[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 20620-20626]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                      SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I rise today to clarify a matter that has 
been somewhat taken out of context. I know my good friend, the majority 
leader, was asked this morning about comments the Senator from Delaware 
allegedly made speaking to the New York Council on Foreign Relations, 
which surprised me the question was asked.
  I was informed that a high-ranking Republican on the House side put 
out a statement--and I am sure he did not understand the context--
suggesting I implied Americans were high-tech bullies who were bombing 
Afghanis, and we should be fighting on the ground and not bombing.
  I want to assure my friend from South Dakota, in his response to the 
question, he was correct. I did not say anything like that. I will read 
from the transcript from the New York Council on Foreign Relations 
speech.
  I was asked by a gentleman, whose name I will not put in the--well, 
his name is Ron Paul, whom I do not know, who says: I concur with 
everybody else in commending you on your comments, and he goes on.
  Then he says: With regard to the bombing, every day it goes on the 
harder it may be for us to do something next, referring to rebuilding 
Afghanistan. He said: What do you see as the situation if we do not 
defeat the Taliban in the next 4 weeks and winter sets in in 
Afghanistan?
  The context of the question was, Is it not a hard decision for the 
President to have to choose between bombing, knowing it will be 
unfairly used for propaganda purposes by radical Muslims in that area 
of the world, and bombing to make the environment more hospitable for 
American forces to be able to be successful on the ground?
  I said it was a hard decision. The question was repeated, and my 
answer was: I am not a military man--I will read this in part.

       The part that I think flies in the face of and plays into 
     every stereotypical criticism of us----

  Referring to the radical Muslims, that part of the world that is 
radical----

       is we're this high-tech bully that thinks from the air we 
     can do whatever we want to do, and it builds the case for 
     those who want to make the case against us that all we're 
     doing is indiscriminately bombing innocents, which is not the 
     truth.

  So I want the majority leader to know, and I am sure when the 
gentleman on the House side sees the comments, he will be able to put 
it in the proper perspective because the irony is anyone who has been 
in the Senate knows I was the first, most consistent, and the last 
calling for the United States to bomb in Bosnia, bomb in Kosovo, use 
the full force of our air power.
  I have been around long enough to know unless someone stands up and 
clarifies something, it can get out of hand very quickly.
  I thank my colleague for his response this morning to the press and 
for his faith in his chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I 
assure him, in this case at least, it was well placed.
  I ask unanimous consent that my entire speech--which I would not 
ordinarily do because it is my own speech--to the Council on Foreign 
Relations be printed in the Record, along with the question and answers 
that follow.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   [Remarks By Joseph R. Biden, Jr., United States Senator--Delaware]

  From Tragedy to Opportunity: Acting Wisely in a time of Uncertainty

  (Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, October 22, 2001, (As 
                               Prepared))

       When I accepted this invitation I expected to be talking 
     about the ABM treaty, about our military priorities in the 
     context of an evaporating budget surplus, or about missile 
     defense versus the more urgent threats we could face--and 
     now, in fact, do face.
       I thought the questions I might be asked would be about 
     strategic doctrine, about relations with traditional 
     adversaries like Russia and China, and whether the Yankees 
     will win another World Series.
       I certainly did not, for one instance, think we'd be here 
     today wondering about our short-and long-term goals in a war 
     against terrorism: Will we succeed? How long will it take? 
     What constitutes victory?
       But those are, in fact, the questions facing the United 
     States, and, I confess, they're not easy to answer.
       First, our immediate goal is to cut off the head of Al 
     Qaeda, break up the network, leave them no safe haven. That 
     means the removal of Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and the 
     Taliban leadership.
       I don't know how long it will be before the regime is 
     toppled. I wouldn't want to guess. But the handwriting is on 
     the wall. They've lost the support of their key sponsors and 
     are essentially isolated. But some of these sponsors may need 
     reminding that they've got to make a clear break with the 
     past, and we should not hesitate to spell that out.
       After Al Qaeda and the Taliban fall, and--to use the phrase 
     of the day--we drain the swamp, the medium-term goal is to 
     roll up all Al Qaeda cells around the world.
       Then, with the help of other nations and possibly with the 
     ultimate sanction of the United Nations, our hope is we'll 
     see a relatively stable government in Afghanistan--one that 
     does not harbor terrorists, is acceptable to the major 
     players in the region, represents the ethnic make up of the 
     country, and provides a foundation for future reconstruction.
       In the long term, our goals are easy to articulate, but 
     much more difficult to achieve.

[[Page 20621]]

