to 
     section 15(g);
       ``(B) the procurement policy outlined in section 8(d), 
     which states that small business concerns should be given the 
     maximum practicable opportunity to participate in Federal 
     contracts;
       ``(C) Federal prime contractors small business 
     subcontracting plans negotiated under section 8(d)(4)(B);
       ``(D) the responsibilities outlined under section 15(k); 
     and

[[Page 13530]]

       ``(E) any other provision of this Act.
       ``(5) Goal attainment plan.--If a major Federal agency 
     fails to meet any small business procurement goal under this 
     Act in any fiscal year, such agency shall submit a goal 
     attainment plan to the SDB Ombudsman not later than 90 days 
     after the end of the fiscal year in which the goal was not 
     met, containing--
       ``(A) a description of the circumstances that contributed 
     to the failure of the agency to reach its small business 
     procurement goals; and
       ``(B) a detailed plan for meeting the small business 
     procurement goals in the fiscal year immediately following 
     the fiscal year in which the goal was not met.
       ``(6) Effect on other offices.--Nothing in this section is 
     intended to replace or diminish the activities of the Office 
     of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization or any 
     similar office in any Federal agency.
       ``(7) Administrative resources.--To enable the SDB 
     Ombudsman to carry out the duties required by this 
     subsection, the Administrator shall provide the SDB Ombudsman 
     with sufficient--
       ``(A) personnel;
       ``(B) office space; and
       ``(C) dedicated financial resources, which are specifically 
     identified in the annual budget request of the 
     Administration.''.

     SEC. 3. OFFICE OF SMALL AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS 
                   UTILIZATION.

       (a) Director.--Section 15(k) of the Small Business Act (15 
     U.S.C. 644(k)) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``(except for the 
     Administration)'' after ``Federal agency'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (2), and inserting the following:
       ``(2) be well qualified, with experience assisting small 
     business concerns with Federal procurement, and receive basic 
     pay at a rate not to exceed the rate of pay for grade 15 of 
     the General Schedule, under section 5332 of title 5, United 
     States Code;'';
       (3) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the following:
       ``(3) be appointed by the head of such agency, be 
     responsible to, and report only to, the head or deputy head 
     of such agency for policy matters, personnel matters, 
     budgetary matters, and all other matters;'';
       (4) in paragraph (9), by striking ``, and'' and inserting a 
     semicolon;
       (5) in paragraph (10)--
       (A) by striking ``or section 8(a) of this Act or section 
     2323 of title 10, United States Code. Such recommendations'' 
     and inserting ``section 8(a), or section 2323 of title 10, 
     United States Code, which recommendations''; and
       (B) by striking the period at the end and inserting a 
     semicolon; and
       (6) by striking the undesignated matter after paragraph 
     (10) and inserting the following:
       ``(11) not concurrently serve as the chief procurement 
     officer for such agency; and
       ``(12) if the officer is employed by a major Federal agency 
     (as defined in section 30)--
       ``(A) have no other job duties beyond those described under 
     this subsection;
       ``(B) receive basic pay at a rate equal to the rate of pay 
     for grade 15 of the General Schedule, under section 5332 of 
     title 5, United States Code; and
       ``(C) attend the meetings of the Office of Small and 
     Disadvantaged Business Utilization Council.''.
       (b) Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization 
     Council.--
       (1) Establishment.--There is established an interagency 
     council to be known as the ``Office of Small and 
     Disadvantaged Business Utilization Council'' (in this 
     subsection referred to as the ``Council'').
       (2) Membership.--The Council shall be composed of--
       (A) the Director of Small and Disadvantaged Business 
     Utilization from each Federal agency;
       (B) the Small and Disadvantaged Business Ombudsman for 
     Procurement, as an ex officio member; and
       (C) other individuals, as ex officio members, as the 
     Council considers necessary.
       (3) Leadership.--
       (A) Chairperson.--The members of the Council shall elect a 
     chairperson, who shall serve for a 1-year, renewable term.
       (B) Other positions.--The members of the Council may elect 
     other leadership positions, as necessary, from among its 
     members.
       (C) Voting.--Each member of the Council, except for ex 
     officio members, shall have voting rights on the Council.
       (4) Meetings.--
       (A) Frequency.--The Council shall meet not less frequently 
     than once every 2 months.
       (B) Issues.--At the meetings under subparagraph (A), the 
     Council shall discuss issues faced by each Office of Small 
     and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, including--
       (i) personnel matters;
       (ii) barriers to small business participation in Federal 
     procurement;
       (iii) agency compliance with section 15(k) of the Small 
     Business Act (15 U.S.C. 644(k)), as amended by this Act; and
       (iv) any other matter that the Council considers necessary 
     to further the mission of each Office of Small and 
     Disadvantaged Business Utilization.
       (5) Funding limitation.--The Small Business Administration 
     shall not provide the Council with financial assistance to 
     carry out the provisions of this section.

     SEC. 4. GOVERNMENTWIDE SMALL BUSINESS GOAL.

       Section 15(g)(1) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 
     644(g)(1)) is amended in the second sentence, by striking 
     ``23 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards 
     for each fiscal year.'' and inserting ``26 percent of the 
     total value of all prime contract awards for fiscal year 
     2004, not less than 28 percent of the total value of all 
     prime contract awards for fiscal year 2005, and not less than 
     30 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards 
     for fiscal year 2006 and each fiscal year thereafter.''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Ms. COLLINS:
  S. 2754. A bill to establish a Presidential Commission on the United 
States Postal Service; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the ``United 
States Postal Service Commission Act of 2002.'' This legislation will 
establish a Commission to examine the challenges facing the Postal 
Service and develop solutions to ensure its long term viability and 
increased efficiency.
  The Postal Service's problems have reached a near crisis level. In 
2000, the Postal Service lost nearly $200 million, while in 2001, this 
loss ballooned to $1.68 billion. Losses are projected to be $1.35 
billion this year, despite the $675 million in appropriations from 
Congress to cover the unanticipated costs associated with the September 
11 attacks and the anthrax incidents. The Postal Service is mandated by 
law to break even on its operating expenses and its capital needs, both 
of which continue to grow.
  The Postal Service is also fast approaching its $15 billion statutory 
borrowing limit. Given its recent history of increasing rather than 
paying down its debt, increasing the Postal Service's debt ceiling is 
not the answer. In addition, the Postal Service's long term liabilities 
are enormous, to the tune of nearly $6 billion for Workers Compensation 
claims, a staggering $32 billion in retirement costs and perhaps as 
much as $45 billion to cover retiree health care costs. Meanwhile, on 
June 30, consumers experienced a third postal rate increase in just 18 
months.
  How could the Postal Service have landed in such dire straits? The 
Postal Service's problems stem from many causes. For example, the 
overall growth rate of mail has been declining since 1997, and first 
class mail volumes actually have declined over the past four years. 
This is particularly significant, as first class mail accounts for 48 
percent of total mail volume. In addition, revenues from first class 
mail cover more than two-thirds of institutional costs, such as post 
offices. Shortfalls must be made up by decreasing costs, increasing 
volumes in other categories of mail or by increasing postal rates.
  Some of this declining volume can be attributed to the increasing 
forms of electronic communication, particularly the Internet, which has 
revolutionized the way we communicate and transact business. For 
example, while financial statements, bills and bill payments constitute 
about half of first class mail revenue, or about $17 billion annually, 
electronic bill payment is quickly becoming a major means of doing 
business. It is estimated that 75 percent of banks will provide online 
banking services by 2003. This is in addition to other competing 
methods of communication such as faxes and telephones. In addition, 
filing tax returns, receiving Social Security payments, and many other 
transactions are also available electronically.
  The Postal Service also faces significant labor-related costs. Indeed 
nearly 80 percent of its expenses are related to compensation and 
benefits. By comparison, 56 percent of FedEx's expenses and 42 percent 
of UPS's expenses are related to compensation and benefits.
  The need to preserve a viable Postal Service is clear. Americans rely 
on affordable, reliable and universal mail delivery as their primary 
means of communication. The Postal Service delivers more than 200 
billion pieces of mail each year to nearly 140 million addresses, which 
accounts for more than 40 percent of the world's mail. Moreover, 1.7 
million new delivery points are added each year--roughly the

