[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 20297-20304]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. REID:
  S. 1564. A bill to convey land to the University of Nevada at Las 
Vegas Research Foundation for a research park and technology center; 
read the first time.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1564

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, needs land in the 
     greater Las Vegas area to provide for the future growth of 
     the university;
       (2) the proposal by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 
     for construction of a research park and technology center in 
     the greater Las Vegas area would enhance the high tech 
     industry and entrepreneurship in the State of Nevada; and

[[Page 20298]]

       (3) the land transferred to the Clark County Department of 
     Aviation under section 4(g) of the Southern Nevada Public 
     Land Management Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-263; 112 Stat. 
     2346) is the best location for the research park and 
     technology center.
       (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are--
       (1) to provide a suitable location for the construction of 
     a research park and technology center in the greater Las 
     Vegas area;
       (2) to provide the public with opportunities for education 
     and research in the field of high technology; and
       (3) to provide the State of Nevada with opportunities for 
     competition and economic development in the field of high 
     technology.

     SEC. 2. CONVEYANCE TO THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA AT LAS VEGAS 
                   RESEARCH FOUNDATION.

       (a) Conveyance.--Notwithstanding section 4(g)(4) of the 
     Southern Nevada Public Land Management Act of 1998 (Public 
     Law 105-263; 112 Stat. 2347), the Clark County Department of 
     Aviation may convey, without consideration, all right, title, 
     and interest in and to the parcel of land described in 
     subsection (b) to the University of Nevada at Las Vegas 
     Research Foundation for the development of a technology 
     research center.
       (b) Description of Land.--The parcel of land referred to in 
     subsection (a) is the parcel of Clark County Department of 
     Aviation land--
       (1) consisting of approximately 115 acres;
       (2) located in the SW \1/4\ of section 33, T. 21 S., R. 60 
     E., Mount Diablo Base and Meridian; and
       (3) identified in the agreement entitled ``Interim 
     Cooperative Management Agreement Between the United States 
     Department of the Interior--Bureau of Land Management and 
     Clark County'', dated November 4, 1992.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Feingold, Mr. 
        Corzine, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Leahy):
  S. 1565. A bill relating to United States adherence to the ABM 
Treaty; to the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation 
regarding the testing, development, and possible deployment of a 
National Missile Defense system. This legislation is cosponsored by 
Senators Wyden, Feingold, Corzine, Harkin, and Leahy.
  I share the concern of many of my colleagues that, in the aftermath 
of the horrific events of September 11, this is not the appropriate 
time or place for a divisive debate on the Senate floor on missile 
defense.
  That is why I did not offer this legislation as an amendment on the 
Defense authorization bill, do not intend to offer it as an amendment 
on other legislation before the Senate at this time, and do not intend 
to push this legislation for a vote at this point in time. This is not 
the time for Senate consideration of this legislation or for a divisive 
debate on this issue.
  But I also believe that it is critical that at the appropriate time, 
and in the appropriate way, a full public and congressional debate on 
missile defense must occur. It is simply too an important a decision, 
and too important an issue, to be treated in any other way.
  Indeed, National Missile Defense is one of the most serious foreign 
policy and national security issue that we will face in the coming 
decades. The administration's decisions on this issue should be made 
deliberately, in consultation with our allies, and, most importantly, 
in consultation with the United States Congress.
  As one Senator, I myself have spent considerable time over the past 
several years in meetings, briefings, and discussions on this issue. 
Earlier this year I had the opportunity to discuss missile defense 
issues at length with former Secretary Perry.
  He suggested to me that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons of mass destruction, and the increasing availability 
to other nations as well as transnational groups such as terrorist 
organizations, of the technology and material necessary to develop and 
deliver WMD is perhaps the most serious threat to U.S. national 
security today.
  Secretary Perry went on to argue, however, that National Missile 
Defense is not and should not be seen as a one-size-fits-all substitute 
for an effective non-proliferation strategy, and that the United States 
must have a balanced program to effectively safeguard our interests. 
This includes effective strategies for the prevention of proliferation, 
deterrence, homeland defense, and counter-proliferation, and clearly 
calibrating and allocating resources to meet the real challenges that 
face U.S. national security interests.
  I believe that the approach suggested by Secretary Perry makes a good 
deal of sense.
  Based on this approach, I believe that it is therefore important for 
Congress to ask a number of questions with regard to NMD. Questions 
such as:
  Would missile defense have helped to prevent the events of September 
11?
  Are there more immediate security needs, such as homeland defense, 
which demand priority on our scarce national defense and national 
security resources?
  Is NMD an appropriate to serve as the central axle around which U.S. 
national security rotates, given the nature of the threats we now face?
  Would unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty hurt U.S. 
efforts to get international cooperation in the battle against 
terrorism?
  Will acquiring NMD make the United States, and the world, safer and 
more secure? Or will unilateral U.S. development and deployment of NMD, 
and unilateral violation, abrogation, or withdrawal from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, make us less safe and secure?
  I am also concerned that with what appears to be a rush toward 
construction at Fort Greely, AK, the administration has already made a 
decision on deployment, without having yet answered these bottom line 
questions.
  The legislation that I and my colleagues introduce today seeks to 
address these questions, and to suggest that the balanced approach 
suggested by Secretary Perry to safeguarding the United States from the 
threat of WMD attack might be a wiser policy for Congress to consider, 
rather than merely rubber-stamping the administration's missile defense 
policy.
  This legislation would: express the Sense of the Senate that U.S. 
research and development of missile defense remain consistent with the 
ABM treaty, that the U.S. should pursue good faith negotiations with 
Russia to make such modifications to the ABM as may be necessary, but 
that the U.S. should not unilaterally opt-out of the treaty and not 
deploy a missile defense system that has not met the basic research, 
testing, and evaluation standards to prove its operational 
effectiveness.
  Place a limitation on funding available for missile defense testing, 
evaluation, or deployment that would unilaterally abrogate or violate 
the ABM treaty.
  Call on the Secretary of State to report to Congress, if a decision 
on deployment is made, regarding the nature of the threat that 
triggered the deployment decision and the likely impact that the 
deployment decision will have on U.S. national security interests.
  Call on the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress, if a decision 
on deployment is made, on the operational effectiveness of the missile 
defense system.
  Call on the President to make an annual report to Congress on the 
nature of the WMD threat faced by the U.S. and its allies, evaluate the 
threat posed by different means of delivery, ranging from ballistic 
missiles to suitcase bombs, provide an estimation for the total cost of 
development and deployment of missile defense, and make a determination 
whether missile defense spending adversely impacts other priority 
national security programs of the Department of Defense.
  I have previously stated that my concerns about NMD revolve largely 
around four issues: The nature of the threat; the implications for arms 
control and the international security environment; the feasibility of 
the technology; and the cost. I would like to address each of these in 
turn.
  The bottom line of these concerns is simply this: Will a 
unilateralist missile defense deployment decision become the basis for 
a new arms race, leading to a world with more ballistic missiles and 
WMD pointed at the United States, not less? Would the United States be 
more secure, or less?
  We also must ask where does the long range missile threat to the U.S. 
stand?
  Russia for all its problems, remains the only nation possessing 
enough Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles,

