[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 15]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages 21820-21821]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



    DR. HENRY KISSINGER'S EXCELLENT ANALYSIS OF OUR WAR ON TERRORISM

                                 ______
                                 

                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, November 6, 2001

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, today's issue of the Washington Post 
includes an excellent oped by our nation's former National Security 
Adviser to the President and former Secretary of State, Dr. Henry 
Kissinger. He gives an outstanding strategic analysis of our current 
war on terrorism. In particular he emphasizes the importance of 
recognizing that our objectives in Afghanistan are limited, and we must 
realistically limit what we seek to do there. His analysis of our tasks 
beyond our action in Afghanistan is equally prescient.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to read Dr. Kissinger's 
brilliant article ``Where Do We Go From Here?'' and I ask that the full 
text be placed in the Record.

                [From the Washington Post Nov. 6, 2001]

                       Where Do We Go From Here?

                          (By Henry Kissinger)

       As the war against the Taliban gathers momentum, it is 
     important to see it in its proper perspective. President Bush 
     has eloquently described the objective as the destruction of 
     state-supported terrorism. And for all its novelty, the new 
     warfare permits a clear definition of victory.
       The terrorists are ruthless, but not numerous. They control 
     no territory permanently. If their activities are harassed by 
     the security forces of all countries--if no country will 
     harbor them--they will become outlaws and increasingly 
     obliged to devote efforts to elemental survival. If they 
     attempt to commandeer a part of a country, as has happened to 
     some extent in Afghanistan and Colombia, they can be hunted 
     down by military operations. The key to anti-terrorism 
     strategy is to eliminate safe havens.

[[Page 21821]]