       We'll need to deter any potential state sponsors of 
     terrorism from providing support or haven to future bin 
     Ladens.
       We'll work with others and try to help rebuild a 
     politically and socially stable Afghanistan that does NOT 
     export terrorism, narcotics, or militancy to its neighbors 
     and to the wider world--more like it was in the 1950s.
       We'll need to stabilize Southwest and Central Asia and 
     prevent the Taliban-izing, if you will, of Pakistan and other 
     countries.
       And we'll need to address some of the economic and 
     political forces that can be manipulated by men like bin 
     Laden. We must do this with the full awareness that attention 
     to social and political development alone won't prevent 
     another bin Laden from emerging. But, at least, it will 
     severely limit the pool from which he can draw recruits and 
     support.
       If we're successful in prosecuting this effort in 
     Afghanistan, it ups the ante for other nations harboring or 
     sponsoring--directly or indirectly--other terrorist groups.
       The President believes, and I agree, that we must stay 
     involved in the region, not necessarily with American troops, 
     but with American leadership, and resources.
       The President has repeated many times, and it's important 
     that we say it over and over again: This is not a war against 
     the Afghan people or any one faith. This is a war between 
     nation states and transnational terrorist organizations, 
     between civilization and chaos.
       We need to remind the world's 1.2 billion Muslims--the vast 
     majority of whom are sickened by the attempted hijacking of 
     their faith--that our beef is with bin Laden and Al Qaeda, 
     not with them.
       American policy has long been marked by a blend of the 
     Wilsonian trend and realpolitik, but whatever our motive, it 
     has not been guided by religious imperatives.
       When we sought to bring peace and stability to the Balkans, 
     the Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo were the primary 
     beneficiaries.
       When we went into Somalia, our aim was to feed starving 
     people who happen to be Muslims.
       And, when we provided 170 million dollars in humanitarian 
     assistance to the Afghan people in the last year, it had to 
     do with our principles, and the people there were Muslim, 
     too.
       Unfortunately, we're doing a terrible job of disseminating 
     information. We have to take a fresh look at public diplomacy 
     and determine the most effective ways we can get out our 
     message.
       But I'm under no illusions. Winning the hearts and minds of 
     ordinary citizens in the Islamic world is an uphill battle, 
     but one we must undertake.
       We must enhance the means we use as well as the message--
     whether it's people to people visits that explain our 
     principled respect for the diversity of all faiths and 
     cultures--or radio and television broadcasts that inform and 
     ultimately empower moderate Muslim voices.
       What we cannot do is let the Taliban wage the same 
     propaganda war Saddam waged in Iraq, with photographs of 
     mothers and children scrambling for food and endless footage 
     of destroyed buildings--all designed to portray America as 
     anti-Islam. That's a bald-faced lie.
       Regardless of whether we succeed in getting our message 
     out, the truth is, we CANNOT and we certainly WILL not walk 
     away from seven million displaced and desperate Afghans 
     surviving on little more than grass and locusts.
       We must do more to help the Afghan people, and we must do 
     FAR more to make our aid visible across the Muslim world.
       I'm reluctant to use the word ``nation building'' because 
     it's such a loaded political term--but, if we leave 
     Afghanistan in chaos, it'll be another time bomb waiting to 
     explode. And there's an enormous powder keg right next door 
     in Pakistan.
       If we think we have a problem now, imagine a nation with 
     six times the population of Afghanistan, a nuclear arsenal, 
     and a Talibanized government.
       To avoid that scenario, we have to work with the World 
     Bank, the IMF, the U.N., other NGOs and our allies, 
     especially those in the region, to help build an 
     infrastructure in Afghanistan that works.
       United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan said it will 
     take nearly $600 million just to get the Afghan refugees 
     through the winter. But that's only the beginning.
       In the long term, Afghanistan will need to find a way to 
     break the hold that the madrassas have had on a generation of 
     young men.
       They will need to educate a generation of young women, to 
     give them the tools necessary to seize the rights so cruelly 
     denied them under Taliban rule.
       They'll need to de-mine the most heavily mined nation in 
     the world.
       They'll need crop substitution programs to rid themselves 
     of the title of the world's foremost producers of heroin and 
     opium.
       They'll need wells, water purification centers, hospitals, 
     village clinics, even simple roads from one town to the next.
       I commend the President for promising $320 million in 
     Afghan aid. In my opinion, this might be the best investment 
     we could make. I say this notwithstanding the many obstacles 
     to achieving these goals that exist in a region that has not 
     proved fertile for incubating democratic institutions. 
     Clearly, we can't do it alone.
       As demonstrated since September 11th, it's even more 
     obvious, at least to me, that our national interests can't be 
     furthered, let alone achieved--in splendid indifference to 
     the rest of the world.
       Our interests are furthered when we meet our international 
     obligations, keep our treaties, and engage the world.
       Far from the black and white of campaigns and up against 
     the gray of governing, it's much easier to see the virtues of 
     multi-nationalism and the shortcomings of unilateralism.
       The same tools we used to build this coalition may, in the 
     long term, help change the dynamics of bilateral relations, 
     and present real and unexpected opportunities to define this 
     new century.
       And by the way, the Administration has figured it out.
       Where the Administration may have once been tempted to see 
     only strategic differences with China over national missile 
     defense and Taiwan, today there's a growing recognition that 
     we have common strategic interests as well--like fighting 
     terrorism and maintaining peace and stability in Central 
     Asia.
       Where the Administration may have once seen relations with 
     Russia through the prism of the Cold-War, today there's the 
     promise of entering into a fundamentally different 
     relationship with the Russian Federation.
       Where the Administration may have once viewed relations 
     with Iran within the confines of a twenty-year time warp, 
     today Iran has signaled a desire to at least explore a 
     relationship based on newly defined common interests. They've 
     even said they would assist in search and rescue operations 
     of any downed American pilots.
       Clearly there's an internal rift in Iran. The reformists 
     would like to go further. All they could get through the 
     system was this modest gesture. But because the system 
     operates on consensus, I'm virtually certain Khamene'i 
     approves, which is significant in itself.
       Let's not be under any illusion that there will be full 
     blown rapprochement with China, Russia, and Iran. But if we 
     do this right, if we look at our adversaries in a new light, 
     there will be much to build off in the future.
       This weekend the President was in Shanghai for the Asia 
     Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit. He met with China's 
     leaders, who now see more clearly than ever the threat posed 
     to them by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
     biological, and ballistic missile technology.
       I guarantee that Jiang Zemin can imagine a plane crashing 
     into an 80 story office tower in Shanghai. I expect that 
     China's leaders will never think of their nuclear and 
     ballistic missile exports to Pakistan in quite the same way.
       Working with China against terrorism, however, does not 
     mean jettisoning our concerns about China's human rights 
     record, or overlooking proliferation. In fact, we may need to 
     remind China's leaders that respect for the human rights and 
     religious liberty of China's Muslim minorities is not only 
     morally right, but also essential if we are to deprive the 
     terrorists of recruits.
       In Russia, President Putin has emerged as a strategic 
     thinker who realizes that, in order for Russia to advance 
     into the ranks of highly developed nations, he must cast his 
     lot with the West.
       Putin recently said ``Today we must firmly declare: the 
     Cold War is over.'' And with respect to our efforts in 
     Afghanistan, he said ``I have no doubt that the U.S. 
     leadership and President Bush will do their best so that the 
     peaceful population does not suffer, and they are already 
     doing their best.''
       Putin is willing to confront entrenched, reactionary 
     domestic opposition when necessary. He overruled his senior 
     military, and gave the green light for American planes to 
     overfly Russian territory and to permit troops on former 
     Soviet territory in Central Asia, actions virtually 
     unimaginable not long ago.
       We have a genuine opportunity to pursue a new relationship 
     with Russia, and we should. If the news out of Shanghai this 
     weekend is accurate, it may well be possible to reach 
     agreement on mutually limiting offensive capabilities and 
     allowing Tests of missile defense systems. I hope the 
     President will resist those in his Administration who would 
     have him risk squandering this opportunity by withdrawing 
     unilaterally from the ABM treaty.
       I've always said: nations, like people, use crises to 
     resolve differences, or create opportunities.
       In the case of Russia, we have a momentous opportunity. It 
     may well be possible to deal not only with strategic forces, 
     but also with NATO enlargement and our non-proliferation 
     concerns.
       That new relationship could shape this half-century as the 
     Cold-War shaped the last.
       Three days ago, Secretary Powell said in Shanghai, ``Not 
     only is the Cold War over, the post-Cold War period is also 
     over.''
       If the Administration proceeds pragmatically, rather than 
     ideologically, the new era could be good, indeed.

