[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 16]
[SEN]
[Pages 22688-22691]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                      SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC ISSUES

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I compliment the distinguished leader--and 
he is still my leader--the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, 
Senator Byrd, on his speech and his remembrance relative to 
Thanksgiving.
  I also rise to compliment him on his speech that I only heard in my 
office relating to strategic doctrine and strategic weapons. Quite 
frankly, I am a little embarrassed. I thought he was going to make the 
Thanksgiving speech first. I wished to be here for his comments on what 
is going on now in Crawford, TX, with President Bush and President 
Putin.
  Today, I think we all agree we have an opportunity to reach a 
reasonable agreement with the Russians on the three most significant 
strategic issues of our day: missile defense, strategic arms 
reductions, and nonproliferation. Senator Byrd and I and others have 
had a chance to meet with Mr. Putin in a larger group. Based on private 
discussions with him and on reports of what he has said in his meetings 
with President Bush, it seems as though genuine progress has been made 
in the summit this week between President Bush and President Putin.
  I respectfully suggest--and I believe the President would probably 
agree--that much more needs to be done. It seems to me that, in 
conjunction with what Senator Byrd said earlier, it is vital for us to 
continue to make progress, and it is equally vital that the United 
States refrain from actions that would make further agreements on these 
vital issues difficult, if not impossible.
  President Bush has made clear--in the ten months since he has been 
President--his determination to proceed on the development of a limited 
missile defense system, despite any limitations in the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty of 1972. Now, we have had very conflicting accounts from 
his representatives in the administration before the Intelligence 
Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Foreign Relations 
Committee as to whether or not they were ``prepared to break out of the 
ABM treaty'' based on planned testing, or needed testing, to further 
determine the feasibility of a limited missile defense.
  But one thing has come through consistently: President Bush has 
stated his determination to do whatever it takes to develop a limited 
missile defense. Obviously, Russian officials have heard him, and they 
understand his determination to proceed.
  But--and it is a big but--President Putin, in his discussion with 
some of us Senators and in his public statements, has made it clear 
that he still considers the ABM Treaty a critical element in the 
agreements that govern strategic relations between the United States 
and his country.
  President Bush and President Putin seem to have achieved a personal 
rapport over the last 6 months that bolsters President Putin's 
confidence that we mean no harm to Russia. I have said before, somewhat 
facetiously but only somewhat, that as a student of history--although 
not to the extent of my friend from West Virginia, and I mean that 
seriously--I cannot think of any Russian leader, other than a tsar 
Peter the Great, who looked further west than this gentleman, Mr. 
Putin, seems to be looking.
  He seems to have made a very fundamental and significant decision 
that the future of his country lies in the West. He has taken some 
political chances at home. How significant they are, we do not know, 
but nonetheless, he has, to use the vernacular, stiffed both the browns 
and the reds, the nationalists and the former Communists, in making 
such a dramatic statement about his intentions to live and thrive in 
the West. He has even dismantled Russia's listening post in Cuba as a 
demonstration of the lack of feeling of hostility toward the United 
States.
  I will say that President Bush has succeeded in communicating to the 
President of Russia that we mean no harm; that the Cold War is over. In 
fact, Secretary Powell said in Asia that the post-Cold War is also 
over. This is the opportunity for a fundamental new beginning. But the 
beginning does not necessarily mean the end, and clearly to Putin it 
does not mean the end, to the ABM Treaty. President Putin appears to 
have internalized President Bush's assertion that he is not an enemy 
and that Russia is not an enemy--but President Putin is still unwilling 
to bend the ABM Treaty.
  He is willing, however, to let the United States proceed with the 
testing and development of missile defense, so long as the ABM Treaty 
remains in force. That seems to me to be a sensible arrangement.
  The part that gets difficult is the part to which the Senator from 
West Virginia spoke. If, in fact, we are, in practical terms, about to 
amend the ABM Treaty--this is a government with equal branches--that is 
something about which we in the Senate get to have a say. We should be 
in on that deal, as Russell Long used to say. That is a deal we should 
be in on.
