[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 285-288]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




                     WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, tomorrow evening President Bush will be 
giving his State of the Union speech. He will undoubtedly review the 
actions of the past year and talk about his plans for this current 
year. It seems to me appropriate to focus a little bit on what I 
believe is one of the most important decisions he made in the last year 
and to reflect a little bit upon what that decision will mean for the 
United States in the years to come. It was made at a time when Congress 
was not in session and the country, frankly, was primarily thinking 
about the Christmas season. There was not a lot of media attention paid 
to the decision.
  For reasons I will discuss in some subsequent speeches, it seems to 
me one of the most fundamental and important decisions of any President 
in recent years and certainly of President Bush during his first term. 
I refer to his decision on behalf of the United States to give notice 
to Russia of the withdrawal of the United States from the 1972 ABM 
Treaty. As I said, I am going to discuss different aspects of this 
decision in some subsequent remarks.
  For example, I will discuss the President's legal authority to 
withdraw. Some have suggested action by the Senate should take place or 
that somehow the President doesn't necessarily have the authority to 
withdraw from the treaty. That is not true; he does. I will be 
discussing that. I also want to address in subsequent remarks how I 
think this decision changes the geopolitical relationships and, 
frankly, reflects a 21st century view of the world, especially the 
relationship between the United States on one hand and Russia on the 
other hand, a view far different from that of the adversarial cold war 
relationship between the two superpowers, and how this ABM decision is 
probably the most dramatic recognition of that new relationship.
  I will discuss what that means both in terms of the relationship 
between the two countries in the future but also what it means in terms 
of a change in the direction of the philosophy of this country with 
respect to national security issues, especially how it relates to the 
question of how we protect ourselves. Is it through a combination of 
ideas that are premised on peace through strength, going back to the 
Reagan days, or more of a focus on arms control agreements, reflecting 
more of the Clinton administration view?
  Clearly, the Bush administration has decided defending the United 
States depends first and foremost upon our ability to defend ourselves 
through missile defense, for example, and less on arms control 
agreements. I will be discussing what I think are the important 
ramifications of that decision.

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  Today, I will first of all commend the President for his decision, 
made on December 13 of last year, of the intent to withdraw from the 
ABM Treaty and, secondly, discuss the reasons I believe this was the 
right decision for the President to make. Let me note those two reasons 
in summary.
  It is highly questionable whether the ABM Treaty ever served U.S. 
interests. It did not stop an arms race, its purpose, as proponents 
claims. It was the product of a bipolar international structure, as I 
said before, that no longer exists and no longer reflects the 
relationship we should have with Russia as a result. It remains a 
serious obstacle to U.S. ability to defend itself against the long-
range threat of ballistic missiles. The President's decision was a 
necessary step forward in addressing that threat. The future national 
security of the United States requires the construction of ballistic 
missile defenses that were flatly prohibited by the treaty.
  Let me discuss those items in turn. First, with respect to the 
purpose of the treaty, the premise of the ABM Treaty back in 1972 was 
that if neither the United States nor the Soviet Union took steps to 
protect itself against a devastating nuclear strike, then both nations 
would feel confident in their ability to retaliate against each other, 
secure in the knowledge that each possessed that capability, and 
neither would find it necessary to increase the size of their nuclear 
arsenals. An accompanying agreement, SALT I, was intended to limit the 
size and shape of the arsenals in order to enhance strategic stability.
  Proponents of the ABM Treaty--and their numbers are many --have for 
the 30 years or so since the treaty's ratification considered it the 
cornerstone of strategic stability. They view the treaty not just as 
the guiding document in United States-Soviet and now United States-
Russian relations but as the principal constraint on all countries 
considering developing missile forces with which to threaten neighbors 
and argue that the absence unleashes a destabilizing arms buildup 
around the world, including in Russia.
  Well, what of this?
  The central premise of the ABM Treaty, that the United States and 
Soviet nuclear arsenals would be restrained by the absence of missile 
defenses, is refuted through the simplest quantitative analysis. In the 
15 years since the treaty's ratification, the number of strategic 
ballistic missile warheads in the inventory of the Soviet Union grew 
from around 2,000 to 10,000. The U.S. level grew from around 3,700 in 
1972 to about 8,000 in 1987. In fact, strategic nuclear forces expanded 
not just quantitatively but qualitatively as well. The decade following 
the ABM Treaty signing witnessed introduction into the Soviet arsenal 
of entire generations of new long-range missiles, not just in 
contradiction to the intent of the ABM Treaty but in contravention of 
the accompanying SALT I accord as well.
  The post-cold-war picture similarly argues against the treaty's 
effectiveness at restraining offensive forces. China has been 
exceedingly belligerent in its use of warlike rhetoric targeted against 
the concept of a regional missile defense plan encompassing the island 
of Taiwan. Yet in the absence of missile defenses, it has been 
deploying missiles opposite Taiwan at the rate of 50 a year. China made 
the decision and embarked on a modernization of its long-range missile 
force targeted against the United States long before the United States 
made a decision to deploy missile defense systems.
  Similarly, India and Pakistan missile developments which, combined 
with each country's nuclear weapons programs, create the most dangerous 
region on Earth right now, occur without reference to missile defenses. 
And of course missile programs of countries such as Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea have been restrained at times by technological factors but 
never by the presence of missile defenses in countries they might 
target.
  The point is that missile forces are not a response to missile 
defenses. They are the result of national perceptions of threat and 
political and military requirements. As the new National Intelligence 
Estimate on foreign ballistic missiles states:

