[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 8]
[Senate]
[Pages 11730-11731]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                        NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the President has recently concluded his 
trip to Europe, where he attempted to convince European leaders of the 
need for the United States to deploy a national missile defense system. 
It seems that our friends in Europe still have the same reservations 
about this apparent rush to a missile shield, and I can understand why. 
While I support the deployment of an effective missile defense system, 
there are a number of reasons why I believe it is not as easy to build 
such a system as it is to declare the intent to build it.
  One cannot underestimate the scientific challenge of deploying an 
effective national missile defense system. The last two anti-missile 
tests, performed in January and July of 2000, were failures. In 
response to these failures, the Department of Defense did the right 
thing. The Department of Defense took a time-out to assess what went 
wrong, and to explore how it can be fixed. The next test, scheduled for 
July of this year of our Lord 2001, will be a crucial milestone for the 
national missile defense program. All eyes will be watching to see if 
the technological and engineering problems can be addressed, or if we 
have to go back to the drawing board once more.
  It must also be recognized that no matter how robust missile defense 
technology might become, it will always--now and forever--be of limited 
use. I fear that in the minds of some, a national missile defense 
system is the sine qua non of a safe and secure United States. But the 
most sophisticated radars or space-based sensors will never be able to 
detect the sabotage of our drinking water supplies by the use of a few 
vials--just a few vials--of a biological weapon, and no amount of anti-
missile missiles will prevent the use of a nuclear bomb neatly packaged 
in a suitcase and carried to one of our major cities. We should not let 
the flashy idea of missile defense distract us from other, and perhaps 
more serious, threats to our national security.
  If deployment of a missile defense system were to be expedited, there 
is the question of how effective it could possibly be. Military 
officers involved in the project have called a 2004 deployment date 
``high risk.'' That means that if we were to station a handful of 
interceptors in Alaska in 2004, there is no guarantee--none, no 
guarantee that they would provide any useful defense at all. Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has downplayed this problem, saying that an 
early system does not have to be 100 percent effective. I believe that 
if we are going to pursue a robust missile shield, that is what we 
should pursue. I do not support the deployment of a multi-billion 
dollar scarecrow that will not be an effective defense if a missile is 
actually launched at the United States.
  The New York Times has printed an article that drives this point 
home. The newspaper reports on a study by the Pentagon's Office of 
Operational Test and Evaluation that details some of the problems that 
a National Missile Defense system must overcome before it can be 
considered effective. According to the New York Times, the authors of 
this internal Department of Defense report believe that the missile 
defense program has ``suffered too many failures to justify deploying 
the system in 2005, a year after the Bush administration is considering 
deploying one.''
  The article goes on to state that system now being tested has 
benefitted from unrealistic tests, and that the computer system could 
attempt to shoot down inbound missiles that don't even exist. If the 
Department of Defense's own scientists and engineers don't trust the 
system that could be deployed in the next few years, this system might 
not even be a very good scarecrow. Let the scientists and engineers 
find the most effective system possible, and then go forward with its 
deployment.
  Let us also consider our international obligations under the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. The President has begun 
discussions with Russia, China, our European allies, and others on 
revising the ABM Treaty, but so far the responses have been mixed. I 
suggest that it is because our message is mixed. On one hand, there is 
the stated intent to consult with our allies before doing away with the 
ABM Treaty. On the other, the Administration has made clear its 
position that a missile defense system will be deployed as soon as 
possible.
  It is no wonder that Russia and our European allies are confused as 
to whether we are consulting with them on the future of the ABM Treaty, 
or we are simply informing them as to what the future of the ABM Treaty 
will be. We must listen to our allies, and take their comments 
seriously. The end result of the discussions with Russia, China, and 
our European allies should be an understanding of how to preserve our 
national security, not a scheme to gain acceptance from those countries 
of our plan to rush forward with the deployment of an anti-missile 
system at the earliest possible date.
  What's more, Secretary of State Colin Powell said this past weekend 
that the President may unilaterally abandon the ABM Treaty as soon as 
it conflicts with our testing activities. According to the recently 
released Pentagon report on missile defense, however, the currently 
scheduled tests on anti-missile systems will not conflict with the ABM 
Treaty in 2002, and there is no conflict anticipated in 2003. Why, 
therefore, is there a rush to amend or do away with the ABM Treaty? Who 
is to say that there will not be additional test failures in the next 
two and a half years that will further push back the test schedule, as 
well as potential conflicts with the ABM Treaty?
  There is also the issue of the high cost of building a national 
missile defense system. This year, the United States will spend $4.3 
billion on all the various programs related to missile defense. From 
1962 to today, the Brookings Institution estimated that we have spent 
$99 billion, and I do not believe that for all that money, our national 
security has been increased one bit.
  The Congressional Budget Office in an April 2000 report concluded 
that the most limited national missile defense system would cost $30 
billion. This system could only hope to defend against a small number 
of unsophisticated missiles, such as a single missile launched from a 
rogue nation. If we hope to defend against the accidental launch of 
numerous, highly sophisticated missiles of the type that are now in 
Russia's arsenal, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the 
cost will almost double, to $60 billion.
  We have seen how these estimates work. They have only one way to go. 
That is always up.
  However, that number may even be too low. This is what the 
Congressional Budget Office had to say in March 2001: ``Those estimates 
from April 2000 may now be too low, however. A combination of delays in 
testing and efforts by the Clinton administration to reduce the 
program's technical risk (including a more challenging testing program) 
may have increased the funding requirements well beyond the levels 
included in this option [for national missile defense systems].'' Is it 
any wonder that some critics believe that a workable national missile 
defense system will cost more than $120 billion?
  Tell me. How does the Administration expect to finance this missile 
defense system? The $1.35 trillion tax cut that the President signed 
into law last

