[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 16]
[House]
[Pages 22628-22630]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                            SUDAN PEACE ACT

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
the Committee on International Relations be discharged from further 
consideration of the Senate bill (S. 180) to facilitate famine relief 
efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan, and ask for 
its immediate consideration in the House.
  The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Biggert). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from New Jersey?
  There was no objection.
  The Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows:

                                 S. 180

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution 
     of the war against areas outside of its control, which has 
     already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more 
     than 4,000,000.
       (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
     peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
     chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of 
     human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
       (3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian 
     relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the 
     effort to bring an end to the war.
       (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
       (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas 
     of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, 
     the absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a 
     major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese 
     people and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace 
     process.
       (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
     peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government 
     of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques 
     to subjugate their population, and internationally sponsored 
     reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in 
     reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.
       (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing 
     militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units 
     for raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the 
     control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely 
     disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain 
     themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of 
     bans on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war 
     through selective starvation and to minimize the Government 
     of Sudan's accountability internationally.
       (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
     intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
     increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
     outside its control.
       (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport 
     flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation 
     Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able 
     to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people 
     from the United States and other donor countries as a 
     devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the 
     Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the 
     Government's control.
       (10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in 
     delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS 
     have played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in 
     OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
     donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
       (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
     facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
     population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
     Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption 
     of their ability to sustain themselves.
       (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, 
     Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded 
     completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently

[[Page 22629]]

     placing their populations at increased risk of famine.
       (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per 
     day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the 
     immediate food needs of the recipients, the current 
     international relief operations are neither sustainable nor 
     desirable in the long term.
       (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves 
     against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's 
     control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of 
     the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within 
     officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
     battlefield can be achieved.
       (15) The United States should use all means of pressure 
     available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war 
     in Sudan, including--
       (A) the multilateralization of economic and diplomatic 
     tools to compel the Government of Sudan to enter into a good 
     faith peace process;
       (B) the support or creation of viable democratic civil 
     authority and institutions in areas of Sudan outside 
     government control;
       (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
     reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside of 
     government control;
       (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
     humanitarian relief to those areas; and
       (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the United 
     States and within multilateral institutions toward those 
     ends.

     SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
     means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, 
     Sudan.
       (2) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
     operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
     participating relief organizations known as ``Operation 
     Lifeline Sudan''.

     SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 
                   AND TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

       Congress hereby--
       (1) condemns--
       (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict 
     in Sudan;
       (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights record, 
     with regard to both the prosecution of the war and the denial 
     of basic human and political rights to all Sudanese;
       (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role of the 
     Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating the practice; 
     and
       (D) the Government of Sudan's use and organization of 
     ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular Defense Forces 
     (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into organized and 
     coordinated raiding and slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, 
     the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and
       (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air 
     transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use 
     of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
     shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
     societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and 
     Nuba peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

     SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE 
                   PROCESS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress hereby recognizes that--
       (1) a single viable, internationally and regionally 
     sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to 
     promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in 
     Sudan; and
       (2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made 
     through a peace process based on the Declaration of 
     Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994.
       (b) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of 
     State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the 
     Department of State for the support of--
       (1) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of 
     Sudan and opposition forces;
       (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or 
     implementation; and
       (3) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a 
     peace process in Sudan.

     SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to 
     facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
       (2) the President, acting through the United States 
     Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should seek 
     to--
       (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline Sudan to end the 
     veto power of the Government of Sudan over the plans by 
     Operation Lifeline Sudan for air transport of relief flights 
     and, by doing so, to end the manipulation of the delivery of 
     those relief supplies to the advantage of the Government of 
     Sudan on the battlefield;
       (B) investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and 
     provide mechanisms for its elimination; and
       (C) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each 
     time it subjects civilians to aerial bombardment.

     SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

       Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
     U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d) 
     and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall 
     include--
       ``(1) a description of the sources and current status of 
     Sudan's financing and construction of oil exploitation 
     infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the inhabitants 
     of the oil fields regions of such financing and construction, 
     and the Government of Sudan's ability to finance the war in 
     Sudan;
       ``(2) a description of the extent to which that financing 
     was secured in the United States or with involvement of 
     United States citizens;
       ``(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial 
     bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas 
     outside its control, including targets, frequency, and best 
     estimates of damage; and
       ``(4) a description of the extent to which humanitarian 
     relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the Government 
     of Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war in 
     Sudan.''.

     SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF 
                   EFFORTS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS 
     agencies in the distribution of relief supplies in southern 
     Sudan.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed 
     report to Congress describing the progress made toward 
     carrying out subsection (a).

     SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
                   FLIGHTS.

       (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan 
     to provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the 
     greatest possible amount of United States Government and 
     privately donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, 
     including the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in 
     the event the Government of Sudan imposes a total, partial, 
     or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief flights.
       (b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under 
     subsection (a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent 
     of the funds available for support of OLS operations (but for 
     this subsection) for the purposes of the plan.

     SEC. 10. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR EXCLUSIONARY ``NO GO'' 
                   AREAS OF SUDAN.

       (a) Pilot Project Activities.--The President, acting 
     through the United States Agency for International 
     Development, is authorized and requested to undertake, 
     immediately, pilot project activities to provide food and 
     other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to vulnerable 
     populations in Sudan that are residing in exclusionary ``no 
     go'' areas of Sudan.
       (b) Study.--The President, acting through the United States 
     Agency for International Development, shall conduct a study 
     examining the adverse impact upon indigenous Sudan 
     communities by OLS policies that curtail direct humanitarian 
     assistance to exclusionary ``no go'' areas of Sudan.
       (c) Exclusionary ``No Go'' Areas of Sudan Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``exclusionary `no go' areas of Sudan'' 
     means areas of Sudan designated by OLS for curtailment of 
     direct humanitarian assistance, including, but not limited 
     to, the Nuba Mountains, the Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile


               Motion Offered by Mr. Smith of New Jersey

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I offer a motion.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Smith of New Jersey moved to strike out all after the 
     enacting clause of the bill S. 180 and insert in lieu thereof 
     the text of H.R. 2052 as passed by the House.

  Mr. TOWNS. Madam Speaker, I rise today to express my concern over 
proposals that would deny investors and issuers access to the U.S. 
capital markets. As the House prepares to go to conference with the 
Senate on the Sudan Peace Act (S. 180/H.R. 2052), I would like to urge 
my colleagues to take a close look at the provisions of the bill that 
would impose such sanctions.
  I am fully aware of the human rights atrocities that are going on in 
Sudan. As Congress works to develop policies to end the violence is 
important that we be careful and prudent and not act in ways that 
damage our economy, the free flow of capital, or create greater 
uncertainty in our capital markets.
  Closing the U.S. capital markets in order to influence the behavior 
of foreign countries sets a poor policy precedent that might easily 
provoke other countries to pursue their own foreign policy objectives 
through similar sanctions. The continued health of our capital markets 
is dependent on economic and political certainty and predictability. 
The historic U.S. commitment to open and fair markets has been 
fundamental to the U.S. financial service sector's ability to nurture 
and establish a substantial foreign client base.
  The imposition of capital markets sanctions could have the unintended 
effects of redirecting business out of the United States

[[Page 22630]]