[[Page 13531]]

equivalent of adding the number of addresses in Chicago. More than 
seven million Americans visit post offices each day.
  In States with large rural areas, such as Maine, it is vital that 
postal services remain in place. If the Postal Service were no longer 
obligated to provide universal service and deliver mail to every 
customer, six days a week, the affordable communication link upon which 
many Americans rely would be jeopardized. Most commercial enterprises 
would find it uneconomical, if not impossible, to deliver mail and 
packages to these areas at rates that the Postal Service has been 
offering.
  In addition to providing a critical service to consumers, the Postal 
Service is the eleventh largest enterprise in the Nation with $66 
billion in annual revenues. This is more than Microsoft, McDonald's and 
Coca Cola combined. While the Postal Service itself employs more than 
700,000 career employees, it is also the linchpin of a $900 billion 
mailing industry that employs nine million Americans in fields as 
diverse as direct mailing, printing and paper production.
  Affordable postal rates are vital to the economic health of many 
companies, especially magazines, catalog houses and the service 
providers they use. The June 2002 rate hike alone represents a ten 
percent increase for periodicals, and a nine percent increase for 
catalogs. It is estimated that the combined effect of the past three 
rate increases, totaling 22 percent over just 18 months, have cost the 
magazine industry about $400 million.
  In May I met with a group of about twenty Maine businessmen and women 
involved in the mailing industry, who described for me the impact that 
rising postal rates have on their businesses. One magazine publisher 
told me that postage represents ten percent of her costs. I was amazed 
to hear that one of the catalog busineses pays more for postage a year 
than it pays to any one of the companies that supply the raw materials 
for its products. It was also startling to hear from one printer that 
his postage costs have doubled over the last ten years.
  Most of the people I met with are small business owners, and there 
are millions more across the country, all grappling with the same 
effects of rapidly rising postage costs.
  At the request of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and House 
Committee on Government Reform, the Postal Service produced a 
comprehensive Transformation Plan, which it presented to Congress in 
April. The Plan addresses general measures that the Postal Service 
believes it needs to take to ensure its survival, but it fails to lay 
out specific steps the Postal Service will take and a timeline for 
action. It is also unclear whether these measures will result in the 
cost savings necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the Postal 
Service.
  Many attempts have been made to reform the Postal Service over the 
years. My colleagues in the House of Representatives have tried for 
nearly eight years to pass postal reform legislation, but to no avail. 
Stakeholders have widely diverging views on what shape postal reform 
should take, if any. This lack of consensus on how or whether to deal 
with divisive issues has led only to stalemates in Congress.
  To take a fresh look at these difficult issues, I rise today to 
introduce legislation establishing a Presidential Postal Commission 
charged with examining the problems that the Postal Service faces, and 
developing specific recommendations and legislative proposals that 
Congress and the Postal Service can implement. Precedent exists for 
such a commission. In the late 1960s, the Kappel Commission was formed 
to resolve the crisis situation that the former Postal Department then 
found itself in, train cars of undelivered mail, strikes, and a host of 
other problems. The Kappel Commission's efforts laid the groundwork for 
the Postal Service we have today, which has functioned admirably for 
many years but is now in serious trouble.
  Mindful of the body of work that has been done in this area by my 
colleagues in the House and Senate, by the General Accounting Office, 
by the Postal Service itself and by others, I intend that this 
commission have a short life of one year, during which it will carry 
out its study and produce legislative proposals for consideration by 
the Administration and the Congress.
  Finally, I intend that the commission consider all relevant aspects 
of the Postal Service. Everything should be put on the table and 
evaluated. We need to ensure that the Postal Service will stand up to 
the challenges it is facing today and will face tomorrow.
  These and many more issues must be examined in depth, if we are to 
preserve this vital service upon which so many Americans rely for 
communication and for their livelihood. The Postal Service has 
successfully overcome numerous difficulties over its 226-year history, 
and has continued to deliver the mail faithfully. Yet it has reached a 
critical juncture and once again, it is time for a thorough evaluation 
of the Postal Service's operations and requirements.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SANTORUM (for himself and Mr. SPECTER):
  S. 2755. A bill to require the Secretary of the Treasury to mint 
coins in commemoration of the opening of the National Constitution 
Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania scheduled for July 4, 2003; to the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
  Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President I am pleased to introduce legislation 
along with my colleague Senator Specter to establish a one dollar 
silver coin that will benefit the National Constitution Center in 
Philadelphia, PA.
  As the first national center of its kind in the country, the National 
Constitution Center will promote understanding of the United States 
Constitution and its values. The events of the past year in our nation 
as well as recent judicial rulings have brought increased attention to 
those principles and values that define and bind us as Americans. All 
would agree that the United States Constitution is central to defining 
our country, who we are, and how we live as Americans. Even as we often 
debate in the halls of Congress and the Supreme Court those policies 
and laws that best reflect the values and intent of the Constitution, 
we all recognize the freedoms and opportunity that this remarkable 
document secures for us.
  The National Constitution Center has been an important project in 
Philadelphia with which Senator Specter and I have been involved. 
Construction began on September 17, 2000. When the Constitution Center 
is completed as expected on July 4, 2003, it will be a key feature of a 
revitalized Independence Mall where it will join Independence Hall and 
the Liberty Bell. The issuance of this coin would coincide with the 
opening of the Center.
  I encourage all of my colleagues to support the National Constitution 
Center by cosponsoring this bill.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:
       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``National Constitution Center 
     Commemorative Coin Act of 2002''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress finds that--
       (1) a Constitutional Convention was convened in the summer 
     of 1787 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for the purposes of 
     replacing the failed Articles of Confederation as a framework 
     for governing the 13 American colonies newly independent from 
     Great Britain;
       (2) the United States Constitution produced by the 
     Convention would set the United States of America on a unique 
     course of experiment in self-government that would profoundly 
     impact the United States and the world;
       (3) in its deliberations and promotion through such 
     literary works as The Federalist Papers, the United States 
     Constitution drew upon the successes and failures of nations 
     and peoples dating as far back as the city-state republics of 
     ancient Greece in forming representative governments;
       (4) the first 10 amendments to the Constitution, known as 
     the Bill of Rights, comprise the best written set of legal 
     protections

[[Page 13532]]

     of the rights and dignity of the individual in the history of 
     human civilization and continue to be the benchmark for 
     nations' adherence to human rights standards;
       (5) the principles of the United States Constitution have 
     been enacted into the governing laws of numerous free 
     countries around the globe, and are reflected in the founding 
     documents of the United Nations;
       (6) the United States Constitution created the framework 
     for what is now the oldest representative democracy in the 
     world;
       (7) in its wisdom, the Constitutional Convention created a 
     mechanism through which the United States Constitution can be 
     perfected, as it has been 27 times to date, to better reflect 
     its founding ideals, as well as to accommodate changing 
     circumstances;
       (8) the rights and freedoms secured to Americans by the 
     United States Constitution have and continue to draw millions 
     from around the globe to the shores of this Nation;
       (9) all Americans should gain an understanding of and 
     appreciation for the United States Constitution and the role 
     this remarkable document plays in the freedoms and quality of 
     life they enjoy;
       (10) the National Constitution Center was established by 
     the Constitution Heritage Act of 1988 (16 U.S.C. 407aa et 
     seq.), which was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan 
     on September 16, 1988, to provide for continuing 
     interpretation of the Constitution and to establish a 
     national center for the United States Constitution; and
       (11) the National Constitution Center, located at the site 
     of the birth of the Constitution, only steps away from the 
     Liberty Bell and Independence Hall in the Independence 
     National Historic Park in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the 
     only center in the world solely dedicated to promoting 
     understanding of the Constitution and its values and ideals.

     SEC. 3. COIN SPECIFICATIONS.

       (a) $1 Silver Coins.--The Secretary of the Treasury (in 
     this Act referred to as the ``Secretary'') shall mint and 
     issue not more than 500,000 $1 coins, which shall--
       (A) weigh 26.73 grams;
       (B) have a diameter of 1.500 inches; and
       (C) contain 90 percent silver and 10 percent copper.
       (b) Legal Tender.--The coins minted under this Act shall be 
     legal tender, as provided in section 5103 of title 31, United 
     States Code.

     SEC. 4. SOURCES OF BULLION.

       The Secretary may obtain silver for minting coins under 
     this Act from stockpiles established under the Strategic and 
     Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, to the extent available, 
     and from other available sources, if necessary.

     SEC. 5. DESIGN OF COINS.

       (a) Design Requirements.--
       (1) In general.--The design of the coins minted under this 
     Act shall be emblematic of the National Constitution Center 
     in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
       (2) Designation and inscriptions.--On each coin minted 
     under this Act, there shall be--
       (A) a designation of the value of the coin;
       (B) an inscription of the year ``2003''; and
       (C) inscriptions of the words ``Liberty'', ``In God We 
     Trust'', ``United States of America'', and ``E Pluribus 
     Unum''.
       (b) Design Selection.--The design for the coins minted 
     under this Act shall be--
       (1) selected by the Secretary, after consultation with the 
     Constitution Center Coin Advisory Committee; and
       (2) reviewed by the Citizens Commemorative Coin Advisory 
     Committee.

     SEC. 6. ISSUANCE OF COINS.

       (a) Quality of Coins.--Coins minted under this Act shall be 
     issued in uncirculated and proof qualities.
       (b) Mint Facility.--Only 1 facility of the United States 
     Mint may be used to mint coins under this Act.
       (c) Period for Issuance.--The Secretary may issue coins 
     minted under this Act beginning on January 1, 2003, and 
     ending when the quantity of coins issued under this Act 
     reaches the limit under section 3(a).

     SEC. 7. SALE OF COINS.

       (a) Sale Price.--The coins minted under this Act shall be 
     sold by the Secretary at a price equal to the sum of--
       (1) the face value of the coins;
       (2) the surcharge provided in subsection (d) with respect 
     to such coins; and
       (3) the cost of designing and issuing the coins (including 
     labor, materials, dies, use of machinery, overhead expenses, 
     marketing, and shipping).
       (b) Bulk Sales.--The Secretary shall make bulk sales of the 
     coins issued under this Act at a reasonable discount.
       (c) Prepaid Orders.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall accept prepaid orders 
     for the coins minted under this Act before the issuance of 
     such coins.
       (2) Discount.--Sale prices with respect to prepaid orders 
     under paragraph (1) shall be at a reasonable discount.
       (d) Surcharges.--All sales of coins issued under this Act 
     shall include a surcharge established by the Secretary, in an 
     amount equal to not more than $10 per coin.

