[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 2916-2919]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                              NORTH KOREA

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the situation in 
North Korea. Today President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea is meeting 
with President Bush as part of his official state visit. His visit 
occurs against a hopeful backdrop of the third round of family reunions 
on the divided Korean peninsula. Fathers are greeting their grownup 
sons; sisters are hugging their sisters they haven't seen for a 
generation. Grandmothers are meeting their grandchildren who they have 
never met.
  Tomorrow the distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee and I will host the President of South Korea for coffee here 
on Capitol Hill. Kim's visit will give us a chance to renew the close 
bonds forged in blood in the common struggle against the forces of 
oppression which unite our people in the United States and South Korea.
  I rise today to talk a little bit about the Korean peninsula and the 
important role the United States can play in concert with our South 
Korean allies and other friends to help build lasting peace on that 
peninsula.

[[Page 2917]]

  Yesterday the New York Times published an article by veteran defense 
correspondent Michael Gordon which suggests that a missile deal with 
North Korea may have been within reach last year. As fascinating as 
this rendition of events was and as fascinating as the policies were, 
we now have a new President. The failure or the judgment to not proceed 
with negotiations into the month of January of this year on the part of 
the new President is in fact at this moment irrelevant. We have a new 
President and a new administration. The question squarely now is not 
whether President Clinton should have gone to North Korea; the question 
is whether this administration, the Bush administration, is going to 
build on the progress made over the past 5 years since we narrowly 
averted a nuclear showdown on the Korean peninsula.
  I was pleased to see Secretary of State Powell quoted in a Washington 
Post article today, suggesting this administration was going to pursue 
the possibilities of a better relationship with North Korea and was 
going to leave nothing on the table. I was slightly dismayed to read of 
an informed source in the administration who chose not to be 
identified, demonstrating a great deal more of what seemed to me in the 
article to be not only skepticism, which I share about the intentions 
of North Korea, but unwillingness to pursue vigorously the 
possibilities of further negotiations. Hopefully, I am misreading that 
unidentified highly placed administration official.
  In my view, there is only one correct answer and that is the one 
Secretary Powell has indicated today. For it would be irresponsible not 
to explore to discover whether North Korea is prepared to abandon its 
pursuit of long-range missiles in response to a serious proposal from 
the United States, our friends, and our allies.
  North Korea confronts the United States with a number of security 
challenges. North Korea maintains a huge army of more than 1 million 
men and women in uniform, about 5 percent of its entire population. 
Many of that army are poised on the South Korean border. The threat 
that North Korea opposes extends well beyond the Korean peninsula. Its 
Nodong missile can not only strike all of South Korea but can also 
threaten our ally, Japan. North Korea sells those same missiles to 
anyone who has the cash to buy them. North Korean missile exports to 
Iran and Pakistan have guaranteed, unfortunately, that any future war 
in the Middle East or South Asia will be even more dangerous and more 
destructive than past conflicts in that region.
  North Korean missiles and the very real concern that North Korea 
might even build longer range missiles capable of striking the United 
States are a driving force behind our plans to build a national missile 
defense system.
  If we can remove that threat, that is, the threat from North Korea 
long-range missile possibility, the impact will be huge, not only on 
the security of Northeast Asia but also on our own defense strategy as 
we debate how best to deal with our vulnerability to weapons of mass 
destruction.
  For most of the past 50 years, U.S. soldiers of the 2d Infantry 
Division have looked north from their positions along the DMV at North 
Korean adversaries that appeared unchanging--a hermit kingdom, locked 
in a Stalinist time warp. Indeed, 2 or 3 years ago if I had spoken to 
the American people about landmines, the 38th parallel, and the armies 
of North and South Korea, it would have been to discuss the latest 
northern incursion along what remains the most heavily armed border in 
the world. The troops of the 2d Infantry Division are still standing 
shoulder to shoulder with our South Korean allies. The landmines are 
still there. And much of the tension along the DMZ remains unabated, at 
least for now.
  But maybe, just maybe, things are beginning to change.
  The United States should end our ``prevent defense'' and go on the 
offensive to advance our vital interests--particularly the 
dismantlement of North Korea's long-range missile program. Now is not 
the time for lengthy policy reviews or foot-dragging on existing 
commitments. Now is the time to forge ahead and test North Korea's 
commitment to peace.
  A few weeks ago what had been unthinkable--the opening of direct rail 
transport across the DMZ--became a near term achievable objective. The 
militaries of North and South Korea will soon begin to reconstruct the 
rail links connecting Seoul not only to Pyongyang, but also to China, 
Russia, and Western Europe.
  I remember vividly the moment when the people of East and West Berlin 
decided to tear down the Berlin Wall.
  The Berlin Wall had become a true anachronism: a graffiti-strewn 
relic of a morally, politically, and economically bankrupt Soviet 
regime. Once the East German people had torn down the ideological walls 
in their own minds, tearing down the concrete was a piece of cake.
  The people of North and South Korea are not there yet. But the walls 
are under siege. The establishment of direct rail links will represent 
a major breach in the walls of fear, insecurity, and isolation which 
have built up over the past 50 years.
  Last October, I spoke to this body about testing North Korea's 
willingness to abandon its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. At 
that time, I pointed to some of the hopeful signs that North Korea was 
interested in improving its relations with its neighbors--a missile 
launch moratorium now more than 2 years old, summit meetings with South 
Korea, Russia, and China, and the first tentative steps toward economic 
reform.
  I attributed these North Korean actions to the ``Sunshine Policy'' 
crafted by South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, and to the hard-headed 
engagement strategy implemented by former Secretary of Defense William 
Perry on behalf of the Clinton administration.
  Since last fall, evidence has mounted steadily that North Korea's 
leader Kim Jong-il has indeed decided that nothing short of a major 
overhaul of his economic system and diplomatic relations is likely to 
pull his country back from the brink of starvation and economic 
collapse.
  In addition to the progress on rail links, here are some of the other 
recent developments:
  North Korea has expanded cooperation to search for the remains of 
Americans missing in action from the Korean war. Uniformed U.S. 
military personnel are working along side their North Korean 
counterparts, searching the rice paddies, often in remote areas, in an 
effort to solve 50-year-old mysteries.
  The North has continued modest steps to allow family reunions across 
the DMZ, exposing people from the North to the quality of life enjoyed 
by their brothers and sisters in the South. More than 300 families have 
enjoyed reunion visits, and more are scheduled.
  The North has toned down its customary harsh rhetoric about the U.S. 
and South Korea, substituting a steady diet of editorials outlining the 
North's plans to make economic revitalization its top priority.
  North Korea for the first time last November opened its food 
distribution system to South Korean inspection and also provided a 
detailed accounting of food aid distribution.
  North and South Korea have held defense talks at both the ministerial 
level and subsequently at the working level, and have agreed, at the 
urging of South Korea, to improve military to military communications. 
This is the first step toward confidence building measures that can 
reduce the likelihood that a relatively minor incident along the DMZ 
might escalate into war.
  North and South have established an economic cooperation panel and 
launched a joint study of North Korea's energy needs.
  North and South Korean flood control experts met last month in 
Pyongyang for talks on cooperation in efforts along the Imjin River, 
which crosses the border between the two countries.
  The North Koreans have dispatched a team of financial experts to 
Washington to examine what it would take for North Korea to earn 
support from international financial institutions once it has taken the 
steps necessary to satisfy U.S. anti-terrorism laws.

