[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 5]
[Senate]
[Pages 7312-7314]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



         THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Nuclear Control Institute, NCI, this 
year celebrates its 20th anniversary. For 20 years the NCI has worked 
to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons to nations or to 
groups. In honor of their achievements and contributions, I ask 
unanimous consent that a letter of congratulations to NCI by our former 
colleague, Senator John Glenn, adn the remarks of the founder and 
president of NCI, Paul Leventhal, at NCI's 20th anniversary conference 
on April 9, 2001, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                         The John Glenn Institute,


                               Public Service & Public Policy,

                                    Columbus, Ohio, April 9, 2001.
     Mr. Paul Leventhal,
     c/o Mr. Len Bickwit,
     Miller & Chevalier, Chartered,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Paul: I want to extend to you personally my most 
     sincere congratulations on the occasion of the twentieth 
     anniversary of the Nuclear Control Institute. Your 
     contribution to the debate on nuclear proliferation has been 
     invaluable over the years and undoubtedly has helped make the 
     world a safer one in which to live. I will always appreciate 
     your & Senator Ribicoff's role in initially involving me in 
     the nonproliferation issue during my early days in the 
     Senate. While we have not always agreed on the specific 
     measures to be taken in support of nonproliferation, we have 
     always shared the objective that the control of nuclear 
     weaponry must rank high on the list of the nation's public 
     policy priorities. Your tireless work in support of that 
     objective well deserves the commemoration it is receiving 
     today.
       Best regards,
           Sincerely,
     John Glenn.
                                  ____


   Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Can We Have One 
                           Without the Other?

