[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 14]
[Senate]
[Pages 19492-19579]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                 UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA ACT

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1510) to deter and punish terrorist acts in the 
     United States and around the world, to enhance law 
     enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, what is the time agreement that we are now 
operating under?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 4 hours equally divided. In 
addition, there are 40 minutes on each of the four amendments to be 
offered by the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Feingold.
  Mr. LEAHY. I thank the distinguished Presiding Officer.
  I cannot help but think in looking at our distinguished Presiding 
Officer, the senior Senator from New York, how much his State has 
suffered. Both he and his distinguished colleague, Senator Clinton, 
have spoken so eloquently, both on the floor and elsewhere, about that. 
I know in my own private conversations with the distinguished Presiding 
Officer I felt the depth of his grief and emotion for a city that he 
obviously and unabashedly loves. His references to New York City

[[Page 19493]]

over the years are almost similar to the kind of comments I make about 
Vermont. But I do note the accent is somewhat different. I assume it is 
because of the Vermont accent.
  But I think the Senators from New York, and the Senators from New 
Jersey and Connecticut have especially spoken of the effect on families 
and loved ones in the New York City area. People who work there are 
from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. I know how sad they feel.
  I think of the people who died in Pennsylvania in an airplane that 
was probably planning to strike the very building we are in--this 
symbol of democracy. Only with a great loss of life did it not happen. 
But there would be an enormous disruption in our Government. The next 
day, the view that most people around the world have--our symbol of 
democracy--would be gone.
  I think of the brave men and women who died, as the President and 
others have said, doing their duty at the Pentagon, and the hundreds--
even thousands--of children who went to school happily in the morning 
and came home to find that they were orphans.
  It was a terrible, terrible day.
  I think back to what happened in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the 
actions we took then. We are moving, of course, much faster now than we 
did at that time, and I hope perhaps with more care on legislation.
  We have before us the USA Act of 2001. I worked with Chairman 
Sensenbrenner and Congressman Conyers and Republican and Democratic 
leaders in the House because I hope Congress can act swiftly to enact 
this measure.
  Some may be concerned if we have a conference--because the House is 
somewhat different than the Senate--that we could take a year or more 
to resolve these issues. That happened after Oklahoma City. That 
legislation took nearly a year to reconcile.
  I believe the American people and my fellow Senators, both Republican 
and Democratic, deserve faster final action.
  I assure the Senate, when we go to conference, we will complete that 
conference very quickly. We have demonstrated the ability in this 
body--and also Senators who have worked with me on both sides of the 
aisle and our staff--that we can work around the clock.
  The distinguished senior Senator from Utah, Mr. Hatch, and I have 
been working together in constant communication with our staffs.
  Last Thursday, October 4, I was pleased to introduce, along with the 
majority leader, Senator Daschle, and the Republican leader, Senator 
Lott, also the chairmen of the Banking and Intelligence Committees, 
Senator Sarbanes, Senator Graham of Florida, Senator Hatch, and Senator 
Shelby, the USA Act.
  I must say this bill is not the bill I would have written if I were 
the only one writing it. I daresay it is not the bill the distinguished 
Presiding Officer, one of the brightest and most accomplished people I 
know, would have written, if he were writing it. It is not the bill the 
distinguished chairman of the Banking Committee would have written if 
he were writing it. It is not the bill the distinguished ranking 
member, Mr. Hatch, would have written when he was chairman, if he was 
solely writing the bill. It is really not the bill that any one of the 
other Members would have written. We can't pass 100 bills.
  We have tried to put together the best possible bill. Of course, 
Republican and Democratic colleagues must come together, and that is 
what we did.
  I should point out that this is not the bill the administration, 
through the Attorney General, delivered to us and asked for immediate 
passage. We actually did the administration a favor because rather than 
take the bill they dropped in our laps and said pass immediately, we 
did something that apparently they had not done. We read it and were 
able to refine and supplement their proposal in a number of ways. We 
were able to remove a number of unconstitutional parts. The 
administration accepted a number of practical steps that I proposed to 
improve our security on the Northern Border to assist our State, 
Federal, and local law enforcement officers and provide compensation to 
the victims of terrorist acts and to the public safety officers that 
gave their lives to protect us.
  It also provides proposed checks on Government powers--checks that 
were not contained in the Attorney General's initial proposal.
  In negotiations with the administration, I have done my best to 
strike a reasonable balance between the need to address the threat of 
terrorism, which we all keenly feel at the present time, and the need 
to protect our constitutional freedoms. Despite my misgivings, I have 
acquiesced in some of the administration's proposals because it is 
important to preserve national unity in this time of national crisis 
and to move the legislative process forward.
  We still have room for improvement. Even after the Senate passes 
judgment on this bill--I believe it will tonight--the debate is not 
going to be finished because we have to consider those important things 
done in the other body.
  What I have done throughout this time is to remember the words of 
Benjamin Franklin--when he literally had his neck on the line because 
if the Revolution had failed, he and the others would have been 
hanged--when he said: A people who would trade their liberty for 
security deserve neither.
  We protected our security, but I am not going to give up the 
liberties that Americans have spent 220 years to obtain.
  Moreover, our ability to make rapid progress was impeded because the 
negotiations with the Administration did not progress in a straight 
line. On several key issues that are of particular concern to me, we 
had reached an agreement with the Administration on Sunday, September 
30. Unfortunately, within two days, the Administration announced that 
it was reneging on the deal. I appreciate the complex task of 
considering the concerns and missions of multiple federal agencies, and 
that sometimes agreements must be modified as their implications are 
scrutinized by affected agencies. When agreements made by the 
Administration must be withdrawn and negotiations on resolved issues 
reopened, those in the Administration who blame the Congress for delay 
with what the New York Times described last week as ``scurrilous 
remarks,'' do not help the process move forward.
  Hearings. We have expedited the legislative process in the Judiciary 
Committee to consider the Administration's proposals. In daily news 
conferences, the Attorney General has referred to the need for such 
prompt consideration. I commend him for making the time to appear 
before the Judiciary Committee at a hearing September 25 to respond to 
questions that Members from both parties have about the 
Administration's initial proposals. I also thank the Attorney General 
for extending the hour and a half he was able to make in his schedule 
for the hearing for another fifteen minutes so that Senator Feinstein 
and Senator Specter were able to ask questions before his departure. I 
regret that the Attorney General did not have the time to respond to 
questions from all the Members of the committee either on September 25 
or last week, but again thank him for the attention he promised to give 
to written questions Members submitted about the legislation. We have 
not received answers to those written questions yet, but I will make 
them a part of the hearing whenever they are sent.
  The Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, Senator Feingold, also 
held an important hearing on October 3 on the civil liberties 
ramifications of the expanded surveillance powers requested by the 
Administration. I thank him for his assistance in illuminating these 
critical issues for the Senate.
  Rule 14. To accede to the Administration's request for prompt 
consideration of this legislation, the Leaders decided to hold the USA 
Act at the desk rather than refer the bill to the Committee for mark-
up, as is regular practice. Senator Hatch specifically urged that this 
occur and I support this decision. Indeed, when the Senate considered 
the anti-terrorism act in 1995 after the Oklahoma City bombing, we 
bypassed

[[Page 19494]]

Committee in order to deal with the legislation more promptly on the 
floor.
  Given the expedited process that we have used to move this bill, I 
will take more time than usual to detail its provisions.
  Victims. The heart of every American aches for those who died or have 
been injured because of the tragic terrorist attacks in New York, 
Virginia, and Pennsylvania on September 11th. Even now, we cannot 
assess the full measure of this attack in terms of human lives, but we 
know that the number of casualties is extraordinarily high.
  Congress acted swiftly to help the victims of September 11th. Within 
10 days, we passed legislation to establish a Victims Compensation 
Program, which will provide fair compensation to those most affected by 
this national tragedy. I am proud of our work on that legislation, 
which will expedite payments to thousands of Americans whose lives were 
so suddenly shattered.
  But now more than ever, we should remember the tens of thousands of 
Americans whose needs are not being met--the victims of crimes that 
have not made the national headlines. Just one day before the events 
that have so transformed our nation, I came before this body to express 
my concern that we were not doing more for crime victims. I noted that 
the pace of victims legislation has slowed, and that many opportunities 
for progress had been squandered. I suggested that this year, we had a 
golden opportunity to make significant progress in this area by passing 
S. 783, the Leahy-Kennedy Crime Victims Assistance Act of 2001.
  I am pleased, therefore, that the antiterrorism package now before 
the Senate contains substantial portions of S. 783 aimed at refining 
the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA), and improving the manner in 
which the Crime Victims Fund is managed and preserved. Most 
significantly, section 621 of the USA Act will eliminate the cap on 
VOCA spending, which has prevented more than $700 million in Fund 
deposits from reaching victims and supporting essential services.
  Congress has capped spending from the Fund for the last two fiscal 
year, and President Bush has proposed a third cap for fiscal year 2002. 
These limits on VOCA spending have created a growing sense of confusion 
and unease by many of those concerned about the future of the Fund.
  We should not be imposing artificial caps on VOCA spending while 
substantial unmet needs continue to exist. Section 621 of the USA Act 
replaces the cap with a self-regulating system that will ensure 
stability and protection of Fund assets, while allowing more money to 
be distributed to the States for victim compensation and assistance.
  Other provisions included from S. 783 will also make an immediate 
difference in the lives of victims, including victims of terrorism. 
Shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing, I proposed and the Congress 
adopted the Victims of Terrorism Act of 1995. This legislation 
authorized the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) to set aside an 
emergency reserve of up to $50 million as part of the Crime Victims 
Fund. The emergency reserve was intended to serve as a ``rainy day'' 
fund to supplement compensation and assistance grants to States to 
provide emergency relief in the wake of an act of terrorism or mass 
violence that might otherwise overwhelm the resources of a State's 
crime victim compensation program and crime victim assistance services. 
Last month's disaster created vast needs that have all but depleted the 
reserve. Section 621 of the USA Act authorizes OVC to replenish the 
reserve with up to $50 million, and streamlines the mechanism for 
replenishment in future years.
  Another critical provision of the USA Act will enable OVC to provide 
more immediate and effective assistance to victims of terrorism and 
mass violence occurring within the United States. I proposed this 
measure last year as an amendment to the Justice for Victims of 
Terrorism Act, but was compelled to drop it to achieve bipartisan 
consensus. I am pleased that we are finally getting it done this year.
  These and other VOCA reforms in the USA Act are long overdue. Yet, I 
regret that we are not doing more. In my view, we should pass the Crime 
Victims Assistance Act in its entirety. In addition to the provisions 
that are included in today's antiterrorism package, this legislation 
provides for comprehensive reform of Federal law to establish enhanced 
rights and protections for victims of Federal crime. It also proposes 
several programs to help States provide better assistance for victims 
of State crimes.
  I also regret that we have not done more for other victims of recent 
terrorist attacks. While all Americans are numbed by the heinous acts 
of September 11th, we should not forget the victims of the 1998 embassy 
bombings in East Africa. Eleven Americans and many Kenyan and Tanzanian 
nationals employed by the United States lost their lives in that tragic 
incident. It is my understanding that compensation to the families of 
these victims has in many instances fallen short. It is my hope that 
OVC will use a portion of the newly replenished reserve fund to remedy 
any inequity in the way that these individuals have been treated.
  Hate crimes. We cannot speak of the victims of the September 11 
without also noting that Arab-Americans and Muslims in this country 
have become the targets of hate crimes, harassment, and intimidation. I 
applaud the President for speaking out against and condemning such 
acts, and visiting a mosque to demonstrate by action that all religions 
are embraced in this country. I also commend the FBI Director for his 
periodic reports on the number of hate crime incidents against Arab-
American and Muslims that the FBI is aggressively investigating and 
making clear that this conduct is taken seriously and will be punished.
  The USA Act contains, in section 102, a sense of the Congress that 
crimes and discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans are 
condemned. Many of us would like to do more, and finally enact 
effective hate crimes legislation, but the Administration has asked 
that the debate on that legislation be postponed. One of my greatest 
regrets regarding the negotiations in this bill was the objections that 
prevented the Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act, S. 625, from being 
included in the USA Act.
  State and local law enforcement. The Administration's initial 
proposal was entirely focused on Federal law enforcement. Yet, we must 
remember that state and local law enforcement officers have critical 
roles to play in preventing and investigating terrorist acts. I am 
pleased that the USA Act we consider today recognizes this fact.
  As a former State prosecutor, I know that State and local law 
enforcement officers are often the first responders to a crime. On 
September 11th, the nation saw that the first on the scene were the 
heroic firefighters, police officers and emergency personnel in New 
York City. These New York public safety officers, many of whom gave the 
ultimate sacrifice, remind us of how important it is to support our 
State and local law enforcement partners. The USA Act provides three 
critical measures of Federal support for our State and local law 
enforcement officers in the war against terrorism.
  First, we streamline and expedite the Public Safety Officers' 
Benefits application process for family members of fire fighters, 
police officers and rescue workers who perish or suffer a disabling 
injury in connection with prevention, investigation, rescue or recovery 
efforts related to a future terrorist attack.
  The Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program provides benefits for 
each of the families of law enforcement officers, firefighters, and 
emergency response crew members who are killed or disabled in the line 
of duty. Current regulations, however, require the families of public 
safety officers who have fallen in the line of duty to go through a 
cumbersome and time-consuming application process. In the face of our 
national fight against terrorism, it is important that we provide a 
quick process to support the families of brave Americans who selflessly 
give their lives so that others might live before, during and after a 
terrorist attack.

[[Page 19495]]

  This provision builds on the new law championed by Senator Clinton, 
Senator Schumer and Congressman Nadler to speed the benefit payment 
process for families of public safety officers killed in the line of 
duty in New York City, Virginia, and Western Pennsylvania, on September 
11.
  Second, we have raised the total amount of Public Safety Officers' 
Benefit Program payments from approximately $150,000 to $250,000. This 
provision retroactively goes into effort to provide much-needed relief 
for the families of the brave men and women who sacrificed their own 
lives for their fellow Americans during the year. Although this 
increase in benefits can never replace a family's tragic loss, it is 
the right thing to do for the families of our fallen heroes. I want to 
thank Senator Biden and Senator Hatch for their bipartisan leadership 
on this provision.
  Third, we expand the Department of Justice Regional Information 
Sharing Systems Program to promote information sharing among Federal, 
State and local law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute 
terrorist conspiracies and activities and authorize a doubling of 
funding for this year and next year. The RISS Secure Intranet is a 
nationwide law enforcement network that already allows secure 
communications among the more than 5,700 Federal, State and local law 
enforcement agencies. Effective communication is key to effective law 
enforcement efforts and will be essential in our national fight against 
terrorism.
  The RISS program enables its member agencies to send secure, 
encrypted communications--whether within just one agency or from one 
agency to another. Federal agencies, such as the FBI, do not have this 
capability, but recognize the need for it. Indeed, on September 11, 
2001, immediately after the terrorist attacks, FBI Headquarters called 
RISS officials to request ``Smartgate'' cards and readers to secure 
their communications systems. The FBI agency in Philadelphia called 
soon after to request more Smartgate cards and readers as well.
  The Regional Information sharing Systems Program is a proven success 
that we need to expand to improve secure information sharing among 
Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies to coordinate their 
counter-terrorism efforts.
  Our State and local law enforcement partners welcome the challenge to 
join in our national mission to combat terrorism. We cannot ask State 
and local law enforcement officers to assume these new national 
responsibilities without also providing new Federal support. The USA 
Act provides the necessary Federal support for our State and local law 
enforcement officers to serve as full partners in our fight against 
terrorism.
  I am deeply troubled by continuing reports that information is not 
being shared with state local law enforcement. In particular, the 
testimony of Baltimore Police Chief Ed Norris before the House 
Government Reform Committee last week highlighted the current problem.
  Northern borders. The unfolding facts about how the terrorists who 
committed the September 11 attack were able to enter this country 
without difficulty are chilling. Since the attacks many have pointed to 
our northern border as vulnerable to the entry of future terrorists. 
This is not surprising when a simple review of the numbers shows that 
the northern border has been routinely short-changed in personnel. 
While the number of border patrol agents along the southern border has 
increased over the last few years to over 8,000, the number at the 
northern border has remained the same as a decade ago at 300. This 
remains true despite the fact that Admad Ressam, the Algerian who 
planned to blow up the Los Angeles International Airport in 1999, and 
who has been linked to those involved in the September 11 attacks, 
chose to enter the United States at our northern border. It will remain 
an inviting target until we dramatically improve our security.
  The USA Act includes my proposals to provide the substantial and long 
overdue assistance for our law enforcement and border control efforts 
along the Northern Border. My home state of Vermont has seen huge 
increases in customs and INS activity since the signing of NAFTA. The 
number of people coming through our borders has risen steeply over the 
years, but our staff and our resources have not.
  I proposed--and this legislation authorizes in section 402--tripling 
the number of Border Patrol, INS inspectors, and customs Service 
employees in each of the States along the 4,000-mile Northern Border. I 
was gratified when 22 Senators--Democrats and Republicans--wrote to the 
President supporting such an increase, and I am pleased that the 
Administration agreed that this critical law enforcement improvement 
should be included in the bill. Senators Cantwell and Schumer in the 
Committee and Senators Murray and Dorgan have been especially strong 
advocates of these provisions and I thank them for their leadership. In 
addition, the USA Act, in section 401, authorizes the Attorney General 
to waive the FTE cap on INS personnel in order to address the national 
security needs of the United States on the northern border. Now more 
than ever, we must patrol our border vigilantly and prevent those who 
wish America harm from gaining entry. At the same time, we must work 
with the Canadians to allow speedy crossing to legitimate visitors and 
foster the continued growth of trade which is beneficial to both 
countries.
  In addition to providing for more personnel, this bill also includes, 
in section 402(4), my proposal to provide $100 million in funding for 
both the INS and the Customs Service to improve the technology used to 
monitor the Northern Border and to purchase additional equipment. The 
bill also includes, in section 403(c), an important provisions from 
Senator Cantwell directing the Attorney General, in consultation with 
other agencies, to develop a technical standard for identifying 
electronically the identity of persons applying for visas or seeking to 
enter the United States. In short, this bill provides a comprehensive 
high-tech boost for the security of our nation.
  This bill also includes important proposals to enhance data sharing. 
The bill, in section 403, directs the Attorney General and the FBI 
Director to give the State Department and INS access to the criminal 
history information in the FBI's National Crime Information Center 
(NCIC) database, as the Administration and I both proposed. The 
Attorney General is directed to report back to the Congress in two 
years on progress in implementing this requirement. We have also 
adopted the Administration's language, in section 413, to make it 
easier for the State Department to share information with foreign 
governments for aid in terrorist investigations.
  Criminal justice improvements. The USA Act contains a number of 
provisions intended to improve and update the federal criminal code to 
address better the nature of terrorist activity, assist the FBI in 
translating foreign language information collected, and ensure that 
federal prosecutors are unhindered by conflicting local rules of 
conduct to get the job done. I will mention just a few of these 
provisions.
  FBI translators. The truth certainly seems self-evident that all the 
best surveillance techniques in the world will not help this country 
defend itself from terrorist attack if the information cannot be 
understood in a timely fashion. Indeed, within days of the September 
11, the FBI Director issued an employment ad on national TV by calling 
upon those who speak Arabic to apply for a job as an FBI translator. 
This is a dire situation that needs attention. I am therefore gratified 
that the Administration accepted by proposal, in section 205, to waive 
any federal personnel requirements and limitations imposed by any other 
law in order to expedite the hiring of translators at the FBI.
  This bill also directs the FBI Director to establish such security 
requirements as are necessary for the personnel employed as 
translators. We know the effort to recruit translators has a high 
priority, and the Congress should provide all possible support. 
Therefore, the bill calls on the Attorney General to report to the 
Judiciary

[[Page 19496]]

Committees on the number of translators employed by the Justice 
Department, any legal or practical impediments to using translators 
employed by other Federal, State, or local agencies, on a full, part-
time, or shared basis; and the needs of the FBI for specific 
translation services in certain languages, and recommendations for 
meeting those needs.
  Federal crime of terrorism. The Administration's initial proposal 
assembled a laundry list of more than 40 Federal crimes ranging from 
computer hacking to malicious mischief to the use of weapons of mass 
destruction, and designated them as ``Federal terrorism offenses,'' 
regardless of the circumstances under which they were committed. For 
example, a teenager who spammed the NASA website and, as a result, 
recklessly caused damage, would be deemed to have committed this new 
``terrorism'' offense. Under the Administration's proposal, the 
consequences of this designation were severe. Crimes on the list would 
carry no statute of limitations. The maximum penalties would shoot up 
to life imprisonment, and those released earlier would be subject to a 
lifetime of supervised release. Moreover, anyone who harbored a person 
whom he had ``reasonable grounds to suspect'' had committed, or was 
about to commit, a ``Federal terrorism offense''--whether it was the 
Taliban or the mother of my hypothetical teenage computer hacker--would 
be subject to stiff criminal penalties. I worked closely with the 
Administration to ensure that the definition of ``terrorism'' in the 
USA Act fit the crime.
  First, we have trimmed the list of crimes that may be considered as 
terrorism predicates in section 808 of the bill. This shorter, more 
focused list, to be codified at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2332(g)(5)(B), more 
closely reflects the sorts of offenses committed by terrorists.
  Second, we have provided, in section 810, that the current 8-year 
limitations period for this new set of offenses will remain in place, 
except where the commission of the offense resulted in, or created a 
risk of, death or serious bodily injury.
  Third, rather than make an across-the-board, one-size-fits-all 
increase of the penalties for every offense on the list, without regard 
to the severity of the offense, we have made, in section 811, more 
measured increases in maximum penalties where appropriate, including 
life imprisonment or lifetime supervised release in cases in which the 
offense resulted in death. We have also added, in section 812, 
conspiracy provisions to a few criminal statutes where appropriate, 
with penalties equal to the penalties for the object offense, up to 
life imprisonment.
  Finally, we have more carefully defined the new crime of harboring 
terrorists in section 804, so that it applies only to those harboring 
people who have committed, or are about to commit, the most serious of 
federal terrorism-related crimes, such as the use of weapons of mass 
destruction. Moreover, it is not enough that the defendant had 
``reasonable grounds to suspect'' that the person he was harboring had 
committed, or was about to commit, such a crime; the government must 
prove that the defendant knew or had ``reasonable grounds to believe'' 
that this was so.
  McDade fix. The massive investigation underway into who was 
responsible for and assisted in carrying out the September 11 attacks 
stretches across state and national boundaries. While the scope of the 
tragedy is unsurpassed, the disregard for state and national borders of 
this criminal conspiracy is not unusual. Federal investigative officers 
and prosecutors often must follow leads and conduct investigations 
outside their assigned jurisdictions. At the end of the 105th Congress, 
a legal impediment to such multi-jurisdiction investigations was 
slipped into the omnibus appropriations bill, over the objection at the 
time of every member of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
  I have spoken many times over the past two years of the problems 
caused by the so-called McDade law, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 530B. According to 
the Justice Department, the McDade law has delayed important criminal 
investigations, prevented the use of effective and traditionally-
accepted investigative techniques, and served as the basis of 
litigation to interfere with legitimate federal prosecutions. At a time 
when we need federal law enforcement authorities to move quickly to 
catch those responsible for the September 11th attacks, and to prevent 
further attacks on our country, we can no longer tolerate the drag on 
federal investigations and prosecutions caused by this ill-considered 
legislation.
  On September 19th, I introduced S. 1437, the Professional Standards 
for Government Attorneys Act of 2001, along with Senators Hatch and 
Wyden. This bill proposes to modify the McDade law by establishing a 
set of rules that clarify the professional standards applicable to 
government attorneys. I am delighted that the Administration recognized 
the importance of S. 1437 for improving federal law enforcement and 
combating terrorism, and agreed to its inclusion as section 501 of the 
USA Act.
  The first part of section 501 embodies the traditional understanding 
that when lawyers handle cases before a Federal court, they should be 
subject to the Federal court's standards of professional 
responsibility, and not to the possibly inconsistent standards of other 
jurisdictions. By incorporating this ordinary choice-of-law principle, 
the bill preserves the Federal courts' traditional authority to oversee 
the professional conduct of Federal trial lawyers, including Federal 
prosecutors. It thus avoids the uncertainties presented by the McDade 
law, which potentially subjects Federal prosecutors to State laws, 
rules of criminal procedure, and judicial decisions which differ from 
existing Federal law.
  Another part of section 501 specifically addresses the situation in 
Oregon, where a state court ruling has seriously impeded the ability of 
Federal agents to engage in undercover operations and other covert 
activities. See In re Gatti, 330 Or. 517 (2000). Such activities are 
legitimate and essential crime-fighting tools. The Professional 
Standards for Government Attorneys Act ensures that these tools will be 
available to combat terrorism.
  Finally, section 501 addresses the most pressing contemporary 
question of government attorney ethics--namely, the question of which 
rule should govern government attorneys' communications with 
represented persons. It asks the Judicial Conference of the United 
States to submit to the Supreme Court a proposed uniform national rule 
to govern this area of professional conduct, and to study the need for 
additional national rules to govern other areas in which the 
proliferation of local rules may interfere with effective Federal law 
enforcement. The Rules Enabling Act process is the ideal one for 
developing such rules, both because the Federal judiciary traditionally 
is responsible for overseeing the conduct of lawyers in Federal court 
proceedings, and because this process would best provide the Supreme 
Court an opportunity fully to consider and objectively to weigh all 
relevant considerations.
  The problems posed to Federal law enforcement investigations and 
prosecutions by the McDade law are real and urgent. The Professional 
Standards for Government Attorneys Act provides a reasonable and 
measured alternative: It preserves the traditional role of the State 
courts in regulating the conduct of attorneys licensed to practice 
before them, while ensuring that Federal prosecutors and law 
enforcement agents will be able to use traditional Federal 
investigative techniques. We need to pass this corrective legislation 
before more cases are compromised.
  Terrorist attacks against mass transportation systems. Another 
provision of the USA Act that was not included in the Administration's 
initial proposal is section 801, which targets acts of terrorism and 
other violence against mass transportation systems. Just last week, a 
Greyhound bus crashed in Tennessee after a deranged passenger slit the 
driver's throat and then grabbed the steering wheel, force the bus into 
the oncoming traffic. Six people were killed in the crash. Because 
there are

