[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 6]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 7915-7916]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



         HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NV

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. SHELLEY BERKLEY

                               of nevada

                    in the house of representatives

                         Wednesday, May 9, 2001

  Ms. BERKLEY. Mr. Speaker, I include my testimony concerning nuclear 
waste storage at your Mountain for the Record.
  I would like to thank the Chairman for allowing me the opportunity to 
comment on the proposed FY02 Appropriations for Energy Department, 
Nuclear Waste Management and Disposal relating to the Department of 
Energy's (DOE) proposal to store high-level nuclear waste at Yucca 
Mountain in Nevada. This issue is critical to me because my district is 
located 90 miles southeast of Yucca Mountain, and it is my constituents 
who would be the most affected by the Yucca Mountain Plan.
  More then a decade has gone by since the 1987 amendments to the 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act designated Yucca Mountain as the

[[Page 7916]]

only site to be studied, and the scientific evidence against the 
Mountain continues to grow. Yucca Mountain is located in an earthquake 
and volcanic eruption zone. As recently as last month there was so much 
moisture at the proposed site that electrical test equipment was 
shorted out. It is widely known that ground water will corrode the 
waste storage containers, and release the deadly toxins into the 
environment.
  Scientific evidence against the proposed Yucca Mountain site is 
plentiful, but just like the 1987 ``Screw Nevada'' bill, each time 
legitimate arguments are raised, standards for Yucca Mountain are 
changed. Regarding the current situation with groundwater and personal 
radiation dose standards, the goalposts have again been moved. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) set a groundwater standard of no 
greater than 4 millirems, and a personal radiation dose standard of 15 
millirems per year at 18 kilometers, for the first 10,000 years of 
waste disposal. Despite the fact that the personal dose radiation 
standards are significantly weaker than similar sites around the 
country, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has still asked the 
EPA to rewrite these standards to allow an even higher dose of 
radiation. The NRC knows full well that without reduced standards, 
Yucca Mountain can never be found suitable. So again, the rules must 
change.
  On three separate occasions the State of Nevada has demonstrated, 
using DOE's own data, that the site should be disqualified under both 
the EPA standard and DOE's own internal site screening regulation. And 
each time, the DOE or Congress has changed regulations to ensure that 
Yucca Mountain would not be disqualified, regardless of the health and 
safety consequences to Nevadans.
  In fact, the DOE has found the geology at Yucca Mountain so poorly 
serves the need of a repository, that over 95% of the waste isolation 
capability would have to be provided by metal waste containers, and 
other so-called engineered barriers around the waste. When this project 
started, the idea was to find a site capable of containing the 
radiation entirely through its natural geologic features. That standard 
has since been lowered from 100% to 5%.
  Aside from the earthquakes and the potential for volcanic eruption, 
an aquifer flows beneath the mountain, with water moving so rapidly 
that even with all engineered barriers, radiation will unavoidably 
escape the repository and contaminate our water table. This fact is 
underscored by a U.S. Geological Survey report entitled ``Flooding in 
the Amargosa River Drainage Basin, February 23-24, 1998, Southern 
Nevada and Eastern California, including the Nevada Test Site.'' This 
document, which I would like to include with my statement, details two 
floods, one in 1995, and one in 1998, that, would have had severe 
repercussions on the proposed repository. Most notable is the 
conclusion that, ``Both the 1995 and 1998 floods indicate . . . that 
the Amargosa River, with contributing streamflow from one or more among 
Beatty, Fortymile, and Topopah Washes, has the potential to transport 
dissolved and particulate material well beyond the boundary on NTS and 
the Yucca Mountain area during periods of moderate to severe 
streamflow.'' Yet once again, in clear English, scientific evidence 
condemns the Yucca plan.
  In addition to the mounting scientific evidence against Yucca 
Mountain, there are also ongoing General Accounting Office 
investigations into mismanagement by senior staff, and a review of the 
Inspector General's report on bias at the DOE.
  The first issue was brought to my attention by an anonymous letter I 
received at my office from an individual who appears to be highly 
knowledgeable about the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Site 
Characterization Project. The letter reflects a high level of expertise 
and first hand knowledge. It is alarming to say the least. Among the 
allegations are the lack of oversight in relation to the continually 
escalating lifetime costs for storing nuclear waste at the mountain, 
unnecessary travel abroad by senior level managers, lack of experience 
and technical background of those in charge of the project, and an 
adversarial relationship between managers of the project--and this very 
body--the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board. The General Accounting 
Office is still in the process of investigating these very serious 
charges.
  As for the second issue, as you are likely aware by now, the 
Inspector General has found that there were several statements in the 
draft Overview and a note which was attached to one version of the 
Overview, that ``could be viewed as suggesting a premature conclusion 
regarding the suitability of Yucca Mountain.'' Of particular concern to 
me is the section of the I.G.'s report that states, ``Based on 
Correspondence received by the Office of the Inspector General, it is 
fair to observe that, at least in some quarters, public confidence in 
the Department's (DOE) evaluation of Yucca Mountain has eroded.'' The 
IG also noted disincentives at DOE for Yucca Mountain employees to 
question assumptions, or to, in any way, ``rock the boat.''
  The Inspector General's report serves to underscore what Nevadans 
have been saying since the origins of the ``Screw Nevada'' bill. 
Politics plays the leading role in determining the fate of the Yucca 
Mountain project.
  It is pointless to discuss how we can restore the public confidence 
into this doomed project. The American public has seen behind the 
curtain, and we cannot erase from our memory that we have seen a 
tainted process, driven by politics, with questionable scientific 
merit. The further we investigate Yucca Mountain, the more money we 
spend, the more obvious it becomes that Yucca Mountain is not the 
answer.
  Scientific evidence and ongoing investigations continue to shed doubt 
on the feasibility of a Yucca Mountain Repository. Now is not the time 
to increase this budget, while the GAO continues to investigate, and 
science continues to condemn this plan. I again request that federal 
agencies change their course, and stop trying to fit a square peg in a 
round hole. Instead of trying to change the rules to keep the proposed 
plan alive, they should immediately begin the decommissioning of the 
Yucca Mountain Project.

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