[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 5]
[House]
[Pages 7411-7412]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON VTOL TECHNOLOGY WILL EXAMINE FAILED OSPREY 
                       PROJECT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Rohrabacher) is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to discuss an issue that 
relates directly to the safety of the men and women whose task it is to 
defend our country. It also goes to the heart of the American lead in 
the aviation technology upon which we depend so much.
  For over a decade, I backed a project that I believed would permit 
America to take the lead in the next major step in aviation technology, 
that is, Vertical Takeoff and Vertical Landing aircraft. Unfortunately, 
it is clear now that the project, the Osprey project, has been a costly 
and a dangerous failure.
  Of the 11 aircraft built, four have crashed, and three of the crashes 
resulted in 30 fatalities. That is 30 dead heroes whom we cannot bring 
back. The flight crews that were lost were the most experienced on this 
craft and some of the best and the brightest of the Marine Corps.
  On page 32 of the most recent copy of the Marine Corps Gazette, there 
is an article by a pilot who is also a weapons and tactics instructor 
that underscores the skepticism about the viability of the Osprey 
program. Then there is the alarming allegations of a cover-up, a cover-
up and records falsification by Marine officers directly involved in 
the Osprey's operational testing. Recently, the Defense Department's 
Blue Ribbon panel echoed the finding of the Marine Corps' Accident 
Mishap Board in recommending extensive redesign of the craft. All of 
this calls into question the Osprey's future use by the military and, 
of equal significance, its commercial viability. No commercial aviation 
company in this country is ever going to get insurance on a craft with 
this kind of safety record.
  The Blue Ribbon panel mandates that we go back to the drawing board. 
That is not a condemnation of vertical landing, vertical takeoff; it is 
a condemnation of the Osprey program. Vertical Takeoff and Vertical 
Landing technologies are the way to alleviate our overcrowded airports, 
to ease our overburdened air traffic control systems, and to ensure our 
military's ability to respond when our runways have been destroyed by a 
wartime adversary. To pull us into the 21st century, we need a simple 
Vertical Takeoff, Vertical Landing aircraft with longer range, higher 
speed, and greater payload capacity. Perhaps like a transport version 
of the Harrier jet.
  Tomorrow, the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, a subcommittee 
that I chair, will be holding a hearing on one such aircraft that holds 
promise for the future, and it will fly for the first time this summer. 
Let me note that my father was a Marine pilot.
  Mr. Speaker, these 30 casualties during the testing of the Osprey 
program

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are unconscionable, 30 dead Marines. We do not need any more dead 
Marines. The Osprey program is a failure, but the Vertical Takeoff, 
Vertical Landing concept is not. We should not abandon that technology, 
and we should try to keep America first in aviation technology by 
ensuring that new concepts of Vertical Landing, Vertical Takeoff will 
be available to the American military and also available to commercial 
aviation so that the United States of America will be able to fly its 
up-to-date, cutting-edge aircraft throughout the world and remain the 
leader in aviation technology, creating jobs for our people and 
creating a capability, both militarily and commercially, that will keep 
America ahead of the competition and ahead of our adversaries.
  So I would ask my colleagues tomorrow to pay attention to our 
hearing, and I would ask the public to pay attention to the hearing of 
the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics that I chair, and we will be 
examining the Vertical Takeoff and Vertical Landing concept, and 
perhaps some of the reasons why the old program failed and why there is 
hope that better technology is available in the future, technology that 
would protect our military people and offer great commercial 
possibilities for our country.
  Mr. Speaker, I would submit for the Record the article in the Marine 
Corps Gazette entitled, ``MV-22 Osprey or Edsel?''

                     [Ideas & Issues, MV-22 Osprey]

                         MV-22 Osprey or Edsel?

                   (By LtCol Bruce A. Milton, USMCR)


                   is the osprey `too much' aircraft?