[[Page 19497]]

currently no federal law addressing terrorism of mass transportation 
systems, however, there may be no federal jurisdiction over such as 
case, even if it were committed by suspected terrorists. Clearly, there 
is an urgent need for strong criminal legislation to deter attacks 
against mass transportation systems. Section 801 will fill this gap.
  Cybercrime. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030, is 
the primary federal criminal statue prohibiting computer frauds and 
hacking. I worked with Senator Hatch in the last Congress to make 
improvements to this law in the Internet Security Act, which passed the 
Senate as part of another bill. Our work is included in section 815 of 
the USA Act. This section would amend the statute to clarify the 
appropriate scope of federal jurisdiction. First, the bill adds a 
definition of ``loss'' to cover any reasonable cost to the victim in 
responding to a computer hacker. Calculation of loss is important both 
in determining whether the $5,000 jurisdictional hurdle in the statute 
is met, and, at sentencing, in calculating the appropriate guideline 
range and restitution amount.
  Second, the bill amends the definitions of ``protected computer'' to 
include qualified computers even when they are physically located 
outside of the United States. This clarification will preserve the 
ability of the United States to assist in internal hacking cases.
  Finally, this section eliminates the current directive to the 
Sentencing Commission requiring that all violations, including 
misdemeanor violations, of certain provisions of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act be punished with a term of imprisonment of at least six 
months.
  Biological weapons. Borrowing from a bill introduced in the last 
Congress By Senator Biden, the USA Act contains a provision in section 
802 to strengthen our federal laws relating to the threat of biological 
weapons. Current law prohibits the possession, development, or 
acquisition of biological agents or toxins ``for use as a weapon.'' 
This section amends the definition of ``for use as a weapon'' to 
include all situations in which it can be proven that the defendant had 
any purpose other than a peaceful purpose. This will enhance the 
government's ability to prosecute suspected terrorists in possession of 
biological agents or toxins, and conform the scope of the criminal 
offense in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 175 more closely to the related forfeiture 
provision in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 176. This section also contains a new 
statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 175b, which generally makes it an offense for 
certain restricted persons, including non-resident aliens from 
countries that support international terrorism, to possess a listed 
biological agent or toxin.
  Of greater consequence, section 802 defines another additional 
offense, punishable by up to 10 years in prison, of possessing a 
biological agent, toxin, or delivery system ``of a type or in a 
quantity that, under the circumstances,'' is not reasonably justified 
by a peaceful purpose. As originally proposed by the Administration, 
this provision specifically stated that knowledge of whether the type 
or quantity of the agent or toxin was reasonably justified was not an 
element of the offense. Thus, although the burden of proof is always on 
the government, every person who possesses a biological agent, toxin, 
or delivery system was at some level of risk. I am pleased that the 
Administration agreed to drop this portion of the provision.
  Nevertheless, I remain troubled by the subjectivity of the 
substantive standard for violation of this new criminal prohibition, 
and question whether it provides sufficient notice under the 
Constitution. I also share the concerns of the American Society for 
Microbiology and the Association of American Universities that this 
provision will have a chilling effect upon legitimate scientific 
inquiry that offsets any benefit in protecting against terrorism. While 
we have tried to prevent against this by creating an explicit exclusion 
for ``bona fide research,'' this provision may yet prove unworkable, 
unconstitutional, or both. I urge the Justice Department and the 
research community to work together on substitute language that would 
provide prosecutors with a more workable tool.
  Secret Service jurisdiction. Two sections of the USA Act were added 
at the request of the United States Secret Service, with the support of 
the Administration. I was pleased to accommodate the Secret Service by 
including these provisions in the bill to expand Electronic Crimes Task 
Force and to clarify the authority of the Secret Service to 
investigator computer crimes.
  The Secret Service is committed to the development of new tools to 
combat the growing areas of financial crime, computer fraud, and 
cyberterrorism. Recognizing a need for law enforcement, private 
industry and academia to pool their resources, skills and revision to 
combat criminal elements in cyberspace, the Secret Service created the 
New York Electronic Crimes Task Force (NYECTF). This highly successful 
model is comprised of over 250 individual members, including 50 
different Federal, State and local enforcement agencies, 100 private 
companies, and 9 universities. Since its inception in 1995, the NYECTF 
has successfully investigated a range of financial and electronic 
crimes, including credit card fraud, identify theft, bank fraud, 
computer systems intrusions, and e-mail threats against protectees of 
the Secret Service. Section 105 of the USA Act authorizes the Secret 
Service to develop similar task forces in cities and regions across the 
country where critical infrastructure may be vulnerable to attacks from 
terrorists or other cyber-criminals.
  Section 507 of the USA Act gives the Secret Service concurrent 
jurisdiction to investigate offenses under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1030. 
relating to fraud and related activity in connection with computers. 
Prior to the 1996 amendments to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the 
Secret Service was authorized to investigate any an all violations of 
section 1030, pursuant to an agreement between the Secretary of 
Treasury and the Attorney General. The 1996 amendments, however, 
concentrated Secret Service jurisdiction on certain specified 
subsections of section 1030. The current amendment would return full 
jurisdiction to the Secret Service and would allow the Justice and 
Treasury Departments to decide on the appropriate work-sharing balance 
between the two. This will enable the Secret Service to investigate a 
wide range of potential White House network intrusions, as well as 
intrusions into remote sites (outside of the White House) that could 
impact the safety and security of its protectees, and to continue its 
mission to protect the nation's critical infrastructure and financial 
payment systems.
  Counter-terrorism Fund. The USA Act also authorizes, for the first 
time, a counter-terrorism fund in the Treasury of the United States to 
reimburse Justice Department for any costs incurred in connection with 
the fight against terrorism.
  Specifically, this counter-terrorism fund will: (1) reestablish an 
office or facility that has been damaged as the result of any domestic 
or international terrorism incident; (2) provide support to counter, 
investigate, or prosecute domestic or international terrorism, 
including paying rewards in connection with these activities; (3) 
conduct terrorism threat assessments of Federal agencies; and (4) for 
costs incurred in connection with detaining individuals in foreign 
countries who are accused of acts of terrorism in violation of United 
States law.
  I first authored this counter-terrorism fund in the S. 1319, the 21st 
Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, which 
Senator Hatch and I introduced in August.
  Enhanced surveillance procedures. The USA Act provides enhanced 
surveillance procedures for the investigation of terrorism and other 
crimes. The challenge before us has been to strike a reasonable balance 
to protect both security and the liberties of our people. In some 
respects, the changes made are appropriate and important ones to update 
surveillance and investigative procedures in light of new technology 
and experience with current law. Yet, in other respects, I have deep 
concerns that we may be increasing surveillance

[[Page 19498]]

powers and the sharing of criminal justice information without adequate 
checks on how information may be handled and without adequate 
accountability in the form of judicial review.
  The bill contains a number of sensible proposals that should not be 
controversial.
  Wiretap predicates. For example, sections 201 and 202 of the USA Act 
would add to the list of crimes that may be used as predicates for 
wiretaps certain offenses which are specifically tailored to the 
terrorist threat. In addition to crimes that relate directly to 
terrorism, the list would include crimes of computer fraud and abuse 
which are committed by terrorists to support and advance their illegal 
objectives.
  FISA roving wiretraps. The bill, in section 206, would authorize the 
use of roving wiretaps in the course of a foreign intelligence 
investigation and brings FISA into line with criminal procedures that 
allow surveillance to follow a person, rather than requiring a separate 
court order identifying each telephone company or other communication 
common carrier whose assistance is needed. This is a matter on which 
the Attorney General and I reached early agreement. This is the kind of 
change that has a compelling justification, because it recognizes the 
ease with which targets of investigations can evade surveillance by 
changing phones. In fact, the original roving wiretap authority for use 
in criminal investigations was enacted as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986. I was proud to be the 
primary Senate sponsor of that earlier law.
  Paralleling the statutory rules applicable to criminal 
investigations, the formulation I originally proposed made clear that 
this roving wiretap authority must be requested in the application 
before the FISA court was authorized to order such roving surveillance 
authority. Indeed, the Administration agrees that the FISA court may 
not grant such authority sua sponte. Nevertheless, we have accepted the 
Administration's formulation of the new roving wiretap authority, which 
requires the FISA court to make a finding that the actions of the 
person whose communications are to be intercepted could have the effect 
of thwarting the identification of a specified facility or place. While 
no amendment is made to the statutory directions for what must be 
included in the application for a FISA electronic surveillance order, 
these applications should include the necessary information to support 
the FISA court's finding that roving wiretap authority is warranted.
  Search warrants. The USA Act, in section 219, authorizes nationwide 
service of search warrants in terrorism investigations. This will allow 
the judge who is most familiar with the developments in a fast-breaking 
and complex terrorism investigation to make determinations of probable 
cause, no matter where the property to be searched is located. This 
will not only save time by avoiding having to bring up-to-speed another 
judge in another jurisdiction where the property is located, but also 
serves privacy and Fourth Amendment interests in ensuring that the most 
knowledgeable judge makes the determination of probable cause. The 
bill, in section 209, also authorizes voice mail messages to be seized 
on the authority of a probable cause search warrant rather than through 
the more burdensome and time-consuming process of a wiretap.
  Electronic records. The bill updates the laws pertaining to 
electronic records in three primary ways. First, in section 210, the 
bill authorizes the nationwide service of subpoenas for subscriber 
information and expands the list of items subject to subpoena to 
include the means and source of payment for the service.
  Second, in section 211, the bill equalizes the standard for law 
enforcement access to cable subscriber records on the same basis as 
other electronic records. The Cable Communications Policy Act, passed 
in 1984 to regulate various aspects of the cable television industry, 
did not take into account the changes in technology that have occurred 
over the last fifteen years. Cable television companies now often 
provide Internet access and telephone service in addition to television 
programming. This amendment clarifies that a cable company must comply 
with the laws governing the interception and disclosure of wire and 
electronic communications just like any other telephone company or 
Internet service provider. The amendments would retain current 
standards that govern the release of customer records for television 
programming.
  Finally, the bill, in section 212, permits, but does not require, an 
electronic communications service to disclose the contents of and 
subscriber information about communications in emergencies involving 
the immediate danger of death or serious physical injury. Under current 
law, if an ISP's customer receives an e-mail death threat from another 
customer of the same ISP, and the victim provides a copy of the 
communication to the ISP, the ISP is limited in what actions it may 
take. On one hand, the ISP may disclose the contents of the forwarded 
communication to law enforcement (or to any other third party as it 
sees fit). See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702(b)(3). On the other hand, current 
law does not expressly authorize the ISP to voluntarily provide law 
enforcement with the identity, home address, and other subscriber 
information of the user making the threat. See 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2703(c)(1)(B),(C) (permitting disclosure to government entities 
only in response to legal process). In those cases where the risk of 
death or injury is imminent, the law should not require providers to 
sit idly by. This voluntary disclosure, however, in no way creates an 
affirmative obligation to review customer communications in search of 
such imminent dangers.
  Also, under existing law, a provider (even one providing services to 
the public) may disclose the contents of a customer's communications--
to law enforcement or anyone else--in order to protect its rights or 
property. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2702(b)(5). However, the current statute 
does not expressly permit a provider voluntarily to disclose non-
content records (such as a subscriber's login records) to law 
enforcement for purposes of self-protection. See 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 2703(c)(1)(B). Yet the right to disclose the content of 
communications necessarily implies the less intrusive ability to 
disclose non-content records. Cf. United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 
646 n.9 (7th Cir. 1976) (phone company's authority to monitor and 
disclose conversations to protect against fraud necessarily implies 
right to commit lesser invasion of using, and disclosing fruits of, pen 
register device) (citing United States v. Freeman, 524 F.2d 337, 341 
(7th Cir. 1975)). Moreover, as a practical matter providers must have 
the right to disclose the facts surrounding attacks on their systems. 
When a telephone carrier is defrauded by a subscriber, or when an ISP's 
authorized user launches a network intrusion against his own ISP, the 
provider must have the legal ability to report the complete details of 
the crime to law enforcement. The bill clarifies that service providers 
have the statutory authority to make such disclosures.
  Pen registers. There is consensus that the existing legal procedures 
for pen register and trap-and-trace authority are antiquated and need 
to be updated. I have been proposing ways to update the pen register 
and trap and trace statutes for several years, but not necessarily in 
the same ways as the Administration initially proposed. In fact, in 
1998, I introduced with then-Senator Ashcroft, the E-PRIVACY Act, S. 
2067, which proposed changes in the pen register laws. In 1999, I 
introduced the E-RIGHTS Act, S. 934, also with proposals to update the 
pen register laws.
  Again, in the last Congress, I introduced the Internet Security Act, 
S. 2430, on April 13, 2000, that proposed (1) changing the pen register 
and trap and trace device law to give nationwide effect to pen register 
and trap and trace orders obtained by Government attorneys and obviate 
the need to obtain identical orders in multiple federal jurisdictions; 
(2) clarifying that such devices can be used for computer transmissions 
to obtain electronic addresses, not just on telephone lines; and (3)

[[Page 19499]]

as a guard against abuse, providing for meaningful judicial review of 
government attorney applications for pen registers and trap and trace 
devices.
  As the outline of my earlier legislation suggests, I have long 
supported modernizing the pen register and trap and trace device laws 
by modifying the statutory language to cover the use of these orders on 
computer transmissions; to remove the jurisdictional limits on service 
of these orders; and to update the judicial review procedure, which, 
unlike any other area in criminal procedure, bars the exercise of 
judicial discretion in reviewing the justification for the order. The 
USA Act, in section 216, updates the pen register and trap and trace 
laws only in two out of three respects I believe are important, and 
without allowing meaningful judicial review. Yet, we were able to 
improve the Administration's initial proposal, which suffered from the 
same problem as the provision that was hastily taken up and passed by 
the Senate, by voice vote, on September, 13, 2001, as an amendment to 
the Commerce Justice State Appropriations Act.
  Nationwide service. The existing legal procedures for pen register 
and trap-and-trace authority require service of individual orders for 
installation of pen register or trap and trace device on the service 
providers that carried the targeted communications. Deregulation of the 
telecommunications industry has had the consequence that one 
communication may be carried by multiple providers. For example, a 
telephone call may be carried by a competitive local exchange carrier, 
which passes it at a switch to a local Bell Operating Company, which 
passes it to a long distance carrier, which hands it to an incumbent 
local exchange carrier elsewhere in the U.S., which in turn may finally 
hand it to a cellular carrier. If these carriers do not pass source 
information with each call, identifying that source may require 
compelling information from a host of providers located throughout the 
country.
  Under present law, a court may only authorize the installation of a 
pen register or trap device ``within the jurisdiction of the court.'' 
As a result, when one provider indicates that the source of a 
communication is a carrier in another district, a second order may be 
necessary. The Department of Justice has advised, for example, that in 
1996, a hacker (who later turned out to be launching his attacks from a 
foreign country) extensively penetrated computers belonging to the 
Department of Defense. This hacker was dialing into a computer at 
Harvard University and used this computer as an intermediate staging 
point in an effort to conceal his location and identity. Investigators 
obtained a trap and trace order instructing the phone company, Nynex, 
to trace these calls, but Nynex could only report that the 
communications were coming to it from a long-distance carrier, MCI. 
Investigators then applied for a court order to obtain the connection 
information from MCI, but since the hacker was no longer actually using 
the connection, MCI could not identify its source. Only if the 
investigators could have served MCI with a trap and trace order while 
the hacker was actively on-line could they have successfully traced 
back and located him.
  In another example provided by the Department of Justice, 
investigators encountered similar difficulties in attempting to track 
Kevin Mitnick, a criminal who continued to hack into computers attached 
to the Internet despite the fact that he was on supervised release for 
a prior computer crime conviction. The FBI attempted to trace these 
electronic communications while they were in progress. In order to 
evade arrest, however, Mitnick moved around the country and used cloned 
cellular phones and other evasive techniques. His hacking attacks would 
often pass through one of two cellular carriers, a local phone company, 
and then two Internet service providers. In this situation, where 
investigators and service providers had to act quickly to trace Mitnick 
in the act of hacking, only many repeated attempts--accompanied by an 
order to each service provider--finally produced success. Fortunately, 
Mitnick was such a persistent hacker that he gave law enforcement many 
chances to complete the trace.
  This duplicative process of obtaining a separate order for each link 
in the communications chain can be quite time-consuming, and it serves 
no useful purpose since the original court has already authorized the 
trace. Moreover, a second or third order addressed to a particular 
carrier that carried part of a prior communication may prove useless 
during the next attack: in computer intrusion cases, for example, the 
target may use an entirely different path (i.e., utilize a different 
set of intermediate providers) for his or her subsequent activity.
  The bill would modify the pen register and trap and trace statutes to 
allow for nationwide service of a single order for installation of 
these devices, without the necessity of returning to court for each new 
carrier. I support this change.
  Second, the language of the existing statute is hopelessly out of 
date and speaks of a pen register or trap and trace ``device'' being 
``attached'' to a telephone ``line.'' However, the rapid 
computerization of the telephone system has changed the tracing 
process. No longer are such functions normally accomplished by physical 
hardware components attached to telephone lines. Instead, these 
functions are typically performed by computerized collection and 
retention of call routing information passing through a communications 
system.
  The statute's definition of a ``pen register'' as a ``device'' that 
is ``attached'' to a particular ``telephone line'' is particularly 
obsolete when applied to the wireless portion of a cellular phone call, 
which has no line to which anything can be attached. While courts have 
authorized pen register orders for wireless phones based on the notion 
of obtaining access to a ``virtual line,'' updating the law to keep 
pace with current technology is a better course.
  Moreover, the statute is ill-equipped to facilitate the tracing of 
communications that take place over the Internet. For example, the pen 
register definition refers to telephone ``numbers'' rather than the 
broader concept of a user's communications account. Although pen 
register and trap orders have been obtained for activity on computer 
networks, Internet service providers have challenged the application of 
the statute to electronic communications, frustrating legitimate 
investigations. I have long supported updating the statute by removing 
words such as ``numbers . . . dialed'' that do not apply to the way 
that pen/trap devices are used and to clarify the statute's proper 
application to tracing communications in an electronic environment, but 
in a manner that is technology neutral and does not capture the content 
of communications. That being said, I have been concerned about the FBI 
and Justice Department's insistence over the past few years that the 
pen/trap devices statutes be updated with broad, undefined terms that 
continue to flame concerns that these laws will be used to intercept 
private communications content.
  The Administration's initial pen/trap device proposal added the terms 
``routing'' and ``addressing'' to the definitions describing the 
information that was authorized for interception on the low relevance 
standard under these laws. The Administration and the Department of 
Justice flatly rejected my suggestion that these terms be defined to 
respond to concerns that the new terms might encompass matter 
considered content, which may be captured only upon a showing of 
probable cause, not the mere relevancy of the pen/trap statute. 
Instead, the Administration agreed that the definition should expressly 
exclude the use of pen/trap devices to intercept ``content,'' which is 
broadly defined in 18 U.S.C. 2510(8).
  While this is an improvement, the FBI and Justice Department are 
short-sighted in their refusal to define these terms. We should be 
clear about the consequence of not providing definitions for these new 
terms in the pen/trap device statutes. These terms will be defined, if 
not by the Congress, then by the courts in the context of criminal 
cases where pen/trap devices have

[[Page 19500]]

been used and challenged by defendants. If a court determines that a 
pen register has captured ``content,'' which the FBI admits such 
devices do, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, suppression may be 
ordered, not only of the pen register evidence but any other evidence 
derived from it. We are leaving the courts with little or no guidance 
of what is covered by ``addressing'' or ``routing.''
  The USA Act also requires the government to use reasonably available 
technology that limits the interceptions under the pen/trap device laws 
``so as not to include the contents of any wire or electronic 
communications.'' This limitation on the technology used by the 
government to execute pen/trap orders is important since, as the FBI 
advised me June, 2000, pen register devices ``do capture all electronic 
impulses transmitted by the facility on which they are attached, 
including such impulses transmitted after a phone call is connected to 
the called party.'' The impulses made after the call is connected could 
reflect the electronic banking transactions a caller makes, or the 
electronic ordering from a catalogue that a customer makes over the 
telephone, or the electronic ordering of a prescription drug.
  This transactional data intercepted after the call is connected is 
``content.'' As the Justice Department explained in May, 1998 in a 
letter to House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, ``the 
retrieval of the electronic impulses that a caller necessarily 
generated in attempting to direct the phone call'' does not constitute 
a ``search'' requiring probable cause since ``no part of the 
substantive information transmitted after the caller had reached the 
called party'' is obtained. But the Justice Department made clear that 
``all of the information transmitted after a phone call is connected to 
the called party . . . is substantive in nature. These electronic 
impulses are the `contents' of the call: They are not used to direct or 
process the call, but instead convey certain messages to the 
recipient.''
  When I added the direction on use of reasonably available technology 
(codified as 18 U.S.C. 3121(c)) to the pen register statute as part of 
the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994, 
I recognized that these devices collected content and that such 
collection was unconstitutional on the mere relevance standard. 
Nevertheless, the FBI advised me in June, 2000, that pen register 
devices for telephone services ``continue to operate as they have for 
decades'' and that ``there had been no change . . . that would better 
restrict the recording or decoding of electronic or other impulses to 
the dialing and signaling information utilized in call processing.'' 
Perhaps, if there were meaningful judicial review and accountability, 
the FBI would take the statutory direction more seriously and actually 
implement it.
  Judicial review. Due in significant part to the fact that pen/trap 
devices in use today collect ``content,'' I have sought in legislation 
introduced over the past few years to update and modify the judicial 
review procedure for pen register and trap and trace devices. Existing 
law requires an attorney for the government to certify that the 
information likely to be obtained by the installation of a pen register 
or trap and trace device will be relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation. The court is required to issue an order upon seeing the 
prosecutor's certification. The court is not authorized to look behind 
the certification to evaluate the judgment of the prosecutor.
  I have urged that government attorneys be required to include facts 
about their investigations in their applications for pen/trap orders 
and allow courts to grant such orders only where the facts support the 
relevancy of the information likely to be obtained by the orders. This 
is not a change in the applicable standard, which would remain the very 
low relevancy standard. Instead, this change would simply allow the 
court to evaluate the facts presented by a prosecutor, and, if it finds 
that the facts support the government's assertion that the information 
to be collected will be relevant, issue the order. Although this change 
will place an additional burden on law enforcement, it will allow the 
courts a greater ability to assure that government attorneys are using 
such orders properly.
  Some have called this change a ``roll-back'' in the statute, as if 
the concept of allowing meaningful judicial review was an extreme 
position. To the contrary, this is a change that the Clinton 
Administration supported in legislation transmitted to the Congress 
last year. This is a change that the House Judiciary Committee also 
supported last year. In the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, H.R. 
5018, that Committee proposed that before a pen/trap device ``could be 
ordered installed, the government must first demonstrate to an 
independent judge that `specific and articulable facts reasonably 
indicate that a crime has been, is being, or will be committed, and 
information likely to be obtained by such installation and use . . . is 
relevant to an investigation of that crime.'' (Report 106-932, 106th 
Cong. 2d Sess., Oct. 4, 2000, p. 13). Unfortunately, the Bush 
Administration has taken a contrary position and has rejected this 
change in the judicial review process.
  Computer trespasser. Currently, an owner or operator of a computer 
that is accessed by a hacker as a means for the hacker to reach a third 
computer, cannot simply consent to law enforcement monitoring of the 
computer. Instead, because the owner or operator is not technically a 
party to the communication, law enforcement needs wiretap authorization 
under Title III to conduct such monitoring. I have long been interested 
in closing this loophole. Indeed, when I asked about this problem, the 
FBI explained to me in June, 2000, that:

       This anomaly in the law creates an untenable situation 
     whereby providers are sometimes forced to sit idly by as they 
     witness hackers enter and, in some situations, destroy or 
     damage their systems and networks while law enforcement 
     begins the detailed process of seeking court authorization to 
     assist them. In the real world, the situation is akin to a 
     homeowner being forced to helplessly watch a burglar or 
     vandal while police seek a search warrant to enter the 
     dwelling.

  I therefore introduced as part of the Internet Security Act, S. 2430, 
in 2000, an exception to the wiretap statute that would explicitly 
permit such monitoring without a wiretap if prior consent is obtained 
from the person whose computer is being hacked through and used to send 
``harmful interference to a lawfully operating computer system.''
  The Administration initially proposed a different formulation of the 
exception that would have allowed an owner/operator of any computer 
connected to the Internet to consent to FBI wiretapping of any user who 
violated a workplace computer use policy or online service term of 
service and was thereby an ``unauthorized'' user. The Administration's 
proposal was not limited to computer hacking offenses under 18 U.S.C. 
1030 or to conduct that caused harm to a computer or computer system. 
The Administration rejected these refinements to their proposed wiretap 
exception, but did agree, in section 217 of the USA Act, to limit the 
authority for wiretapping with the consent of the owner/operator to 
communications of unauthorized users without an existing subscriber or 
other contractual relationship with the owner/operator.
  Sharing criminal justice information. The USA Act will make 
significant changes in the sharing of confidential criminal justice 
information with various Federal agencies. For those of us who have 
been concerned about the leaks from the FBI that can irreparably damage 
reputations of innocent people and frustrate investigations by alerting 
suspects to flee or destroy material evidence, the Administration's 
insistence on the broadest authority to disseminate such information, 
without any judicial check, is disturbing. Nonetheless, I believe we 
have improved the Administration's initial proposal in responsible 
ways. Only time will tell whether the improvements we were able to 
reach agreement on are sufficient.
  At the outset, we should be clear that current law allows the sharing 
of confidential criminal justice information, but with close court 
supervision. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)

[[Page 19501]]

provides that matters occurring before a grand jury may be disclosed 
only to an attorney for the government, such other government personnel 
as are necessary to assist the attorney and another grand jury. Further 
disclosure is also allowed as specifically authorized by a court.
  Similarly, section 2517 of title 18, United States Code provides that 
wiretap evidence may be disclosed in testimony during official 
proceedings and to investigative or law enforcement officers to the 
extent appropriate to the proper performance of their official duties. 
In addition, the wiretap law allows disclosure of wiretap evidence 
``relating to offenses other than specified in the order'' when 
authorized or approved by a judge. Indeed, just last year, the Justice 
Department assured us that ``law enforcement agencies have authority 
under current law to share title III information regarding terrorism 
with intelligence agencies when the information is of overriding 
importance to the national security.'' (Letter from Robert Raben, 
Assistant Attorney General, September 28, 2000).
  For this reason, and others, the Justice Department at the time 
opposed an amendment proposed by Senators Kyl and Feinstein to S. 2507, 
the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2001 that would have 
allowed the sharing of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence 
information collected from wiretaps with the intelligence community. I 
deferred to the Justice Department on this issue and sought changes in 
the proposed amendment to address the Department's concern that this 
provision was not only unnecessary but also ``could have significant 
implications for prosecutions and the discovery process in 
litigation'', ``raises significant issues regarding the sharing with 
intelligence agencies of information collected about United States 
persons'' and jeopardized ``the need to protect equities relating to 
ongoing criminal investigations.'' In the end, the amendment was 
revised to address the Justice Department's concerns and passed the 
Senate as a free-standing bill, S. 3205, the Counterterrorism Act of 
2000. The House took no action on this legislation.
  Disclosure of wiretap information. The Administration initially 
proposed adding a sweeping provision to the wiretap statute that 
broadened the definition of an ``investigative or law enforcement 
officer'' who may receive disclosures of information obtained through 
wiretaps to include federal law enforcement, intelligence, national 
security, national defense, protective and immigration personnel and 
the President and Vice President. This proposal troubled me because 
information intercepted by a wiretap has enormous potential to infringe 
upon the privacy rights of innocent people, including people who are 
not even suspected of a crime and merely happen to speak on the 
telephone with the targets of an investigation. For this reason, the 
authority to disclose information obtained through a wiretap has always 
been carefully circumscribed in law.
  While I recognize that appropriate officials in the executive branch 
of government should have access to wiretap information that is 
important to combating terrorism or protecting the national security, I 
proposed allowing such disclosures where specifically authorized by a 
court order. Further, with respect to information relating to 
terrorism, I proposed allowing the disclosure without a court order as 
long as the judge who authorized the wiretap was notified as soon as 
practicable after the fact. This would have provided a check against 
abuses of the disclosure authority by providing for review by a neutral 
judicial official. At the same time, there was a little likelihood that 
a judge would deny any requests for disclosure in cases where it was 
warranted.
  On Sunday, September 30, the Administration agreed to my proposal, 
but within two days, it backed away from its agreement. I remain 
concerned that the resulting provision will allow the unprecedented, 
widespread disclosure of this highly sensitive information without any 
notification to or review by the court that authorizes and supervises 
the wiretap. This is clearly an area where our Committee will have to 
exercise close oversight to make sure that the newly-minted disclosure 
authority is not being abused.
  The Administration offered three reasons for reneging on the original 
deal. First, they claimed that the involvement of the court would 
inhibit Federal investigators and attorneys from disclosing information 
needed by intelligence and national security officials. Second, they 
said the courts might not have adequate security and therefore should 
not be told that information was disclosed for intelligence or national 
security purposes. And third, they said the President's constitutional 
powers under Article II give him authority to get whatever foreign 
intelligence he needs to exercise his national security 
responsibilities.
  I believe these concerns are unfounded. Federal investigators and 
attorneys will recognize the need to disclose information relevant to 
terrorism investigations. Courts can be trusted to keep secrets and 
recognize the needs of the President.
  Current law requires that such information be used only for law 
enforcement purpose. This provides an assurance that highly intrusive 
invasions of privacy are confined to the purpose for which they have 
been approved by a court, based on probable cause, as required by the 
Fourth Amendment. Current law calls for minimization procedures to 
ensure that the surveillance does not gather information about private 
and personal conduct and conversations that are not relevant to the 
criminal investigation.
  When the Administration reneged on the agreement regarding court 
supervision, we turned to other safeguards and were more successful in 
changing other questionable features of the Administration's bill. The 
Administration accepted my proposal to strike the term ``national 
security'' from the description of wiretap information that may be 
shared throughout the executive branch and replace it with ``foreign 
intelligence'' information. This change is important in clarifying what 
information may be disclosed because the term ``foreign intelligence'' 
is specifically defined by statute whereas ``national security'' is 
not.
  Moreoever, the rubric of ``national security'' has been used to 
justify some particularly unsavory activities by the government in the 
past. We must have at least some assurance that we are not embarked on 
a course that will lead to a repetition of these abuses because the 
statute will now more clearly define what type of information is 
subject to disclosure. In addition, Federal officials who receive the 
information may use it only as necessary to the conduct of their 
official duties. Therefore, any disclosure or use outside the conduct 
of their official duties remains subject to all limitations applicable 
to their retention and dissemination of information of the type of 
information received. This includes the Privacy Act, the criminal 
penalties for unauthorized disclosure of electronic surveillance 
information under chapter 119 of title 18, and the contempt penalties 
for unauthorized disclosure of grand jury information. In addition, the 
Attorney General must establish procedures for the handling of 
information that identifies a United States person, such as the 
restrictions on retention and dissemination of foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence information pertaining to United States persons 
currently in effect under Executive Order 12333.
  While these safeguards do not fully substitute for court supervision, 
they can provide some assurance against misuse of the private, 
personal, and business information about Americans, that is acquired in 
the course of criminal investigations and that may flow more widely in 
the intelligence, defense, and national security worlds.
  Disclosure of grand jury information. The wiretap statute was not the 
only provision in which the Administration sought broader authority to 
disclose highly sensitive investigative information. It also proposed 
broadening Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
allow the disclosure of information relating to terrorism and national 
security obtained from grand

