[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 20]
[Senate]
[Pages 27733-27746]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                 PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY ACT OF 2001

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, under the unanimous consent agreement, 
can we turn to S. 1214 and ask the clerk to report?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.

       A bill (S. 1214) to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 
     to establish programs to ensure greater security for U.S. 
     Seaports, and for other purposes.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
South Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. In my 5 minutes, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona, my ranking member--this is really a bipartisan initiative--
Senator Graham of Florida who has been a leader in this regard and also 
Senator Hutchison of Texas.
  I also thank the distinguished director of the Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation Committee, Mr. Kevin Kayes; Mr. Carl Bentzel, the expert 
on port security who has been working on this over the past several 
years; and Mr. Matthew Morrissey.
  We actually reported the bill before September 11 of this year. We 
have been working diligently to take care of the concerns on both sides 
of the aisle and both sides of the Capitol. We think this measure can 
pass expeditiously, as soon as the House returns.
  Following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, we have worked hard to 
improve the security of America's transportation system, starting with 
the airline security bill just signed into law. However, protecting 
America from terrorist threats is only as effective as the weakest line 
of defense. That means every mode of transportation must be secured, 
including maritime transportation.
  The United States has more than 1,000 harbor channels and 25,000 
miles of inland, intracoastal, and coastal waterways. Those waterways 
serve 361 ports and have more than 3,700 terminals handling passengers 
and cargo. The U.S. marine transportation system each year moves more 
than 2 billion tons of domestic and international freight, imports 3 
billion tons of oil, transports 134 million passengers by ferry, and 
hosts more than 7 million cruise ship passengers. Of the more than 2 
billion tons of freight, the majority of cargo is shipped in huge 
containers from ships directly onto trucks and railcars that 
immediately head onto our highways and rail systems. However less than 
2 percent of those containers are ever checked by Customs or law 
enforcement officials. The volume of maritime trade is expected to more 
than double by the year 2020, making maritime security even more 
important for the future. This is a gaping hole in our national 
security that must be fixed--and it must be fixed before enemies of the 
United States try to exploit our weakness.
  Before discussing the specifics of our bill, I want to read an 
excerpt from a chilling story published October 8 in the The Times of 
London:

       Intelligence agencies across the world are examining Osama 
     bin Laden's multimillion [dollar] shipping interests. He 
     maintains a secret fleet, under a variety of flags of 
     convenience, allowing him to hide his ownership and transport 
     goods, arms, drugs, and recruits with little official 
     scrutiny.
       Three years ago, nobody paid much attention to a crew 
     unloading cargo from a rusting freighter tied up on the 
     quayside in Mombasa, Kenya. The freighter was part of Osama 
     bin Laden's merchant fleet and the crew were delivering 
     supplies for the team of suicide bombers who weeks later 
     would blow up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin 
     Laden's covert shipping interests were revealed at the trial 
     of the bombers, but until now security services have been 
     slow to track down how many vessels he operates.

  Lloyd's List International reported that a NATO country's 
intelligence service has identified more than 20 merchant vessels 
believed to be linked to Osama bin Laden. Those vessels are now subject 
to seizure in ports all over the world. Some of the vessels are thought 
to be owned outright by bin Laden's business interests, while others 
are on long-term charter.
  Several weeks ago, a suspected member of the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network was arrested in Italy after he tried to stow-away in a shipping 
container heading to Toronto. The container was furnished with a bed, a 
toilet, and its own power source to operate the heater and recharge 
batteries. According to the Toronto Sun, the man also had a global 
satellite telephone, a laptop computer, an airline mechanics 
certificate, and security passes for airports in Canada, Thailand and 
Egypt.
  These two stories really bring home this issue of seaport security. 
Except for those of us who live in port cities like Charleston, 
Americans often do not think about their ports--the ports that load 
industrial and consumer goods onto trucks and railroad cars heading 
directly to their hometowns. Therefore, security provided through our 
seaports ultimately affects landlocked communities in the heartland of 
the United States. Of the cargo imported and exported into the United 
States, 95 percent arrives through our seaports; the balance is shipped 
through land and air borders. The potential damage and destruction that 
can be accomplished through security holes at our seaports potentially 
exceeds any other mode of transportation. And yet we have failed to 
make seaport security a priority.
  Many of our busiest seaports are not only near large cities, they are 
in the core of cities like Charleston, Boston, Miami, and Seattle. 
These seaports have been the historic hubs of economic growth, and, in 
some cases, they have existed for close to four centuries. By 
comparison, our rail infrastructure is 150 years old and most of our 
aviation infrastructure is less than 60 years old. The port areas in 
many cities have become increasingly attractive places to live because 
many people want a view of the water, and to live near the coast. So we 
are facing a major problem: the number of people who want to live close 
to the waterfront is growing rapidly, but the open nature of our 
seaports exposes them to risks associated with maritime trade, 
including the transport of hazardous materials.
  Most Americans would be surprised to discover there is no unified 
federal plan for overseeing the security of the international borders 
at our seaports. And that's what seaports are: international borders 
that must be protected as well as our land borders with Canada and 
Mexico. Yet we have failed to make them secure. The U.S. Coast Guard 
and Customs Service are doing an outstanding job, but they are 
outgunned. In the year 2000, we imported 5.5 million trailer truckloads 
of cargo. Due to that volume, seaports, according to the Customs 
Service, are only able to inspect between 1 to 2 percent of containers. 
In other words, potential terrorists and drug smugglers

[[Page 27734]]

have a 98 percent chance of randomly importing illegal and dangerous 
materials.
  When traveling by airplane, we walk through metal detectors, our 
luggage is X-rayed, and Customs officials may interview us and check 
our bags. The inspection rate is 100 percent. At our land border 
crossings, every single car and truck driver is stopped and 
interviewed, or at least reviewed by the federal government. Again, the 
inspection rate is 100 percent. However, at a U.S. seaport, a person 
has a 98 percent chance of importing a 48-foot truckload of cargo with 
no inspection at all. One marine container can carry more heroin than 
is used in the United States in one year. Some of these containers can 
carry as much as 30 tons, or 60,000 pounds of cargo. A medium sized 
tanker can carry as much as 32 million gallons of petroleum or 
hazardous materials. Nearly one-quarter of all hazardous materials are 
moved via water, most of it in bulk form via huge tankers. These 
shipments of oil or hazardous materials--most of them carried by 
foreign vessels--are especially dangerous targets for terrorists. 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, we must take action to 
better secure our maritime borders.
  The Congress recently approved a new law that spends $3.2 billion to 
improve security at our airports. The highway reauthorization bill--
TEA-21 passed in 1998--directed $140 million a year for five years to 
improve roads and security infrastructure at our land borders. We 
annually fund the Border Patrol to guard against illegal entry at our 
land borders. At U.S. seaports, the federal government provides 
officers from the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service--but the federal government 
invests nothing in security infrastructure at our seaports. We leave 
that up to the state-controlled port authorities and private marine 
terminal operators. Thus, we have essentially abrogated the federal 
responsibility of our international seaport borders to states and the 
private sector.
  Like airline security, seaport and international border security is 
one of the prime responsibilities of the federal government. We must 
meet the challenge head-on with enough resources to address these 
serious issues of national security, and to help our partners at the 
state and local levels protect their own communities. While these 
security holes at our seaports may be less obvious to the public, they 
do exist. Because of the magnitudes of the cargoes, the proximity of 
cargo delivery to large populations, and the transportability that 
water confers to certain hazardous materials or oil, seaports lacking 
adequate security are more vulnerable to attack and sabotage than our 
airports or land borders.
  A couple years ago, Senator Bob Graham convinced President Clinton to 
appoint a commission to look at seaport security. At the time, the main 
focus of port security was stopping illegal drugs, the smuggling of 
people, and cargo theft. While those problems still exist, the new--and 
very real--threat of terrorism strikes right at the heart of our 
national defense.
  The Interagency Commission on Crime and Security at U.S. Seaports 
issued a report in September 2000 that said security at U.S. seaports 
``ranges from poor to fair.'' Let me repeat that: 17 federal agencies 
reviewed our port security system and found that it is in poor shape.
  According to the Commission:

       Control of access to the seaport or sensitive areas within 
     the seaports is often lacking. Practices to restrict or 
     control the access of vehicles to vessels, cargo receipt and 
     delivery operations, and passenger processing operations at 
     seaports are either not present or not consistently enforced, 
     increasing the risk that violators could quickly remove cargo 
     or contraband. Many ports do not have identification cards 
     issued to personnel to restrict access to vehicles, cargo 
     receipt and delivery operations, and passenger processing 
     operations.
       At many seaports, the carrying of firearms is not 
     restricted, and thus internal conspirators and other 
     criminals are allowed armed access to cargo vessels and 
     cruise line terminals. In addition, many seaports rely on 
     private security personnel who lack the crime prevention and 
     law enforcement training and capability of regular police 
     officers.

  The report also found that port-related businesses did not know where 
to report cargo theft and other crimes, and that federal, state and 
local law enforcement agencies responsible for a port's security rarely 
meet to coordinate their work.
  That is what our legislation does--it creates mechanisms to integrate 
all these different security agencies and their security efforts at our 
seaports and the railways and highways that converge at our seaports. 
Our seaport security bill also directly funds more Customs officers, 
more screening equipment, and the building of important security 
infrastructure.
  Each agency is good at what they do individually. But they will be 
even stronger working together, sharing information and tactics, and 
coordinating security coverage at our seaports. More teamwork between 
these federal, state and local agencies--along with our security 
partners in the private sector--will produce a more secure seaport 
environment that is stronger than the sum of each agency's individual 
efforts.
  S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, requires the 
Secretary of Transportation to chair a National Maritime Security 
Advisory Committee. The Secretary is required to request participation 
of the U.S. Customs Service and invite the participation of other 
federal agencies with an interest in crime or threats of terrorism at 
U.S. seaports. The bill also authorizes the establishment of 
subcommittees, including a subcommittee comprised of Federal, State, 
and local government law enforcement agencies to address port security 
issues, and law enforcement-sensitive matters.
  The Committee is required to advise on long-term solutions for 
maritime and port security; coordination of information-sharing and 
operations among federal, state and local governments, and area and 
local port and harbor security committees; conditions for maritime 
security loan guarantees and grants; and the development of a National 
Maritime Security Plan. Given the varied nature and geographical 
structure of our port system, it will be important to consider private 
sector input. A one-size-fits-all approach will not work because we are 
looking at a wide variety of waterside facilities and maritime 
transportation-related infrastructure.
  The bill will mandate, for the first time ever, that all ports and 
waterfront facilities have a comprehensive security plan approved by 
the Secretary of Transportation. An element of port security often 
overlooked are the intermodal means for transporting cargo from the 
ships: railroads, highways, and barges. The bill requires that all the 
modes of transportation converging at the port be covered by a port's 
security plan. To make the entire waterfront environment more secure, 
any facility that might pose a threat to the public must tender 
security plans to the Coast Guard for review and approval.
  However, we will do more than just mandate security plans. We will 
have security experts to assess waterfront and port security, and 
provide those assessments to the individuals in charge of making 
security plans. Assessment information will be invaluable in helping 
the industry use the best information in order to complete effective 
security plans. The bill requires the Secretary to incorporate existing 
programs and practices when reviewing and approving security plans. The 
Department of Transportation will have to take into account the 
different security practices of our different ports. The Department 
must recognize and harmonize existing security practices to avoid 
duplicating costs. However, recognition of existing practices should 
not require the Department to endorse or approve faulty security.
  At the seaport level, the bill will establish local port security 
committees at each U.S. seaport. The section would require membership 
of these committees to include representatives of the port authority, 
labor organizations, the private sector, and Federal, State, and local 
governments and law enforcement. The Committees would be chaired by the 
Coast Guard Captain of

