[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 22685-22686]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



          BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION-NUCLEAR ARMS TREATIES

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Nation's attention is focused on the 
threat of biological weapons. The pernicious nature of these types of 
weapons has been shown in the anthrax-laced mailings that were sent to 
the office of the majority leader, Tom Daschle, NBC news in New York, 
and American Media in Florida, which have resulted in contamination of 
a number of post offices in Washington, D.C., New Jersey, Florida, and 
perhaps elsewhere.
  One question is on all American's minds: how can we defend ourselves 
against a threat that is literally microscopic? In the days of the Cold 
War, we became accustomed to being able to quantify the threats posed 
to the United States: we could count the number of Soviet missiles, 
bombers, tanks, and soldiers, and respond by increasing the 
capabilities of our own military.
  But now, the threat to our security has changed. We can not quantify 
this threat and we can not track its movements until it might be too 
late. Building up our military will not affect our security from 
biological weapons. We must adjust our thinking on how to deal with 
these abhorrent weapons of pestilence.
  Mr. President, remember that Jesus said: You shall hear of wars and 
rumors of wars, but the end is not yet. For nation will rise against 
nation and kingdom against kingdom. There will be famines and 
pestilences and earthquakes.
  Pestilences, that is what I am talking about; germ warfare, viral 
warfare, anthrax. Building up our military, I said, will not affect our 
security from these pestilences. We must adjust our thinking, I say 
again, on how to deal with these abhorrent weapons of pestilence.
  We do not yet know for certain whether the anthrax attacks were 
carried out by foreign or domestic agents, by someone across the seas 
or someone in our midst. We also do not know when the next biological 
weapons attack might happen, what type of germs or viruses might be 
used, or who might be planning it. But the U.S. must take action. The 
time is right now, in the midst of intensified international 
condemnation of the use of biological weapons, to form an international 
regime to eliminate the manipulation of nature for violent purposes.
  Over 140 countries have signed the Biological Weapons Convention of 
1972. It is one of the simplest arms control treaties in existence. 
Parties of the treaty agree not to develop or retain any biological 
toxins or agents that are to be used for other than peaceful purposes. 
There are no means to verify this binding commitment, but the 
Convention has succeeded in its limited purpose by confirming among 
most of the world that biological weapons are abhorrent to all mankind.
  Negotiations began in 1995 on how to add a binding protocol to the 
Biological Weapons Convention to create a regime that would verify 
compliance with the treaty. Parties to the Convention would thereby 
submit themselves to the same kinds of inspections that are conducted 
at nuclear facilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
chemical facilities under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The purpose 
of these inspections would be to assure the whole wide world that 
potentially dangerous microbes, which are needed to conduct scientific 
and medical research, are handled in a safe manner, and are not being 
diverted to nefarious purposes.
  Representatives at the last conference on the Biological Weapons 
Convention, which took place in July, hoped to gain consensus on the 
final text of the protocol, which may open for signature within weeks. 
The results of that conference were disappointing. Rather than 
negotiating toward the resolution of many outstanding issues on the 
protocol, the Bush Administration took the view that no protocol would 
be preferable to a negotiated protocol. Like much of the world, I was 
left wondering whether this Administration takes arms control 
seriously.
  I am pleased to see that on November 1, the Administration unveiled a 
number of proposals to complement the Biological Weapons Convention. 
These voluntary measures are well-intentioned and they make sense. 
However, they do not go far enough.
  I am wary of addressing our urgent and serious national security 
concerns simply through voluntary measures by foreign countries. With 
no formal multilateral protocol to spell out exactly what each 
country's responsibilities are, I fear that the future of the 
international ban on biological weapons will be a patchwork quilt of 
full compliance, non-compliance, half-measures, and more talk and less 
action. This could ultimately leave us even less secure from these 
horrific weapons.
  There are other important treaty matters before our country. We are 
closing in on an agreement with Russia for sharp reductions in our 
nuclear stockpiles, and negotiations will continue on altering the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 to allow increased national 
missile defense testing. These deals, if concluded, would be a major 
development in our relationship with Russia and have a major impact on 
geopolitics. The strategic arms of the two biggest nuclear powers would 
be cut to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads, which is less than a third 
of our present level. We have not had as few as 2,000 strategic 
warheads in our nuclear arsenal since 1955.
  I am not against reducing the nuclear stockpile. I am not against 
reducing the number of missiles, the number of warheads. I am not 
against that. But as important as this agreement would be, I am shocked 
by the President's view that an agreement on arms reductions need not 
be on paper. Legally and technically he is right. It need not be on 
paper. But, Mr. President, it ought to be on paper. The President said 
that he was content to conclude arms reduction talks with nothing more 
than a handshake. Nothing more than a handshake.
  Now, that is troubling me. If I sell a piece of property or if I buy 
a piece of property, I will shake hands with the person who buys my 
property. I will shake hands with the person from whom I buy property. 
But there will also be a deed and it will be registered at the 
courthouse in the county where the property exists. There will be a 
handshake--that is fine. A handshake carries with it the indication of 
honor. ``It is an honor to deal with you--it is a pleasure, I have 
enjoyed doing business with you.'' But it is that deed that is in 
writing that assures my grandchildren, and their children if necessary, 
that that property, that transfer of property is on record.
  So I say again, the President said--he is reported to have said that 
he was content to conclude arms reduction talks with nothing more than 
a handshake. Are you? Are you, the people who are watching this Senate 
floor through those electronic eyes behind the Presiding Officer, are 
you content? Are you content that arms reduction talks be concluded 
with nothing more than a handshake?
  We are closing in on a historic compact, and I cannot understand why 
this agreement should not be done as a formal written treaty. That 
would require