[[Page 19502]]

jury proceedings to a broad range of officials in the executive branch 
of government. As with wiretaps, few would disagree that information 
learned in a criminal investigation that is necessary to combating 
terrorism or protecting the national security ought to be shared with 
the appropriate intelligence and national security officials. The 
question is how best to regulate and limit such disclosures so as not 
to compromise the important policies of secrecy and confidentiality 
that have long applied to grand jury proceedings.
  I proposed that we require judicial review of requests to disclose 
terrorism and foreign intelligence information to officials in the 
executive branch beyond those already authorized to receive such 
disclosures. Once again, the Administration agreed to my proposal on 
Sunday, September 30, but reneged within two days. As a result, the 
bill does not provide for any judicial supervision of the new 
authorization for dissemination of grand jury information throughout 
the executive branch. The bill does contain the safeguards that I have 
discussed with respect to law enforcement wiretap information. However, 
as with the new wiretap disclosure authority, I am troubled by this 
issue and plan to exercise the close oversight of the Judiciary 
Committee to make sure it is not being abused.
  Foreign intelligence information sharing. The Administration also 
sought a provision that would allow the sharing of foreign intelligence 
information throughout the executive branch of the government 
notwithstanding any current legal prohibition that may prevent or limit 
its disclosure. I have resisted this proposal more strongly than 
anything else that still remains in the bill. What concerns me is that 
it is not clear what existing prohibitions this provision would affect 
beyond the grand jury secrecy rule and the wiretap statute, which are 
already covered by other provisions in the bill. Even the 
Administration, which wrote this provision, has not been able to 
provide a fully satisfactory explanation of its scope.
  If there are specific laws that the Administration believes impede 
the necessary sharing of information on terrorism and foreign 
intelligence within the executive branch, we should address those 
problems through legislation that is narrowly targeted to those 
statutes. Tacking on a blunderbuss provision whose scope we do not 
fully understand can only lead to consequences that we cannot foresee. 
Further, I am concerned that such legislation, broadly authorizing the 
secret sharing of intelligence information throughout the executive 
branch, will fuel the unwarranted fears and dark conspiracy theories of 
Americans who do not trust their government. This was another provision 
of which the Administration reneged on its agreement with me; it agreed 
to drop it on September 30, but resurrected it within two days, 
insisting that it remain in the bill. I have been able to mitigate its 
potential for abuse somewhat by adding the same safeguards that apply 
to disclosure of law enforcement wiretap and grand jury information.
  ``Sneak and peek'' search warrants. Another issue that has caused me 
serious concern relates to the Administration's proposal for so-called 
``sneak and peek'' search warrants. The House Judiciary Committee 
dropped this proposal entirely from its version of the legislation. 
Normally, when law enforcement officers execute a search warrant, they 
must leave a copy of the warrant and a receipt for all property seized 
at the premises searched. Thus, even if the search occurs when the 
owner of the premises is not present, the owner will receive notice 
that the premises have been lawfully searched pursuant to a warrant 
rather than, for example, burglarized.
  Two circuit courts of appeal, the Second and the Ninth Circuits, have 
recognized a limited exception to this requirement. When specifically 
authorized by the issuing judge or magistrate, the officers may delay 
providing notice of the search to avoid compromising an ongoing 
investigation or for some other good reason. However, this authority 
has been carefully circumscribed.
  First, the Second and Ninth Circuit cases have dealt only with 
situations where the officers search a premises without seizing any 
tangible property. As the Second Circuit explained, such searches are 
``less intrusive than a conventional search with physical seizure 
because the latter deprives the owner not only of privacy but also of 
the use of his property.'' United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 
899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990).
  Second, the cases have required that the officers seeking the warrant 
must show good reason for the delay. Finally, while the courts have 
allowed notice of the search may be delayed, it must be provided within 
a reasonable period thereafter, which should generally be no more than 
seven days. The reasons for these careful limitations were spelled out 
succinctly by Judge Sneed of the Ninth Circuit: ``The mere thought of 
strangers walking through and visually examining the center of our 
privacy interest, our home, arouses our passion for freedom as does 
nothing else. That passion, the true source of the Fourth Amendment, 
demands that surreptitious entries be closely circumscribed.'' United 
States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986).
  The Administration's original proposal would have ignored some of the 
key limitations created by the caselaw for sneak and peek search 
warrants. First, it would have broadly authorized officers not only to 
conduct surreptitious searches, but also to secretly seize any type of 
property without any additional showing of necessity. This type of 
warrant, which has never been addressed by a published decision of a 
federal appellate court, has been referred to in a law review article 
written by an FBI agent as a ``sneak and steal'' warrant. See K. Corr, 
``Sneaky But Lawful: The Use of Sneak and Peek Search Warrants,'' 43 U. 
Kan. L. Rev. 1103, 1113 (1995). Second, the proposal would simply have 
adopted the procedural requirements of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2705 for 
providing delayed notice of a wiretap. Among other things, this would 
have extended the permissible period of delay to a maximum of 90 days, 
instead of the presumptive seven-day period provided by the caselaw on 
sneak and peek warrants.
  I was able to make significant improvements in the Administration's 
original proposal that will help to ensure that the government's 
authority to obtain sneak and peek warrants is not abused. First, the 
provision that is now in section 213 of the bill prohibits the 
government from seizing any tangible property or any wire or electronic 
communication or stored electronic information unless it makes a 
showing of reasonable necessity for the seizure. Thus, in contrast to 
the Administration's original proposal, the presumption is that the 
warrant will authorize only a search unless the government can make a 
specific showing of additional need for a seizure. Second, the 
provision now requires that notice be given within a reasonable time of 
the execution of the warrant rather than giving a blanket authorization 
for up to a 90-day delay. What constitutes a reasonable time, of 
course, will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. But 
I would expect courts to be guided by the teachings of the Second and 
the Ninth Circuits that, in the ordinary case, a reasonable time is no 
more than seven days.
  FISA. Several changes in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) are designed to clarify technical aspects of the statutory 
framework and take account of experience in practical implementation. 
These changes are not controversial, and they will facilitate the 
collection of intelligence for counterterrorism and counterintelligence 
purposes. Other changes are more significant and required careful 
evaluation and revision of the Administration's proposals.
  Duration of surveillance. The USA Act, in section 297, changes the 
duration of electronic surveillance under FISA in cases of an agent of 
a foreign power, other than a United States persons, who acts in the 
United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power or as a 
member of an international terrorist group. Current law limits court 
orders in these cases to 90 days, the same duration as for United

[[Page 19503]]

States persons. Experience indicates, however, that after the initial 
period has confirmed probable cause that the foreign national meets the 
statutory standard, court orders are renewed repeatedly and the 90-day 
renewal becomes an unnecessary procedural for investigators taxed with 
far more pressing duties.
  The Administration proposed that the period of electronic 
surveillance be changed from 90 days to one year in these cases. This 
proposal did not ensure adequate review after the initial stage to 
ensure that the probable cause determination remained justified over 
time. Therefore, the bill changes the initial period of the 
surveillance 90 to 120 days and changes the period for extensions from 
90 days to one year. The initial 120-day period provides for a review 
of the results of the surveillance or search directed at an individual 
before one-year extensions are requested. These changes do not affect 
surveillance of a United States person.
  The bill also changes the period for execution of an order for 
physical search under FISA from 45 to 90 days. This change applies to 
United States persons as well as foreign nationals. Experience since 
physical search authority was added to FISA in 1994 indicates that 45 
days is frequently not long enough to plan and carry out a covert 
physical search. There is no change in the restrictions which provide 
that United States persons may not be the targets of search or 
surveillance under FISA unless a judge finds probable cause to believe 
that they are agents of foreign powers who engage in specified 
international terrorist, sabotage, or clandestine intelligence 
activities that may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the 
United States.
  FISA judges. The bill, in section 208, seeks to ensure that the 
special court established under FISA has sufficient judges to handle 
the workload. While changing the duration of orders and extensions will 
reduce the number of cases in some categories, the bill retains the 
court's role in pen register and trap and trace cases and expands the 
court's responsibility for issuing orders for records and other 
tangible items needed for counterintelligence and counter terrorism 
investigations. Upon reviewing the court's requirements, the 
Administration requested an increase in the number of federal district 
judges designated for the court from seven to 11 of whom no less than 3 
shall reside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia. The latter 
provision ensures that more than one judge is available to handle cases 
on short notice and reduces the need to invoke the alternative of 
Attorney General approval under the emergency authorities in FISA.
  Agent of a foreign power standard. Other changes in FISA and related 
national security laws are more controversial. In several areas, the 
bill reflects a serious effort to accommodate the requests for expanded 
surveillance authority with the need for safeguards against misuse, 
especially the gathering of intelligence about the lawful political or 
commercial activities of Americans. One of the most difficult issues 
was whether to eliminate the existing statutory ``agent of a foreign 
power'' standards for surveillance and investigative techniques that 
raise important privacy concerns, but not at the level that the supreme 
Court has held to require a court order and a probable cause finding 
under the Fourth Amendment. These include pen register and trap and 
trace devices, access to business records and other tangible items held 
by third parties, and access to records that have statutory privacy 
protection. The latter include telephone, bank, and credit records.
  The ``agent of a foreign power'' standard in existing law was 
designed to ensure that the FBI and other intelligence agencies do not 
use these surveillance and investigative methods to investigate the 
lawful activities of Americans in the name of an undefined authority to 
collect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information. The 
law has required a showing of reasonable suspicion, less than probable 
cause, to believe that a United States person is an ``agent of a 
foreign power'' engaged in international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities.
  However, the ``agent of a foreign power'' standard is more stringent 
than the standard under comparable criminal law enforcement procedures 
which require only a showing of relevance to a criminal investigation. 
The FBI's experience under existing laws since they were enacted at 
various time over the past 15 years has been that, in practice, the 
requirement to show reasonable suspicion that a person is an ``agent of 
a foreign power'' has been almost as burdensome as the requirement to 
show probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment for more intrusive 
techniques. The FBI has made a clear case that a relevance standard is 
appropriate for counterintelligence and counterterrorism 
investigations, as well as for criminal investigations.
  The challenge, then, was to define those investigations. The 
alternative proposed by the Administration was to cover any 
investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information. This was 
extremely broad, because the definition includes any information with 
respect to a foreign power that relates to, and if concerning a United 
States person is necessary to, the national defense or the security of 
the United States or the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United 
States. This goes far beyond FBI counterintelligence and 
counterterrorism requirements. Instead, the bill requires that use of 
the surveillance technique or access to the records concerning a United 
States person be relevant to an investigation to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.
  In addition, an investigation of a United States person may not be 
based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment. This 
framework applies to pen registers and trap and trace under section 
215, access to records and other items under section 215, and the 
national security authorities for access to telephone, bank, and credit 
records under section 506. Lawful political dissent and protest by 
American citizens against the government may not be the basis for FBI 
counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations under these 
provisions.
  A separate issue for pen registers and trap and trace under FISA is 
whether the court should have the discretion to make the decision on 
relevance. The Administration has insisted on a certification process. 
I discussed this issue as it comes up in the criminal procedures for 
pen registers and trap and trace under title 18, and my concerns apply 
to the FISA procedures as well.
  The purpose of FISA. The most controversial change in FISA requested 
by the Administration was the proposal to allow surveillance and search 
when ``a purpose'' is to obtain foreign intelligence information. 
Current law requires that the secret procedures and different probable 
cause standards under FISA be used only if a high-level executive 
official certifies that ``the purpose'' is to obtain foreign 
intelligence formation. The Administration's aim was to allow FISA 
surveillance and search for law enforcement purposes, so long as there 
was at least some element of a foreign intelligence purpose. This 
proposal raised constitutional concerns, which were addressed in a 
legal opinion provided by the Justice Department, which I insert in the 
record at the end of my statement.
  The Justice Department opinion did not defend the constitutionality 
of the original proposal. Instead, it addressed a suggestion made by 
Senator Feinstein to the Attorney General at the Judiciary Committee 
hearing to change ``the purpose'' to ``a significant purpose.'' No 
matter what statutory change is made even the Department concedes that 
the court's may impose a constitutional requirement of ``primary 
purpose'' based on the appellate court decisions upholding FISA against 
constitutional challenges over the past 20 years.
  Section 218 of the bill adopts ``significant purpose,'' and it will 
be up to the courts to determine how far law enforcement agencies may 
use FISA for criminal investigation and prosecution beyond the scope of 
the statutory definition of ``foreign intelligence information.''

[[Page 19504]]

  In addition, I proposed and the Administration agreed to an 
additional provision in Section 505 that clarifies the boundaries for 
consultation and coordination between officials who conduct FISA search 
and surveillance and Federal law enforcement officials including 
prosecutors. Such consultation and coordination is authorized for the 
enforcement of laws that protect against international terrorism, 
clandestine intelligence activities of foreign agents, and other grave 
foreign threats to the nation. Protection against these foreign-based 
threats by any lawful means is within the scope of the definition of 
``foreign intelligence information,'' and the use of FISA to gather 
evidence for the enforcement of these laws was contemplated in the 
enactment of FISA. The Justice Department's opinion cites relevant 
legislative history from the Senate Intelligence Committee's report in 
1978, and there is comparable language in the House report.
  Immigration. The Administration initially proposed that the Attorney 
General be authorized to detain any alien indefinitely upon 
certification of suspicion to links to terrorist activities or 
organizations. Under close questioning by both Senator Kennedy and 
Senator Specter at the Committee hearing on September 25, the Attorney 
General said that his proposal was intended only to allow the 
government to hold an alien suspected of terrorist activity while 
deportation proceedings were ongoing. In response to a question by 
Senator Specter, the Attorney General said: ``Our intention is to be 
able to detain individuals who are the subject of deportation 
proceedings on other grounds, to detain them as if they were the 
subject of deportation proceedings on terrorism.'' The Justice 
Department, however, continued to insist on broader authority, 
including the power to detain even if the alien was found not to be 
deportable.
  I remain concerned about the provision, in section 412, but I believe 
that it has been improved from the original proposal offered by the 
Administration. First, the Justice Department must now charge an alien 
with an immigration or criminal violation within seven days of taking 
custody, and the Attorney General's certification of an alien under 
this section is subject to judicial review. Second, if an alien is 
found not to be removable, he must be released from custody. Third, the 
Attorney General can only delegate the power to certify an alien to the 
Deputy Attorney General, ensuring greater accountability and preventing 
the certification decision from being made by low-level officials. 
Despite these improvements, I would have preferred that this provision 
not be included, and I would urge the Attorney General and his 
successors to employ great discretion in using this new power.
  In addition, the Administration initially proposed a sweeping 
definition of terrorist activity and new powers for the Secretary of 
State to designate an organization as a terrorist organization for 
purposes of immigration law. We were able to work with the 
Administration to refine this definition to limit its application to 
individuals who had innocent contacts with non-designated 
organizations. We also limited the retroactive effect of these new 
definitions. If an alien solicited funds or membership, or provided 
material support for an organization that was not designated at that 
time by the Secretary of State, the alien will have the opportunity to 
show that he did not know and should have known that his acts would 
further the organization's terrorist activity. This is substantially 
better than the administration's proposal, which by its terms, would 
have empowered the INS to deport someone who raised money for the 
African National Congress in the 1980s.
  Throughout our negotiations on these issues, Senator Kennedy provided 
steadfast leadership. Although neither of us are pleased with the final 
product, it is far better than it would have been without his active 
involvement.
  Trade Sanctions. I was disappointed that the Administration's initial 
proposal authorizing the President to impose unilateral food and 
medical sanctions would have undermined a law we passed last year with 
overwhelming bipartisan support.
  Under that law, the President already has full authority to impose 
unilateral food and medicine sanctions during this crisis because of 
two exceptions built into the law that apply to our current situation. 
Nevertheless, the Administration sought to undo this law and obtain 
virtually unlimited authority in the future to impose food and medicine 
embargoes, without making any effort for a multi-lateral approach in 
cooperation with other nations. Absent such a multi-lateral approach, 
other nations would be free to step in immediately and take over 
business from American firms and farmers that they are unilaterally 
barred from pursuing.
  Over 30 farm and export groups, including the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, the Grocery Manufacturers of America, the National Farmers 
Union, and the U.S. Dairy Export Council, wrote to me and explained 
that the Administration proposal would ``not achieve its intended 
policy goal.''
  I worked with Senator Enzi, and other Senators, on substitute 
language to give the Administration the tools it needs in this crisis. 
This substitute has been carefully crafted to avoid needlessly hurting 
American farmers in the future, yet it will assure that the U.S. can 
engage in effective multilateral sanctions.
  This bipartisan agreement limits the authority in the bill to 
existing laws and executive orders, which give the President full 
authority regarding this conflict, and grants authority for the 
President to restrict exports of agricultural products, medicine or 
medical devices. I continue to agree with then-Senator Ashcroft who 
argued in 1999 that unilateral U.S. food and medicine sanctions simply 
do not work when he introduced the ``Food and Medicine for the World 
Act.''
  As recently as October 2000, then-Senator Ashcroft pointed out how 
broad, unilateral embargoes of food or medicine are often 
counterproductive. Many Republican and Democratic Senators made it 
clear just last year that the U.S. should work with other countries on 
food and medical sanctions so that the sanctions will be effective in 
hurting our enemies, instead of just hurting the U.S. I am glad that 
with Senator Enzi's help, we were able to make changes in the trade 
sanctions provision to both protect our farmers and help the President 
during this crisis.
  Money Laundering. Title III of the USA Act consists of a bipartisan 
bill that was reported out of the Banking Committee on October 4, 2001. 
I commend the Chairman and Ranking Member of that Committee, Senators 
Sarbanes and Gramm, for working together to produce a balanced and 
effective package of measures to combat international money laundering 
and the financing of terrorism.
  I am pleased that the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Banking 
Committee agreed to our inclusion in the managers' amendment of a small 
change to a provision of title III, section 319, relating to forfeiture 
of funds in United States interbank accounts. As reported by the 
Banking Committee, this provision included language suggesting that in 
a criminal case, the government may have authority to seek a pretrial 
restraining order of substitute assets. In fact, as all but one of the 
circuit courts to consider the issue have held, the government has no 
such authority. The managers' amendment strikes the offending language 
from section 319.
  Another provision added as part of the Banking Committee title--
section 351--is far more troubling. Section 351 creates a new Bank 
Secrecy Act offense involving the bulk smuggling of more than $10,000 
in currency in any conveyance, article of luggage or merchandise or 
container, either into or out of the United States. The obvious purpose 
of this section is to circumvent the Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2029 (1998), which held that a 
``punitive'' forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the 
offense it is designed to punish.

[[Page 19505]]

  In fact, the crime created in section 351--willfully evading a 
currency reporting requirement by ``concealing'' and transporting more 
than $10,000 across a U.S. border--is no different than the crime at 
issue in Bajakajian--willfully evading a currency reporting requirement 
by transporting more than $10,000 across a U.S. border. A forfeiture 
that is ``grossly disproportional'' with respect to the latter will 
inevitably be found ``grossly disproportional'' with respect to the 
former. The new element of ``concealment'' does little or nothing to 
bolster the government's claim to forfeiture of the unreported 
currency, since this element is already implicit in the current crime 
of evasion: It is hardly likely that a person who is in the process of 
willfully evading the currency reporting requirement will be waiving 
his currency around for all the world to see.
  Conclusion. I have done my best under the circumstances and want to 
thank especially Senator Kennedy for his leadership on the Immigration 
parts of the bill. My efforts have not been completely successful and 
there are a number of provisions on which the Administration has 
insisted with which I disagree. Frankly, the agreement of September 30, 
2001 would have led to a better balanced bill. I could not stop the 
Administration from reneging on the agreement any more than I could 
have sped the process to reconstitute this bill in the aftermath of 
those breaches. In these times we need to work together to face the 
challenges of international terrorism. I have sought to do so in good 
faith.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I enjoyed the remarks of my distinguished 
colleague from Vermont. I compliment him for the work he has done on 
this bill and for the hard work, over the last 3 weeks, that he and his 
staff have put into this bill, as well as other members of the 
Judiciary Committee as a whole, and, of course, people on my side as 
well.
  Mr. President, I do not intend to take very long. I know our 
colleagues are tired, and I know they would like to go home. I also 
know that we have a distinguished colleague in the Chamber who has some 
amendments on which we may have to vote.
  Four weeks ago we were a relatively tranquil nation, but on September 
11, in what amounted to a dastardly attack, an unprovoked attack of 
war, the World Trade Center was destroyed, along with almost 6,000 
people, or maybe more. Our Pentagon was struck by a volitionary act of 
terrorism.
  As a result of the acts of heroes, one of the planes was downed in 
Pennsylvania, killing all aboard, including those heroes who made sure 
that that plane did not strike either the Capitol or the White House. I 
want to pay special tribute to those people who were so heroic as to 
give up their own lives to protect the lives of so many others.
  There have been so many acts of heroism and self-sacrifice--the 
firefighters who gave their lives, the firefighters who worked day and 
night, the volunteers who have gone in there, the mayor of New York 
City, the Governor, and so many others who deserve mention.
  This bill, hopefully, will help to at least rectify and redeem some 
of the problems, problems that have existed ever since September 11.
  We did not seek this war; it was thrust upon us. It was an unprovoked 
attack by people who claim that they represent a religious point of 
view when, in fact, what they represent is a complete distortion of the 
religion of Islam.
  Islamic people do not believe in murder, murdering innocent 
civilians. The Koran does not teach that. They do not believe in 
suicide. The Koran does not teach that.
  This is not a war against Islam; this is a war against terrorism and 
people who have so little regard for human life that they would do 
something against innocent civilians that was unthinkable before 
September 11.
  Therefore, we live in a dangerous and difficult world today. It is a 
different world. And we are going to have to wake up and do the things 
we have to do to protect our citizenry and, of course, to protect the 
rest of the world to the extent this great Nation can, with the help of 
other nations, a number of which have become supportive of our efforts. 
We are very grateful to them.
  But a lot of people do not realize we have terror cells in this 
country--that has been in the media even--and there are people in this 
country who are dedicated to the overthrow of America. There are people 
who are dedicated to terrorism right here within our Nation. And some 
of these people who have participated in this matter may very well be 
people who were rightfully in our Nation--or at least we thought were 
rightfully in our Nation.
  The responsibility of redeeming and rectifying this situation is the 
responsibility of the Congress, the Justice Department, the FBI, the 
INS, and the Border Patrol. It is our job to provide the tools, and for 
them to first identify and then eradicate terrorist activity within our 
borders. And our President has taken the extraordinary step of saying 
we are going to go after terrorists worldwide and those who harbor 
them.
  I agree with the President. I think it is time to do it. It is time 
to hit them where it hurts. It is time to let them know we are not 
going to put up with this type of activity.
  A few weeks ago, the Justice Department sent up its legislative 
proposal. It was a good legislative proposal. They had a lot of ideas 
in there that literally we have been trying to get through for years. 
When we passed the 1996 antiterrorism, effective death penalty act, a 
number of us tried to get some of these provisions in at that time, but 
we were unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, some very sincere.
  The fact is, a lot of the provisions we have in the bill are not 
brand new; a lot of them have been requested for years. And had they 
been in play, who knows but we might have been able to interdict these 
terrorists and have stopped what happened and have stopped the loss of 
civil liberties for approximately 6,000 or more people.
  In the past several weeks, after the Justice Department sent up its 
bill, Senator Leahy and I, Justice Department officials, White House 
officials, staff members from both of our staffs, and staff members 
from other members of the committee have worked day and night to come 
up with this particular bill.
  I congratulate my partner and my colleague, Senator Leahy, for his 
hard work on this bill, and his staffers' for the work they have done 
on this bill, and, of course, my own staffers, and, of course, those 
others I have named.
  This has been a very difficult bill to put forward because there are 
all kinds of cross-pressures, all kinds of ideas, all kinds of 
different thoughts, all kinds of differing philosophies. We believe, 
with all kinds of deliberation and work, we have been able to put 
together a bill that really makes sense, that will give the Justice 
Department the tools it needs to be able to work and stamp out 
terrorist activity within our country. At least we want to give them 
the very best tools we possibly can.
  We have tried to accommodate the concerns of Senators on both sides 
of the aisle. We have worked very hard to do so. We cannot accommodate 
everybody's concerns. As Senator Leahy has said, this is not a perfect 
bill. Nothing ever seems to be perfect around here. But this is as good 
a bill as can be put together, in a bipartisan way, in this area in the 
history of the Senate. I really feel good about it, that we have done 
this type of a job.
  As I say, a lot of these provisions have been requested by the 
Justice Department and both Democrat and Republican White Houses for 
years. We took into consideration civil liberties throughout our 
discussions on this bill. I think we got it just right. We are 
protective of civil liberties while at the same time giving the tools 
to the law enforcement agencies to be able to do their jobs in this 
country.
  I might mention that this bill encourages information sharing, that 
would be absolutely prohibited under

[[Page 19506]]

current law, among various agencies of Government, information sharing 
that should have been allowed a long time ago, at least in my view.
  It updates the laws with regard to electronic surveillance and brings 
those laws into the digital age, and brings them into an effective way 
so that we can, in a modernized way, protect our society, at least to 
the extent we can, from these types of terrorist activities.
  Of course, little things, such as pen registers, trap-and-trace 
authority--we have been able to resolve these problems after years of 
problems.
  I would like to make a few comments regarding the process for this 
legislation. Although we have considered this in a more expedited 
manner than other legislation, my colleagues can be assured that this 
bill has received thorough consideration. First, the fact is that the 
bulk of these proposals have been requested by the Department of 
Justice for years, and have languished in Congress for years because we 
have been unable to muster the collective political will to enact them 
into law.
  No one can say whether these tools could have prevented the attacks 
of September 11. But, as the Attorney General has said, it is certain 
that without these tools, we did not stop the vicious acts of last 
month. I say to my colleagues, Mr. President, that if these tools could 
help us now to track down the perpetrators--if they will help us in our 
continued pursuit of terrorist activities within our national borders 
then we should not hesitate any further to pass these reforms into law. 
As long as these reforms are consistent with our--Constitution and they 
are--it is difficult to see why anyone would oppose their passage.
  Furthermore, I would like to clearly dispel the myth that the reforms 
in this legislation somehow abridge the Constitutional freedoms enjoyed 
by law-abiding American citizens. Some press reports have portrayed 
this issue as a choice between individual liberties on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, enhanced powers for our law enforcement 
institutions. This is a false dichotomy. We should all take comfort 
that the reforms in this bill are primarily directed at allowing law 
enforcement agents to work smarter and more efficiently--in no case do 
they curtail the precious civil liberties protected by our 
Constitution. I want to assure my colleagues that we worked very hard 
over the past several weeks to ensure that this legislation upholds all 
of the constitutional freedoms our citizens cherish. It does.
  Mr. President, I will submit for the Record my extended remarks 
describing this legislation, but I would like to take a minute to 
explain briefly a few of the most important provisions of this critical 
legislation.
  First, the legislation encourages information-sharing between various 
arms of the federal government. I believe most of our citizens would be 
shocked to learn that, even if certain government agents had prior 
knowledge of the September 11 attacks, under many circumstances they 
would have been prohibited by law from sharing that information with 
the appropriate intelligence or national security authorities.
  This legislation makes sure that, in the future, such information 
flows freely within the Federal government, so that it will be received 
by those responsible for protecting against terrorist attacks.
  By making these reforms, we are rejecting the outdated Cold War 
paradigm that has prevented cooperation between our intelligence 
community and our law enforcement agents. Current law does not 
adequately allow for such cooperation, artificially hampering our 
government's ability to identify and prevent acts of terrorism against 
our citizens.
  In this new war, terrorists are a hybrid between domestic criminals 
and international agents. We must lower the barriers that discourage 
our law enforcement and intelligence agencies from working together to 
stop these terrorists. These hybrid criminals call for new, hybrid 
tools.
  Second, this bill updates the laws relating to electronic 
surveillance. Electronic surveillance, conducted under the supervision 
of a federal judge, is one of the most powerful tools at the disposal 
of our law enforcement community. It is simply a disgrace that we have 
not acted to modernize the laws currently on the books which govern 
such surveillance, laws that were enacted before the fax machine came 
into common usage, and well before the advent of cellular telephones, 
e-mail, and instant messaging. The Department of Justice has asked us 
for years to update these laws to reflect the new technologies, but 
there has always been a call to go slow, to seek more information, to 
order further studies.
  This is no hypothetical problem. We now know that e-mail, cellular 
telephones, and the Internet have been principal tools used by the 
terrorists to coordinate their atrocious activities. We need to pursue 
all solid investigatory leads that exist right now that our law 
enforcement agents would be unable to pursue because they must continue 
to work within these outdated laws. It is high time that we update our 
laws so that our law enforcement agencies can deal with the world as it 
is, rather than the world as it existed 20 years ago.
  A good example of way we our handicapping our law enforcement 
agencies relates to devices called ``pen registers.'' Pen registers may 
be employed by the FBI, after obtaining a court order, to determine 
what telephone numbers are being dialed from a particular telephone. 
These devices are essential investigatory tools, which allow law 
enforcement agents to determine who is speaking to whom, within a 
criminal conspiracy.
  The Supreme Court has held, in Smith v. Maryland, that the 
information obtained by pen register devices is not information that is 
subject to any constitutional protection. Unlike the content of your 
telephone conversation once your call is connected, the numbers you 
dial into your telephone are not private. Because you have no 
reasonable expectation that such numbers will be kept private, they are 
not protected under the Constitution. The Smith holding was cited with 
approval by the Supreme Court just earlier this year.
  The legislation under consideration today would make clear what the 
Federal courts have already ruled--that Federal judges may grant pen 
register authority to the FBI to cover, not just telephones, but other 
more modern modes of communication such as e-mail or instant messaging. 
Let me make clear that the bill does not allow law enforcement to 
receive the content of the communication, but they can receive the 
addressing information to identify the computer or computers a suspect 
is using to further his criminal activity.
  Importantly, reform of the pen register law does not allow--as has 
sometimes been misreported in the press--for law enforcement agents to 
view the content of any e-mail messages--not even the subject line of 
e-mails. In addition, this legislation we are considering today makes 
it explicit that content can not be collected through such pen register 
orders.
  This legislation also allows judges to enter pen register orders with 
nationwide scope. Nationwide jurisdiction for pen register orders makes 
common sense. It helps law enforcement agents efficiently identify 
communications facilities throughout the country, which greatly 
enhances the ability of law enforcement to identify quickly other 
members of a criminal organization, such as a terrorist cell.
  Moreover, this legislation provides our intelligence community with 
the same authority to use pen register devices, under the auspices of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, that our law enforcement 
agents have when investigating criminal offenses. It simply makes sense 
to provide law enforcement with the same tools to catch terrorists that 
they already possess in connection with other criminal investigations, 
such as drug crimes or illegal gambling.
  In addition to the pen register statute, this legislation updates 
other aspects of our wiretapping statutes. It is amazing that law 
enforcement agents do not currently have authority to

