[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 3]
[House]
[Pages 3582-3587]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



  MULTIDISTRICT, MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM TRIAL JURISDICTION ACT OF 2001

  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass 
the bill (H.R. 860) to amend title 28, United States Code, to allow a 
judge to whom a case is transferred to retain jurisdiction over certain 
multidistrict litigation cases for trial, and to provide for Federal 
jurisdiction of certain multiparty, multiforum civil actions, as 
amended.
  The Clerk read as follows:

                                H.R. 860

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Multidistrict, Multiparty, 
     Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001''.

     SEC. 2. MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION.

       Section 1407 of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in the third sentence of subsection (a), by inserting 
     ``or ordered transferred to the transferee or other district 
     under subsection (i)'' after ``terminated''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(i)(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and except as provided in 
     subsection (j), any action transferred under this section by 
     the panel may be transferred for trial purposes, by the judge 
     or judges of the transferee district to whom the action was 
     assigned, to the transferee or other district in the interest 
     of justice and for the convenience of the parties and 
     witnesses.
       ``(2) Any action transferred for trial purposes under 
     paragraph (1) shall be remanded by the panel for the 
     determination of compensatory damages to the district court 
     from which it was transferred, unless the court to which the 
     action has been transferred for trial purposes also finds, 
     for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the 
     interests of justice, that the action should be retained for 
     the determination of compensatory damages.''.

     SEC. 3. MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT 
                   COURTS.

       (a) Basis of Jurisdiction.--
       (1) In general.--Chapter 85 of title 28, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 1369. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction

       ``(a) In General.--The district courts shall have original 
     jurisdiction of any civil action involving minimal diversity 
     between adverse parties that arises from a single accident, 
     where at least 25 natural persons have either died or 
     incurred injury in the accident at a discrete location and, 
     in the case of injury, the injury has resulted in damages 
     which exceed $150,000 per person, exclusive of interest and 
     costs, if--
       ``(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part 
     of the accident took place in another State or other 
     location, regardless of whether that defendant is also a 
     resident of the State where a substantial part of the 
     accident took place;
       ``(2) any two defendants reside in different States, 
     regardless of whether such defendants are also residents of 
     the same State or States; or
       ``(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in 
     different States.
       ``(b) Limitation of Jurisdiction of District Courts.--The 
     district court shall abstain from hearing any civil action 
     described in subsection (a) in which--
       ``(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are 
     citizens of a single State of which the primary defendants 
     are also citizens; and
       ``(2) the claims asserted will be governed primarily by the 
     laws of that State.
       ``(c) Special Rules and Definitions.--For purposes of this 
     section--
       ``(1) minimal diversity exists between adverse parties if 
     any party is a citizen of a State and any adverse party is a 
     citizen of another State, a citizen or subject of a foreign 
     state, or a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of 
     this title;
       ``(2) a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of any State, 
     and a citizen or subject of any foreign state, in which it is 
     incorporated or has its principal place of business, and is 
     deemed to be a resident of any State in which it is 
     incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business;
       ``(3) the term `injury' means--
       ``(A) physical harm to a natural person; and
       ``(B) physical damage to or destruction of tangible 
     property, but only if physical harm described in subparagraph 
     (A) exists;
       ``(4) the term `accident' means a sudden accident, or a 
     natural event culminating in an accident, that results in 
     death or injury incurred at a discrete location by at least 
     25 natural persons; and
       ``(5) the term `State' includes the District of Columbia, 
     the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or 
     possession of the United States.
       ``(d) Intervening Parties.--In any action in a district 
     court which is or could have been brought, in whole or in 
     part, under this section, any person with a claim arising 
     from the accident described in subsection (a) shall be 
     permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff in the 
     action, even if that person could not have brought an 
     action in a district court as an original matter.
       ``(e) Notification of Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
     Litigation.--A district court in which an action under this 
     section is pending shall promptly notify the judicial panel 
     on multidistrict litigation of the pendency of the action.''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``1369. Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction.''.