       Good morning, I am Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear 
     Control Institute, and I want to welcome you to NCI's 20th 
     anniversary conference, ``Nuclear Power and the Spread of 
     Nuclear Weapons--Can We Have One Without the Other?''
       NCI got started 20 years ago on a spring day like today 
     when I landed a $7,500 contribution from an anonymous member 
     of the Rockefeller family. Wade Greene, the Rockefeller 
     program officer who has been so helpful to a number of non-
     profit organizations represented here today, called it a 
     ``stimulative grant'' to encourage giving by other 
     foundations. But I had just lost my job on Capitol Hill, when 
     the majority of the Senate switched to the party other than 
     the one my boss and subcommittee chairman, Gary Hart, 
     belonged to. So, I wasted no time and applied the Rockefeller 
     check to renting a desk in the corridor of a small law firm 
     located in a town house a block away from here, on N Street. 
     With the desk came a posh conference room, suitable for 
     holding meetings with other NGOs with an interest in 
     plutonium and proliferation, and NCI was born.
       In those days, NCI stood for The Nuclear Club Inc. The name 
     was too clever by 5/8ths. But we used it anyway in a full-
     page New York Times ad, on Sunday, June 21, 1981, to launch 
     our fledgling organization. The ad, which you will find in 
     your folders, posed the question, ``Will Tomorrow's Terrorist 
     Have an Atom Bomb?''--a question, unfortunately, still highly 
     relevant today, as is the answer. NCI's name has changed, but 
     our mission--to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons 
     to nations, or to groups--remains the same.
       The ad's creator was Julian Koenig, an original member and 
     still a member of our Board. He is a Madison Avenue legend, 
     now retired, whose credits included Volkswagen's original 
     ``Think Small'' campaign and the naming of ``Earth Day.''
       At first, Mr. Koenig expressed reluctance about joining our 
     board, but I assured him that NCI would have to solve the 
     plutonium problem in five years, or he and I probably 
     wouldn't survive to talk about it anyway. I was wrong on both 
     counts. We haven't solved the problem. We are still around to 
     talk about it. To paraphrase Faulkner, NCI has endured, if 
     not prevailed. We are all still here to talk about the role 
     of nuclear power, plutonium and other associated 
     proliferation risks--that is the purpose of our meeting 
     today.
       Those of you familiar with NCI's work probably detect 
     something different about today's program. When we planned 
     this conference--and here I wish to acknowledge the 
     contribution of Marvin Miller of MIT, a long-time technical 
     adviser and all-around shmoozer for NCI--we discussed whether 
     we should look at nuclear power in a broader context: Do we 
     need nuclear power? How essential is it? This is a policy 
     area that Nuclear Control Institute has not ventured into 
     before. Although some in industry and bureaucracy conclude 
     that our opposition to civilian use of plutonium and the 
     other nuclear weapons material, highly enriched uranium 
     (HEU), means that we are opposed to nuclear power, we are in 
     fact not an anti-nuclear organization. We have maintained a 
     policy of neutrality on nuclear power and steer clear of 
     efforts to shut the industry down. We are anti-plutonium and 
     anti-HEU, not anti-nuclear.
       Our purpose today in examining the need for nuclear power, 
     and the possible alternatives to it, is the current push by 
     industry and apparently by the Bush Administration to revive 
     nuclear power and to expand it in response to growing 
     concerns about electricity-supply shortages and global 
     warming.
       To underscore this point, today's Washington Post quotes 
     Vice President Cheney as saying, ``We need to build 65 new 
     power plants for the next 20 years, and my own view is that 
     some of those ought to be nuclear, and that's the 
     environmentally sound way to go.''
       We strongly believe that such an initiative should not go 
     forward without first examining whether there is an 
     irreducible proliferation risk associated with nuclear power, 
     and whether this risk is serious enough to change current 
     commitments to nuclear power.
       If the nuclear industry refuses to end its love affair with 
     plutonium, especially now that it is widely acknowledged that 
     plutonium is not an essential fuel because of the abundance 
     of cheap, non-weapons usable uranium, then the world may well 
     be better off without nuclear power. In that case, we should 
     look to alternative sources of energy and to energy 
     conservation and efficiency measures. Even if industry gives 
     up plutonium, there are still severe proliferation dangers 
     associated with the prospect of cheap, efficient enrichment 
     technology and with potentially limitless sources of uranium.
       So, we will be examining two sets of questions today:
       Are there viable alternatives to nuclear power?
       Are the proliferation risks associated with nuclear power 
     so great as to make these alternative approaches imperative?
       We have called on a world-class set of experts to address 
     these questions, and we also have an expert audience 
     representing a full range of views that should keep the 
     speakers on their toes. NCI has always sought to be inclusive 
     and to invite opposing viewpoints to be represented at its 
     conferences. This approach sometimes generates heat, but also 
     light. We ask the speakers to keep to their time limits and 
     the questioners to be succinct and to the point. We have a 
     number of issues to cover in one day and can only do so if 
     concision is king.
       I want to highlight some of NCI's concerns about the 
     proliferation and security risks of nuclear power and about 
     the way these risks are now being addressed. I hope these 
     points help to inform and to stimulate the discussions that 
     follow.
       It is important to recognize the central role of fissile 
     materials as the driving force behind proliferation. Granted, 
     any decision to go nuclear is a political one, but the 
     capability to execute that decision is technical. It is 
     impossible to build nuclear weapons without plutonium or HEU. 
     Thus, it should be straightforward that the nuclear power 
     industry imposes a menace on the world if its insists on 
     utilizing these explosive nuclear fuels when it is possible 
     to run nuclear power and research reactors without them. As 
     will be discussed by the luncheon speakers and the afternoon 
     non-proliferation panel, nuclear power programs have provided 
     cover for actual or attempted weapons-making in a number of 
     countries. In each case, closing the fuel cycle to extract 
     plutonium enriching uranium to weapons grade, or importing 
     weapons-grade uranium to run research reactors were the 
     quintessential elements of those programs.
       Seeking to restrict and eliminate use of these fuels was 
     the objective of the Congressional non-proliferation 
     initiatives of the 1970s and of the Ford and Carter 
     administrations. But these initiatives ran into political 
     trouble because of the fierce opposition of our European and 
     Japanese allies, who refused to follow the U.S. example. 
     Today, the plutonium and breeder programs in these countries 
     are in desperate financial straits,

[[Page 7313]]