[[Page 19507]]

seek wiretapping authority from a Federal judge when investigating a 
terrorist offense. This legislation fixes that problem.
  Moving on, I note that much has been made of the complex immigration 
provisions of this bill. I know Senators Specter, Kohl and Kennedy had 
questions about earlier provisions, particularly the detention 
provision for suspected alien terrorists.
  I want to assure my colleagues that we have worked hard to address 
your concerns, and the concerns of the public. As with the other 
immigration provisions of this bill, we have made painstaking efforts 
to achieve this workable compromise.
  Let me address some of the specific concerns. In response to the 
concern that the INS might detain a suspected terrorist indefinitely, 
the Senator Kennedy, Senator Kyl, and I worked out a compromise that 
limits the provision. It provides that the alien must be charged with 
an immigration or criminal violation within seven days after the 
commencement of detention or be released. In addition, contrary to what 
has been alleged, the certification itself is subject to judicial 
review. The Attorney General's power to detain a suspected terrorist 
under this bill is, then, not unfettered.
  Moreover, Senator Leahy and I have also worked diligently to craft 
necessary language that provides for the deportation of those aliens 
who are representatives of organizations that endorse terrorist 
activity, those who use a position of prominence to endorse terrorist 
activity or persuade others to support terrorist activity, or those who 
provide material support to terrorist organizations. If we are to fight 
terrorism, we can not allow those who support terrorists to remain in 
our country. Also, I should note that we have worked hard to provide 
the State Department and the INS the tools they need to ensure that no 
applicant for admission who is a terrorist is able to secure entry into 
the United States through legal channels.
  Finally, the bill gives law enforcement agencies powerful tools to 
attack the financial infrastructure of terrorism giving our Government 
the ability to choke off the financing that these dangerous terrorist 
organizations need to survive. It criminalizes the practice of 
harboring terrorists, and puts teeth in the laws against providing 
material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations. It gives 
the President expanded authority to freeze the assets of terrorists and 
terrorist organizations, and provides for the eventual seizure of such 
assets. These tools are vital to our ability to effectively wage the 
war against terrorism, and ultimately to win it.
  There have been few, if any, times in our nation's great history 
where an event has brought home to so many of our citizens, so quickly, 
and in such a graphic fashion, a sense of our vulnerability to 
unexpected attack.
  I believe we all took some comfort when President Bush promised us 
that our law enforcement institutions would have the tools necessary to 
protect us from the danger that we are only just beginning to perceive.
  The Attorney General has told us what tools he needs. We have taken 
the time to review the problems with our current laws, and to reflect 
on their solutions. The time to act is now. Let us please move forward 
expeditiously, and give those who are in the business of protecting us 
the tools that they need to do the job.
  Mr. President, I think most people understand this is an important 
bill. All of us understand it needs to be done. All of us understand 
that these are tools our law enforcement people deserve and need to 
have. And, frankly, it is a bill that I think can make a real 
difference with regard to the interdiction of future acts of terrorism 
in our society.
  Nobody can guarantee, when you have people willing to commit suicide 
in the perpetration of these awful acts, at all times that we can 
absolutely protect our Nation. But this bill will provide the tools 
whereby we might be able--and in most cases should be able--to resolve 
even those types of problems.
  So with that, I am happy to yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Durbin). Who yields time?
  The Senator from Maryland.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I rise in very strong support of S. 
1510, the Uniting and Strengthening America Act of 2001, and in 
particular, Title III of S. 1510, the International Money Laundering 
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.
  Title III was reported out of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, which I am privileged to chair, a week ago today by a 
unanimous vote of 21 to 0.
  President Bush said on September 24: ``We have launched a strike on 
the financial foundation of the global terror network.''
  Title III of our comprehensive anti-terrorism package supplies the 
armament for that strike. Osama bin Laden may have boasted that ``al-
Qaeda [includes] modern, educated youth who are aware of the cracks 
inside the western financial system, as they are aware of the lines in 
their hands.'' With Title III, we are sealing up those cracks.
  Title III contains, among other things, authority to take targeted 
action against countries, institutions, transactions, or types of 
accounts the Secretary of the Treasury finds to be of ``primary money-
laundering concern.'' It also contains requirements for due diligence 
standards directed at corresponding accounts opened at U.S. banks by 
foreign offshore banks and banks in jurisdictions that have been found 
to fall significantly below international anti-money laundering 
standards.
  It contains a bar on the maintenance of U.S. correspondent accounts 
for offshore shell banks--those banks that have no physical presence or 
employees anywhere, and that are not part of a regulated and recognized 
banking company. There is also a requirement that all financial 
institutions establish anti-money laundering programs.
  Title III also contains several provisions that should enhance the 
ability of the Government to share more specific information with 
banks, and the ability of banks to share information with one another 
relating to potential terrorist or money-laundering activities, and a 
large number of important technical improvements in anti-money 
laundering statutes, as well as, mandates to the Department of the 
Treasury to act or formulate recommendations to improve our anti-money 
laundering programs.
  The problem of money laundering is not a new one. There have been 
significant efforts for some time in Congress to cut the financial 
lifelines on which criminal operations depend. Senator John Kerry's 
exhaustive investigation nearly a decade ago into the collapse of a 
shady institution called BCCI, which he found was established with 
``the specific purpose of evading regulation or control by 
governments,'' led him to introduce anti-money laundering legislation. 
A bill similar to his was approved last year by the Banking Committee 
of the House of Representatives on a 31 to 1 vote.
  Recent investigations by Senator Carl Levin's Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations produced two excellent reports on the ways criminals 
use financial institutions to launder funds and how we can counter 
these activities. Senator Levin's reports demonstrated dramatically how 
correspondent banking facilities and private banking services impede 
financial transparency and hide foreign client identity and activity, 
thereby contributing to international money laundering.
  Senator Charles Grassley has also advocated for stronger money 
laundering legislation, and sponsored the Money Laundering and 
Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 1998, which mandates the development 
of an annual national money laundering strategy.
  Two weeks ago we held our own hearings in the Banking Committee. We 
heard from a number of expert witnesses and from Under Secretary of the

[[Page 19508]]

Treasury Gurule; Assistant Attorney General Chertoff; and Ambassador 
Stuart Eizenstat, the former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.
  On October 4, the Banking Committee marked-up and reported out our 
own bill. The committee print was built, in a sense, on the foundation 
given to us by Senators Kerry, Levin, Grassley, and by others in this 
institution.
  Before describing the provisions of Title III in greater detail, I 
want to thank all members of the Banking Committee for their 
contributions to this legislation. As I indicated, it came out of the 
committee on a vote of 21 to 0. The Ranking Member, Senator Gramm, 
provided crucial support. He raised certain issues which were addressed 
in the course of the mark-up involving, among other things, important 
due process protections. Senators Stabenow and Johnson were 
instrumental in producing a compromise to resolve a dispute over one of 
the package's most important provisions. Senator Enzi contributed his 
experience as an accountant in refining another critical provision.
  Senator Schumer, who has been involved in past efforts to address 
money laundering activities, played an important role, as did Senators 
Allard, Bayh, Corzine, and Crapo, who offered amendments and 
contributed important improvements to various parts of the subtitle.
  I am deeply grateful to all of the members of the committee for their 
strong, positive, and constructive contributions and for their 
willingness to work day and night. It is my understanding that the 
committee staff went three consecutive nights without any sleep in 
order to prepare this legislation. This is carefully considered 
legislation because it reflects and builds upon efforts which have been 
made over a number of years.
  Earlier today, our colleagues on the Financial Services Committee in 
the House of Representatives marked-up a bill, many of the provisions 
of which are identical or virtually identical to those contained in 
Title III of the package now before us.
  Public support across the country for anti-money laundering 
legislation is extremely strong. Jim Hoagland put it plainly in the 
Washington Post:

       This crisis offers Washington an opportunity to force 
     American and international banks to clean up concealment and 
     laundering practices they now tolerate or encourage and which 
     terrorism can exploit.

  Terrorist attacks require major investments of time, planning, 
training, practice, and financial resources to pay the bills. Money 
laundering is the transmission belt that gives terrorists the resources 
to carry out their campaigns of carnage. We intend, with Title III of 
this legislation, to end that transmission belt and its ability to 
bring resources to the networks that enable terrorists to carry out 
their campaigns of violence.
  Title III addresses all aspects of our defenses against money 
laundering. Those defenses generally fall into three parts. The first 
is the Bank Secrecy Act, ``BSA'', passed in 1970. It requires financial 
institutions to keep standardized transaction records and report large 
currency transactions and suspicious transactions and mandates 
reporting of the movement of more than $10,000 in currency into or out 
of the country. The statute is called the ``bank secrecy act,'' because 
it bars bank secrecy in America, by preventing financial institutions 
from maintaining opaque records, or discarding their records 
altogether. Secrecy is the hiding place for crime, and Congress has 
barred our institutions from allowing those hiding places. The 
financial institutions covered by that act include banks, broker-
dealers, casinos, and non-bank transmitters of funds, currency 
exchangers, and check cashers--all financial services businesses 
through which our citizens--and criminals hiding as legitimate 
citizens--can move funds into and through our economy. Unfortunately, 
reporting regulations covering some of these institutions have not yet 
been promulgated.
  The second part of our money laundering defenses are the criminal 
statutes first enacted in 1986 that make it a crime to launder money 
and allow criminal and civil forfeiture of the proceeds of crime. The 
third part is the statutory framework that allows information to be 
communicated to and between law enforcement officials. Our goal must be 
to assure--to the greatest extent consistent with reasonable privacy 
protections--that the necessary information can be used by the right 
persons in ``real time'' to cut off terrorism and crime.
  Title III modernizes provisions in all three areas to meet today's 
threats in a global economy. Its provisions are divided into five 
subtitles, dealing, respectively, with ``international counter-money 
laundering measures''--sections 311-328--``Bank Secrecy Act 
improvements''--sections 331-342--bulk cash smuggling--section 351 and 
anti-corruption measures--sections 361-363.
  There are 39 provisions in Title III. At this time, I want to 
summarize some of the bill's most important provisions.
  Section 311 gives the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with 
other senior government officials, authority to impose one or more of 
five new ``special measures'' against foreign jurisdictions, entities, 
transactions or accounts that the Secretary, after consultation with 
other senior federal officials, determines to pose a ``primary money 
laundering concern'' to the United States. The special measures all 
involve special recordkeeping and reporting measures--to eliminate the 
curtains behind which launderers hide. In extreme cases the Secretary 
is permitted to bar certain kinds of inter-bank accounts from 
especially problematic jurisdictions. The statute specifies the 
considerations the Secretary must take into account in using the new 
authority and contains provisions to supplement the Administrative 
Procedure Act to assure that any remedies--except certain short-term 
measures--are subject to full comment from all affected persons.
  This new provision gives the Secretary real authority to act to close 
overseas loopholes through which U.S. financial institutions are 
abused. At present the Secretary has no weapons except Treasury 
Advisories--which don't impose specific requirements--or full economic 
sanctions that suspend financial and trade relations with offending 
targets. President Bush's invocation of the International Economic 
Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) several weeks ago was obviously 
appropriate. But there are many other situations in which we will not 
want to block all transactions, but in which we will want to do more 
than simply advise financial institutions about under-regulated foreign 
financial institutions or holes in foreign counter-money laundering 
efforts. Former Deputy Secretary Eizenstat testified before the 
Committee that adding this tool to the Secretary's arsenal was 
essential.
  Section 312 focuses on another aspect of the fight against money 
laundering, the financial institutions that are on the front lines 
making the initial decisions about what foreign banks to allow inside 
the United States. It requires U.S. financial institutions to exercise 
appropriate due diligence when dealing with private banking accounts 
and interbank correspondent relationships with foreign banks. With 
respect to foreign banks, the section requires U.S. financial 
institutions to apply appropriate due diligence to all correspondent 
accounts with foreign banks, and enhanced due diligence for accounts 
sought by offshore banks or banks in jurisdictions found to have 
substandard money laundering controls or which the Secretary determines 
to be of primary money laundering concern under the new authority given 
him by section 311.
  The section also specifies certain minimum standards for the enhanced 
due diligence that U.S. financial institutions are required to apply to 
accounts opened for two categories of foreign banks with high money 
laundering risks--offshore banks and banks in jurisdictions with weak 
anti-money laundering and banking controls. These minimum standards 
were developed from, and are based upon, the factual record and 
analysis contained in the Levin staff report on correspondent banking 
and money laundering.

[[Page 19509]]

  Section 312 is essential to Title III. It addresses, with appropriate 
flexibility, mechanisms whose very importance for the conduct of 
commercial banking makes them special targets of money launderers, as 
illustrated in Senator Levin's extensive reports and hearings. A 
related provision, in section 319, requires foreign banks that maintain 
correspondent accounts in the United States to appoint agents for 
service of process within the United States and authorizes the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a summons or 
subpoena to any such foreign bank seeking records, wherever located, 
relating to such a correspondent account. U.S. banks must sever 
correspondent arrangements with foreign banks that do not either comply 
with or contest any such summons or subpoena, and if the Attorney 
General or the Secretary of the Treasury asks them to sever the 
arrangements.
  These provisions send a simple message to foreign banks doing 
business through U.S. correspondent accounts: be prepared, if you want 
to use our banking facilities, to operate in accordance with U.S. law.
  Section 313 also builds on the factual record before the Banking 
Committee to bar from the United States financial system pure ``brass-
plate'' shell banks created outside the U.S. that have no physical 
presence anywhere and are not affiliated with recognized banking 
institutions. These shell banks carry the highest money laundering 
risks in the banking world because they are inherently unavailable for 
effective oversight--there is no office where a bank regulator or law 
enforcement official can go to observe bank operations, review 
documents or freeze funds.
  Section 327 permits the Secretary to deal with abuse of another 
recognized commercial banking mechanism--concentration accounts that 
are used to commingle related funds in one place temporarily pending 
disbursement or the transfer of funds into individual client accounts. 
Concentration accounts have been used to launder funds, and the bill 
permits the Secretary to issue rules to bar the use of concentration 
accounts to move client funds anonymously, without documentation 
linking particular funds to their true owners.
  Section 332 requires financial institutions to establish minimum 
anti-money laundering programs that include appropriate internal 
policies, management, employee training, and audit features. This is 
not a ``one size fits all'' requirement; in fact its very generality 
recognizes that different types of programs will be appropriate for 
different types and sizes of institutions.
  A number of improvements are made to the suspicious activity 
reporting rules. First, technical changes strengthen the safe harbor 
from civil liability for institutions that report suspicious activity 
to the Treasury. The provisions not only add to the protection for 
reporting institutions; they also address individual privacy concerns 
by making it clear that government officers may not disclose suspicious 
transaction reports information except in the conduct of their official 
duties. The Act also requires the issuance of suspicious transaction 
reporting rules applicable to brokers and dealers in securities within 
270 days of the date of enactment.
  Sections 341 and 342 of the Title deal with underground banking 
systems such as the Hawala, which is suspected of being a channel used 
to finance the al Qaeda network. Section 341 makes it clear that 
underground money transmitters are subject to the same recordkeeping 
rules--and the same penalties for violating those rules--as above-
ground, recognized, money transmitters. It also directs the Secretary 
of the Treasury to report to Congress, within one year, on the need for 
additional legislation or regulatory controls relating to underground 
banking systems. Section 342 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury 
to instruct the United States Executive Director of each of the 
international financial institutions to use such Director's ``voice and 
vote'' to support loans and other use of resources to benefit nations 
that the President determines to be contributing to efforts to combat 
international terrorism, and to require the auditing of each 
international financial institution to ensure that funds are not paid 
to persons engaged in or supporting terrorism.
  Section 351 creates a new Bank Secrecy Act offense involving the bulk 
smuggling of more than $10,000 in currency in any conveyance, article 
of luggage or merchandise or container, either into or out of the 
United States, and related forfeiture provisions. This provision has 
been sought for several years by both the Departments of Justice and 
Treasury.
  Other provisions of the bill address relevant provisions of the 
Criminal Code. These provisions were worked out with the Judiciary 
Committee and are included in Title III because of their close 
relationship to the provisions of Title 31 added or modified by Title 
III.
  The most important is section 315, which expands the list of 
specified unlawful activities under 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957 to include 
foreign corruption offenses, certain U.S. export control violations, 
offenses subject to U.S. extradition obligations under multilateral 
treaties, and misuse of funds of international financial institutions.
  Section 316 establishes procedures to protect the rights of persons 
whose property may be subject to confiscation in the exercise of the 
government's anti-terrorism authority.
  Section 319 treats amounts deposited by foreign banks in interbank 
accounts with U.S. banks as having been deposited in the United States 
for purposes of the forfeiture rules, but grants the Attorney General 
authority, in the interest of fairness and consistent with the United 
States' national interest, to suspend a forfeiture proceeding based on 
that presumption. This closes an important forfeiture loophole.
  Section 321 allows the United States to exclude any alien that the 
Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is or has engaged in or 
abetted certain money laundering offenses.
  A third important set of provisions modernize information sharing 
rules to reflect the reality of the fight against money laundering and 
terrorism.
  Section 314 requires the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 
regulations to encourage cooperation among financial institutions, 
financial regulators and law enforcement officials and to permit the 
sharing of information by law enforcement and regulatory authorities 
with such institutions regarding persons reasonably suspected, based on 
credible evidence, of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering 
activities. The section also allows banks to share information 
involving possible money laundering or terrorist activity among 
themselves--with notice to the Secretary of the Treasury.
  Section 335 permits, but does not require, a bank to include 
information, in a response to a request for an employment reference by 
a second bank, about the possible involvement of a former institution-
affiliated party in potentially unlawful activity, and creates a safe 
harbor from civil liability for the bank that includes such information 
in response to an employment reference request, except in the case of 
malicious intent. Given its different focus, it is not my intention to 
similarly limit a bank's safe harbor from civil liability for the 
filing of suspicious activity reports under the Bank Secrecy Act.
  Section 340 contains amendments to various provisions of the Bank 
Secrecy Act, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, to permit information subject to those statutes to be 
used in the conduct of United States intelligence or 
counterintelligence activities to protect against international 
terrorism.

  The modernization of our money laundering laws represented by 
Subtitle III is long overdue. It is not the work of one week or one 
weekend, but represents years of careful study and a bipartisan effort 
to produce a piece of prudent legislation. The care taken in producing 
the legislation extends to several provisions calling for reporting on 
the legislation's effect and a provision for a three-year review of the 
legislation's effectiveness.
  Title III responds, as I've indicated, to the statement of Assistant 
Attorney

[[Page 19510]]

General Chertoff, the head of the Department of Justice's Criminal 
Division, at the Banking Committee's September 26 hearing that ``[w]e 
are fighting with outdated weapons in the money laundering arena 
today.'' Without this legislation, the cracks in the system of which 
bin Laden boasted will remain open. We should not, indeed we can not, 
allow that to happen, any more than we can delay dealing with the 
financial aspects of the terrorist threat.
  Title III is a balanced effort to address a complex area of national 
concern. I strongly urge my colleagues to follow the unanimous 
recommendation of the Banking Committee and support this important 
component of the anti-terrorism package.
  I ask unanimous consent that a section-by-section summary of Title 
III be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Title III--International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist 
           Financing Act of 2001--Section-by-Section Summary

       Sec. 301. Short title and table of contents.
       Sec. 302. Findings and purposes.
       Sec. 303. Provides that the provisions added and amendments 
     made by Title III will terminate after September 30, 2004, if 
     the Congress enacts a joint resolution to that effect, and 
     that such joint resolution will be given expedited 
     consideration in each Houses of Congress.


subtitle A. International Counter-Money Laundering and Related Measures

       Sec. 311. Gives the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with other senior government officials, 
     authority (in the Secretary's discretion) to impose one or 
     more of five new ``special measures'' against foreign 
     jurisdictions, entities, transactions and accounts that the 
     Secretary, after consultation with other senior federal 
     officials, determines to pose a ``primary money laundering 
     concern'' to the United States. The special measures include: 
     (1) requiring additional recordkeeping or reporting for 
     particular transactions, (2) requiring the identification of 
     the foreign beneficial owners of certain accounts at a U.S. 
     financial institution, (3) requiring the identification of 
     customers of a foreign bank who use an interbank payable-
     through account opened by that foreign bank at a U.S. bank, 
     (4) requiring the identification of customers of a foreign 
     bank who use an interbank correspondent account opened by 
     that foreign bank at a U.S. bank, and (5) after consultation 
     with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the 
     Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, restricting or 
     prohibiting the opening or maintaining of certain interbank 
     correspondent or payable-through accounts. Measures 1-4 may 
     not be imposed, other than by regulation, for a period in 
     excess of 120 days; measure 5 may only be imposed by 
     regulation. Also requires the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the appropriate Federal banking agencies, 
     to submit to Congress, within 180 days of the date of 
     enactment, recommendations for the most effective way to 
     require foreign nationals opening a U.S. bank account to 
     provide identification comparable to that required when U.S. 
     citizens open a bank account.
       Sec. 312. Requires a U.S. financial institution that 
     maintains a correspondent account or private banking account 
     for a non-United States person to establish appropriate and, 
     if necessary, enhanced due diligence procedures to detect and 
     report instances of money laundering. Creates a minimum anti-
     money laundering due diligence standards for U.S. financial 
     institutions that enter into correspondent banking 
     relationships with banks that operate under offshore banking 
     licenses or under banking licenses issued by countries that 
     (a) have been found noncooperative with international counter 
     money laundering principles, or (b) have been the subject of 
     special measures authorized by Sec. 311. Creates minimum 
     anti-money laundering due diligence standards for maintenance 
     of private banking accounts by U.S. financial institutions.
       Sec. 313. Bars depository institutions and broker-dealers 
     operating in the United States from establishing, 
     maintaining, administering, or managing correspondent 
     accounts for foreign shell banks, other than shell bank 
     vehicles affiliated with recognized and regulated depository 
     institutions.
       Sec. 314. Requires the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 
     regulations to encourage cooperation among financial 
     institutions, financial regulators and law enforcement 
     officials and to permit the sharing of information by law 
     enforcement and regulatory authorities with such institutions 
     regarding persons reasonably suspected, based on credible 
     evidence, of engaging in terrorist acts or money laundering 
     activities. Allows (with notice to the Secretary of the 
     Treasury) the sharing of information among banks involving 
     possible terrorist or money laundering activity.
       Sec. 315. Expands the list of specified unlawful activities 
     under 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957 to include foreign corruption 
     offenses, certain U.S. export control violations, and misuse 
     of funds of the IMF.
       Sec. 316. Establishes procedures to protect the rights of 
     persons whose property may be subject to confiscation in the 
     exercise of the government's anti-terrorism authority.
       Sec. 317. Gives United States courts ``long-arm'' 
     jurisdiction over foreign persons committing money laundering 
     offenses in the United States, over foreign banks opening 
     United States bank accounts, and over foreign persons seizing 
     assets ordered forfeited by a U.S. court.
       Sec. 318. Expands the definition of financial institution 
     for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957 to include banks 
     operating outside the United States.
       Sec. 319. Treats amounts deposited by foreign banks in 
     interbank accounts with U.S. banks as having been deposited 
     in the United States for purposes of the forfeiture rules, 
     but grants the Attorney General authority, in the interest of 
     justice and consistent with the United States' national 
     interest, to suspend a forfeiture proceeding based on that 
     presumption. Requires U.S. financial institutions to reply to 
     a request for information from a U.S. regulator relating to 
     anti-money laundering compliance within 120 hours of receipt 
     of such a request. Requires foreign banks that maintain 
     correspondent accounts in the United States to appoint agents 
     for service of process within the United States and 
     authorizes the Attorney General and the Secretary of the 
     Treasury to issue a summons or subpoena to any such foreign 
     bank seeking records, wherever located, relating to such a 
     correspondent account. Requires U.S. banks to sever 
     correspondent arrangements with foreign banks that do not 
     either comply with or contest any such summons or subpoena. 
     Authorizes United States courts to order a convicted criminal 
     to return property located abroad and to order a civil 
     forfeiture defendant to return property located abroad 
     pending trial on the merits. Authorizes United States 
     prosecutors to use a court-appointed Federal receiver to find 
     a criminal defendant's assets, wherever located.
       Sec. 320. Permits the United States to institute forfeiture 
     proceedings against the proceeds of foreign criminal offenses 
     found in the United States.
       Sec. 321. Allows the United States to exclude any alien 
     that the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is 
     or has engaged in or abetted certain money laundering 
     offenses.
       Sec. 322. Extends the prohibition against the maintenance 
     of a forfeiture proceedings on behalf of a fugitive to 
     include a proceeding by a corporation whose majority 
     shareholder is a fugitive and a proceeding in which the 
     corporation's claim is instituted by a fugitive.
       Sec. 323. Permits the government to seek a restraining 
     order to preserve the availability of property subject to a 
     foreign forfeiture or confiscation judgment.
       Sec. 324. Increases from $100,000 to $1,000,000 the maximum 
     civil and criminal penalties for a violation of provisions 
     added to the Bank Secrecy Act by sections 311 and 312 of the 
     Act.
       Sec. 325. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General, the Federal banking 
     agencies, the SEC, the CFTC and other appropriate agencies to 
     evaluate operation of the provisions of Subtitle A of Title 
     III of the Act and recommend to Congress any relevant 
     legislative action, within 30 months of the date of 
     enactment.
       Sec. 326. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to report 
     annually to the Senate Banking Committee and House Financial 
     Services Committee on measures taken pursuant to Subtitle A 
     of Title III of the Act.
       Sec. 327. Authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 
     regulations concerning the maintenance of concentration 
     accounts by U.S. depository institutions to prevent an 
     institution's customers from anonymously directing funds into 
     or through such accounts.
       Sec. 328. Provides criminal penalties for officials who 
     violate their trust in connection with the administration of 
     Title III.


