[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 16]
[Senate]
[Pages 22035-22036]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                              FOOD SAFETY

  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, earlier this week I introduced the 
Imported Food Safety Act of 2001. Food safety has long been a serious 
public health concern in America, but awareness of the vulnerability of 
our food supply has heightened since September 11.
  I have long been concerned about the adequacy of our system for 
screening and ensuring the safety of imported food. In 1998, in my 
capacity of chairing the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I 
began a 16-month investigation of the safety of imported foods. This 
investigation revealed much about the Government's flawed food safety 
net. Regrettably, in the intervening years little has changed, and now 
we must acknowledge that the systemic shortcomings can also be 
exploited by bioterrorists.
  As part of the investigation, I asked the General Accounting Office 
to evaluate the Federal Government's efforts to ensure the safety of 
imported food. In its April 1998 report, the General Accounting Office 
concluded that ``Federal efforts to ensure the safety of imported foods 
are inconsistent and unreliable.'' Just last month, the GAO reiterated 
that conclusion in testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 
Government Management.
  During the 5 days of subcommittee hearings that I chaired, we heard 
testimony from 29 witnesses, including scientists, industry and 
consumer groups, government officials, the General Accounting Office, 
and two individuals with firsthand knowledge of the seamier side of the 
imported food industry--a convicted customs broker and a convicted 
former FDA inspector.
  Let me briefly recount some of the subcommittee's findings which make 
clear why the legislation I have introduced is so urgently needed.
  First, weaknesses in the FDA's import controls--specifically, the 
ability of importers to control food shipments from the port to the 
point of distribution--make the system very vulnerable to fraud and 
deception, and clearly vulnerable to a concerted bioterrorist attack.
  Second, the bonds required to be posted by importers who violate food 
safety laws are so low that they are simply considered by some 
unscrupulous importers to be a cost of doing business.
  Third, maintaining the food safety net for imported food is an 
increasingly complicated and complex task, made more complicated by 
previously unknown food pathogens, such as Cyclospora, that are 
difficult to detect. Our recent experience with anthrax has taught us 
there is much that public health officials still need to know when 
dealing with such pathogens and bacteria.
  Fourth, because some imported food can be contaminated by substances 
that cannot be detected by visual inspections, grant programs are 
needed to encourage the development of food safety monitoring devices 
and sensors that are capable of detecting chemical and biological 
contaminants.
  Fifth, since contamination of imported food can occur at many 
different places from the farm to the table, the ability to trace 
outbreaks of foodborne illnesses back to the source of contamination 
requires more coordinated effort among Federal, State, and local 
agencies responsible for ensuring food safety, as well as improved 
education for health care providers so that they can better recognize 
and treat foodborne illnesses. Again, our recent experience with 
anthrax underscores the need for better coordination and education.
  Since the terrorist attacks that occurred just weeks ago, we have 
been living in a changed world. We are battling enemies who show no 
regard for the value of human life, and whose twisted minds seek to 
destroy those who embody democracy and freedom. It has never been as 
important as it is now to ensure that our food supplies are adequately 
protected against contamination, both inadvertent and intentional.
  President Bush and his administration are acting swiftly and 
decisively on all fronts. Among the responsibilities of the Office of 
Homeland Security is the protection of our livestock and agricultural 
systems from terrorist attack. The administration has requested 
additional funding to beef up security at our borders and to add more 
inspectors to evaluate the safety of food imports. And the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, has been working tirelessly 
to obtain the additional tools necessary to combat bioterrorism.
  On October 17, 2001, Secretary Thompson appeared before the Senate's 
Governmental Affairs Committee, and testified about the Federal 
Government's efforts to ensure that the country is adequately prepared 
to respond to bioterrorist threats. He identified food safety and, in 
particular, imported foods, as vulnerable areas that require further 
strengthening. Similarly, at a recent hearing before the Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, every single public health 
expert who testified before us expressed concern about the 
vulnerability of our food supplies.
  Weak import controls make our system all too easy to circumvent. 
After all, FDA only inspects fewer than 1 percent of all imported food 
shipments that arrive in our country. Those shipments are sent from 
countries around the world, most of whom wish us no harm. Yet, because 
of the hard lessons we have had to learn since September 11, we must be 
more vigilant about protecting ourselves. It is vital that we

[[Page 22036]]

take the necessary steps to close the loopholes that unscrupulous 
shippers have used in the past and that bioterrorists could exploit 
now.
  I first became concerned about the safety of the U.S. food supply in 
1998 when I learned that fruit from Mexico and Guatemala was associated 
with three multi-state outbreaks of foodborne illnesses that sickened 
thousands of Americans. Regrettably, those type of outbreaks are far 
too common. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimate 
that 76 million cases of foodborne illnesses occur each year. 
Fortunately, the majority of these incidents are mild and cause 
symptoms for only a day or two. Less fortunately, the CDC also 
estimates that over 325,000 hospitalizations and 5,000 deaths result 
from those 76 million cases. And as astonishingly high as those numbers 
are, they are estimates, and the truth may be even more deadly.
  It was because of my concern that I began the subcommittee's 
investigation of the adequacy of our country's imported food safety 
system. The testimony I heard was troubling. The U.S. Customs Service 
told us of one particularly egregious case. It involved contaminated 
fish and illustrated the challenges facing federal regulators who are 
charged with ensuring the safety of our Nation's food supply.
  In 1996, Federal inspectors along our border with Mexico opened a 
shipment of seafood destined for sales to restaurants in Los Angeles. 
The shipment was dangerously tainted with life-threatening 
contaminants, including botulism, Salmonella, and just plain filth. 
Much to the surprise of the inspectors, this shipment of frozen fish 
had been inspected before by Federal authorities. Alarmingly, in fact, 
it had arrived at our border 2 years before, and had been rejected by 
the FDA as unfit for consumption. Its importers then held this rotten 
shipment for 2 years before attempting to bring it into the country 
again, by a different route, and a different port in the hope of 
shipping this seafood through the inspection system.
  The inspectors only narrowly prevented this poisoned fish from 
reaching American plates. And what happened to the importer who tried 
to sell this deadly food to American consumers? In effect, nothing. He 
was placed on probation and asked to perform 50 hours of community 
service.