  I am very happy the President appears not to be intent at this moment 
on withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, which I think would be a tragic 
mistake--not only substantively as it relates to arms control but 
diplomatically as it relates to our relations around the world. I am 
anxious to hear what the President has in mind, however, in terms of 
how, in effect, to ratify--not in the constitutional sense, 
necessarily--but how to ratify whatever agreement he reaches with Mr. 
Putin.
  If I am not mistaken, my friend from West Virginia said that 
President Bush said--and I recall President Bush saying this, but I am 
paraphrasing--we can do this on a handshake.
  Handshakes are great--and I admire and I trust the President's 
resolve and

[[Page 22689]]

I trust his sense of honor and I believe he means what he says and will 
stick to it when he shakes hands. I am even prepared to acknowledge 
that is probably true with President Putin as well--but a handshake is 
not the stuff upon which these kinds of agreements should rest 
ultimately.
  The goal of our policy should not be to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, 
as some continue to urge. I think they miss the point. The goal should 
be to maximize our national security interests rather than to win some 
debating point over the relevance of arms control agreements in this 
post-cold-war era.
  With regard to strategic weapons, President Bush announced this week 
that the United States will reduce its force level over the next 10 
years to somewhere between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads.
  The devil is in the details--for example, ``deployed warheads.'' To 
date, I have not gotten an explanation of what is going to happen with 
``all the other warheads,''--roughly 4,000 additional warheads, not 
just ours, but the Russians' as well, because President Putin promised 
to do the same thing, to cut his forces as well. I assume--and this is 
a little premature--but I assume he is also talking about ``deployed'' 
nuclear weapons, as opposed to all the nuclear weapons in your 
possession.
  That is excellent progress as far as it goes, Mr. President, and I do 
not mean to sound as if I am trying to rain on the President's parade. 
I think what he is doing is very helpful. Now, though, it seems to me--
and obviously to the chairman of the Appropriations Committee--
Presidents Bush and Putin should agree on a means by which they can 
verify that each country is complying with its promise.
  Even if the Lord Almighty came down and stood in the well of the 
Senate and said: I guarantee to all you Senators and all America and 
all the world that both Putin and Bush will keep their agreements, that 
would not be quite good enough for me. God willing, Presidents Bush and 
Putin will remain healthy, and I am sure President Bush expects to 
remain in power for 4 years beyond his term. But it may be that he will 
not be President in 3 years, and Mr. Putin may not be President in 3 
years. For great countries to have such fundamental decisions rest upon 
personal assurances between two honorable men is not sufficient--not 
because the men are not honorable, not because they are not intent on 
keeping their promises, but because they are not immortal; they are not 
going to be around forever.
  It seems to me they should make sure, whatever each side is 
promising, that it is able to be determined with some objectivity. This 
would avoid significant misunderstandings of the sort that, I remind my 
colleagues, have plagued us in the past regarding the Russian promises 
on tactical nuclear weapons made a decade ago.
  U.S. force planners benefit from predictability in Russian strategic 
forces. The more we know about what is going on in the Russian nuclear 
force posture, the easier it is to determine how we should deal with 
them, how we should counter them. With a handshake, all we know is what 
President Putin says to the press or in private to President Bush. That 
is all we know. With a written agreement, we have specific commitments. 
U.S.-Russian relations will benefit from knowing what each has 
promised--and what we and they have not promised.
  I go back to the promises made by both Presidents Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin. In fact, what happened was that Gorbachev and Yeltsin made an 
agreement they intended to keep, and they may, in fact, have kept it.
  In January of this year, I remind my colleagues, some of our friends 
who do not like arms control agreements and were much less trusting of 
Russia than they seem to be today raised questions over whether Russia 
had violated its 1991 and 1992 promises to cut back on tactical nuclear 
weapons. That was an issue before this body in the beginning of this 
year, discussed in this town among the nuclear theologians, discussed 
in this town among those interested in strategic doctrine and strategic 
weapons. Had the Russians kept their promise?
  Part of the problem was that people were not sure what Gorbachev or 
Yeltsin had actually promised to do. That was part of the problem.
  Verification obviously helps. Without a formal agreement of some 
sort, however, generally one does not get verification.