       The ballistic missile remains a central element in the 
     military arsenals of nations around the globe and almost 
     certainly will retain this status over the next 15 years.

  In other words, ballistic missiles are not being built as a result of 
missile defenses being built. Those missile forces are already 
occurring, are already being built, and it is the defenses which now 
need to restrain them.
  Another point: The bipolar world structure that I referred to no 
longer exists. The problem of proliferation here has to be addressed.
  The ABM Treaty was negotiated between two countries, one of which no 
longer exists. At its signing, little consideration was given to a 
post-Cold War world. The developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
were simply not foreseen. Nuclear and missile proliferation, while 
certainly acknowledged as issues, took a backseat in the two 
superpowers' thinking to direct bipolar considerations back in 1972.
  Proliferation is today, however, one of our principal national 
security challenges. Roughly two dozen countries have or are developing 
ballistic missiles. These weapons have also become a common feature of 
modern warfare. Used but once between 1945 and 1980, thousands of 
ballistic missiles have been fired in at least six conflicts since 
1980, and their range and sophistication are growing. In fact, despite 
the promised reductions in Russian strategic forces, the threat from 
other countries seeking to target the United States with long-range 
missiles has grown since the end of the Cold War.
  Let me give some examples of this trend:
  China is actively modernizing and expanding its long-range missile 
force. The newly released National Intelligence Estimate states that, 
by 2015, ``the total number of Chinese strategic warheads will rise 
several-fold.''
  Despite difficulties it has experienced in developing its Shahab-3 
medium-range missile--and it should be pointed out that all countries, 
including the United States, experience developmental problems with new 
missile programs--Iran continues to place much emphasis on its missile 
activities. With considerable Russian assistance, it is developing 
missiles capable of striking Central Europe. The new NIE concludes that 
``Teheran's longstanding commitment to its ballistic missile programs . 
. . is unlikely to diminish.''
  Iraq is believed to covertly possess a stockpile of banned missiles. 
While Iraq's missile programs have been constrained by sanctions in 
effect since the Persian Gulf War, the gradual but steady erosion of 
those sanctions could result in its being able to reconstitute its 
long-range missile programs. Iraq's ability to surprise us in the past 
with the scale of its missile and nuclear, chemical and biological 
programs should serve as a warning of what can happen should the 
sanctions regime collapse completely.
  North Korea has extended its moratorium on testing its 
intercontinental-range Taepo-dong missiles, but its surprise August 
1998 test flight over Japan of one such missile should similarly temper 
any enthusiasm about that regime's capabilities and intentions. The 
National Intelligence Estimate pointed out that North Korea has not 
abandoned the the Taepo-dong 2, and that it could reappear ``as a 
[space-launch vehicle] with a third stage to place a small payload into 
the same orbit the North Koreans tried to achieve in 1998.''

  If the National Intelligence Estimate is nebulous in its description 
of the threat to the continental United States of long-range ballistic 
missiles, it is emphatic in its description of the threat from shorter-
range missiles:

       The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass 
     destruction will be used against U.S. forces or interests is 
     higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will 
     continue to grow as the capabilities of potential adversaries 
     mature . . . (T)he missile threat will continue to grow, in 
     part because missiles have become important regional weapons 
     in the arsenals of numerous countries. Moreover, missiles 
     provide a level of prestige, coercive diplomacy, and 
     deterrence that nonmissile means do not.