       (b) Venue.--Section 1391 of title 28, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) A civil action in which jurisdiction of the district 
     court is based upon section 1369 of this title may be brought 
     in any district in which any defendant resides or in which a 
     substantial part of the accident giving rise to the action 
     took place.''.
       (c) Multidistrict Litigation.--Section 1407 of title 28, 
     United States Code, as amended by section 2 of this Act, is 
     further amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(j)(1) In actions transferred under this section when 
     jurisdiction is or could have been based, in whole or in 
     part, on section 1369 of this title, the transferee district 
     court may, notwithstanding any other provision of this 
     section, retain actions so transferred for the determination 
     of liability and punitive damages. An action retained for the 
     determination of liability shall be remanded to the district 
     court from which the action was transferred, or to the State 
     court from which the action was removed, for the 
     determination of damages, other than punitive damages, unless 
     the court finds, for the convenience of parties and witnesses 
     and in the interest of justice, that the action should be 
     retained for the determination of damages.
       ``(2) Any remand under paragraph (1) shall not be effective 
     until 60 days after the transferee court has issued an order 
     determining

[[Page 3583]]

     liability and has certified its intention to remand some or 
     all of the transferred actions for the determination of 
     damages. An appeal with respect to the liability 
     determination of the transferee court may be taken during 
     that 60-day period to the court of appeals with appellate 
     jurisdiction over the transferee court. In the event a party 
     files such an appeal, the remand shall not be effective until 
     the appeal has been finally disposed of. Once the remand has 
     become effective, the liability determination shall not be 
     subject to further review by appeal or otherwise.
       ``(3) An appeal with respect to determination of punitive 
     damages by the transferee court may be taken, during the 60-
     day period beginning on the date the order making the 
     determination is issued, to the court of appeals with 
     jurisdiction over the transferee court.
       ``(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand 
     for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by 
     appeal or otherwise.
       ``(5) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the 
     authority of the transferee court to transfer or dismiss an 
     action on the ground of inconvenient forum.''.
       (d) Removal of Actions.--Section 1441 of title 28, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (e) by striking ``(e) The court to which 
     such civil action is removed'' and inserting ``(f) The court 
     to which a civil action is removed under this section''; and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(e)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) 
     of this section, a defendant in a civil action in a State 
     court may remove the action to the district court of the 
     United States for the district and division embracing the 
     place where the action is pending if--
       ``(A) the action could have been brought in a United States 
     district court under section 1369 of this title; or
       ``(B) the defendant is a party to an action which is or 
     could have been brought, in whole or in part, under section 
     1369 in a United States district court and arises from the 
     same accident as the action in State court, even if the 
     action to be removed could not have been brought in a 
     district court as an original matter.

     The removal of an action under this subsection shall be made 
     in accordance with section 1446 of this title, except that a 
     notice of removal may also be filed before trial of the 
     action in State court within 30 days after the date on which 
     the defendant first becomes a party to an action under 
     section 1369 in a United States district court that arises 
     from the same accident as the action in State court, or at a 
     later time with leave of the district court.
       ``(2) Whenever an action is removed under this subsection 
     and the district court to which it is removed or transferred 
     under section 1407(j) has made a liability determination 
     requiring further proceedings as to damages, the district 
     court shall remand the action to the State court from which 
     it had been removed for the determination of damages, unless 
     the court finds that, for the convenience of parties and 
     witnesses and in the interest of justice, the action should 
     be retained for the determination of damages.
       ``(3) Any remand under paragraph (2) shall not be effective 
     until 60 days after the district court has issued an order 
     determining liability and has certified its intention to 
     remand the removed action for the determination of damages. 
     An appeal with respect to the liability determination of the 
     district court may be taken during that 60-day period to the 
     court of appeals with appellate jurisdiction over the 
     district court. In the event a party files such an appeal, 
     the remand shall not be effective until the appeal has been 
     finally disposed of. Once the remand has become effective, 
     the liability determination shall not be subject to further 
     review by appeal or otherwise.
       ``(4) Any decision under this subsection concerning remand 
     for the determination of damages shall not be reviewable by 
     appeal or otherwise.
       ``(5) An action removed under this subsection shall be 
     deemed to be an action under section 1369 and an action in 
     which jurisdiction is based on section 1369 of this title for 
     purposes of this section and sections 1407, 1697, and 1785 of 
     this title.
       ``(6) Nothing in this subsection shall restrict the 
     authority of the district court to transfer or dismiss an 
     action on the ground of inconvenient forum.''.
       (e) Service of Process.--
       (1) Other than subpoenas.--(A) Chapter 113 of title 28, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions

       ``When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in 
     whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, process, 
     other than subpoenas, may be served at any place within the 
     United States, or anywhere outside the United States if 
     otherwise permitted by law.''.
       (B) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 113 
     of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new item:

``1697. Service in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.

       (2) Service of subpoenas.--(A) Chapter 117 of title 28, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions

       ``When the jurisdiction of the district court is based in 
     whole or in part upon section 1369 of this title, a subpoena 
     for attendance at a hearing or trial may, if authorized by 
     the court upon motion for good cause shown, and upon such 
     terms and conditions as the court may impose, be served at 
     any place within the United States, or anywhere outside the 
     United States if otherwise permitted by law.''.
       (B) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 117 
     of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new item:

``1785. Subpoenas in multiparty, multiforum actions.''.

     SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       (a) Section 2.--The amendments made by section 2 shall 
     apply to any civil action pending on or brought on or after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Section 3.--The amendments made by section 3 shall 
     apply to a civil action if the accident giving rise to the 
     cause of action occurred on or after the 90th day after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from 
Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. 
Conyers) each will control 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
Sensenbrenner).
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  As the author of H.R. 860, I am grateful for the opportunity to 
consider it on the floor today. The bill before us has had a long 
legislative life, having been considered in one form or another since 
the 101st Congress in 1991.
  This legislation addresses two important issues in the world of 
complex multidistrict litigation. Section 2 of the bill would reverse 
the effects of the 1998 Supreme Court decision in the so-called Lexecon 
case. It would simply amend the multidistrict litigation statute by 
explicitly allowing a transferee court to retain jurisdiction over 
referred cases for trial for the purpose of determining liability and 
punitive damages or refer them to other districts as it sees fit. In 
fact, section 2 only codifies what had constituted ongoing judicial 
practice for nearly 30 years prior to the Lexecon decision.
  Section 3 addresses a particular species of complex litigation, so-
called disaster cases, such as those involving airline accidents. The 
language set forth in my bill is a revised version of a concept which, 
beginning in the 101st Congress, has been supported by the Department 
of Justice, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, two previous 
Democratic Congresses, and one previous Republican Congress.
  Section 3 will help reduce litigation costs as well as the likelihood 
of forum shopping in single-accident mass tort cases. All plaintiffs in 
these cases would ordinarily be situated identically, making the case 
for consolidation of their actions especially compelling. These types 
of disasters, with their hundreds or thousands of plaintiffs and 
numerous defendants, have the potential to impair the orderly 
administration of justice in Federal courts for an extended period of 
time.
  This committee and the full House unanimously passed the precursor to 
H.R. 860 last term. During eleventh hour negotiations with the other 
body, I offered to make three changes in an effort to generate greater 
support for the bill. As a show of good faith, I have incorporated 
those changes into the bill we are considering today. They consist of 
the following:
  First, a plaintiff must allege at least $150,000 in damages, up from 
$75,000, to file in U.S. district court.
  Second, an exception to the minimum diversity rule is created. A U.S. 
district court may not hear a case in which a substantial majority of 
plaintiffs and the primary defendants are citizens of the same State 
and in which the claims asserted are governed primarily by the laws of 
that same State. In other words, only State courts may hear such cases.
  Third, the choice-of-law section is stricken. Upon further 
reflection, I believe it confers too much discretionary authority on a 
Federal judge to select the relevant law that will apply in a given 
case.

[[Page 3584]]

  In sum, this legislation speaks to process, fairness, and judicial 
efficiency. It will not interfere with jury verdicts or compensation 
rates for litigators. I therefore urge my colleagues to join me in a 
bipartisan effort to support the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum 
Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I rise in support of the bill. I am willing to support the bill as 
described by the gentleman from Wisconsin with the understanding that 
section 3 pertaining to disaster litigation would expand Federal court 
jurisdiction in a very narrowly defined category of cases in order to 
improve the manageability of complex litigation.
  My support of the bill does not in any way serve as a precedent for 
support of broader expansion of diversity jurisdiction that can be 
found in the class action reform bill which I do not support.
  Section 3 of the bill expands Federal court jurisdiction for single 
accidents involving at least 25 people having damages in excess of 
$150,000 per claim and establishes new Federal procedures in these 
narrowly defined cases for selection of venue, service of process and 
issuance of subpoenas. I agree and thank the gentleman from Wisconsin 
for making the kinds of concessions that have made this measure more 
palatable.
  As introduced in the Congress, this bill includes an additional 
safeguard to the limited expansion of Federal court jurisdiction. A 
United States District Court may not hear any case in which a 
``substantial majority'' of plaintiffs and the primary defendants are 
all citizens of the same State and in which the claims asserted are 
governed primarily by the laws of that same State, another provision 
that the gentleman from Wisconsin provided us that we agreed to.