  The allegation in January of 2001 was that Russia was storing nuclear 
weapons in Kaliningrad and people wanted to inspect those sites. We 
heard some concern from my friends, saying the Russians have these 
missiles hidden in barns and they took them out of silos but they have 
them on rail, and on and on, trying to demonstrate a short 8 months ago 
that we cannot trust the Russians.
  It caused a bit of a furor because one of the arguments concerning 
why we should do away with the ABM Treaty was that we ought to do away 
with this treaty because the Russians do not keep these treaties, and 
Lord only knows what they are doing, and we have to build this national 
missile defense. That was only in January of this year.
  But when people suggested that we inspect those sites--because we 
thought, as some asserted, they had stored nuclear weapons there--there 
were no grounds to request the inspection, let alone demand one, 
because there was no agreement attendant to the promise of Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin to, in fact, allow for verification.
  Why do I bring this up? To say the Russians cannot be trusted? No.
  What happens is that when there is doubt about issues such as nuclear 
weapons, people always err on the side of the worst case because we 
almost cannot afford not to--because if we are wrong, we are, no pun 
intended, dead wrong; we are really wrong.
  So what happened as a consequence of the January dispute about 
whether or not they had kept their 1991 promise? What happened was it 
bred mistrust. Remember all the articles that occurred in January and 
February and March and actually began during the last campaign? This 
administration got off to an incredibly rocky start with Russia.
  The President has made that right, and I compliment him for it, but 
now we have stalled. We have sort of stumbled through 9 months of lost 
opportunity.
  The point is, when there is no independent means to verify--when a 
new President comes into office, the next President, whoever that is--
how does he or she judge whether or not the commitment is being kept? I 
promise he or she will be buffeted on every side by those within the 
Defense Department, the intelligence community and the think-tanks who 
are whispering in his or her ear saying: Hey, they are not keeping the 
deal.
  The same problems can and do occur regarding strategic weapons. How 
will we know if Russia has reduced its weapons numbers? Will it remove 
them from launchers and silos, or only say that certain weapons are no 
longer operational? How will we know? That was the basis of a big 
debate not too long ago, I remind my friend--although I do not have to 
remind my friend--from West Virginia. That was the basis of a big 
debate.
  How are we going to know? What is Russia really promising to do? The 
only misunderstanding that is worse than one that was intended is one 
that was unintended. Maybe they are going to be keeping their word, but 
how will we know?
  I promise, there will be many voices questioning whether the Russians 
are keeping the agreement, and if there is no independent means to 
verify it, our questioning then breeds distrust as to whether or not 
the Americans really are looking for a way out: Are they really with 
us? Did they really mean to enter into this?
  What is Russia really promising to do? That, I hope, will be made 
clear, because even that is in question.
  It is not wise to make assertions that you will reduce weapons to 
between 1,700 and 2,200. I guarantee there will be people in this 
Chamber saying the Russians really said they would be down to 1,700 by 
such and such a date, and there are 2,200.

[[Page 22690]]

  I might add, what is going to happen to those warheads that are not 
deployed? For that matter, how will Russia or the American people know 
if the United States reduces its arms? What are we promising to do? Are 
we promising to destroy the weapons, as the START agreements require us 
to do, such that when we get the force numbers down, we get rid of the 
rest? Or are we only promising we will decommission them in the sense 
that we will put them in a barn, we will put them in a hangar, able to 
be reloaded, but we are not going to have them on station and targeted 
somewhere?
  Will Russia change its training doctrine in the absence of a formal 
treaty? I remind people when Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed with the 
first President Bush to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, they said that 
without a formal agreement they could not change Russian training.
  What does that have to do with anything? Rather than deciding they 
were going to act as if they had decommissioned the weapons, which they 
said they had, what did they do? They continued to train Russian forces 
to make war with the weapons they said were no longer deployed. So what 
then happened?
  I am sure my colleagues from West Virginia and Montana and I must 
have attended intelligence meetings where we would be told the 
following: They said they had decommissioned these weapons, but yet 
look at the manual; their doctrine still says they are going to plan to 
use them. So that must mean they have not decommissioned them. How do 
we know? And yet Gorbachev and Yeltsin had said at the start, without a 
verifiable agreement we are not going to change our manual because we 
may have to pull those suckers out of storage and use them if you guys 
turn out not to keep your side of the deal.