[[Page 27735]]

the Port, and meet 4 times per year. The Committees would be 
responsible for coordinating planning and other port security 
activities; making recommendations for the port security evaluations; 
annually reviewing security plans; and conducting a field security 
exercise at least once every 3 years. These committees will play a 
vital role--day to day and month to month--coordinating the actions of 
law enforcement and the private sector in combating threats of 
terrorism and crime.
  The bill requires the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination 
with the Director of the FBI, ensure that all area maritime counter-
terrorism and incident contingency plans are reviewed, revised, and 
updated no less than once every three years. The Secretary shall ensure 
that local port security committees conduct annual simulation exercises 
for all such plans, and actual practice drills at least once every 
three years. The plans should be comprehensive and address terrorist 
threats to waterfront facilities and adjacent areas, and also cover 
elements of prevention and protection as well as response. I would hope 
that the Secretary would take steps to ensure that area maritime 
counter-terrorism and incident contingency plans are coordinated with 
security plans.
  The bill creates standards and procedures for training and certifying 
maritime security professionals. The bill requires the Secretary of 
Transportation and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, 
``FLETC,'' to establish a Maritime Security Institute for training 
security personnel, in accordance with internationally recognized law 
enforcement standards. I look forward to working with the Department of 
Transportation and the FLETC to establish an Institute to strengthen 
and professionalize maritime law enforcement and security forces. I 
have worked with FLETC to establish a facility in Charleston, South 
Carolina to train Border Patrol personnel. I also look forward to 
working with the Secretary and FLETC to establish the Maritime Law 
Institute.
  The legislation requires the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of 
the Treasury, Secretary of Transportation, and the Attorney General to 
work together to establish shared dockside inspection facilities at 
seaports for Federal and State agencies. At some U.S. ports, federal 
investigators and inspectors do not have any space available to conduct 
inspections, and they have to route the cargo to other places before 
inspection. In other words, it would be similar to Customs officials at 
JFK airport asking arriving international passengers to take a cab to 
the Customs headquarters downtown in order to have their bags 
inspected. That is just not right.
  To improve seaport security tactics, the bill directs the Secretary 
of Transportation to immediately establish domestic maritime safety and 
security teams for the purpose of responding to terrorist activity, 
criminal activity, or other threats to U.S. ports, especially in 
strategically important ports. The units shall consist of personnel 
trained in anti-terrorism, drug interdiction, navigation assistance, 
and facilitating responses to security threats. I want to thank Senator 
Edwards for his work on this security team initiative. I was pleased 
that we were able to include in the bill two other amendments authored 
by Senator Edwards: one promotes research and development funds for 
non-intrusive scanning technology; the second establishes standards for 
locking marine containers. These amendments will contribute greatly to 
increasing security at our seaports.
  Ports, terminals, waterfront facilities, and adjacent facilities will 
be required to immediately implement interim security measures, 
including securing their perimeters. The Secretary of Transportation 
will then prescribe regulations for the aforementioned parties to 
follow when designing the required maritime security plans. An 
important point is that the regulations will require ports to control 
and limit personnel access to security-sensitive areas. Ports also will 
be required to limit cars and trucks in security-sensitive areas, 
restrict firearms and other weapons, coordinate local and private law 
enforcement, and develop an evacuation plan. While the bill requires 
security programs to be individually tailored due to the varied nature 
of different ports, the Department of Transportation regulations will 
still require certain elements to be incorporated. In implementing new 
regulations, I would hope that the Department would review the 
feasibility of establishing a nationwide credentialing process. If we 
can harmonize identification procedures, we can eliminate duplication 
and reduce costs.
  The Secretary of Transportation will write regulations to designate 
controlled access areas in the Maritime Facility Security Plan for each 
waterfront facility and other covered entities, and require ports to 
limit access to security-sensitive information, such as passenger and 
cargo manifests. The regulations may require physical searches of 
persons entering controlled access areas or exiting such areas, 
security escorts, and employment history and criminal background checks 
for individuals with unrestricted access to controlled areas or 
sensitive information. An individual will be eligible to work in such 
positions if they meet the criteria established by the Secretary, and a 
background check does not reveal a felony conviction within the 
previous 7 years, or release from prison during the previous 5 years. 
An individual that otherwise may have been disqualified from a 
security-sensitive position may still be hired if the employer 
establishes alternate security arrangements acceptable to the 
Secretary. The bill would allow the Secretary to access FBI, 
fingerprint, and other crime data bases to conduct the background 
investigations, and transmit the results to port authorities or other 
covered entities. The bill also would require the Secretary and the 
Attorney General to establish and collect reasonable fees to pay 
expenses incurred for the background checks.
  The intent of conducting criminal background checks of port 
employees, employers and other maritime transportation-related 
employees or employers, is not to upset any of the existing work 
relationships or dynamics. Rather the background checks are intended to 
identify legitimate criminal and national security risks. The Secretary 
of Transportation will write regulations outlining how background 
checks should be conducted, and will be responsible for conducting the 
background checks. In the aviation security bill, we created a Deputy 
Secretary for Transportation Security. The person in that position 
should be responsible for implementing the national security check 
program.
  The Secretary also will determine which areas are controlled-access 
areas. Clearly, not all areas in ports are security risks areas 
justifying designation as such. I would suggest that controlled access 
areas include areas where ships tie up carrying combustibles, or 
storage areas for combustibles or explosives, areas where security 
admit credentialed persons into the port or terminal areas, or areas in 
the port or terminal where containers are opened or exposed. However, 
the Secretary should determine where risk or threat resides, and create 
a way to check the backgrounds of individuals who pose a national 
security or criminal threat by virtue of their presence in areas 
requiring a greater degree of control. Individuals subject to potential 
disqualification from positions with access to ocean manifests or 
segregated controlled access areas must be given full and adequate due 
process, and collected information must be protected from disclosure 
and only revealed to the extent that it is pertinent to security 
considerations.
  The bill would give the Secretary of Transportation additional 
authority to address security risks arising from foreign ports, such as 
enhanced enforcement against vessels arriving from such port, travel 
advisories for passengers, suspension of the right of a United States 
vessel to enter such port, and authority to assist foreign port 
authorities to maintain an appropriate level of security. The Secretary 
of Transportation would be authorized to work through the Secretary of 
State to notify foreign countries of security

[[Page 27736]]