                              {time}  1115

  It is my understanding that under the bill, mass tort injuries that 
involve the same injury over and over again like asbestos cases, breast 
implant cases, would be excluded, and that the type of cases that would 
be included would be plane, train, bus, boat accidents, environmental 
spills, many of which may already be brought in Federal court.
  So while I have traditionally opposed having Federal courts decide 
State tort issues and disfavor the expansion of the jurisdiction of the 
already overloaded district courts, I will support the bill because 
unlike the class-action bill, it only expands Federal court 
jurisdiction in a much narrower class of actions, with the objective of 
judicial expedience.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from North Carolina (Mr. Coble).
  Mr. COBLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time. The distinguished gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) 
and the distinguished gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) have very 
adequately explained this bill, Mr. Speaker, so I will be brief.
  I have endorsed this bill during the preceding two Congresses, and I 
welcome the opportunity to voice my support for it today. I will not 
repeat what has already been said about it; but I would note, Mr. 
Speaker, that the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the 
chairman of the committee, did add three additional features to this 
year's version in an effort to compromise, and I think this good-faith 
gesture ought to be acknowledged.
  I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 860. It will help the 
multidistrict litigation panel discharge its responsibilities and will 
ultimately streamline the adjudication of complex multidistrict cases 
in a manner that is fair to all litigants.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), our ranking member on the 
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, one does not have to be an intellectual to 
be on that subcommittee.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House passage of H.R. 860, the 
Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiplatform Trial Jurisdiction Act of 
2001.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 860 is a narrow bill designed to improve judicial 
efficiency. Last Congress, the House passed a virtually identical bill, 
H.R. 2112, by voice vote under suspension. In three previous 
Congresses, the House-passed bills were comprised of section 3 of H.R. 
860. The bill has two operative sections.
  Section 2 overturns the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1998, Lexecon 
v. Milberg, Weiss. Section 2 will improve judicial efficiency by 
allowing a transferee court to retain a case for purposes of deciding 
liability and punitive damages as well as for hearing pretrial motions. 
Through language I worked out with the chairman of the committee during 
committee consideration of a nearly identical bill last Congress, H.R. 
860 creates a presumption that cases will be sent back to transferee 
courts for the purposes of determining compensatory damages.
  Section 3 of this bill gives the Federal courts minimal diversity 
jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of single accidents involving 
death or injury to at least 25 persons where damages of $150,000 or 
more are claimed by each of those persons. Section 3 applies in very 
narrow, strictly circumscribed circumstances. As such, it is not a 
significant increase of Federal court jurisdiction, and it is justified 
by the judicial efficiencies it will occasion.
  My colleagues should not confuse section 3 with the proposed class-
action legislation which would cause a much greater and, to my way of 
thinking, more troubling increase in Federal court jurisdiction; nor 
should my colleagues see this bill as establishing a precedent in 
support of class-action legislation. Quite to the contrary, support for 
this bill is in no way an exception of support for class-action 
legislation.
  With this understanding about the narrow reach of H.R. 860, I 
encourage my colleagues to vote in support of it.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the chairman and 
the ranking member.
  I am certainly pleased that we have legislation on the floor that 
hopefully creates an opportunity to open the doors of the courthouse to 
plaintiffs and litigants in a manner that is expansive. There are a few 
parts of the legislation I would like to comment on and I think merit 
attention.
  One provision of the bill allows a transferee court in multidistrict 
litigation to retain jurisdiction over all of the consolidated cases 
with the presumption that compensatory damages will be remanded to the 
transfer court. It also expands Federal court jurisdiction by requiring 
only minimal diversity as opposed to complete diversity for mass torts 
arising from a single incident. Lastly, the bill establishes new 
Federal procedures in these narrowly defined cases for the selection of 
venue, service of process, and issuance of subpoenas.
  I am concerned, however, that this bill was marked up by the full 
committee only 2 days after it was introduced and received no 
consideration at the subcommittee level. I am aware, however, that this 
bill has traveled through many Congresses.
  Currently, this bill could impact plaintiffs who file suit in a State 
court, because H.R. 860 could allow for that case to be involuntarily 
sent to a Federal court that may be hundreds of miles from his or her 
home. In this case, there is no reason to force a plaintiff into 
Federal court where the defendant resides or has a place of business in 
a State where the applicable law is the State law.
  I am supportive, however, of the bill's expansion of jurisdiction 
over civil actions arising out of a single accident that resulted in 
death or injury of 25 or more persons, if the damages exceed $150,000 
per claim and minimal diversity exists. While the bill contains a 
number of details, I am reassured

