[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 1]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 270]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




            ON FEDERALIZING SECURITY AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

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                        HON. WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                        Friday, January 25, 2002

  Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Speaker, I rise to inform my colleagues that I have 
requested that the General Accounting Office undertake a study of 
questions relating to the feasibility of federalizing security at 
nuclear power plants nationwide.
  As Congress examines ways to protect critical infrastructure in the 
wake of September 11, the vulnerability of commercial nuclear reactors 
has become increasingly evident. Even before then, the potential 
hazards associated with nuclear power have long required special 
vigilance; and the terrorist attack obviously elevates the gravity and 
urgency of security concerns. All of us who represent areas with 
commercial nuclear facilities share an urgent concern for safeguarding 
residents who live in close proximity to the 103 facilities across the 
country.
  Most Americans understand that we can't completely insulate the 
nation--and every person and property in it--from attack by suicidal 
terrorists. Nearly everyone appreciates the complexities and expense 
involved, and grasps the need to balance security precautions with 
civil liberties and economic impact. But the fact remains that there is 
no more fundamental responsibility of government than homeland defense, 
and that addressing vulnerabilities--including those associated with 
nuclear plants--are essential.
  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has acknowledged that the 
nation's commercial reactors were not designed to withstand the type of 
attack carried out against the World Trade Towers. In light of this new 
potential threat and in the context of analogous legislation relating 
to airport safeguards, it seems to me self-evident that we explore the 
prospect of a federal security force charged with protecting nuclear 
plants.
  Within hours of the September attacks, security at nuclear plants 
went on high alert. In my own congressional district, the Pilgrim 
facility took significant new precautions against potential threats to 
perimeter security from both the ground and the water. Although the 
immediate response was sound, I remain concerned about long-term 
protection of the plant. The NRC is presumably consulting with the new 
office of Homeland Security and various other federal agencies on 
coordinated efforts to buttress nuclear safeguards; however, its 
approach seems focused on existing protocols rather than new methods. 
Even as legislation to federalize airport screening regimes was signed 
into law, however, the equivalent discussion of a federal nuclear plant 
security force has received only scant attention.
  Historically, it appears the NRC has not moved aggressively to 
explore the potential authority for federalization under existing 
statute, much less for administrative or legislative initiatives to 
create a federal presence. Correspondence with my office over the last 
four months suggests the NRC is not inclined to examine section 102 of 
the Atomic Energy Act, which could offer relevant authority. The agency 
rationale is that ``the Commission is confident that substantial 
protection is being provided to plants.''
  Perhaps that reluctance derives from a substantive disagreement about 
the need even to review a federal approach. In written remarks to a 
Senate colleague, the NRC Chairman stated last month that ``there have 
been no failures in nuclear plant security of the type that would 
warrant the creation of a new federal security force'' and warned that, 
by federalizing security, the government would incur an exorbitant cost 
``all to address a non-existent problem''.
  I seek neither to raise undue alarm nor to condemn the current 
security protocol. However, in a series of meetings since September 11 
with local, state and federal officials about public health and safety 
in the dozens of communities near the Pilgrim plant, one of the most 
recurring and compelling themes has been the need for serious and 
thorough consideration of a federal force.
  The consequences of getting this wrong are unthinkable. It seems to 
me that an independent examination of a number of technical and 
financial issues by the GAO would be invaluable. Accordingly, I wrote 
today to the Comptroller General to ask the GAO to:
  1. Review current federal guidelines and protocols for safeguarding 
nuclear plants from the air (including through the use of no-fly 
zones); through perimeter ground security measures; and through coastal 
security measures;
  2. Examine the jurisdictional issues and administrative obstacles to 
transferring responsibility for security from plant owners to the 
federal government; and
  3. Analyze the cost of federalizing security--including initial 
training, upkeep, and long-term protection.
  I have no presuppositions about the outcome of such a study, or about 
the policy debate it could help inform. However, I remain deeply 
concerned about the consequences of failing to explore these issues on 
an expedited basis.

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