problems with their ports, and to publish a list of ports with 
insufficient security that would be posted prominently at U.S. ports, 
on passenger tickets, and as a travel advisory by the State Department. 
The Secretary of Transportation, after consultation with the Secretary 
of the Treasury, may prohibit or prescribe conditions of port entry 
into the U.S. for any vessel arriving from a port listed as not secure. 
In particular, I would like to commend both Senator Kerry, who chairs 
the Coast Guard Subcommittee, and Senator Breaux, who chairs the 
Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee, for their 
efforts on this front.
  Senators Kerry and Breaux authored another critical section of this 
bill: the Sea Marshal program. The bill would authorize the Coast Guard 
to board vessels in order to deter, prevent, or respond to acts of 
terrorism or otherwise provide for the safety and security of the port 
and maritime environment. We would authorize $13 million over five 
years for this new Coast Guard enforcement. The provision in question 
also requires the Secretary to evaluate the potential of using licensed 
U.S. merchant marine personnel to supplement the law enforcement 
efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard.
  The bill would authorize the President, without prior notice or a 
hearing, to suspend the right of any vessel or person of the United 
States to enter from a foreign port or depart to a foreign port in 
which a condition exists that threatens the safety or security of 
passengers, vessels, or crew traveling to that port, or if a public 
interest requires the suspension of trade between the United States and 
that port. The bill would authorize the imposition of civil penalties 
of up to $50,000 for violating the law.
  S. 1214 will require that we know more in advance about the cargo and 
crew members coming into the United States. The more we know about a 
ship's cargo, and where it originated, the better our Customs agents 
and other law enforcement officers can target the most suspicious 
containers and passengers. Even with more screening equipment, we are 
still going to have an inadequate number of inspections. So targeting 
the highest risk cargo will be crucial.
  The bill requires ships to electronically send their cargo manifests 
to the port before gaining clearance to enter. While denying vessel 
clearance to land is within the authority of Customs, I would urge that 
it be used only in the most extreme cases, and that enforcement 
alternatives for handling offending cargo interests be pursued in order 
not to disrupt all the other legal cargoes on-board a vessel. Unloading 
cargo will be prohibited if it is not properly documented. Advanced 
import information is regularly transmitted by nearly 90 percent of the 
ocean shippers. But for the shippers who are not transmitting that 
information, we will require it. By giving Customs advance cargo 
information, we can better screen imported cargo.
  Specifically, the legislation requires carriers, including non-
vessel-owning common carriers, to provide by electronic transmission, 
cargo manifest information in advance of port entry or clearance. 
However, the Secretary of Treasury may exclude classes of vessels for 
which the Secretary concludes these manifest requirements are not 
necessary, and in some cases such as trucking, where the electronic 
transmission may not be possible. Customs should use its authority to 
require electronic transmission, but recognize, because of the nature 
of certain categories of transport, that it may not be possible to 
conduct electronic transmissions in every situation. The bill also 
outlines the cargo and route information that must be transmitted to 
Customs.
  The bill prohibits the export of cargo unless properly documented, 
and no marine terminal operator may load, or cause to be loaded, any 
cargo that is not documented. The bill requires the U.S. Customs 
Service to be notified of improperly documented cargo that has remained 
in a marine terminal for more than 48 hours, and authorizes that cargo 
to be searched, seized, and forfeited. Undocumented cargo should not 
sit in port areas for extended periods of time. Specifically, shippers 
who file Shippers Export Declarations (SED) by paper shall be required 
to provide a copy of the SED to the carrier; shippers who file their 
SEDs electronically shall be required to provide the carrier with a 
complete master bill of lading or equivalent shipping instructions, 
including the Automated Export System number. While it is important 
that we obtain certain crucial pieces of information about cargo, 
Customs should recognize that certain elements of cargo information, 
such as weight discrepancies, may fluctuate and shippers should not be 
held responsible for 100 percent accuracy. The bill creates civil 
penalties for violating documentation requirements.
  An important part of the legislation creates new requirements for the 
documentation and electronic transmission of passenger information in 
advance of entry or clearance into a port. It is imperative that the 
United States have advanced information on foreign passengers and crew 
members to ensure that we are not admitting security risks. Evidence 
indicates that materials used in terrorist attacks in Kenya and 
Tanzania were shipped by vessels owned and operated by Osama bin Laden. 
More information--and more credible information--about foreign entrants 
will be vital given the volume of vessels, cargo and crew members 
entering into U.S. waters. In establishing such regulations, Customs 
should work with all federal agencies to harmonize data reporting 
requirements to ensure that entrants into the United States only need 
to file one form. Policies such as INS pre-qualification of crew 
members between specific pre-approved train routes between the United 
States and Canada should be allowed to continue. Such policies ensure 
advance compliance, and stimulate regular cross-border operation, while 
not jeopardizing security.
  I am also pleased that we were able to accept an amendment authored 
by Senator Cleland to allow the Commissioner of Customs to develop a 
pilot program to pre-clear cargo coming into the United States if it is 
determined that such program would improve the security and safety of 
U.S. ports. However, before implementation of such a program, Customs 
must determine that it would not compromise existing procedures for 
ensuring the safety of these ports and the United States. The pilot 
program should be used to determine whether we can successfully shift 
the evaluation of cargo and cargo security to points outside the United 
States, and also ensure that the subsequent delivery of cargo is 
accomplished in a way that protects against tampering and maintains the 
integrity of the cargo seal.
  The bill directs the Customs Service to improve reporting of imports, 
including consigned items and goods, of in-bond goods arriving at U.S. 
seaports. Current policies can sometimes allow goods to travel into the 
United States, and travel for, in some instances, up to 37 days, 
without recording formal entry. The bill will require the reporting of 
in-bond movements prior to arrival to ensure advance filing of 
information identifying the cosignor, consignee, country of origin, and 
the 6-digit harmonized tariff code. The new information must be 
electronically filed by the importer of record, or its agent. This 
information will better enable Customs to track cargo and to intercept 
any suspicious cargoes in a more timely fashion. This reporting is not 
intended to reflect formal entry, but will allow Customs to use their 
targeting system on in-bond cargoes, where current policies make it 
difficult to enter relevant targeting data.
  Within 6 months of the bill's enactment, the bill would require a 
report that evaluates the feasibility of establishing a general 
database to collect information about the movements of vessels, cargo, 
and maritime passengers in order to identify criminal threats, national 
and economic security threats, and threats of terrorism. The Secretary 
would submit a report of the findings to Congress. Among several 
requirements, the report must estimate potential costs and benefits of 
using public and private databases to collect

[[Page 27737]]

and analyze information, including the feasibility of establishing a 
Joint Inter-Agency Task Force on Maritime Intelligence. Additional 
information, and coordination of information will be crucial in 
allowing law enforcement to evaluate threats in advance of U.S. 
arrival, ultimately, policies allowing us to identify risks abroad will 
help us avoid being forced to rely on policies of deterrence and 
prevention on U.S. soil.
  Perhaps most importantly, we need to give seaport authorities the 
resources to get the job done. It would be great if we could simply 
declare our ports to be more secure. However, it takes money to make 
sure the international borders at our seaports are fully staffed with 
Customs, law enforcement, and Immigration personnel. It takes money to 
make sure they have modern security equipment, including the latest 
scanners to check cargo for the most dangerous materials. And it takes 
money to build the physical infrastructure of a secure port.
  Our bill will provide $219 million over four years directly to these 
important national security functions. Cargo ships currently pay a tax 
on the gross registered tonnage the ship can carry. That tax rate, in 
current law, is scheduled to decline beginning in 2003. Our bill will 
simply extend the existing tax rate--which has been imposed since 
1986--until 2006. All those revenues will be directed to help beef up 
security. These tax revenues will have to be appropriated, but they can 
only be spent on the programs authorized by this seaport security bill.
  However, the funds provided directly by the tonnage tax extension are 
insufficient to cover all of the port security needs. So the bill 
includes additional authorizations of $965.5 million that Congress can 
appropriate as our colleagues come to realize the important security 
needs that must be met in the defense of our nation. Absent the 
realization of these authorized funds, Congress will be imposing an 
unfunded mandate on states and the private sector to secure our 
nation's maritime border.
  The money will help pay for many of the items previously mentioned, 
and additionally will be focused on building infrastructure at our 
seaports, including gates and fencing, security-related lighting 
systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video systems, and 
other security equipment. The bill will directly fund and authorize 
$390 million in grants to local port security projects. Specifically, 
the bill amends the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to provide grants for 
security projects, of which the federal government will pay up to 75 
percent. Projects under $25,000 would not have a matching requirement, 
and the Secretary may approve federal contributions above 75 percent to 
a project the Secretary deems to have high merit.
  The bill also will fund loan guarantees that, according to regular 
credit risk premiums for federal loans, could cover as much as $3.3 
billion in long term loans to port authorities acting to improve their 
security infrastructure. The loans could not cover more than 87.5 
percent of the actual cost of a security infrastructure project, and 
can extend for up to 25 years. The loan guarantee mechanism allows the 
federal government to leverage funds by extending credit to cover loans 
for security infrastructure, and can help port authorities reduce their 
capital costs for security infrastructure by amortizing it over time. 
Ultimately, this policy will help us build an infrastructure at our 
maritime borders in the most cost-effective way. The bill makes 
directly available and authorizes $166 million to cover the credit 
risks of loans extended under this provision.
  U.S. Customs officers must be able to screen more than just 2 percent 
of the cargo coming into our seaports. Investing in new screening 
technologies will help human screeners inspect more cargo, and detect 
the most dangerous shipments. To increase the amount of cargo screened, 
the bill authorizes $145 million for FY02 for additional Customs 
personnel, and to help Customs update their computer systems consistent 
with the requirements of this bill. Especially important is that the 
bill directly funds and authorizes $168 million to purchase non-
intrusive screening and detection equipment for the U.S. Customs 
Service.
  While we cannot expect to screen every marine container entering into 
the United States, we need to provide some expectation of inspection, 
or create some level of deterrence to dissuade smugglers from using the 
intermodal system to smuggle cargo. We are so busy investing in a anti-
ballistic missile defense system, we fail to see perhaps even a greater 
threat: a cargo container equipped with a digital global positioning 
system can be delivered anywhere in the United States for less than 
$5,000. Why would the enemies of America spend millions on a rocket 
launcher and go up against the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy when they 
could spend $5,000 to ship a container full of explosives or other 
dangerous materials that has only a two percent chance of being 
inspected?
  The bill also will authorize $75 million to establish a grant program 
to fund the development, testing, and transfer of technology to enhance 
security at U.S. seaports. The screening technology would focus on 
finding explosives or firearms, weapons of mass destruction, chemical 
and biological weapons. The grants may not exceed 75 percent of the 
research program.
  This bill is the product of bipartisan compromise. I want to thank 
the Administration for their efforts to produce this legislation. The 
Maritime Administration, Coast Guard and Office of the Secretary all 
played a vital role in helping draft the bill. I had intended to work 
to include legislation that would increase various maritime criminal 
statutes. Unfortunately, in the crush of time we were unable to clear 
these amendments. I think that both Senator McCain and I agree that 
these amendments are really important to be included in final 
legislation on seaport security, and I will work with him, and Chairman 
Leahy and Ranking Member Hatch of the Judiciary Committee to include 
provisions updating our maritime criminal laws.
  The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation to prepare and 
publish a National Maritime Transportation Security Plan for prevention 
and response to maritime crime and terrorism. The plan would include an 
allocation of duties among federal departments and agencies and among 
state and local governments and agencies; procedures and techniques for 
preventing and responding to acts of crime or terrorism; and 
designation of the federal official who shall be the Federal Maritime 
Security Coordinator for each area for which an Area Maritime Security 
Plan is required and prepared. Additionally, the bill would also 
require the Secretary of Transportation to establish Area Maritime 
Security Committees comprised of members appointed by the Secretary. 
Each Area Maritime Security Committee would be required to prepare a 
maritime security plan, and work with state and local officials to 
enhance contingency planning. Each Area Maritime Security Plan must be 
submitted to the Secretary of Transportation. The plans are required to 
outline how to respond to an act of maritime crime or terrorism in or 
near the area, describe the area covered by the plan, and describe in 
detail how the plan is integrated with other security plans. This 
requirement is similar to the planning requirements that we mandated in 
the Oil Pollution Act for oil spill response, and will help ensure that 
we have local, regional and national level responses to maritime crime 
and terrorism. The bill would also authorize the Secretary of 
Transportation to issue regulations establishing requirements for 
vessel security plans and programs for vessels calling on United States 
ports, would also authorize the Secretary of Transportation, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, to require crewmembers aboard 
vessels calling on the United States ports to carry and present upon 
demand such identification as the Secretary determines.
  The bill would require the Secretary of Transportation and the 
Secretary of Treasury to establish a joint task force to work with 
ocean shippers in the development of a system to track data for 
shipments, containers, and contents. The Secretaries also would work

