[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 2]
[Senate]
[Pages 2102-2103]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



            THE CTBT AND A NATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and how it fits into an integrated national non-
proliferation policy. We all agree that proliferation of nuclear 
weapons is a bad thing. Slowing or halting new countries from acquiring 
nuclear weapons, or keeping current nuclear states from developing new, 
more powerful weapons is not a Democrat or Republican--it is a 
necessity. It also is not a new idea.
  Since the end of World War II, every president has worked on ways to 
reduce other countries' access to nuclear weapons and their reasons for 
trying to acquire them. By mutual security alliances and numerous 
international agreements, we have succeeded in slowing the development 
of nuclear weapons. But, the game has changed. A number of smaller 
states may see nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, 
as the only way to counter the unparalleled superiority of American 
conventional military power. Therefore, the United States has more 
reason than ever to lead global efforts to stop proliferation.
  A national non-proliferation program needs to include diplomatic, 
economic, scientific and military tools, all honed and accessible for 
particular proliferation problems. One such tool should be the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT. It is time for a responsible, calm

[[Page 2103]]

reconsideration of the CTBT. Former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman 
General Shalikashvili's recent report addresses many of the questions 
and concerns raised in objection to the CTBT. I urge any of my 
colleagues who have not had a chance to read his report to do so. 
General Shalikashvili states that the CTBT ``. . . is a very important 
part of global non-proliferation efforts and is compatible with keeping 
a safe, reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent . . . an objective and thorough 
net assessment shows convincingly that U.S. interests, as well as those 
of friends and allies, will be served by the Treaty's entry into 
force.''
  The CTBT does not mean an end to the threat of nuclear war or nuclear 
terrorism or nuclear proliferation. It is, however, a step in the right 
direction of containing these threats. Of course there are risks, but 
they exist with or without the CTBT. These risks can be better managed 
with the treaty than without it. An integrated and comprehensive non-
proliferation strategy is required, of which the CTBT is a crucial 
part. In his report, General Shalikashvili outlines recommendations to 
make such a strategy.
  Is the CTBT verifiable? With or without the CTBT, we will always need 
reliable information about nuclear testing activity. The CTBT gives us 
new sources of information and creates greater political clout for 
uncovering and addressing suspected violations. There is more to the 
verification regime than the International Monitoring System, which by 
itself will be an impressive network of 321 stations and 16 
laboratories. There are also stations and satellites owned and operated 
by governments, research institutions, universities, and commercial 
companies.
  A report by the Independent Commission on the Verifiability of the 
CTBT concludes that when all the resources are put into place, they 
will be able to detect, locate and identify all relevant events. 
Monitoring and verification will involve a complex and constantly 
evolving network, which any potential violator will have to confront. A 
treaty evader would need to muffle the seismic signal, ensure that no 
signature particles or gas escape the cavity, as well as avoid the 
creation of surface evidence, such as a crater. And, all test 
preparations, such as making a cavity or buying materials, would have 
to be done without causing suspicion. Only the United States and the 
former Soviet Union have ever been able to carry off such a test. How 
likely could an emerging nuclear weapon state do so? Some have argued 
that advancing technology would make hiding such a test easier, but 
that assumes all monitoring and detection technology will stand still. 
New technologies and the expansion of a global monitoring regime will 
make it more difficult to conceal such tests.
  What about the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapon 
stockpile? General Shalikashvili, former Secretary of Defense Cohen, 
former Secretary of Energy Richardson, the Commander in Chief of U.S. 
Strategic Command, the directors of the three nuclear weapon 
laboratories, and numerous experts agree that the nation's nuclear 
stockpile is safe and reliable and that nuclear testing is not needed 
at this time. In the Armed Services Committee Department of Energy 
oversight hearing last week, Secretary of Energy Abraham stated ``. . . 
that the results of the most recent process, which was just completed 
in January, enjoys the full confidence of the lab directors and the 
certification that just took place by my predecessor and the immediate 
past Secretary of Defense, another one of our former colleagues, is one 
that I have high confidence in.'' The United States has no alternative 
to the Stockpile Stewardship Program unless we want to return to the 
level of nuclear testing prior to the testing moratorium. The annual 
certification process provides a clear, candid and careful assessment 
of each nuclear weapon type in the stockpile.
  I am especially concerned about recent news reports that President 
Bush wants to cut back funds for the Stockpile Stewardship Program. 
During the presidential campaign, President Bush stated that, while he 
was in favor of the nuclear weapon testing moratorium, he was opposed 
to CTBT ratification because it ``is not enforceable'' and it would 
``stop us from ensuring the safety and reliability of our nation's 
deterrent, should the need arise.'' For the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program to work, it must have both sufficient funds and a strong 
commitment from the Congress and Administration.
  I do not believe that the American public wants to see resumed 
nuclear weapon testing, nor do they want any other country to do so. We 
all agree that the spread of weapons of mass destruction is one of the 
greatest national security threats we face. The CTBT establishes an 
international norm against nuclear testing while preserving the 
undisputed U.S. advantage in nuclear weapon technology. It reduces the 
likelihood that significant new threats will arise from proliferating 
nations while enhancing the already formidable U.S. monitoring 
capability. Finally, it strengthens our ability to persuade other 
nations to respect the obligations of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Regime.
  We need to examine all the risks in a careful and deliberate manner, 
just as General Shalikashvili has done. Two days before the Senate's 
October 1999 vote against ratification of the CTBT, 62 of our 
colleagues sent a bipartisan letter to their respective leaders 
requesting that consideration of the Treaty be postponed until the next 
Congress. It is now sixteen months later. Let us work together to 
discuss how, not if, the U.S. should lead global efforts to deal with 
nuclear proliferation.

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