[[Page 20622]]

       But let's remember that Russia is not the only country that 
     matters in developing a new strategic doctrine. We must take 
     care not to provoke a major Chinese arms build-up, which 
     could lead to more nuclear arms in India and Pakistan. We 
     need the help of both in the war on terrorism. And nobody 
     needs more nuclear weapons along a border that is already 
     getting too hot for comfort.
       The time is right to consider joint efforts to reduce 
     strategic arms; commit to a joint program to combat 
     terrorism; develop a bilateral plan to prevent other 
     countries or terrorists from gaining weapons of mass 
     destruction; find ways to counter infectious disease 
     epidemics and clean up the residue left by our weapons 
     programs. And we should do everything we can to help Russia 
     stay on a path of economic and political growth and 
     stability.
       Once the foundation of cooperation is firmly established, 
     we can pursue missile defense--if that's what we want--
     without rocking the boat of strategic stability.
       Look, in the long-term--even if the coalition breaks down--
     we'll have the potential opportunity to create a new day of 
     enhanced bilateral relations with China, Russia, and maybe 
     even with Iran.
       So, in the short term we want to eliminate bin Laden and 
     his top aides and remove Mullah Omar and the Taliban 
     leadership.
       In the medium term, we'll need to establish a relatively 
     stable regime in Afghanistan and roll up Al Qaeda cells 
     around the world.
       And in the long-term, we have to deter state sponsorship of 
     future bin Ladens, help rebuild Afghanistan, and stabilize 
     Southwest and Central Asia.
       What will be much more difficult, will be to clearly 
     identify and address some of the root causes of this hard-
     core, hate-driven zealotry so we can limit the pool from 
     which another bin Laden can draw recruits.
       The list of root causes is long--from the lack of 
     legitimate channels of dissent in the Arab world, to 
     desperation, resentment at American material success, a 
     perception that our actions don't match our ideals.
       All of these issues are worthy of our attention, but they 
     can never be excuses for terrorism.
       Which brings us to Israel. Let me just say, Israel did not 
     produce bin Laden, and we can't let Israel be the scapegoat.
       We are in a tough stage right now, and there are many 
     cross-winds buffeting our relationship, but our friendship 
     with Israel is not a transitory event, a marriage of 
     convenience, or a short-term alliance.
       Differences are normal even among friends, but airing them 
     in public is never useful. Surely there are sufficient 
     channels to communicate our views. Let us not create any 
     false impressions about the fundamental, long-term basis upon 
     which the U.S.-Israel relationship rests: we continue to be 
     bound by unshakable, shared democratic values.
       After all this, the question remains--what constitutes 
     victory in the war on terrorism?
       If we cut off the head of Al Qaeda, help to rebuild a 
     stable Afghanistan, and if, in the process, we find a way to 
     stabilize the relationship between Pakistan and India, and 
     enhance bilateral relations with China, Russia, and Iran, 
     then we have achieved a victory that may well define the 21st 
     century.
       In sum, just as we could not have put together a viable 
     coalition if President Bush had already walked away from the 
     ABM treaty, so too will we have trouble nurturing future 
     bilateral relations if we decide, when the crisis is over, to 
     go it alone, again.
       We should be figuring out right now how we revive the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Biological Weapons 
     Treaty, move on arms control proposals that go to Start III, 
     environmental treaties, and how to amend--and not jettison--
     the ABM Treaty.
       Before I take some questions let me leave you with these 
     final thoughts. On September 11th the world changed for the 
     terrorists. It was, I believe the beginning of the end of a 
     way of life, not for America, but for international 
     terrorism.
       Out of our dark grief our nation is newly united and abroad 
     we have new opportunities.
       As my mother says, ``Out of every tragedy, if you look hard 
     enough, you can find one good thing.''
       Or, in the words of another great Irish poet, Seamus 
     Heaney:

     ``History says, don't hope
     On this side of the grave.
     But then, once in a lifetime
     The longed-for tidal wave
     Of justice can rise up,
     And hope and history rhyme.''

       I truly believe, notwithstanding incredible difficulties we 
     face in doing even half the things I mentioned here, that 
     we're on the verge, if we do it right, of making hope and 
     history rhyme. But we cannot squander this opportunity. I 
     believe the President has made a genuine transition in his 
     thinking on foreign policy. I hope I am not kidding myself. 
     If he has, I think not only will he go down as a great 
     President, I think we will have marked the beginning of a new 
     era in international relations.
                                  ____

