[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 148 (2002), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1225-1227]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]




          IMPRESSIVE STEPS TAKEN AGAINST THE WAR ON TERRORISM

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition to comment 
about our war against terrorism and about the recent statements made by 
Administration officials concerning possible actions toward Iraq.
  At the outset, I compliment President Bush and the Administration for 
the very effective steps taken on the war against terrorism. We have 
seen the response to the disastrous, tragic, horrendous events of 
September 11, with the military moving in, doing in Afghanistan what 
the Soviets could not do, and doing what the British could not do much 
earlier. We are well on our way, having defeated the Taliban and al-
Qaida; very impressive steps taken in the war against terrorism. The 
President has done an outstanding job on leadership on this critical 
issue.
  There have been comments recently about the possibility of action 
against Iraq, and that may well be warranted. On this state of the 
record, it is my thinking there are quite a number of serious questions 
which have to be answered. We need to know, with some greater 
precision, the threat posed by Saddam Hussein with respect to weapons 
of mass destruction. There is solid evidence about Saddam Hussein 
having chemical weapons, substantial evidence on biological weapons, 
and some questions about nuclear weapons. However, there really ought 
to be a comprehensive analysis as to the precise nature of Saddam 
Hussein's threat.
  Iraq is on the record as having supported terrorism, and it seems to 
me there ought to be an elaboration as to the terrorist activities 
which are attributable to Iraq. If there is to be military action, we 
ought to have a full statement as to Iraq's violations of UN 
inspections. We know that the UN inspectors have been ousted, but here 
again, this is an issue where more information is necessary for the 
Congress and, in my view, for the American people. There also has to be 
an analysis of what the costs would be, some appraisal in terms of 
casualties, depending upon the nature of the contemplated action.
  Then there is the issue as to what happens after Saddam Hussein is 
toppled. There is no doubt about the desirability of toppling Saddam 
Hussein. By twenty-twenty hindsight, perhaps it is regrettable the 
United States and its allies did not move on Baghdad in 1991.

[[Page 1226]]