   Subtitle B. Currency Transaction Reporting Amendments and Related 
                              Improvements

       Sec. 331. Clarifies the terms of the safe harbor from civil 
     liability for financial institutions filing suspicious 
     activity reports pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5318(g).
       Sec. 332. Requires financial institutions to establish 
     anti-money laundering programs and grants the Secretary of 
     the Treasury authority to set minimum standards for such 
     programs.
       Sec. 333. Clarifies that penalties for violation of the 
     Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations also apply 
     to violation of Geographic Targeting Orders issued under 31 
     U.S.C. 3526, and to certain recordkeeping requirements 
     relating to funds transfers. Otherwise clarifies and updates 
     certain provisions of 31 U.S.C. 5326 relating to Geographic 
     Targeting Orders.
       Sec. 334. Adds ``money laundering related to terrorist 
     funding'' to the list of subjects to be dealt with in the 
     annual National Money Laundering Strategy prepared by the 
     Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the

[[Page 19511]]

     ``Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act of 
     1998.''
       Sec. 335. Permits (but does not require) a bank to include 
     information, in a response to a request for an employment 
     reference by a second bank, about the possible involvement of 
     a former institution-affiliated party in potentially unlawful 
     activity, and creates a safe harbor from civil liability for 
     the bank that includes such information in response to an 
     employment reference request, except in the case of malicious 
     intent.
       Sec. 336. requires the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group to 
     include a privacy advocate among its membership and to 
     operate under certain of the ``sunshine'' provisions of the 
     Federal Advisory Committee Act.
       Sec. 337. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
     Federal bank regulatory agencies to submit reports to 
     Congress, one year after the date of enactment, containing 
     recommendations on possible legislation to conform the 
     penalties imposed on depository institutions for violations 
     of the Bank Secrecy Act with penalties imposed on such 
     institutions under section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
     Act.
       Sec. 338. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury, after 
     consultation with the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
     the Federal Reserve Board, to promulgate regulations, within 
     270 days of the date of enactment, requiring broker-dealers 
     to file suspicious activity reports. Also requires the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, the SEC, Federal Reserve Board, 
     and the CFTC to submit jointly to Congress, within one year 
     of the date of enactment, recommendations for effective 
     application of the provisions of 31 U.S.C. 5311-30 to both 
     registered and unregistered investment companies.
       Sec. 339. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to submit a 
     report to Congress, six months after the date of enactment, 
     on the role of the Internal Revenue Service in the 
     administration of the Bank Secrecy Act, with emphasis on 
     whether IRS Bank Secrecy Act information processing 
     responsibility (for reports filed by all financial 
     institutions) or Bank Secrecy Act audit and examination 
     responsibility (for certain non-bank financial institutions) 
     should be retained or transferred.
       Sec. 340. Contains amendments to various provisions of the 
     Bank Secrecy Act, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and the 
     Fair Credit Reporting Act, to permit information to be used 
     in the conduct of United States intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities to protect against 
     international terrorism.
       Sec. 341. Clarifies that the Bank Secrecy Act treats 
     certain underground banking systems as financial 
     institutions, and that the funds transfer recordkeeping rules 
     applicable to licensed money transmitters also apply to such 
     underground systems. Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to 
     report to Congress, within one year of the date of enactment, 
     on the need for additional legislation or regulatory controls 
     relating to underground banking systems.
       Sec. 342. Authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to 
     instruct the United States Executive Director of each of the 
     international financial institutions (for example, the IMF 
     and the World Bank) to use such Director's ``voice and vote'' 
     to support loans and other use of resources to benefit 
     nations that the President determines to be contributing to 
     United States efforts to combat international terrorism, and 
     to require the auditing of each international financial 
     institution to ensure that funds are not paid to persons 
     engaged in or supporting terrorism.


                      subtitle c. currency crimes

       Sec. 351. Creates a new Bank Secrecy Act offense involving 
     the bulk smuggling of more than $10,000 in currency in any 
     conveyance, article of luggage or merchandise or container, 
     either into or out of the United States, and related 
     forfeiture provisions.


                  subtitle d. anti-corruption measures

       Sec. 361. Expresses the sense of Congress that the United 
     States should take all steps necessary to identify the 
     proceeds of foreign government corruption that have been 
     deposited in United States financial institutions and return 
     such proceeds to the citizens of the country to whom such 
     assets belong.
       Sec. 362. Expresses the sense of Congress that the United 
     States must continue actively and publicly to support the 
     objectives of the 29-country Financial Action Task Force 
     Against Money Laundering.
       Sec. 363. Expresses the sense of Congress that the United 
     States, in its deliberations and negotiations with other 
     countries, should promote international efforts to identify 
     and prevent the transmittal of funds to and from terrorist 
     organizations.


                       subtitle e. miscellaneous

       Sec. 371. Expands the SEC's emergency order authority.
       Sec. 372. Creates uniform protection standards for Federal 
     Reserve facilities.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Banking Committee, the senior Senator from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes. He 
did unbelievable work in this committee to pass out a money-laundering 
bill--a very complex and difficult subject. He did it unanimously, I 
believe, in a committee that probably has as diverse a membership--that 
is an understatement--as one might find. I compliment him and thank him 
for his kind words.
  I reserve the remainder of my time. I see the chairman of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee here, who wishes to give his opening statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada is recognized.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I conferred with Senator Daschle a few 
minutes ago. It is his desire--so there is no misunderstanding of the 
Members--that a number of opening statements be given: The Senator from 
Florida, the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and we understand 
Senator Stabenow wishes to speak, and there may be a couple of other 
opening statements.
  As soon as that is done, we are going to turn to Senator Feingold to 
offer the first of his amendments. After that, there will be a vote on 
the first Feingold amendment.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the senior Senator 
from Florida.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I wish to commend Senators Daschle and 
Lott for their leadership in bringing this critical piece of 
legislation to the Senate just 1 month after the horrific events of 
September 11. Senators Leahy and Hatch also deserve credit for moving 
quickly to shape the judiciary components of this bill and choreograph 
other provisions, including those affecting the intelligence agencies.
  My remarks will focus on title IX of this legislation, which is 
entitled ``Improved Intelligence,'' as well as the other provisions in 
the bill that directly affect the mission of the agencies of the 
intelligence community.
  Title IX is derived from S. 1448, legislation which was developed 
within the intelligence community, entitled ``Intelligence to Prevent 
Terrorism Act of 2001.''
  Since long before September 11, I have been working with members of 
the committee, particularly Senators Feinstein and Kyl, on 
comprehensive counterterrorism legislation. Most of the provisions of 
our bill, with some changes requested by the administration, have now 
become title IX of S. 1510.
  The provisions in title IX, as well as other provisions in the bill, 
are designed to accomplish a daunting but not impossible task. That 
task is to change the cultures within the Federal law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies--primarily the FBI and the CIA--so they work 
seamlessly together for the good of the American people.
  Both the FBI and the CIA are very good. They are the standards of the 
world in their own missions. But those missions are very different. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation is goal oriented. A criminal case has a 
beginning, a middle, and an end. In a case that has developed the 
guilty party, the end is a conviction for the crime committed. The 
information collected during a criminal case is very closely held. It 
is held closely because its purpose is to result in the successful 
prosecution of an event that occurred in the past--not to inform 
thinking about what may happen now or in the future.
  The Central Intelligence Agency, on the other hand, as well as its 
other companions in the intelligence community, has a global approach, 
literally and figuratively. The CIA is restricted to activities outside 
the United States of America. The CIA collects information on a 
worldwide basis, and it processes that information, analyzes that 
information, and it places it in the hands of its customers. Its 
customers are other Federal agencies and senior policymakers, including 
the President of the United States. The purpose of that information is 
to allow those senior policymakers to make more informed decisions.
  Given the threats we now face, the cultures growing out of these 
different missions must be melded. We cannot fight terrorism by putting 
yellow tape around a bomb site, calling it a crime scene, collecting 
evidence, and proceeding to trial frequently years later.

[[Page 19512]]

We must put the evidence collected after such an event to work for us 
in real time so we can predict and prevent the next attack. If there is 
a single goal of the intelligence components of this antiterrorism 
bill, it is to change the focus from responding to acts that have 
already occurred to preventing the acts which threaten the lives of 
American citizens in this country and abroad.
  It is critical that all information lawfully available to the Federal 
Government be used efficiently and effectively to fight terrorism. We 
cannot continue to use critical information only in a criminal trial. 
Any information collected must be available to intelligence officials 
to inform their operational initiatives so as to prevent the next 
attack.
  Along these lines, several provisions of S. 1510 are designed to 
change the way information is handled within the Federal Government. 
For example, section 203 permits law enforcement to share information 
collected in grand jury proceedings and from title III criminal 
wiretaps with intelligence agencies. Current law, as it has been 
interpreted, prevents that sharing, except in very limited 
circumstances.
  Section 905 then complements section 203 in that it requires law 
enforcement officers, FBI agents, and the Justice Department 
prosecutors to provide foreign intelligence derived in the course of a 
criminal investigation, including grand juries, criminal wiretaps, FBI 
interviews, and the like, to the Central Intelligence Agency and to 
other intelligence agencies.
  A ``permissive'' approach is not good enough under current 
circumstances. Too many lives have been lost, too many lives are at 
risk. Law enforcement sharing of information with the intelligence 
agencies must be mandatory.
  Section 908 further complements this legislation by providing the 
training of law enforcement officers at the Federal, State, and local 
agencies so they will be better equipped to recognize foreign 
intelligence information when they see it, and to get it to the right 
place on a timely basis.
  Let me give a couple of hypothetical but eerily-close-to-reality 
examples. It is likely that there are, tonight, grand juries meeting at 
various places in the United States to deal with issues related to the 
events of September 11. Witnesses may be providing information--
information about training camps in Afghanistan, ground warfare 
techniques used by al-Qaida and the Taliban, the types and quantity of 
weapons available. This type of information will be critical for the 
military--critical for the military now, not 2 years from now when 
these cases might go to trial.
  Another example is in the area of wiretaps. Let me just take two 
wiretaps. One has been issued under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act because there was a finding by a Federal judge that 
there was credible evidence that the telephone was being used by an 
agent of a foreign power.
  In the course of listening to the wiretap, this conversation comes 
across: I am planning to fly from a specifically designated site in 
Central America to a city in Texas. I am going to take my flight a week 
from Monday. My intention is, once I arrive over that city, to 
distribute chemical or biological materials that will terrorize the 
people of that city by creating havoc due to the illnesses that will be 
provoked.
  But how are you going to pay for this? You don't have the money to 
buy a plane, chemicals, or get the expertise necessary to do that?
  I am going to do that because I am going to rob a bank next Monday in 
order to get the money that I need to pay for this operation. The bank 
is going to be located at the corner of First and Main, and I am going 
to do it 3 hours after the bank closes next Monday.
  The person listening to that conversation with a foreign intelligence 
wiretap is under a legal obligation to make known to the appropriate 
law enforcement officials that there is about to be a bank robbery at a 
specific location on a specific date and time in a certain Texas city.
  Conversely, if that exact conversation had taken place under a 
criminal wiretap under title 3, the person listening to that 
conversation would be prohibited from telling the foreign intelligence 
agencies that there was about to be a terrorist attack on a date 
certain against a specific Texas city originating at a specific site in 
Central America.
  Try to convince the American people that makes sense. It clearly does 
not in today's reality. This legislation is going to make the same 
requirement of mandatory sharing when the information is gathered under 
a criminal wiretap that involves foreign intelligence information, as 
is the case today when information gathered under a Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act wiretap must be made available to 
appropriate law enforcement officials.
  Another provision of title 9 addresses the role of the Director of 
Central Intelligence in the process of collecting foreign intelligence 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It recognizes the need 
to target limited resources, including personnel and translators 
against the highest priority targets.
  I ask if I can have an additional 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. I have about 11 minutes left that has not been committed 
which I thought I might use to answer some questions. I give the 
Senator 2 of my 11 minutes.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I appreciate the Senator's limitations.
  Mr. LEAHY. We just had one Senator ask me for 30 minutes. I am 
looking at my 11. How can I give him 30? But I will give you 2 of the 
11.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Vermont.
  We have a provision that the Director of Central Intelligence, the 
DCI, will set the overall strategic goals for the collection of foreign 
intelligence so that we can use our limited resources as effectively as 
possible.
  In order to complement that, we also have a provision that will 
establish a national virtual translation center as a means of 
increasing our woefully limited linguistic capabilities to translate 
the material which we are gathering.
  We will also provide for additional capability with human 
intelligence. We have become very reliant on technology--eavesdropping, 
satellite imagery, to the exclusion of the use of human beings. If we 
want to gain information about the bin Ladens of the world, we cannot 
just take a picture of bin Laden.
  Today it is increasingly difficult to eavesdrop on bin Laden. What we 
need to do is get a human being who is able to get close enough to bin 
Laden to learn his intentions and capabilities. This gets to the 
difficult issue of what kind of assets, human beings, we hire to work 
for us to gather such information?
  We would all like to employ the purist of people, all choir boys to 
do this type of work. Unfortunately, they are not the type of people 
who are likely to be able to get close to the bin Ladens of the world. 
Thus, we have a provision in this legislation in the nature of a sense 
of Congress which we hope will send a strong message to the 
intelligence community that we are encouraging them to overcome some 
previous messages from Congress and to proceed to recruit the persons 
who they find to be necessary to gain access to terrorists so that we 
can have the best opportunity of protecting ourselves.
  With the adoption of this legislation, we have not reached the end of 
our task or responsibilities to protect the American people. We are 
taking a substantial step in that direction.
  To reiterate, another provision of title 9 addresses the role of the 
Director of Central Intelligence in the process of collecting foreign 
intelligence under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. It 
recognizes the need to target limited resources--e.g. translators--
against the highest priority targets.
  In order to ensure that scarce resources are effectively used, the 
DCI--in his role as head of the Intelligence community, not as CIA 
Director--will set overall strategic goals for FISA collection.

[[Page 19513]]

  He will work with the Attorney General to ensure that FISA 
information is distributed to the intelligence operators and analysts 
who need it government-wide.
  Of course, the operational targeting and collection using wiretaps 
will be conducted by the FBI, as it has in the past; the DCI will 
perform no role in those decisions.
  One of the scarce resources that has plagued the Intelligence 
Community, as well as law enforcement, is translation capability.
  Section 907 of this bill requires the FBI and CIA to work together to 
create a ``National Virtual Translation Center.''
  Such a center would seek to remedy the chronic problem of developing 
critical language abilities, and matching those resources to 
intelligence collected by the wide range of techniques available.
  It is not enough to be able to listen to the conversations of 
terrorists and their supporters.
  Those conversations must be translated, often from difficult 
languages such as Urdu, and analyzed, all in a timely fashion.
  Our intelligence services collect vast amounts of data every day. It 
is possible that we may find that a critical clue to the September 11 
attacks may have been available, but untranslated, days, weeks, or even 
months before the hijackings.
  We must address this problem before another specific threat is 
overlooked.
  Finally, I would like to mention a problem that has received a great 
deal of attention in recent weeks. There has been criticism of the 
intelligence agencies for placing too great a reliance on technical 
intelligence collection--laws dropping, satelite photograph--in recent 
years at the expense of human sources, or spies.
  A corollary of this criticism is that CIA officers are to risk-averse 
and that they do not aggressively recruit sources overseas that may 
have access to terrorist groups because the sources may have engaged in 
human rights violations or violent crimes.
  As to the first problem, the Intelligence authorization bill for 
fiscal year 2002, which may come to the floor next week, provides 
greater resources for human source recruitment--and it is part of a 5-
year plan to beef up this method of collection.
  With respect to the second problem, we in the Congress simply must 
accept some of the responsibility for creating a risk-averse reaction 
at CIA, if needed there is one.
  The internal CIA regulations addressing the so-called ``dirty asset'' 
problem grew out of the criticisms by Congress in the mid-1990s about 
the recruitment of sources in Guatemala with sordid pasts.
  We address this issue in S. 1510, section 903, by sending a strong 
message to CIA Headquarters and CIA officers overseas that recruitment 
of any person who has access to terrorists or terrorist groups should 
be of the highest priority.
  There is no place in times like these for timidity in seeking every 
method available to learn the capabilities, plans, and intentions of 
terrorists.
  Congress needs to send a strong message that we value such efforts to 
recruit sources on terrorism, even those with pasts we would not 
applaud.
  Section 903 sends that message.
  I urge passage of S. 1510.
  I again commend the Members of the Senate who have played such an 
effective role.
  I also thank the staff: Al Cumming, Bob Filippone, Vicki Divoll, 
Steven Cash, Bill Duhnke, Paula DeSutter, Jim Hensler, and Jim Barnett.
  They have been working for the past many months to bring us to the 
point of this legislation being available for adoption by the Senate 
tonight and for the safety of the American people.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. The 
Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. I ask the distinguished Senator from Utah--I see the 
distinguished senior Senator from Pennsylvania is here--perhaps after 
the senior Senator from Utah, and then after the senior Senator from 
Pennsylvania speaks, whether it might be possible to go to the Senator 
from Wisconsin for the purpose of bringing up his amendments, and we 
can then debate and vote on them. Will that be agreeable to everybody?
  Mr. HATCH. It is agreeable.
  Mr. LEAHY. I ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Utah, 
and the Senator from Pennsylvania, we go to the Senator from Wisconsin 
for the purpose of bringing up his amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, in my opening remarks, I was remiss in not 
mentioning the tremendous work of the distinguished chairman and vice 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee. They have done a tremendous 
amount of work on the intelligence aspect of this bill. As a member of 
the Intelligence Committee, I express my high regard for the both of 
them and the work they have done.
  I also express my regard for my friend from Maryland, Senator 
Sarbanes, who came to the Senate with me, for the work he has done on 
the money-laundering section of this bill. He and Senator Gramm and the 
Banking Committee have done yeoman's service on this, and I hope we are 
able to have that as part of the final bill.
  I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the great work that has 
been done--also, Senator Kyl and so many others. I felt I needed to say 
that. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry, that I have 30 
minutes under the unanimous consent request?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. SPECTER. I yield myself 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have sought recognition and asked for 
this reservation of time to express my concerns about the record which 
the Senate is creating so that whatever legislation we pass will pass 
constitutional muster.
  The Supreme Court of the United States has handed down a series of 
decisions in the past decade which question the constitutionality and, 
in fact, invalidate acts of Congress because there has been an 
insufficient record compiled. So I make these statements and review the 
record so far with a view to urging my colleagues to create a record in 
this Chamber, in conference, or wherever that opportunity may present 
itself.
  In 1989, in the case of Sable v. FCC, the Supreme Court of the United 
States struck down an act of Congress saying, ``no Congressman or 
Senator purported to present a considered judgment.'' I thought it was 
a remarkable statement by the Supreme Court since Congressman Tom 
Bliley in the House of Representatives had established a very 
comprehensive record.
  The Supreme Court in 1997, in a case captioned Reno v. ACLU, again 
invalidated an act of Congress noting, ``the lack of legislative 
attention to the statute at issue in Sable suggests another parallel 
with this case.''
  It was surprising to me that the Supreme Court of the United States 
would invalidate an act of Congress on the ground that no Senator or 
Congressman had purported to present a considered judgment, when that 
is the view of the Supreme Court which is contrary to Congress.
  Under our doctrine of separation of powers, it seemed to me an act of 
Congress should stand unless there is some specific provision in the 
Constitution which warrants invalidating it or for vagueness under the 
due process clause of the fifth amendment.
  The Supreme Court of the United States, in January of last year, did 
it again in a case captioned Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, a case 
which involved the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. There the 
Court said, ``our examination of the act's legislative record confirms 
that Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an 
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem.'' Again,

[[Page 19514]]

a remarkable holding that the Congress had an unwarranted response and 
that it was an inconsequential problem, totally contradicting the 
judgment of the Congress of the United States.
  Then the Court went on in the Kimel case to say, ``Congress had no 
reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in 
this field.''
  Those are only a few of the cases where the Supreme Court of the 
United States has invalidated acts of Congress. There is no doubt there 
is a need for legislation to expand the powers of law enforcement to 
enable us to act against terrorists. My own experience in 8 years on 
the Intelligence Committee, 2 years of which was as chairman, and my 
work as chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism have 
convinced me without a doubt of the scourge of terrorism which we have 
seen many times but never with the intensity which we observed on 
September 11 of this year.
  The act of Congress in expanding law enforcement has to be very 
carefully calibrated to protect civil liberties and be in accordance 
with the Constitution of the United States. Attorney General Ashcroft 
met with a number of us on Wednesday, September 19, just 8 days after 
the incident of September 11, and asked that we enact legislation by 
the end of the week. My response at that time was I thought it could 
not be done in that time frame, but I thought we could hold hearings in 
the remainder of that week, perhaps on Thursday the 20th, or Friday the 
21st, or Saturday the 22nd, to move ahead, understanding the import of 
the administration's bill, and legislate to give them what they needed, 
consistent with civil rights.
  The Judiciary Committee then held a hearing on September 25 where the 
Attorney General testified for about an hour and 20 minutes. At that 
time, as that record will show, only a few Senators were able to ask 
questions. In fact, the questioning ended after my turn came, and most 
of the Judiciary Committee did not have a chance to raise questions.
  On September 26, the following day, I wrote to the chairman of the 
committee saying:
  I write to urge that our Judiciary Committee proceed promptly with 
the Attorney General's terrorism package with a view to mark up the 
bill early next week so the full Senate can consider it and hopefully 
act upon it by the end of the week. I am concerned that some further 
act of terrorism may occur which could be attributed to our failure to 
act promptly.
  I then found out on October 3 that the Subcommittee on the 
Constitution was having a hearing. By chance, I heard about it in the 
corridors. Although we were having a hearing with Health and Human 
Services Secretary Thompson on bioterrorism, I absented myself from the 
bioterrorism hearing and went down the hall to the Judiciary 
subcommittee hearing and participated there and expressed many of the 
reservations and concerns I am commenting about today.
  On that date, I again wrote to Senator Leahy. I ask unanimous consent 
that the full text of my letter to him and the full text of his reply 
to me of October 9 be printed in the Record at the conclusion of these 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. I quote only from the first sentence of Senator Leahy's 
response to me:
  I thank you for your letters of September 26 and October 3 and for 
your participation in the September 25 hearing regarding antiterrorism 
legislation. On October 3, you wrote that you were concerned about the 
lack of hearings. I share that concern and have tried to notice prompt 
hearings on a number of aspects of the legislative proposals at the 
earliest possible time.
  On this state of the record, which I hope can yet be perfected, I am 
concerned about our meeting the standards of the Supreme Court of the 
United States for a sufficient deliberative process.
  When Attorney General Ashcroft appeared before the Judiciary 
Committee on September 25, he said the only detention he wanted on 
aliens was those who were subject to deportation proceedings. I then 
pointed out, as the record will show, that the legislation submitted by 
the Attorney General was much broader and did not limit detention 
simply or exclusively to those who were subject to deportation 
proceedings. So my comment was that it was necessary to analyze the 
bill very carefully, not do it hurriedly, and give the Attorney General 
of the Department of Justice what he needed, consistent with 
constitutional rights.
  The other issue which I had an opportunity to raise in the very brief 
period of time I had--some 5 minutes--involved modifications to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, where the issue was to change 
the law from ``the purpose,'' being the gathering of intelligence, to 
``a purpose.'' Ultimately the legislation has been modified to read ``a 
significant purpose.''
  At that hearing, the Attorney General said he did not look to obtain 
content from electronic surveillance unless probable cause was 
established. But in the draft bill, which the Department of Justice had 
submitted at that time, that was not what the bill provided. So that on 
this state of the record, I think the Congress has some work to do, 
tonight in conference or perhaps by other means, to see to it we have a 
record which will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
  On our Judiciary Committee, we have many Members who have expertise 
in this field. This bill, as the Record will show, was negotiated by 
the chairman and ranking member with the Department of Justice, with 
the participation of the committee only to the extent of the hearing of 
the full committee on September 25 and the subcommittee on October 3.
  We have on our Judiciary Committee a number of Members who have had 
experience as prosecuting attorneys. We have a number of lawyers who 
are learned in law. We have other Members who have extensive experience 
on the Judiciary Committee and a great deal of common sense which may 
top some of us who have prosecutorial experience or extended experience 
with probable cause and search warrants or surveillance of some sort or 
another.
  I express these concerns so whatever can be done by the Congress will 
be done to meet the constitutional standards.
  How much of the 15 minutes have I used?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 3 minutes 37 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. SPECTER. I reserve the remainder of my time, and I yield the 
floor.

                               Exhibit 1


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                               Washington, DC, September 26, 2001.
     Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
     Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC.
       Dear Pat: I write to urge that our Judiciary Committee 
     proceed promptly with the Attorney General's terrorism 
     package with the view to mark up the bill early next week so 
     the full Senate can consider it and hopefully act upon it by 
     the end of next week.
       I am concerned that some further act of terrorism may occur 
     which could be attributed to our failure to act promptly.
           Sincerely,
     Arlen Specter.
                                  ____



                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                  Washington, DC, October 3, 2001.
     Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
     Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Leahy: I am very much concerned about the 
     delay in acting on the anti-terrorism legislation and also 
     about the absence of hearings to establish a record for the 
     legislative package.
       In recent decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States 
     has declared acts of Congress unconstitutional when there has 
     been an insufficient record or deliberative process to 
     justify the legislation.
       On the anti-terrorism legislation, perhaps more than any 
     other, the Court engages in balancing the needs of law 
     enforcement with the civil rights issues so that it is 
     necessary to have the specification of the problems to 
     warrant broadening police power.
       In my judgment, there is no substitute for the hearings, 
     perhaps in closed session, to deal with these issues.
       As you know, I have been pressing for hearings. I am now 
     informed that Senator Hatch has convened a meeting of all 
     Republican senators to, in effect, tell us what is in a 
     proposed bill where Judiciary Committee members have had no 
     input.

[[Page 19515]]

       We could still have meaningful hearings this week and get 
     this bill ready for prompt floor action.
           Sincerely,
     Arlen Specter.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                   Committee on the Judiciary,

                                  Washington, DC, October 9, 2001.
     Hon. Arlen Specter,
     711 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Arlen, I thank you for your letters of September 26, 
     2001 and October 3, 2001 and for your participation in the 
     September 25, 2001 hearing regarding anti-terrorism 
     legislation. On October 3, 2001, you wrote that you were 
     concerned about the lack of hearings. I share that concern 
     and have tried to notice prompt hearings on a number of 
     aspects of the legislation proposals at the earliest possible 
     time.
       As you know, the Attorney General consented to appear at 
     our September 25, 2001 hearing for only an hour and we had to 
     prevail upon him to stay a few extra minutes so that Senator 
     Feinstein and you could have a brief opportunity to ask the 
     Attorney General a single question. I invited him to rejoin 
     us the following Tuesday to complete the hearing and I 
     continue to extend such invitations, but he has not accepted 
     any of my follow up invitations. In addition, although 
     Members of the Committee submitted questions in writing to 
     the Attorney General following the September 25, 2001 
     hearing, they have yet to be answered. I agree with you that 
     these are important matters that justify a more thorough 
     record than we have been able to establish.
       Last week, Senator Feingold chaired an important hearing on 
     civil liberties concerns before the Constitution 
     Subcommittee. This week Senators Schumer, Feinstein and 
     Durbin each are working to organize hearings on these matters 
     and Senators Kennedy and Biden are working on possible 
     hearings next week.
       At the same time, we have continued to work nonstop to 
     prepare for Senate action on legislative proposals. We 
     suffered a setback last week when after weeks of intensive 
     negotiations the White House reneged on agreements reached on 
     Sunday, September 30, 2001, and we had to spend much of last 
     week renegotiating a legislative package. Finally, last 
     Thursday S. 1510 was introduced by the Majority Leader, the 
     Republican Leader, the Chairmen of the Judiciary, Banking and 
     Select Intelligence Committees and by Senators Hatch and 
     Shelby as Ranking Members. I am seeking to work closely with 
     the Senate leadership to be prepared to proceed to that 
     legislation at the earliest opportunity. The House is on a 
     similar track and may well consider its version of 
     legislation later this week, as well.
       You and I both know that no legislation can guarantee 
     against future terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, I have 
     expedited work on anti-terrorism legislation, within which 
     the Administration has insisted on including general criminal 
     law measures not limited to terrorism, in order to allow the 
     Senate to act promptly in response to the unprecedented 
     attacks of September 11, 2001.


           Sincerely,
                                                    Patrick Leahy,
                                                         Chairman.