[[Page 20299]]

ICBMs, and submarine launched ballistic missiles, SLBMs, to overwhelm 
the proposed U.S. defensive umbrella. China has only a small number of 
ICBMs. No other nation has operational ICBMs and only two, France and 
the United Kingdom, have SLBMs.
  Other countries, such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, do not today have 
ballistic missile capabilities that are a threat to the United States. 
We should not act in ways to encourage them to develop these 
capabilities or, just as troubling, to develop alternate means to 
attack the United States which NMD is powerless to counter.
  Looking ahead, however, George Tenet, Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, testified before Congress last year that ``over 
the next 15 years, our cities will face ballistic missile threats from 
a variety of actors.'' He pointed to North Korea which, he said, could 
further develop its Taepo Dong 2 missile, noting that it ``might be 
capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States.''
  Other nations which have or are pursuing ballistic missile programs 
include Iran and Iraq. Neither of these countries have succeeded in 
developing ballistic missile capabilities, however, and unless they 
make a concerted effort to do so, neither appears likely to develop 
capabilities within the next 10 years.
  As we consider U.S. missile defense policy, I believe it is a fair 
question to ask what sort of developments in the international security 
environment might lead them, or others, to make that sort of concerted 
effort?
  As the past two weeks have too well illustrated, the world is not a 
static place. International security relationships are fluid and 
dynamic. The United States today is the world's sole superpower, and 
although that gives us great strategic flexibility and maneuverability, 
it would be naive for us to believe that other nations and 
transnational groups do not and will not react to the strategic choices 
the United States makes, and how they perceive those choices affecting 
their own interests.
  In other words, how might the rest of the world react to a unilateral 
U.S. decision to deploy NMD? What would other countries do to protect 
what they perceive as their national security interests in the face of 
a U.S. NMD?
  The National Intelligence Estimate prepared last year, ``Foreign 
Responses to U.S. National Missile Deployment,'' suggests that in 
reaction to U.S. NMD deployment:
  Russia could opt to deploy shorter-range missiles along its borders 
and resume adding multiple warheads to its ballistic missiles.
  China would most likely seek to deploy additional missiles with 
MIRVed warheads if the U.S. went ahead with NMD. This would mean that 
China may attempt a strategy of ``breaking out,'' giving them the 
capability to ``overwhelm'' a U.S. NMD system.
  North Korea could resume its missile flight test program and 
cooperate with other countries, such as Iran or Iraq, in helping them 
develop missile capabilities.
  Iran and Iraq might well redouble their efforts to develop their own 
missile programs, including decoys and countermeasures that would allow 
them to bypass a U.S. missile shield.
  The NIE report also concluded that if China sought to deploy 
additional missiles and warheads in response to NMD, this might prompt 
India to respond by building up its own nuclear arsenals and missile 
arsenal, which would in turn prompt Pakistan to seek to develop 
additional nuclear weapons and advanced missiles, unleashing a South 
Asian nuclear arms race.
  I do not believe I need to comment further, given recent events, just 
how dangerous that would be.
  Such a destabilized environment, with Russia, China, North Korea, 
India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and possibly others adding to their 
nuclear arsenals or missile capabilities does not strike me as a more 
stable world, or one in which the U.S. is more secure from the threat 
of WMD or missile attack.
  In addition, many analysts believe that if the United States were to 
go ahead with NMD, rogue states and terrorists groups would simply 
shift their focus from developing missile technology to delivering 
weapons of mass destruction by ship, plane, or cruise missile, methods 
that are both more reliable, provide no ``return address,'' and can't 
be countered by NMD.
  I do not even want to contemplate what September 11 would have been 
like had one or more of those hijacked planes contained even a small, 
primitive, ``dirty'' nuclear device.
  The second issue I would like to address today is the implication of 
a rush to deploy NMD for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
  Today the ABM Treaty is the keystone of a number of interlinked 
nuclear arms control agreements, including the START I and START II 
treaties with Russia. Although the ABM Treaty may require some 
modifications to take into account the realities of the new security 
environment, and this legislation urges the Administration to pursue 
such negotiations, to just cast it aside risks undermining the very 
foundations of strategic stability and U.S. national security.
  The United States has long been at the forefront of the international 
community in trying to inculcate respect for international law and 
treaty obligations.
  In fact, one of the ways in which the United States identifies so-
called rogue states is that these are states that do not respect their 
obligations to other members of the international community; states who 
walk away from, ignore, or cheat on their treaty obligations.
  And so it is deeply troubling to me that the United States may now be 
telling the rest of the world, through its own actions, that it is 
accepted behavior to break your treaty obligations.
  Indeed, with this approach I am particularly concerned that the 
United States may, in fact, be sending precisely the wrong message on 
international arms control to China: That only the weak must respect 
other nations and international law. If you are strong enough, you can 
do as you please.
  If the United States seeks to unilaterally abrogate the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, and in general treat international treaty 
commitments as mere pieces of paper to be disregarded if they prove 
inconvenient, how can we expect to hold China accountable to live up to 
its international agreements, or to the commitment it has made to the 
Missile Technology Control Regime?
  As reported in the press accounts earlier this summer, the Department 
of Defense ABM Compliance Review Group, the Pentagon lawyers tasked to 
identify potential ABM Treaty issues raised by the testing schedule, 
have determined that some elements of the administration's plan for 
developing missile defenses may conflict with the ABM Treaty by 2002.
  Indeed, a July 30, 2001 letter from Undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz to 
me stated that the ``Department has neither designed the missile 
defense program to intentionally impact the ABM treaty sooner rather 
than later, nor have we designed it to avoid the treaty.'' That is good 
as far as it goes. But is also avoids the real question:
  Has the Department of Defense made an effort to develop a missile 
defense testing program which is, by intent, consistent with the ABM? 
So long as the treaty is in force and is the supreme law of the land 
that seems to me to be a reasonable requirement.
  Moreover, as Philip Coyle, the former director of Operational Test 
and Evaluation at the Pentagon, wrote in a recent issue of The Defense 
Monitor, the ABM treaty ``is not holding back the design and 
development of the technology needed for National Missile Defense, NMD, 
nor is the treaty slowing the tests of an NMD system. Development of 
NMD will take a decade or more for technical and budgetary reasons, but 
not due to the impediments caused by the ABM treaty.''
  In other words, the United States can continue with an aggressive NMD 
development and testing program for the foreseeable future, should the 
Administration and Congress choose to, without the need to abandon the 
ABM.
  I do not believe that arms control treaties and agreements are a 
panacea