[[Page 2918]]

  And, as I mentioned above, the North has not test-fired a missile for 
more than 2\1/2\ years, and has pledged not to do so while negotiations 
with the United States on the North's missile program continue.
  Five years ago when people spoke of ``North Korean offensives,'' they 
were referring to the threat of a North Korean assault across the DMZ.
  Today, Kim Jong-il is mounting an offensive, but it is a diplomatic 
and economic offensive, not a military one. Over the past 12 months, 
North Korea has established diplomatic relations with almost all of the 
nations of Western Europe. Planning is underway for an unprecedented 
trip by Kim Jong-il to Seoul to meet with President Kim Dae-jung later 
this year.
  Finally, Kim Jong-il has publicly embraced China's model of economic 
reform. His celebrated January visit to Shanghai and his open praise of 
Chinese economic reforms indicates that Kim is driving North Korea 
toward a future in which it would be more closely integrated 
economically and politically to the rest of East Asia and the world.
  What are we to make of all of this? How should we respond?
  I want to be clear about why I find these developments so promising. 
I am not a fan of Kim Jong-il. No one should think that his motives are 
noble or humanitarian.
  Over the years, Kim Jong-il has shown himself willing to go to any 
length--including state-sponsored terrorism--to preserve his regime.
  I have no reason to believe he has abandoned his love of dictatorship 
in favor of constitutional democracy. Far from it.
  Kim Jong-il is betting that he can emerge from a process of change at 
the head of a North Korean society that is more prosperous, stable, and 
militarily capable than it is today, but still a dictatorship.
  But frankly, the reasons why Kim Jong-il is pursuing economic reform 
and diplomatic opening are not as important as the steps he will have 
to take along the way.
  If North Korea's opening is to succeed, the North will have to 
address many of the fundamentals which make it so threatening--
especially the gross distortion of its domestic spending priorities in 
favor of the military. The North cannot revitalize its economy while 
spending 25 percent of its gross domestic product on weaponry.
  The North cannot obtain meaningful, sustained foreign investment 
without addressing the lack of transparency in its economy as well as 
the absence of laws and institutions to protect investors and 
facilitate international trade.
  North Korea's pursuit of economic reform and diplomatic opening 
presents the United States with a golden opportunity, if we are wise 
enough to seize it.
  We should welcome the emergence of North Korea from its shell not 
because North Korea's motives are benign, but because we have a chance, 
in concert with our allies, to shape its transformation into a less 
threatening country.
  If we play our cards right, North Korea's opening can lead to a less 
authoritarian regime that is more respectful of international norms--
all without any shots being fired in anger.
  I point out, a number of old Communist dictators had thought they 
could move in an easy transition from the Communist regime that has 
clearly failed to a market economy, or integration with the rest of the 
world, and still maintain their power.
  None, none--none has succeeded thus far. I believe it is an oxymoron 
to suggest that North Korea can emerge and become an engaged partner in 
world trade without having to fundamentally change itself and in the 
process, I believe, end up a country very different from what we have 
now.
  I am delighted that Secretary Powell has expressed his support for 
this hard-headed brand of engagement with North Korea. As he testified 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month:

       We are open to a continued process of engagement with the 
     North so long as it addresses political, economic, and 
     security concerns, is reciprocal, and does not come at the 
     expense of our alliance relationships.

  This is precisely the kind of engagement I have in mind. I think we 
should get on with it.
  North Korea knows that under our nonproliferation laws it cannot gain 
unfettered access to trade, investment, and technology without first 
halting its development and export of long-range ballistic missile 
technology and submitting its nuclear program to full-scope safeguards 
under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
  North Korea knows it won't get World Bank loans as long as it remains 
on our list of nations that condone international terrorism or provide 
sanctuary for terrorists. In order to get off that list, North Korea 
must end all support for terrorist organizations and must cooperate 
fully with the Japanese government to resolve the question of Japanese 
citizens abducted from Japan--some more than 20 years ago.
  In other words, Mr. President, if North Korea is to turn around its 
moribund economy and fully normalize relations with its neighbors, it 
will have to take steps which are demonstrably in our national interest 
and in the national interests of our allies.
  We should do everything in our power to ensure that North Korea does 
not diverge from the path it is now on.
  Specifically, we should continue to provide generous humanitarian 
relief to starving North Korean children. Nothing about the situation 
on the peninsula will be improved by the suffering of North Korean 
children racked by hunger and disease.
  We should continue to abide by the terms of the Agreed Framework, so 
long as North Korea does the same. We should not unilaterally start 
moving the goal posts. The Agreed Framework has effectively capped the 
North's ability to produce fissile material with which to construct 
nuclear weapons. Under the terms of Agreed Framework, North Korea 
placed its nuclear program under International Atomic Energy Agency 
safeguards and halted work on two unfinished heavy water nuclear 
reactors in exchange for the promise of proliferation-resistant light 
water nuclear reactors and heavy fuel oil deliveries for electric power 
generation. Without the Agreed Framework, North Korea might already 
have sufficient fissile material with which to construct dozens of 
nuclear bombs.


             missile agreement possible--patience required

  Finally, Mr. President, we should engage North Korea in a serious 
diplomatic effort aimed at an iron-clad agreement to end forever the 
North's pursuit of long range missiles.
  In discussions with U.S., Russian, and Chinese officials, North Korea 
has signaled its willingness to give up the export, and possibly the 
development, of long-range missiles, in response to the right package 
of incentives. Such an agreement would remove a direct North Korean 
threat to the region and improve prospects for North-South 
reconciliation. It would also remove a major source of missiles and 
missile technology for countries such as Iran.
  Getting an agreement will not be easy, but it helps a lot that we are 
not the only country which would benefit from the dismantlement of 
North Korea's missile program. Our allies South Korea and Japan, our 
European allies who already provide financial support for the Agreed 
Framework, the Chinese, the Russians, all share a desire to see North 
Korea devote its meager resources to food, not rockets. The only 
countries which want to see North Korea building missiles are its 
disreputable customers.
  A tough, verifiable agreement to eliminate the North's long-range 
missile threat might be possible in exchange for reasonable U.S. 
assistance that would help North Korea feed itself and help convert 
missile plants to peaceful manufacturing.
  Some people are impatient for change in North Korea. They want to 
adopt a more confrontational approach, including rushing ahead to 
deploy an unproven, hugely expensive, and potentially destabilizing 
national missile defense system.
  I understand their frustration and share their desire for action 
against the threat of North Korean ballistic missiles.