       The following transcript of the Question and Answer period 
     has been provided by the Council on Foreign Relations. The 
     moderator is former Congressman Vin Weber.
       VW: Thank you. It's my job to screen questions for the 
     Senator without trying to get too much between the questioner 
     and the answer. Under the rules of these engagements, when I 
     call on you will you please stand up and state your 
     affiliation, and try to state your question as concisely as 
     possible. To get things going, though, I'm going to take the 
     prerogative of the Chair and ask the first question.
       Senator, you talked at some length about some possibilities 
     in terms of relationships around Russia and other places. 
     Talk about a place where there might be some strains, the 
     American people at least are being fed a significant diet of 
     negative information about our relationship with the Saudi's 
     and their relationship to terrorism over these past many 
     years. Is there a deeper problem there than we thought, and 
     how should the American people and the government think about 
     that relationship?
       JB: I've been admonished to make the answers very, very 
     brief, so I will make them brief, if you want me to expand I 
     will attempt to do that. Number one, I do not doubt the 
     pressure that the Saudis are under, like other Arab states in 
     the region, having to essentially buy off their extreme 
     groups in order to maintain themselves. But the Saudis have 
     gone above and beyond the call in destabilizing the region, 
     in my view, in terms of essentially funding a significant 
     portion of what we are now dealing with in the extreme 
     example of Islam gone awry. It's one thing to decide you're 
     going to export Wahhabi Sunnism, by setting up Madrassas 
     around the region. Okay, I get that. But what I don't get is 
     setting them up where they have a third feature: that they're 
     a hate-filled, anti-American breeding ground.
       I think we should have a very simple, straightforward 
     discussion with the Saudis and they should understand that 
     they have a hell of a lot more to lose in the break up of the 
     relationship than we do. That is taking a great risk. I am 
     not sanguine about the fact that we get 1.6 million barrels 
     of oil a day from there, but I would be prepared, were I the 
     Secretary of State, or I was in another position, to tell the 
     Saudis: Don't push it. Don't push it. Cease and desist on 
     this activity. There will be consequences. At any rate, 
     that's my view.
       SR: I'm Steve Robert of Robert Capital Management. As I 
     listened carefully to your address, which I thought was very 
     good, it seems the center of gravity in the debate over 
     missile defense has changed. Because while the opponents of 
     missile defense prior to September 11th would have just 
     probably said it's a foolish idea and the wrong priority, 
     what you seem to be saying is that, it's almost inevitable if 
     we also cut nuclear arms stockpiles, renegotiate the arms 
     control treaty and the strategic arms treaty and so forth. So 
     is this in fact what you mean to communicate, that we're now 
     just talking about how we get to missile defense, as opposed 
     to whether we should have missile defense at all?
       JB: What I'm suggesting is, and it's a very good question, 
     what I'm suggesting is, we should be prepared to explore, 
     assuming we can amend the ABM Treaty to do the exploration, 
     whether or not a viable missile defense system is feasible 
     without starting a new arms race, and without producing an 
     economic hemorrhage of a half a trillion dollars with little 
     return on our investment.
       Right now we're caught between the rock and the hard place. 
     In order to go forward, according to this administration--and 
     I think they're inaccurate--but the gentleman sitting behind 
     you has forgotten more about this issue than I am going to 
     know. But in order for them to go forward with the testing 
     program they have in mind, they can do it without having to 
     violate the ABM Treaty. But it has become sort of religious 
     doctrine on the right that the ABM Treaty is, per se, bad. 
     I'm hopeful that we're at a place now, where the President, 
     if we in fact--and I happen to support significant further 
     reductions in all offensive capability--if we get the Joint 
     chiefs to agree upon a number significantly below where we 
     are, I'm willing to go along with an amendment of the ABM 
     Treaty, assuming that we have scrubbed this in a way that we 
     understand what the likely response in China will be to such 
     a system.
       If in fact, notwithstanding the fact that the Russians 
     would agree, this will start a significant--and our 
     intelligence agencies publish widely, and I can only tell you 
     what was in the paper, only confirm . . . I won't confirm, 
     I'll state what's in the paper--that they will do ten times 
     as much as they would have otherwise done in offensive 
     capability if we build such a system. If we cannot get 
     through that wicket, then it seems to me it is not worth a 
     candle. The cost is not worth it, and the consequence of 
     going forward with the limited benefit that would flow from 
     it may very well start that arms race which I worry most 
     about in the most dangeorus part of the world. It was 
     dangerous before, and it's considerably more dangerous now.
       So I cannot fathom India sitting by if China rapidly racks 
     up their nuclear capability, and I cannot figure Pakistan 
     doing the same, and so I see it as a disaster. But this is a 
     beginning step, and I guess the polite way of saying this, 
     I'm happy the President seems to be moving in the direction

[[Page 20623]]