[[Page 3585]]

that this bill would not apply to mass tort injuries that involve the 
same injury over and over again, such as asbestos or breast implants. 
This issue has been of real concern to me, having worked on these 
issues over the last couple of Congresses.
  In this sense, H.R. 860 is a sharp distinction from the Interstate 
Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999. Unlike H.R. 860, the class-
action bills require only minimal diversity for all civil actions 
brought as class actions in Federal court, regardless of the individual 
amounts in controversy, the number of separate incidents or injuries 
that may give rise to a class action or the state-based nature of the 
claim. Rather than providing a reasonable, limited modification to 
diversity jurisdiction, the class action bill, which I strongly oppose, 
represents a radical rewrite of the class-action rules and would ban 
most forms of State class actions. Not the bill today.
  Mr. Speaker, in closing, let me say I know that this legislation is 
not a radical rewrite of existing law. It is my sincere hope that H.R. 
860 will permit a genuine commitment to provide meaningful access to 
the courts as all Americans should have. Access to our courts and 
justice is simply the right thing to happen for everyone in America.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 860, the 
``Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1999.'' I 
supported the legislation in a Judiciary Committee markup last week, 
with a few observations.
  Clearly, consideration of H.R. 860 comes at a time where court 
dockets continue to rise yet pay salaries for federal judges appear 
inadequate to deal with the important questions that confront 
Americans. H.R. 860 is intended to improve the ability of federal 
courts to handle complex multidistrict litigation arising from a common 
set of facts. Last Congress the House passed a virtually identical 
bill, H.R. 2112, by voice vote under suspension of the rules; however, 
it stalled in the Senate.
  There are a few parts of the legislation which merit attention. One 
provision of the bill allows a transferee court in multidistrict 
litigation to retain jurisdiction over all of the consolidated cases 
which the presumption that compensatory damages will be remanded to the 
transferor court. It also expands federal court jurisdiction by 
requiring only minimal diversity (as opposed to complete diversity) for 
mass torts arising from a single incident. Lastly, the bill establishes 
new federal procedures in these narrowly defined cases for the 
selection of venue, service of process and issuance of subpoenas.
  I am concerned, however, that this bill was marked up by the full 
Committee only two days after it was introduced and received no 
consideration at the subcommittee level. Currently this bill could 
impact plaintiffs who file suit in a State court, because H.R. 860 
could allow for that case to be involuntarily sent to a Federal court 
that may be hundreds of miles from his home. In this case, there is no 
reason to force a plaintiff into Federal court where the defendant 
resides or has a place of business in the state and where the 
applicable law is the state law.
  I am supportive however, of the bills expansion of jurisdiction over 
civil actions arising out of a single accident that result in the death 
or injury of 25 or more persons, if the damages exceed $150,000 per 
claim and minimal diversity exists. While the bill contains a number of 
details, I am reassured that this bill would not apply to mass tort 
injuries that involve the same injury over and over again, such as, 
asbestos or breast implants. This issue has been of real concern to me.
  In this sense, H.R. 860 is a sharp distinction from the ``Interstate 
Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999.'' Unlike H.R. 860, the class 
action bill requires only minimal diversity for all civil actions 
brought as class actions in federal court, regardless of the individual 
amounts in controversy, the number of separate incidents or injuries 
that may give rise to a class action, or the state-based nature of the 
claim. Rather than providing a reasonable, limited modification to 
diversity jurisdiction, the class bill--which I strongly oppose--
represents a radical rewrite of the class action rules and would ban 
most forms of state class actions. Such a bill is not before us today.
  Mr. Speaker, I know that this legislation is not a radical rewrite of 
existing law. It is my sincere hope that H.R. 860 will permit a genuine 
commitment to providing meaningful access to our courts. Access to our 
courts is simply essential for every American.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield the remaining time to 
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt).
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, certainly I will not consume 
the remaining time that we have on this side, but I appreciate the 
opportunity to speak and I appreciate the gentleman yielding time to 
me.
  I was one of several people in the committee who actually voted 
against reporting this bill favorably to the floor; and while I am not 
personally planning to ask for a vote on the floor if somebody else 
does not ask for it, if a vote is requested, I intend to vote against 
the bill again.
  I think what has been said up to this point is correct. This bill is 
better in a number of respects than it was when it was originally 
introduced, and I want to applaud the chairman of the full committee 
and others who have worked to improve the bill.
  I do believe, however, that the bill continues to have one blind spot 
in it, and the blind spot could have been addressed if the bill had 
received subcommittee attention or more thorough attention in the full 
committee; and I am hopeful that this blind spot will be addressed if 
this bill moves forward in the process, because I think it is a serious 
blind spot.
  The blind spot really approaches this issue from a different end of 
the spectrum than the bill itself does, because the bill really talks 
about kind of a majority rule in big cases where the majority of the 
plaintiffs in a case can really control where the case is tried.
  The problem with that is that cases by their very nature are 
individual cases, and so this bill leaves us with this kind of 
situation: we have an individual plaintiff who has been injured by a 
defendant who has a residence in the State in which the accident 
occurred. There is no diversity of jurisdiction between that plaintiff 
and that defendant. Yet, if it were a big accident and there were 25 
people injured in the accident, they can take that case and it becomes 
a Federal issue under this bill, whereas if it were a small case, it 
would continue to be the case of the individual plaintiff and the 
plaintiff would have the right to litigate that case either in his own 
State court or in the jurisdiction that the plaintiff chooses to 
litigate the case in.
  Now, for urban communities, this may not have significant 
implications, but there are some States in which the closest Federal 
district court is hundreds of miles away. While this bill does a good 
job of taking into account the convenience of the court and the 
expediency of cases on a gross basis, our courts were not made for the 
gross basis; our courts were made for individual litigants and for the 
convenience of individual litigants. In this rare circumstance where we 
have one plaintiff who is part of a bigger group, a defendant, who is 
resident in the same State as that one defendant, that plaintiff ought 
to be able to litigate that case in his home community, even though 
everybody else is moving to a Federal court, because the underlying 
proposition of our courts is that the courts are for the convenience of 
litigants, not for the convenience of judges or even for judicial 
efficiency. When judicial efficiency comes into conflict with the 
interests of an individual plaintiff or the individual parties in a 
case, the rights of the individual parties in that case should prevail.
  So this is a small thing; it is not a Federal issue. This bill is 
better than it started off with. I am not at odds with anybody on this.