     SEC. 8. DISTRIBUTION OF SURCHARGES.

       (a) In General.--Subject to section 5134(f) of title 31, 
     United States Code, the proceeds from the surcharges received 
     by the Secretary from the sale of coins minted under this Act 
     shall be paid promptly by the Secretary to the National 
     Constitution Center.
       (b) Use of Proceeds.--The proceeds received by the National 
     Constitution Center under subsection (a) shall be used by the 
     Center to promote a greater understanding of the Constitution 
     and its values and ideals.
       (c) Audits.--The Comptroller General of the United States 
     shall have the right to examine such books, records, 
     documents, and other data of the National Constitution Center 
     as may be related to the expenditures of amounts paid under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 8. FINANCIAL ASSURANCES.

       (a) No Net Cost to the Government.--The Secretary shall 
     take such actions as may be necessary to ensure that minting 
     and issuing coins under this Act will not result in any net 
     cost to the United States Government.
       (b) Payment for Coins.--A coin shall not be issued under 
     this Act, unless the Secretary has received--
       (1) full payment for the coin;
       (2) security satisfactory to the Secretary to indemnify the 
     United States for full payment; or
       (3) a guarantee of full payment satisfactory to the 
     Secretary from a depository institution, the deposits of 
     which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
     Corporation or the National Credit Union Administration.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. JEFFORDS (for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Schumer, and Mrs. 
        Clinton):
  S. 2756. A bill to establish the Champlain Valley National Heritage 
Partnership in the States of Vermont and New York, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I am very pleased to introduce the 
Champlain Valley National Heritage Act of 2002. I am joined by Senator 
Leahy and Senators Schumer and Clinton of New York. This bill will 
establish a National Heritage Partnership within the Champlain Valley. 
Passage of this bill will culminate a process to enhance the incredible 
cultural resources of the Champlain Valley.
  The Champlain Valley of Vermont and New York has one of the richest 
and most intact collections of historic resources in the United States. 
Fort Ticonderoga still stands where it has for centuries, at the scene 
of numerous battles critical to the birth of our Nation. Revolutionary 
gunboats have recently been found fully intact on the bottom of Lake 
Champlain. Our cemeteries are the permanent resting place for great 
explorers, soldiers and sailors. The United States and Canada would not 
exist today but for events that occurred in this region.
  We in Vermont and New York take great pride in our history. We 
preserve it, honor it and show it off to visitors from around the 
world. These visitors are also very important to our economy. Tourism 
is among the most important industries in this region and has much 
potential for growth.
  The Champlain Valley Heritage Partnership will bring together more 
than one hundred local groups working to preserve and promote our 
heritage. Up to $2 million a year will be made available from the 
National Park Service though the Lake Champlain Basin Program to 
support local efforts to preserve and interpret our heritage and 
present it to the world. Most of the funding will be given to small 
communities to help preserve their heritage and develop economic 
opportunities.
  This project has taken many years for me to bring to the point of 
introducing legislation. This has been time well spent working at the 
grass-roots level to develop a framework to direct federal resources to 
where it will do the most good. I am confident that we have found the 
best model. This will be a true partnership that supports each member 
but does not impose any new Federal requirements.
  The Champlain Valley National Heritage Partnership will preserve our 
historic resources, interpret and teach about the events that shaped 
our Nation and will be an engine for economic growth. I am hopeful that 
this bill soon become law.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join with my Senate 
colleagues from Vermont and New York as we introduce the Lake Champlain 
Heritage Act of 2002. With this legislation, we will take an important 
step in recognizing the importance of the Lake Champlain Valley in the 
history of America.

[[Page 13533]]

  I want to thank Senator Jeffords and his staff for all the work they 
have put into this effort. I know that many hours have gone into the 
research, discussion and editing to get where we are today. I also want 
to thank Senators Clinton and Schumer who are our valuable New York 
partners in all things related to Lake Champlain.
  Over the July 4th recess, I was able to participate in the Lake 
Champlain Maritime Museum's opening of a new exhibit featuring 
artifacts recovered from the 1776 Revolutionary War Battle of Valcour. 
It was just 1 year ago that Senator Clinton and I were at the site of 
the Battle to take part in the recovery and beginning of the 
conservation process of those artifacts.
  The Valcour Bay Research Project followed the 1997 discovery of the 
missing American gunboat from the Battle. I bring this up because our 
purpose today as we introduce this legislation underscores to the rest 
of our Nation a message we Vermonters and New Yorkers have long 
proclaimed: the role of Lake Champlain in the cause of American 
independence cannot be overlooked.
  The evidence of the struggle for this strategic waterway from the 
days of Native American excursions, through the colonial rivalry 
between Britain and France, our War of Independence, until the end of 
the War of 1812, constantly surrounds those of us who make our homes in 
this Valley.
  This act is intended to advance the cultural heritage goals of 
``Opportunities for Action,'' the comprehensive plan developed under 
the Lake Champlain Special Designation Act by the Lake Champlain Basin 
Program with broad public input and support as well as with the 
involvement of local, State and Federal Governments.
  We envision activities such as locally planned and managed heritage 
networks and programs, a management strategy for the Lake's underwater 
cultural resources and strengthening the links between cultural 
resources and economic development. This legislation will also help 
provide assistance as the 400th anniversary of Samuel De Champlain's 
arrival in the Valley is commemorated in 2009.
  Today, we are taking a significant step in helping all Americans 
better appreciate the full history of the Lake Champlain Valley which 
holds such an extensive collection of historic sites and artifacts.
  As Vermonters and New Yorkers the stewards of Lake Champlain, we have 
a serious responsibility to conserve this evidence for future 
generations. We believe that what we do here, how we manage the 
cultural heritage of the Valley, can contribute to the growing debate 
on how present generations can live and prosper on the same ground that 
we conserve as our natural and cultural heritage.
  Our Vermont and New York Champlain Valley communities share this 
heritage and have helped us develop a vision to enhance the 
conservation, interpretation and enjoyment of our shared history and to 
make it more readily available to residents and visitors alike. We can 
help revitalize local economies and promote heritage tourism as we 
improve the stewardship of the Valley's cultural legacy by making 
additional resources available to communities and organizations through 
the Lake Champlain Basin Program.
  I think it is most fitting that we have come here together to 
introduce this long-awaited bill, reasserting our partnership for Lake 
Champlain: Vermont and New York engaged in a cooperative effort to 
conserve, interpret, and honor our common heritage.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. BIDEN:
  S. 2757. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to 
provide coverage of outpatient prescription drugs under the medicare 
program; to the Committee on Finance.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing a bill to add 
outpatient prescription drug coverage as a new and integral benefit 
under Part B of Medicare. Under this bill, like the rest of the 
services under Part B, Medicare will pick up 80 percent of the cost of 
prescription drugs. This would be the case until a beneficiary hits a 
$4000 annual out-of-pocket limit, at which point the government picks 
up 100 percent of drug costs. Moreover, beneficiaries will not have to 
pay increased monthly premiums or annual deductibles as a result of 
this new drug benefit.
  Now, we have been discussing prescription drug coverage for seniors 
in this chamber for many years, and there have been numerous proposals 
brought forward. Some might ask, why do you feel the need to propose 
your own prescription drug plan; what is wrong with the many previous 
proposals.
  Well, to my way of thinking, we have lost our focus on this issue. In 
developing a drug plan, we have concentrated too much on such things as 
budget allotments, philosophy of government, desires of committee 
chairs, election politics, and other related issues, while ignoring the 
one thing that really counts: what do the citizens of this country, the 
ones who are supposed to use this plan, really want? All of these 
prescription drug plans will be voluntary, and yet unless a plan is 
attractive enough to ensure the participation of close to 100 percent 
of those eligible, it probably won't work from an economic point of 
view. Those of us who were around in 1988 for the debates about 
catastrophic health care remember with great clarity the consequences 
of passing a health-related bill that the citizens don't want.
  Frankly, I have some doubts about whether any of the prescription 
drug proposals to date provide what the citizens in Delaware or 
elsewhere really want. And I think I have a pretty good idea of what 
people want in a prescription drug plan, at least people in my home 
state of Delaware. I live in Delaware, and I commute back and forth on 
AMTRAK every day between Delaware and Washington DC. I have been a 
Senator for 30 years and people in Delaware know me well. They have no 
reluctance about walking up to me at the local diner, on the train, or 
at the drugstore, to give me a piece of their minds. And here is what 
Delawareans want in a prescription drug bill.
  They want something simple and easily understandable. They don't want 
a plan with a lot of fine print, exclusions, complicated payment 
formulas, gaps in coverage, lengthy paragraphs filled with whereases 
and wherefores. They don't want to be in a state of constant anxiety 
because they really don't know what they have signed up for and what 
they are covered for. They don't want to have to spend hours on the 
phone listening to music while waiting for an insurance company clerk 
to answer the phone and try to explain what the benefits are. They 
don't want to spend a whole day filling out paperwork to try to get 
reimbursed for their expenses when they could just as well be playing 
with their grandchildren. They don't want to be caught in the middle of 
a fight between their drug insurance plan and their Medicare over who 
is going to pay for what.
  They want a plan that provides meaningful and substantial financial 
help towards the cost of their medications. For most people I talk to, 
a cut in prescription drug costs from $5000 per year down to $4700 per 
year is not very helpful; they are still faced with choosing between 
paying for medications and paying for rent. With the increasing costs 
of prescription drugs these days, this is a criterion that is just as 
important to the middle class as it is to those with low incomes.
  They want a plan that is stable, reliable, and predictable. They 
don't want to sign up with an insurance company and then have the 
company pull out of the state the following year. They don't want the 
specifics of their benefits to be changing every year. They want to 
know what they are getting.
  They want a guarantee that a plan will be available to them. They 
don't want a guarantee that a plan will be available only if an 
insurance company decides it will offer a plan or if an insurance 
company decides they are a good risk.
  They want a plan that is uniform, not one whose benefits change 
drastically if they happen to move a few miles. Delaware is a small 
state, and people who live or work in Delaware move back and forth 
across state lines with great frequency.
  My prescription drug bill is focused on what consumers want, and it 
fulfills