       Mishaps have been an aviation bane ever since Orville and 
     Wilbur made those first epic flights amid the dunes of Kitty 
     Hawk. The early days of powered flight took an incredible 
     toll on those intrepid airmen who ventured forth to challenge 
     gravity. Despite tremendous losses, the potential benefits to 
     both the civil and military complexes enabled a fledgling 
     enterprise to evolve into the technologically advanced 
     industry that we have today. I doubt few events in modern 
     history can compare with the meteoric accomplishments of the 
     aviation field. To think that Neil Armstrong walked on the 
     moon less than 65 years after the Wrights' first powered 
     flight is simply phenomenal.
       Throughout these ever-evolving phases of aviation, 
     countless steps have been taken to reduce the inherent risks 
     associated with flying. There isn't adequate space in this 
     article to pay homage to all the positive changes 
     incorporated by manufacturers, operators, government 
     entities, and others to enhance flight safety. Suffice it to 
     say that the mishap rate--a tangible statistic that measures 
     how safe we really are--has improved markedly over the years 
     as a result of these positive changes.
       However, just as the automotive industry has had models 
     that were not successful, the annals of aviation history also 
     include numerous aircraft that were ``scrapped'' or pulled 
     from production. Unlike the doomed Edsel, a car that the 
     driving public simply did not find aesthetically pleasing, 
     many prematurely canceled aircraft, certainly many military 
     aircraft, had their operational lives shortened because they 
     were deemed too dangerous.
       With a new aircraft, as with any complicated machine, there 
     is a learning curve. This wringing out period includes the 
     time that skilled test pilots put the aircraft through its 
     paces. They ``push the envelope'' to establish limitations, 
     procedures, and guidelines for subsequent squadron pilot 
     usage. During this wringing out, the aircraft also undergoes 
     operational test and evaluation (OTE). During OTE, more 
     guidelines and procedures are established as how to best 
     employ the aircraft in a tactical environment. Once the new 
     aircraft has successfully completed this rigorous testing, it 
     is ready for introduction to the fleet.
       When speaking of the MV-22, it is with this latter portion 
     of the learning curve that I am most concerned. I am not now, 
     nor have I ever been, a test pilot. I have, however, spent 
     the majority of my aviation career in some type of 
     instructional capacity. From my days on active duty as a 
     weapons and tactics instructor to my current duties as a 
     training captain for a large commercial emergency medical 
     services operator, I have amassed literally thousands of 
     hours of flight instruction in both fixed- and rotary-wing 
     aircraft. This experience has provided me with some insights 
     into pilot performance and behavior.
       Collectively, pilots are merely a cross section of society. 
     As such, among pilots there exists a widely varying degree of 
     aeronautical prowess and ability. I have flown with pilots 
     whose seemingly effortless skill I admired. I have flown with 
     those who struggled very hard to make the required grade. I 
     have also flown with pilots whose performance made me wonder 
     how they had progressed as far as they had. Interestingly 
     enough, I suppose most of the pilots I have flown with over 
     the last 19 years can be defined as being average.
       In most communities and subcultures of naval aviation, 
     there is certainly nothing wrong with average. Average can be 
     equated to someone who is safe, reliable, and aware of his or 
     her capabilities and limitations. However, in the case of the 
     Osprey, I am concerned that average may not be good enough. 
     As recent tragic events illustrate, ``above average'' or even 
     ``outstanding'' may not be sufficient skill levels to 
     successfully master the MV-22. We have lost the two most 
     experienced Osprey aircrews, senior test pilots even, in the 
     first stages of fleet incorporation. What happens when we man 
     this aircraft with less than stellar experienced aircrews? 
     I'm not sure the jury is ``in'' on this subject.
       In my capacity as an instructor, I have more than a 
     layman's appreciation for helicopter aerodynamics. I 
     understand such phenomena as ``settling with power'' and 
     ``vortex ring state.'' I have deliberately induced this 
     condition at altitude to show pilots how dangerous it can be 
     if encountered in close proximity to the ground. I opine that 
     in most helicopters, under most conditions--even tactically--
     it is rare to enter the vortex ring state. Reports I have 
     read about the Marana incident attribute the mishap to the 
     pilot having entered a vortex ring state. The speed and rates 
     of descent reported certainly did not seem to me to be 
     excessive. I have seen conditions far worse with no hint of 
     loss of control. Is the margin of error or more correctly, 
     margin of safety, of the Osprey so narrow as to put the 
     aircrews at a disadvantage?
       If the Osprey is as demanding to fly as it might seem, what 
     happens when we man it with the inevitable average crew, 
     cloak them in the fog of war, and send them forth in harm's 
     way? Send them into a hot landing zone on a dark night 
     wearing night vision goggles? Send relatively inexperienced 
     crews into tactical situations where it is prudent to 
     expedite time spent in the vulnerable landing phase? I cannot 
     help but ponder such questions.
       I do not particularly care about the politics involved in 
     the overwhelming process of aircraft acquisition and 
     employment. Instead, I worry about the troops tasked to fly 
     in those aircraft. It is time to take a long, unbiased, 
     nonpartisan look at the MV-22's future in the Corps. If it 
     can be proven that cockpit workload and aircrew skill 
     requirements are reasonable, then let us welcome its 
     capabilities into our arsenal. If the aircraft needs further 
     redesign or modification to make it safer, then we should 
     pursue those changes. If it turns out that there is no 
     rational or cost-effective solution to the current woes, then 
     perhaps we should consider tabling MV-22 acquisitions until 
     such time that it is safe.
       We owe this analysis to our Marines. After all, the Edsel 
     may have been unsightly, but it wouldn't kill you.

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