                              {time}  1130

  But I am hopeful that the people in control of this bill, between now 
and the time that it passes into law, can figure out a way, and it 
would be simple to do, I think, by changing one or two words in this 
bill, figure out a way to allow an individual plaintiff in the 
situation that I have described to continue to be able to litigate his 
case in the State courts in the community in which they live, and not 
have to travel miles away and become part of a big class action lawsuit 
that the plaintiff may not want to be associated with in the first 
place.
  So I am hopeful that the spirit in which I am offering this, and I am 
not trying to be adverse to anybody, will be heard, and that somebody 
will try to

[[Page 3586]]

correct this blind spot in the bill before this bill becomes law.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the arguments made by my friend, the 
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Watt), because I think that the 
purpose of this bill is to make the process of adjudicating a common 
disaster lawsuit, such as one arising from a plane crash or a train 
wreck, more convenient to all of the litigants concerned.
  That provides for the consolidation of these cases in a manner that 
has been described for determining liability and punitive damages, but 
not for determining compensatory damages. So overall, it makes the 
system fairer for all litigants, although it might make the system a 
bit inconvenient to some litigants. So I think we have a balancing 
effect here.
  I am just concerned over a common disaster case bringing about a huge 
plethora of lawsuits that would be filed in courts all over the 
country. Given where the plaintiffs would live who were injured or 
killed in the plane crash, or where the airline was located, where the 
crash occurred, or the manufacturer of the plane and its component 
parts were situated, we could have lawsuits on the same disaster going 
on in every court.
  Sooner or later there would be appeals which would be expensive, that 
would have to be consolidated so there would be a single law that would 
be applicable to everybody.
  We can short-circuit that problem by the type of consolidation that 
is being proposed in this bill. The administrative office of the U.S. 
courts and the multidistrict litigation panel of the judicial 
conference of the United States have supported this bill. They do not 
like to see an expansion of Federal jurisdiction, but they see this as 
necessary for the streamlining of the adjudication of these claims.
  Someone said, ``Justice delayed is justice denied.'' Whenever we have 
a complex case like this, there are delays that are in and of the 
nature of the litigation. But I believe that this will speed up the 
final resolution in bringing to closure any litigation that may arise 
as a result of one of these disasters. I would hope that the bill would 
be passed for that reason.
  Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record two letters related to this 
matter.
  The letters referred to are as follows:
                                            Judicial Conference of