[[Page 2919]]

  But foreclosing diplomatic options by rushing to deploy NMD is not 
the right antidote. Sure, a limited ground-based national missile 
defense might someday be capable of shooting down a handful of North 
Korean missiles aimed at Los Angeles, but it will do nothing to defend 
our Asian allies from a North Korean missile attack.
  Nor will it defend us from a nuclear bomb smuggled into the country 
aboard a fishing trawler or a biological toxin released into our water 
supply. NMD will not defend U.S. forces on Okinawa or elsewhere in the 
Pacific theater. It will do nothing to prevent North Korea from 
wielding weapons of mass destruction against Seoul, much of which is 
actually within artillery range of North Korea.
  Moreover, a rush to deploy an unproven national missile defense, 
particularly absent a meaningful strategic dialog with China, could 
jeopardize the cooperative role China has played in recent years on the 
Korean Peninsula. Given our common interest in preventing North Korea 
from becoming a nuclear weapons power, the United States and China 
should work in concert, not at cross purposes.


                       Opening North Korean Eyes

  North Korea's opening has given the North Korean people a fresh look 
at the outside world--like a gopher coming out of its hole--with 
consequences which could be profound over the long haul. Hundreds of 
foreigners are in North Korea today, compared with a handful just a few 
years ago.
  Foreigners increasingly are free to travel widely in the country and 
talk to average North Koreans without government interference. North 
Korea has even begun to issue tourist visas. The presence of foreigners 
in North Korea is gradually changing North Korean attitudes about South 
Korea and the West.
  One American with a long history of working in North Korea 
illustrated the change underway by describing an impromptu encounter he 
had recently.
  While he was out on an unescorted morning walk, a North Korean woman 
approached him and said, ``You're not a Russian, are you? You're a 
Miguk Nom aren't you?''
  Her expression translates roughly into ``You're an American 
imperialist bastard, eh?''
  The American replied good-naturedly, ``Yes, I am an American 
imperialist bastard.''
  To which the woman replied quite sincerely, ``Thanks very much for 
the food aid!''
  Another American, a State Department official accompanying a World 
Food Program inspection team, noted that hundreds of people along the 
road waved and smiled, and in the case of soldiers, saluted, as the 
convoy passed.
  He also reports that many of 80 million woven nylon bags used to 
distribute grain and emblazoned with the letters ``U.S.A.'' are being 
recycled by North Koreans for use as everything from back-packs to rain 
coats. These North Koreans become walking billboards of American aid 
and generosity of spirit.
  North Korea is just one critical challenge in a region of enormous 
importance to us. We cannot separate our policy there from our overall 
approach in East Asia.
  We cannot hope that decisions we make about national missile defense, 
Taiwan policy, or support for democracy and rule of law in China will 
be of no consequence to developments on the Korean Peninsula. To the 
contrary, we need to think holistically and comprehensively about East 
Asia policy.
  Our interests are vast. Roughly one-third of the world's population 
resides in East Asia. In my lifetime, East Asia has gone from less than 
3 percent of the world GDP in 1950 to roughly 25 percent today.
  Four of our 10 largest trading partners--Japan, China, Taiwan, and 
South Korea, are in East Asia.
  Each of those trading partners is also one of the world's top ten 
economies as measured by gross domestic product. China, Japan, and 
South Korea together hold more than $700 billion in hard currency 
reserves--half of the world's total.
  East Asia is a region of economic dynamism. Last year Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and South Korea grew by more than 10 percent, shaking off the 
East Asian financial crisis and resuming their characteristic vitality. 
U.S. exports to the region have grown dramatically in recent years. 
U.S. exports to Southeast Asia, for instance, surpass our exports to 
Germany and are double our exports to France. U.S. direct investment in 
East Asia now tops $150 billion, and has tripled over the past decade.
  And of course these are just a few of the raw economic realities 
which underscore East Asia's importance. The United States has 
important humanitarian, environmental, energy, and security interests 
throughout the region.
  We have an obligation, it seems to me, not to drop the ball. We have 
a vital interest in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia. We 
have good friends and allies--like President Kim Dae Jung of South 
Korea--who stand ready to work with us toward that goal. It is vital 
that we not drop the ball; miss an opportunity to end North Korea's 
deadly and destabilizing pursuit of long range missiles. I don't know 
that an agreement can be reached. In the end North Korea may prove too 
intransigent, too truculent, for us to reach an accord.
  But I hope the Bush administration will listen closely to President 
Kim today, and work with him to test North Korea's commitment to peace. 
We should stay the course on an engagement policy that has brought the 
peninsula to the brink, not of war, but of the dawning of a brave new 
day for all the Korean people.
  I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from California is 
recognized.

                          ____________________