[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 7]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 10098-10099]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



  COLUMN ILLUMINATES NEED FOR CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE'S 
                           REPUBLIC OF CHINA

                                 ______
                                 

                           HON. DOUG BEREUTER

                              of nebraska

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 6, 2001

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, the Member wishes to commend to his 
colleagues Mr. Thomas J. Friedman's editorial column, ``One Nation, 3 
Lessons,'' which was published in the April 13, 2001, edition of the 
New York Times. In the column, Mr. Friedman accurately describes the 
stabilizing and the destabilizing elements currently acting within the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) and prescribes steady, incremental 
U.S. engagement with the PRC as a means of encouraging China's growth 
into an open society, not into a cold war adversary.
  As this body prepares to vote in the near future on renewing normal 
trade relations (NTR) with the PRC, this Member asks that his 
colleagues heed Mr. Friedman's advice to Bridges to China Everywhere 
Possible. Continuing NTR with the PRC, encouraging its accession to the 
WTO and other multilateral institutions as appropriate, engaging in 
dialogue about human rights concerns, and promoting democracy building 
and rule of law programs within the PRC are among the bridges Congress 
can and should immediately build.

                         One Nation, 3 Lessons

                        (By Thomas L. Friedman)

       So what are the lessons from this latest China-U.S. crisis? 
     They are (1) When dealing with China, carry a big stick and a 
     big dictionary. (2) This is an inherently unstable 
     relationship. (3) Get used to it--it's going to be this way 
     for a long time.
       Let's start with Lesson 2, because it's the crux of the 
     matter. We learn from this incident that the U.S.-China 
     relationship has within it two highly stabilizing and two 
     highly destabilizing elements, and the future will be shaped 
     by the balance between them.
       The two stabilizing elements are China's economic 
     dependence on U.S. trade, technology transfers and the 
     American market, and China's more general, but steady, 
     integration into the world. When China's foreign minister 
     declared that China was releasing the U.S. surveillance 
     plane's crew for ``humanitarian reasons,'' I burst out 
     laughing. One thing the Chinese are expert at is calculating 
     their interests. And they had clearly calculated that 
     dragging this affair on another day could imperil China's 
     entry into the World Trade Organization, its $100 billion in 
     trade with the U.S., its application to be host to the 2008 
     Summer Olympics, its 54,000 students studying in American, 
     etc. etc.
       These things matter. They matter to a regime whose 
     Communist ideology is largely defunct and whose only basis of 
     legitimacy is its ability to keep incomes rising. And they 
     matter deeply to the people of China, who see themselves as a 
     rising power and want to be accepted as such. The more China 
     is integrated with the global economy and international 
     rules-based systems like the W.T.O., the more these will be a 
     source of restraint on the regime.
       But they are not foolproof, because these stabilizing 
     elements in the relationship are counterbalanced by two 
     highly destabilizing ones: the authoritarian character of the 
     Chinese regime, and China's rising popular nationalism and 
     unquenchable aspiration to absorb Taiwan into one China.
       Authoritarian regimes, having little legitimacy, can almost 
     never admit a mistake. That's why you need a big stick and 
     big dictionary when dealing with them. The idea that a slow-
     moving, propeller-driven surveillance plane, flying on auto-
     pilot, rammed into a Chinese fighter jet is ludicrous. But 
     since China's leaders lacked the self-confidence to admit 
     this, the Bush team wisely found a way to apologize without 
     really apologizing.
       The same tools need to be applied to Taiwan. Taiwan's 
     character--the fact that it is a country that has built 
     itself in America's image, economically and politically--
     mandates that we defend it. We cannot shirk that 
     responsibility. But Taiwan's history and geography mandate 
     that Taiwan find a way to accommodate with mainland China--
     without sacrificing its de facto independence or character. 
     China has actually shown a lot of flexibility in proposing 
     different formulas lately, and Taiwan needs to respond. Pass 
     the dictionary.
       We need to keep our eyes on the prize here, folks. Those 
     voices in the U.S. now calling for America to ``stick it to 
     China'' and to ``teach them a lesson'' sound as silly as the 
     China People's Daily hectoring America. China is a unique 
     problem. It represents one-fifth of humanity. It threatens us 
     as much by its weaknesses as by its strengths. We may be 
     doomed to a cold war with China, but it is not something we 
     should court.
       A cold war with Russia, a country that made tractors that 
     were more valuable as scrap steel and TV's that blew up when 
     you turned them on, was one thing. A cold war with one-fifth 
     of humanity, with an economy growing at 10 percent a year, is 
     another. At the same time, trying to collapse the Chinese 
     regime overnight would produce a degree of chaos among one-
     fifth of the world's inhabitants that would affect everything 
     from the air we breathe to the cost of the clothes we wear to 
     the value of our currency.
       Our strategy toward China needs to remain exactly as it 
     was: Build bridges to China everywhere possible, because they 
     have clearly

[[Page 10099]]

     become a source of restraint on the regime; and draw red 
     lines everywhere necessary, because China's rising 
     nationalism and insecure leadership can produce irrational 
     behavior that overrides all other interests. Do this, and 
     hope that over time China continues, as it slowly has been, 
     becoming a more open, legalized, pluralistic society, with a 
     government more responsive, and less threatening, to its 
     people and neighbors. Lurching to any other extremes with 
     China would be utterly, utterly foolhardy.

     

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