[[Page 20300]]

that, by themselves, secure U.S. national security interests or those 
of our friends and allies.
  But surely the constraints that these treaties and agreements impose 
can play a valuable role in constricting the development of weapons of 
mass destruction and their proliferation around the globe.
  They are a useful tool in a fully articulated foreign policy and 
national security toolbox, and it is short-sighted, to say the least, 
to throw the tool out. Especially if one does not replace it with 
something of equal or greater value.
  Although the technical challenges of developing missile defense 
technology are great, I believe that the United States, if we choose to 
pursue it, is equal to the task.
  But that we can develop a missile defense system should not be 
confused by anyone to mean that we have the capabilities now, or will 
possess them, even with an aggressive testing and development program, 
anytime soon.
  Effective missile defense is an enormous technical challenge. 
Commonly compared to ``hitting a bullet with a bullet,'' missile 
defense requires interceptors to find and hit the warheads of long-
range missiles traveling at speeds of 15,000 mph or more. Although two 
of the four tests thus far have failed, and serious questions have been 
raised about the degree of success of the other two, these tests have 
indicated that it may indeed be possible to ``hit a bullet with a 
bullet.''
  But it is still far from clear if it can be done reliably in a real-
world setting, where decoys and countermeasures will complicate the 
system's ability to determine what targets need to be hit. A global 
system of satellites, radars, communications relays, booster rockets 
and interceptors all must work with each other almost perfectly for the 
defense to have a chance of success.
  There are also concerns, first raised by the November 1999 Welch 
Report, that political pressure to deploy a system regardless of 
whether the science works or not may lead to a ``rush to failure.'' 
However, it must be a scientific determination, not a political 
determination, that decides how far and how fast we go forward with 
missile defense.
  If the United States goes forward with development and deployment of 
a missile defense system, it must be one that is fully tested and 
deemed operationally effective in a real world setting. Anything less 
would be an invitation to disaster.
  My final concern about missile defense relates to the potential costs 
of development and deployment.
  As Congress considers this issue it is critical that it is able to 
clearly prioritize missile defense programs and spending, within the 
context of our larger national security needs. Funds that are spent on 
national missile defense are, in effect, funds that can not be spent on 
other priority programs, such as homeland defense. I do not propose 
that the United States spends all on one or the other. Rather, Congress 
must play a responsible role in making sure that sufficient funds are 
available to meet the threats to national security that exist today, 
while planning prudently for threats that will emerge tomorrow.
  To allocate a disproportionate share of defense spending on a threat 
that does not exist at all, or which will not be real until much 
further off in the future creates a very real risk to those programs 
that need to be funded today. This means that immediate and concrete 
threats we face today may not be addressed with potentially disastrous 
results.
  There has never been a consensus cost figure for deploying an NMD 
system. For several years, the Clinton administration estimated that a 
limited NMD system would cost $9 to $11 billion to develop, test, and 
deploy. In January 1999, the administration estimated that an initial 
system of 20 interceptors would cost about $10.6 billion. In February 
2000, the administration provided a ``life-cycle'' cost estimate of 
$26.6 billion for an initial system of 100 ground-based interceptors in 
Alaska.
  An April 2000 study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
however, estimated that it would cost about $29.5 billion to develop, 
build, and operate an initial NMD system through 2015. CBO estimates it 
will cost another $19 billion through 2015 to expand the initial system 
of 100 interceptors and build what was called a Capability 2 and 
Capability 3 system designed for greater numbers of more sophisticated 
potential missile threats. According to CBO, additional space-based 
sensors would bring the total costs for NMD to around $60 billion 
through 2015.
  Several reports issued by outside groups, however, suggest that the 
real costs of missile defense deployment could be much higher, perhaps 
as $300 billion if such elements as space-based and naval-based NMD 
interceptors are included.
  Trying to put a price tag on missile defense costs is all the more 
difficult at present because the current administration has not yet 
determined what sort of missile defense architecture they want to 
develop. Put simply, they have asked for the credit card to go to the 
store, but have not told us if they will be buying jeans or a tuxedo, 
or anything in between.
  The question of cost should not be a determining factor in and of 
itself. If the international security environment demands development 
and deployment of missile defenses, the U.S. must go forward regardless 
of the cost.
