[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 9]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page 12623]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



      PASSAGE OF ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS BILL

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                          HON. TED STRICKLAND

                                of ohio

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, June 28, 2001

  Mr. STRICKLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank our Subcommittee 
Chairman and Ranking Member for the hard work they put into this bill, 
which includes a number of programs that are very important to Southern 
Ohio. I would like to take this opportunity to comment on these 
Department of Energy programs that directly affect the workers and 
communities supporting the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant located 
in Piketon, Ohio.
  First, I would like to express my support for the $110,784,000 
included in the Fiscal Year 2002 Energy and Water Appropriations bill 
for costs associated with winterization of the Portsmouth, Ohio Gaseous 
Diffusion Plant and maintaining the plant on cold standby. It was just 
over a year ago today that the United States Enrichment Corporation, 
Inc. (USEC) announced that it would close the only U.S. uranium 
enrichment plant capable of meeting industry's nuclear fuel 
specifications. While I cannot overstate my disagreement, 
disappointment and disgust with that decision, I am pleased that 
funding will be available in Fiscal Year 2002 to ensure that the 
Portsmouth facility remains in a cold standby condition so that it 
could be restarted if needed in the future. I have been assured by the 
Department of Energy that the funding levels in this year's 
appropriations bill will allow the Department to meet its goals as 
announced in Columbus, Ohio on March 1, 2001 and as stated by then 
Governor Bush last October.
  I am aware of report language accompanying the bill which discusses 
the nonproliferation programs with Russia and, specifically, the Highly 
Enriched Uranium (HEU) Agreement. I support this incredibly important 
foreign policy initiative and I agree with the language calling for the 
Russian HEU to ``be reduced as quickly as possible.'' I am also aware 
that the purchase of the 500 metric tons of Russian HEU has not always 
stayed on schedule, and I support exploring ways to accelerate the 
purchase of the downblended weapons grade material from Russia. 
However, I would hope that we can accelerate this program without 
adversely affecting the domestic uranium enrichment industry. Today, we 
are dependent upon this downblended Russian HEU for approximately 50 
percent of our domestic nuclear fuel supply. Increasing that dependence 
makes no sense to me, particularly at a time when we are debating a 
national energy strategy calling for greater energy security in order 
to avoid price volatility and supply uncertainty. We must act in a 
manner that strikes a reasonable balance between this significant 
foreign policy objective and the need to maintain a reliable and 
economic source of domestic nuclear fuel.
  I am disappointed that the Department of Energy's Worker and 
Community Transition Office funding falls short of the President's 
request. I am deeply concerned that the allocated funding is inadequate 
to address the needs of the Department of Energy workers and 
communities across the DOE complex who depend on these funds to help 
minimize the social and economic impacts resulting from the changes in 
the Department of Energy's mission.
  Finally, but not least of all, I am concerned about the slight 
reduction in the funding for the Department of Energy's Environment, 
Safety and Health Office. I am hopeful that this reduction will not 
impact the extremely important medical monitoring program at the 
Portsmouth plant, which also serves to screen past and present workers 
at other sites throughout the DOE complex. I am hopeful that these 
funds will be restored as the bill moves through the conference 
committee. We now know that many workers at DOE sites, including the 
one in Piketon, Ohio, handled hazardous and radioactive materials with 
little knowledge and, oftentimes, with inadequate safety practices. In 
fact, a May 2000 report issued by the Department's Office of Oversight 
on the Piketon Gaseous Diffusion Plant states, ``Due to weaknesses in 
monitoring programs, such as the lack of extremity monitoring, exposure 
limits may have unknowingly been exceeded. In addition, communication 
of hazards, the rationale for and use of protective measures, accurate 
information about radiation exposure, and the enforcement of protective 
equipment use were inadequate. Further, workers were exposed to various 
chemical hazards for which adverse health effects had not yet been 
identified.'' Scaling back the medical monitoring program now would be 
unconscionable knowing what we know today. Furthermore, the 
compensation program established last fall by passage of the Energy 
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA), 
designed to compensate employees made ill by the work they performed 
for the government, would be weakened if workers are then denied access 
to medical screening. Although the EEOICPA is not a perfect bill, it 
would be a shame to hobble a long overdue program before it is even out 
of the gate.

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