[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 27784-27786]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



  BANKRUPTCY OF AMERICAN CLASSIC VOYAGES AND THE FAILURE OF ``PROJECT 
                               AMERICA''

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President I want to bring to the attention of may 
colleagues a short article that appeared in Sunday's New York Times 
that points out just how awry a project based on pork barrel politics 
can go. The article, title ``A Venture in Ships Is a Rare Zell Flop,'' 
gives a short chronicle of the rise and fall of American Classic 
Voyages (AMCV), its largest shareholder, and the government support for 
American Classic Voyages that has now left the taxpayers holding the 
proverbial bag for a whopping $366.9 million in defaults on title XI 
maritime loan guarantees.
  On October 19, 2001, American Classic Voyages (AMCV) voluntarily 
filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. The petition lists total assets of $37.4 million and 
total liabilities of $452.8 million. The cruise line's reorganization 
petition indicated it has more than 1,000 creditors, including the 
Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation in this 
case, means the American taxpayer whose exposure on a total of six 
title XI maritime loan guarantees made to AMCV totals $366,897,000. The 
loans cover five vessels that were in service in Hawaii, the East 
Coast, and the Northwest Coast and the partially completed ``Project 
America'' vessel at Northrup Grumman's Ingalls Shipbuildings in 
Pascagoula, Mississippi.
  In order for my colleagues to fully understand what this article in 
the business section of the New York Times represents, we really need 
to look back at the brief history of the American Classic Voyages rise 
and the political push for AMCV's ``Project America.'' The ``Project 
America'' initiative included building two 1,900 passenger cruise ships 
that were to enter service in Hawaii in 2004 and 2005. These were to be 
the largest cruise ships ever built in the United States. To help push 
the program, the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), in the face of 
strong political support for the project, approved a $1.1 billion title 
XI loan guarantee for the construction of these two vessels on April 8, 
1999.
  The New York Times article reports just how that political pressure 
was felt at MARAD when it quotes a former top MARAD official who 
insisted on anonymity saying. ``We were supported

[[Page 27785]]

