[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 8]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 10494-10496]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



               GRADUATION ADDRESS AT US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. IKE SKELTON

                              of missouri

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, June 12, 2001

  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I had the privilege to give the 
commencement address at the US Army War College on June 9, 2001. It was 
a terrific honor. My speech to that group is set forth as follows:

           Military History and the Battlefield of the Future

       A couple of years ago, I prepared an article with the 
     assistance of the Congressional Research Service entitled, 
     ``Learning on the Job: Applying the Lessons of Recent 
     Conflicts to Current Issues in Defense Policy''. It was the 
     premise of my article that a careful look at significant U.S. 
     military operations over about the past twenty years--roughly 
     the period of time that I have served in Congress--can help 
     shape answers to a surprisingly large number of contemporary 
     issues in defense policy.


                            Lessons Learned

       My research revealed at least twelve military operations 
     during my tenure in Congress, ranging from the small-scale 
     1985 interception of an aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro 
     hijackers to the Persian Gulf War in 1991. We discovered that 
     there were lessons learned in each of these military 
     operations. I won't go into all of these lessons or all of 
     these military operations, but let me summarize just a few of 
     them:
       In Lebanon, 1982-1984, we learned that we need force 
     protection measures wherever we deploy our forces.
       In Grenada, 1983, we discovered shortcomings in the ability 
     of our forces to plan and execute joint operations.
       Panama, 1989-1990, taught us that night operations could be 
     conducted successfully and that stealth technology could work 
     in an operational setting.
       The Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991, showed that tactical, 
     operational and strategic thought, derived from the study of 
     yesteryear's conflicts, pays off on the battlefield. It also 
     demonstrated the devastating efficacy of high technology 
     munitions like smart bombs, the success of stealth 
     technology, the importance of establishing air supremacy, and 
     the advantages of disabling the enemy's infrastructure and 
     command, control, and communications ability. The war also 
     made clear that the threat of the use of chemical and 
     biological weapons is real.
       It is also interesting to note how General Schwartzkopf 
     used the lessons of history in at least three instances in 
     his successful Desert Storm campaign: First, the thorough 40-
     day air campaign which preceded the ground war recalls the 
     failure to conduct adequate bombardment at the island of 
     Tarawa in November of 1943. The price paid for that failure 
     at Tarawa was heavy Marine Corps casualties. In the Gulf War, 
     the ability of Iraqi forces to offer opposition to our forces 
     was severely reduced. Second, consider the successful feint 
     carried out by the 1st Cavalry Division prior to the actual 
     start of the ground war. This recalls Montgomery's strategy 
     in 1942 at the Battle of the Marinth Line in North Africa 
     against the German Afrika Corps. This action was a prelude to 
     the decisive battle at El Alamein. Third, by utilizing a 
     leftward flanking movement when he launched the ground war, 
     General Schwartzkopf was taking a page from the book of 
     Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson at the Battle of 
     Chancellorsville. As you will recall, Jackson's forces 
     conducted a brilliant flanking maneuver and completely 
     surprised Union forces under General Joseph Hooker, in the 
     May 1863 battle.
       Somalia, 1992-1993, taught us that we should strive to 
     avoid mission creep, and that requests from on-scene 
     commanders for additional equipment, personnel, or other 
     resources must be given appropriate attention by the national 
     command authority.
       In summary, my research revealed that even apparently 
     limited military operations have required a very broad range 
     of well-trained and well-equipped forces. We don't have the 
     luxury of picking and choosing what missions to prepare for. 
     And all of this is expensive--we cannot expect to have global 
     reach, or to be engaged in Europe, Asia, and other places 
     around the world, on the cheap. We learned that while we 
     still have much to work on--making the Army more deployable 
     for one thing, how to move from peacekeeping by military 
     forces to nation-building by largely civilian institutions 
     for another--we have actually done a lot right. The U.S. 
     military has shown the ability to absorb the lessons of each 
     new operation. Improvements have been made in command 
     arrangements, in operational planning, in tactics and 
     doctrine, in training, and in key technologies. Precision 
     strike capabilities have matured. Congress, yes Congress, has 
     sometimes helped. Congress's establishment of an independent 
     Special Operations Command in 1987 has been vindicated by the 
     continued critical importance of special operations forces in 
     a host of military actions since then, and by the marvelous 
     performance of those forces when called upon. Congressional 
     passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act 
     of 1986 clearly helped to clarify and strengthen command 
     arrangements.