  But as Congress considers the elements of U.S. national security 
strategy in the years ahead, it must do so mindful that devoting 
resources to one area likely means depriving them from another. We must 
be careful, therefore, to make sure that our national security needs 
are properly prioritized. To move forward with missile defense, if it 
is not at the top of the list or immediately needed, and in so doing 
place in jeopardy other higher and more immediate needs and priorities, 
such as homeland defense, risks creating an unbalanced and ineffective 
national security strategy.
  The administration's current plans, of what we know about them, seem 
to suggest that the United States will abandon the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty before we even know if the deployment of NMD is even 
feasible. And that it would abandon the ABM in pursuit of what can only 
be considered ``unbalanced'' national security strategy, one that 
places too much weight on the development of missile defense, and too 
little on the other areas, such as prevention, intelligence, rollback, 
and management, that are equally, or more, important.
  The United States must respond to new threats, and defenses can play 
an important role. But the question is not whether we deploy defenses, 
as missile defense advocates like to paint it, but what, when, and, 
most importantly, how.
  As I stated earlier, the threat of the proliferation of WMD is real 
and growing, and how the United States manages this threat should be an 
overriding security priority. Management requires a comprehensive 
approach that strikes the right balance between prevention, deterrence, 
and defense, and the emphasis placed on missile defense must be 
balanced against other national security priorities. An effective WMD 
national security strategy must emphasize:
  Prevention, through preventive defense and preventive diplomacy, 
including export controls, regional security commitments, on-going 
threat reduction programs, and arms control regimes;
  Intelligence, including those efforts that show promise for 
penetrating transnational and terrorist groups that may be planning 
attacks against the United States or our allies and that illuminate the 
nature of the proliferation threat;
  Rollback of WMD and missile programs that have been developed by 
other countries, such as the intense diplomacy such as has met with 
some success on the Korean Peninsula, and a mixture of economic and 
political incentives; and,
  Management of the consequences of proliferation by better protecting 
our forces, holding open the possibility of pre-emption, and active 
defenses.
  And our defensive programs must also recognize that as the horrific

[[Page 20301]]

events of September 11 too well illustrated, missile defense is a 
response to but one of the WMD threats that the United States faces in 
today's world--and perhaps the least of these threats at that.
  Indeed, a breakdown of the ``threat spectrum'' produced by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff earlier this year lists a missile attack as having the 
lowest ``probability of occurrence'' in the threat spectrum.
  In fact, as a member of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, I have 
had an opportunity to discuss WMD threat assessments with members of 
our intelligence community. Although the threat of a ballistic missile 
attack from a rogue nation is certainly a concern, they are far more 
concerned about the threat that a ``suitcase'' bomb or a bomb hidden on 
a ship may pose. Needless to say, NMD does nothing to address these 
threats.
  A balanced approach to national security therefore suggests that it 
is only prudent for the United States to conduct a limited testing 
program to develop missile defense technology so that if, at some point 
in the future, it is necessary we will have appropriate options. And 
yes, the ABM Treaty may need to be modified or amended to enable us to 
respond to new threats.
  But it would be folly to place too much of an emphasis on missile 
defense, to simply and unilaterally develop and deploy NMD, and to 
abandon the treaty, before we even know what defensive systems are 
feasible, which systems best meet our needs, and well before any 
sensible development or testing program needs to bump up to treaty 
limits.
  The unilateral U.S. pursuit of NMD is likely to create a less stable 
world, with more nations pursuing weapons of mass destruction, and 
without the constraints of international arms control agreement.
  It strikes me as a big gamble to develop a national security strategy 
on one hand which seems intent on cultivating a missile defense system 
of unknown effectiveness, and a less stable and less secure world on 
the other.
  I look forward to the opportunity to debate these issues on the floor 
with my colleagues at an appropriate time.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. ENZI (for himself, Mr. Dorgan, Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Kerry, 
        Mr. Thomas, Mr. Graham, Mr. Voinovich, and Mr. Hutchinson):
  S. 1567. A bill to foster innovation and technological advancement in 
the development of the Internet and electronic commerce, and to assist 
the States in simplifying their sales and use taxes; to the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
  Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1567