That, obviously, is water over the dam. There were many factors to be 
considered including the unwillingness of our allies at that time to 
move. The U.S. had success against Iraq in 1991, but toppling Saddam 
Hussein was an action that was obviously not taken.
  There have been statements by the President in identifying the axis 
of evil as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. The President has stated if we 
do not have the cooperation of our allies we will act alone, and I 
think there is a solid basis for the President to say that and for the 
President to give serious consideration to acting alone.
  We know there were many danger signals as to Osama bin Laden and al-
Qaida. We know that bin Laden was under indictment for murdering 
Americans in Mogadishu in 1993. He was under indictment for murdering 
Americans and others in the embassy attacks in 1998. He was implicated 
in the terrorism against the USS Cole. He pledged a worldwide ``jihad'' 
against the United States. There was substantial authority under 
international law for what had transpired for the United States to act.
  What we have seen in modern times is in effect a non-determination of 
guilt and action against terrorism as a matter of self-defense 
recognized under international law. When President Reagan acted against 
Muammar Qadhafi in April of 1986, that was in effect a non-
determination of guilt, and we moved in self-defense against Qadhafi. 
When President Clinton dispatched missiles to Afghanistan in August of 
1998--again, a non-judicial determination of guilt. There would have 
been total justification for the United States moving against al-Qaida 
and Osama bin Laden in advance of September 11. That experience 
suggests we have to make a careful analysis, a calculated analysis of 
the risks.
  It may well be justified as a matter of self-defense to act, and act 
against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. As we know by twenty-twenty hindsight, 
the vision is very clear. We know in twenty-twenty hindsight that it 
would have been wise to have acted against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida 
before September 11.
  The statements reported from Secretary Colin Powell yesterday, in 
testifying before the Senate Budget Committee, are worth noting with 
particularity. Secretary Powell was quoted as saying: ``With respect to 
Iraq, it has long been for several years now a policy of the U.S. 
Government that regime change would be in the best interests of the 
region, the best interests of the Iraqi people.'' Secretary Powell also 
said: ``With respect to Iran and with respect to North Korea, there is 
no plan to start a war with these nations.''
  By the grammatical negative pregnant pause, the implication is pretty 
clear that when the Secretary of State says in formal testimony before 
the Senate committee that there is no plan to ``start a war with these 
nations,'' referring to Iran and North Korea, there is a different plan 
with respect to Iraq. As I say, it may well be justified.
  If there is to be a use of force and if there is to be war, under our 
Constitution it is the responsibility and it is the authority of the 
Congress of the United States to make the determination to declare war. 
That constitutional provision is there for a very good reason. We in 
the Senate and those in the House of Representatives represent the 
American people, and we speak for the American people. We have seen the 
bitter lesson from Vietnam that we cannot prosecute a war without the 
public support. If there is to be the authorization for the use of 
force or declaration of war, that is a matter that ought to come before 
the Congress.
  These are views I have held for a very long time. In college I 
studied political science and international relations and served 
stateside during the period of the Korean war. At that time I wondered 
about being engaged in a war which was not a matter of congressional 
determination. That may be a somewhat personal aspect, having been 
called to service, and I was glad to spend twp years in the U.S. Air 
Force. I served stateside. However, the question in my mind at that 
time, having studied international relations and knowing the 
constitutional provision, was why a war was not declared.
  Since coming to the Senate, I have been engaged in debates in this 
Chamber on this subject on many occasions. In 1983 when there was 
military action in Lebanon, I had an extensive colloquy with Senator 
Percy, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and asked him 
if, in fact, Korea was not a war. He said, ``yes, it was a war.'' I 
asked about Vietnam, ``was it a war?'' ``Yes, it was a war.'' However, 
on neither occasion was the declaration determined by the Congress.
  On the hearings for nominees for the Supreme Court, that was a 
question I posed with some frequency to nominees, illustrative of which 
was the confirmation of Justice David Souter. I recalled on Friday 
asking him, ``was Korea a war?'' I wanted to know. I had framed 
litigation which I took to Senator Baker for determination as to the 
War Powers Act and constitutionality, thinking there would be an 
appropriate judicial determination on that subject. Not unexpectedly, 
Justice Souter said he had not thought about it. So I said, take some 
time, and over the weekend we had an adjournment and came back on 
Monday. I said, ``you have had time to think about it. Was Korea a 
war?'' He said, ``I do not know''--which is not a bad answer. If you do 
not know, you do not know. There is not much you can say by questioning 
beyond that. I see Justice Souter from time to time, and that colloquy 
is something about which he comments from time to time.
  When this body took up the resolution for the use of force in 1991, I 
have a clear recollection that President Bush did not want the 
resolution put before the Senate and before the House. I think he was 
concerned whether it would be approved. There was historic debate here 
in January of 1991. The Senate approved the resolution for the use of 
force by a vote of 52 to 47. The comments at that time went to the 
effect that it was a historic event. However, when President Bush had 
the resolution by the House and by the Senate, it was a much stronger 
approach.
  His reluctance to come before Congress is typical of the tension 
which exists between the executive and legislative branches, with the 
Presidents traditionally saying they do not need congressional 
authorization to act because they have the constitutional authority as 
Commander in Chief, and the response institutionally from many in the 
Congress has been, ``no, the Congress has the sole authority to involve 
the United States in war by our sole constitutional authority.''
  The history of the War Powers Act is a very significant development. 
The executive branch, the President, while complying with it, 
traditionally says it is not constitutional; he is not really bound to 
do so.
  We had the issue raised again when President Clinton sent missiles 
into Baghdad. I took the floor on a number of occasions in 1998 arguing 
that with the imminence of the likelihood of action by the President on 
missiles in Baghdad, the House of Representatives and Senate ought to 
stand up and make that determination. Candidly, the Congress is never 
very anxious to make that determination. It is easier to let the 
President make the decision. If he is wrong, he gets the blame. If he 
is right, then the issue passes.
  We did have the debate on the bombing of Yugoslavia. It passed this 
body. It came to a tie vote, 213-to-213, in the House of 
Representatives. Therefore, Congress had not authorized that attack. It 
takes, obviously, a resolution on both sides. However, the bombing went 
ahead.
  We are facing a very serious situation with Iraq. Iraq is a real 
menace. There is no doubt about that. I think there are very strong 
United States national interests to topple Saddam Hussein, and I think 
it is very much in the interests of the people of the region that he be 
toppled and also very much in the interests of the people of Iraq that 
he be toppled.
  However, I do believe that, constitutionally, it is a judgment which 
ought to come before the Congress of the United States. I believe there 
ought to be hearings by the appropriate committees of the Congress to 
take up these

[[Page 1227]]

questions as to the specific threats which Saddam Hussein poses and 
Iraq's specific activities on terrorism--a good bit of it, doubtless, 
might have to be conducted in closed session. However, some of it could 
be conducted in an open session: what the costs would be, the 
casualties, and what happens afterwards.
  However, the American people need to know much more of the details, 
and I believe the Congress needs to know much more of the details than 
what has been conveyed so far by the Administration. It is my hope that 
this issue will attract the attention of the Congress of the United 
States with statements such as this one, with hearings, and with our 
deliberative process, recognizing the seriousness of the issue and 
recognizing also our constitutional responsibility.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has consumed 15 
minutes.
  Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.

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