                              Korea, 1950

       What caused me to think back on a now two-year-old article 
     was the information that a group of Korean War Veterans would 
     be in the audience today. No veterans from any war suffered 
     more from the failure to heed the lessons of history than the 
     veterans of the Korean War. Let me quote a passage from a 
     book by former journalist Robert Donovan which describes the 
     experience of elements of the 24th, Division upon their 
     arrival in Korea in July, 1950:
       ``Out-gunned, lacking in heavy antitank weapons, unfamiliar 
     with the terrain, ill prepared for combat after the soft life 
     of occupation duty in Japan, the 24th Division soldiers were 
     disorganized and confused, hampered by early-morning fog, 
     exhausted by midday heat, and frustrated by faulty 
     communications. Mis-directed mortar fire from one unit caused 
     injuries and death in another. Chronically, supplies of 
     ammunition ran low. Men were ambushed or were completely cut 
     off in strange villages and never seen again. Mortars and 
     machine guns were abandoned in the bedlam of battle . . .''
       This was the experience of Task Force Smith and the other 
     units which were among the first to deploy to Korea. 
     Historians can argue over why we were so unprepared for 
     conflict in Korea. Perhaps it was overconfidence after our 
     great victory in World War II. Perhaps it was the tendency of 
     the U.S. to ``bring the boys home'' immediately after a war--
     a tendency then-Major George C. Marshall noted in a 1923 
     speech--which led to cuts in the military that were too deep 
     in a still-dangerous world.
       Whatever the reason for our unpreparedness, there can be no 
     disagreement on this: No group of Americans ever fought more 
     bravely than those we called upon to serve in the Korean War. 
     In the past decade, a lot of people have stepped forward to 
     take credit for winning the Cold War. Let me tell who should 
     get the credit. It is these Korean War veterans who are with 
     us today. Their courage, their sacrifices, drew a line in 
     sand against Communist expansion. There would be other 
     battles--in Vietnam and in other places around the globe. But 
     in Korea, a country most Americans had never heard of before 
     1950, the message was sent. America would fight to preserve 
     freedom. We owe you a debt of gratitude we can never repay. 
     Indeed, the whole world owes you a debt of gratitude. It is 
     not enough, but I just want to say, ``Thank you.''


                     The Battlefield of the Future

       Recently, I visited TRADOC headquarters at Ft. Monroe, and 
     received an excellent briefing from General John Abrams and 
     his staff, especially Colonel Maxie MacFarland, on the 
     ``Battlefield of the Future''. Allow me to summarize that 
     briefing from my perspective--a country lawyer who serves on 
     the House Armed Services Committee, and who is an avid 
     student of military history:
       It should be obvious that we are not the only military that 
     has learned lessons from these U.S. military operations which 
     I discussed earlier, and from others around the world, such 
     as Chechnya. The U.S. military is the most studied military 
     in the world. All major U.S. field manuals and joint 
     doctrinal publications are freely available on the internet, 
     and indeed, U.S. military internet sites are frequently 
     accessed by foreign organizations. Foreign military students 
     from 125

[[Page 10495]]