to be promoting shipbuilding.'' ``The maritime trade unions wanted 
jobs. So there was a lot of political support.''
  ``Project America'' did indeed receive considerable political support 
over the last several years as noted further in the New York Times 
article: ``In 1996 and 1997, American Classic executives met with 
members of Congress, labor leaders and shipyard owners in an all our 
effort to promote the project in Washington.'' My colleagues may recall 
that this promotion paid off in the form of political support which 
translated into language being included in the Fiscal Year 1998 
Department of Defense Appropriation Bill granting a legal monopoly for 
American Classic Voyages to operate as the only U.S.-flagged operator 
among the Hawaiian islands.
  My colleagues may recall that I questioned the merits of the 
``Project America'' at the time the special legislation was considered 
and went as far as to introduce an amendment to the fiscal year 1998 
Department of Defense appropriations bill to remove the monopoly 
language. Based on the information available at the time, I believed 
then that the project was more likely to fail than to succeed and I 
called the monopoly language, and I quote an ``egregious example of 
porkbarrel spending,'' and asked ``How many times has the U.S. Senate 
so blatantly set up a monopoly set-aside for any individual or 
business?'' I would ask now, how many times will we do this in the 
future?
  There were early warnings signs that something was going seriously 
wrong with the project. During the first year of construction, 
``Project America'' fell a year to a year-and-one-half behind schedule. 
Both American Classic Voyages and Ingalls Shipbuilding were crying foul 
over construction problems and months of non-binding mediation over 
contract disputes led to no resolution. Accusations of default came 
from both sides. However, on September 21 of this year a resolution was 
announced. Yet, here we are three months later and it is still unclear 
who was at fault as both sides have refused to discuss the dispute. 
This is important since, the settlement agreement between Ingalls and 
AMCV, which was reviewed and agreed to by the U.S. Maritime 
Administration, kept the American taxpayer holding all the risk.
  To highlight just how critical the problems with Project America were 
at the time this agreement was reached, I want to read from a two-page 
summary on the status of the project at that time that a lobbyist 
representing American Classic Voyages inadvertently faxed to my office. 
It highlights the lagging construction schedule, the claims for 
additional payments by Ingalls, and the problems of dealing with a yard 
used to doing work under the typically higher-cost DOD procurement 
standards.
  One statement in the summary hints at AMCV's recognition that a 
shipyard accustomed to dealing with the U.S. Navy was ill-prepared for 
the commercial project, is very telling of how the customer views the 
shipyard's ability to meet the demands of commercial work. The faxed 
summary reads, ``For U.S. shipyards to succeed in commercial 
construction, they must use commercial procedures to maintain costs and 
ensure timely delivery schedules. Cost increases and schedule delays 
have significant impact on commercial customers--increased capital 
costs, higher marketing costs, lost revenue from employment of the 
vessel, and market uncertainties.''
  In March 1999, the contract for Project America was signed with great 
fanfare in the rotunda of this very building and now we have one of the 
signatories calling into question the shipyard's ability to succeed at 
commercial ship construction. If a customer of the shipyard is 
questioning Ingalls Shipbuilding's ability to meet its obligations, 
shouldn't MARAD also have raised this question before it approved the 
settlement agreement that allowed for the continuation of the project?
  We all know the answer now.
  In signing off on the Settlement Agreement between AMCV and Northrop 
Grumman's Ingalls Shipbuilding, MARAD, on behalf of the taxpayer, 
agreed to assume the outstanding Title XI debt of $185 million on the 
first of the two cruise ships under construction at Ingalls in the 
event of an AMCV bankruptcy and complete the vessel, after the issue of 
the remaining Title XI debt of $350 million. Fortunately, AMCV filed 
bankruptcy before the remaining debt was issued. Otherwise, MARAD would 
have been legally obligated to complete the vessel at an additional 
loss to the taxpayers.
  On October 29, MARAD formally announced that it was not legally 
required to fully fund the construction of the first ship at Ingalls 
Shipbuilding. However, in a sign of just how deep the political support 
of AMCV is, and despite the overwhelming evidence that the project was 
in serious trouble and was unlikely ever to be completed, 14 members of 
Congress signed a letter urging Secretary Mineta to reconsider and move 
to complete construction of the Project America vessel. This would 
involve an additional $350 million in Title XI loan guarantees and the 
vessel, upon completion, would be sold by MARAD.
  It is important to note, that with more than 80,000 new cruise ship 
berths coming on line in the next four years, MARAD expects that the 
vessel would sell for $150 to $200 million less than it would cost the 
American taxpayer to build.
  This week, MARAD will pay out $267.4 million in the first of several 
payments to be made to American Classic Voyages' creditors. The 
remaining $105.7 million will be paid off in the next 30 days as 
required waiting periods expire. I note for my colleagues this totals 
$366.7 million of the American taxpayers' money. And what do we have to 
show them for these expenditures? A growing U.S.-flagged cruise ship 
fleet? NO. A growing and competitive U.S. shipbuilding industry? NO. 
More U.S. mariner jobs at sea? NO.
  As a matter of act we have just the opposite. We have a smaller U.S.-
flagged cruise ship fleet, struggling shipyards, and fewer mariners at 
sea than ever before. As I have said many times before, we owe it to 
the taxpayer to do better and make wiser decisions.
  AMCV is but one example to Title XI loan guarantee defaults. The 
Title XI maritime loan guarantee program has experienced many problems 
and suffered financial difficulties throughout its history. Since the 
beginning of this year, the program has cost taxpayers more than $339.1 
million due to defaults.
  Let me provide some background for the record: Title XI of the 
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation 
to make loan guarantees to finance the construction, reconstruction, or 
reconditioning of eligible export vessels and the modernization and 
improvement of shipyards. Under regulations governing the Title XI loan 
guarantee process, applicants must meet certain economic soundness 
criteria before receiving a commitment from MARAD. Even with controls 
in place, loan defaults during the 1980's reached into the billions of 
dollars and the program was halted. In 1986, the worst year on record, 
defaults in pay-outs of $1.2 billion.
  The title XI program was revived in 1993 following the enactment of 
the Federal Credit Reform Act and the National Shipbuilding and 
Shipyard Conversion Act. According to figures recently provided by 
MARAD, the title XI program has cost taxpayers $400 million in default 
payments since 1993. Of that cost, MARAD has been able to recover 
roughly 10 percent or $40 million through the disposition of assets.
  Currently, the title XI program has an outstanding loan guarantee 
portfolio of approximately $4.7 billion consisting of 86 projects 
covering more than 100 vessels, several hundred barges, and 7 shipyard 
modernization projects. What that means is the American taxpayer could, 
as happened in the 1980's, be burdened with billions of dollars in debt 
if an industry downturn occurs. With that much at risk, I think we owe 
it to the American taxpayers to do all we can to ensure that adequate 
protections are in place.
  Our Nation has had a strong and proud maritime history. I fear our 
maritime future, in the U.S. however, is

