[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 8]
[House]
[Page 10326]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                 AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY ON NORTH KOREA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
January 3, 2001, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) is 
recognized during morning hour debates for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, there was a range of interesting reactions 
to the Bush administration's statements last week that they were 
willing to resume talks with the government of North Korea, the DPRK, 
some suggesting this was a reversal of policy, perhaps a return to the 
North Korean foreign policy of the Clinton administration. Rather, the 
last 4- to 5-month period should be recognized as an appropriate pause 
in our intensive contacts with North Korea to reexamine the goals, 
tactics, achievements, and failures of American policy toward North 
Korea.
  During the last few years, there have been substantial and growing 
congressional concerns, especially among Republicans, over the Clinton 
administration's North Korea policy. North Korea is arguably the most 
dangerous and erratic nation in Asia, perhaps the world, with a ruling 
clique that is intent on surviving even at any cost to its people. 
Indeed, their policies have killed huge numbers of their people through 
starvation. I believe it remains the place where there is the greatest 
chance of U.S. troops becoming militarily engaged in a terrible 
conflict. The DPRK continues to forward-deploy a 1.2 million-man army.
  While finally agreeing to an indefinitely defined moratorium on 
missile flight tests, North Korea continues to develop and produce 
ballistic missiles, some of which are now capable of reaching the 
United States. In addition, there are certain indications that the DPRK 
may be maintaining a covert nuclear program.
  Economically and socially, the ``Hermit Kingdom'' has come to the 
crossroads and must decide whether it continues on its path towards 
oblivion or whether it wants to dramatically reform its conduct and 
join the community of responsible nations. Logically, the United States 
should be in a position to significantly influence the DPRK's behavior. 
Instead, however, we find ourselves in a position where over the last 
few years North Korea has consistently been rewarded for outrageous 
behavior or for threatening such conduct.

                              {time}  1300

  North Korean behavior resembles that of the 18th century Barbary 
pirates, demanding ever-increasing levels of tribute from America, and 
some of its neighbors, in return for marginally tolerable behavior.
  Overall, the preceding administration seemed too willing to tolerate 
North Korean misbehavior and demands for tribute. The United States has 
provided heavy fuel oil and humanitarian food aid in increasing 
quantities. Quietly, escaping the notice of the American people, North 
Korea became the largest recipient of foreign aid in Asia, although 
humanitarian aid was given through indirect means. Despite that level 
of assistance, we are prevented now from adequately monitoring the 
distribution of that assistance, even though there is a very high 
probability of aid diversions to the North Korean military.
  Mr. Speaker, as the Bush administration stands poised and ready to 
reengage North Korea in discussions, if there is any sign such talks 
would be productive, it needs to be mindful of the need to let the 
North Koreans know in no uncertain terms that the cycle of extortion 
for their good behavior is over. Pay tribute or extortion is an 
outrageous violation of the American heritage, and we will not continue 
it. We will not pay, directly or indirectly, for what the North Koreans 
should do to improve their own plight: live on the Korean Peninsula 
peacefully with their neighbors to the south; end its tactics of 
terrorism, weapons proliferation, and blackmail; sign a peace treaty to 
finally end the Korean War; and give evidence that it wants to build a 
positive relationship with the United States and the international 
community.
  Finally, Bush administration contacts with North Korea should be much 
more careful than the Clinton administration to closely involve the 
South Koreans, the Republic of Korea, in those talks directly or as 
closely as possible. We must not succumb to the old North Korean 
strategy to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea or 
to denigrate the legitimacy of the government of South Korea.
  Mr. Speaker, that is my advice, gratuitous though it is, to the Bush 
administration. We need to change our policy.

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