[[Page 11731]]

month is projected to consume 72 percent of the non-Social Security, 
non-Medicare surpluses over the next five years. In fact, under the 
budget resolution that was passed earlier this year, the Senate Budget 
Committee shows that the Federal Government is already projected to dip 
into the Medicare trust fund in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. The missile 
defense system envisioned by the Administration would likely have us 
dipping into the Social Security trust funds as well--further 
jeopardizing the long-term solvency of both Federal retirement 
programs. This is no way to provide for our nation's defense.
  I must admit that I am also leery about committing additional vast 
sums to the Pentagon. I was the last man out of Vietnam--the last one. 
I mean to tell you, I supported President Johnson. I supported 
President Nixon to the hilt.
  I have spoken before about the serious management problems in the 
Department of Defense. I am a strong supporter of the Department of 
Defense. When it came to Vietnam, I was a hawk--not just a Byrd but a 
hawk. I am not a Johnny-come-lately when it comes to our national 
defense.
  As Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I find it profoundly 
disturbing that the Department of Defense cannot account for the money 
that it spends, and does not know with any certainty what is in its 
inventory. These problems have been exposed in detail by the 
Department's own Inspector General, as well as the General Accounting 
Office. Ten years after Congress passed the Chief Financial Officers 
Act of 1990, the Department of Defense has still not been able to pass 
an audit of its books. The Pentagon's books are in such disarray that 
outside experts cannot even begin an audit, much less reach a 
conclusion on one!
  Although it does not directly relate to this issue of national 
missile defense, I was shocked by a report issued by the General 
Accounting Office last week on the Department of Defense's use of 
emergency funds intended to buy spare parts in 1999. Out of $1.1 
billion appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 
for Fiscal Year 1999 to buy urgently needed spare parts, the GAO 
reported that the Pentagon could not provide the financial information 
to show that 92 percent of those funds were used as intended. This is 
incredible. This Senate passed that legislation to provide that money 
for spare parts. That is what they said they needed it for. That is 
what we appropriated it for. Congress gave the Department of Defense 
over a billion dollars to buy spare parts, which we were told were 
urgently needed, and we cannot even see the receipt!
  If the Department of Defense cannot track $1 billion that it spent on 
an urgent need, I don't know how it could spend tens of billions of 
dollars on a missile defense system with any confidence that it is 
being spent wisely.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Administrative 
Co-Chairman of the National Security Working Group, along with my 
colleague, Senator Cochran, who was the author of the National Missile 
Defense Act of 1999, I understand that ballistic missiles are a threat 
to the United States. I voted for the National Missile Defense Act of 
1999, which stated that it is the policy of the United States to deploy 
a national missile defense system as soon as it is technologically 
possible. Now, I still support that act. But I also understand that an 
effective national missile defense system cannot be established through 
intent alone. Someone has said that the road to Sheol is paved with 
good intentions. Good intentions are not enough. I think there might be 
a way toward an effective missile defense system, and it is based on 
common sense. Engage our friends, and listen to our critics. Learn from 
the past, and invest wisely. Test carefully, and assess constantly. But 
most of all, avoid haste. We cannot afford to embark on a folly that 
could, if improperly managed, damage our national security, while 
costing billions of dollars.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from West Virginia withhold 
his request for a quorum?
  Mr. BYRD. I withhold my suggestion.

                          ____________________