     countries around the world attend U.S. military education 
     institutions, such as this one, or specialized U.S. military 
     schools under the International Military Education and 
     Training (IMET) programs. Our openness and reliance on 
     information systems means that our adversaries in the future 
     will have a greater depth of knowledge about the capabilities 
     and operational designs of U.S. military forces.
       We have advantages now in air, intelligence, surveillance, 
     reconnaissance, and other technology, and we will likely 
     continue to have these advantages in the future. Our 
     potential adversaries know we have these advantages and they 
     will seek to offset them in some of the following ways:
       They will seek to fight during periods of reduced 
     visibility, in complex terrain, and in urban environments 
     where they can gain sanctuary.
       They may use terrorist organizations to take the fight to 
     the U.S. homeland, and they could possibly use weapons of 
     mass destruction, or attacks on infrastructure and 
     information systems.
       They will attempt to confuse U.S. forces so that the size, 
     location, disposition, and intention of their forces will be 
     impossible to discern. They will try to make U.S. forces 
     vulnerable to unconventional actions and organizations.
       To offset the U.S. technological overmatch, they will use 
     selective or niche technology, perhaps even commercially-
     obtained technology, to degrade U.S. capabilities. As an 
     example, during the first Chechen War, the Chechens bought 
     commercial scanners and radios, and used them to intercept 
     Russian communications.
       They will endeavor to exploit the perception that the 
     American will is vulnerable to the psychological shock of 
     unexpected and unexplained losses. Their goal will be a 
     battlefield which contains greater psychological and 
     emotional impacts.
       In this environment, U.S. forces may no longer be able to 
     count on low casualties, a secure homeland, precision 
     attacks, and a relatively short duration conflict. Conflict 
     may occur in regions where the enemy has a greater knowledge 
     and understanding of the physical environment, and has forces 
     which know how to take advantage of it. They will seek to 
     avoid environments where U.S. abilities are dominant. They 
     will have more situational awareness than possible for U.S. 
     forces.
       My briefers at TRADOC referred to this kind of conflict as 
     ``asymmetric warfare''. And as I listened to the briefing, I 
     thought back on my military history and I realized the truth 
     of the old cliche that there is ``nothing new under the 
     sun.'' Asymmetric warfare is not something new. In fact, it 
     has been a part of American military history. Let me give you 
     a couple of examples:
       The first is from that series of conflicts that we 
     collectively refer to as the Indian Wars, and it has a direct 
     relation to the place we are standing right now. On July 18, 
     1763, during Pontiac's War, Colonel Henry Bouquet left 
     Carlisle in command of a British army force of 400 men to 
     relieve Fort Pitt, 200 miles to the west. On August 5 near a 
     small stream known as Bushy Run, Bouquet's forces were 
     attacked by Indians who were part of Pontiac's forces.
       If you go to the Bushy Run Battlefield State Park today, as 
     I have done, you will see open fields--perfect terrain for 
     the mass formation warfare that Europeans knew how to fight. 
     But on August 5 and 6, 1763, the area around Bushy Run was 
     old growth forest offering limited fields of fire. This was a 
     physical environment that the Indians knew and understood, 
     and they took advantage of it. They forced Colonel Bouquet's 
     forces back into a defensive position on a hilltop. The 
     Indians attacked this position repeatedly, but never waited 
     for a counter attack. They simply faded into the forest, as 
     was their style, suffering few casualties. By the end of the 
     first day of battle, however, sixty of Bouquet's troops had 
     been killed or wounded. As fighting continued on the second 
     day, British losses were mounting and the situation was 
     becoming desperate. At this point, Bouquet saved his forces 
     with a brilliant maneuver, borrowed from Hannibal at the 
     Battle of Cannae. First, he feigned a retreat. As the 
     Indians, sensing victory, left their cover and charged in, 
     they came under devastating fire on their flanks and rear 
     from Bouquet's redeployed forces. Bouquet's strategy had 
     caused the Indians to abandon their asymmetric tactics, and 
     leave the cover of the forest. They were quickly routed and 
     fled the battlefield.
       One other interesting point regarding Bushy Run: The 
     official history says that Bouquet's forces were engaged and 
     surrounded by Indian forces at least equal in size to his 
     own. However, when I toured the battlefield, Indian re-
     enactors, who have studied the battle extensively from the 
     Indian point of view, maintained that the Indians numbered no 
     more than ninety, and that the tactics they used in the 
     forest made their numbers seem larger. Recall that my TRADOC 
     briefing mentioned as an element of asymmetric warfare that 
     adversaries would attempt to confuse U.S. forces so that the 
     size of their forces would be impossible to discern.
       Example number two. Just south of here is the site of the 
     largest battle of the War Between the States. At Gettysburg, 
     two large armies faced off in what was, by the standards of 
     the time, conventional, or symmetrical, warfare.
       But in Western Missouri, where I grew up and still live, 
     the War Between the States was far different. In that border 
     state, where loyalties were divided, large battles fought by 
     conventional forces were the exception, not the rule. Most 
     engagements were fought between small units, usually mounted. 
     The fighting was brutal, vicious, and the civilian population 
     was not spared from attack.
       In this theater, Union forces suffered from some distinct 
     disadvantages:
       Many of the Union units were infantry, which were useless 
     in a conflict where most engagements were lightning cavalry 
     raids.
       Union cavalry units were equipped with the standard issue 
     single shot carbines and sabers. As I will later explain, 
     this armament was ineffective against their adversaries.
       Because Union leaders considered Missouri a backwater, 
     Union troops got the leftovers--the Army's worst horses, 
     officers deficient in leadership skills, and poor training.
       Not surprisingly, these Union Army units suffered from poor 
     morale and lacked unit cohesion.
       In contrast, guerrilla units fighting on behalf of the 
     Confederacy did not have leaders trained at West Point or 
     field manuals to teach them tactics. But they did have 
     strengths that they were able to take advantage of:
       Their troops did not need training. They were tough, young 
     farm boys, already skilled in riding and shooting.
       Their basic weapon was the best revolver in the world--the 
     six-shot Colt .44 Navy. Most guerrillas carried four Colts, 
     some as many as eight. Through trial and error, they 
     discovered that they could shoot more accurately with a 
     smaller charge, without sacrificing lethality. Moreover, this 
     saved powder, a precious resource to the guerrillas. Thus 
     armed, no guerrilla was ever killed by a Union cavalry saber.
       Western Missouri was then noted for its fine horses, and 
     the guerrillas got the pick of the lot in terms of speed and 
     endurance.
       They did not adhere to traditional ways of fighting. They 
     preferred ambush and deception, often dressing in Union 
     uniforms in order to get within point-blank range.
       They had been raised in the area and knew the terrain, and 
     how to travel on paths through the woods to conceal their 
     movements. The Union troops traveled mostly on the main 
     roads.
       They received assistance from the local population--horses, 
     clothing, food, intelligence, shelter, medical care. When the 
     Union army tried to punish the locals for giving this 
     assistance, these repressive measures only made the locals 
     more supportive of the guerrillas.
       Well, by now this should sound familiar. One does not 
     usually find the term ``asymmetric warfare'' used in 
     connection with Missouri in the 1860's, but you can see many 
     elements in common with those mentioned in my TRADOC briefing 
     on the Battlefield of the Future.