[[Page 27738]]

with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop 
enhanced performance standards for in-bond seals and locks for use on 
or in containers used for water-borne cargo shipments.
  The bill includes a number of reporting requirements to assess our 
progress on seaport security. I would like to thank Senator Nelson of 
Florida for his amendment asking for a Coast Guard and Navy study on 
the feasibility of creating a Center for Coastal and Maritime Security. 
We all look forward to the results of this important study.
  We have made dramatic improvements to this bill since it was first 
approved by the Commerce Committee before the terrorist attacks. And I 
want to thank Senator McCain for working with me to co-sponsor this 
manager's amendment to the previous version of our seaport security 
bill, S. 1214. Senator McCain does not have many seaports in Arizona, 
but he understands that the cargo, materials and people who come 
through our seaports make their way quickly inland on trains and 
highways. So even if you are living in the desert, the security of our 
seaports affects all of us. I also would like to recognize and thank 
Rob Freeman of Senator McCain's staff, who invested hours of time and 
effort to finalize this product.
  I also must recognize the extraordinary efforts of Senator Bob 
Graham, who began working to improve port security long ago and put 
this issue on our radar screen. Senator Graham's home state of Florida 
has been wrestling with issues of crime, theft and drug smuggling at 
its seaports for many years. And while the federal government failed to 
address these problems, the state of Florida invested millions of 
dollars of its own resources to improve port security, which has helped 
the communities surrounding those ports. But they will still need much 
more. The states should not carry the entire burden of protecting the 
international boarders at our seaports. And yet, the problems had 
become so severe, that the state of Florida, led in part by Bob Graham, 
decided it had to act on its own. Senator Graham's leadership was vital 
as we developed this seaport security bill long before the terrorist 
attacks of September 11. I would also like to thank the fine work of 
Senator Graham's staffer, Tandy Barrett, she also worked very hard on 
this legislation.
  The initiatives in S. 1214 can help protect America and its citizens 
from potential terrorist threats against seaports and intermodal 
connections throughout the country. These initiatives will not make 
maritime transportation immune from attack. But this bill takes the 
necessary preventative steps to better protect the American public. I 
urge my colleagues to support this legislation that is vital to 
protecting our national security.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, once again I thank Chairman Hollings for 
his efforts to address identified safety and security problems at our 
Nation's seaports. The legislation before us today is designed to 
address port security lapses that have been under review by the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation for the past two 
years. After hearings earlier this year and last year, the Commerce 
Committee reported out S. 1214 in August. The bill is intended to 
provide both the guidance and funding needed to improve seaport 
security. I commend Chairman Hollings' leadership on this very 
important issue to transportation safety and security.
  It is widely reported that transportation systems are the target of 
40 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide. Since September 11, we have 
been working on a bipartisan basis to address the nation's most 
pressing needs in the wake of the terrorist attacks. The Senate 
Commerce Committee has been conducting a series of hearings to gain the 
information we need to help us evaluate potential transportation 
security risks and determine how best to respond to those potential 
risks.
  While it is impossible to precisely quantify, there is no question 
that an attack on any one of our nation's 361 seaports would have far-
reaching effects. With 95 percent of our Nation's foreign trade moving 
through our seaports, the impact of such an attack would ripple through 
our Nation. Businesses nationwide would face problems getting supplies 
and exporting finished goods. Our entire economy would be impacted.
  Both the Hart-Rudman Report on Homeland Security and the Interagency 
Commission on Crime and Seaport Security found our seaports to be 
vulnerable to crime and terrorism. While there is no way to make our 
Nation's seaports completely crime free and impenetrable to terrorist 
attacks, the bill before us today is a very strong first step in 
closing the gaps in national security that now exist at our seaports.
  I want to point out to my colleagues that the Commerce Committee had 
acted on S. 1214 prior to the September 11 attacks. As a result of the 
attacks, members of the committee and others have worked together to 
further modify the legislation to provide direction and funding to the 
agencies involved to focus their efforts not only on decreasing crime 
in our seaports, but to also increase protection against terrorist 
attacks.
  In our efforts to increase our nation's seaport security, we have 
worked to take into account not only the wide range of threats and 
crimes surrounding our seaports, but also the unique nature of our 
ports. As I have said before, a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach will not 
work. Our ports are complex and diverse in both geography and 
infrastructure. This is why we have worked to ensure this provides for 
direct local input into the development of security plans for their 
ports, as well as for response plans for local responders should an 
attack occur.
  S. 1214 would help address a wide range of security shortcomings at 
our Nation's seaport that were identified in the Interagency Commission 
on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports that was issued September 2000. 
According to the Commission's report, seaport crime encompasses a broad 
range of crimes, including the importation of illicit drugs, 
contraband, and prohibited or restricted merchandise; stowaways and 
alien smuggling; trade fraud and commercial smuggling; environmental 
crimes; cargo theft; and the unlawful exportation of controlled 
commodities and munitions, stolen property, and drug proceeds. These 
crimes are violations of federal law, and therefore, the primary 
responsibility for enforcement falls to Federal agencies. This bill 
would give those agencies the authority and funding needed to make up 
for these shortcomings.
  Additionally, the bill would provide much needed improvements in 
preventing terrorist attacks at our Nation's seaports. While seaports 
represent an important component of the nation's transportation 
infrastructure, seaports' level of vulnerability to attack is high, and 
such an attack, as I just mentioned, has the potential to cause 
significant damage. The commission found little control over the access 
of vehicles and personnel to vessels, cargo receipt and delivery 
operations, and passenger processing operations. The main problem they 
were able to identify was the lack of a generally accepted standard for 
physical, procedural, and personnel security at seaports that left 
seaports wide open for attack. This bill will allow the Department of 
Transportation, along with Federal, state and local law enforcement to 
take actions to close the security holes at ports nationwide.
  The bill would authorize $1.18 billion for seaport safety and 
security. The bill would require, for the first time ever, the 
Department of Transportation to assess the security status of U.S. 
seaports and require each port and related facility to submit security 
plans for review and approval. The bill would also improve advance 
reporting requirements for entry into the United States, provide more 
funding for screening equipment, facilitate law enforcement 
coordination at U.S. seaports, and authorize grants and loan guarantees 
to seaports and marine terminal operators to help finance the purchase 
of security equipment and defray the costs of security infrastructure.

[[Page 27739]]

  I want to mention that while the Congress has already worked to 
approve aviation security legislation, and we are now moving forward on 
port security, both Chairman Hollings and I remain committed to 
continuing our agenda during the next session to address transportation 
security issues in all modes of transportation, including railroads and 
buses.
  I urge my colleagues swift approval of this critical legislation.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, allow me to congratulate our distinguished 
chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Hollings, for his 
outstanding work in putting together S. 1214, The Maritime and Port 
Security Improvement Act. I also wish to congratulate Senators Graham 
and McCain for all of their hard work in moving this very important 
legislation that is crucial to homeland defense.
  I also wish to recognize Carl Bentzel of the Commerce Committee for 
his years of hard work in putting this legislation together.
  I thank Senator Hollings for including several provisions from S. 
1589, the Port Threat and Security Act of 2001, in the final version of 
his bill. If I may, I would like to discuss the provisions from S. 1589 
that were included in the final version of S. 1214.
  Senator Breaux and I recently held oversight hearings before our 
respective Subcommittees on the Coast Guard and its role in improving 
maritime security after the terrible attacks of September 11. As 
Senators Hollings and Breaux well know, even before September 11 our 
maritime and port security was in sorry shape. However, the attacks on 
New York and Washington made it clear we need to go farther afield to 
guard against terrorism and other crimes.
  We need to improve our base of information to identify bad actors 
throughout the maritime realm. A provision of the bill would help us 
identify those nations whose vessels and vessel registration procedures 
pose potential threats to our national security. It would require the 
Secretaries of Transportation and State to prepare an annual report for 
the Congress that would list those nations whose vessels the Coast 
Guard has found would pose a risk to our ports, or that have presented 
our government with false, partial, or fraudulent information 
concerning cargo manifests, crew identity, or registration of the 
vessel. In addition the report would identify nations that do not 
exercise adequate control over their vessel registration and ownership 
procedures, particularly with respect to security issues. We need hard 
information like this if we are to force ``flag of convenience'' 
nations from providing cover to criminals and terrorists.
  This is very important as Osama bin Laden has used flags of 
convenience to hide his ownership in various international shipping 
interests. In 1998 one of bin Laden's cargo freighters unloaded 
supplies in Kenya for the suicide bombers who later destroyed the 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. To that end, the bill requires the 
Administration to report on actions they have taken, or would 
recommend, to close these loopholes and improve transparency and 
registration procedures, either through domestic or international 
action--including action at the International Maritime Organization.
  This legislation would also establish a national Sea Marshal program 
to protect our ports from the potential use of vessels as weapons of 
terror. Sea Marshals have recently been used in San Francisco and Los 
Angeles, and is supported strongly by the maritime pilots who, like 
airline pilots, are on the front lines in bringing vessels into U.S. 
ports. Sea Marshals would be used in ports that handle materials that 
are hazardous or flammable in quantities that make them potential 
targets of attack. The Coast Guard has taken a number of steps 
including using armed Coast Guard personnel to escort a Liquid Natural 
Gas, LNG, tankers into Boston since September 11. Prior to September 11 
these vessels were escorted by Coast Guard vessels into the port but no 
armed guards were present on the vessel. I strongly believe that having 
armed personnel, such as Sea Marshals, on these high interest vessels 
is very important and will considerably increase security in our 
nation's ports, including Boston. The ability of terrorists to board a 
vessel and cause a deliberate release of LNG or gasoline for that 
matter is very real. Sea Marshals will make it much more difficult for 
this to happen. The Secretary of Transportation would be responsible 
for evaluating the potential use of Federal, State, or local government 
personnel as well as documented United States Merchant Marine personnel 
to supplement Coast Guard personnel as Sea Marshals. In addition it is 
my hope that the Secretary will establish training centers around the 
country for the Sea Marshal program. I further believe that the U.S. 
Merchant Marine Academy or any of the State maritime academies would 
make excellent locations for such training centers.
  Lastly, this legislation would allow the President to prohibit any 
vessel, U.S. flagged or foreign, from transporting passengers or cargo 
to and from a foreign port that does not have adequate security 
measures as determined by the Secretary of Transportation. I would like 
to remind my colleagues that a similar provision exists in the airline 
industry and I see no reason why the President should not have the 
power to suspend vessel traffic to and from ports with inadequate 
security, just like he can now do with international airports. The 
stakes are simply too high Mr. President, we cannot allow shipping 
containers to enter this country unless adequate security exists in 
foreign ports to prevent weapons of mass destruction from being loaded. 
In addition we should not allow cruise ships carrying U.S. passengers 
to visit foreign passenger ports that do not have adequate security.
  I again wish to congratulate Senator Hollings on this landmark 
legislation and to thank him for including several provisions from S. 
1589. This legislation will ensure that the United States has the 
tools, the information, and the personnel to guard against waterborne 
threats to our Nation and our citizens.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, as many of my colleagues might know, my 
State of Louisiana depends heavily on maritime trade and 
transportation. After all, Louisiana is darn near close to being 
underwater, so I always have had an affinity for things that float.
  Louisiana is fortunate to have the Mississippi River, along which 
barges haul grain, wheat and corn from the heartland of America, and 
coal from Wyoming. Our fortune extends to the fisheries resources of 
the Gulf of Mexico and our oil and gas resources in the outer 
continental shelf. We have invested in maritime-related oil and gas 
technologies to make that exploration as safe as possible. The Port of 
New Orleans, Lake Charles, and South Louisiana--as well as the other 
Louisiana ports--are major seaports handling containerized bulk and 
breakbulk cargoes, as well as passengers. The shipbuilding and repair 
industries employ thousands, as does the marine construction and 
dredging industry.
  My constituents live close to waterways and the the Gulf of Mexico, 
and in many cases earn their living from our marine transportation 
system and its associated industries. So, as the Chairman of the 
Surface Transportation and Merchant Subcommittee--and as a resident of 
a State that relies so much on the smooth operation of its waterways 
and ports--maritime security is one of my primary concerns.
  The security of our commercial sea and river ports has rarely been 
the focus of our national security plans. We have invested millions of 
dollars to protect our airports and our land borders, but very little 
toward making sure that the goods and people arriving at our ports do 
not jeopardize our security. We know that Osama bin Laden controls a 
network of ships that hides his ownership. We have to assume that other 
terrorists and terrorist networks do, too. Therefore it is imperative 
that we take a more active Federal role in protecting the international 
boundaries of our seaports.
  There is no unified Federal plan for overseeing security at the 
international borders of our sea ports. Right now the responsibility of 
building secure sea and river ports rests with