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Internet Tax Moratorium and 
     Equity Act''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The moratorium of the Internet Tax Freedom Act on new 
     taxes on Internet access and on multiple and discriminatory 
     taxes on electronic commerce should be extended.
       (2) States should be encouraged to simplify their sales and 
     use tax systems.
       (3) As a matter of economic policy and basic fairness, 
     similar sales transactions should be treated equally, without 
     regard to the manner in which sales are transacted, whether 
     in person, through the mails, over the telephone, on the 
     Internet, or by other means.
       (4) Congress may facilitate such equal taxation consistent 
     with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Quill 
     Corp. v. North Dakota.
       (5) States that adequately simplify their tax systems 
     should be authorized to correct the present inequities in 
     taxation through requiring sellers to collect taxes on sales 
     of goods or services delivered in-state, without regard to 
     the location of the seller.
       (6) The States have experience, expertise, and a vital 
     interest in the collection of sales and use taxes, and thus 
     should take the lead in developing and implementing sales and 
     use tax collection systems that are fair, efficient, and non-
     discriminatory in their application and that will simplify 
     the process for both sellers and buyers.
       (7) Online consumer privacy is of paramount importance to 
     the growth of electronic commerce and must be protected.

     SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT MORATORIUM.

       Section 1101(a) of the Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 
     151 note) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Moratorium.--No State or political subdivision 
     thereof shall impose--
       ``(1) any taxes on Internet access during the period 
     beginning after September 30, 1998, unless such a tax was 
     generally imposed and actually enforced prior to October 1, 
     1998; and
       ``(2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic 
     commerce during the period beginning on October 1, 1998, and 
     ending on December 31, 2005.''.

     SEC. 4. INTERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT DEFINITIONS.

       (a) Internet Access Services.--Section 1104 of the Internet 
     Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(11) Internet access services.--The term `Internet access 
     services' means services that combine computer processing, 
     information storage, protocol conversion, and routing with 
     transmission to enable users to access Internet content and 
     services. Such term does not include receipt of such content 
     or services.''.
       (b) Internet Access.--Section 1104(5) of the Internet Tax 
     Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note) is amended by striking 
     ``telecommunications services.' and inserting 
     ``telecommunications services generally, but does include 
     wireless web access services used to enable users to access 
     content, information, electronic mail, or other services 
     offered over the Internet, including any comparable package 
     of services offered to users.''.
       (c) Telecommunications Services.--Section 1104(9) of the 
     Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note) is amended by 
     striking ``and includes communications services (as defined 
     in section 4251 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986)''.
       (d) Wireless Web Access Services.--Section 1104 of the 
     Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note), as amended by 
     subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(12) Wireless web access services.--The term `wireless 
     web access services' means commercial mobile services (as 
     defined in section 332(d)(1) of Communications Act of 1934 
     (47 U.S.C. 332(d)(1)), multi-channel, multi-point 
     distribution services, or any wireless telecommunications 
     services used to access the Internet.''.

     SEC. 5. STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX SYSTEM.

       (a) Development of Streamlined System.--It is the sense of 
     Congress that States and localities should work together to 
     develop a streamlined sales and use tax system that addresses 
     the following in the context of remote sales:
       (1) A centralized, one-stop, multi-state reporting, 
     submission, and payment system for sellers.
       (2) Uniform definitions for goods or services, the sale of 
     which may, by State action, be included in the tax base.
       (3) Uniform rules for attributing transactions to 
     particular taxing jurisdictions.
       (4) Uniform procedures for--
       (A) the treatment of purchasers exempt from sales and use 
     taxes; and
       (B) relief from liability for sellers that rely on such 
     State procedures.
       (5) Uniform procedures for the certification of software 
     that sellers rely on to determine sales and use tax rates and 
     taxability.
       (6) A uniform format for tax returns and remittance forms.
       (7) Consistent electronic filing and remittance methods.
       (8) State administration of all State and local sales and 
     use taxes.
       (9) Uniform audit procedures, including a provision giving 
     a seller the option to be subject to no more than a single 
     audit per year using those procedures; except that if the 
     seller does not comply with the procedures to elect a single 
     audit, any State can conduct an audit using those procedures.
       (10) Reasonable compensation for tax collection by sellers.
       (11) Exemption from use tax collection requirements for 
     remote sellers falling below a de minimis threshold of 
     $5,000,000 in gross annual sales.
       (12) Appropriate protections for consumer privacy.
       (13) Such other features that the States deem warranted to 
     promote simplicity, uniformity, neutrality, efficiency, and 
     fairness.
       (b) Study.--It is the sense of Congress that a joint, 
     comprehensive study should be commissioned by State and local 
     governments and the business community to determine the cost 
     to all sellers of collecting and remitting State and local 
     sales and use taxes on sales made by sellers under the law as 
     in effect on the date of enactment of this Act and under the 
     system described in subsection (a) to assist in determining 
     what constitutes reasonable compensation.

     SEC. 6. INTERSTATE SALES AND USE TAX COMPACT.