[[Page 22686]]

a two-thirds vote, yes. But a simple handshake leaves many questions 
unanswered. I would like to see one or both Houses of the Congress 
having some say in that, and backing up that handshake, if needed, with 
their votes, the representatives, the elected representatives of the 
people.
  A simple handshake leaves many questions unanswered. What will happen 
to the nuclear warheads once they are removed from their missiles? I 
must note that in this year's budget request, the Administration cut 
more than $131 million from the programs that keep these powerful 
weapons from falling into the wrong hands. How will we verify? How will 
we verify that Russia carries out its arms reductions, and how will 
Russia, how will President Putin verify that we carry out ours? That we 
are carrying out our arms reduction? It was Ronald Reagan himself that 
said, ``Trust, but verify.'' In other words, yes, shake hands. But 
verify.
  And what will happen to the agreement when President Bush and 
President Putin leave office? President Bush under the Constitution can 
serve 3 more years after this year, and if he is then elected again, he 
can serve 4 more years. But who knows what the attitude of his 
successor will be. If there is no treaty, no formal agreement in which 
this Senate, or on which the Senate and House--whichever type of 
agreement it might be--has been able to put a stamp of approval, who 
knows what his successor might say. Or who knows how the successor to 
Mr. Putin might feel about it. A written treaty could provide clear 
answers to each of these important questions.
  It would be a real mistake to make such an important international 
agreement in any other form, I think, than a treaty. We do not need 
fly-by-night arms control. We need arms control measures that are 
carefully examined to support our national security. We do not need 
hush-hush agreements with other countries on our nuclear weapons. We 
need public confidence in our military and foreign policy. Lacking the 
full confidence of the public, an informal agreement on nuclear arms 
and national missile defense is not worth the paper that it is--or is 
not--written on.
  President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said, ``Treaties are the 
cornerstones on which all relations between nations must rest.'' 
Treaties are useful in clearly elaborating the responsibilities of each 
party, and formal ratification of treaties indicate a country's full 
acceptance of those responsibilities. The Founding Fathers of this 
country The Founding Fathers who wrote this Constitution and made 
reference to treaties in that Constitution, understood that, and that 
is why they secured for the Senate advice and consent responsibilities 
to any treaty made by the President.
  We should not turn away from this treaty-making process for the 
simple convenience of the executive branch.
  The Kings of England make treaties. The Kings of England have always 
made treaties. But this country has no King. This Republic has no King. 
Gentlemen's agreements on matters as important as international 
security or the control of weapons of mass destruction are simply not 
sufficient to inspire the confidence of the public in this or other 
countries. By making treaties, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, the United States shows itself to be a reliable ally to our 
friends, and a principled actor to our opponents.
  We should also consider the President's role in conducting our 
foreign policy, and his role as commander-in-chief. Is his hand in 
conducting future negotiations with Russia, in the case of the ABM 
Treaty and nuclear arms reduction, or with the other nations of the 
world, in the case of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Kyoto 
Protocol, and a host of other treaties, strengthened if he concludes 
these types of agreements without the advice and consent of the Senate?
  Is his hand strengthened if he doesn't have the advice and consent of 
the U.S. Senate standing behind him? No. I don't think his hand would 
be strengthened. I would think just the opposite.
  Senate approval or ratification of important international agreements 
is a signal to all the world that our nation not just a branch of our 
government approves of and will carry out those agreements negotiated 
by the President. Senate approval of important treaties, such as a 
protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention or a new strategic 
agreement with Russia would strengthen the Chief Executive's hand to 
negotiate from a position of strength on other international matters, 
such as the Kyoto Protocol, possible NATO expansion, and future arms 
control treaties.
  So I say that legally and technically, the President might not need 
to have it written on a piece of paper. Legally and technically, he may 
be able to do it with a handshake.
  Let me say again that I am not proposing that we shouldn't reduce our 
nuclear weapons stockpile. I am not proposing that at all. I think the 
MX missile, for example, is old, and we shouldn't continue to keep that 
around. But a handshake is not enough. I don't rest easy. Do you, Mr. 
President? I am saying to the Presiding Officer, and I am saying to 
other Senators, would you rest easy with just a handshake in a matter 
of this nature?
  The two issues I have just discussed, the Biological Weapons 
Convention and our strategic situation with regard to Russia, are very 
important to the security of our country. The United States must take a 
leadership position on these issues to crack down on the use of germs 
and viruses as weapons, and to clarify our relationship with the nation 
that has emerged from our Cold War opponent. These matters cannot rest 
on voluntary measures or unwritten pacts. I urge the Administration to 
pursue formal agreements on these issues in order to recognize their 
importance to Americans and the world.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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