[[Page 13534]]

all of these requirements. People are already very familiar with 
Medicare Part B, so the addition of a prescription drug benefit will 
not add any confusion. People know that Medicare is stable, reliable, 
predictable, and the same all over the country. People know that 
Medicare Part B covers a substantial 80 percent of their medical 
expense. We know that people like Medicare Part B, since 94 percent of 
those eligible have voluntarily signed up for it. The addition of a new 
prescription drug benefit to Part B, without any change in monthly 
premiums or deductibles, is almost certain to increase the voluntary 
participation rate close to 100 percent.
  Can we afford such a bill? Absolutely. It's just a matter of 
priorities and choices. And these choices simply reflect our values. My 
values tell me that providing life-saving prescription drugs to the 
seniors and disabled is a higher priority than, say, making permanent a 
tax cut for the well-to-do that they probably don't need and have not 
really requested.
  Many of my colleagues in the Senate, and a large number of their 
staff, have been working enormously hard to develop a Medicare 
prescription drug bill that satisfies everybody's concerns. However, I 
am reminded of the statement by the noted British engineer Sir Alec 
Issigonis, who commented that ``A camel is a horse designed by 
committee''. If the public is expecting a horse, we better not end up 
with a camel.
  Our current situation here in Congress brings to mind a story related 
by a local TV weatherman here in Washington, DC. This weatherman works 
in a very high tech underground office with fancy color radars, 
computers, split-second communications devices, and state of the art 
graphics. Yet before each broadcast, the weatherman goes upstairs and 
looks out the window to make sure it is not raining. I would ask my 
colleagues, as they work through their cost estimates, economic 
projections, and so forth in developing a prescription drug plan, to 
walk upstairs and look out the window. Policy makers must not work in 
protective isolation, in a vacuum; they need a strong dose of reality 
to inform their deliberations.
  I believe that my bill provides the kind of prescription drug plan 
that Medicare beneficiaries in Delaware, and around the country, really 
want. I encourage my colleagues to keep the wants of their constituents 
foremost as they move to craft a vitally-needed prescription drug bill 
for Medicare beneficiaries.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. DODD (for himself, Ms. Snower, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Reed, Mr. 
        Bingaman, Mrs. Clinton, Mrs. Murray, and Mr. Edwards):
  S. 2758. A bill entitled ``The Child Care and Development Block Grant 
Amendments Act''; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with my colleagues 
Senator Snowe, Senator Jeffords, Senator Reed, Senator Bingaman, 
Senator Clinton, Senator Murray, and Senator Edwards today in 
introducing the new Access to High Quality Child Care Act.
  On April 11, I introduced, S. 2117, which represented a bipartisan 
partnership with the Senate Finance Committee and Senate Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions, HELP, Committee to both improve the 
quality of child care and expand the availability of child care. The 
bill that we are introducing today further strengthens and improves 
that legislation.
  Compared to S. 2117, the new legislation we are introducing today: 
further strengthens the coordination among agencies and outreach about 
the availability of child care assistance, so that the child care 
agency and TANF agency coordinate in providing information to eligible 
parents about the availability of child care assistance; includes a new 
section to improve parent access to the process of obtaining child care 
subsidies; strengthens accountability for the use of quality funds by 
requiring States to set State child care quality goals, set 
quantifiable measures for each goal; and requires States to describe 
their progress in meeting each goal in an annual report; strengthens 
provisions to improve the quality and availability of child care for 
infants and toddlers, child care for disabled children, and child care 
for children who need care during nontraditional hours; allows States 
to operate an At Home Infant Care program to improve the quality of 
care for infants, currently successful in Montana and Minnesota; 
consolidates the general quality setaside and the child care workforce 
development setaside under S. 2117 into one 10 percent quality setaside 
to be used by States to improve the quality of care that children 
receive, regardless of setting; consolidates data collection under 
current law to make data collection and reporting requirements easier 
for States while retaining useful information for policymakers; deletes 
the section on school readiness incentive grants under S. 2117, 
instead, replacing these grants with the text of S. 2566, the Early 
Care and Education Act authorized separately under Title III of this 
new legislation; shifts the text of the Child Care Centers in Federal 
Facilities Act and the Technical and Financial Assistance Grants Act 
under S. 2117 to Title II of the new bill as separate authorizations; 
adds the text of the Book Stamps Act to Title II as a separate 
authorization; and, authorizes $1 billion in FY2003 and such sums as 
necessary in the out years 2004-2007.
  In short, the Access to High Quality Child Care Act is about putting 
``Development'' back into the Child Care and Development Block Grant.
  The fact is that 78 percent of school-age parents are working today; 
65 percent of parents with children under 6 are working today; and, 
over half of mothers with infants are in the workforce today.
  That means about 14 million children, including 6 million infants and 
toddlers, under the age of 5 are in some type of child care 
arrangement. Many of them are in child care every week for many hours.
  While their parents work, children are being cared for in a variety 
of settings. Some of them are very good, but sadly, some of them are 
not. What we know is that 46 percent of kindergarten teachers report 
that half or more of their students enter kindergarten not ready to 
learn.
  This new legislation that we are introducing today further 
strengthens our efforts to improve the quality of care to promote 
school readiness while expanding child care assistance to more working 
poor families.
  We filed this legislation yesterday in the HELP Committee and will 
proceed to markup next Wednesday, July 24th. I urge my colleagues to 
join us in supporting this legislation that so many working families 
with children need.
  I ask unanimous consent that summary of the legislation be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the summary was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 The 2002 Access Act--The Access to High Quality Child Care Act Brief 
                                Summary

       Background: The Access to High Quality Child Care is about 
     putting ``Development'' back into the Child Care and 
     Development Block Grant. About 14 million children, including 
     6 million infants and toddlers, under the age of 5 are in 
     some type of child care arrangement. Many of them are in 
     child care every week for many hours. The fact is that 78% of 
     school-age parents are working today; 65% of parents with 
     children under 6 are working today; and, over half of mothers 
     with infants are in the workforce today. While these parents 
     work, their children are being cared for in a variety of 
     settings--some of which are very good, but sadly, some of 
     them are not. What we know is that 46% of kindergarten 
     teachers report that half or more of their students enter 
     kindergarten not ready to learn. This reauthorization bill is 
     geared toward improving the quality of care to promote school 
     readiness while expanding child care assistance to more 
     working poor families.
       Key Provisions: The Child Care and Development Block Grant 
     is designed to give parents maximum choice among child care 
     providers. The bill retains parental choice, but provides 
     states with a number of ways to help child care providers 
     improve the quality of care that they provide. The 2002 
     Access Act will: Strengthen the coordination among agencies 
     and outreach about the availability of child care assistance; 
     Promote greater coordination among federal, state, and local 
     care and early childhood development programs, including the 
     transition from early

[[Page 13535]]

     care programs to elementary school; Set aside 10% of CCDBG 
     funds to improve the quality of child care for any of the 
     following activities--initiatives to improve recruitment, 
     education, and retention of child care staff; initiatives to 
     improve the quality and availability of care for infants and 
     toddlers, children with disabilities, or care during 
     nontraditional hours; resource and referral services; 
     training and technical assistance; grants or loans to improve 
     provider compliance with state or local law; support for 
     states to monitor compliance or other activities deemed by 
     the state to improve the quality of care, including the 
     provision of emergency child care.
       Improve the accountability of the use of quality funds by 
     requiring states to set quality improvement goals that are 
     measurable to ensure that states are making progress in 
     improving the quality of child care. Set aside 5% of CCDBG 
     funds to help states increase the reimbursement rate for 
     child care providers to ensure that parents have real choices 
     among quality providers. Under current law, CCDBG payment 
     rates are supposed to be sufficient ``to ensure equal access 
     for eligible children to comparable child care services in 
     the state or substate area that are provided to children 
     whose parents are not eligible to receive assistance''. But, 
     current low state reimbursement rates do not offer parents 
     comparable care for their children.
       Allow states to operate an at-home infant care program to 
     promote the quality of care for infants.
       The children of working parents need quality child care if 
     they are to enter school ready to learn. Yet, 30 states 
     require no training in early childhood development before a 
     teacher walks into a child care classroom. 42 states require 
     no training in early childhood development before a family 
     day care provider opens its home to unrelated children. The 
     2002 Access Act will: Require states to set training 
     standards, just as they are required to do now for health and 
     safety under current law. Such training would go beyond CPR 
     and first aid to include training in the social, emotional, 
     physical, and cognitive development of children.
       Exempt relatives from the training requirements, but 
     through the quality funding in CCDBG states could partner 
     with colleges and R&Rs to provide training to relatives and 
     informal caregivers on a voluntary basis. Initial evaluations 
     in Connecticut of such efforts show that relatives and 
     informal caregivers are voluntarily participating and are 
     feeling better about themselves and their interactions with 
     the children have improved.
       Reduce administrative barriers and improve coordination 
     among agencies so that low income working parents can more 
     easily access the process for obtaining and retaining child 
     care assistance.