[[Page 287]]


  What this tells us is that missiles remain an extremely important 
component of the arsenals of the very regimes that represent our 
greatest foreign policy challenges. Yet, the NIE suggests that the 
threat from medium-range missiles is not likely to be matched by a 
commensurate threat from long-range missiles in the next 15 years, in 
spite of the fact that the very same arguments for medium-range 
missiles exists in the case of longer-range ones.
  Fortunately, we have today a Secretary of Defense who understands 
intimately the weaknesses of intelligence estimates that seek to 
predict foreign technological developments. As chairman of the 
bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld led an 
effort to assess the threat of foreign ballistic missiles and the 
ability of the intelligence community to accurately estimate the scale 
of that threat. The commission's unanimous conclusion was that the 
missile threat to the United States ``is broader, more mature and 
evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports 
by the intelligence community,'' and a rogue nation could acquire the 
capability to strike the United States with a ballistic missile in as 
little as 5 years.
  That analysis was accepted by the Congress, by the President, and by 
a majority of the intelligence community. The Rumsfeld Commission 
turned out to be more prescient than anybody anticipated. Within months 
of the completion of its report, North Korea shocked the intelligence 
community with its launch of the Taepo-dong.
  Indeed, for all of its successes--and they have been both numerous 
and vital to our security--it does not disgrace the intelligence 
community to point out that either it or its political overseers have, 
at times, missed important developments. A recent article in Jane's 
Intelligence Review describes the three times during the 1990s that 
North Korea alone surprised the United States within the realm of 
missile programs:

       The first was in 1990 with the testing of the No-dong IRBM 
     . . . The second surprise was in 1994, when aerial 
     photographs revealed mock-ups of two new two-stage ballistic 
     missiles, named Taepo-dong 1 and 2. The third surprise came 
     in August 1998 with the test launch of Taepo-dong 1. . . .

  President Bush recognized the changed post-Cold War security 
environment typified by the ballistic missile programs of numerous real 
or potentially hostile countries, when he stated in his December 13 
announcement of his intent to withdraw the United States from the ABM 
Treaty:

       . . . as the events of September the 11th made all too 
     clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not 
     from each other, or other big powers in the world, but from 
     terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who 
     seek weapons of mass destruction.

  The President's announcement was the culmination of a period of 
negotiations intended to convince Russia of the need to amend or scrap 
an outdated treaty. He did this because he believes that the 
appropriate response to the threat from foreign missile programs must 
include defenses against those missiles, and that the ABM Treaty 
prevents the United States from developing and deploying those 
defenses.
  What of that latter point? Some have argued maybe we could stretch 
our research time and testing time and still not be in direct violation 
of the treaty. In fact, the previous administration sought to deal with 
the threat of ballistic missile attack primarily by relying on treaties 
or agreements as articulated in 1994 by Under Secretary of State John 
Holum:

       The Clinton Administration's policy aims to protect us 
     first and foremost through arms control--by working hard to 
     prevent new threats--and second, by legally pursuing the 
     development of theater defenses for those cases where arms 
     control is not yet successful.

  Arms control, first and foremost; only secondarily by pursuing the 
development--not deployment--of theater defenses, not defenses against 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and only in those cases where arms 
control is not yet successful. That is an entirely different paradigm, 
that we can rely upon arms control to protect the people of the United 
States.
  There are no arms control agreements with rogue states, and they 
don't prevent nuclear blackmail. National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice noted this problem in her July 13 speech before the National Press 
Club:

       We must deal with today's world and today's threats, 
     including weapons of mass destruction and missiles in the 
     hands of states that would blackmail us from coming to the 
     aid of friends and allies.

  Nor do I think it is a good idea to rely principally on deterrence. 
One problem with deterrence is that it does fail. We acknowledge that 
fact when applied regionally. We support the Israeli Arrow missile 
program because we know that Israel's adversaries may not be deterred 
by threat of retaliation. In fact, in the case of Saddam Hussein during 
the Gulf War, such retaliation was invited.
  When the subject becomes the safety of American cities, however, such 
acknowledgements disappear. The fact remains, though, that deterrence 
does fail, and we ought not be left with massive retaliation as the 
only response to an attack on the United States.
  It has always been of concern to me that we would rely on deterrence 
against a largely innocent population of a country headed by a tyrant. 
The best deterrence is the ability to defeat an attack. The principal 
impediment to our ability to develop the means to actually defend 
against missile attack is not technology. It is the ABM Treaty, as I 
said before. As the President stated in his December 13 announcement:

       We must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop 
     effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the 
     American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, 
     and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain 
     in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective 
     defenses.