[[Page 27786]]

jeopardized due to a dependence on government programs that do not 
foster a progressive and competitive attitude in what has clearly 
become a global market. This is especially true of our larger 
shipyards.
  According to MARAD, the purpose of the title XI program is to promote 
the growth and modernization of the U.S. merchant marine and U.S. 
shipyards. Yet, there is little if any evidence that either has 
occurred. Since 1993, when the title XI program was resurrected 
following the heavy loan losses in the 1980s, the program has cost 
taxpayers $400 million in default pay-outs and an additional $296.4 
million in appropriated funds as required by the Federal Credit Reform 
Act.
  Over the same period, the number of vessels in our oceangoing fleet 
shrank considerably. The number of bulk carriers in the U.S. merchant 
fleet dropped from 81 to 71, the number of container ships dropped from 
85 to 75, and the number of tankers dropped from 205 to 154.
  If the tale of AMCV's losses is not enough to stop pork barrel 
spending on pet projects that unfairly put taxpayers' dollars at risk, 
the figures on the U.S. fleet size should clearly show us that a 
program that artifically props up a U.S. shipbuilding industry that is 
struggling to find its way in a tough world market is not working.
  I am sure my colleagues know I oppose any program that unnecessarily 
burdens American taxpayers and subsidizes industry. But, I am not alone 
in this view. I encourage my colleagues to look at the Administrations' 
FY 2002 budget request and its ``Explanation of Program Changes'' for 
Title XI Loan Guarantee Program. It states, ``In an effort to trim 
corporate subsidies, the President's Budget seeks no new funding for 
the Maritime Guaranteed Loan Subsidy Program.''
  I wrote to President Bush in June to express my support for his 
proposal to zero-out the title XI program. In a response to my letter 
prepared for the President by Mitchell Daniels, Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget, Mr. Daniels stated: ``The Administration 
concurs with your view that the Maritime Administration's Maritime 
Guaranteed Loan Program constitutes an unwarranted corporate subsidy.''
  The problems with AMCV's loan guarantees raise serious questions that 
should be answered before we allow additional taxpayer funding to be 
committed in the form of loan guarantees. I have written to the 
Department of Transportation Inspector General (IG), Kenneth Mead, 
twice this year requesting his office look into Title XI loan guarantee 
defaults, including American Classic Voyages, and MARAD's oversight of 
the title XI program.
  I understand that the Inspector General has directed such 
investigations to get underway. I hope he will be able to determine if 
MARAD has acted appropriately to protect the taxpayer in these matters. 
We need to learn if Ingalls, Northrop Grumman, and American Classic 
voyages fully and accurately presented the difficulties they faced in 
building Project America to MARAD while seeking to both secure and 
restructure the title XI loan guarantee for this project.
  I want to close by making one last point on the New York Times 
article. It quotes AMCV's largest investor saying, ``Everyone talks 
about taxpayers' losses. But they never mention the fact that others 
lost significant amounts of money as well.'' That may be true; however, 
unlike investors who chose to put their money at risk on American 
Classic Voyages, the American taxpayer did not have a choice. They 
depend on us to do the right thing, but instead they have been saddled 
with an expenditure $366.7 million. I don't personally know all of 
AMCV's investors, but I would be willing to bet they won't make this 
same mistake again. The question then becomes ``will we?''
  I ask unanimous consent to print the New York Times article in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, Dec. 16, 2001]

                 A Venture in Ships Is a Rare Zell Flop

                           (By Leslie Wayne)