       (a) Authorization.--In general, the States are authorized 
     to enter into an Interstate

[[Page 20302]]

     Sales and Use Tax Compact. The Compact shall describe a 
     uniform, streamlined sales and use tax system consistent with 
     section 5(a), and shall provide that States joining the 
     Compact must adopt that system.
       (b) Expiration.--The authorization in subsection (a) shall 
     expire if the Compact has not been formed before January 1, 
     2005.
       (c) Congressional Approval of Compact.--
       (1) Adopting states to transmit.--Upon the 20th State 
     becoming a signatory to the Compact, the adopting States 
     shall transmit a copy of the Compact to Congress.
       (2) Congressional action.--
       (A) In general.--If a joint resolution described in 
     subparagraph (B) is enacted into law within 120 calendar 
     days, excluding congressional recess period days, of Congress 
     receiving the Compact under paragraph (1), then sections 7 
     and 8 shall apply to the adopting States, and any other State 
     that subsequently adopts the Compact.
       (B) Joint resolution.--A joint resolution described in this 
     subparagraph is a joint resolution of the two Houses of 
     Congress, the matter after the resolving clause of which is 
     as follows: ``That Congress--
       ``(1) agrees that the uniform, streamlined sales and use 
     tax system described in the Compact transmitted to Congress 
     by the States pursuant to section 6(c)(1) of the Internet Tax 
     Moratorium and Equity Act does not create an undue burden on 
     interstate commerce; and
       ``(2) authorizes any State that adopts such Compact to 
     require remote sellers to collect and remit sales and use 
     taxes in accordance with such system .''
       (C) Expedited procedure for approval.--
       (i) Rules of house and senate.--This paragraph is enacted--

       (I) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such is 
     deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but 
     applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed 
     in that House in the case of the joint resolution described 
     in subparagraph (B), and they supersede other rules only to 
     the extent that they are inconsistent therewith, and
       (II) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
     either House to change the rules (so far as they relate to 
     the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner 
     and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of 
     that House.

       (ii) Applicable procedural provisions.--Except as otherwise 
     provided in this paragraph, the procedures set forth in 
     section 152 (other than subsection (a) thereof) of the Trade 
     Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192) shall apply to the joint 
     resolution described in subparagraph (B) by substituting the 
     ``Committee on the Judiciary'' for the ``Committee on Ways 
     and Means'' and the ``Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
     Transportation'' for the ``Committee on Finance'' in 
     subsection (b) thereof.
       (iii) Introduction of joint resolution after compact 
     received.--Until Congress receives the Compact described in 
     paragraph (1), it shall not be in order in either House to 
     introduce the joint resolution described in subparagraph (B).
       (iv) Consideration of joint resolution.--No amendment to 
     the joint resolution described in subparagraph (B) shall be 
     in order in either the House of Representatives or the 
     Senate, and no motion to suspend the application of this 
     clause shall be in order in either House. Within 120 calendar 
     days, excluding congressional recess period days, after the 
     date on which a joint resolution described in subparagraph 
     (B) is introduced in either House, that House shall proceed 
     to a final vote on the joint resolution without intervening 
     action. If either House approves the resolution, it shall be 
     placed on the calendar in the other House, which shall 
     proceed immediately to a final vote on the joint resolution 
     without intervening action.

     SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION TO SIMPLIFY STATE USE-TAX RATES THROUGH 
                   AVERAGING.

       (a) In General.--Subject to the exception in subsection 
     (c), a State that adopts the Compact authorized and approved 
     under section 6 and that levies a use tax shall impose a 
     single, uniform State-wide use-tax rate on all remote sales 
     on which it assesses a use tax for any calendar year for 
     which the State meets the requirements of subsection (b).
       (b) Averaging Requirement.--A State meets the requirements 
     of this subsection for any calendar year in which the single, 
     uniform State-wide use-tax rate is in effect if such rate is 
     no greater than the weighted average of the sales tax rates 
     actually imposed by the State and its local jurisdictions 
     during the 12-month period ending on June 30 prior to such 
     calendar year.
       (c) Annual Option To Collect Actual Tax.--Notwithstanding 
     subsection (a), a remote seller may elect annually to collect 
     the actual applicable State and local use taxes on each sale 
     made in the State.
       (d) Alternative System.--A State that adopts the uniform, 
     streamlined sales and use tax system described in the Compact 
     authorized and approved under section 6 so that remote 
     sellers can use information provided by the State to identify 
     the single applicable rate for each sale, may require a 
     remote seller to collect the actual applicable State and 
     local sales or use tax due on each sale made in the State if 
     the State provides such seller relief from liability to the 
     State for relying on such information provided by the State.

     SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION TO REQUIRE COLLECTION OF USE TAXES.

       (a) Grant of Authority.--
       (1) States that adopt the system may require collection.--
     Any State that has adopted the system described in the 
     Compact authorized and approved under section 6 is 
     authorized, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to 
     require all sellers not qualifying for the de minimis 
     exception to collect and remit sales and use taxes on remote 
     sales to purchasers located in such State.
       (2) States that do not adopt the system may not require 
     collection.--Paragraph (1) does not extend to any State that 
     does not adopt the system described in the Compact.
       (b) No Effect on Nexus, Etc.--No obligation imposed by 
     virtue of authority granted by subsection (a)(1) or denied by 
     subsection (a)(2) shall be considered in determining whether 
     a seller has a nexus with any State for any other tax 
     purpose. Except as provided in subsection (a), nothing in 
     this Act permits or prohibits a State--
       (1) to license or regulate any person;
       (2) to require any person to qualify to transact intrastate 
     business; or
       (3) to subject any person to State taxes not related to the 
     sale of goods or services.

     SEC. 9. NEXUS FOR STATE BUSINESS ACTIVITY TAXES.

       It is the sense of Congress that before the conclusion of 
     the 107th Congress, legislation should be enacted to 
     determine the appropriate factors to be considered in 
     establishing whether nexus exists for State business activity 
     tax purposes.

