[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 6]
[Senate]
[Pages 7571-7572]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



             C-5 PARTS SHORTAGES ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to draw my colleagues 
attention to an on-going problem that impacts our national security--
parts shortages for the C-5. I know it may surprise some that I say 
this is a national security problem. Well, it is. My colleagues on the 
Armed Services Committee and on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee 
are not surprised. They know how vital strategic airlift is to national 
security. They also know that C-5s are the backbone of our strategic 
airlift capability. Working with the C-17, the C-5 provides the airlift 
needed for both wars and for humanitarian missions.
  For those who have not spent as much time on the issue, let me 
explain. The C-5 can carry more cargo, farther than any other plane in 
the American military. It is what brings the big, heavy stuff to the 
fight. For example, C-5s brought precision munitions into our major 
European bases for Allied Force in Kosovo. Once the big loads are 
brought into a theater, where necessary the C-17 then moves the 
equipment and supplies around the theater. As the Commander in Chief of 
United States Transportation Command has said many times, seventy 
percent of the cargo most needed in the first 30 days by the warfighter 
can only be airlifted on a C-5 or a C-17. And, by the way, this is 
stuff we'll need even if we get lighter and more mobile because time 
will always matter and the more we can get to the fight quickly, the 
better our military position.
  In addition to our warfighting needs, America uses the C-5 to promote 
goodwill and to help those made needy by natural disasters. C-5s are 
almost always involved in providing humanitarian assistance. For 
example, large desalinization plants to provide drinkable water must go 
on the C-5. So must the Fairfax Search and Rescue Team that we heard so 
much about after earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan.
  To get back to my earlier point, America is a global power that needs 
a healthy C-5 fleet. One major factor in low mission capable rates and 
lower airlift capacity has been a lack of parts for the C-5. In short, 
without parts, C-5s are not available to the Nation.
  Because I was seeing the impact of this on a regular basis at Dover 
Air Force Base, in my State of Delaware, I thought it was important to 
take a closer look at this problem. What I was seeing was maintenance 
crews being overworked on a regular basis because there were no parts 
available to repair planes. In order to keep C-5s flying, two or more 
C-5s had to be turned into ``hangar queens'' or ``cann-birds''. Sad 
terms that describe million dollar airplanes that must be used to 
provide parts for other planes. Parts are taken from that plane and 
then put into another plane that needs that part. This process, called 
aircraft cannibalization, cost the Logistics Groups at Dover over $2.77 
million for Fiscal Year 1999 according to an independent review of 
Logistics cost done for Air Mobility Command.
  Cannibalization not only wastes money, it also requires significantly 
more work hours to open up an airplane, remove a part, open up the 
other airplane and install the part, and then eventually install a 
replacement part in the original airplane. This process also increases 
the risk that something else on the cann-bird will break or that the 
part itself will break. The end result was that morale was low because

[[Page 7572]]

without an adequate supply of spare and repair parts, inefficient 
procedures had become standard practice. In addition, the overall 
health of the C-5 fleet suffered.
  As I became more aware of the impact this lack of parts was having on 
morale and the readiness of the C-5 fleet 2 years ago, I brought then 
Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen to Dover to make him aware of the 
problem.
  While I believe that visit was helpful, it was clear to me that 
continued attention to the issue was necessary. That led me to write a 
short report on the issue. I have sent copies of the report to my 
colleagues in the Senate.
  The report seeks to explain the important role played by the C-5, the 
extent of the parts problem for the C-5, the impact those parts 
shortages have had on the fleet and those who work on the C-5, and to 
describe the failures in logistics system management that made the 
problem even worse. I hope that my colleagues will take the time to 
review the report and will reach the same conclusions that I did. In 
the end, it was clear to me that we must do three things.
  First, we must continue to increase funding for parts and keep it 
predictable.
  Second, we must completely modernize the C-5 fleet with new avionics 
and the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program.
  Third, we must continue to promote smart management reform throughout 
the defense logistics system.
  Again, I know that none of this is news to my colleagues on the 
defense committees who have provided so much leadership and support for 
addressing these challenges, but I hope the report will be helpful to 
them and their staffs and to other colleagues.
  I know that spare and repair parts is not glamorous, but it is vital 
to America's ability to protect and promote our national security. For 
that reason, we must build on the good work done by the defense 
committees over the past four years to begin to solve the parts 
shortage problem and ensure that we do not lose sight of what must be 
done now and in the future to eliminate the problem.

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