[[Page 27740]]

states like Louisiana, its port authorities, and the private sector. 
That was a poor model for national security when we were fighting drugs 
and international smuggling--and it is totally inadequate after 
September 11 as we face the threat of terrorism.
  That is why we must pass S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act.
  For the first time we will require Federal approval of port security 
programs. These plans will have to meet rigorous standards for security 
infrastructure, screening equipment, evacuation plans, access controls, 
and background checks for workers in security-sensitive areas.
  We also will require more information about the cargo and passengers 
arriving at our ports. Right now we do not know enough about the ships 
and the cargo that call 24 hours a day. We need to change that 
immediately. We will require that ships electronically transmit their 
cargo manifests--and if the manifest does not match the cargo, it will 
not be unloaded. We also will check crew and passenger manifest 
information to identify people who could pose a security threat. My 
Subcommittee held a hearing on rail and maritime security in the 
aftermath of the events of September 11. At that hearing we heard 
testimony that the Republic of Panama had issued more than one thousand 
false documents that allow unauthorized personnel to operate on-board 
their vessels.
  More information--and more reliable information--is the key to 
fighting crime and terrorism. The more we know about these ships, 
including who owns them and where they have been, the better we can 
target our law enforcement resources at our ports to check on the most 
suspicious loads. We need to know who is on these ships, and, 
eventually, be able to quickly check the names with a computer database 
of known terrorists or other associates of international criminal 
organizations.
  This bill will require Federal, State and local law enforcement 
officials to better coordinate the sharing of that information. If a 
local police officer arrests someone for breaking into a secure area of 
the port, timely sharing of that information with State and Federal 
officials might help identify the person as part of a larger 
international network. It is critical that Customs agents work with the 
local police, that the State police work with Immigration officials, 
and that the FBI work with local port authorities. That type of 
cooperation will dramatically improve port security. Seaports have many 
different agencies and jurisdictions. So this bill attempts to 
harmonize their efforts, and will require the Coast Guard, in their 
role as Captain of the Port, to lead the coordination of law 
enforcement.
  The businesses that operate in seaports also play a crucial security 
role. They must be brought into a cooperative environment in which a 
port's law enforcement information is communicated and shared 
confidentially with privately-hired security officers. In return, 
private security officers must have a direct line to share information 
with Federal, State, and local authorities.
  To verify that the cargo loads match the manifests, we will need more 
Customs officials to check that cargo. Incredibly, only 2 percent of 
the cargo containers arriving at our ports are ever checked by Customs 
officials. That is a huge hole in our national security system that 
must be fixed. We seek to close this security hole by directly granting 
and authorizing more than $168 million for the purchase of non-
intrusive screening and detection equipment to be used by U.S. Customs 
officers. These Customs officers are on the front lines of protecting 
our country from the importation of illegal and dangerous goods. We 
must give them the latest technology and the most modern cargo 
screening equipment available.
  We also must help the private sector and the port authorities meet 
these national security challenges. This problem would be must more 
simple to solve it the United States had national seaports under the 
control of the Federal Government--or if the Federal Government 
directly funded seaport infrastructure. However, that is not the case. 
Maritime infrastructure is owned by States and by the private sector. 
But the Federal Government has a role to play here for homeland 
security. We cannot force States and the private sector to comply with 
security mandates, yet not provide funding. The legislation will 
directly fund and authorize $390 million in grants to local port 
security projects. The bill also will fund loan guarantees that could 
cover as much as $3.3 billion in long term loans to port authorities 
acting to improve their security infrastructure. Upgrading that 
infrastructure means installing modern gates and fencing, security-
related lighting systems, remote surveillance systems, concealed video 
systems, and other security equipment that contributes to the overall 
level of security at our ports and waterfront facilities.
  Some of our shipping companies may worry that these new procedures 
requiring more security and customs checks will slow the flow of 
international commerce. But as we did in the airline security bill, we 
can strike the balance between increased security and the convenience 
of our open country and economy. In Louisiana, our sea and river ports 
are a way of life, and an integral part of our economy. We have some of 
the largest seaports in America, and the Mississippi River runs through 
the heart of Louisiana. The river is a super-highway of commerce that 
helps drive our State's economy.
  Security and the protection of our people from harm always will be 
our primary goal. However, we must do it in a way that does not 
dramatically slow the movement of goods that run our just-in-time-
delivery economy. The answer to that problem is technology.
  New scanners are now on the market that can x-ray and scan an entire 
48-foot cargo container. Customs currently depends primarily on gamma-
ray systems that are adequate for seeing through small vehicles or 
loosely-packed crates. But more powerful X-ray based machines--already 
used in Israel, the Netherlands, and Hong Kong--can pierce several 
inches of steel and peer through more densely packed boxes. These 
machines can see everything from false compartments down to the buttons 
on a remote control. And they can be programmed to spot ``density 
signatures'' that indicate explosive and nuclear materials. The more 
the Federal Government, ports and the private sector invest in using 
this new scanning technology, the fewer cargo containers and boxes will 
have to be opened and searched by hand. That will increase the 
efficiency of international commerce and trade--while at the same time 
making our nation more secure.
  Investing in scanners is even more critical when you consider that 
the expanding global economy raises the volume of seaborne shipping by 
7 to 10 percent each year. In other words, the amount of goods arriving 
and departing through our seaports is expected to double by 2020. While 
that increased trade will benefit our economy, it also poses a national 
security threat if we are unable to keep pace with the growing volume 
of goods and people passing through our ports.
  That is why the private sector must get behind our efforts--and 
behind this bill. Before September 11, port security was something of 
an afterthought. We are now facing new threats. The more we invest in 
the infrastructure of making our ports secure, the less likely that 
your key products and supplies will be delayed at the ports due to 
increased security. As public officials, our primary duty is to protect 
public safety and national security. If the private sector engages and 
cooperates with our efforts, there will be less impact from that 
tightened security upon the free flow of goods and supplies through our 
major seaports. That is a public-private partnership that can work--and 
protect America at the same time.
  We have made the investments at our airports and at our land borders 
to counter threats of terrorism and other international criminal 
organizations. It is now time to invest in the security of the 
international borders at our seaports, in order to protect our nation 
and our local seaport communities.

[[Page 27741]]


  Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I rise to thank Chairman 
Hollings and ranking member McCain for agreeing to include in S. 1214, 
the Port and Maritime Security Act, a Coast Guard and Navy study to 
evaluate the merits of establishing a Center for Coastal and Maritime 
Security.
  The events of September 11 cruelly illustrated the challenges we face 
in providing comprehensive and reliable security for our homeland. 
There is no challenge more daunting than the integration of our 
Federal, State and Local law enforcement agencies and their coordinated 
efforts with our Armed Forces to protect our vast and complex maritime 
and industrial areas.
  My amendment directs the administration to seriously consider 
establishing an institution that can provide integrated and coordinated 
training for the organization, planning and execution of security 
systems necessary to protect our vulnerable ports and coasts from 
potential terrorist attacks.
  I am grateful for the inclusion of language directing this study 
because the U.S. Navy's Coastal Systems Station in Panama City, Florida 
is uniquely staffed with coastal security experts to help the Coast 
Guard conduct this assessment. In analyzing the costs and benefits of a 
Coastal and Maritime Security Center, I urge the Coast Guard to work 
closely with the Coastal Systems Station to ensure the best possible 
recommendation for the Administration and Congress.
  Mr. President, I am confident that the study directed by this 
language will conclude that an investment in interagency integrated 
education and training to improve the protection of our ports and 
harbors is in the very best interests of our national security.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, this bill would take a significant step 
toward securing our Nation against future terrorist actions.
  Just as we have unanimously decided to bolster security at our 
airports, we must also improve the overall security and cargo 
processing operations at U.S. seaports.
  If nothing else, September 11 has demonstrated the need to do more to 
secure our Nation from terror--whether it comes from land, sky or sea. 
Before discussing the specifics of this legislation, it is important to 
describe the circumstances that have caused the security crisis at our 
seaports.
  Seaports represent an important component of the Nation's 
transportation infrastructure.
  Each year, thousands of ships, and millions of passengers, enter and 
leave the United States through seaports.
  It is estimated that 95 percent of the cargo that enters the country 
from noncontiguous countries does so through the Nation's 361 coastal 
and inland ports.
  Alarmingly, less than 2 percent of this enormous number of cargo 
containers are actually inspected.
  Over the next 20 years, the total volume of imported and exported 
goods at seaports is expected to increase threefold.
  Waterborne cargo alone contributes more than $750 billion to the U.S. 
gross domestic product and creates employment for 13 million people.
  Despite the massive volume of cargo that moves through our Nation's 
ports, there are no Federal security standards or guidelines protecting 
our citizens from potentially lethal cargo.
  The Federal Government does not provide the resources for technology 
that an adequately screen cargo moving through our ports, leaving them 
vulnerable to criminal activity--from smuggling to cargo theft to 
terrorism.
  Security at our maritime borders is given substantially less Federal 
consideration than airports or land borders.
  At U.S. seaports, the Federal Government invests nothing in 
infrastructure, other than the human presence of the U.S. Coast Guard, 
U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
and whatever equipment those agencies have on-hand to accomplish their 
mandates.
  Physical infrastructure is provided by State or local controlled port 
authorities, or by private sector marine terminal operators.
  There are no controls, or requirements in place, except for the 
minimal standards promulgated by the Coast Guard for the protection of 
cruise ship passenger terminals.
  Essentially, where seaports are concerned, we have abrogated the 
Federal responsibility of border control to the State and private 
sector.
  In the face of these new challenges, it appears that the U.S. port 
management system has fallen behind the rest of world.
  We lack a comprehensive, nation-wide strategy to address the security 
issues that face our seaport system.
  In early 1998--in response to the almost daily reports of crime and 
narcotics trafficking at Florida seaports, and following the day I 
spent working with the Customs Service at Tampa's Port Manatee on 
October 14, 1997--I began an investigation of the security situation at 
seaports throughout the nation. At that time, and perhaps even more so 
today, I was very concerned that our seaports, unlike our airports, 
lacked the advanced security procedures and equipment that are 
necessary to prevent acts of terrorism, cargo theft and drug 
trafficking.
  Based on this workday, and subsequent investigation, I asked 
President Clinton to establish a Federal commission to evaluate both 
the nature and extent of crime and the overall state of security in 
seaports and to develop recommendations for improvement.
  In response to my request, President Clinton established the 
Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports on April 
27, 1999.
  In October 2000, the Commission issued its final report, which 
outlines many of the common security problems discovered in U.S. 
seaports. Among other conclusions, the Commission found that: one, 
intelligence and information sharing among law enforcement agencies 
needs to be improved at many ports; two, that many ports do not have 
any idea about the threats they face, because vulnerability assessments 
are not performed locally;
  Three, that a lack of minimum security standards at ports and at 
terminals, warehouses, and trucking firms leaves many ports and port 
users vulnerable to theft, pilferage, and unauthorized access by 
criminals; and four, advanced equipment, such as small boats, cameras, 
vessel tracking devices, and large scale X-rays, are lacking at many 
high-risk ports.
  Our legislation addresses the problems of our seaports by instructing 
the Attorney General to coordinate the reporting of seaport related 
crimes with State law enforcement officials, so as to harmonize the 
reporting of data on cargo theft.
  The bill would also increase the criminal penalties for cargo theft.
  To address the lack of minimum security standards at America's 
seaports, the bill would require security programs to be developed by 
each port or marine terminal.
  Each security program will be submitted to the Security of 
Transportation for review and approval.
  These security programs would require maintenance of both physical 
and procedure security for passengers, cargoes, crew members, and 
workers; provisions for establishing secure areas within a waterfront; 
creation of a credentialing process to limit access to restricted areas 
so only authorized individuals gain admittance; restriction of 
vehicular access; development of an evacuation process from port areas 
in the event of a terrorist attack or other such emergency; and 
establish security awareness for all employees.
  Our bill requires the Coast Guard, in consultation with the 
appropriate public and private sector officials and officials and 
organizations, develop a system of providing port security-threat 
assessments for U.S. seaports. The bill would authorize $60 million 
over 4 years to carry out this provision.
  The Seaport Commission report found that current inspection levels of 
containerized cargo are insufficient to counter potential security 
risks.
  This bill will authorized $168 million over five yeas, for the 
Customs Service to purchase non-intrusive screening and detection 
equipment for use at U.S. seaports.
  It would also authorize $145 million for 1,200 new customs inspector 
positions, and 300 new customs agent positions.
  The bill would also create a research and development grant program 
to provide grants up to 75 percent of the cost

[[Page 27742]]

of construction, acquisition or deployment of technology to help 
develop non-intrusive inspection technologies.
  The bill would authorize $15 million annually for fiscal year 2002 to 
fiscal year 2006 for this purpose.
  Implementing the provisions of the Port and Maritime Security Act of 
2001 will produce concrete improvements in the efficiency, safety, and 
security of our Nation's seaports, and will result in a demonstrable 
benefit for those who are currently pay tonnage duties.
  This legislation is long overdue--that became all too apparent the 
morning of September 11. Not only is it required to facilitate future 
technological advances and the anticipated increases in international 
trade, but it would ensure that we have the sort of security controls 
necessary to protect our borders from threats of illegal aliens, drug 
smuggling and terrorism.
  As we work to lift our Nation's fear of travel in our skies, we must 
also move to guarantee their safety on our seas.
  This bill does not affect just those states with ports.
  Each day 16,000 containers arrive in the United States. A single 
container can hold 30 tons.
  These containers are either transported by truck or by rail 
throughout the United States.
  To illustrate my point, I have a chart here which depicts a normal 
route of a cargo container entering the Port of Los Angeles and 
arriving in New York.
  These containers travel across America, often more than a dozen 
States before reaching their destination.
  Our seaports are our first line of defense in preventing a potential 
tragedy.
  Seaports play one of the most critical roles in expanding our 
international trade and protecting our borders from international 
threats.
  The ``Port and Maritime Security Act'' recognizes the importance of 
our seaports and devotes the necessary resources to move ports into the 
21st century.
  I urge my colleagues to look towards the future by supporting this 
critical legislation--and by taking action to protect one of our most 
valuable tools for promoting economic growth.
  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I rise today to express my strong support 
for S. 1214, the Port Security and Improvement bill. This legislation 
is overdue and absolutely needed in broadening our response to the 
threat of terrorism.
  The Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in 
U.S. Seaports, issued in the fall of 2000, indicates that ``the state 
of security in U.S. seaports generally ranges from poor to fair, and in 
a few cases, good.'' Now that this country is acutely aware of the 
repercussions of overlooking transportation security weaknesses, 
Congress would be severely remiss if we did not act promptly to improve 
on the ``poor to fair'' rating at our ports.
  I believe that technology can play an important role in ensuring the 
integrity, safety, and security of goods coming into this country via 
ship. To that end, my amendment that is included in S. 1214 establishes 
a pilot program run and defined by the Customs Service to examine 
different technologies and how they can be employed to verify that a 
container's contents are what they say they are and that they have not 
been tampered with during transport. Shippers and transporters using 
effective such technologies could then enter U.S. ports on an expedited 
basis. With 95 percent of foreign trade entering or leaving the U.S. 
via ship, allowing a quicker entrance by certain ``trusted shippers'' 
will allow a quicker conveyance to American consumers.
  Already, I have seen outstanding demonstrations from people all over 
this country of their detection technologies and how they can be used 
to improve security. My amendment is a challenge to these innovators to 
develop such technologies for use in the shipping world.
  Additionally, I have heard testimony from maritime experts that 
America needs to find ways to ``push its borders back.'' By ``pushing 
back'' our borders the intention is to ensure the integrity and 
inspection of goods entering the country at points farther out from our 
physical borders. If this process can be taken care of in a foreign 
port, confidence in the integrity of the goods increases and time is 
saved by domestic inspectors who can use their resources elsewhere. My 
amendment would allow the securing of goods in the port of origin so 
that when these goods arrive in the U.S. we can be assured of their 
safety.
  I thank Senator Hollings for his help with my amendment, and I look 
forward to working with Customs to implement this program, which I 
believe will be helpful to get goods to market in safe but timely 
manner.


                       nuclear devices detection

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I am encouraged that the Senate is 
poised to pass legislation bolstering security at our Nation's 361 
seaports. I thank the members of the Senate Commerce Committee for 
their hard work on this bill.
  While often out of the public eye, ports and harbors across the 
United States are America's economic gateways. Every year, U.S. ports 
handle over 800 million tons of cargo, valued at approximately $600 
billion. If you exclude border commerce with Mexico and Canada, our 
ports handle 95 percent of U.S. trade. Two of the busiest ports of the 
nation are in California, at Long Beach and Oakland.
  Yet, just 1 or 2 percent of the 11 million shipping containers 
reaching our ports are inspected each year. The Federal Government has 
taken steps to beef up security along our northern and southern 
borders. And we are addressing aviation security. But just about 
everything that arrives by ship is waved through.
  This bill will strengthen law enforcement at our ports by 
establishing a federal port security task force and providing more 
funding for local efforts to boost port security. It is crucial that we 
increase cargo surveillance and inspections. And it is crucial that we 
provide our Customs agents and other port security forces with the 
equipment needed to detect chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of 
mass destruction, WMD.
  Osama bin Laden has stated that he considers it his ``religious 
duty'' to obtain such weapons.
  Earlier this month, the director general of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency warned, ``The willingness of terrorists to commit suicide 
to achieve their evil aims makes the nuclear terrorism threat far more 
likely than it was before September 11th.'' According to the Agency, 
there have been 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear material since 1993 
and 201 cases of trafficking in medical and industrial radioactive 
material. Sadly, it is no longer beyond the pale to imagine that bin 
Laden and his associates might try to smuggle a nuclear device or so-
called ``dirty bomb'' onto a cargo ship entering one of our busy 
seaports and then detonate it.
  I was prepared to offer an amendment to make it quite clear that 
references in the bill to chemical, biological, or other weapons of 
mass destruction include nuclear devices.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. If the senior Senator from California will yield, I 
assure her that is our intent. Where was authorize activities or 
funding to step up survelliance, inspection, and detection of WMDs at 
our seaports, we would want to target any kind of nuclear devices as 
well as chemical and biological weapons.
  So, for instance, any authorizations in the bill for the purchase of 
detection equipment could be used to buy radiation pagers for the 
Customs agents who inspect cargo, or for radiation detectors on cargo 
X-ray machines, or to retrofit existing X-ray machines with sensitive 
sodium iodide detectors.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the chairman for his clarification. It is 
absolutely vital that we upgrade our detection technology. Oakland's 
Howard Marine Terminal, for instance, is less than once-half mile from 
Jack London Square, a major tourist attraction. Ships that travel into 
and out of the Port of Oakland terminal pass within 400 yards of the 
Square.
  Immediately following the September 11th attacks, a 920-foot tanker 
carrying 33 million gallons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) was 
prevented from entering Boston Harbor. The tanker

[[Page 27743]]

was kept 6 to 8 miles offshore while authorities figured out a way to 
safeguard the Harbor. It was not until November 4--with Coast Guard 
escorts--that the tanker was allowed into the harbor.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. The Senator from California has raised good points. I 
appreciate her interest in the matter and her willingness to reach an 
accommodation with the Commerce Committee. We certainly want to 
interdict any nuclear devices as assuredly as we want to interdict 
other WMDs.