       Separate Authorizations for Quality Child Care Initiatives

       Separate authorizations include the following measures: the 
     Child Care Centers in Federal Facilities Act, the Technical 
     and Financial Assistance Grants Act, the Book Stamps Act, and 
     the Early Care & Education Act.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself, Mr. Lott, and Mr. Breaux):
  S. 2759. A bill to protect the health and safety of American 
consumers under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act from seafood 
contaminated by certain substances; to the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise today as Chairman of the 
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee to introduce the Seafood 
Safety Enforcement Act of 2002. I am pleased to be joined by the 
Republican minority leader, Senator Trent Lott, and by Senator John 
Breaux, both distinguished members of the Commerce Committee. This Act 
would ensure that imports of seafood into the United States are meeting 
the same food safety standards imposed on seafood that originates from 
the United States.
  Shrimp and other seafood harvested and processed in the United States 
is some of the best quality seafood in the world. I know how hard the 
shrimpers in my State of South Carolina work to bring good, wholesome 
products to our tables. To preserve the quality of seafood, the United 
States has established rigorous food standards to protect the health 
and well-being of American consumers. As part of that approach, we have 
banned the use of certain harmful substances in food-producing animals 
due to the extreme hazards they pose to human health. While these 
standards also apply to imported foods that cross our borders, these 
protections cannot be enforced without adequate inspection and testing.
  Unfortunately, not all countries are applying the same rigorous 
standards that the United States demands for our consumers. In the last 
few months, one of the banned substances, namely the antibiotic 
chloramphenicol, was detected in shrimp and other food product imported 
from several countries to the United States, the European Union and 
Canada. Shockingly these substances have not been detected by the 
inspectors for the federal Food and Drug Administration, FDA, the 
agency responsible for protecting U.S. consumers from adulterated food 
imports. Rather, these substances were detected in the United States by 
independent testing done by State authorities in Louisiana.
  While these products are prohibited by law, FDA testing has never 
detected such substances in food imports. We were alarmed to discover 
that FDA currently tests only 1 to 2 percent of all food imports for 
compliance with food safety standards. This failure to detect such 
substances may be due not only to inadequate frequency of testing, but 
also may be attributed to inadequate testing methods employed by the 
FDA. While the testing protocol used in Europe and Canada can detect 
such substances to 0.3 parts per billion ppb, FDA until very recently 
used a technique that only measures up to 3 ppb, and now is using a 
test that only detects to 1 ppb.
  It is vital that we close this inspection gap at our borders and 
ensure the safety of our food supply, while not placing unreasonable 
burdens on the men and women who are tasked with this huge inspection 
job. This bill would ensure that U.S. consumers are protected from 
serious health risks associated with harmful substances, while allowing 
the continued flow of imports that are shown to be free of these 
harmful substances. It would require FDA to ensure that imports 
suspected of containing such substances are demonstrated to meet food 
safety standards. Such demonstration would be made by the importer or 
exporter, and subject to FDA approval.
  Due to the health threats posed by such substances in our food 
supply, and the national interest of having a uniform inspection and 
testing standard, federal action is appropriate. This bill provides the 
safety and security we seek, while not placing unreasonable burdens on 
our federal food safety inspection system.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2759

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Seafood Safety Enforcement 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       (1) Chloramphenicol, a potent antibiotic, can cause severe 
     toxic effects in humans, including hypo-aplastic anemia, 
     which is usually irreversible and fatal. The drug is 
     administered to humans only in life-threatening situations 
     when less toxic drugs are not effective.
       (2) Because of these human health impacts, chloramphenicol 
     and similar drugs are not approved for use in food-producing 
     animals in the United States. However, other countries have 
     been found to use these drugs in the aquaculture of shrimp 
     and other seafood, including Thailand, Vietnam, and China.
       (3) The majority of shrimp consumed by the United States is 
     imported. The nation imports 400,000 metric tons of shrimp 
     annually, and the percentage of shrimp imports rises each 
     year. Thailand and Vietnam are the top two exporters of 
     shrimp to the United States, and China is the fifth largest 
     exporter of shrimp to the United States.
       (4) Upon detection of chloramphenicol in certain shipments 
     of seafood from China and other nations, in 2002 the European 
     Union and Canada severely restricted imports of shrimp and 
     other food from these nations.
       (5) The United States Food and Drug Administration inspects 
     only 2 percent of all seafood imports into the United States 
     and utilizes a testing procedure that cannot detect the 
     presence of chloramphenicol below 1 part per billion. The 
     European Union and Canada use testing protocols that can 
     detect such substances to 0.3 parts per billion.
       (6) While Food and Drug Administration import testing did 
     not detect chloramphenicol in shrimp imported from these 
     nations in 2002, independent testing performed by the state 
     of Louisiana detected chloramphenicol at a level of over 2 
     parts per billion in crawfish imported from China.

[[Page 13536]]

       (7) Imports of seafood from nations that utilize substances 
     banned in the United States pose potential threats to United 
     States consumers. Denial of entry to contaminated shrimp and 
     other products to the European Union and Canada will likely 
     redirect imports to the United States of contaminated 
     products turned away from these countries.
       (8) Immediate and focused actions must be taken by the 
     Federal government to improve enforcement of food import 
     restrictions of seafood imports in order to protect United 
     States consumers and ensure safety of the food supply.

     SEC. 3. CONTAMINATED SEAFOOD.

       Section 801 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 381) is amended by--
       (1) striking all of the text in the third sentence of 
     subsection (a) after ``section 505,'' and inserting ``or (4) 
     such article is seafood that appears to bear or contain one 
     or more substances listed in section 530.41(a) of title 21, 
     Code of Federal Regulations, or (5) such article is seafood 
     originating from an exporter or country that the Secretary 
     has identified in guidance as a likely source of articles 
     subject to refusal of admission under clause (4) of this 
     sentence, then such article shall be refused admission, 
     except as provided in subsection (c) of this section and, 
     with respect to articles subject to clause (5) of this 
     sentence, except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
     section.'';
       (2) redesignating subsections (b) through (n) as 
     subsections (c) through (o), respectively; and
       (3) inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b)(1) Notwithstanding clause (5) of the third sentence 
     in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary may permit 
     individual shipments of seafood originating in a country or 
     from an exporter listed in guidance to be admitted into the 
     United States if evidence acceptable to the Secretary is 
     presented that the seafood in that shipment does not bear or 
     contain a substance listed in section 530.41(a) of title 21, 
     Code of Federal Regulations.
       ``(2) The Secretary may remove a country or exporter listed 
     in guidance under clause (5) of the third sentence of 
     subsection (a) of this section only if the country or 
     exporter has shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary that 
     each substance at issue is no longer sold for use in, being 
     used in, or being used in a manner that could contaminate 
     food-producing animals in the country at issue.''.

     SEC. 4. GUIDANCE FOR REFUSING ENTRY OF SEAFOOD FROM A COUNTRY 
                   OR EXPORTER.

       (a) Issuance of Guidance.--Upon a determination by the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services that, based on 
     information acceptable to the Secretary, an exporter or 
     country appears to be a source of articles subject to refusal 
     under section 801(a)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
     Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 381(a)(4)), the Secretary shall issue 
     guidance described in section 801(a)(5) of that Act.
       (b) Determination Criteria.--In making the determination 
     described in subsection (a), or any determination under 
     section 801(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
     (21 U.S.C. 381(a)), the Secretary may consider--
       (A) the detection of substances described in section 
     801(a)(4) of that Act by the Secretary;
       (B) the detection of such substances by a person 
     commissioned to carry out examinations and investigations 
     under section 702(a) of that Act;
       (C) findings from an inspection under section 704 of that 
     Act;
       (D) the detection by other importing countries of such 
     substances in shipments of seafood that originate from such 
     country or exporter; and
       (E) other evidence or information as determined by the 
     Secretary.
       (c) Annual Report.--The Secretary shall provide a report 
     within 30 days after the end of each fiscal year to the 
     Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions 
     and the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and 
     Commerce setting forth the names of all countries and 
     exporters for which the guidance described in subsection (a) 
     was issued during that fiscal year.
       (d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act, and no 
     amendment made by this Act, shall be construed to limit the 
     existing authority of the Secretary of Health and Human 
     Services or the Secretary of the Treasury to consider any 
     information or to refuse admission of any article under 
     section 801(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
     (21 U.S.C. 381(a)).

     SEC. 5. ISSUANCE OF TOLERANCES.