       Sam Zell may have the Midas touch when it comes to 
     investing in real estate. But his efforts on the high seas--
     with cruise ships--have ended in a debacle that has cost him 
     over $100 million and taxpayers at least three times that.
       Mr. Zell is the chairman and largest shareholder of 
     American Classic Voyages, which filed for bankruptcy 
     protection in October. This came after the failure of an 
     ambitious project by Mr. Zell to build two 1,900-passenger 
     cruise ships, the first that were to be constructed in this 
     country in 40 years. It also came despite a boatload of 
     government aid to Mr. Zell, including $1.08 billion in 
     federal loan guarantees. When it came to playing the 
     Washington game, Mr. Zell walked away a big winner in the 
     mid-1990's. His cruise ship plan--called Project America--
     wrapped up patriotism and politics and allowed him to 
     construct his two huge ships by putting government money, not 
     his, at risk. He also secured a 30-year monopoly on all 
     cruise-ship traffic within the Hawaiian islands.
       Helping him get this sweet deal were Senator Trent Lott, 
     the Republican minority leader, who wanted to land a big 
     project for the Ingalls shipyard in his home state of 
     Mississippi, and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, the Hawaii 
     Democrat, who engineered the exclusivity pact. Mr. Zell's 
     ships, American-made and with American crews, would be the 
     only ones allowed to sail port-to-port within Hawaii; others 
     must stop at foreign ports first, eating up time.
       ``Obviously, I lost a lot of money,'' Mr. Zell said. 
     ``Everyone talks about the taxpayer losses. But they never 
     mention the fact that others lost significant amounts of 
     money as well. Shareholders lost a lot of money, and that's 
     very unfortunate.''
       Last year, with American Classic shares trading at $36, Mr. 
     Zell's 3.8 million shares were worth $137 million. This fall, 
     the shores were delisted from Nasdaq when they were trading 
     at 45 cents, chopping Mr. Zell's stake to $1.7 million. The 
     government, meanwhile, is looking at losses of $367 million 
     from American Classic, which also operates four paddlewheel 
     steamboats through its Delta Queen Steamboat subsidiary.
       The failure has incurred the wrath of Senator John McCain, 
     Republican of Arizona, who called for an investigation, which 
     the inspector general of the Transportation Department has 
     undertaken.
       Rob Freeman, a staff member of the Senate Commerce 
     Committee, where Mr. McCain is the ranking Republican, said: 
     ``It was a bad idea. The taxpayer took all the risk.''
       Mr. Zell got such government largess by being the right 
     person in the right place when the United States Maritime 
     Administration wanted to revive the domestic shipbuilding 
     industry, which had been beaten down by lower-cost foreign 
     competitors. Without aid, American Classic executives say, 
     their project would never have gotten off the ground.
       ``We were supposed to be promoting shipbuilding,'' said a 
     former top Maritime Administration official, who insisted on 
     anonymity. ``Inouye and the whole state wanted to grow the 
     cruise business. The maritime trade unions wanted jobs. So 
     there was a lot of political support.''
       Mr. Zell never lobbied the administration directly; his top 
     executives did. In 1996 and 1997, American Classic executives 
     met with members of Congress, labor leaders and shipyard 
     owners in an all-out effort to promote the project in 
     Washington. That effort was backed by campaign contributions 
     from Mr. Zell and American Classic to Mr. Lott, Mr. Inouye 
     and other crucial members of Congress.
       It paid off. The $1.08 billion loan guarantee was the 
     largest the Maritime Administration had ever approved, and it 
     allowed American Classic to enter debt markets that would 
     otherwise be closed to it--and at rates comparable to 
     government debt. American Classic was also allowed to buy an 
     old foreign-made ship and use it for Hawaii cruises while the 
     two new ship were under construction, giving the company an 
     exemption from a law prohibiting foreign carriers from that 
     route.
       But the souring economic picture of 2001 halted these 
     ambitions. By last summer, the company had cash-flow 
     problems, and the downturn in tourism after the terrorist 
     attacks pushed it over the edge. ``Sept. 11 just put it 
     away,'' Mr. Zell said. http://www.nytimes.com

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