  What will we do? Will we, too, train our troops to make war with 
weapons we say are no longer deployed? Will other countries take heart 
because we have fewer deployed weapons, or will they look at our total 
stockpile and say that our reductions are a sham?
  Again, I have no doubt that President Bush will keep his word and do 
the right thing, but we cannot, in my view, expect other countries to 
have as much trust in us as we have in ourselves.
  I will never forget the first time I was sent by the man who is now 
the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, and who was then the 
leader of the U.S. Senate--he may remember--asked me as a relatively 
young Senator in 1979, when the SALT II agreement was under 
consideration, to lead a group of new Senators who were uncertain about 
whether or not they were for this new arms control agreement. It was in 
the face of this scare that the Russians had bases in Cuba, and we were 
trying to push the treaty through. The Carter administration wanted it. 
I led a delegation of 10 or 12 Senators--great Senators who are no 
longer in the Senate, Bradley, Boren, Pryor, and a number of others, 
because they were just elected that year. We sat down with Leonid 
Brezhnev, who was the Russian President at the time. Brezhnev came into 
their Cabinet room. We were all on one side, and Brezhnev and Kosygin 
on the other side, and it opened the following way: He welcomed us. We 
had contemporaneous translation.
  Brezhnev looked at me, and he said: ``Let's get two things straight, 
Senator. The first thing is, when I was your age I had an important 
job.'' He went on to tell me his job, along with Kosygin, was to supply 
Leningrad in the siege of Leningrad, making it clear ``you are a young 
man, Senator.'' He wanted me to know he had been important for a long 
time. I got the message.
  The second thing he said, and this is literally what he said: ``Let's 
agree that we do not trust each other, and we have good reason not to 
trust each other.''
  He went on to say: ``You Americans believe, with every fiber of your 
being, that you would never use nuclear weapons.'' You believe you 
would never use them against us first. But I hope you understand why we 
think you might.
  Then he went on to say: ``You are the only nation in the history of 
mankind that has ever used nuclear weapons. You used them against 
civilian populations.''
  He quickly added: ``I am not second-guessing that, but you used them. 
So you have to understand we might think you might use them again.''
  A point well taken. No matter how well intended either side is, we 
cannot expect other nations to trust our resolve as much as we trust 
our resolve. So if we want others to trust us and we want to be able to 
trust Russia in the years to come, we should remember Ronald Reagan's 
advice: Trust but verify.
  I am encouraged by President Bush's statement, following his force 
reductions announcement: If we need to write it down on a piece of 
paper, I would be glad to do that.
  He should. I hope he will. I also hope that piece of paper comes our 
way for us to take a look at. A new START III treaty would not be 
difficult to draft. It would ensure not only rigorous verification but 
also proper respect for the constitutional role of the Senate regarding 
international agreements.
  There are also grounds for hope regarding the problem of 
proliferation and Russia's relations with Iraq and Iran. For the first 
time, Russians are saying there is no longer a strategic rationale for 
putting trade above nonproliferation in Russia's relations with Iran 
and Iraq. The question now is money. It is not a question of Russia's 
place in the world. That place is clearly with us in the West and in 
opposition to proliferation.
  We and our allies can provide the money that Russia needs to maintain 
economic growth and well-being, in return for new Russian policies and 
actions that refrain from proliferating weapons in that part of the 
world.
  We can offer Russia debt relief on its Soviet-era obligations to the 
United States and other countries. Russia could use a significant 
proportion of the proceeds of that debt relief on non-proliferation 
programs to secure its sensitive materials and to provide new, civilian 
careers for its many weapons scientists who could otherwise become prey 
to offers from rogue states or terrorist groups.
  Senator Lugar of Indiana and I have encouraged the Administration to 
consider this option. We also have legislation to authorize such debt 
relief, which the Foreign Relations Committee has approved unanimously.