  I suppose, given how few shipments are inspected by FDA inspectors, 
we should count ourselves lucky that these perpetrators were caught at 
all since, as I mentioned earlier, fewer than 1 percent of all 
shipments of imported food under the jurisdiction of FDA are actually 
inspected. Unsafe food might have escaped detection and reached our 
tables. But it worries me that the importer essentially received a slap 
on the wrist. I believe that forfeiting the small amount of money 
currently required for the Customs' bond, which some importers now 
consider no more than a ``cost of doing business,'' does little to 
deter unscrupulous importers from trying to slip tainted fish that is 2 
years old past overworked Customs agents.
  It is imperative that Congress provide our Federal agencies with the 
direction, resources, and authority necessary to protect our food 
supply from acts of bioterrorism and to keep unsafe, unsanitary food 
out of the United States.
  I have worked with the FDA, the Customs Service, and the CDC to 
ensure that my legislation corrects many of the vulnerabilities that 
have been identified in our imported food safety system. Let me 
describe what this bill is designed to accomplish.
  My legislation would fill the existing gaps in the food import system 
and provide the FDA with stronger authority to protect American 
consumers against tainted food imports. First and foremost, this bill 
gives the FDA the authority to stop such food from entering our 
country. My bill would authorize FDA to deny the entry of imported food 
that has caused repeated outbreaks of foodborne illnesses, presents a 
reasonable probability of causing serious adverse health consequences 
or is likely without systemic changes to cause disease again.
  Second, this legislation would enable the FDA to require secure 
storage of shipments offered by repeat offenders prior to their release 
into commerce. Unscrupulous shippers who have demonstrated a 
willingness to knowingly send tainted food to our country cannot be 
overlooked as potential sources of bioterrorist acts. My bill would 
also prohibit the practice of ``port-shopping,'' and would require that 
boxes containing violative foods that have been refused entry into our 
country be clearly marked. This latter authority is currently used with 
success by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. My bill also would 
require the destruction of certain imported foods that cannot be 
adequately reconditioned to ensure safety.
  What happens now is that when the food is ordered to be reexported 
and denied entrance into this country, it is not destroyed, even if it 
is completely unfit for human consumption and cannot be made safe.
  Third, the legislation would direct the FDA to develop criteria for 
use by private laboratories to collect and analyze samples of food 
offered for import. This will help ensure the integrity of the testing 
process.
  What happens now is that it is often the very same shipper who tried 
to slip the tainted food into our country who is responsible for taking 
it to a lab and getting it tested. Obviously, that is like putting the 
fox in charge of the hen house and offers very little protection to 
consumers.
  Fourth, the legislation would give ``teeth'' to the current food 
import system by establishing two strong deterrents--the threats of 
higher bonds and of debarment--for unscrupulous importers who 
repeatedly violate U.S. law. No longer will the industry's ``bad 
actors'' be able to profit from endangering the health of American 
consumers. In other words, if the shipper is found to be repeatedly 
violating Federal laws regarding food safety, we could ban that shipper 
from importing anything into the United States. We will just kick them 
out of the business altogether.
  Finally, my legislation would authorize the CDC to award grants to 
State and local public health agencies to strengthen the public health 
infrastructure by updating essential items, such as laboratory and 
electronic reporting equipment. Grants would also be available for 
universities, nonprofit corporations, and industrial partners to 
develop new and improved sensors and tests to detect pathogens, and for 
professional schools and societies to develop programs to increase the 
awareness of foodborne illness among health care providers and the 
general public.
  We are truly fortunate that the American food supply is the safest in 
the world. But our system for safeguarding our citizens from imported 
food that has been tainted, either intentionally or inadvertently, is 
fundamentally flawed. We need to work together to correct this problem.
  In that regard, I am pleased to report that I am working with my 
colleagues on bipartisan bioterrorism legislation that targets problems 
posed by bioterrorist threats to our Nation's food supply. I believe 
that the measures provided for in my Imported Food Safety Act of 2001, 
as well as the bipartisan bioterrorism bill we are drafting, will 
significantly reduce this potential threat to our country. It is my 
hope that parts of my bill will be incorporated into the comprehensive 
bioterrorism bill that we are working on now and that we will pass it 
this year.
  Mr. President, we need to take action now. We have identified a 
threat to our food supply. We know what we need to do to put in place 
the safeguards that are needed.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.




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