     where he may not unilaterally walk away from the ABM Treaty. 
     That's a big deal.
       VW: I want to go to Rita next, but if there are other 
     questions on either strategic defense or the ABM Treaty, I'll 
     take them now, before we leave that topic. If not, we'll go 
     to Rita.
       RH: Rita Hauser. You didn't mention Iraq. Do you see Iraq 
     in the second stage as a target for the terrorists counter-
     offensive, and what is your view on the continuation of our 
     policy of sanctions?
       JB: I happen to think that the sanctions policy needs to be 
     changed. The Secretary of State has discussed a smarter 
     sanctions policy. I thought he was going in the right 
     direction, I was hoping that it would be embraced, although I 
     now think there's an opportunity to embrace it because the 
     dynamics have changed in Moscow, and the dynamics have 
     changed in France, and the dynamics have changed in China 
     somewhat, and I would further explore going back to that 
     approach, that is, a smart sanctions policy.
       I'm of a view that what has changed has all been bad from a 
     Iraq standpoint, for the Iraqis. The idea now that we are 
     going to just disregard what Saddam has done, walk away and 
     just seek economic opportuinty, as some of our friends and 
     allies have done, I think is being reconsidered in those very 
     capitols. Rather than have a second phase, the way in which 
     the press uses it, and I assume you're talking about, that 
     is, after we finish with Afghanistan, do we invade Iraq? I 
     think that is not the prudent approach. I think what we 
     attempt to do is to build a coalition, reconstruct a 
     coalition that is tighter and stronger and with more demands 
     placed upon the behavior of Iraq.
       My view is, if we're able to do that, and the behavior is 
     still as bad as it has been in the past, you will be able to 
     much more likely generate a consensus on at least standing by 
     as we took action, or having multilateral action. But to just 
     go from here to there I think would be a disastrous mistaken 
     in the near term.
       VW: Go back to that table. I'm going to try to move the 
     audience as best I can.
       FW: Frank Wisner from the American International Group. The 
     current crisis . . . (Overlap)
       JB: Why are you taking folks out of Delaware? We want to 
     talk about that . . . (Laughter) . . . I want to know this, 
     Mr. Ambassasdor, this a parochial, this a serious stuff. 
     (Laugher) I'm only joking . . . (Overlap)
       FW: . . . we have commitment . . . (Overlap)
       JB: . . . I just want to kind of throw you off. (Laughter)
       VW: . . . He's not really joking. (Laughter)
       JB: . . . Former Congressman, I can tell you, I'm worried 
     about it, but . . .
       FW: Senator, coming back to the subject of your terrific 
     speech today, (Laughter) . . .
       JB: It went from good to terrific. (Laughter)
       FW: This crisis has brought to light other tensions, and 
     among them has been the sparking of tension between India and 
     Pakistan, with very heavy Indian shelling, acts of terror in 
     Kashmir. As you look at that aspect of the challenge to 
     American diplomacy, what message do you have to the parties 
     in the region, how they can get on top of the problem they 
     have and the role the United States can play?
       JB: Let me answer it in reverse order. The role of the 
     United States. The United States should stay engaged the way 
     the Secretary has gotten engaged in the last week. It's made 
     a difference already. I think there has to be a clear 
     understanding, both in Delhi and Islamabad that we are 
     interested, we are looking and we are watching.
       Secondly, I think a message should be delivered very 
     strongly to the Indians, do not attempt to take advantage of 
     the circumstances this moment, it's against your interests 
     across the board. And thirdly, we have to make clear to the 
     Pakistanis that, notwithstanding the fact we need you very 
     much right now, you are in a position where if you are going 
     to continue to foment the terror that does exist in Kashmir, 
     then you are operating against your own near term interests, 
     because that very viper can turn on you. And I think we have 
     to talk and talk and talk and talk, and engage and engage and 
     engage. Because as you well know, part of the cry on the part 
     of India has been, just somebody pay attention . . . or 
     excuse me, in Pakistan, someone pay attention.
       And on India, we don't want any part of anybody being 
     involved and looking at any of this problem. The truth of the 
     matter is, the whole world is looking at their problem now in 
     Kashmir, not just us, the spotlight is on and the 
     consequences for how they will be treated relative to all 
     other nations in the world is very much up in the air right 
     now, and they should be made constantly aware of how tenuous 
     the circumstance is for both of them. In this case, 
     particularly India . . . in my view, particularly India.
       VW: Can I follow up on that myself? Because at the 
     beginning of this administration, the administration seemed 
     to be tilting, to use a term, toward India, the Indian 
     Foreign Minister was given a meeting with the President, and 
     it seemed as if the administration was going to try to, as 
     one of the cornerstones of their foreign policy, build a much 
     better relationship with India than we've had in the past. In 
     view of what you just said, do you think that that was then, 
     and this is now, or is there still an opportunity going 
     forward to forge a much closer relationship with the Indians?
       JB: I think that was then, and it's almost still that way 
     now. (Scattered Laughter) And let me explain what I mean by 
     that. I may be mistaken, and I may be a bit cynical, but I 
     think the initial, quote, tilt toward India was related to 
     Beijing more than it was to Pakistan or anything else. And I 
     think that the relationship with Beijing was going south very 
     rapidly. And continued to move south in a precipitous way 
     until Powell made his visit.
       I coincidentally happened to take a small delegation of 
     Senators to some very high level meetings for six days in 
     China, just on the heels of that visit, and you could 
     literally see, maybe a mild exaggeration, a sigh of relief on 
     the part of the Chinese, that maybe this collision is not 
     inevitable, it is not inevitable. I think it chastened the 
     Chinese a little bit, I think it made them focus on the 
     precipice, as well as us.
       Now what's happened is, I think, you have, and it's a . . . 
     I cannot prove this, I think what you have in India now is a 
     look north and saying, whoa, it looks like these guys are 
     talking again. We may have moved past our opportunity to make 
     a substantial change in the relationship. That would be a 
     mistake on their part, to think that. Because I think that 
     there is a desire in the administration to actually, 
     genuinely better relations with India. I think it is an 
     absolute essential element of American foreign policy that 
     that be done. And part of that is simply engaging . . . 
     engaging them and treating them like what they are. They 
     will, in not too long, be the largest, most populous nation 
     in the world. They are a democracy, as flawed as you may 
     think it is. They are someone with whom we should and must 
     have a much, much, much better relationship and 
     understanding.
       And the whole world has changed for India. It has changed 
     not only when the Wall came down, and when their protector 
     evaporated, it changed now as the relationship with China 
     begins to mature, and they're going to have some great 
     difficulty internally figuring out how to deal with that. But 
     we should be engaged at the highest level on a daily basis, 
     literally with India. So I don't think the administration is 
     jettisoning India, but I think they're beginning to look at 
     India in a different way, not as cynically as just a card to 
     have been played against Beijing.
       VW: Questioner behind Frank, then I'm going to try to go 
     the back of the room for a question.
       ME: Monsoor Ejaz. Senator, it's always good to hear you 
     speak so frankly, so I'm going to try and get you on the 
     record on another sensitive issue. Does the United States 
     need a military policy to deal with an eventuality in which a 
     Taliban-like force would hold control over Pakistan's nuclear 
     weapons? And if it does, what should that policy look like?
       JB: Well, I think we're engaged in that policy right now. 
     And I have every reason to believe from my conversations with 
     the President, and I don't pretend to be his confidant, I 
     don't want anyone . . . I know you all know that, but the CNN 
     audience might think I'm trying to foist myself off as the 
     President's close advisor. I've been flattered the President 
     has engaged me as the opposition and as Chairman of the 
     Foreign Relations Committee, and we've had, as they say, full 
     and frank discussion, probably five, six hours worth in the 
     last several months, and . . . but my impression and my 
     understanding is, coming from both the Secretary of State as 
     well as the Secretary of Defense and as well as the President 
     of the United States personally, that that is the essence of 
     their policy at the moment.
       It is reflected in certain ways. You see, and I'll be very 
     parochial, and I'm going to give you a specific example. 
     Right now there has been, and continues to exist, a real 
     dissatisfaction on the part of the Northern Alliance that we 
     have not done, which is fully without our capability to do 
     now, and that is with air power, essentially provide air 
     cover that could decimate the Taliban capability of holding 
     them back, not only from Mazar i Sharif, but also holding 
     them back from the capitol.
       And the President has not been as blunt as I'm going to be, 
     because I don't speak for him, so I can say it, I believe the 
     President's actions have been somewhat circumspect for very 
     good reasons. He understands that if in fact the Northern 
     Alliance marches into Kabul and sets up a government, that we 
     will have the potential for a disintegration in Islamabad, 
     and that Pakistan may very well, and Musharraf may in fact 
     collapse, it may be gone.
       And so I think that . . . I'll give you that as one example 
     of my view of the President's understanding of how difficult 
     this is. We have also done things which were not particularly 
     comfortable for me to do, quite frankly. I'm the guy, as 
     Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that was 
     responsible for either facilitating and/or proposing the 
     lifting of all the sanctions, of which I have supported 
     relative proliferation, not to proliferation questions, as 
     well