and eroding the certainty and predictability that have been fundamental 
to the preeminence of the U.S. capital markets. Moreover, capital 
markets sanctions would seriously disrupt investor confidence--both 
domestic and foreign--in the U.S. markets, thereby jeopardizing their 
continued vibrancy. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said ``the 
motive of the legislation, I think, obviously commendable, but I think 
it's not been thoroughly thought through and I don't think that the 
implications of this particular type of statute is useful to the United 
States and, indeed, I think it is downright harmful.''
  Capital markets sanctions have never been imposed by the U.S. These 
types of sanctions would seriously disrupt investor confidence--both 
domestic and foreign--in the U.S. markets, thereby jeopardizing their 
continued vibrancy. The imposition of capital markets sanctions could 
also have the unintended effects of redirecting business out of the 
United States and eroding the certainty and predictability that have 
been fundamental to the preeminence of the U.S. capital markets. U.S. 
investors--pension funds, other institutional investors, and 
individuals--would see the liquidity, and the value, of substantial 
amounts of their holdings drop precipitately even at the suggestion 
that companies in which they are invested would be forced to delist 
from U.S. exchanges.
  In sum Madam Speaker, I believe it is a mistake to unilaterally try 
to resolve complex foreign policy issues through an untested formula 
that would greatly impair the U.S. capital markets. The goals of the 
Sudan Peace Act are laudable, but I object to capital markets sanctions 
that are included in the bill. As the House prepares to consider the 
Sudan Peace Act, I urge my colleagues to continue pursuing open and 
fair financial markets and reject these types of sanctions.
  Mr. NEY. Madam Speaker, due to the recent tragedies on U.S. soil we 
are in the position to find ways to stop terrorist attacks. As Congress 
works to develop these policies it is important that we be careful to 
not accidentally damage legitimate American jobs. We must act in ways 
that do not damage our economy, the free flow of capital, or create 
greater uncertainty in our capital markets.
  I am extremely concerned over proposals that would deny legitimate 
investors and issuers access to the U.S. capital markets. As this body 
moves to go to conference with the Senate on the Sudan Peace Act (S. 
180), I urge my colleagues to take a close look at the provisions of 
the bill that would impose such sanctions. The imposition of capital 
markets sanctions could have the unintended effects of redirecting 
business out of the United States and eroding the certainty and 
predictability that have been fundamental to the success of the U.S. 
Capital markets. Moreover, capital markets sanctions would seriously 
disrupt investor confidence--both domestic and foreign--in the US. 
Markets, thereby jeopardizing their continued vibrancy.
  The safety and certainty of U.S. capital markets attracted record 
numbers of foreign issuers and investors in the 1990s. In the 
competitive, global environment, however, there are few products and 
services for which U.S. companies are the sole suppliers. If issuers 
are denied access to the U.S. capital markets through unilaterally 
imposed sanctions, they will simply turn to other countries. Indeed, 
since the House of Representatives approved the Sudan Peace Act (H.R. 
2052)--with a provision restricting capital market access--in June, at 
lease one foreign company cited the uncertain environment created by 
the legislation in deciding to list on the London Stock Exchange over a 
U.S. exchange. H.R. 2052 would have little--if any--impact on the 
ability of sanctioned companies to raise financing, but it would 
strengthen the position of foreign competitors. U.S. investors--pension 
funds, other institutional investors, and individuals--would see the 
liquidity, and the value, of substantial amounts of their holdings drop 
precipitately even at the suggestion that companies in which they are 
invested would be forced to delist from U.S. exchanges.
  Closing the U.S. capital markets in order to influence the behavior 
of foreign countries also sets a poor policy precedent that might 
easily provoke other countries to pursue their own foreign policy 
objectives through similar sanctions. The continued health of our 
capital markets is dependent on economic and political certainty and 
predictability. The historic U.S. commitment to open and fair markets 
has been fundamental to the U.S. financial service sector's ability to 
nurture and establish a substantial foreign client base.
  In sum, Madam Speaker, I believe it is a mistake to unilaterally try 
to resolve complex foreign policy issues through an untested formula 
that would greatly impair the U.S. capital markets. The goals of the 
Sudan Peace Act are laudable, however, I am deeply troubled by the 
capital markets sanctions that are included in the bill. As the House 
requests a conference on the Sudan Peace Act, I urge my colleagues to 
continue pursuing open and fair financial markets and reject these 
types of sanctions.
  The motion was agreed to.
  The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the 
third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the 
table.


          Appointment of Conferees on S. 180, Sudan Peace Act

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to 
insist on the House amendment and request a conference with the Senate 
thereon.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New Jersey? The Chair hears none, and, without 
objection, appoints the following conferees:
  For modification of the Senate bill and the House amendment and 
modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Hyde, Gilman, and Smith 
of New Jersey, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, and Messrs. Royce, Tancredo, Lantos, 
Berman, and Payne, and Ms. McKinney.
  For consideration of sections 8 and 9 of the House amendment and 
modifications committed to conference: Messrs. Oxley, Baker, Bachus, 
LaFalce, and Frank.
  There was no objection.

                          ____________________