     SEC. 10. LIMITATION.

       In general, nothing in this Act shall be construed as 
     subjecting sellers to franchise taxes, income taxes, or 
     licensing requirements of a State or political subdivision 
     thereof, nor shall anything in this Act be construed as 
     affecting the application of such taxes or requirements or 
     enlarging or reducing the authority of any State or political 
     subdivision to impose such taxes or requirements.

     SEC. 11. DEFINITIONS.

       In this Act:
       (1) State.--The term ``State'' means any State of the 
     United States of America and includes the District of 
     Columbia.
       (2) Goods or services.--The term ``goods or services'' 
     includes tangible and intangible personal property and 
     services.
       (3) Remote sale.--The term ``remote sale'' means a sale in 
     interstate commerce of goods or services attributed, under 
     the rules established pursuant to section 5(a)(3), to a 
     particular taxing jurisdiction that could not, except for the 
     authority granted by this Act, require that the seller of 
     such goods or services collect and remit sales or use taxes 
     on such sale.
       (4) Locus of remote sale.--The term ``particular taxing 
     jurisdiction'', when used with respect to the location of a 
     remote sale, means a remote sale of goods or services 
     attributed, under the rules established pursuant to section 
     5(a)(3), to a particular taxing jurisdiction.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. REID (for himself and Mr. Smith of Oregon):
  S. 1566. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to modify 
and expand the credit for electricity produced from renewable resources 
and waste products, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Finance.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, perhaps at no other time in our history is 
the energy security of the United States more vital to this nation's 
well being.
  We all agree that the United States needs to reduce its dependence on 
fossil fuels that pollute the environment and undermine our national 
security interests and balance of trade. Nevadans understand that any 
responsible energy strategy must encompass conservation, efficiency, 
and an expanded generating capacity. Developing renewable energy 
resources represents a responsible way to expand our power capacity 
without compromising air or water quality. These renewable energy 
sources can enhance America's energy supply on a time scale of 1-3 
years, considerably shorter than times required for fossil-fuel power 
plants.
  I rise today to introduce a bill that expands the existing production 
tax credit for renewable energy technologies to cover all renewable 
energy technologies. I want to thank Senator Gordon Smith for joining 
me in the introduction of this bill, which sets America on a steady 
path toward energy independence.
  Our legislation will renew the wind power production tax credit and 
expand the credit to additional renewable resources, including solar 
power, open-loop biomass, poultry and animal

[[Page 20303]]

waste, landfill gas, geothermal, incremental geothermal, and 
incremental hydropower facilities.
  The proposed production tax credit for all these renewable energy 
sources would be made permanent to signal America's long-term 
commitment to renewable energy resources.
  One example that illustrates the need for a permanent tax credit is 
what I recently learned about a major wind farm project at the Nevada 
Test Site. It is experiencing delays. The production of electricity in 
rapidly growing Nevada and the whole western part of the country is 
important. We need to do something to develop new sources of 
electricity.
  But I found that this project, which is set to go on line, is having 
difficulty because in the law we have an expiring tax credit for wind. 
Not only that, but to do it for 1 year really doesn't help that much. 
People are unwilling to lend money on a 1-year tax credit. It is 
possible this project may be canceled due to the uncertain nature of 
the production tax credit for wind energy. This would be a terrible 
disappointment. Within 3 to 5 years they can produce enough electricity 
by wind to supply energy to 260,000 people. That is a lot of people. 
That would be that much less coal we would have to burn, or natural 
gas, or fuel oil.
  The Department of Energy estimates that we could increase our 
geothermal energy production almost ten fold, supplying ten percent of 
the energy needs of the West, and expand wind energy production to 
serve the electricity needs of ten million homes.
  The Nevada Public Utilities Commission estimates 500 megawatts of 
wind energy and 500 megawatts of geothermal should be online in the 
state by 2013, supplying the energy needs of one million Nevadans. That 
is 1,000 megawatts.
  But we need a permanent production tax credit to make these estimates 
a reality.
  The bill Senator Smith and I have introduced this afternoon allows 
for co-production credits to encourage blending of renewable energy 
with traditional fuels and provides a credit for renewable facilities 
on native American and native Alaskan lands.
  It also provides production incentives to not-for-profit public power 
utilities and rural electric cooperatives, which serve 25 percent of 
the nation's power customers, by allowing them to transfer of their 
credits to taxable entities.
  Fossil fuel plants pump over 11 million tons of pollutants into our 
air each year. Eleven million tons--it is hard to comprehend that--
every year. What we are doing is building more powerplants to pump more 
pollution into the air. By including landfill gas in this legislation, 
we systematically reduce the largest single human source of methane 
emissions in the United States, effectively eliminating the greenhouse 
gas equivalent of 233 million tons of carbon dioxide. These figures are 
staggering, but they are realistic.
  There is a compelling need for our legislation because the existing 
production tax credit for electricity produced from wind energy and 
closed-loop biomass renewable resources expires at the end of this 
year.
  In the past year alone, $1.3 billion in capital investment in wind 
energy projects has been made in the U.S.
  As I indicated, at the Nevada Test Site, a new wind farm will provide 
260 megawatts to meet the needs of 260,000 people.
  Growing renewable energy industries in the U.S. will also help 
provide growing employment opportunities in the U.S., and help U.S. 
renewable technologies compete in world markets.
  In States like Nevada, expanded renewable energy production will 
provide jobs in rural areas--areas that have been largely left out of 
America's recent economic boom during the past several years. Rural 
Nevada hasn't done well at all. Renewable energy is poised to make 
major contributions to our Nation's energy needs over the next decade.
  As fantastic as it sounds, enough sunlight falls on a 100-mile-by-
100-mile area of southern Nevada that, if covered with solar panels, 
could power the entire Nation.
  I am proud to say that Nevada has adopted the most aggressive 
Renewable Portfolio Standard in the nation, requiring that 5 percent of 
the state's electricity needs be met by renewable energy resources in 
2003, which then grows to 15 percent by 2013.
  We are mandating in the State of Nevada that 15 percent of the energy 
resources must be produced by alternative energy. That is really a step 
forward, and I applaud the Nevada State Legislature.
  The citizens of Nevada deserve a national energy strategy that 
ensures their economic well being and security, and provides for a 
secure quality of life. That should also apply to the whole United 
States.
  Our legislation encourages the use of renewable energy and signals 
America's long-term commitment to clean energy, a healthy environment, 
and energy independence.
  Renewable energy--as an alternative and successor to traditional 
energy sources--is a common sense way to ensure the American people 
have a reliable source of power at an affordable price.
  The United States needs to move away from its dependence on fossil 
fuels that pollute the environment and undermine our national security 
interests and balance of trade.
  We must accept this commitment for the energy security of the U.S., 
for the protection of our environment, and for the health and security 
of the American people.
  I hope this legislation is allowed to move forward as quickly as 
possible.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Mr. HATCH:
  S. 1568. A bill to prevent cyberterrorism; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the 
Cyberterrorism Prevention Act of 2001, an important piece of 
legislation to prevent terrorists from hijacking our computer system to 
wreak havoc with our essential infrastructure.
  This bill provides law enforcement with critical tools to combat 
cyberterrorism. I urge my colleagues to support this important piece of 
legislation.
                                 ______
                                 