  Mr. LEAHY. I understand the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin is 
willing to have the distinguished Senator from Michigan recognized for 
5 minutes. I ask unanimous consent she be allowed to proceed preceding 
the Senator from Wisconsin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Ms. STABENOW. I thank our distinguished chairman and my friend from 
Wisconsin for allowing me to proceed before he presents his amendments.
  I rise this evening to congratulate all involved in this effort. As 
has been said on so many occasions, it is not perfect but we have come 
together with a very positive, important step forward that we can all 
celebrate this evening on a bipartisan basis.
  As the Senator from Michigan, along with my colleague, Senator Levin, 
we certainly celebrate the efforts along the northern border and the 
important authorizations for dollars that allow us to continue to 
protect and strengthen the efforts at the border. I thank my chairman 
of the Banking Committee, Senator Sarbanes, for his efforts to put into 
this important bill language dealing with the critical issue of money 
laundering which essentially allows us to follow the money.
  My colleague, Senator Levin, has been extremely involved in helping 
to lead efforts to lay out the case for this. Senator Kerry and Senator 
Grassley have been involved in important work. I thank them.
  The antiterrorism bill before the Senate takes a significant step 
forward in cutting the flow of terrorist money. As the President has 
repeatedly said, stopping the flow of money is key to stopping 
terrorism. That is what we are doing this evening. In particular, we 
are establishing important new responsibilities, both for our 
Government and for our financial institutions. The bill authorizes the 
Treasury Secretary to take special measures to stop suspected money-
laundering activities. This anti-money-laundering language is 
significant because it requires financial institutions to set up their 
own due diligence to combat money laundering, particularly for private 
and corresponding banking situations. This is a key provision of which 
I was proud to be a part. I am pleased we were able to come up with 
language that allows that.
  Another important provision I was pleased to offer in the Banking 
Committee, which is now part of the bill, was clear authority for the 
Treasury Secretary to issue regulations to crack down on abuses related 
to concentration accounts. These accounts are administrative accounts 
used by financial institutions to combine funds from multiple 
customers, various transactions. They do not require any identification 
or accountability of who is involved or how much money we are talking 
about.
  The amendment I advocated urges the Treasury Secretary to issue 
regulations ensuring these concentration accounts identify by client 
name all of the client funds moving through the account to prevent 
anonymous movement of the funds that might facilitate money laundering. 
This is a classic case of why this is so important: Raul Salinas, 
brother of former Mexican President Carlos Salinas, transferred almost 
$100 million to Citibank administrative accounts in New York and London 
without any documentation indicating the ownership of these funds. The 
wire transfers sent the funds to Citibank and asked each transfer be 
brought to the attention of a specific private banker. Later, the 
private banker transferred the funds to private accounts controlled by 
Mr. Salinas. The origin of this money--$100 million--was never 
satisfactorily identified.
  Allegations of drug money or other corporate sources persist to this 
day. We know, through Senator Levin's exhaustive documentation at his 
hearings, that other private banks use this practice as well. Although 
financial regulators have cautioned against this practice over and over 
again, they have not yet issued regulations to stop this loophole. That 
is why the language in this bill is so important.
  The use of these anonymous concentration accounts breaks the audit 
trail associating specific funds with specific clients. Again, the 
goal, as the President said, is to follow the money. We have to have 
information if we are going to follow the money.
  It should now be abundantly clear to Treasury that they have the 
authority to stop this practice. I hope it is also abundantly clear it 
is a serious problem. I am very concerned that the administration act 
quickly on these anonymous accounts.
  I congratulate everyone involved in this effort. I think the effort 
regarding the anti-money-laundering language is a critical part of 
making sure we have an effective antiterrorism bill. I thank my 
colleagues for their work.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Michigan has 
expired. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I will give a brief statement before I 
start my amendments, and I ask unanimous consent the time be equally 
divided amongst the time I have on each of my four amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, 1 month ago, we all were viciously 
attacked. I am pleased and grateful that both the domestic and 
international effort to respond to these attacks is fully underway. As 
we recall, almost as soon as the attacks of September 11 ended, our 
public discussion turned to two issues: how the United States will 
respond to these terrorist acts and how

[[Page 19516]]

we can protect ourselves against future attacks.
  Almost immediately, discussion of that second issue raised the 
question of how our efforts to prevent terrorism will affect the civil 
liberties enjoyed by all Americans as part of our constitutional 
birthright.
  I was encouraged by many of the reactions that our leaders and 
Members of this body had, but especially encouraged by the words of our 
colleague, Senator George Allen of Virginia who represents one of the 
States struck by terrorism. On the day after the attacks he said:

       We must make sure that as we learn the facts, we do not 
     allow these attacks to succeed in tempting us in any way to 
     diminish what makes us a great nation. And what makes us a 
     great nation is that this is a country that understands that 
     people have God-given rights and liberties. And we cannot--in 
     our efforts to bring justice--diminish those liberties.

  I agree with Senator Allen. I believe that one of the most important 
duties of this Congress is in responding to the terrible events of 
September 11, in order to protect our civil liberties, which, of 
course, derive from our Constitution. That is why I am pleased that we 
did not take the Attorney General's advice to enact an anti-terrorism 
bill immediately without any deliberation or negotiation. I commend 
Senator Leahy for all his efforts to improve this bill. It is certainly 
a better and more comprehensive bill than the one the administration 
originally proposed. I think even the administration recognizes that.
  But I still believe we needed a more deliberative process on this 
bill, and more careful consideration of the civil liberties implication 
of it. I held a hearing in the Constitution Subcommittee at which many 
serious and substantive concerns about the bill were raised by 
commentators and experts from both sides of the political spectrum.
  As the chairman of the subcommittee, I took many of those concerns 
very seriously. That is why I would not consent on Tuesday night to 
bringing up this bill and passing it without any amendments being 
considered. I am pleased that we were able to reach agreement on a 
process that will allow some of my concerns with this bill to be 
debated and voted on through the amendment process.
  That is not to say that no measures to strengthen law enforcement 
should be enacted. They should be. We need to do it. We need to do some 
very serious updating of a number of these laws. This bill does many 
things to assist the Department of Justice in its mission to catch 
those who helped the terrorists and prevent future attacks. We can and 
we will give the FBI new and better tools. But we must also make sure 
that the new tools don't become instruments of abuse.
  There is no doubt that if we lived in a police state, it would be 
easier to catch terrorists. If we lived in a country where the police 
were allowed to search your home at any time for any reason; if we 
lived in a country where the government was entitled to open your mail, 
eavesdrop on your phone conversations, or intercept your email 
communications; if we lived in a country where people could be held in 
jail indefinitely based on what they write or think, or based on mere 
suspicion that they were up to no good, the government would probably 
discover and arrest more terrorists, or would be terrorists, just as it 
would find more lawbreakers generally. But that would not be a country 
in which we would want to live, and it would not be a country for which 
we could, in good conscience, ask our young people to fight and die. In 
short, that country would not be America.
  I think it is important to remember that the Constitution was written 
in 1789 by men who had recently won the Revolutionary War. They did not 
live in comfortable and easy times of hypothetical enemies. They wrote 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties 
in times of war as well as in times of peace.
  There have been periods in our nation's history when civil liberties 
have taken a back seat to what appeared at the time to be the 
legitimate exigencies of war. Our national consciousness still bears 
the stain and the scars of those events: The Alien and Sedition Acts, 
the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the internment of 
Japanese-Americans during World War II and the injustices perpetrated 
against German-Americans and Italian-Americans, the blacklisting of 
supposed communist sympathizers during the McCarthy era, and the 
surveillance and harassment of antiwar protesters, including Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., during the Vietnam war. We must not allow this piece 
of our past to become prologue.
  Preserving our freedom is the reason we are now engaged in this new 
war on terrorism. We will lose that war without a shot being fired if 
we sacrifice the liberties of the American people in the belief that by 
doing so we will stop the terrorists.
  That is why this exercise of considering the administration's 
proposed legislation and fine tuning it to minimize the infringement of 
civil liberties is so necessary and so important. And this is a job 
that only the Congress can do. We cannot simply rely on the Supreme 
Court to protect us from laws that sacrifice our freedoms. We took an 
oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. In 
these difficult times that oath becomes all the more significant.
  There are quite a number of things in this bill that I am concerned 
about, but my amendments focus on a small discreet number of items.
  At this point, I would like to turn to one of the amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 1899

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1899.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I ask unanimous consent the reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

(Purpose: To make amendments to the provisions relating to interception 
                 of computer trespasser communications)

       On page 42, line 25, insert ``or other'' after 
     ``contractual''.
       On page 43, line 2, strike ``for'' and insert 
     ``permitting''.
       On page 43, line 8, insert ``transmitted to, through, or 
     from the protected computer'' after ``computer trespasser''.
       On page 43, line 20, insert ``does not last for more than 
     96 hours and'' after ``such interception''.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I ask this time now be charged to the first amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Stabenow). The time will be charged.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, this amendment simply clarifies the 
provision in the bill dealing with computer trespass, section 217, so 
that it more accurately reflects the intent of the provision, as 
frequently expressed by the administration. Section 217 is designed, we 
have been told, to permit law enforcement to assist computer owners who 
are subject to denial of service attacks or other episodes of hacking. 
As currently drafted, however, this provision could allow universities, 
libraries, and employers to permit government surveillance of people 
who are permitted to use the computer facilities of those entities. 
Such surveillance would take place without a judicial order or probable 
cause to believe that a crime is being committed. Under the bill, 
anyone accessing a computer ``without authorization'' is deemed to have 
no privacy rights whatsoever, with no time limit, for as long as they 
are accessing the computer at issue. Basically, the way I read this, 
this provision completely eliminates fourth amendment protection for a 
potentially very large set of electronic communications.
  The danger that this amendment tries to address is that ``accessing a 
computer without authorization'' could be interpreted to mean a minor 
transgression of an office or library computer use policy. Let's take 
an example. A working mom uses an office

[[Page 19517]]

computer to purchase Christmas presents on the Internet. Company policy 
prohibits personal use of office computers. This person has potentially 
accessed a computer without authorization and her company could give 
permission to law enforcement to review all of the e-mails that she 
sends or receives at work, monitor all the instant messages she sends, 
and record every website she visits: No warrant, no probable cause, no 
fourth amendment rights at all. My amendment makes clear that a 
computer trespasser is not someone who is permitted to use a computer 
by the owner or operator of that computer.
  This amendment also limits the length of this unreviewed surveillance 
to 96 hours, which is a longer time frame than that placed on other 
emergency wiretap authorities. Again, if this provision is aimed solely 
at responding to cyber-attacks, there is no need to continue such 
surveillance beyond 96 hours--which is the time we put in our 
amendment--because that time is sufficient to allow the government to 
obtain a warrant to continue the surveillance. It is not as if they 
cannot continue it, they simply have to get a warrant after 4 days. 
Warrants based on probable cause are still the constitutionally 
preferred method for conducting surveillance in America. The need for 
immediate and emergency assistance during a denial of service attack or 
hacking episode, which I certainly think is a legitimate concern, 
cannot justify continued surveillance without judicial supervision.
  Finally, this amendment prevents law enforcement from abusing this 
authority in investigations unrelated to the actual computer trespass. 
The current provision potentially allows law enforcement to intercept 
wire and electronic communications in many investigations where they 
may not want, or be able, to secure a court order. If the government 
suspects a person of committing a crime but does not have probable 
cause to justify monitoring of the suspect's work computer, it could 
pressure the owner or operator of the computer to find some 
transgression in the suspect's computer use, allowing the government 
carte blanche access to email and internet activity of the suspect. I 
suspect that few small business owners will be anxious to stand up to 
federal law enforcement requests for this information.
  Now the administration was apparently willing to add language to deal 
with employees using office computers, but it refused to recognize that 
in our society many people use computers that they do not own, with 
permission, but without a contractual relationship. People who don't 
own their own home computers use computers at libraries. Students use 
computers at school in computer labs or student centers. Without my 
amendment, these innocent users could become subject to intrusive 
government surveillance merely because they disobeyed a rule of the 
owner of the computer concerning its use. I have been told that this is 
not the administration's intent, but they would not fix this provision. 
So I think it is fair to ask why. Why does the administration insist on 
leaving open the possibility that this provision will be abused to 
entirely eliminate the privacy of students' and library patrons' 
computer communications? Is there a hidden agenda here? I sincerely 
hope not, but I was very disappointed in the administration's 
unwillingness to address this concern. I remain willing to negotiate on 
this amendment, but if there is no further movement on it, I hope my 
colleagues will recognize that this amendment will leave the publicly 
expressed purpose of the computer trespass provision untouched and fix 
a potentially disastrous case of overbreadth.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, how much time do I have remaining on 
my side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Eighteen and one-half minutes on this 
amendment.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Washington.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.
  Ms. CANTWELL. Madam President, I rise to support my colleague, 
Senator Feingold, and his amendment to section 217. I think the Senator 
has done a tremendous job in outlining the issues related to this bill 
and the fact that haste can sometimes make waste. Haste in some 
instances on very well crafted language to uphold our rights under the 
Constitution can be infringed upon.
  Section 217 is intended to allow computer system owners and operators 
to fully engage Federal law enforcement where someone hacks or intrudes 
into their system. As Senator Feingold mentioned, that could be a 
business owner, or it could be a library system, or it could be a 
university system.
  Unfortunately, as drafted, there are few limits on what 
communications the Government could intercept without showing probable 
cause that a crime has been committed and without having the 
opportunity for judicial review of those intercepts.
  The provisions do not even limit the scope of the surveillance. Once 
authorized, the Government could intercept all communications of a 
person who is allegedly a trespasser. Again, let me be clear: Without 
meeting the fourth amendment requirement to show probable cause.
  Further, there is no time limit on the surveillance under the 
provision of this legislation. For those who may be reviewing this 
legislation for the first time, and understanding that as they go to 
their workplace, or as they go to their educational institution, or as 
they go to their library to enhance their education, they could be 
under surveillance for a very long and indefinite period of time 
without their knowledge.
  Thus, once authorized by a computer system operator, the Government 
could intercept all communications of a person forever without a proper 
search warrant. Even a court order wiretap expires after 30 days.
  This amendment would remedy some of the defects in this bill. It 
would do that by requiring that the surveillance be only of 
communications associated with the trespass and that the length of the 
surveillance be limited to 96 hours, which, by the way, is twice as 
long as the time limit placed on emergency wiretap authority. If the 
problem continues, investigators could easily obtain additional warrant 
time for the surveillance to continue.
  This is a very important time in our country's history. It is a time 
in which we want to act in unity and support the administration. It is 
a time in which we want to act to give law enforcement the tools they 
need to apprehend those who have been responsible and may be 
responsible for future acts of terrorism. But we also must preserve the 
right of citizens of this country when it comes to the fourth 
amendment.
  I encourage my colleagues to support the Feingold amendment. I yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, first, I want to say how important it 
is to have on the committee the Senator with expertise in this area as 
well as her own background. I appreciate very much her help on this 
matter.
  Madam President, how much time do I have remaining on my side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 14\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Minnesota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Madam President, my colleague from Washington I think 
speaks within a framework of expertise that she brings to this 
particular amendment. I speak from the framework of a layperson who has 
been trying to understand this bill's pluses and minuses.
  I say to Senator Feingold and all colleagues, since I think there is 
kind of a rush to table all of the Feingold

[[Page 19518]]

amendments, that this amendment is eminently reasonable. The Senator 
from Wisconsin is saying: Let's put a time limit on this. That is good. 
Let's have some judicial oversight. That is good as well.
  There are international terrorists who have killed many Americans and 
want to kill more Americans. There are a lot of provisions in this bill 
which I think are right on the money, including northern border 
protection which is relevant to the Chair, relevant to the Senator from 
Washington, and certainly relevant to the people I represent. But I 
also think there is no reason, in this rush to pass the bill, that we 
can't make some changes. These are minor changes the Senator wants to 
make. This just gives this piece of legislation more balance.
  I will say this: There is a lot that is good in this bill and a lot 
that is attractive to me as a Senator. When you add some of the 
additional security provisions that help all the people we are asked to 
represent in addition to the benefits--the financial help to all of the 
rescue workers and all of the innocent people's families, people have 
been murdered--there is much in this bill that is commendable. The 
Senator from Wisconsin is just trying to give it more balance.
  I say to my colleagues that I hope you will support this amendment. I 
want to say one other thing as well. I really believe what is good 
about this bill is the provisions that focus on the people whom the 
terrorists are basically trying to kill--Americans. What is not as good 
is when the reach of the bill goes too far beyond that and is too 
broad.
  The sunset provision that passed in the House is so important, so 
that we can continue to monitor this legislation as we move forward.
  I think this amendment that the Senator from Wisconsin has submitted 
is a step to give this piece of legislation a little more balance, and 
it will be more vigilant of people's civil liberties. I think it is the 
right step.
  I thank the Senator for his amendment.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Minnesota for his help, 
especially for making this point: All this amendment is about is making 
sure that it is about the problem we face with the terrorism that is 
threatening our country and our freedoms. That is all we are trying to 
do--make sure it doesn't go broadly into people's rights, and into 
their privacy, and into their own lives.
  At this point, I am simply going to reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, let me talk a little bit about the 
provision of today's legislation that has been referred to as the 
``computer trespasser'' exception.
  This provision is a perfect example of how our laws dealing with 
electronic surveillance have become outdated, and nonsensical as 
applied to modern technology.
  Imagine the following scenario. A terrorist decides to wreak havoc in 
a major U.S. city by shutting down an electrical power grid. He uses a 
computer to hack into the mainframe computer of a regional utility 
company, which he plans to use to bring down the power grid. Before the 
terrorist can accomplish his goal, the utility company recognizes that 
an intruder is attempting to access their computer. The company quickly 
calls the FBI for assistance in repelling the intruder.
  Guess what? Under current law, even with the permission from the 
utility company, the FBI is not permitted to monitor the terrorist's 
activity on the utility company's computer, because current law 
perversely grants the terrorist privacy rights with respect to his 
communications on the computer he has invaded.
  It is as if police could not investigate a burglary, even when 
invited into the house by the victim of the burglary, because the 
burglar had established privacy rights inside the home he has invaded.
  It is anomalies such as this, in our current laws regarding 
electronic surveillance, that today's legislation is designed to fix.
  As it stands, the computer trespasser provision is defined in such a 
way that the owner or operator of a computer network cannot arbitrarily 
declare the user of the network at trespasser, and then invite law 
enforcement in to monitor that user's communications.
  The provision, as written, provides that a person is not considered a 
computer trespasser if the person has an ``existing contractual'' 
relationship for access to all or part of the computer network.
  Senator Feingold's amendment would broadly amend the negotiated 
exception, including within its scope anyone with a contractual or 
``other'' relationship to the owner or operator of a computer network. 
What is meant by ``other'' relationship? Any hacker could make the 
argument that they have a relationship with a computer operator. 
Indeed, were I a defense counsel, I would argue that the mere fact that 
the hacker has accessed the computer has created some form of 
relationship. Clearly, the proposed amendment would broadly and 
unwisely give immunity from our cyber-crime laws. This amendment 
creates an exception to the criminal laws and puts law enforcement back 
in the same position they currently are--that is, powerless to 
investigate hacking incidents where the owner of the computer network 
wants the assistance of law enforcement.
  Madam President, we should not tie the hands of our law enforcement 
to assist the owners of our computer networks. We should not help 
hackers and cyberterrorists to get away.
  If you are a victim of a burglary, shouldn't you have the right to 
ask the police to investigate your house, to come to your house and 
investigate?
  Why should the owners of the computer not have the right to ask the 
police to investigate a commuter-hacking incident, especially where it 
appears it is terrorist oriented?
  This act applies, as written, only to people without authorization to 
be on the computer. Why should the law protect people who have invaded 
a computer they have no right to be on?
  Let me say one last comment about this. The proponents of this 
amendment argue it will apply to students using a university computer. 
That is true, but only if such students use that university computer to 
hack into a place where they do not belong.
  Either we have to get serious in this modern society, with these 
modern computers, about terrorism or we have to ignore it. I, for one, 
am not for ignoring it. I believe we need to have this language in 
here--so does the Justice Department; so does the White House and the 
White House Counsel's Office--in order to do what cannot be done today 
to protect people in our society, and to protect our powerplants, our 
dams, and so many important facilities in our society that are 
vulnerable to cyber-terrorists. This law, the way it is currently 
written, will help to do that.
  That is all I care to say about it. But I believe we should vote down 
the Senator's amendment. I know it is well intentioned. I have great 
respect for the Senator from Wisconsin. He is one of the very diligent 
members of our committee, and I appreciate him very much, but on this 
amendment I believe we have to keep the language of the bill the way it 
is written in order to give our law enforcement people the tools to be 
able to stop terrorist hacking into computers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank my friend for his kind words.
  Madam President, in response to the points he made, first, let me 
respond that I accept the premise of this basic provision in terms of 
updating the ability to get at computer hackers. That is an update. We 
did not know what this was a few years ago. We did not know what risks 
it posed. Nobody opposes that very important part of this bill.
  But what the Senator claims is that the phrase ``contractual 
relationship'' somehow makes sure that people are protected from being 
subject to this who really should not be subject to this; but it does 
it.
  I can think of at least three categories of people who do not come 
within the category of ``contractual relationship.'' One is in the 
context employment. It is nice if you have a contract, but a lot of 
employees do not.

[[Page 19519]]

They do not fall within the protection of a contractual relationship.
  The same goes for people who would go and use a computer at a 
library. They do not have a contractual relationship to protect them in 
this situation.
  And finally, as the Senator conceded here, in his last example, that 
certainly students, students at all our universities across the 
country, are not protected by that language. And that is all we want to 
do, to make it clear that this amendment is related to the problem of 
computer hackers, not moms who might be buying Christmas presents on a 
computer at work, even though they are not supposed to, or students who 
maybe are gambling on a university computer. Of course they should not 
do that, but should that subject them to extraordinary, unprecedented 
intrusion by Government law enforcement authority? Of course not.
  The Senator attempts to suggest that the provision in here having to 
do with our desire to have the language say ``contractual'' or 
``other'' relationship would somehow allow a hacker to claim that he is 
protected. The notion that a hacker would be considered as somebody who 
has a relationship with the company under this amendment is an absurd 
interpretation of the amendment's intent, so that clearly is not what 
this amendment would do.
  And finally, let me get back to the students, the example the Senator 
from Utah mentioned. It is simply an unprecedented intrusion into 
individual rights for a university to be able to allow--because of a 
minor use that is not within university rules--that person to be 
completely subject to this kind of intrusion.
  Mr. DURBIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Yes.
  Mr. DURBIN. I have followed this debate closely. I commend the 
Senator for the hearing he had on the constitutional rights part of 
this debate. But I want to make sure I understand exactly what his 
amendment sets out to do.
  Is my understanding correct that under the Feingold amendment there 
could be surveillance of a computer for 96 hours before there is any 
court approval, so that in the example given by the Senator from Utah, 
the law enforcement authorities could, in fact, monitor the 
communications of someone using this computer for 96 hours before ever 
going to a court and asking for a warrant for that search?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. That is correct. And that even troubles me for the 
length of time that it is allowed--but it is far better than an 
infinite position. Law Enforcement should be required to seek a warrant 
as soon as possible, within reason, given the fact that what the 
amendment tries to get at is emergency situations involving hackers. As 
soon as possible, they should have to meet the standards that are 
normally met.
  But, yes, the amendment does permit that, in my view, rather 
extraordinary period of time before the requirement would have to be 
made.
  Mr. DURBIN. And that period of time, I ask the Senator from 
Wisconsin, is roughly twice the amount currently given under emergency 
wiretap authority; is that correct?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. That is correct.
  Mr. DURBIN. One last question. I want to try to understand. I ask the 
Senator do you not say, in your amendment, that a trespasser does not 
include someone who is permitted to use a computer by the owner or 
operator of the computer?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Correct.
  Mr. DURBIN. And the difference, of course, is whether it is a 
contractual relationship or just a permission to use; you are including 
permission to use as well as contractual relationship?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. That is correct.
  Mr. DURBIN. The examples you have given are of people going to a 
library, who may not have a contractual relationship with the library 
but use the computer, who would be subjected to this warrantless search 
of their computer communications for an indefinite period of time.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. That is right, exactly. This is exactly the problem. 
All we asked of the committee and of the administration yesterday was 
to make it clear that they did not want to reach these people. That is 
what we have been told. The purpose of this is to get at the threat of 
computer hackers.
  The Senator from Illinois has just illustrated, with those examples--
and he is, of course, correct--that this could be interpreted and could 
be understood to include situations that not only have nothing to do 
with the problem but represent a very serious departure from the 
individual rights people should have in our country.
  Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Illinois and reserve the 
remainder of my time.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I have been concerned about the scope of 
the amendment carving an exception to the wiretap statute for so-called 
``computer trespassers.'' This covers anyone who accesses a computer 
``without authorization'' and could allow government eavesdropping, 
without a court order or other safeguards in the wiretap statute, or 
Internet users who violate workplace computer use rules or online 
service rules.
  I was unable to reach agreement with the administration on limiting 
the scope of this amendment, and the Feingold amendment makes further 
refinements. It is unfortunate that the administration did not accept 
this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 4 minutes 47 
seconds; the managers have 9 minutes 14 seconds.
  Mr. HATCH. I am prepared to yield back whatever time we have, if it 
is all right with the distinguished Senator from Vermont, with the 
understanding that we are just trying to stop unauthorized hacking that 
could be done by terrorists and others who are criminals that currently 
cannot be stopped. I am prepared to yield back the time, if the 
distinguished Senator from Vermont is.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I ask the chairman of the committee, 
after listening to the presentation by the Senator from Wisconsin, what 
is the chairman's view of the incursion on law enforcement by the 
limitation of 96 hours?
  Mr. LEAHY. The incursion of law enforcement by the 96 hours?
  Mr. SPECTER. The principal thrust of what the Senator from Wisconsin 
seeks to do is to broaden the definition of a contractual relationship 
to someone who may otherwise have permission. What I am trying to do is 
to understand the administration's position, the law enforcement 
position as to how law enforcement is adversely impacted by what the 
Senator from Wisconsin seeks to do.
  My concern, as expressed earlier, is that, especially in the face of 
the challenge by the amendment, this is a complicated bill.
  The reality is, it is hard to know all of it without the normal 
hearing process. Now we have a specific challenge. What I would like to 
know is, how does it inhibit law enforcement? What about the broader 
definition gives problems to law enforcement? And then, what is the 
difficulty in having 96 hours, which is 4 days, to see what is going on 
to find some basis for seeking a warrant with probable cause?
  Mr. LEAHY. Frankly, I don't have a problem with the Feingold 
amendment as it is written. I do have a problem, however, with keeping 
a bill together. The initial administration request had no limitations 
whatsoever. It was so wide open we were concerned that someone who 
might be using a computer at work to add up their accounts for the 
month would be trapped by this because the company said you couldn't 
use the computer to add up your checking account, for example, to use a 
farfetched example, because they would be accessing the computer 
without authorization and the Government could just step in and go 
forward.
  The administration moved partly our way. We actually ended up with a 
compromise on this. I suspect what they

[[Page 19520]]

would say to the Senator from Pennsylvania is that these attacks last 
more than 96 hours and that they would be unable to go after them if 
they were limited to the 96 hours.
  We saw this recently 2 or 3 weeks ago where we had a continuous 
roving attack on a number of Government computers. As I recall--I 
didn't pay that much attention at the time--they were attacking them 
one week and when we came back the following week, they were still 
attacking them. So you had more than 96 hours.
  Frankly, it is a case where we have reached a compromise. The 
distinguished ranking member, speaking on behalf of the administration, 
said this is not acceptable to them. Had this been part of the original 
package, I wouldn't have found it acceptable.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. SPECTER. Yes.
  Mr. HATCH. Basically, what the administration is after here is that 
if a burglar is coming into your home and the police come to 
investigate, they don't have to report to a judge within 96 hours. The 
police have to act on these terrorist matters. If they find that a 
terrorist has infiltrated a computer controlling an electrical grid 
system, they want to get right on the ball and do something about it. 
That is what they are trying to do with this provision.
  There are no fourth amendment rights implicated because you have 
people who have hacked into a computer that they don't have any right 
to be in.
  We want to give law enforcement the power to stop that. This 
provision upsets that power and basically puts us back where we are 
when we can't do anything in a modern digital age to stop terrorists 
from stopping power grids and damaging dams and a whole raft of other 
things.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, if the Senator from Utah will yield for 
a question?
  Mr. HATCH. Surely.
  Mr. SPECTER. The Senator from Wisconsin makes the point that people 
may have standing to use a computer even without a contractual 
relationship. He uses the example of a student. Does the Senator from 
Utah believe or does the administration represent that there are no 
relationships other than contractual which give a person the legitimate 
standing to use the computer?
  Mr. HATCH. Under this provision, you do not have a right to hack into 
another private computer, whether you are a university student or 
anybody else. It only applies, the law we have written, to unauthorized 
access. It does not apply to authorized access. But unauthorized 
access, yes, it applies to that. If we don't put it in there, we will 
be leaving a glaring error that currently exists in our laws that 
prohibit us from solving some of these problems. It would be a terrible 
thing to not correct at this particular time, knowing what we know 
about how these terrorists are operating right now.
  Mr. SPECTER. So is the Senator from Utah saying that if you have 
permission, that is a form of a contractual relationship?
  Mr. HATCH. I am saying that if you have permission, you are not 
covered by this provision as written. In other words, you would not be 
considered a hacker.
  Mr. SPECTER. On its face you would seem to, unless there is a 
contractual relationship?
  Mr. HATCH. It comes down to authorized or unauthorized access. If it 
is authorized, it is not covered under the computer trespasser 
provision.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, did the Senator yield back his 
remaining time?
  Mr. HATCH. Yes, we are prepared to yield.
  Mr. LEAHY. We are prepared if the Senator from Wisconsin is.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I want to clarify a couple points, then I will be 
prepared to yield the remaining time.
  These were helpful exchanges on a couple of points. First of all, it 
became very clear from Senator Specter's excellent questioning that, of 
course, there is no guarantee, under the way this language is set up, 
under the words ``contractual relationship,'' that the provision would 
not apply to students or to people who would use a computer at a 
library. I can't understand why, if that is the intent of the 
administration, the intent of the legislation, why they don't just 
agree to language that would say so. That is all we asked for 
yesterday. It could have resolved the problem. For some reason, they 
won't agree to it.
  Second, is this notion that a hacker could somehow get in under our 
language. There is no way that a hacker has a relationship with the 
computer owner that permits the use of the computer. The hacker is, 
obviously, the antithesis, the opposite of an individual with a 
relationship that permits use of the computer.
  Finally, I am amazed at this notion that this amendment, even under 
our version of it, would allow only 96 hours for surveillance when 
under the example of the Senator from Utah, an ongoing hacker attack is 
occurring.
  Is it the Senator's contention that at the end of 96 hours, the FBI 
would not have probable cause to get a warrant, when all it has been 
dealing with for 4 days is this hacking of the computer? Of course, it 
would. It would be the easiest thing in the world.
  Section 217 is a very dramatic exception to the usual rule as derived 
under our system, and expressed in the fourth amendment. Normally, you 
have to come up with probable cause and a warrant. There are exceptions 
because we have difficult problems sometimes. But 96 hours? At the end 
of that time, with clear evidence of a hacking attempt, a warrant could 
easily be obtained. Obviously, our amendment takes care of the need for 
emergency authorization. In fact, I think it is too generous. I am 
trying to put some kind of a time limit on this so we can have some 
semblance of the normal rules that protect our citizens.
  If the other side yields their time, I will yield my remaining time 
as well.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, I have listened to this debate with 
great interest, and I appreciate very much the arguments made by the 
Senator from Wisconsin. As the Senator from Vermont and, I believe, the 
Senator from Pennsylvania, have noted, there are circumstances where I 
can easily see that we could be sympathetic to his amendment. He makes 
an argument.
  My difficulty tonight is not substantive as much as it is procedural. 
There is no question, all 100 of us could go through this bill with a 
fine-tooth comb and pinpoint those things which we could improve. There 
is no doubt about that. I have looked at this bill, and there are a lot 
of things, were I to write it alone, upon which I could improve. I know 
the chairman of the committee believes that too.
  I think we also have to recognize that this is the product of a lot 
of work in concert with our Republican colleagues, in concert with the 
administration, in concert with civil liberties groups, and in concert 
with law enforcement. We have come up with what I would view as a 
delicate but, yes, successful compromise.
  Now, if we had opened the bill to amendment, I have no doubt there 
are many colleagues who would offer amendments with which I would 
vehemently disagree--in fact, so much so that I might want to 
filibuster the bill. I would probably lose. I think there is a 
realistic expectation that on a lot of these issues, my side would 
lose. I think you could make the same case for the other side. So, we 
made the best judgment we could, taking into account the very delicate 
balance between civil liberties and law enforcement that we had to 
achieve in bringing a bill of this complexity to the floor.
  I have to say, I think our chair and ranking member and all of those 
involved did a terrific job under the most difficult of circumstances. 
What we did was to say: Let's take this product and work with it; let's 
review it; if we have to make some changes, let's consider them; but 
let's recognize that if we were to take this bill open-ended, there