  The U.N. could authorize a major increase in the Iraqi Oil for Food 
program--which would revitalize Iraq's oil production infrastructure--
in return for devoting the proceeds to payment of Iraq's foreign debt, 
especially its debt to Russia. That would free Russia to pursue the 
issue of United Nations inspections on the basis of strategic concerns 
alone.
  Senators Domenici and Lugar propose that we provide loan guarantees 
to Russia in return for Russia reducing its fissile material 
stockpiles.
  Missile defense, strategic arms and non-proliferation affect not only 
Russia and the United States, but the future of the whole world. The 
opportunities for U.S.-Russian cooperation--if we seize them--hold the 
promise of a transformed world in which international cooperation is 
the norm, with Russia and the United States leading the way.
  But we must seize those opportunities.
  And we must not waste those opportunities by engaging in purely 
ideological actions, like withdrawing from the ABM Treaty when there is 
no rational need to do that.
  I conclude by saying that I compliment my friend from West Virginia 
who is, as usual, the first person to come to the floor and speak to 
this issue. It is vitally important. I hope the President and the 
administration listen to his advice. I think he is dead right.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Delaware for his statement. I well remember in 1987, with respect to 
the INF

[[Page 22691]]

Treaty, the Reagan administration sought to reinterpret the provisions 
of the ABM Treaty--to reinterpret those provisions because the Reagan 
administration did not want to live up to the ABM Treaty. They wanted 
to get away from that ABM Treaty. There were some people in that 
administration who sought to reinterpret the ABM Treaty. But as we 
prepared for the subsequent approval by this U.S. Senate of the 
ratification of the INF Treaty, the distinguished Senator from Delaware 
was adamant in insisting that there be an amendment written to provide 
that there be no reinterpretation of any treaty by a subsequent 
administration; that the treaty had to be interpreted based on the four 
corners of the treaty plus interpretation of the treaty as explained by 
witnesses of the administration in power at the time the treaty was 
ratified. Any new understanding would have to be agreed upon by the 
executive branch and the legislative branch.
  The distinguished Senator from Delaware rendered a great service in 
that instance, as did the then-Senator from Georgia, Mr. Nunn, who was 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee; the then-Senator from 
Oklahoma, Mr. Boren, who was chairman of the Intelligence Committee; 
and the then-chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Pell.
  Mr. BIDEN. That is correct.
  Mr. BYRD. Those three Senators and I insisted on having it in writing 
from the Soviets. And Secretary of State Shultz went to--I guess it was 
Paris--went to Europe, at least, and worked with Mr. Shevardnadze, I 
believe, and came back with a document in writing saying that all 
parties agreed that that would be the interpretation, that there would 
not be any subsequent reinterpretation by any administration, any 
subsequent President. Because if that were the case, how could we ever 
depend upon any treaty as having credibility, if a subsequent 
administration could reinterpret it according to its own wishes?
  How would a subsequent administration interpret an ``understanding'' 
that was entered into by a handshake? All the more reasons for wanting 
to see it in writing and having it debated by the elected 
representatives of the people.
  I thank the distinguished Senator.
  Mr. BIDEN. I ask unanimous consent to speak for 30 seconds.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, to reaffirm what the Senator says, I do not 
think anyone should read in this that the Senator from West Virginia 
and I aren't happy that the President wants to bring down the number of 
nuclear weapons.
  Mr. BYRD. No.
  Mr. BIDEN. We are very supportive of that. We want to make sure when 
it is done, it is done.
  Mr. BYRD. It is done.
  Mr. BIDEN. And we know it is done.
  I thank the Senator and I thank the Chair, and I particularly thank 
Senator Baucus for his kindness in allowing us to proceed.
  Mr. BYRD. I join in the thanks.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I compliment the Senator from West 
Virginia as well as the Senator from Delaware. They as well as many 
others over the years have provided terrific service to our country, 
keeping their eye on this ball with respect to the former Soviet Union, 
current Russia, and the key question of nuclear proliferation. I thank 
them very much. On behalf of the American people, I thank them, too.
  The Senator has done a terrific job.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, let me say I am deeply appreciative, and I 
thank the very able Senator from Montana for his observations.

                          ____________________