                PORT AND MARITIME SECURITY ACT COLLOQUY

  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we worked hard with the Administration 
to incorporate many of their suggested changes in this bill to sharpen 
the policy and create a better legislative product. I had intended to 
work with Chairman Leahy of the Judiciary Committee to modernize and 
update some of our maritime criminal laws to reflect the realities 
following the attacks of September 11th, and to strengthen our laws to 
protect against maritime terrorism. Unfortunately, the Administration 
did not consult or share with the Judiciary Committee the changes in 
criminal laws and other matters within the Judiciary Committee's 
jurisdiction that were provided to me. I would like to ask the Chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee, if he would be willing to work to work with 
me and Senator McCain next year to consider whether new criminal 
provisions are necessary to enhance seaport security?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am also very concerned that we develop 
policies to more adequately protect our maritime vulnerabilities and 
protect the public from the threats emerging as a result of maritime 
trade. I would be happy to work with Chairman Hollings and Ranking 
Member McCain next year to evaluate whether any gaps in our criminal 
laws to protect our maritime safety and seaport security exist and the 
appropriate steps we should take to close those gaps and at the same 
time ensure that the rights of port employees are protected.
  Mr. President, I have also expressed to Chairman Hollings my concerns 
that we properly limit access to and use of sensitive law enforcement 
information relating to background checks which are provided for in 
this bill. Chairman Hollings has assured me that the bill sets strict 
and appropriate limits as to both when such access will be required and 
how the information will be used once obtained. Additionally, the 
Chairman understands my continuing concern over the need for 
appropriate due process protections for employees of ports at all 
levels who may be subject to background checks. These would include a 
hearing that would consider mitigating and extenuating circumstances 
related to the individual in question. Am I correct that it is the 
intent of the Chairman to ensure that the Department of Transportation 
and the nation's ports carry out background checks with proper 
safeguards in place that ensure due process protections for employees. 
And will the Chairman commit to work with me to that end? I would like 
to ask Chairman Hollings if he could explain these provisions?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, we have included the important 
protections and limitations for such use in access in the bill. 
Background checks will be limited to those employees who have access to 
sensitive cargo information or unrestricted access to segregated 
``controlled access areas,'' that is defined areas within ports, 
terminals, or affiliated maritime infrastructure which present a 
critical security concern. Such controlled access areas could be: 
locations where containers will be opened, points where vessels 
containing combustible or hazardous materials are berthed and port 
security stations. In addition, under this bill the use of background 
information, once it is obtained, will be restricted to the minimum 
necessary to disqualify an ineligible employee. In other words, only 
the minimum amount of law enforcement information necessary to make 
eligibility decisions will be shared with port authorities or maritime 
terminal operators.
  Moreover, this legislation ensures appropriate due process 
protections for port employees who may be subject to a background 
check. In the legislation the Secretary is required to establish an 
appeals process that includes notice and an opportunity for a hearing 
for individuals found to be ineligible for employment as prescribed in 
Section 106. I also agree that this process should evaluate any 
extenuating and mitigating circumstances. I will work to ensure that we 
accomplish these objectives as the port security legislation moves 
forward.


                      Security of Inland Waterways

  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I rise to engage the distinguished chairman 
of the Commerce Committee in a colloquy on very important legislation 
he has sponsored--the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001. This 
legislation, which I am pleased to have cosponsored, would establish 
new Federal safeguards for the security of our ports and maritime 
commerce. I would appreciate the chairman clarifying whether the intent 
of this legislation is to cover not only the security of ports but also 
inland waterways such as the Columbia-Snake River system. This is an 
important issue for the Pacific Northwest region because dams on the 
Columbia and Snake Rivers are not only critical for maritime 
transportation in our region but also a major source of our region's 
energy. Barges pass through the locks on these dams every day carrying 
gasoline and other explosive cargoes that could disrupt our waterways 
or energy production and even put residents downstream at risk of 
flooding if these cargoes exploded while in transit through one of the 
navigation locks. So I would ask my Chairman whether the authority 
provided to the Coast Guard and S. 1214 includes evaluating not just 
security for ports but also inland waterways like the Columbia/Snake 
River system?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate the Senator helping to clarify this point. 
I know it is especially important for the Senator's home State of 
Oregon and the Pacific Northwest region. The answer to the Senator's 
question is yes, the intention is to cover all areas affected by 
maritime transportation and commerce. The legislation covers not only 
seaports but also ``public or commercial structures located within or 
adjacent to the marine environment'' including navigation locks.
  Mr. WYDEN. I thank the Senator for his clarification. I also ask him 
whether under his legislation, the Coast Guard would have authority to 
oversee dangerous cargoes transported along the Columbia/Snake River 
system as well as cargoes in port?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Under the legislation, the Secretary of Transportation 
would issue regulations for security programs for cargo as well for 
protecting passengers, crew members and other workers. The authority 
for security of cargo is broad enough to cover not only cargoes in port 
but also dangerous cargoes anywhere in the maritime navigation system 
including those in transit through navigation locks.
  Mr. WYDEN. I thank the chairman again for answer and commend him for 
his leadership on this important issue.


                         FREIGHT RAIL SECURITY

  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, will my friend, the distinguished 
chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, the Senator from South 
Carolina, yield for the purpose of engaging in a colloquy?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I will be happy to yield for the purpose.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the distinguished chairman of the Commerce 
Committee.
  Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator from South Carolina if 
he would agree that in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th, this nation came to a number of stark realizations 
about our vulnerabilities and the overall state of our security?
  We have become aware that glaring security gaps exist throughout our 
nation's transportation system. The Senator from South Carolina has 
been a leader in focusing the Senate's attention on the need to improve 
the safety of our ports, and he has been steadfast in his support for 
additional protections for our nation's rail passengers. I hope that he 
will agree with me that as

[[Page 27744]]

important as improving the security in those areas is, our job is not 
complete until we pay similar attention to the security of our freight 
rail system.
  One of the most serious vulnerabilities in the nation's 
transportation system is possibility that terrorists may target 
hazardous materials being transported across this nation's vast and 
largely unsecured freight rail network. I am sure the Senator is aware 
that several studies conclude that the chemical industry is 
particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and point to the shipment 
of hazardous materials by rail as one of the most serious threats to 
the industry. In fact, I believe that a study requested by the 
Senator's Appropriations Subcommittee and due to be published this 
month, will come to this very conclusion.
  I do not mean to suggest that transportation of chemicals or other 
hazardous materials should be curtailed. While the transportation of 
hazardous materials poses risks to human health, the expeditious 
movement of certain products, like chlorine for municipal water 
systems, is absolutely essential for the protection of human health.
  The railroad and chemical industries have acknowledged the risks, and 
have taken strides toward improving the security of their facilities, 
hazardous materials shipments, and rolling stock since the September 
11th attacks. These security improvements, and additional security 
enhancements that are planned, will be inordinately costly, perhaps 
reaching as high as $150 million in this calendar year, and another 
$150 million in 2002. I hope the Senator will agree that the 
extraordinary and unforeseen nature of the costs being incurred by 
hazardous materials shippers, tank car owners, and railroads, combined 
with the benefit to human health and public safety that these security 
enhancements represent, justifies a program of short-term federal 
grants to reimburse or defray some of the post-September 11th security-
related expenses these companies are incurring.
  If the Senator from South Carolina does agree with the need to 
improve our nation's rail security, and understands the unprecedented 
outlays that railroads and shippers have made or will make in the near 
future, would he commit to this Senator to hold whatever hearings 
deemed necessary, and to schedule a prompt mark-up in the Commerce 
Committee early in 2002 for legislation of mine to require the 
Secretary of Transportation to conduct a comprehensive terrorism risk 
assessment, and to set up a Rail Security Fund to make the types of 
grants that we have discussed here today?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the Senator for his comments on the state of 
our nation's transportation security, and I agree with his assertion 
that a complete treatment of our security needs would include 
legislation to improve the security of our rail network. I am aware 
that the need for the safe and expeditious rail transportation of 
chemicals and other hazardous materials is essential for our nation's 
economy, and that the movement of some chemicals, including chlorine, 
is necessary for the preservation of public health.
  I am aware also of the security improvements that have been 
undertaken by railroads and hazardous materials shippers. I agree that 
the security-related expenses are extraordinary, and that in the 
interest of protecting the general public from the effects of a 
terrorist attack on hazardous materials shipped by rail, the federal 
government should help these companies on a short-term basis to defray 
their post-September 11th security-related expenses. I will promise the 
Senator from West Virginia that the Commerce Committee will take up the 
issue of rail security as early as possible during the next session of 
the Congress.
  Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Senator from South Carolina, and I thank 
the Presiding Officer.