[[Page 20624]]

     as democratization. And we've even looked at Section 508, and 
     so my point is that we have taken extraordinary actions, 
     which is sort of against our instincts, with only the 
     promise, only the promise of elections a year from now, with 
     the commitment to be kept, and only the hope, the hope that 
     we will be able to stabilize, that the region will, with our 
     help and others, be stabilized in such a way that we don't 
     have to face that God awful specter of radical Islamic groups 
     taking over a country that is multiple sizes larger than 
     Afghanistan, with nuclear weapons.
       So I think the administration is fully appraised, fully 
     understands, and is doing everything within its power, 
     understanding, and I don't . . . in defense of the 
     administration, no one has a hole card here. No one that I 
     know, maybe some of you do, and if you do, let me know 
     because I want to nominate you for the Nobel Peace Prize in 
     advance. No one I know has a surefire way to assure that 
     stability in this part of the world will result from the 
     actions undertaken. Conversely, I don't know of anyone who . 
     . . I do know of some, I don't know anyone in this room would 
     like to suggest we should not and need not have taken the 
     action we are taking. We're not going to get into the weeds 
     here. It's going to start to get . . . we talked, and I hope 
     I don't offend anybody saying this, at our table here, we 
     talked about how long the honymoon, how long the 
     unquestioning period of unabashed support for the President's 
     policy will continue. I think everyone . . . I shouldn't say 
     everyone . . . I mean the vast majority of the foreign policy 
     establishment, of the Democratic and Republican sides of the 
     aisle, in fact share the view that up to now the President's 
     done a pretty darn good job of assembling this multilateral 
     force, resisting what were very strong entree's from parts of 
     the administration to bypass Afghanistan and go straight to 
     Iraq, et cetera. I think he's done well. But now we're going 
     to get into the tough calls.
       Case in point, and I'll stop with this. How much longer 
     does the bombing continue? Because we're going to pay every 
     single hour, every single day it continues, we're going to 
     pay an escalating price in the Muslim world. We're going to 
     pay an escalating price in the region. And that in fact is 
     going to make the aftermath of our, quote, victory more 
     difficult to reconstruct the region. Conversely, the 
     President's in a very difficult spot. How much does he have 
     to do to make the environment in which we are going to send, 
     and we will, American forces, hospitable to the extent . . .)

       (Council on Foreign Relations tape turned to side B . . . 
     several seconds missing . . .)
       . . . tell you, though, I hope to God it ends sooner rather 
     than later, becasue every moment it goes on, it makes the 
     aftermath problem more severe than it is . . . was an hour 
     ago. And so that's what I mean when I say they're fully 
     appraised of their problem. They are going to engage in 
     activities that we may . . . I may be able to Monday morning 
     quarterback and second guess, but I know of no clear path 
     that suggests how they secure the notion that there is no 
     possibility of Pakistan degenerating into chaos, and us 
     dealing with a problem there. The ultimate answer would be, 
     if that were the case, we would find ourselves with a whole 
     hell of a lot more forces in that region than we have now, 
     which would be a very bad idea.
       VW: Going to go right straight to the back of the room, and 
     then I have a question at the middle table up front.
       DG: I'm Davey Gaw(?), with the conference board. Senator, 
     you gave us a picture that was historic, and it raised the 
     question in my mind, to this effect. Is there an advertising 
     problem, is there a genuine insoluble intellectual issue, or 
     simply have we not solved the following? It seems to me that 
     for the past 50 years or so, the U.S. has always been stuck 
     in a corner, on the one hand we launch into the world with 
     noble causes, and then we tie ourselves to ignoble regimes so 
     that we have (Inaudible) for purposes, but people think that 
     we're married to these regimes, and the same thing is 
     occuring now in the Middle East. What's wrong? Why can't we 
     do a dual track strategy? Why can't we send a message that's 
     credible, that we do serve double purposes on the one end, 
     but we also do not want to marry ignoble regimes on the 
     other? Why can't we solve that issue?
       JB: Because life's tough (Scattered Laughter) There are 
     hard choices. I don't know. I don't want to get him in 
     trouble, but I suspect Les Gelb may remember, about a dozen 
     years ago, my proposing we start to distance ourselves from 
     some of those various regimes, and for example, during the 
     Gulf War, one of the reasons I voted against the resolution 
     that was put forward was, I did not get any commitment from 
     the administration personally that they would in fact make 
     sure that when we freed Kuwait, the circumstance in Kuwait 
     would change. I did not see merely putting the Emir back in 
     power as anything that inured to our great benefit. The 
     territorial principle of not crossing a border was a big 
     deal, and important and oil mattered, but it seemed to me we 
     should have extracted in return for that some commitment 
     toward the movement toward, some movement toward, not 
     outright democracy, but some movement toward a liberalization 
     of the system.
       I have been the odd man out on that for a long time with 
     regard to Saudi Arabia as well, and other countries in the 
     region. But I acknowledge to you, it is incredibly difficult 
     to do. And you got to be prepared to take a risk, and the 
     risk is serious. The down side is high. The costs 
     economically are severe. But I think we're at the point now 
     where we have to take those risks. But it's not easy. It is 
     not easy because the truth of the matter is, we inherited 
     what was there, we helped make and sustained what was there, 
     but we did it for reasons relating to our immediate self 
     interests that were of consequence to us, enabling us to do 
     other things in other parts of the world that were necessary 
     to be done.
       So, it's, yes, as a former President once said, life ain't 
     fair. Well, the world ain't fair, and we're left with a lot 
     of Hobson's Choices. If I can elaborate on one piece. This 
     dissemination of information, I put together a proposal that 
     I've been discussing with the administration. I've been sort 
     of the guy who has, and a lot of you have as well, but I mean 
     in the Senate, in the House, I've been sort of the godfather 
     of the radios lately, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the 
     Voice of America, et cetera. It's woefully underfunded. For 
     example, in the largest Muslim state in the world, where they 
     have 220 million people, we spend two million dollars on the 
     radio, for example. So I put together a proposal at the 
     President's urging, quite frankly, because one of the things 
     I discussed with him, that I'm going to present to him when 
     he gets back, is over a half a billion dollar initial 
     investment, 250 million dollars a year, for public diplomacy, 
     and fundamentally altering the way in which we're able to 
     broadcast to that part of the world. As part of this, I asked 
     my staff, and I have some very talented staff people who know 
     the region well, have worked in the region, and are very 
     academically qualified as well as practically qualified, if 
     they would get together some two or three or four of the most 
     knowledgeable folks on Islam in the world, so that we in 
     fact, when I propose this, I was doing something that was 
     counterproductive. So that we wouldn't find we were causing 
     more problems than there were solutions. And I sat with these 
     four folks, I'll tell you what they said to me. Now, they're 
     not the end of the day, but they said to me, they said, look, 
     the idea of winning the hearts and minds of the Islamic 
     world, and the Arab Islamic world is not likely. The best you 
     can do is give some reasons for the moderates within that 
     regime to have a reason to sustain their position against the 
     extremists in . . . did I say regime? I meant to say region, 
     against extremists in the region. And they went on to say, 
     the problem isn't with the American people, it's with 
     American foreign policies, and then they ticked off the 
     foreign policy. Being part of propping up regimes that in 
     fact are anti-democratic and are part of the problem, because 
     again, Osama Bin Laden is after Riyadh, not after Jerusalem.
       And it's a different problem. And also they then point out 
     Israel, and they say part of the problem relates to our 
     policy relative to Israel. Well, there are certain things 
     we're not going to change. There are certain things we're not 
     going to change, so the question is, what utility would a 
     significant investment in our public diplomacy have? And it 
     seems to me the minimum what it would have, it would give a 
     context in which we were able to . . . they were able to make 
     judgments about the totality of our action, and would not in 
     fact change the attitude in that part of the world toward us, 
     but would moderate it. And so these are very difficult 
     questions, though, but I am going to propose we make this 
     major investment, and I think it will fall on, quite frankly, 
     friendly ears in the administration, based on my 
     conversations with the President.
       VW: Is there an opportunity to take that a step further to 
     the whole foreign policy budget of the government, the United 
     Nations that you've been involved in, support for our 
     embassies abroad that's been underfunded for some time, 
     foreign aid budget, is that a part of the whole response?
       JB: No, because . . . and I'm not being . . . I didn't mean 
     to be so sure. (Laughs) I don't mean . . . (Overlap)
       VW: . . . short answer (?) . . .
       JB: . . . that's right. (Scattered Laughter) Now, well . . 
     . the answer is no for the following reasons. For the federal 
     government to engage in public diplomacy at home is a very 
     dangerous thing, in my view. For us to fund news 
     organizations that promote a governmental position, it seems 
     to me is not what we need, domestically in the United States. 
     But we do need it abroad. What will change, and has changed 
     that, as Ambassador Negroponte knows, he not only . . . I 
     mean, I love the guy. We held him up for God knows how long 
     before we approved him, so everybody made sure any accusation 
     ever against wouldn't rub off on them, and they all turned 
     out to be false, and we approved unanimously, wasn't it? I 
     don't think anybody voted against it. And he went up there 
     and did something no one's been able to do, including Prince 
     Holbrooke, no one's been able to do this. (Laughter) And you 
     know what he did? He went up and there and got immediately 
     the right wing Republicans to free up the money in the House. 
     You know