       These safe havens come about in various ways. In some 
     countries, domestic legislation or constitutional restraints 
     inhibit surveillance unless there are demonstrated criminal 
     acts, or they prevent transmitting what is ostensibly 
     domestic intelligence to other countries--as seems to be the 
     case in Germany and, to some extent, the United States. 
     Remedial measures with respect to these situations are in 
     train.
       But the overwhelming majority of safe havens occur when a 
     government closes its eyes because it agrees with at least 
     some of the objectives of the terrorists--as in Afghanistan, 
     to some extent in Iran and Syria and, until recently, in 
     Pakistan. Even ostensibly friendly countries that have been 
     cooperating with the United States on general strategy, such 
     as Saudi Arabia, sometimes make a tacit bargain with 
     terrorists so long as terrorist actions are not directed 
     against the host government.
       A serious anti-terrorism campaign must break this nexus. 
     Many of the host governments know more than they were 
     prepared to communicate before Sept. 11. Incentives must be 
     created for the sharing of intelligence. The anti-terrorism 
     campaign must improve security cooperation, interrupt the 
     flow of funds, harass terrorist communications and subject 
     the countries that provide safe haven to pressures including, 
     in the extreme case, military pressure.
       In the aftermath of the attack on American soil, the Bush 
     administration resisted arguments urging immediate military 
     action against known terrorist centers. Instead, Secretary of 
     State Colin Powell very skillfully brought about a global 
     coalition that legitimized the use of military power against 
     Afghanistan, the most flagrant provider of a safe haven for 
     the most egregious symbol of international terrorism, Osama 
     bin Laden.
       The strategy of focusing on Afghanistan carries with it two 
     risks, however. The first is that the inherent complexities 
     of a trackless geography and chaotic political system may 
     divert the coalition from the ultimate objective of crippling 
     international terrorism. Though the elimination of bin Laden 
     and his network and associates will be a significant symbolic 
     achievement, it will be only the opening engagement of what 
     must be viewed as a continuing and relentless worldwide 
     campaign. The second challenge is to guard against the 
     temptation to treat cooperation on Afghanistan as meeting the 
     challenge and to use it as an alibi for avoiding the 
     necessary succeeding phases.
       This is why military operations in Afghanistan should be 
     limited to the shattering of the Taliban and disintegration 
     of the bin Laden network. Using U.S. military forces for 
     nation-building or pacifying the entire country would involve 
     us in a quagmire comparable to what drained the Soviet Union. 
     The conventional wisdom of creating a broadly based coalition 
     to govern Afghanistan is desirable but not encouraged by the 
     historical record. The likely--perhaps optimum--outcome is a 
     central Kabul government of limited reach, with tribal 
     autonomy prevailing in the various regions. This essential 
     enterprise should be put under the aegis of the United 
     Nations, with generous economic support from the United 
     States and other advanced industrial countries. A contact 
     group could be created composed of Afghanistan's neighbors 
     (minus Iraq), India, the United States and those NATO allies 
     that participated in the military operations. This would 
     provide a mechanism to reintroduce Iran to the international 
     system, provided it genuinely abandons its support of 
     terrorism.
       The crucial phase of America's anti-terrorism strategy will 
     begin as the Afghanistan military campaign winds down, and 
     its focus will have to be outside Afghanistan. At that point, 
     the coalition will come under strain.
       So far the issue of long-term goals has been avoided by the 
     formula that members of the global coalition are free to 
     choose the degree of their involvement. A la carte coalition 
     management worked well when membership required little more 
     than affirming opposition to terrorism in principle. Its 
     continued usefulness will depend on how coalition obligations 
     are defined in the next phase. Should the convoy move at the 
     pace of the slowest ship or should some parts of it be able 
     to sail by themselves? If the former, the coalition effort 
     will gradually be defined by the least-common-denominator 
     compromises that killed the U.N. inspection system in Iraq 
     and are on the verge of eliminating the U.N. sanctions 
     against that country. Alternatively, the coalition can be 
     conceived as a group united by common objectives but 
     permitting autonomous action by whatever consensus can be 
     created--or, in the extreme case, by the United States alone.
       Those who argue for the widest possible coalition--in other 
     words, for a coalition veto--often cite the experience of the 
     Gulf War. But the differences are significant. The Gulf War 
     was triggered by a clear case of aggression that threatened 
     Saudi Arabia, whose security has been deemed crucial by a 
     bipartisan succession of American presidents. The United 
     States decided to undo Saddam's adventure in the few months 
     available before the summer heat made large-scale ground 
     operations impossible. Several hundred thousand American 
     troops were dispatched before any attempt at coalition 
     building was undertaken. Since the United States would 
     obviously act alone if necessary, participating in the 
     coalition became the most effective means for influencing 
     events.
       The direction of the current coalition is more ambiguous. 
     President Bush has frequently and forcefully emphasized that 
     he is determined to press the anti-terrorism campaign beyond 
     Afghanistan. In due course he will supplement his policy 
     pronouncements with specific proposals. That will be the 
     point at which the scope of the operational coalition will 
     become clear. There could be disagreement on what constitutes 
     a terrorist safe haven; what measures states should take to 
     cut off the flow of funds; what penalties there are for 
     noncompliance; in what manner, whether and by whom force 
     should be used.
       Just as, in the Gulf War, the pressures for American 
     unilateral action provided the cement to bring a coalition 
     together, so, in the anti-terrorism war, American 
     determination and that of allies of comparable views are 
     needed. A firm strategy becomes all the more important as 
     biological weapons appear to have entered the arsenals of 
     terrorism. Preventive action is becoming imperative. States 
     known to possess such facilities and to have previously used 
     them must be obliged to open themselves to strict, conclusive 
     international inspections with obligatory enforcement 
     mechanisms. This applies particularly to Iraq, with its long 
     history of threats to all its neighbors and the use of 
     chemical weapons.
       The conditions of international support for a firm policy 
     exist. The attack on the United States has produced an 
     extraordinary congruence of interests among the major powers. 
     None wants to be vulnerable to shadowy groups that have 
     emerged, from Southeast Asia to the edge of Europe. Few have 
     the means to resist alone. The NATO allies have ended the 
     debate about whether, after the end of the Cold War, there is 
     still a need for an Atlantic security structure. Our Asian 
     allies, Japan and Korea, being democratic and industrialized, 
     share this conviction. India, profoundly threatened by 
     domestic Islamic fundamentalism, has much to lose by 
     abandoning a common course. Russia perceives a common 
     interest due to its contiguous Islamic southern regions. 
     China shares a similar concern with respect to its western 
     regions and has an added incentive to bring an end to global 
     terrorism well before the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. 
     Paradoxically, terrorism has evoked a sense of world 
     community that has eluded theoretical pleas for world order.
       In the Islamic world, attitudes are more ambiguous. Many 
     Islamic nations, though deeply concerned about 
     fundamentalism, are constrained by their public opinion from 
     avowing public support, and a few may sympathize with some 
     aspects of the terrorist agenda. An understanding American 
     attitude toward traditional friends of America, such as Saudi 
     Arabia and Egypt, is appropriate. Their leaders are quite 
     well aware that they have made compromises imposed on them by 
     brutal domestic necessities. The administration clearly 
     should make every effort to help them overcome these 
     circumstances, to improve intelligence sharing and the 
     control of money flows. But it must not undermine these 
     governments, for in the short term, any foreseeable 
     alternative would be worse for our interests and for the 
     peoples involved.
       Yet there are limits beyond which a serious policy cannot 
     go. There is no reason for treating as members of the 
     coalition countries whose state- supported media advocate and 
     justify terrorism, withhold intelligence vital to the 
     security of potential victims and permit terrorist groups to 
     operate from their territory.
       These considerations apply especially to Iran. Geopolitics 
     argues for improved U.S.-Iranian relations. To welcome Iran 
     into an anti-terrorism coalition has as a prerequisite the 
     abandonment of its current role as the leading supporter of 
     global terrorism as both the State Department and the 
     bipartisan Bremer Commission have reported. An Iranian 
     relationship with the West can prosper only when both sides 
     feel the need for it. Both sides--and not only the West--must 
     make fundamental choices. The same is true to a somewhat 
     lesser degree of Syria.
       The war on terrorism is not just about hunting down 
     terrorists. It is, above all, to protect the extraordinary 
     opportunity that has come about to recast the international 
     system. The North Atlantic nations, having understood their 
     common dangers, can turn to a new definition of common 
     purposes. Relations with former adversaries can go beyond 
     liquidating the vestiges of the Cold War and find a new role 
     for Russia in its post-imperial phase, and for China as it 
     emerges into great power status. India is emerging as an 
     important global player. After measurable success in the 
     anti-terrorism campaign, when it does not appear as 
     concession to the terrorists, the Middle East peace process 
     should be urgently resumed. These and other prospects must 
     not be allowed to vanish because those that have the ability 
     to prevail shrink from what their opportunities require.





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