                            BUS SECURITY ACT

  Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I appreciate the chairman's leadership in 
promoting safety in all modes of passenger and cargo transportation. In 
the Commerce Committee executive session on October 17, the committee 
addressed the important issue of passenger rail safety. The committee 
approved funding for the upgrading of Amtrak tunnels and bridges 
primarily along the much-used Northwest corridor. While I support and 
applaud the goal of increasing passenger rail safety and security--in 
fact I strongly support this legislation--at the same committee session 
I raised the issue of intercity bus security. Attention became acute on 
this issue after the October 3 incident on a Greyhound bus that 
resulted in the death of seven people. Since that event, there have 
been other attempts to cause mayhem on buses, but thankfully, none have 
resulted in deaths. With over 774 million intercity bus passengers 
annually with companies serving over 4,000 communities, we cannot wait 
to act on securing this important mode of transportation.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I appreciate the fact that the Senator from Georgia 
brought this matter to the committee's attention. Bus security is in 
fact an important issue which unfortunately cannot be appropriately 
addressed before the end of this year. I applaud the initiative of the 
Senator from Georgia and leadership on this issue and, in particular, 
his introduction of S. 1739, which establishes a competitive grant 
program to allocate funding to bus companies to increase security and 
safety and creates a research and development program for new 
technologies to increase bus security and safety. It is my intention to 
consider this legislation on the markup calendar of the Commerce 
Committee's first executive session of 2002.
  Mr. CLELAND. I applaud the chairman's decision to advance the issue 
of bus safety. With bus terminals often sharing facilities with both 
airports and rail stations, omitting this critical component of the 
equation leaves a hole in the system. This mode of transportation is 
the largest domestic passenger service provider, and it has grown 
without the aid of federal support. Now that they need assistance to 
supplement their own efforts and protect our citizenry, it is time for 
Congress to act. This industry is made up of many small businesses, 
which may not be able to survive if assistance is not given to help 
boost security in order to bring passengers back to bus travel. 
Otherwise, these businesses may have to increase the cost to the 
customer to pay for the necessary security upgrades.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. As chairman of the Commerce Committee, I am very aware 
of the need of the bus community. It is an important segment of our 
transportation infrastructure. I look forward to working with my 
colleague from Georgia on his legislation at the earliest opportunity 
in 2002.
  Mr. CLELAND. I thank the Senator for his support and attention to 
this matter, and I look forward to working with you in the future on 
this issue of national importance.
  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I seek unanimous consent to say a few 
words about the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001 and the 
herculean efforts of the Senate Commerce Committee Chairman, Senator 
Hollings, to get it passed.
  In the aftermath of September 11, most of the legislation considered 
in this chamber has been reactive in nature. This bill, like Senator 
Byrd's homeland security package, is decidedly different.
  This bill is designed to prevent a terrorist attack on one of our 
nation's most vulnerable pieces of infrastructure--our ports. This bill 
anticipates the possibility of an attack, and sets out to make that 
impossible. This is exactly the kind of legislation that we were sent 
to Congress to pass.
  Yet it would not have passed without the dogged efforts of Senator 
Hollings, who forced the issue as most members of Congress were leaving 
town.
  Finally, I would just like to comment on Senator Holling's use of 
David Stockman's The Triumph of Politics, in his remarks today. I too 
remember those days in the early 1980's, when the Laffer Curve and 
trickle-down economics were coming into vogue. I was a young 
congressman then, and I didn't believe it would work.

[[Page 27745]]

  I still don't. And I share the chairman's disbelief that even after 
September 11--when our Nation's vulnerabilities have been so explicitly 
exposed and the need for additional security resources has been made so 
evident-- we would again travel down that path.
  Mr. President, I thank the Chairman for his efforts on this vital 
piece of legislation.


                         PORT SECURITY, S. 1214

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to thank Chairman Hollings 
and Senator McCain for accepting my amendment to this important bill 
will promote security at our Nation's seaports.
  America's ports provide invaluable links between American 
productivity and markets both here at home and abroad.
  Ports are a critical cog in the wheels of our economy. But quite 
frankly, our ports are vulnerable.
  History has taught us lessons in vulnerability before, whether it be 
the USS Maine in Havana Harbor, the attack on Pearl, or the USS Cole in 
Yemen, ships and shipping are always a risky proposition, especially in 
the confines of port.
  These lessons have new meaning in today's reality of war.
  A single attack, on a single ship, in a single U.S. port could render 
the entire facility immobile.
  What does that mean? No exports of U.S. autos. No freighters carrying 
ore on the Great Lakes. No grain barges up or down the Mississippi 
Rover. Simply put, No trade.
  And perhaps most troubling, no energy.
  In my State the Port of Valdez, at the end of the Alaska Pipeline, is 
responsible for providing much of the West Coast and Hawaii with its 
oil. And in Kenai, the facility sees billions of cubic feet of 
Liquified Natural Gas transferred each year.
  What would happen if these ports were closed by some horrific act? 
How could we move our Nation's domestically produced energy?
  These facilities and others around the U.S. demand our best efforts 
to protect them.
  But a large, and unfortunately growing, role for our ports is the 
importation of foreign-produced energy, crude oil, refined petroleum 
products and liquified natural gas.
  As imported energy becomes a larger share of the U.S. energy supply, 
we become more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
  The energy trade itself creates new terrorist targets.
  In the aftermath of September 11th, the Coast Guard was forced to 
suspend LNG shipments in to Boston Harbor for fear of those ships being 
used for terror.
  What else is aboard those foreign flagged supertankers that enter our 
ports from the Middle East?
  What is hidden in the holds? Biohazards? Chemical warfare?
  What else has that crew been trained to do?
  These situations take on a new sense of reality after September 11.
  My colleagues are well aware of my efforts to reduce our dependence 
on foreign oil and foreign supertankers by using our own domestic 
resources.
  The longer we wait, the more vulnerable we become.
  The majority leader has used parliamentary tactics to subvert the 
will of the Senate and delay voting on our energy independence.
  That is a debate that still lies before us.
  But for today, as long as we remain dependent, we must do all we can 
to protect the safety of those ships and that energy.
  My amendment which is now included in this bill makes certain that 
those who are the most knowledgeable in this most critically-important 
aspect of port operations are full participants in the effort to ensure 
port security.
  It further ensures that when we talk port security, that we're 
talking about our Nation's energy security.
  I greatly appreciate the willingness of the Chairman, Mr. Hollings, 
and the Ranking Republican, Mr. McCain, to accept this amendment.
  This amendment will make a strong and much needed bill even stronger.
  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, I rise today to support the Port and 
Maritime Security Act of 2001 and to speak about the need to protect 
our seaports from terrorist attacks.
  Our seaports are critically important to our national, and global, 
economy. Our seaports enable us to export our goods to the rest of the 
world and allow us to import the goods we do not produce domestically. 
Ninety-five percent of all U.S. overseas trade is conducted through our 
361 public seaports. Roughly 45,000 cargo containers enter the U.S. 
every day.
  Our seaports are also an important component of our national 
security. In the interest of promoting trade, we accept increasing 
traffic in and around our seaports as ships, crew and cargo move goods 
between our nation and others. Yet even as we do this, we must 
recognize that the very volume of cargo moving through our seaports 
makes it difficult to adequately guard against a potential terrorist 
attack.
  Traditionally, our seaports are viewed as highly vulnerable targets 
for terrorist attacks. They are open spaces, full of traffic, and 
difficult to monitor. Yet an attack against one of our larger seaports 
could dramatically impact our domestic economy by destroying cargo, 
eliminating jobs, and shutting off trading routes to other shippers.
  Unfortunately, we have let our guard down with respect to our 
seaports by failing to adequately address the potential for a terrorist 
attack. We know how important our seaports are to our national and 
global economy, yet at best, inspectors are able to examine only about 
two percent of the cargo that passes through our seaports. This means 
that the vast majority of cargo entering our seaports is not inspected 
before the containers are allowed to move throughout the country. We 
can, and must, do better.
  We must improve the quality of and deployment of detection technology 
and we must make sure that those who guard our seaports are equipped to 
prevent an attack. We have technology that scans containers to look for 
suspicious materials and shipments. It is in place right now, but not 
at all our seaports and not even at all of the largest seaports. We 
need to expand the deployment of this type of technology, and make sure 
all our seaports are equipped with the best available scanning 
technology. We must also make sure that the Coast Guard has the 
manpower and equipment it needs to protect our coast and ports and to 
respond in the event of an attack.
  I am so pleased that we are passing the Port Security Bill. This is 
an extremely important piece of legislation and an important component 
of our national defense.
  I would like to take this moment to thank Chairman Hollings for 
working with me on several amendments I had to this important bill.
  When the Commerce Committee held hearings on port security back in 
July, I raised several issues with the witnesses about the security of 
our ports and the ability to protect against a possible terrorist 
threat. I have been working since then to develop legislation to 
address some of the concerns I had that were confirmed at the hearing.
  When the Commerce Committee marked up its port security bill in early 
August, I received assurances from Chairman Hollings that we would 
continue to work to make sure my concerns were addressed when the bill 
came to the Senate floor. At that time, we of course had no idea that 
our country was only a month away from such a horrendous terrorist 
attack.
  But I am pleased that we are now taking up this bill. It will make 
our seaports and our nation safer. And I want to again thank the 
Chairman and Ranking Member for working with me on these amendments and 
for including them in the final bill.
  Specifically, these amendments will: improve our ability to safely 
handle cargo entering our country; provide the Coast Guard with 
additional anti-terrorism resources to protect domestic ports; and 
provide for the most modern security technology to be deployed in 
seaports.
  My first amendment is an anti-tampering amendment that will ensure

[[Page 27746]]

that the cargo we accept in our country has not been altered or 
interfered with. The amendment improves port security by allowing 
Customs to work with ocean shippers to better coordinate the tracking 
of cargo in our ports and across our country. It will improve security 
by enabling Customs to better assist shippers in preventing cargo 
tampering and cargo theft. It will also improve security by enabling 
Customs to track containers as they move cross-country to ensure that 
they are not diverted for criminal or terrorist purposes.
  My second amendment establishes Port and Maritime Security Teams, 
teams of Coast Guard personnel with training in anti-terrorism, drug 
interdiction, and navigation assistance. These units will operate high-
speed boats that are equipped to patrol our coastal waters and respond 
immediately to terrorist or other criminal threats to our coast and 
seaports. Similar teams are already used to protect U.S. vessels in 
foreign ports, my amendment brings them to our domestic defense.
  My final amendment will ensure that the best available technology is 
deployed in our seaports to improve security, identify threats, and 
prevent terrorist attacks. The grant program would cover technologies 
to deal with such security risks as: explosives, firearms, weapons of 
mass destruction, chemical and biological weapons, drug and illegal 
alien smuggling, and trade fraud. This amendment is so important, 
because the type of cargo and containers that move through seaports are 
entirely different than what moves through our airports, and we need to 
make sure we are developing technology that recognizes those 
differences. Only about 2 percent of the cargo entering our seaports is 
inspected, without better technology, we are leaving ourselves too 
vulnerable to those who would exploit our seaports for terrorist or 
criminal activity.
  Again, I would like to express my thanks to Chairman Hollings and 
Senator McCain for helping make sure that these amendments were 
included in the final bill and for making sure that we take aggressive 
action to protect our seaports.


                           Amendment No. 2690

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there is an 
amendment in order. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Hollings], for 
     himself, Mr. McCain, and Mr. Graham, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2690.

  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment. It 
is a managers' amendment agreed to by Senators McCain, Graham, 
Hutchison, and myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
2690.
  The amendment (No. 2690) was agreed to.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I urge passage of the bill, as amended.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield back all time?
  Mr. HOLLINGS. I yield back all time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having been yielded back, the 
question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the 
question is, Shall the bill pass?
  The bill (S. 1214) was passed.
  Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, may I be recognized?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

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