     and this situation presents the United States an opportunity 
     to reopen these issues and to seek cooperative approaches for 
     disposal of excess fissile materials without introducing them 
     as fuels.
       Even the pro-plutonium British Nuclear Industrial Forum, in 
     a recent analysis of prospects for the industry, made this 
     statement: ``Proliferation is a major issue in the nuclear 
     fuel cycle. Nuclear Power may become more acceptable to the 
     public if reprocessing is shut down.'' Clearly, the plutonium 
     program in Britain, as in Germany and Japan, is encountering 
     great difficulties. I have been privileged to be the only 
     American invited to participate in a stakeholders' dialogue 
     with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., the government-owned fuel 
     cycle company, on its plutonium program. As a result of this 
     dialogue, BNFL has now agreed to undertake a formal 
     assessment of immobilizing Britain's 60-plus ton stockpile of 
     civilian plutonium as an alternative to fabricating it into 
     MOX fuel.
       However, despite this and other opportunities for the 
     United States to revisit the plutonium component of U.S. non-
     proliferation policy, ``transparency'' and ``gradualism'' 
     still dominate U.S. policy today. But achieving transparency 
     of the world's plutonium stockpiles is no substitute for 
     getting rid of them, while gradualism can be an excuse for 
     not doing anything effective. The rapid growth of stocks of 
     plutonium serves to illustrate this point. The growth has not 
     been as rapid as we projected in 1983 when NCI commissioned 
     David Albright to do his first study of this project. At that 
     time, we projected 600 tons of separated civilian plutonium 
     by the year 2000. Today, because of large-scale cancellations 
     of new nuclear power and fuel-cycle plant orders, and of the 
     demise of the breeder reactor, the actual amount of 
     separated, civilian plutonium is about 200 tons--still an 
     awesome figure that approximates the amount of military 
     plutonium in the world.
       But, by way of contrast, it should be noted that stocks of 
     civilian highly enriched uranium exported by the United 
     States have gone down dramatically--the result of the RERTR 
     (Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors) program, 
     run by the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory, with relatively 
     strong support by the Executive Branch. In this case, there 
     is a law in effect (the Schumer Amendment) which applies a 
     sanctions approach and bars exports of HEU except to research 
     reactors whose operators have agreed to convert to high-
     density, low-enriched uranium that cannot be used in bombs. 
     The result: HEU exports by the United States are now 
     virtually nil, limited to relatively small amounts to support 
     continued operation of reactors while they are in the process 
     of conversion.
       Plutonium is a different story, however, Provisions in the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 1978, which were intended to 
     restrict commerce in plutonium derived from U.S.-supplied 
     nuclear fuel, have been circumvented by the Executive Branch.
       It is important to note the pivotal role of Japan in all of 
     this. Those of you familiar with the activities of NCI know 
     that we focus attention on the Japanese plutonium program. We 
     are sometimes criticized for doing so. Questions have been 
     raised as to why we are so concerned about plutonium in 
     Japan, given Japan's adherence to the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty and to IAEA safeguards.
       The answer is that Japan strongly resisted U.S. efforts to 
     avoid commercial use of plutonium and is now the lynchpin for 
     world plutonium commerce. Japan is the most important 
     customer today of the European reprocessing and MOX 
     industries. Without Japan, these industries might well be 
     forced to shut down.
       The Japanese plutonium program is losing domestic public 
     acceptance as a consequence of a succession of nuclear 
     accidents in Japan, as well as a scandal that developed when 
     BNFL workers deliberately falsified quality-control data for 
     plutonium-uranium, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel that was shipped to 
     Japan for use in light-water reactors. Outside Japan, there 
     is a considerable suspicion in the East Asian region as to 
     why Japan wants to accumulate so much weapons-usable 
     plutonium when there is a clear alternative in the form of 
     low-enriched uranium fuel. NCI has pointed out in a detailed 
     economic analysis that Japan could ensure its energy security 
     by building a strategic reserve of non-weapons-usable uranium 
     at a fraction of the cost of its plutonium and breeder 
     programs.
       NCI regards Japan as a special case, too, because, of all 
     the civil plutonium-consuming countries, Japan refuses to 
     acknowledge the weapons utility of reactor-grade plutonium 
     despite many briefings on the subject by the U.S. Government. 
     NCI commissioned the late Carson Mark, former head of weapons 
     design at Los Alamos National Laboratory, to do an analysis 
     of the weapons utility of reactor grade plutonium. This study 
     eventually convinced the IAEA that reactor-grade plutonium 
     was suitable for073 weapons, but unfortunately the Japanese 
     government and industry continue to refuse to do so.
       The Japanese plutonium program has also prompted strong 
     protests from many states that are alarmed by the regular 
     transports of MOX fuel and highly radioactive reprocessing 
     waste that now pass close to their coastlines, en route from 
     Europe to Japan. Japan has not been responsive to the safety 
     and security concerns about these shipments that have been 
     raised by the en-route states, or to their demands for 
     environmental impact assessments, advance consultation on 
     emergency planning, and guarantees of salvage of lost cargoes 
     and indemnification against catastrophic consequences of 
     accidents or attacks.
       The consequence of all this is that the Japanese plutonium 