       If, after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary 
     of Health and Human Services intends to issue a tolerance 
     under section 512(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
     Act (21 U.S.C. 360b(b)) for any of the substances listed in 
     section 530.41(a) of title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, 
     then the Secretary shall notify the Senate Committee on 
     Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House of 
     Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce before 
     issuing that tolerance. The Secretary shall include in the 
     notification a draft of any changes in Federal statute law 
     that may be necessary.

     SEC. 6. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       Section 801 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 
     U.S.C. 381), as amended by subsection (a), is amended by--
       (1) striking ``subsection (b)'' in subsection (d), as 
     redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, and inserting 
     ``subsection (c)'';
       (2) striking ``subsection (e)'' in paragraph (1) of 
     subsection (g), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, 
     and inserting ``subsection (f)'';
       (3) striking ``section 801(a)'' in paragraph (1)(A)(i) of 
     subsection (h), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, 
     and inserting ``subsection (a) of this section'';
       (4) striking ``section 801(a)'' in paragraph (1)(A)(ii) of 
     subsection (h), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, 
     and inserting ``subsection (a) of this section'';
       (5) striking ``section 801(d)(1);'' in paragraph 
     (1)(A)(iii) of subsection (h), as redesignated by section 
     2(2) of this Act, and inserting ``subsection (e)(1) of this 
     section;''.
       (6) striking ``Subsection (b)'' in paragraph (2) of 
     subsection (k), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, 
     and inserting ``Subsection (c)'';
       (7) striking ``Subsection (b)'' in paragraph (1) of 
     subsection (l), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, 
     and inserting ``Subsection (c)'';
       (8) striking ``Subsection (b)'' in subsection (m), as 
     redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, and inserting 
     ``Subsection (c)''; and
       (9) striking ``Subsection (b)'' in paragraph (2)(B)(i) of 
     subsection (n), as redesignated by section 2(2) of this Act, 
     and inserting ``Subsection (c)''.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. SPECTER (for himself and Mr. Harkin):
  S.J. Res. 41. A joint resolution calling for Congress to consider and 
vote on a resolution for the use of force by the United States Armed 
Forces against Iraq before such force is deployed; to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I sought recognition to introduce a joint 
resolution on behalf of Senator Harkin and myself calling upon the 
Congress to consider, vote on, and enact a joint resolution authorizing 
the use of force by the U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq before such 
force is used.
  This resolution takes no position as to whether the use of force 
should be authorized or it should not be authorized, but goes to the 
essential authority of the Congress under the Constitution to declare 
war.
  The President's powers as Commander in Chief are reserved for an 
emergency where Congress does not have an opportunity to deliberate and 
decide. It is obvious that concerning the current situation with Iraq, 
there is ample time for a resolution of the issue by the Congress.
  There have been repeated statements by the administration relating to 
military action against Saddam Hussein. It is known that Saddam has 
weapons of mass destruction, such as chemicals which he used against 
the Kurds, and there exists evidence of biological weapons that he 
possesses. The best thinking is Saddam does not now have nuclear bombs 
but is trying to acquire them.
  The President of the United States, in his State of the Union speech, 
identified Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as the ``axis of 
evil.'' Secretary of State Powell in congressional testimony then 
testified that the United States was not going to go to war against 
either Iran or North Korea, raising the inference that war against Iraq 
by negative implication was a distinct possibility.
  There have been repeated requests for regime change by the 
administration. In lieu of the limited time, I will not enumerate them, 
although they are set forth in some detail in my prepared statement.
  On February 13, 2002, I spoke on the floor calling for hearings by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and/or the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, and by letters dated February 14, 2002, and March 12, 2002, 
wrote to the respective chairmen of those committees. I am glad to note 
that Senator Biden, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, has 
called for a September hearing on the Iraq issue.
  The power of the Congress on the declaration of war has been eroded 
very materially, with the President taking unilateral action in Korea, 
Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Somalia, and Kosovo. But in a 
situation where there is ample time for the Congress to

[[Page 13537]]

deliberate and decide, the Congress should assert its constitutional 
authority.
  Among the many issues regarding the separation of powers, none is 
more important than this basic power to declare war and the separate 
power which the President has as Commander in Chief which sometimes 
conflict, but not in the situation such as the one at hand where we 
have time to deliberate and decide.
  Earlier this month, I conducted some 19 town meetings across my State 
of Pennsylvania and found a great deal of citizen concern. People are 
unaware of the details and would like to know more.
  In my February 13, 2002 floor speech, I enumerated a number of issues 
which are worth repeating. First, hearings would identify with greater 
precision what Saddam has by way of weapons of mass destruction.
  Secondly, we would get into the details as to what Saddam and Iraq 
have done by way of thwarting the United Nations from conducting 
inspections. Earlier this year, I met with Secretary General Kofi Annan 
to get a firsthand briefing and to press the U.N. to do everything it 
could to get those inspections.
  Another issue which I think needs to be subjected to analysis and 
hearings and national debate is what the cost would be of toppling 
Saddam, including the cost in casualties.
  Fourth, what will happen after a regime change? What will happen if, 
as and when Saddam goes?
  There is also the critical issue as to what we may expect from Saddam 
by way of reprisal or by way of anticipatory action. We know that 
Saddam Hussein is ruthless. We have seen him use chemicals against his 
own people, the Kurds. We have his statement just yesterday on the 24th 
anniversary of the July revolution when Saddam came into power. It is a 
belligerent, bellicose statement.
  I had an opportunity to meet with Saddam Hussein in January of 1990 
at a meeting with Senator Richard Shelby. There is no doubt in my mind, 
from that contact--a meeting of about an hour and a quarter--that we 
are dealing with someone who has a mindset and a determination, having 
invaded Kuwait, having acted against the Kurds, that should give us 
every reason to be concerned about what he may do in light of the 
administration's repeated statements about a regime change; a concern 
if there is action by the United States against Iraq that there may be 
retaliation against Israel or others in the Mideast.
  Consideration by the Congress also would be very helpful in 
addressing the concerns which the international community has expressed 
on the unilateralism of President Bush and President Bush's 
administration. We have had instances of that: the International 
Criminal Court, Kyoto, the U.N.-Bosnia peacekeeping force, and others 
which I have enumerated in greater detail in the written statement 
which I will include at the conclusion of these remarks.
  If there are Members of the Senate and House who come forward and 
support the President--people in this body with extensive experience in 
the field over many years, respected international reputations--I think 
that would give credence to a position that the President may wish to 
take and would allay some of the concerns internationally on 
unilateralism, and perhaps persuade some of our allies that this is the 
right course of conduct.
  In considering what to do about Saddam, we have the example fresh in 
our mind of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. We have learned that 20/20 
hindsight always being very good that we should have acted against bin 
Laden before September 11. We had ample warning and ample cause to do 
so. Bin Laden was under indictment for killing Americans in Mogadishu 
in 1993. Bin Laden was under indictment for the East Africa Embassy 
bombings in 1998. We knew he was involved in the U.S.S. Cole terrorism. 
He had made pronouncements about a worldwide jihad. The United States 
and the United Nations made demands on the Taliban to turn over bin 
Laden, which were refused. So we had a right under international law to 
proceed against bin Laden.
  There is obviously great concern about Saddam Hussein or what the 
future may hold if he goes unchecked. But these are all complicated 
issues. There ought to be full hearings. The American people ought to 
be informed. We have learned from the bitter experience of Vietnam what 
happens when there is military action where the American people are not 
supportive and the Congress is not supportive.
  Obviously, in a representative democracy, the matter first comes to 
the Congress. There is the precedent of President George H.W. Bush in 
1991, when the Congress authorized a resolution for the use of force. I 
know the Presiding Officer remembers it well, as do I. It was a 
historic debate, and has been so characterized by the media and other 
commentators. President Bush, in 1990, had originally said he did not 
need congressional authorization. Then Senator Harkin took the floor on 
January 3, 1991, during a swearing-in ceremony, and procedurally the 
course that then followed, without going into great detail now, was 
that we had the debate on January 10, 11, and 12 and voted 52 to 47 in 
this body authorizing the use of force to repel Iraq from Kuwait. So 
that precedent is with us.
  There is no doubt that Congress is reluctant to step into the breach 
and to take a position. I urged in 1998 that the Congress authorize the 
use of force before President Clinton moved in with the missile attacks 
against Iraq in December of 1998. My written statement goes into detail 
as to what I have done on this issue going back to 1983, when I 
conducted a debate with Senator Charles Percy on the question of Korea 
and Vietnam being a war, and the questioning of Justice Souter in 1990 
on whether Korea was a war. There has been a reluctance on the part of 
Congress to step forward. If we do nothing and it all works out, 
everything is fine, the Congress is happy. If the President acts 
unilaterally and is wrong, he gets the blame and we do not get the 
blame.
  I believe we have a responsibility to step forward. We have a 
responsibility institutionally under the Constitution to declare war, 
and we have a responsibility to acquaint the American people as to what 
is involved, and I think a responsibility to have this debate, to tell 
our European allies what our reasons are for what we may do.
  If there is to be military action against Saddam and Iraq, there is 
no doubt it would be much stronger with a congressional resolution, 
which implicitly carries the support of the American people. I think 
the hearings which I have called for and the debate on the resolution 
will do a great deal to inform the American people and the people of 
the world as to what we are up to, and whatever justification it is we 
have.
  I understand that my distinguished colleague, Senator Harkin, will be 
a cosponsor of this resolution.
  Repeated statements from the administration carry the strong 
suggestion that President Bush intends to take military action to 
change the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. There are good reasons to 
be concerned about Saddam Hussein's developing weapons of mass 
destruction. Iraq's exclusion of UN inspectors raises the inference he 
has something to hide.
  On February 13, 2002, in a Senate floor statement, I urged that the 
Senate Armed Services and/or Senate Foreign Relations Committee hold 
hearings as much as possible in public with some necessarily in closed 
sessions, to determine:
  (1) The specifics on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction;
  (2) Precisely what happened on the United Nations efforts to conduct 
inspections in Iraq and Iraq's refusals;
  (3) What type of a military action would be necessary to topple 
Saddam, including estimates of U.S. casualties;
  (4) What is anticipated in a change in regime in Iraq including 
Saddam's prospective replacement.
  Congressional Record, S730-731, February 13, 2002.
  On April 4, 2002, I met with United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan urging the UN to press Iraq to submit to wide-open, including 
surprise inspections, to determine the facts on Iraq's