                                            the United States,

                                   Washington, DC, March 13, 2001.
     Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
         Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Judicial Conference of 
     the United States, I write to express the support of the 
     federal judiciary for H.R. 860, the ``Multidistrict, 
     Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2001.'' This 
     bill was reported favorably on March 8, 2001, by the 
     Committee you chair. H.R. 860 will facilitate the resolution 
     of claims by citizens and improve the administration of 
     justice.
       Section 2 of the bill amends 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407, the 
     multidistrict litigation statute, to allow a judge with a 
     transferred case to retain it for trial or to transfer it to 
     another district. Presently, section 1407(a) authorizes the 
     Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil 
     actions pending in multiple federal judicial districts with 
     common questions of fact ``to any district for coordinated or 
     consolidated pretrial proceedings.'' It also requires the 
     Judicial Panel to remand any such action to the district 
     court in which the action was filed at or before the 
     conclusion of such pretrial proceedings, unless the action is 
     terminated before then in the transferee court.
       Although the federal courts had for nearly 30 years 
     followed the practice of allowing a transferee court to 
     invoke the venue transfer provision (28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a)) 
     and transfer the case to itself for trial purposes, the 
     Supreme Court in Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes 
     & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), held that statutory authority 
     did not exist for a district judge conducting pretrial 
     proceedings to transfer a case to itself for trial. The Court 
     noted that the proper venue for resolving the desirability of 
     such self-transfer authority is ``the floor of Congress.''
       A proposal to amend section 1407 in response to the Lexecon 
     decision was approved by the Judicial Conference at its 
     September 1998 session and is supported by the Judicial Panel 
     on Multidistrict Litigation. As experience has shown, there 
     is wisdom in permitting the judge who is familiar with the 
     facts and parties and pretrial proceedings of a transferred 
     case to retain the case for trial. Also, as with most federal 
     civil actions, multidistrict litigation cases are typically 
     resolved through settlement. Allowing the transferee judge to 
     set a firm trial date promotes the resolution of these cases.
       Section 3 of H.R. 860 adds a new section 1369 to title 28, 
     United States Code, entitled ``multiparty, multiforum 
     jurisdiction.'' It essentially provides that the United 
     States district courts shall have jurisdiction over any civil 
     action that arises from a single accident or event in which 
     at least 25 persons have died or been injured at a particular 
     location, where any such injuries result in alleged damages 
     exceeding $150,000 by each plaintiff and which involves 
     minimal diversity between adverse parties. The legislation 
     also requires that one defendant must reside in a state that 
     is different from the location of the accident or the 
     residence of any other defendant or that substantial parts of 
     the event took place in different states. The transferee 
     court would be authorized to determine issues of liability 
     and punitive damages and would remand cases to the transferor 
     court for determinations of compensatory damages, unless the 
     court finds, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and 
     in the interest of justice, that the action should be 
     retained for the determination of damages. The district 
     court, however, must abstain from hearing an action under the 
     bill if a substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens 
     of a single state of which the primary defendants are also 
     citizens and the claims asserted will be governed primarily 
     by the laws of that state.
       Upon consideration of related proposals during the 100th 
     Congress, the Judicial Conference in March 1988 approved in 
     principle the creation of federal jurisdiction that would 
     rely on minimal diversity to consolidate multiple litigation 
     in state and federal courts of cases involving personal 
     injury or property damage and arising out of a single event. 
     The Conference endorsed the idea of redirecting diversity 
     jurisdiction to serve a purpose that state courts are not 
     able to serve, namely to facilitate the consolidation of 
     scattered actions arising out of the same accident or event 
     and thereby ``to promote more expeditious and economical 
     disposition of such litigation.''
       Today, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation can 
     transfer to one judge for pretrial proceedings those cases 
     involving common questions of fact that are pending in 
     federal courts throughout the country. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407. 
     Section 3 of H.R. 860 would expand federal jurisdiction by 
     allowing state cases arising from a single event (such as a 
     plane crash or hotel fire) to be brought into such process as 
     a result of filing, removal, or intervention. Section 3 of 
     the bill would avoid multiple trials on common issues, 
     minimize litigation costs, and ensure that litigants are 
     treated consistently and fairly. Thus, this legislation will 
     promote the resolution of litigants' claims in these unique 
     and related cases.
       Thank you for taking prompt action on this important and 
     necessary legislation. If you or your staff have any 
     questions, please contact Mike Blommer, Assistant Director, 
     Office of Legislative Affairs (202-502-1700).
           Sincerely,
                                            Leonidas Ralph Mecham,
     Secretary.
                                  ____

                                                 Judicial Panel on


                                     Multidistrict Litigation,

                                                   March 13, 2001.
     Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
     Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
         Representatives, Rayburn House Office Building, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Judicial Panel on 
     Multidistrict Litigation, I am writing to urge support of 
     H.R. 860, the Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial 
     Jurisdiction Act of 2001. As you know, my predecessor as 
     Chairman of the Panel, Judge John F. Nangle, testified in 
     favor of the previous version of this legislation on June 16, 
     1999, before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
     Property.
       Section 2 of this legislation, to restore the options 
     available to the litigants and the federal judiciary prior to 
     the 1998 Supreme Court Lexecon decision, passed unanimously 
     word-for-word in both the House of Representatives and the 
     Senate in the last Congress. The previous version of Section 
     3 of the legislation, aimed at streamlining adjudication of 
     single accident litigation, has passed the House of 
     Representatives in bipartisan fashion on four prior 
     occasions--twice when the Democrats were in the majority in 
     the 101st and 102nd Congresses, and twice when the 
     Republicans were in the majority in the 105th and 106th 
     Congresses.
       Surely the time has come to enact this clearly beneficial 
     legislation for the reasons stated in Judge Nangle's 
     testimony. Your continued leadership in this area is highly 
     valued and appreciated.
           Sincerely,
                                               Wm. Terrell Hodges,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from California (Mr. Berman).