     program is mired in controversy, both domestically and 
     internationally. In NCI's view, it should be regarded as a 
     special case and of special concern. If Japan should 
     eventually decide against further use of plutonium fuel and 
     the European plutonium industry collapsed as a result, it 
     might then be possible to build an international consensus to 
     eliminate commerce in plutonium as well as bomb-grade 
     uranium.
       We think Japan and the other big plutonium-producing and--
     consuming countries do count because they set an example and 
     a standard for the rest of the world. I will return to this 
     subject this afternoon during the non-proliferation panel.
       I also want to highlight NCI's concerns about the 
     possibility of reactors as radiological weapons--that is, the 
     risk of sabotage of nuclear power plants. This is not just a 
     Russian problem. It is an American problem, as well. Half the 
     nuclear power plants in the United States have failed to 
     repel mock attacks--so-called force-on-force exercises 
     supervised by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The NRC 
     refuses to take enforcement action in response to the 
     failures, and is in the process of weakening the rules of the 
     game in response to industry complaints. The agency even 
     refuses to officially acknowledge the pass-fail nature of the 
     exercises when the mock attackers reach and ``destory'' a 
     complete set of redundant core cooling systems. Perhaps the 
     NRC is right. It's not pass-fail. It's pass-melt.
       NCI's Scientific Director, Edwin Lyman, will have more to 
     say on this subject at this afternoon's technical fixes 
     panel.
       There is a curious historical context to this issue. It 
     goes back to 1913, when H.G. Wells wrote a book entitled The 
     World Set Free. In 1933, the Hungarian physicist, Leo 
     Szilard, was thinking about this book, which he had read the 
     year before, at the historic moment when, as he crossed 
     Southhampton Row in the Bloomsbury section of London, he 
     figured out the nuclear chain reaction. Wells, in this book, 
     depicted a future nuclear war that began after atomic energy 
     had been harnessed for peaceful purposes. But it was warfare 
     that involved not exploding atomic bombs, but machines that 
     spewed forth radiological poisons--the equivalent of a modern 
     reactor meltdown.
       My concern is that sabotage of nuclear power plants may be 
     the greatest domestic vulnerability in the United States 
     today. Many plants are not protected adequately, industry 
     operators seem not prepared to pay the cost of doing so, and 
     the NRC seems ill-disposed to require them to do so. It is 
     not even certain that security of nuclear power plants 
     against attack and sabotage can be assured by conventional, 
     private means. This is a subject worth taking a hard look at.
       It also raises the larger question of the adequacy of 
     nuclear regulation today. It is essential to maintain strong, 
     independent nuclear regulation free of undue industry 
     influence. When I got into this business as a U.S. Senate 
     staffer more than 25 years ago, my first responsibility was 
     to handle the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. This act 
     ``fissioned'' the Atomic Energy Commission into separate 
     regulatory and promotional agencies, and thus transformed a 
     weak regulatory division of the AEC into a strong, 
     independent NRC. As I observe the NRC today, I am concerned 
     that it is looking more and more like the old AEC regulatory 
     division, subject to undue influence by industry and 
     particularly by industry's powerful friends on Capitol Hill. 
     This is also a matter deserving of close scrutiny.
       When I started out, I was very much influenced by the 
     thinking of two leading nuclear contrarians. One was David 
     Lilienthal, who had served as both the first head of the 
     Tennessee Valley Authority and the first chairman of the 
     Atomic Energy Commission. His Congressional testimony in 1976 
     in opposition to U.S. nuclear exports and in support of non-
     proliferation legislation caused a furor among his former 
     colleagues. He once said to me, ``If we assume nuclear 
     proliferation to be inevitable, of course it will be.'' That 
     made a lot of sense to me then, and still does today.
       Ted Taylor, America's most creative fission bomb designer 
     and a member of NCI's Board, also made a concise and 
     compelling point: ``Nuclear is different,'' he said. And to 
     illustrate the point, he noted that the bomb that destroyed 
     Nagasaki set off an instant of explosive energy equivalent to 
     a pile of dynamite as big as the White House that was 
     contained in a sphere of plutonium no bigger than a baseball. 
     That was a first-generation bomb, a technological feat now 
     within the grasp of terrorists or radical states if they 
     manage to get their hands on the material.
       Ultimately it comes down to a test of reasonableness. Is it 
     reasonable to assume, over time, that millions of kilograms 
     of plutonium can be sequestered down to the less

[[Page 7314]]

     than 8 kilograms needed for such a bomb? This question, in my 
     view, must be answered before giving any further comfort to 
     and support of an industry that remains officially committed 
     to utilizing plutonium as a fuel--and surely before 
     supporting an extension and expansion of that industry in 
     response to electricity-supply shortages and global warming.
       I close with a reminder from one of NCI's original Board 
     members, the historian Barbara Tuchman, who in her book of 
     the same title gave a sobering description of the ``march of 
     folly'' that drives nations to destruction. She identified 
     this phenomenon, one repeated throughout recorded history, as 
     ``pervasive persistence in a policy demonstrably unworkable 
     or counterproductive.'' To qualify as folly, she said, it 
     ``must have been perceived as counter-productive in its own 
     time, not merely by hindsight, . . . (and) a feasible 
     alternative course of action must have been available.''




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