[[Page 13538]]

possession and efforts to create weapons of mass destruction. Meetings 
between UN officials and Iraqi representatives on May 1 and 3, 2002 
produced no results. Subsequent meetings between UN officials and Iraqi 
representatives in early July produced no results.
  A ranking U.S. intelligence official advised that wide-open and 
surprise inspections in Iraq could provide reasonable assurances as to 
what Iraq has by way of possessing and/or developing weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Presidents have acted unilaterally in the past half century in 
initiating military actions in Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Lebanon, 
Panama, Somalia and Kosovo. In some of those situations where there was 
not time for the Congress to deliberate and decide on a declaration of 
war or an authorization for the use of force, it was appropriate for 
the President to utilize his authority as Commander-in-Chief in an 
emergency. There is now ample time for the Congress to hold hearings, 
deliberate and take whatever action Congress deems appropriate 
regarding Iraq.
  There is a need for the American public to understand the issues 
involved in the use of military force against Iraq. There has been some 
public discussion, but relatively little. Congressional hearings would 
stimulate a national dialogue on the nation's op-ed pages, radio and 
television talk shows and in town halls across the country. I am glad 
to see that Senator Joseph R. Biden, Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, has announced his committee will hold hearings on Iraq in 
September.
  In 19 town meetings, which I conducted across the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania this month, I heard considerable public concern and 
confusion over the President's intentions as to Iraq. Public support, 
reflected through the elected members of the House and Senate, is 
indispensable to successfully carry out an extensive military action. 
The United States learned a better lesson in Vietnam that a war cannot 
be successfully fought without public and congressional support.
  Consideration by the Congress on these key issues would provide a 
basis for international understanding of our position and perhaps even 
support in some quarters. There is a world view that President Bush too 
often acts unilaterally on critical international issues such as the 
International Criminal Court, the UN/Bosnia peacekeeping force, the 
Kyoto Protocol, ABM Treaty withdrawal, and the Biological Weapons 
Convention. If congressional consideration was followed by the 
authorization for the use of force supported by thoughtful and 
experienced members of the House and Senate, the international 
community might well be reassured that the U.S. military action was not 
the decision of just one man, even though he is the President of the 
United States.
  There is solid precedent for President George W. Bush to request 
congressional authority for the use of force against Iraq, just as 
President George H.W. Bush did in January, 1991. On December 21, 1990, 
and as late as January 9, 1991, President Bush was quoted as saying a 
congressional authorization was not necessary. See Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents, January 14, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 24-25. 
Many Senators, including Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island, Richard Lugar 
of Indiana, Tom Harkin of Iowa, Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, 
Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of Delaware, Brock Adams of Washington and I 
sought to force debate on a resolution that would require congressional 
authorization for the use of force against Iraq. Congressional Record, 
S 48, January 4, 1991; Congressional Record, S119-120, January 10, 
1991; see also New York Times, October 18, 1990, page A1, ``Senators 
Demand Role in Approving Any Move on Iraq;'' Washington Post, January 
4, 1991, page A19, ``Canceling Recess, Lawmakers Prepare to Debate War 
Powers.''
  On January 3, 1991, the date that Senators who were elected and re-
elected the previous November took the oath of office, Senator Harkin 
successfully sought Senate debate and a vote on a use-of-force 
resolution. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell scheduled Senate 
floor action for consideration of a resolution for the use of force on 
January 10, 1991. Following a Senate debate which was characterized as 
``historical'' by the Washington Post, the Senate authorized the use of 
force against Iraq by a vote of 52 to 47. Congressional Record, S1018-
1019, January 12, 1991. Similarly, the House of Representatives passed 
such a resolution by a vote of 250 to 183. Congressional Record, H1139-
1140, January 12, 1991.
  With the repeated public commentary on the President's plans to use 
force against Iraq, there has been public concern about what Saddam 
Hussein might do in anticipation or retaliation. Saddam is well known 
for his ruthlessness and his disdain for life by use of chemicals 
against his own people, the Kurds. Saddam is widely reported to have 
stockpiles of biological weapons. In a struggle for his own survival, 
why should we expect Saddam Hussein to refrain from using every weapon 
at his disposal against an announced attacker? A lengthy article in the 
New York Times on July 6, 2002 concerning U.S. plans for widespread 
inoculation for smallpox carried the implicit suggestion of a concern 
for a bioterrorism attack.
  Consideration by Congress on a resolution for the use of force 
against Saddam would not impact on any potential element of surprise 
because there is no element of surprise left. The news media has been 
full of notice to Saddam of potential U.S. plans such as: The New York 
Times February 16, 2002, edition which quoted Vice President Cheney as 
saying, ``The President is determined to press on and stop Iraq . . .  
from continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction'' and intends to 
use ``the means at our disposal--including military, diplomatic and 
intelligence to address these concerns'';
  The Los Angeles Times on May 5, 2002, reported that the defense 
Intelligence Agency has produced an operational support study on Iraq 
including maps and data on geography, roads, refineries, communication 
facilities, security organizations and military deployments;
  The Washington Post reported on May 24, 2002, General Tommy R. 
Franks, Commander of the U.S. Central Command, has briefed the 
President concerning troop levels necessary to invade Iraq and oust 
Saddam Hussein;
  The New York Times on July 5, 2002, reported on an American military 
document calling for air, land and sea based forces to attack Iraq and 
topple Saddam Hussein;
  The New York Times on July 9, 2002, quoted President Bush as saying 
on Iraq: ``It's the stated policy of this government to have regime 
change and it hasn't changed. And we'll use all tools at our disposal 
to do so.''
  In considering a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, we should 
consider--not that it is determinative--the consequences of not acting 
against al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden before September 11, 2001. We had 
reason in that situation to anticipate a terrorist attack and we had 
rights under international law to move against bin Laden and al-Qaeda 
in a pre-emptive strike before September 11, 2001.
  Prior to September 11, Osama bin Laden was under U.S. indictment for 
killing Americans in Mogadishu in 1993. He was further under U.S. 
indictment for the attacks against American embassies in 1998. He was 
known to have been involved in the terrorist attack of the USS Cole. 
Osama bin Laden had spoken repeatedly and publicly about his intention 
to carry out a worldwide Jihad against the United States.
  When the Taliban in control in Afghanistan refused to turn over bin 
Laden to the United States after demands by the United States and the 
United Nations, the United States had rights under international law to 
use military force against al-Qaeda and bin Laden.
  With congressional hearings as a start, the American people should be 
informed about Iraq's threat and all our efforts to deal with this 
threat short of use of military force. We should do our utmost to 
organize an international coalition against Iraq, which President 
George Bush did in

[[Page 13539]]