[[Page 19521]]

would be no end to the amendments--that is the result that would most 
likely occur in such a circumstance.
  While I may be sympathetic to some amendments offered tonight, had it 
been an open debate, there would have been a lot of amendments for 
which I would not have been sympathetic.
  Given those circumstances, my argument is not substantive, it is 
procedural. We have a job to do. The clock is ticking. The work needs 
to get done. We have to make our best judgment about what is possible, 
and that process goes on.
  I hope my colleagues will join me tonight in tabling this amendment 
and tabling every other amendment that is offered, should he choose to 
offer them tonight. Let's move on and finish this bill. Let's work with 
the House and come up with the best product between the Houses. Then, 
let's let law enforcement do its job, and let's use our power of 
oversight to ensure that civil liberties are protected.
  I make a motion to table.
  Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator withhold that motion to table for a 
moment?
  Mr. DASCHLE. Yes.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I have served with over 250 Senators 
here, and I have been proud to serve with all of them. I know of no 
Senator who has a stronger commitment to our individual rights and 
personal liberties than the senior Senator from South Dakota, our 
majority leader. But I also know that were it not for his commitment 
and efforts, we would not be here with a far better bill than the one 
originally proposed by the administration. It has been because of his 
willingness to back us up as we try to improve that bill, to remove 
unconstitutional aspects of it, because of his willingness, we were 
able to get here.
  As the Senator from South Dakota, the dearest friend I have in this 
body, has said, he could find parts he would do differently, and he 
knows there are parts I would do differently--even on this one. I have 
high regard for the Senator from Wisconsin, and I would have loved to 
have had his amendment. Actually, I would have done it probably 
differently than that. But we had a whole lot of places where we won 
and some where we lost.
  I can tell you right now, if we start unraveling this bill, we are 
going to lose all the parts we won and we will be back to a proposal 
that was blatantly unconstitutional in many parts. So I join, with no 
reluctance whatsoever, in the leader's motion.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, I move to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, on this bill there was not a single 
moment of markup or vote in the Judiciary Committee. I accepted that 
because of the crisis our Nation faces. This is the first substantive 
amendment in the Senate on this entire issue, one of the most important 
civil liberties bills of our time, and the majority leader has asked 
Senators to not vote on the merits of the issue. I understand the 
difficult task he has, but I must object to the idea that not one 
single amendment on this issue will be voted on the merits on the floor 
of the Senate.
  What have we come to when we don't have either committee or Senate 
deliberation on amendments on an issue of this importance?
  I yield the floor, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, I move to table the amendment.
  Mr. LEAHY. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. Domenici), the Senator from 
South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond), and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. 
Lott) are necessary absent.
  I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from North 
Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 83, nays 13, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 299 Leg.]

                                YEAS--83

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--13

     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Cantwell
     Collins
     Corzine
     Dayton
     Durbin
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Levin
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Domenici
     Helms
     Lott
     Thurmond
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, so we understand where we are, there is 
still a fair amount of time on the bill that the Senator from Utah and 
I have and we have committed to Senators on both sides of the aisle who 
need time. The remaining time is for the Senator from Wisconsin who has 
three more amendments with the same time as he had in the last 
amendment.
  The Senator from Massachusetts has asked for 5 minutes. I understand 
we have three more amendments that would take probably an hour or so 
per amendment with the vote if the Senator from Wisconsin wishes to use 
all his time, and he has a right to do that.
  Once those are disposed of, the Senator from Utah and I are probably 
prepared to yield back our time.
  I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, it was depending entirely on what the 
Senator from Wisconsin was doing. I reserve that now and see where we 
are heading.
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, it is my intention to offer two more 
amendments, not the third amendment. I believe the time for each of 
these amendments could be less than the full time allotted. We have a 
fair amount of interest, but I didn't expect as much debate. I think 
the last two could be expedited, and I am prepared to proceed, if that 
is what my colleagues desire.


                           Amendment No. 1900

  I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1900.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be 
dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 21, line 14, insert ``except that, in such 
     circumstances, the order shall direct that the surveillance 
     shall be conducted only when the target's presence at the 
     place where, or use of the facility at which, the electronic 
     surveillance is to be directed has been ascertained by the 
     person implementing the order and that the electronic 
     surveillance must be directed only at the

[[Page 19522]]

     communication of the target,'' after ``such other persons''.

  Mr. KERRY. For the purpose of planning, could the Senator give us a 
sense of both amendments and how long he thinks he will talk.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I have about 12 minutes on this amendment subject to 
any response to that and approximately the same on the second 
amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, this amendment has to do with what is 
called roving wiretap, or multipoint surveillance authority. This is 
one of the first things Attorney General Ashcroft asked for in the 
first days after the September 11 attack and gave the example of a 
terrorist using throwaway cell phones and the need for continued 
roaming wiretap authority to allow the FBI to keep up with the ready 
availability of this new technology.
  First, let me say I have a lot of sympathy for the idea of updating 
this area of the law. Obviously, it is needed in light of changes in 
technology. It is vitally important for Members of the Senate to 
understand that roving wiretap authority is already available for 
criminal investigations under title III. It is in title 18, section 
2518(11) and (12). The Attorney General doesn't need nor has he asked 
for any new roving wiretap authority for criminal investigations. He 
already has it.
  What the bill does in Section 206 is provide similar authority in 
investigations under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, known 
as FISA. I am not opposed to expanding existing roving wiretap 
authority to include FISA investigations, but I am very concerned that 
Section 206 does not include a key safeguard that was part of the 
roving wiretap authority when it was added to title III in 1986. That 
protection minimizes the possible misuse of the authority, whether 
intentional or unintentional, to eavesdrop on the conversations of 
individuals who are not the subject of the investigation.
  Let me read from the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the 
legislation that granted roving wiretap authority:

       Proposed subsection 2518(12) of title 18 provides, with 
     respect to both ``wire'' and ``oral'' communications, that 
     where the federal government has been successful in obtaining 
     a relaxed specificity order, it cannot begin the interception 
     until the facilities or place from which the communication is 
     to be intercepted is ascertained by the person implementing 
     the interception order.

  In other words, the actual interception could not begin until the 
suspect begins or evidences an intention to begin a conversation.
  It further reads:

       It would be improper to use this expanded specificity order 
     to tap a series of telephones, intercept all conversations 
     over such phones and then minimize the conversations 
     collected as a result. This provision puts the burden on the 
     investigation agency to ascertain when the interception is to 
     take place.

  It seems to me that Congress struck the right balance in that 
provision. It recognized the needs of law enforcement, but also 
recognized that rights of innocent people were implicated and designed 
a safeguard to protect them.
  When Congress passed FISA in 1978 it granted to the executive branch 
the power to conduct surveillance in certain types of investigations 
without meeting the rigorous probable cause standard under the Fourth 
Amendment that is required for criminal investigations. Investigations 
of agents of foreign powers were different. There is a lower threshold 
for obtaining an order from the FISA court. But I don't think that 
roving wiretap authority under FISA should be less protective of the 
constitutional rights of innocent people who are not the subject of the 
investigation than the authority that Congress intended to grant in a 
standard criminal investigation.
  My amendment takes the safeguard from Title III--from current law--
and includes it in the FISA roving wiretap authority provision. The 
amendment simply provides that before conducting surveillance, the 
person implementing the order must ascertain that the target of the 
surveillance is actually in the house that has been bugged, or using 
the phone that has been tapped.
  Let me give a few examples of how this would work, which should also 
show why it is necessary. Indeed, it may be constitutionally required. 
If the government receives information that the target of the FISA 
investigation is making phone calls from a particular bank of pay 
phones in a train station, it may set up wiretaps at all the phones in 
that bank, but may only listen in on a particular phone that the 
subject is using. Before beginning the actual surveillance it must know 
that the suspect is using a particular phone. Otherwise, on the basis 
of a report that a terrorist has been using a particular bank of pay 
phones, the private conversations of innumerable innocent Americans 
with absolutely no connection to the investigation would be subject to 
government scrutiny. That violates their Fourth Amendment rights. 
Similarly, the Government should not be able to conduct surveillance on 
all payphones in a neighborhood frequented by a suspected terrorist or 
on a particular payphone all day long while innocent people use it.
  Another example. Suppose a target of a FISA investigation has the 
practice of using a neighbor's or relative's phone. Under my amendment, 
the Government would not be able to listen in on all calls from that 
phone, but only those taking place when the target is in that person's 
home. Likewise, if the government believes that the target uses 
computers in a library, it can only monitor the one that the terrorist 
is actually using, not all the computers in that facility even when the 
terrorist is not there.
  I don't believe this amendment should affect the Government's 
authorization to monitor a new cell phone obtained by the target. If 
the phone is in the possession of the target or is registered to the 
target, then the person implementing the surveillance has ascertained 
that the facility is being used by the target. They could do it, and I 
support that.
  Now, it has been pointed out to me that in 1999 this safeguard was 
removed from Title III with respect to wiretaps but left in place with 
respect to bugs. The change was made in the conference report of an 
intelligence authorization bill, without consideration by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.
  I remind my colleagues again that my amendment was part of the roving 
wiretap authority that Congress granted federal law enforcement in 
criminal investigations in 1986. It contains a standard that as far as 
we know served law enforcement adequately in conducting effective 
surveillance on very sophisticated criminal organizations, including 
the mafia and drug importation and distribution organizations. I submit 
that if this standard is not sufficient, we would have seen an open 
effort to change it, but we didn't. Even after the change made in 1999 
without discussion or debate, the standard remains in effect for bugs 
placed in homes or businesses. Without this protection, Section 206 
threatens the rights of innocent people.
  If law enforcement has been significantly impaired in conducting 
effective surveillance in criminal investigations under the roving 
wiretap provision in current law, we should be shown specific evidence 
of its shortcomings. But if it has not been impaired, then there is no 
reason not to include a similar safeguard in the roving wiretap 
authority under FISA.
  I urge my colleagues to take a close look at this amendment. It is 
reasonable, it appropriately reflects current law, but it also allows 
for updating to face the reality of new technology and all the 
technologies that are implicated here. And it protects the 
constitutional rights of people who are not the subjects of an 
investigation.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Yes.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Again, I am not a lawyer. I do not think I understood 
exactly all the argument you were making.
  Are you saying there has to be some standard of proof? That before 
conducting surveillance, law enforcement has to make sure? In other 
words, before you actually wiretap a phone or bug a house or a home, 
the target of the surveillance has to be in that home you are bugging?

[[Page 19523]]


  Mr. FEINGOLD. No. Let's say somebody goes to their neighbor's house 
to use their phone. They do that once or twice or whatever it might be. 
Our amendment makes sure this new provision doesn't open up that house 
and everybody in it and every phone call they have in the house to 
unlimited Government surveillance. It requires what has been normally 
required under the law, that the law enforcement people ascertain that 
the person is in the house at the time so it is credible that they 
would be using that phone again.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. In other words, other people who are in the house who 
have nothing to do with the target of surveillance, their conversations 
could be--
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Their conversations could and undoubtedly would be, 
without some protection.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. And the same thing for the bugging?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Exactly.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. So you are trying to minimize the misuse of authority. 
It might be unintentional?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Absolutely. There are standards, as I indicated in my 
statement. There have been rules about how law enforcement has to 
ascertain, whether it be at a phone bank or in somebody else's home, 
that there is a reasonable belief that the individual is actually 
there. Without that kind of rule, what we are doing is not just 
extending this authority to the reality that people have cell phones 
and move around and use different phones of their own, but it takes us 
into an area that, frankly, prior to September 11 we would never have 
dreamed of allowing.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Madam President, if I could take 2 minutes --I ask the 
Senator from Wisconsin, might I have 2 minutes?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Yes. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on 
the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There appears to 
be.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield 2 minutes.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. My colleague is saying we have to be very careful 
about not eavesdropping on the conversations of innocent individuals.
  Again, we all are painfully aware of September 11. I personally think 
there is much in this bill that is good, that we need to do. But I 
think all the Senator from Wisconsin is trying to do is achieve some 
balance and make sure we do not go above and beyond going after 
terrorists who are trying to kill Americans and instead end up 
eavesdropping on innocent people in our country.
  I think the vast majority of the people in the country, if they 
understood what this amendment was about, would support this amendment. 
I do not think passing this amendment does any damage whatsoever to 
much of what is in this bill, which is so important.
  So, again, I hope Senators will support this amendment on the merits. 
I think it is a very important amendment. I thank the Senator from 
Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Minnesota very much for his 
help, and I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, under current law, law enforcement has 
so-called-roving or multi-point surveillance authority for criminal 
investigations under title III, but FISA does not have comparable 
provisions for agents investigating foreign intelligence. Roving 
interceptions are tied to a named person rather than to any particular 
communications facility or place. Today's bill adds this vital 
authority to FISA.
  This authority is critical for tracking suspected spies and 
terrorists who are experts in counter-surveillance methods such as 
frequently changing locations and communications devices such as phones 
and computer accounts.
  It simply makes no sense that our wire-tapping statute recognizes 
this problem, and provides roving wiretap authority for surveillance of 
common criminals, but makes no provision for roving authority to 
monitor terrorists under the FISA statute.
  The proposed amendment would not succeed in its stated goal of 
harmonizing the standard between title III wiretaps and FISA wiretaps. 
The proposed amendment would put a requirement on the interception of 
wire or electronic communications under a FISA warrant that does not 
exist in the title III context--a requirement that the law enforcement 
officer implementing the wiretapping order personally ascertain that 
the target of the order is using a telephone or computer, before the 
monitoring could begin.
  This requirement is operationally unworkable. The way that roving 
orders are implemented, requires that law enforcement officers have the 
ability to spot check several different telephones in order to 
determine which one is being used by the target of the order. The 
language proposed in this amendment does not give law enforcement 
officers the ability to do so. In fact, they would be worse off under 
this proposal than they are under current law.
  The goal of the roving wiretap provision is to give counter-terrorism 
investigators as much authority to conduct wiretaps as their 
counterparts have in conducting criminal investigations. This amendment 
defeats that goal by putting new, significant obstacles in the path of 
investigators attempting to investigate and prevent terrorist 
activities.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, Senator Feingold provided invaluable 
assistance to the committee during our consideration of this 
legislation. He also held a hearing in his Constitution Subcommittee 
last week on the critical civil liberties issues raised by the 
Administration's anti-terrorism bill. I fully appreciate the depth of 
his concern and his desire to improve this bill.
  The Attorney General and I agreed in principal that the roving, or 
multipoint, wiretap authority for criminal cases should be available 
under FISA for foreign intelligence cases. The need for such authority 
is especially acute to conduct surveillance of foreign spies trained in 
the art of avoiding surveillance and detection.
  Senator Feingold's amendment simply assures that when roving 
surveillance is conducted, the Government makes efforts to ascertain 
that the target is actually at the place or using the phone, being 
tapped. This is required in the criminal context. It is unfortunate 
that the Administration did not accept this amendment.
  I hope all time could be yielded back on both sides.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. It is my understanding the opponents have yielded all 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LEAHY. If the Senator is going to yield his.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, I will just use a minute of my leader 
time to respond.
  I have already made my argument on the first amendment. I, in the 
interest of time, am not going to repeat it. As I said before, I am 
sympathetic to many of these ideas, but I am much more sympathetic to 
arriving at a product that will bring us to a point where we can pass 
something into law. The record reflects the compromises that have been 
put in place, the very delicate balance that we have achieved. It is 
too late to open up the amendment process in a way that might destroy 
that delicate balance. For that reason, I move to table this amendment.
  I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond), and the Senator 
from New Mexico (Mr. Domenici) are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from North 
Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``yea.''

[[Page 19524]]

  The result was announced--yeas 90, nays 7, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 300 Leg.]

                                YEAS--90

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--7

     Cantwell
     Corzine
     Feingold
     Levin
     Specter
     Thompson
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Domenici
     Helms
     Thurmond
  The motion was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. HATCH. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed 
in the Record a Statement of Administration Policy on the USA Act.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   Statement of Administration Policy

    (This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the concerned 
                               agencies)


      S. 1510--Uniting and Strengthening America (USA) Act of 2001

       The Administration commends the Senate leadership and the 
     Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
     on reaching agreement on S. 1510. This bill contains, in some 
     form, virtually all of the proposals made by the 
     Administration in the wake of the terrorist attacks 
     perpetrated against the United States on September 11th. The 
     Administration strongly supports passage of this bill.
       The Administration's initial proposals, on which S. 1510 is 
     based, were designed to provide Federal law enforcement and 
     national security officials with the tools and resources 
     necessary to disrupt, weaken, and counter the infrastructure 
     of terrorist organizations, to prevent terrorist attacks, and 
     to punish and defeat terrorists and those who harbor them. S. 
     1510 includes the provisions proposed by the Administration 
     in three main areas: (1) information gathering and sharing; 
     (2) substantive criminal law and criminal procedure; and (3) 
     immigration procedures. The Administration strongly supports 
     passage of these provisions. The Administration also supports 
     valuable provisions, introduced by the Chairman of the Senate 
     Judiciary Committee, aimed at improving the Nation's border 
     protection.
     Information Gathering and Sharing
       Existing laws fail to provide national security authorities 
     and law enforcement authorities with certain critical tools 
     they need to fight and win the war against terrorism. For 
     example, technology has dramatically outpaced the Nation's 
     statutes. Many of the most important intelligence gathering 
     laws were enacted decades ago, in and for an era of rotary 
     telephones. Meanwhile, the Nation's enemies use e-mail, the 
     Internet, mobile communications and voice mail.
       S. 1510 contains numerous provisions that address this 
     problem by helping to make the intelligence gathering and 
     surveillance statutes more ``technology-neutral.'' 
     Specifically, the bill updates the pen-register, trap-and-
     trace, and Title III-wiretap statutes to cover computer and 
     mobile communications more effectively, while ensuring that 
     the scope of the authority remains the same.
       The bill also provides for nationwide scope of orders and 
     search warrants, and other practical changes that will enable 
     law enforcement to work more efficiently and effectively. In 
     addition, the bill contains important updates of foreign 
     intelligence gathering-statutes, with the identical goal of 
     making the statutes technology-neutral. Even more important, 
     the bill contains provisions to reduce existing barriers to 
     the sharing of information among Federal agencies where 
     necessary to identify and respond to terrorist threats. The 
     ability of law enforcement and national security personnel to 
     share this type of information is a critical tool for 
     pursuing the war against terrorism on all fronts.
     Substantive Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure
       S. 1510 contains important reforms to the criminal statutes 
     designed to strengthen law enforcement's ability to 
     investigate, prosecute, prevent, and punish terrorism crimes. 
     The bill would remove existing barriers to effective 
     prosecution by extending the statute of limitations for 
     terrorist crimes that risk or result in death or serious 
     injury. The bill also creates and strengthens criminal 
     statutes, including a prohibition on harboring terrorists and 
     on providing material support to terrorists, and provides for 
     tougher penalties, including longer prison terms and higher 
     conspiracy penalties for those who commit terrorist acts. 
     These provisions will help to ensure that the fight against 
     terrorism is a national priority in our criminal justice 
     system.
     Border Protection and Immigration Procedures
       S. 1510 also contains a number of provisions that would 
     enhance the ability of immigration officials to exclude or 
     deport aliens who engage in terrorist activity and improve 
     the Federal government's ability to share information about 
     suspected terrorists. Under the bill, those who contribute to 
     or otherwise support terrorist organizations and terrorist 
     activities would be denied admission to or deported from this 
     country, and the Attorney General would be authorized to 
     detain deportable persons who are suspected of terrorist 
     activities pending their removal from the United States. In 
     addition, the bill provides for access by the Department of 
     State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to 
     criminal history records and related information maintained 
     by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
     Money Laundering
       Title III of S. 1510 includes money laundering and other 
     financial infrastructure provisions, arising from a separate 
     legislative proposal from the Administration. These 
     provisions were added to this bill after unanimous approval 
     was reached on these provisions in the Senate Banking 
     Committee. The Administration supports the effort to 
     strengthen the money laundering statutes to help combat 
     terrorism, and supports virtually all of the proposals that 
     are now included in S. 1510.
     Pay-As-You-Go Scoring
       Any law that would increase direct spending is subject to 
     the pay-as-you-go requirements of the Balanced Budget and 
     Emergency Deficit Control Act. Accordingly, S. 1510, or any 
     substitute amendment in lieu thereof that would also increase 
     direct spending, will be subject to the pay-as-you-go 
     requirement. OMB's scoring estimates are under development. 
     The Administration will work with Congress to ensure that any 
     unintended sequester of spending does not occur under current 
     law or the enactment of any other proposals that meet the 
     President's objectives to reduce the debt, fund priority 
     initiatives, and grant tax relief to all income tax paying 
     Americans.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I know the Senator from Wisconsin has 
another amendment. I have had requests for time on our side of the 
aisle from the distinguished Senator from Washington State, Ms. 
Cantwell, for 7 minutes; the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Kerry, for 5 minutes; the distinguished Senator from Minnesota, Mr. 
Wellstone, for 5 minutes; the distinguished Senator from Michigan, Mr. 
Levin, for 2 minutes.
  I mention that, not to lock that in, because the time is there, but 
just to give people an idea of where we are.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Madam President, is the Senator from Vermont proposing 
a time agreement?
  Mr. LEAHY. No. I am just saying what people are requesting for time. 
I am trying to get some idea. A number of Senators have asked the 
distinguished leader and myself how much longer we are going to be here 
tonight.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Madam President, let me just say, anybody who wishes to 
speak on this bill is certainly welcome to do so, but we will be here 
after the vote for anybody who wishes to accommodate any other Senator 
who would like to go home.
  The hour is late. We have one more amendment, and then we have final 
passage. It is my hope that we can complete our work on the bill and 
certainly leave open the opportunity for Senators to express 
themselves. We

[[Page 19525]]

will stay just as long as that is required. I hope, though, we can 
accommodate other Senators who may not feel the need to participate in 
further debate.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I had spoken earlier this evening at 
some length about my concerns as to the procedures on the bill. I want 
to make a very few brief comments at this time.
  I am concerned about the procedures on establishing a record which 
will withstand constitutional scrutiny. I shall not repeat the 
citations from decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
which I cited earlier, except to say that the Supreme Court has 
invalidated acts of Congress where there is not a considered judgment.
  I understand the position of the majority leader in wanting to get 
this bill finished. Earlier this evening, I went through an elaborate 
chronology as to what has happened here. Nine days after September 11, 
the Attorney General submitted a bill. I had suggested hearings that 
week. The bill was submitted on September 20. We could have had 
hearings on September 21 and even on September 22, a Saturday. The 
Judiciary Committee had one hearing, a very brief one, on September 25.
  I wrote the chairman of the committee two letters urging hearings, 
and there was ample time to have hearings to find out about the details 
of this bill. There was a Judiciary subcommittee hearing on October 3.
  This bill was negotiated between the chairman and ranking member and 
the White House. The Judiciary Committee did not take up the bill. We 
have had ample time. This bill should have been before the Senate 2 
weeks ago. If we had moved on it promptly after it was submitted on the 
20th, we could have had hearings, perhaps some in closed session. We 
could have had a markup. We could have had an understanding of the 
bill.
  When the Senator from Wisconsin has offered two amendments, which I 
have supported, I am inquiring as to what is the specific concern about 
law enforcement to preclude the adoption of the amendments of the 
Senator from Wisconsin and on the possible invasions of privacy that 
may result from the amendments not being adopted.
  This is a very important bill. I intend to vote for it. I served 8 
years on the Intelligence Committee, 2 years as chairman. I chaired the 
Subcommittee of Judiciary on Terrorism. I have been through detailed 
hearings and understand the problem we face, especially in light of the 
warning which was put out today, and I understand, with the approval of 
the President, that a terrorist act may happen in the United States or 
overseas in the next several days.
  We do need adequate law enforcement powers. We should have finished 
this bill some time ago. But when the majority leader says he is 
concerned about procedure and not about substance, we are regrettably 
establishing a record where we have not only not shown the deliberative 
process to uphold constitutionality, but we are putting on the record a 
disregard for constitutionality and elevating procedure over substance, 
which is not the way you legislate in a constitutional area where the 
Supreme Court of the United States balances law enforcement's needs 
with the incursion on privacy.
  I feel constrained to make these comments. I hope yet that we can 
create a record which will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
  Again, I intend to vote for the bill, but say again that this body 
ought to be proceeding in a way to establish the record. The worst 
thing that would happen is if we try terrorists, having used these 
procedures, and have the convictions invalidated. I have had 
experiences as a prosecuting attorney and know exactly what that means.
  I want my concerns noted for the record. I thank the Chair and yield 
the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I have 5 minutes, but I will not use it. 
I want to make two very quick points.
  One, as a former prosecutor, I am sympathetic to the comments of the 
Senator from Pennsylvania. I think all of us ought to be respectful of 
what the Senator from Wisconsin has been talking about this evening.
  I will vote for the bill. I am particularly sensitive to what the 
majority leader has said about the delicacy and the balance. Even 
within that delicacy, there are some very legitimate concerns.
  It is my hope that when this goes to conference, some of the 
positions of the House will be thought about carefully and respected 
and that the Senate may even be able to improve what we have by taking 
those into account.
  The second point is that there is within this legislation for the 
first time a very significant effort on money laundering. I will say to 
my colleagues that of all the weapons in this war and for all of our 
might militarily, the most significant efforts to ferret out and stop 
terrorists are going to come from the combination of information, 
intelligence that we gather and process, and from our ability to take 
unconventional steps, particularly those such as the money-laundering 
measures.
  Senator Levin has done an outstanding job of helping to frame that, 
as has Senator Sarbanes. The truth is, there are banking interests that 
even to this moment still resist living up to the standards of the 
Basel convention and the international standards about knowing your 
customer and being part of the law enforcement effort rather than a 
blockade to it.
  We are told there may be some effort through the House to try to 
strip this out. It is my hope that the Senate will stand firm and hold 
to the full measure of what President Bush has asked us to do.
  This will be a long effort, a painstaking effort. If we are serious 
about it, we have to have the law enforcement tools to make this 
happen.
  One of the most critical ones is empowering the Secretary of the 
Treasury to do a reasonable, ratcheted, sort of geared process of 
addressing the concerns of ferreting out money laundering and taking 
the money away from these illicit interests around the globe. They are 
not just in terrorism. They are linked to money laundering, to illegal 
alien trafficking. They are all part of the same network which also 
funds the terrorists themselves.
  We recognize that three-quarters of the heroin that reaches the 
United States comes from Afghanistan. The Taliban and al-Qaida were 
both trafficking in that heroin. These networks and the 
interconnectedness of them to the banking institutions, the financial 
marketplace, are absolutely essential for us as we fight a war on 
terrorism.
  I hope this money-laundering component will be part of the final 
terrorism bill.
  I yield whatever remaining time I have.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I thank Chairman Leahy, Chairman 
Sarbanes, and members of their committees, for including our very 
strong anti-money-laundering provisions in the antiterrorism bill. The 
antiterrorism bill is simply incomplete unless it has anti-money-
laundering provisions. Our provisions are strong provisions. They will 
help prevent terrorists and other criminals from using our banks to get 
their money into this country to fund their activities which are 
terrorizing this country.
  There apparently is going to be a continuing effort in the House of 
Representatives to strip the anti-money-laundering provisions, which we 
have worked so hard on, from the antiterrorism bill. It is my 
understanding the White House will support keeping those provisions in 
the bill. Our committees have worked very hard to keep our anti-money-
laundering provisions in the antiterrorism bill. Unless these 
provisions are in there, we are providing the executive branch with 
only half a tool box in the fight against terrorism.
  Three years ago, the minority staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations which I now chair, began its investigation into money 
laundering using U.S. banks. Three years,