[[Page 3587]]


  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman from California 
1 minute.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Shimkus). The gentleman from California 
(Mr. Berman) is recognized for 6 minutes.
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the ranking member and the gentleman 
from Wisconsin for their generous yielding of time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I just want to make a few comments in response to the 
gentleman from North Carolina, because he makes legitimate and accurate 
points about this legislation. But in response, I would make a few 
points.
  Mr. Speaker, concerning H.R. 860, the circumstances which this bill 
applies to are so narrow and unique, and because so many civil actions 
which arise out of a single action are already subject to Federal 
jurisdiction, there really are in a practical sense very few plaintiffs 
who will find themselves in a Federal court who would not have already 
been there.
  But even if they do, this bill has protection, because the bill 
preserves the ability of the transferee court, the Federal court to 
which this multi-party litigation has been assigned, it preserves the 
ability of that court to transfer back or dismiss an action on the 
ground of an inconvenient forum.
  So that plaintiff has the ability to make his case that even though 
it is a result of that single accident, even though I am alleging 
$150,000, in my particular situation, notwithstanding the efficiencies 
that would justify a single trial, for purposes of liability and other 
issues, we should go back to the State court.
  The gentleman from North Carolina says, but he has to get to that 
court in order to make that request. That is true.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman 
yielding. I appreciate him taking seriously the comments that I am 
making.
  I would just point out to him two things. Yes, this bill will make 
the system more efficient, but from 22 years of the practice of law, I 
will tell the gentleman that every single case is a unique case for the 
parties in that case.
  So when we say that this applies only to a small number of cases, the 
gentleman is absolutely right. I do not argue that. But for that 
individual plaintiff who is coming into court, we ought to make the 
courts as conveniently available to that one individual as we can.
  The gentleman says that this person can show up in the Federal court, 
make a motion to move it back, but here he is sitting there with 16 
other plaintiffs who say, Please do not move this case. All I am saying 
is, that person ought to be allowed to go and litigate their case in a 
forum that is convenient to them, not have their case and the placement 
of it decided on the basis of some majority rule theory.
  I understand efficiency of the court. I understand why the Judicial 
Conference would favor this. But in the interest of individual 
plaintiffs, I think it is important to have another exception in this 
bill, and it would be used so infrequently that it would not be an 
imposition. It could be done very easily in the context of this bill.
  Mr. BERMAN. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, this is not just about 
efficiency. This is also about convenience of the parties.
  We had a horrible accident recently with a private plane taking the 
Oklahoma State basketball team. That may not be applicable, because 
this requires 25 people. But think of a similar situation where a huge 
number of those passengers are from one State. The defendant is from 
some other State.
  This allows the multi-party committee, the panel that decides these 
multi-district multi-party cases where they should be tried, to 
consider the convenience of the plaintiffs in this kind of a case, not 
simply the question of efficiency. So there are some real positive 
benefits from this legislation, as well.
  Moreover, on the issue of damages, which can be particularly a matter 
to be determined by local communities and peers in the community where 
that plaintiff resides, this creates the presumption that that issue, 
the compensatory damages issue, will go back, in the case of the 
hypothetical that you cited, to the State court for determination.
  Yes, the bill will cause some plaintiffs to find themselves in 
Federal court, while without the bill those plaintiffs would have been 
able to remain in State courts. I think there are several policy 
considerations. I have mentioned them. As the chairman said earlier, we 
have to draw a balance. Having the very complicated and complex issue 
of liability tried in one place makes sense.
  As we balance these things, Mr. Speaker, I come down on the side of 
having the complicated, expensive, and controversial issue litigated in 
one court.
  And I might just add in the remaining seconds I have that from what I 
understand from plaintiff's attorneys involved in these accident cases 
and other cases like this that this bill addresses, that the problem 
is, sometimes that guy who wants to file in the State court, the lawyer 
who wants to file in the State court because it is an in-State 
defendant, he really wants to be the free rider in this. He wants the 
whole thing tried and all the discovery, all that done by others. Then, 
after that issue is settled, he will come in with a State action, not 
having put up his share of the costs and his efforts, and cash in. I am 
told that is one aspect of why some plaintiff's lawyers, no one in this 
room, I am sure, would actually prefer to file in the State court.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I 
yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, 
and I yield back the balance of my time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the 
gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) that the House suspend the 
rules and pass the bill, H.R. 860, as amended.
  The question was taken; and (two-thirds having voted in favor 
thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________