1991, specifying as much of the evidence as possible in public 
congressional hearings in order to create American and worldwide public 
support for appropriate action. Such public hearings would be 
supplemented by classified information given to the leaders of the 
prospective coalition.
  Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides that 
``Congress has the authority to declare war.'' Article 2 Section 2 of 
the United States Constitution provides that the President ``shall be 
commander in chief of the army and navy of the United States. . . .''
  In the past half century, there has been a consistent and 
considerable erosion of Congress' constitutional authority to declare 
war with a concomitant expansion of the President's powers as 
Commander-in-Chief. My concerns about the erosion of congressional 
authority to declare war first arose in 1951 when I was called to 
active duty in the United States Air Force after having received in 
R.O.T.C. commission as a second lieutenant upon graduation from the 
University of Pennsylvania. I was glad to serve state-side from July 
29, 1951 to July 31, 1953 as a special agent in the Office of Special 
Investigations, noting that President Truman had acted on his authority 
as Commander-in-Chief to order a ``police action'' without 
congressional authorization.
  Early in my Senate career, I participated extensively in floor debate 
on the War Powers Resolution concerning U.S. military action in 
Lebanon. On September 27, 1983, I questioned Senator Charles H. Percy, 
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as to whether Korea and 
Vietnam were wars. Senator Percy stated that both Korea and Vietnam 
were wars even though undeclared. Congressional Record, S. 12995, 
September 27, 1983.
  In 1983, I prepared a legal document for a declaratory judgment 
action to take to the Supreme Court of the United States on the issue 
of the constitutionality of the War Powers Act and seeking a judicial 
determination of the respective authority of the President as 
Commander-in-Chief and the Congress to declare war. It was my thought 
that if the Congress and the President asked the Court to take 
jurisdiction and decide this issue, the Court might do so although even 
with such a joint request, the Supreme Court might be unwilling to be 
involved in the so-called ``political thicket''. The Reagan 
Administration was unwilling to join in such a request and 
congressional leaders were reluctant to do so although no final 
determination was made since the issue was rendered moot by the Reagan 
Administration's declination. Understandably, the parties preferred to 
leave the issue ambiguous with a resolution on a case-by-case basis in 
the political process without a finite judicial determination.
  I pursued my inquiries by questioning Supreme Court nominees as to 
whether Korea was a war. In confirmation hearings for Justice David 
Souter on September 14, 1990, I questioned him as to whether Korea was 
a war, whether the Presidents exceeded their constitutional authority 
in military action in Korea and Vietnam and whether the War Powers Act 
was unconstitutional in violating presidential powers as Commander-in-
Chief. Justice Souter declined to express an opinion stating, in 
effect, that there was no law to guide him in answering these 
questions. See Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United 
States Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., on the Nomination of David H. 
Souter to be Associate of the Supreme Court of the United States.
  In the Fall of 1990 and in early January 1991, I joined other 
senators in successfully taking the position that the President needed 
congressional authorization for the use of military force against Iraq 
and the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 678. 
Congressional Record, S. 405-490, January 10, 1991.
  I took up this question again on September 13, 1994, taking the 
position that the President did not have the constitutional authority 
to order an invasion of Haiti without prior congressional 
authorization. Congressional Record, S. 12760, September 13, 1994.
  On June 5, 1995, I introduced S. Res. 128, which stated it was the 
sense of the Senate that no U.S. military personnel should be 
introduced into combat or potential combat situations in Bosnia without 
clearly defined objectives and sufficient resources to achieve those 
objectives. Congressional Record, S. 7703, June 5, 1995. That 
resolution noted that there was ample time for Congress to deliberate 
and decide that matter, stating that such a decision was a matter for 
the Congress and that there should be no further erosion of that 
authority by the Executive Branch.
  On November 1, 1995, noting the military action in Somalia without 
congressional authority and the military action in Haiti without 
congressional authority, I urge the President to follow the precedent 
of the Gulf war and seek congressional approval for incursions into 
Bosnia since there was ample opportunity for Congress to consider and 
decide the issue. Congressional Record, S. 31102, November 1, 1995.
  On September 17, 1996, I spoke on the Senate floor on the use of 
force with missile strikes against Iraq on September 3, 1996, noting 
that this was another example where the President did not seek 
congressional authorization or even consultation in advance of that 
military action. Congressional Record, S. 10624-10625, September 17, 
1996.
  When there was speculation about additional military action against 
Iraq in early 1998, I spoke on the Senate floor on February 12, 1998, 
noting that an air attack or a missile attack constituted acts of war 
which required congressional authority. Congressional Record, S. 791-
792, February 12, 1998. The President then ordered missile strikes 
against Iraq in December 1998 without seeking congressional authority.
  On February 23, 1999, during Senate debate on the President's use of 
force in Kosovo, I noted my concern that air strikes constituted acts 
of war which required authorization by Congress. Congressional Record, 
S. 1771-1773, February 23, 1999. I again noted the continuing erosion 
of constitutional authority and the need for Congress to debate, 
deliberate and decide these issues when there was ample time to do so. 
I noted the tendency on the part of Congress to sit back and avoid such 
tough decisions. If things go wrong, there is always the President to 
blame. If things go right, we have not impeded Presidential action.
  On March 23, 1999, the Senate voted 58 to 41 to authorize air strikes 
in Kosovo after the President's request for such congressional action. 
Congressional Record, S. 3118, March 23, 1999. I voted in favor of air 
strikes even though I had concerns about the President's reliance on 
the ``humanitarian catastrophe'' which was a departure from recognized 
U.S. policy to use force where there was a vital U.S. national security 
interest. The House deadlocked 213 to 213 on the same vote to authorize 
force. Congressional Record, H. 2451-2452, April 28, 1999.
  On May 24, 1999, I proposed an amendment to S. 1059--the Department 
of Defense Authorization bill--calling on the President to ``seek 
approval from Congress prior to the introduction of ground troops from 
the United States Armed Forces in connection with the present 
operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or funding for 
that operation will not be authorized.'' Congressional Record, S. 5809-
5811, May 25, 1999.
  While supporting air strikes proposed by the President against the 
former Yugloslavia, I opposed any open-ended authorization, such as 
S.J. Res. 20, which would have ``authorized [the President] to use all 
necessary force and other means in concert with United States allies to 
accomplish the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and 
Montenegro''. I thought the broad wording of that resolution 
constituted a blank check which was unwise. Instead, the President 
should seek specific congressional authority after specifying the 
objectives and the means for accomplishing those objectives.

[[Page 13540]]

  There is an understandable reluctance on the part of Members of the 
House and Senate to challenge a President, especially a popular 
President, on his actions as Commander-in-Chief to protect U.S. 
national interests. The constitutional issues on separation of powers 
and the respective authority of the Congress vis-a-vis the President 
are obviously important. Of even greater importance, however, is the 
value of a united front with the President backed by congressional 
authorization and American public opinion on an issue where most, if 
not virtually all, of the international community is in opposition.
  If the Congress sits back and does nothing and the President is 
right, then there is public approval. If the President turns out to be 
wrong, then it is his responsibility without blame being attached to 
the Congress. There is an added element that the President may, and 
probably does, know more than the Congress. Hearings, in closed 
session, could address that discrepancy in knowledge.
  The current issue of Iraq is another chapter, albeit a very important 
chapter, in the ongoing effort to define congressional and Presidential 
authority on the critical constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers. In the present case, there is ample time for Congress to 
deliberate and decide. With the stakes so high, Congress should assert 
its constitutional authority to make this critical decision.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the joint resolution be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                            Joint Resolution


 calling for congress to consider and vote on a resolution for the use 
  of force by the united states armed forces against Iraq before such 
                           force is deployed

       Whereas Iraq has consistently breached its cease-fire 
     agreement between Iraq and the United States, entered into on 
     March 3, 1991, by failing to dismantle its weapons of mass 
     destruction program, and refusing to permit monitoring and 
     verification by United Nations inspections;
       Whereas Iraq has developed weapons of mass destruction, 
     including chemical and biological capabilities, and has made 
     positive progress toward developing nuclear weapons 
     capabilities;
       Whereas in his January 29, 2002 ``State of the Union'' 
     address the President characterized Iraq, Iran and North 
     Korea as an ``axis of evil'';
       Whereas the Secretary of State distinguished Iraq from Iran 
     and North Korea in his testimony before the Senate Budget 
     Committee on February 12, 2002, stating that ``for several 
     years now [it has been] a policy of the United States 
     government that a regime change would be in the best interest 
     of the region, [and] the best interest of the Iraqi people'';
       Whereas in his February 12, 2002 testimony, the Secretary 
     of State specifically stated, ``With respect to Iran and with 
     respect to North Korea, there is no plan to start a war with 
     these nations'', raising the implication that the United 
     States had a plan to start a war with Iraq;
       Whereas, there have been repeated reports in the news media 
     on U.S. plans to use force against Iraq and statements by the 
     President and the Vice President on the intention of the 
     United States to use force against Iraq:
       (a) The New York Times February 16, 2002, quoting Vice 
     President Cheney saying, ``The President is determined to 
     press on and stop Iraq . . . from continuing to develop 
     weapons of mass destruction'' and intends to use ``the means 
     at our disposal--including military, diplomatic and 
     intelligence to address these concerns'';
       (b) New York Times on July 9, 2002 quoting President Bush 
     on Iraq: ``It's the stated policy of this government to have 
     regime change and it hasn't changed. And we'll use all tools 
     at our disposal to do so.''
       Whereas Congress has the exclusive authority to declare war 
     under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution;
       Whereas, the President has authority under Article II, 
     Section 2, of the United States Constitution as Commander-in-
     Chief, which authorizes him to take military action in an 
     emergency when Congress does not have time to deliberate and 
     decide on a declaration of war or the equivalent 
     authorization for the use of force;
       Whereas, within the past half century, Presidents have 
     unilaterally initiated military actions in Korea, Vietnam, 
     Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Somalia and Kosovo;
       Whereas, President George H.W. Bush, although initially 
     stating publicly that he did not need congressional action, 
     ultimately requested authorization from Congress, which was 
     granted in January 1991, to use force against Iraq under 
     circumstances similar to the present situation;
       Whereas, there is adequate time for the Congress to 
     deliberate and decide on the authorization to initiate 
     military action against Iraq;
       Whereas, if Congress takes no action in the current 
     situation where there is adequate time to deliberate and 
     decide, there will be a significant further, if not virtually 
     complete, erosion of congressional authority under Article I, 
     Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
       Whereas, this resolution takes no position on whether such 
     authorization should or should not be granted by Congress;
       Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
     United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress 
     consider and vote on a Resolution authorizing the use of 
     force by the United States Armed Forces against Iraq before 
     such force is deployed against Iraq.

                          ____________________