[[Page 20625]]

     what did that? The world changed. They did not want to have 
     to, as former Senator Carol Moseley Braun would say, wear the 
     jacket of us not being able to put together a coalition 
     because he was unable to do his job in the United Nations 
     because he had to face the constant charge that we weren't 
     meeting our end of the deal.
       So I think events alter those kinds of things and I think 
     you're going to see foreign policy much more on the front 
     burner of American domestic politics for the reasons that 
     were stated at the outset, that we'll, in fact, up those 
     budgets and people are beginning to understand the 
     complexity. It's not all military, it's diplomacy. We have to 
     lead in other ways, and I think that will be helped by this 
     terrible circumstance.
       VW: Senator Biden, thank you for . . . (Overlap)
       DG: I'm Dick Garwin, Council on Foreign Relations. Thank 
     you for an insightful and constructive presentation. Now, on 
     the ABM Treaty and missile defense, I can just say Amen, but 
     the rest of the topics you mentioned, we need to have not 
     only some priorities, but more than that. That administration 
     and the Congress are going to have to do a number of things 
     together. First, it seems to me that we have to have refugee 
     camps, and the refugee camps have to be training grounds for 
     democracy. So, we need to work with the United Nations to do 
     this, and to accomplish that. We need to provide security, 
     but we need to provide more than security.
       The next priority I think has to be the chemical and 
     biological weapons conventions, especially the BWC . . . 
     essentially all the nations of the world have signed up, but 
     they're not all obeying it. They're not all doing what they 
     said. Before we have any compliance, we've got to have them 
     say, we're going to do this, we're passing a law, everybody 
     has to stop affiliating with biological weapons and we're 
     going to destroy our stocks. Seems to me that's the next. And 
     finally, in my talk, is the Pakistani nuclear weapons. You 
     read in the New York Times Bruce Wehr(?), saying we ought to 
     provide means of going in, and capturing them in case 
     Pakistan regime falls. Well, we'll get a lot more cooperation 
     if we fund Pakistani regime in order to destroy their own, or 
     render them ineffective if the regime falls, and with uranium 
     weapons that can be done in reasonably expeditious fashion. 
     But how do you solve the problem of priorities, and doing a 
     number of things at the same time which neither 
     administrations nor Congress are good at?
       JB: Let me tell you, I fully agree with your list, I 
     shortened my speech on the fly here, I'll give you a copy of 
     it, it mentions all three of those things, particularly the 
     biological and chemical weapons treaty and the 
     implementation. And I think you do just what you said. Those 
     discussions are underway with the Democratic Congress and the 
     Republican members of Congress and the President on setting 
     those priorities. The question is, the President has an 
     internal dilemma he has to overcome first. He is focusing on 
     first things first, but then he has to deal with . . . and 
     I'm going to get in trouble for saying this . . . but he has 
     to deal with what has not gone away. There is, for lack of a 
     better phrase, still a Rumsfeld-Powell split on how they look 
     at the world, and how they look at these very issues that 
     you've stated here. I was discussing here at my table, my 
     perception, and maybe, what's that old expression, the father 
     is . . . the wish is the father of the thought, or whatever 
     it is, that maybe I'm just sort of making this up as I go 
     along because I want to feel it. But my impression is, this 
     President is arriving at his own foreign policy. He is 
     arriving at his own foreign policy. I think he accepted 
     wholesale sort of the movement right position on foreign 
     policy issues, because as a Governor he hadn't paid much 
     attention to those. And I think he's finding that those as a 
     prescription don't fit the modern day world as easily as he 
     thought they may.
       And so I see the first thing that has to happen is the 
     President himself has to decide what he thinks about these 
     issues. And I hope we throw in CTBT here, because I think to 
     me that is one of the . . . that is the single most important 
     thing we could do at the front end. But . . . Vin is looking 
     at his watch, understandably, I happen to agree with you. 
     With regard to priorities, Dick Lugar and I are going to be 
     introducing this week after call for a commission that is, I 
     know we got a lot of commissions, but a commission made up, 
     appointed by the President, the House and the Senate, made up 
     of the leading people in America that we could find with the 
     greatest stature, to come forward with us with a threat 
     assessment, a threat assessment that in fact reflects, for 
     purposes of deciding what priorities we should be focusing 
     on. And so I can talk to you more about that later, but my 
     time is . . . (Overlap)
       VW: I don't know if we have time for one or two more, but 
     one there, and if there's time for two, it's over there. Les 
     is telling me only one, I'm sorry to say, (inaudible).
       M: (inaudible) Talbot(?). Senator, thank you for this broad 
     guarded approach to the problems we face. My question is 
     this, do you foresee the need or the expectation of a 
     Congressional declaration of war, which the Constitution 
     calls for, and if so, against whom? (Scattered Laughter)
       JB: The answer is yes, and we did it. I happen to be a 
     professor of Constitutional law. I'm the guy that drafted the 
     Use of Force proposal that we passed. It was in conflict 
     between the President and the House. I was the guy who 
     finally drafted what we did pass. Under the Constitution, 
     there is simply no distinction . . . Louis Fisher(?) and 
     others can tell you, there is no distinction between a formal 
     declaration of war, and an authorization of use of force. 
     There is none for Constitutional purposes. None whatsoever. 
     And we defined in that Use of Force Act that we passed, what 
     . . . against whom we were moving, and what authority was 
     granted to the President.
       And why don't you take that question, it's not two o'clock, 
     I'll give a yes or no. He may be from Delaware. (Laughter)
       RP: Roland Paul, Senator, I concur with everybody else in 
     commending you on your comments, and anyone who's heard you 
     before would certainly not be surprised at how good they 
     were. I would return to a question you answered earlier, and 
     you said as long . . . the bombing, every day it goes on, the 
     harder it may be for us to do something in the past(?). What 
     do you see as the situation if we don't defeat the Taliban in 
     the next four weeks, and winter sets in in Afghanistan?
       JB: Again, I'm not a military man. I think the American 
     public and the Islamic world is fully prepared for us to take 
     as long as we need to take, if it is action that is mano-a-
     mano. If it's us on the ground going against other forces on 
     the ground. The part that I think flies in the face of and 
     plays into every stereotypical criticism of us is we're this 
     high tech bully that thinks from the air we can do whatever 
     we want to do, and it builds the case for those who want to 
     make the cause against us that all we're doing is 
     indiscriminately bombing innocents, which is not the truth. 
     Some innocents are (indiscriminately) bombed, but that is not 
     the truth. I think the American public is prepared for a long 
     siege. I think the American public is prepared for American 
     losses. I think the American public is prepared, and the 
     President must continue to remind them to be prepared, for 
     American body bags coming home.
       There is no way that you can in fact go after and root out 
     al-Qaeda and/or Bid Laden without folks on the ground, in 
     caves, risking and losing their lives. And I believe that the 
     tolerance for that in the Islamic world is significant . . . 
     exponentially higher than it is for us bombing. That's a 
     generic point I wish to make. I am not qualified enough to 
     tell you, although I can tell you what the military guys have 
     said to me, this is not 1948. This is 2001, I'm not at all 
     they're correct, and our ability to wage conflict in the 
     winter, in parts of this region, is within our control, I 
     don't know enough to vouch for that or not, but I do think it 
     clearly makes it more difficulty, and the weather window is 
     closing, as opposed to the tolerance window for a behavior, 
     in my view. Thank you all very, very much. (Applause)

  Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Miller). The majority leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the Senator from Delaware for his clarification, 
although there was none required on my part.
  Mr. BIDEN. I knew it would not be required on the Senator's part.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I have the greatest admiration for the extraordinary 
experience and leadership provided by the Senator from Delaware. I am 
not surprised he was misquoted, and I think he is wise. He speaks from 
experience in coming to the floor to ensure if there is any 
misunderstanding it has now been clarified.
  He did it in a way I would expect. He has come to the Chamber with a 
complete explanation. I have read some of the remarks because after 
being asked the question, I was informed of the Senator's comments. I 
applaud him for the way in which he handled the questions and applaud 
him as well for his speech. I appreciate his willingness to come to the 
Chamber, and I thank him for the extraordinary job he does every day as 
chairman of our Foreign Relations Committee.
  Mr. BIDEN. Very briefly in response, I thank the Senator. I know the 
public listening to this would say they expect two guys who are friends 
and in the same party to say the same thing, but the truth is we are 
all going to be tested over the next several months. The President of 
the United States, who we all think is doing a very fine job, is going 
to have to make some very tough decisions.
  I, for one, and I know my two leaders and the Senator from Oregon as 
well are not into Monday morning quarterbacking. Some of the decisions 
we are

[[Page 20626]]

going to make are going to turn out to be brilliant. Some we are going 
to make are not going to be so good.
  I would say this: This President, in my view, so far has made the 
right choices. He has done the right thing. He is pursuing the right 
way. This notion of how long we bomb versus how long before we put 
forces on the ground is an incredibly difficult decision. You can be 
assured every single mistake we accidentally make--and by the way, to 
our credit the Defense Department acknowledged today, like no other 
Defense Department would, I think, that, yes, there was an errant bomb, 
and it did take out some innocent people. What other great nation would 
acknowledge that?
  That is going to happen. It is horrible that it will, but the 
President has a series of very tough choices. I want him to know that 
not only I, but we all wish him well, and as long as he is trying, as 
he is, to keep this coalition together, to keep it moving, I am willing 
to yield to his judgment in the prosecution of this war.
  So I thank my friend for his kind comments, and I hope this puts it 
to rest. I am sure the gentleman on the House side who made the 
comments was probably told by staff, and I think it was kind of like a 
drive-by shooting because I have never had a cross word with this 
particular House Member, but I understand things got pretty hot in the 
House today. I think I was the first Democrat who came across his 
radar, and I think this would be called a political drive-by shooting--
accidental, I hope--and it will get straightened out.
  I am not criticizing or making light of what was said. I want the 
Record to be straight because it is important the world knows and the 
Nation knows we are behind the President and we are not at this point 
second-guessing his judgment, particularly about bombing.

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