  Despite the failure of the ABM Treaty to slow the growth in nuclear 
arms, it was remarkably successfully at preventing the development of 
missile defenses. We cannot develop, let alone deploy, a national 
missile defense system under the constraints of the ABM Treaty. That 
was its whole purpose. But times have changed, and, as the President 
has pointed out, the treaty has become an unacceptable restraint on our 
ability to defend ourselves against the threat of ballistic missile 
attack.
  To repeat, we cannot develop, let alone deploy, a national missile 
defense system under the constraints of the ABM Treaty. Both its letter 
and its intent are very clear on this point. Let me just take a moment 
to explain why.
  Article I, Section 2, states:

       Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a 
     defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a 
     base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for an 
     individual region except as provided for in Article III of 
     this treaty.

  Additionally, under the terms of the treaty, specifically Article 
III, we can only build one treaty-permissible site around either 
Washington, DC, or around an ICBM field. The treaty prevents the 
defense of any other part of the United States. That is why the Fort 
Greely, AK, site under the terms of the treaty, cannot be an 
operational missile defense site.
  Critics of the President argue that the decision to withdraw from the 
treaty is premature, and that the treaty does not really prevent the 
development of the capability to build a nationwide defense.
  For example: The Union of Concerned Scientists concludes, on the 
basis of its own examination of the issue, that ``there is no 
compelling reason for the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty 
for at least the next several years.'' One of our colleagues from the 
State of Florida, Senator Nelson, stated at a hearing in June:

       We need, for the sake of defense of our country, to proceed 
     with robust research and development, but you can't deploy 
     something that's not developed.

  The fact is, we cannot develop a nationwide system under the 
constraints of the ABM Treaty. That was the efficacious thing about the 
treaty: it effectively prevented the development of such a system.
  Furthermore, we cannot even research the kind of layered defense 
necessary to maximize the prospects of a successful intercept.
  Article V of the treaty states:


[[Page 288]]

       Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM 
     systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-
     based, or mobile land-based.

  Article VI states:

       Each Party undertakes not to give missiles, launchers, or 
     radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, 
     or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic 
     missiles or their element in flight trajectory, and not to 
     test them in an ABM mode.

  It is critical. That is why the Secretary of Defense was forced in 
October to alter the most recent missile-flight test. It would have 
violated the treaty had we used a U.S. Navy ship to track the target 
missile in flight--precisely, by the way, what we want to do in 
developing a successful missile defense system. Because the sea-based 
option remains among the most promising for a secure, flexible missile 
tracking capability, we should be actively integrating the AEGIS system 
into these flight tests, but under Articles V and VI of the treaty that 
is prohibited.
  Similarly, use of a Multiple Object Tracking Radar at Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, which was going to be used to track the target missile, is 
prohibited. An administration official was quoted in the Washington 
Post as noting:

       This shows that the ABM Treaty is already constraining us 
     in a very material way. These are aspects of tests that we 
     canceled, and they need to be done at some point.

  Similarly, how can we exploit the capabilities that may emerge from 
development of the Airborne Laser Program, a system designed to shoot 
down enemy missiles early in their ascent phase when they are larger 
and hotter and therefore easier to target? The Airborne Laser won't 
necessarily know whether it is shooting at a short-range missile, or 
one with intercontinental range. The former would be permissible under 
the treaty, but not the latter.
  In short, the treaty, as it was designed to do, prevents us from even 
developing let alone deploying a national missile defense system that 
exploits the most promising technologies.
  In conclusion, the ABM Treaty was signed in a vastly different 
strategic environment than exists today. It can hardly be said to have 
been a success during the cold war, the geopolitical context in which 
it was written. Today, it serves only to prevent us from addressing the 
post-cold war challenges that confront us from a number of other 
countries. A treaty that failed in a strictly bipolar structure to 
restrain nuclear weapons developments, it is even more ill-suited to 
the security environment of today's multipolar world. The President's 
decision to withdraw the United States from its provisions should be 
commended. We cannot predicate the defense of the American people on a 
theory of deterrence that assumes hostile regimes make decisions in the 
same manner as do we, and that leaves us vulnerable to a particular 
type of threat we know is on the horizon.
  We have a fundamental responsibility to the American public to defend 
it against all threats. The threat from the ballistic missile programs 
of foreign countries is real, and it can be expected to grow. We cannot 
address that threat within the confines of the ABM Treaty. The decision 
to move beyond it was the right decision, and I applaud President 
Bush's leadership on this issue of tremendous importance to all 
Americans.
  As I said, he probably will be too modest to address this much in his 
State of the Union speech tomorrow evening, but I believe it to be one 
of the most important decisions he made last year, and its 
ramifications will be felt and be defined by greater security for the 
American people for decades to come.
  I commend him for that decision.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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