                     The Study of Military History

       No doubt during your time here at the Army War College you 
     have had the opportunity to read and study a great deal of 
     military history. Let me urge you to make that a lifetime 
     commitment.
       In 1935, the newly-elected U.S. Senator from Missouri 
     visited a school then known as Northeast Missouri State 
     Teachers College. While there he was introduced to a young 
     man who was an outstanding student and the president of the 
     student body. The Senator told the student, ``Young man, if 
     you want to be a good American, you should know your 
     history.'' That young student, the late Fred Schwengel, went 
     on to become a Member of Congress from Iowa, and later, 
     President of the U.S. Capitol Historical Society. And, as you 
     may have guessed by now, that newly-elected Senator went on 
     to become President of the United States. The school is now 
     named for him--Truman State University.
       I can't say it any better than Harry S. Truman. The main 
     praise for building an increasingly flexible and effective 
     force must go mainly to the generation of military officers 
     that rebuilt U.S. military capabilities after the Vietnam 
     War. This generation has now almost entirely reached 
     retirement age. The task of the next generation of military 
     leaders is to learn as well as its predecessors. You are 
     bridge between those generations. You have served under the 
     Vietnam generation. You will lead, train, and mentor, the 
     generation to follow. If you do your job well, some future 
     leader in some future conflict will be able, like Colonel 
     Bouquet at Bushy Run, like General Schwarzkopf in Desert 
     Storm, to call on a lesson from military history to shape the 
     answer to a contemporary problem.


                               Gratitude

       The Roman orator Cicero once said that gratitude is the 
     greatest of virtues. Those of you who serve in uniform, your 
     families, and our veterans who have served in uniform and 
     their families, deserve the gratitude of our nation. I know 
     sometimes you feel unappreciated. Yes, there are days set 
     aside

[[Page 10496]]

     to officially honor our service members and our veterans:
       Veterans Day is set aside to honor those who have served in 
     our nation's wars. But is only one day.
       On Memorial Day we pay our respects to those who have given 
     that ``last full measure of devotion''. Again, one day.
       Armed Forces Day is dedicated to those currently serving in 
     uniform. One day. And, because it is not a national holiday, 
     most people don't know the date of Armed Forces Day.
       I want you to know that many Americans do appreciate you 
     every day. They don't need a holiday to do it. So, let me 
     express gratitude to you personally, and on behalf of the 
     American people, for all that you do, and all that you have 
     done. And, let me ask you as senior leaders to do your part 
     to show gratitude. Let me tell you why: The difference 
     between keeping someone in uniform and losing them might just 
     be an encouraging word at the right time. So, when you go out 
     to your next assignments, and that junior officer or that 
     young NCO puts in those extra hours, or does something that 
     makes you look good, take the time to express your gratitude. 
     Let them know how much they are appreciated.
       Thank you and God bless you.

       

                          ____________________