      By Ms. COLLINS (for herself, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Reed, Mr. Johnson, 
        Mr. Sessions, and Mr. Warner):
  S. 1570. A bill to provide the Secretary of Education with specific 
waiver authority to respond to conditions in the national emergency 
declared by the President on September 14, 2001; to the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
  Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, every American is struggling to cope with 
the terrorist attacks of September 11 and subsequent events. Among 
those on the front lines in addressing these disasters are our military 
Reservists and members of our National Guard. Not only are these men 
and women grappling with the consequences of the catastrophe and the 
rigors of being mobilized for active duty, but many of them are also 
forced to worry about leaving college in the middle of their courses 
and making continued payments on their student loans. Will their 
tuition be reimbursed for courses that are interrupted? How will they 
keep up with their student loan payments while they are on active duty?
  In my State of Maine, more than 10 percent of our National Guard 
members are making payments on their student loans and are faced with 
these very questions. As these Guard members and Reservists prepare to 
serve their country, the least we can do is alleviate their concerns 
about making payments on their student loans while they are on active 
duty.
  Some of the families directly affected by the tragedies of September 
11 are facing similar dilemmas. The dislocation in New York City and 
elsewhere caused by the terrorist attacks has jeopardized the ability 
of some individuals to meet their payment schedules on their student 
loans.
  Lending institutions located in New York City are encountering yet 
another set of difficulties. A number of lenders are headquartered 
within a few blocks of ground zero. They, understandably, have been 
unable to meet

[[Page 20304]]

the due diligence requirements set forth by the Department of 
Education. Several firms, in fact, were not even able to access their 
office buildings for many days after the attacks, let alone meet filing 
deadlines.
  With those Guard members, Reservists, affected families, and lending 
institutions in mind, I am pleased today to introduce the Higher 
Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2001. My colleagues, 
Senators Gregg, Reed, Warner, and Sessions, as well as the Presiding 
Officer, Senator Johnson, whose support and leadership I value greatly, 
have signed on as original cosponsors. The HEROS Act grants the 
Secretary of Education specific waiver authority under the Higher 
Education Act to provide relief to those affected by the recent attacks 
on America. The Secretary would be empowered to assist Reservists and 
Guard members who are being called up for active duty as well as others 
directly affected by the attacks.
  The Secretary's new authority would be limited to ensuring that 
military personnel and civilians are in the same financial position as 
they were prior to the terrorist attacks with respect to their student 
loans. And it has been drafted so as to not impair the integrity of the 
student loan programs.
  The Secretary of Education is given some discretion under the Higher 
Education Act to defer payments on student loans. But this authority 
does not go far enough. The HEROS Act would empower the Secretary to 
take several additional steps to provide needed relief to help those 
directly affected by the terrorist attacks.
  Specifically, the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students 
Act authorizes the Secretary of Education to relax repayment 
obligations for Guard members and Reservists called up to active duty, 
to provide a period of time during which the victims and their families 
may reduce or delay monthly student loan payments, and to assist 
educational institutions and lenders with reporting requirements.
  All of these steps can be taken while still ensuring the integrity of 
our student loan programs.
  This legislation is modeled on a previous law that was enacted during 
the Gulf War to provide relief for our men and women in the military. 
In short, there is precedent for authorizing the Secretary of Education 
to provide these kinds of relief.
  I am pleased to be joined by five of my colleagues in introducing 
this bill, and I thank them all for their support. I also commend 
Representative McKeon for his leadership on the House version of the 
HEROS Act. His initiative will help ensure that we provide adequate 
student loan relief to Reservists, Guard members, and victims' 
families.
  I look forward to the swift passage of this legislation.
  Mr. President, I send the bill to the desk and ask it be 
appropriately referred at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately 
referred.

                          ____________________