[[Page 19526]]

three sets of hearings, two reports and a five-volume record on 
correspondent banking and money laundering was the result.
  We found, not surprisingly, that U.S. banks have accounts for foreign 
banks and that the customers of those foreign banks can then use the 
U.S. banks to move their money. But if foreign banks do a poor job of 
screening their customers, criminals and terrorists can end up using 
U.S. banks for their criminal purposes.
  We found that U.S. banks do a poor job in screening the foreign banks 
they accept as correspondent customers. Banks told us ``a bank is a 
bank is a bank'' but that's not true. There are good banks and bad 
banks. We found numerous banks where the bank was engaged in criminal 
activity or had such poor banking practices any criminal could be a 
customer. If a bad bank has a correspondent account with a U.S. bank, 
customers of that bad bank have access to U.S. financial system. Then 
criminals, including drug traffickers and terrorists, are able to use 
our financial systems to carry out their crimes.
  In response to what we learned, we developed a bill--S. 1371, the 
Money Laundering Abatement Act introduced in early August.
  It's a bipartisan bill, and I would like to recognize my cosponsors--
in particular, Senator Chuck Grassley who has helped to lead the fight 
for including this money laundering legislation on this anti-terrorism 
bill. The cosponsors in addition to Senator Grassley are: Senators 
Sarbanes, Kyl, DeWine, Bill Nelson, Durbin, Kerry and Stabenow. The 
provisions of this bill have been included in the legislation we are 
now considering.
  We now know that the September 11 terrorists used our financial 
institutions and systems to help accomplish their ends. They used 
checks, credit cards, and wire transfers involving U.S. banks in 
Florida, New York, Pennsylvania. We've seen the photos of two of the 
terrorists using an ATM machine. Osama bin Laden has bragged about it. 
There are reports of large, unpaid credit card bills.
  We know that current law is not tough enough in area of correspondent 
banking--the mechanism used to transfer money around the globe. There 
are too many holes that let in bad banks and bad actors, and we need to 
close them.
  Look at what we've learned just in the last few days about bin Laden 
and al-Qaida. Several U.S. banks have had correspondent accounts for a 
Sundanese bank called the al Shamal Islamic Bank.
  A 1996 State Department fact sheet states that bin Laden helped 
finance the bank in the amount of $50 million. A respected 
international newsletter on intelligence matters, Indigo Publications 
in March 16, 2000, said bin Laden remains a leading shareholder, 
although the al Shamal Bank apparently denies that.
  Testimony in the February 2001 criminal trial of the 1998 terrorist 
bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, revealed that a bin 
Laden associate who handled financial transactions for al-Qaida 
testified al-Qaida had a half dozen accounts at al Shamal bank, one of 
which was in bin Laden's name. The witness at that trial said in 1994 a 
bin Laden associate took $100,000--in cash, U.S. Dollars--out of the 
Shamal Bank gave it to the witness and told him to deliver it to an 
individual in Jordan, which he did.
  Another bin Ladin associate testified at the same trial that he 
received $250,000 by a wire transfer from the Shamal Bank to his 
account in a U.S. bank in Arlington, Texas, to purchase a plane in the 
United States for bin Laden. He said he personally delivered the plane 
to bin Laden.
  Why did this bank have a correspondent account with a U.S. bank? Why 
should we allow that to happen?
  Even today, when you look at the al Shamal bank website, the bank is 
still active and advertises an extensive correspondent bank network. 
Three U.S. banks are listed. One of those banks has closed its account, 
but the two other banks continue to have accounts, although the 
accounts are frozen. Those accounts are now inactive because Sudan, 
home country of al Shamal, is on the list of terrorist countries and 
any business with the government of those countries has to be approved. 
But the accounts were operational at one point in time. Moreover, al 
Shamal bank has correspondent accounts with other foreign banks which 
have accounts with U.S. banks.
  That means al Shamal bank can still be using the U.S. financial 
system through an account with a foreign bank that has a correspondent 
account with a U.S. bank. We call this nesting and it's a serious 
problem. It means the al Shamal bank and its customers can still use 
the U.S. banking system.
  The bill before us would require U.S. banks to do a lot more homework 
on the banks they allow to have correspondent accounts. Under the anti-
terrorism bill, it is my belief and my hope that a bank like al Shamal 
would never be granted a correspondent account at a U.S. bank.
  The bill would also allow U.S. law enforcement to capture any illicit 
funds in a U.S. correspondent account. Now, if a criminal or terrorist 
has money in a foreign bank that has an account at U.S. bank and 
illicit money is being held in a U.S. account, law enforcement can't 
freeze that money unless the person is on the terrorist list or can 
prove that the foreign bank with the correspondent account is part of a 
criminal or terrorist act. That's an excessively hard threshold. This 
legislation would allow law enforcement to freeze money in 
correspondent accounts to the same extent they can freeze money in 
regular, individual accounts.
  We need all the tools possible in our arsenal to fight the financial 
network of terrorism. The money laundering provisions in this bill 
close the loopholes in existing law and provide additional tools for 
law enforcement to use.
  I thank Chairman Sarbanes and the other members of the Banking 
Committee for including so much of the Levin-Grassley anti-money 
laundering bill, S. 1371, in the Committee's bill. I also thank 
Chairman Leahy and the other Judiciary Committee members for including 
anti-money laundering provisions in title 3 of S. 1510, the anti-
terrorism bill. Strengthening our anti-money laundering laws will 
strike a blow against terrorism by making it harder for terrorists to 
get the funds they need into United States; an anti-terrorism bill 
without these anti-money laundering provisions would be providing U.S. 
law enforcement with only half a toolbox against terrorism.
  I would like to take a few minutes to discuss a few key provisions 
from the Levin-Grassley bill that have been incorporated into S. 1510. 
These provisions are based on an extensive record of hearings and 
reports issued in connection with investigations conducted over the 
past few years by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which I 
chair, into money laundering in the correspondent and private banking 
fields.
  The four provisions I want to focus on are provisions that would ban 
foreign shell banks from the U.S. financial system; require U.S. 
financial institutions to exercise due diligence; add foreign 
corruption offenses to the crimes that can trigger a U.S. money 
laundering prosecution; and close a major forfeiture loophole involving 
foreign banks.
  First is the shell bank ban in Section 313 of S. 1510. This provision 
is a very important one, because it attempts to eliminate from the U.S. 
financial system one category of foreign banks that carry the highest 
money laundering risks in the banking world today. Those are foreign 
offshore shell banks which, as defined in the bill, are banks that have 
no physical presence anywhere and no affiliation with any bank that has 
a physical presence. Our Subcommittee investigation found that these 
shell banks carry the highest money laundering risks in the banking 
world, because they are inherently unavailable for effective oversight. 
There is no office where a bank regulator or law enforcement official 
can go to observe bank operations, review documents, talk to bank 
officials, or freeze funds. Only a few countries now issue licenses for 
unaffiliated shall banks;

[[Page 19527]]

they include Nauru, Vanuatu, and Montenegro. Nauru alone is believed to 
maintain licenses for somewhere between 400 and 3,000 offshore shell 
banks, none of which are being actively supervised, and some of which 
are suspected of laundering funds for Russian organized crime. A staff 
report that we issued in February of this year includes four detailed 
case histories of offshore shell banks that were able to open 
correspondent accounts at U.S. banks and used them to move funds 
related to drug trafficking, bribe money and financial fraud money. The 
possibility that terrorists are also using shell banks to conduct their 
operations is real and cannot be ignored. That is why this provision 
seeks to exclude shell banks from the U.S. financial system.
  The provision flat-out prohibits U.S. financial institutions from 
opening accounts for shell banks. Period. It also requires U.S. 
financial institutions to take reasonable steps to make sure that other 
foreign banks are not allowing shell banks to use their U.S. accounts 
to gain entry to the U.S. financial system. The point is to prevent 
shell banks from getting direct or indirect access to U.S. financial 
accounts. The shell bank ban applies to both banks and securities firms 
operating in the United States, so that it is as broad and as effective 
as possible.
  The provision directs the Treasury Secretary to provide regulatory 
guidance to U.S. financial institutions on the reasonable steps they 
have to take to guard against shell banks using accounts opened for 
other foreign banks. One possible approach would be for U.S. financial 
institutions to include a new section in the standard language they use 
to open accounts for foreign banks asking the foreign bank to certify 
that it will not allow any shell bank to use its U.S. accounts. The 
U.S. financial institution could then rely on that certification, 
unless it encountered evidence to the contrary indicating that a shell 
bank was actually using the account, in which case the financial 
institution would have to take reasonable steps to evaluate that 
evidence and determine whether a shell bank was, in fact, using the 
U.S. account.
  The provision contains one exception to the shell bank ban, which 
should be narrowly construed to protect the U.S. financial system to 
the greatest extent possible. This exception allows U.S. financial 
institutions to open an account for a shell bank that is both 
affiliated with another bank that maintains a physical presence, and 
subject to supervision by the banking regulatory of that affiliated 
bank. This exception is intended to allow U.S. financial institutions 
to do business with shell branches of large, established banks on the 
ground that the regulator of the established bank can and does oversee 
all of that bank's branches, including any shell branch.
  This exception could, of course, be abused. It is possible that an 
established bank in a jurisdiction with weak banking and anti-money 
laundering controls could open a shell branch in another country with 
equally weak controls and try to use that shell branch to launder funds 
in ways that are unlikely to be detected or stopped by the bank 
regulator in its home jurisdiction. In that case, while the shell bank 
ban exception would not flat-out bar U.S. financial institutions from 
opening an account for the shell branch, another provision would come 
into play and require the U.S. financial institution to exercise 
enhanced due diligence before opening an account for this shell bank. I 
would hope that U.S. financial institutions would not open such an 
account--that they would exercise common sense and restraint and 
refrain from doing business with a shell operation that is affiliated 
with a poorly regulated bank and inherently resistant to effective 
oversight.
  Many U.S. financial institutions already have a policy against doing 
business with shell banks, but at least one major U.S. bank, Citibank, 
has a history of taking on shell banks as clients. In order to keep 
those clients, Citibank tried very hard to expand the exception in this 
section to also allow U.S. accounts for shell banks affiliated with 
financial service companies other than banks, such as securities firms 
or financial holding companies. The broad exception was firmly and 
explicitly rejected by both the Senate Banking Committee and the House 
Financial Services Committee, because it would have opened a gaping 
loophole in the shell bank ban and rendered the ban largely 
ineffective. All a shell bank would have had to do to evade the ban was 
establish an affiliated shell corporation and call it a financial 
services company in order to be eligible to open a U.S. bank account. 
The Citibank approach would, for example, have allowed a shell bank 
established by bin Laden's financial holding company, Taba Investments, 
to open accounts at U.S. banks and securities firms. That would 
perpetuate the very problem that the Senate investigation identified in 
two of its shell bank case histories involving M.A. Bank and Federal 
Bank, each of which opened Citibank accounts in New York and used those 
accounts to deposit suspect funds associated with drug trafficking and 
bribery.
  The exception to the shell bank ban is intended to be narrowly 
construed, and U.S. financial institutions will hopefully use great 
restraint in doing business with any shell bank that is not affiliated 
with a well known, well regulated bank. The shell bank ban is intended 
to close the U.S. financial marketplace to the money laundering risks 
posed by these banks, and it is my hope that other countries and the 
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering will follow the U.S. 
lead and take the same action in other jurisdictions.
  The next provision is the due diligence requirement in Section 312 of 
S. 1510. This is another critical provision that tightens up U.S. anti-
money laundering controls by requiring U.S. financial institutions to 
exercise due diligence when opening and managing correspondent and 
private banking accounts for foreign banks and wealthy foreign 
individuals.
  The provision targets correspondent and private banking accounts, 
because these two areas have been identified by U.S. bank regulators as 
high risk areas for money laundering, and because Congressional 
investigations have documented money laundering abuses through them. 
For example, two weeks ago, I testified before the Banking Committee 
about a high risk foreign bank in Sudan that was able to open accounts 
at major banks around the world, including in the United States and, in 
1994, used these accounts to funnel money to a bin Laden operative then 
living in Texas. On one occasion, he used a $250,000 wire transfer from 
the Sudanese bank to buy an airplane capable of transporting Stinger 
missiles, fly it to Sudan and deliver the keys to bin Laden. Six months 
earlier, we released a staff report with ten case histories of high 
risk foreign banks that used their U.S. accounts to transfer illicit 
proceeds associated with drug trafficking, financial fraud and other 
crimes. A year earlier, another staff report presented four case 
histories of senior foreign government officials or their relatives 
opening U.S. private banking accounts and using them to deposit 
millions of dollars in suspect funds. The bottom line is that U.S. 
banks need to do a much better job in screening the foreign banks and 
wealthy foreign individuals they allow to open accounts in the United 
States.
  The due diligence provision would address that problem. It would 
impose an ongoing, industry-wide legal obligation on all types of 
financial institutions operating in the United States to exercise 
greater care when opening accounts for foreign banks and wealthy 
foreign individuals. Its due diligence requirements are intended to 
function as preventative measures to stop dubious banks and as well as 
terrorists or other criminals from using foreign banks' U.S. accounts 
to gain access to the U.S. financial system.
  The general obligation to exercise due diligence with respect to all 
correspondent and private banking accounts is contained in paragraph 
(1). Paragraphs (2) and (3) then provide minimum standards for the 
enhanced

[[Page 19528]]

due diligence that U.S. banks must exercise with respect to certain 
correspondent and private banking accounts. Paragraph (4)(B) gives the 
Treasury Secretary discretionary authority to issue regulatory guidance 
to further clarify the due diligence policies, procedures and controls 
required by paragraph (1).
  The regulatory authority granted in this section is intended to help 
financial institutions understand what is expected of them. The 
Secretary may want to issue regulations that help different types of 
financial institutions to understand their obligations under the due 
diligence provision. However, one caveat needs to be made with respect 
to the Secretary's exercise of this regulatory authority, and that 
involves how it is to be coordinated with Section 5318(a)(6), which 
authorizes the Secretary to grant ``appropriate exemptions'' from any 
particular money laundering requirement. There are going to be many 
efforts made by various groups of financial institutions to win an 
exemption from the due diligence requirements in this section--from 
insurance companies, to money transmitters, to offshore affiliates of 
large foreign banks. But the Committee's and the Senate's clear 
intention is to cover all major financial institutions operating in the 
United States. That is why Chairman Sarbanes changed the language in my 
bill, S. 1371, so that the due diligence requirement did not apply just 
to banks, but to all financial institutions as that term is defined in 
Section 5312(a)(2) of title 31. That broad coverage is exactly what is 
contemplated by this statute. The bottom line, then, is that the 
Secretary is intended to apply the due diligence requirements broadly 
to U.S. financial institutions, and not to grant an exemption without a 
very compelling justification.
  This same reasoning also applies to the shell bank ban. There will be 
some that will seek one exemption or another from the ban, asking the 
Treasury Secretary to use the authority available under Section 
5318(a)(6). Again, the intent of the Committee and this Senate is to 
enact as comprehensive a shell bank ban as possible to protect the 
United States from the money laundering threat posed by shell banks. 
That means that the Secretary should refrain from granting any 
exemption to the shell bank ban without a very compelling 
justification.
  The third provision I want to discuss is the provision in Section 315 
adding new foreign corruption offenses to the list of crimes that can 
trigger a U.S. money laundering prosecution. This is another important 
advance in U.S. anti-money laundering law. Right now, because foreign 
corruption offenses are not currently on the list of crimes that can 
trigger a U.S. money laundering prosecution, corrupt foreign leaders 
may be targeting U.S. financial institutions as a safe haven for their 
funds. This provision will make it clear to those who loot their 
countries, or accept bribes, or steal from their people, that their 
illicit money is not welcome here. Our banks do not want that money, 
and if it is deposited in U.S. banks, it is subject to seizure and the 
depositor may become subject to a money laundering prosecution.
  The fourth provision would close a major forfeiture loophole in U.S. 
law involving foreign banks. This provision is in Section 319(a) of S. 
1510. It would make a depositor's funds in a foreign bank's U.S. 
correspondent account subject to the same civil forfeiture rules that 
apply to depositors funds in other U.S. bank accounts. Right now, due 
to a quirk in the law, U.S. law enforcement faces a significant and 
unusual legal barrier to seizing funds from a correspondent account. 
Unlike a regular U.S. bank account, it is not enough for U.S. law 
enforcement to show that criminal proceeds were deposited into the 
correspondent account; instead, because funds in a correspondent 
account are considered to be the funds of the foreign bank itself, the 
government must also show that the foreign bank was somehow part of the 
wrongdoing.
  That's not only a tough job, that can be an impossible job. In many 
cases, the foreign bank will not have been part of the wrongdoing, but 
that's a strange reason for letting the foreign depositor who was 
engaged in a wrongdoing escape forfeiture. And in those cases where the 
foreign bank may have been involved, no prosecutor will be able to 
allege it in a complaint without first getting the resources needed to 
chase the foreign bank abroad.
  Take, for example, the case of Barclays Bank which has frozen an 
account because of suspicious activity suggesting it may be associated 
with terrorism. If that account had been a correspondent account in the 
United States opened for Barclays Bank, U.S. law enforcement could have 
been unable to freeze the particular deposits suspected of being 
associated with terrorism, because the funds were in the Barclays 
correspondent account and Barclays itself was apparently unaware of any 
wrongdoing. That doesn't make sense. U.S. law enforcement should be 
able to freeze the funds.
  Section 319(a) would eliminate that quirk by placing civil 
forfeitures of funds in correspondent accounts on the same footing as 
forfeitures of funds in all other U.S. accounts. There is just no 
reason foreign banks should be shielded from forfeitures when U.S. 
banks would not be.
  Section 319 has many other important provisions as well, including 
provisions dealing with Federal Receivers, legal service on foreign 
banks and more.
  I want to again thank Senator Sarbanes and Senator Leahy and their 
staffs for their hard work and cooperative spirit in bringing this bill 
to the floor and including the provisions of our bill in it.
  I need to add that the hard work in passing this bill will be for 
naught if some of the banks have their way in the House and in 
Conference Committee. I'm very concerned with reports that there is an 
effort in the House to separate the money laundering and anti-terrorism 
bills, so money laundering will be considered separately. The banks 
should be working with us to figure out even more ways in which the 
money flow of terrorists can be shut down.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to print letters of support 
for this legislation and testimony from the FBI in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

Statement of Dennis M. Lormel, Chief, Financial Crimes Section, Federal 
   Bureau of Investigation, Before the House Committee on Financial 
               Services, Washington, DC, October 3, 2001

       Correspondent banking is another potential vulnerability in 
     the financial services sector that can offer terrorist 
     organizations a gateway into U.S. banks just as it does for 
     money launderers. As this Committee well knows, the problem 
     stems from the relationships many U.S. Banks have with high 
     risk foreign banks. These foreign banks may be shell banks 
     with no physical presence in any country, offshore banks with 
     licenses limited to transacting business with persons outside 
     the licensing jurisdiction, or banks licensed and regulated 
     by jurisdictions with weak regulatory controls that invite 
     banking abuses and criminal misconduct. Attempts to trace 
     funds through these banks are met with overwhelming 
     obstacles. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that once a 
     correspondent account is opened in a U.S. Bank, not only the 
     foreign bank but its clients can transact business through 
     the U.S. bank. As Congress has noted in the past, requiring 
     U.S. banks to more thoroughly screen and monitor foreign 
     banks as clients could help prevent much of the abuse in 
     correspondent bank relationships.
                                  ____

                                       U.S. Department of Justice,


                                Office of Legislative Affairs,

                               Washington, DC, September 18, 2001.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee 
         on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Charles Grassley,
     Co-Chairman, Senate Drug Caucus, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman and Mr. Co-Chairman: We are writing in 
     response to your recent letter to Attorney General Ashcroft 
     concerning S. 1371, the Money Laundering Abatement Act. We 
     appreciate your continued commitment to addressing the 
     serious problem of money laundering in this country and 
     abroad, as demonstrated by your introduction of S. 1371. As 
     you indicated in your letter, the Attorney General has 
     expressed the need to strengthen our money laundering laws. 
     In his August 7th speech, the Attorney General stated: ``The 
     Department of Justice

[[Page 19529]]

     has identified several areas in which our money laundering 
     laws need to be updated to more effectively combat organized 
     crime and to better serve the cause of justice.''
       We were very pleased to see that one of the areas 
     highlighted in the Attorney General's speech--the need to add 
     to the list of foreign offenses that constitute predicate 
     crimes for money laundering prosecutions--is included in S. 
     1371. This and other provisions in your bill would greatly 
     improve our money laundering laws.
       As the Attorney General also indicated in his speech, the 
     Department of Justice has been developing its own proposal to 
     update our money laundering laws and we hope to provide 
     Congress with our own recommendations in the near future. We 
     look forward to working with you in pursuing our mutual goal 
     of strengthening and modernizing our money laundering laws to 
     meet the challenges of this new century.
       Thank you for your attention to this matter. If we may be 
     of additional assistance, we trust that you will not hesitate 
     to call upon us. The Office of Management and Budget has 
     advised that there is no objection from the standpoint of the 
     Administration's program to the presentation of this report.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Daniel J. Bryant,
     Assistant Attorney General.
                                  ____

                                       U.S. Department of Justice,


                              Drug Enforcement Administration,

                               Washington, DC, September 20, 2001.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee 
         on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for requesting our views on S. 
     1371, the ``Money Laundering Abatement Act,'' which is 
     designed to combat money laundering and protect the United 
     States financial system by strengthening safeguards in 
     private and correspondent banking.
       We greatly appreciate your initiative in this important 
     area and believe that several provisions of S. 1371 would be 
     of particular benefit to DEA's efforts to combat money 
     laundering. In addition, as Assistant Attorney General Bryant 
     recently indicated in his letter to you, the Administration 
     has been working for some time on a package of additional 
     suggested money laundering amendments, which we hope to be 
     able to share with you shortly.
       We look forward to working with you to strengthen and 
     improve the Nation's money laundering laws. If I can be of 
     any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
     The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is 
     no objection to the presentation of this report from the 
     standpoint of the Administration's program.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Asa Hutchinson,
     Administrator.
                                  ____

                                                   Federal Deposit


                                        Insurance Corporation,

                                Washington, DC, September 7, 2001.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Chairman, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. 
         Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the opportunity to comment 
     on S. 1371, the Money Laundering Abatement Act. The Federal 
     Deposit Insurance Corporation shares your concern about the 
     damage to the U.S. financial system that may result from 
     money laundering activities and we congratulate you for your 
     leadership in this area.
       As deposit insurer, the FDIC is vitally interested in 
     preventing insured depository institutions from being used as 
     conduits for funds derived from illegal activity. As you may 
     know, in January of this year, the FDIC, together with the 
     Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the 
     Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
     Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the 
     Department of State, issued Guidance On Enhanced Scrutiny For 
     Transactions That May Involve The Proceeds Of Official 
     Corruption. The FDIC is also an active participant in other 
     working groups that seek more effective ways to combat money 
     laundering.
       S. 1371 is an important step in trying to preclude foreign 
     entities from laundering money through U.S. financial 
     institutions. S. 1371 would, in several ways, require U.S. 
     financial institutions to identify foreign parties who open 
     or maintain accounts with U.S. banks, such as through 
     correspondent accounts or private banking accounts. The bill 
     would also prohibit customers from having direct access to 
     concentration accounts, and make it a crime to falsify the 
     identity of a participant in a transaction with or through 
     U.S. financial institutions. Correspondent and concentration 
     accounts have the potential to be misused so as to facilitate 
     money laundering, and the bill appropriately addresses these 
     concerns.
       One point we would like to raise is in relation to Section 
     3 of the bill. Section 3 provides for consultation between 
     the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, both in regard to devising 
     measures to combat money laundering and defining terms 
     relating to anti-money laundering measures. The FDIC believes 
     that such consultation requirements should include the FDIC 
     as well as the other Federal banking agencies.
       Thank you again for the opportunity to provide our views on 
     S. 1371. Please do not hesitate to contact Alice Goodman, 
     Director of our Office of Legislative Affairs, at (202) 898-
     8730 if we can be of any further assistance.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Donald E. Powell,
     Chairman.
                                  ____

                                                State of Michigan,


                               Department of Attorney General,

                                   Lansing MI, September 25, 2001.
     Hon: Carl Levin,
     U.S. Senator, Russell Senate Office Bldg.,
     Washington, DC.
     Hon. Chuck Grassley,
     U.S. Senator,
     Hart Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators Levin and Grassley: I write to express my 
     strong support for S1371, the Money Laundering Abatement Act. 
     This is a prevalent problem that has allowed the criminal 
     element to secrete the proceeds of criminal activity and to 
     generate funds needed to facilitate and underwrite organized 
     crime.
       The bill will make it harder for foreign criminals to use 
     United States banks to launder the proceeds of their illegal 
     activity and allow investigators to detect, prevent, and 
     prosecute money laundering. In particular, the bill 
     strengthens existing anti-money laundering laws by adding 
     foreign corruption offenses, barring U.S. banks from 
     providing banking services to foreign shell banks, requiring 
     U.S. banks to conduct enhanced due diligence, and making 
     foreign bank depositors' funds in U.S. correspondence banks 
     subject to the same forfeiture rules that apply to funds in 
     other U.S. bank accounts.
       Recent events highlighting the activities of foreign 
     terrorists have demonstrated the necessity for his law. My 
     colleagues in the U.S. Justice Department indicate that this 
     and similar laws are essential if we are to succeed in our 
     fight against organized crime, drug dealers, and terrorism. 
     This bill is the result of lengthy hearings and congressional 
     fact-finding that concluded that the regulations set forth in 
     the bill are needed. The bill has my support, and I would 
     urge its passage as soon as possible.
           Sincerely yours,
                                             Jennifer M. Granholm,
     Attorney General.
                                  ____

                                                 State of Arizona,


                               Office of the Attorney General,

                                      Phoenix, AZ, August 2, 2001.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Hon. Chuck Grassley,
     Hart Senate Office Building,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators Levin and Grassley: I write to express my 
     views on the Money Laundering Abatement Act you are planning 
     to introduce soon. This bill would provide much needed relief 
     from some of the most pressing problems in money laundering 
     enforcement in the international arena. The burdens it places 
     on the financial institutions are well considered, closely 
     tailored to the problems, and reasonable in light of the 
     public benefits involved.
       The bill focuses on the structural arrangements that allow 
     major money launderers to operate. These include the use of 
     shell banks and foreign accounts, abuse of private banking, 
     evasion of law enforcement efforts to acquire necessary 
     records, and of safe foreign havens for criminal proceeds. 
     The approach is very encouraging, because efforts to limit 
     the abuse of these international money laundering tools and 
     techniques must come from Congress rather than the state 
     legislatures, and because such measures attack money 
     laundering at a deeper and more lasting level than simpler 
     measures.
       The focus on structural matters means that this bill's 
     effects on cases actually prosecuted by state attorneys 
     general are a relatively small part of the substantial 
     effects its passage would have on money laundering as a 
     whole. Nevertheless, its effects on money laundering 
     affecting victims of crime and illegal drug trafficking would 
     be dramatic. I will use two examples from my Office's present 
     money laundering efforts.
       My Office initiated a program to combat so-called ``prime 
     bank fraud'' in 1996, and continues to focus on these cases. 
     Some years ago, the International Chamber of Commerce 
     estimated that over $10 million per day is invested in this 
     wholly fraudulent investment scam. The ``PBI'' business has 
     grown substantially since then. To date, my Office has 
     recovered over $46 million in these cases, directly and in 
     concert with U.S. Attorneys and SEC. Prime bank fraudsters 
     rely heavily on the money movement and concealment techniques 
     that this bill would address, particularly foreign bank 
     accounts, shell banks, accounts in false identities, movement 
     of funds through ``concentration'' accounts, and impunity 
     from efforts to repatriate stolen funds. One of our targets 
     was sentenced recently in federal court to over eight years 
     in prison and ordered to make restitution of over $9 million, 
     but without the tools provided in this bill, there is little

[[Page 19530]]

     hope that the victims will even see anything that was not 
     seized for forfeiture in the early stages of the 
     investigation.
       My Office is now engaged in a program to control the 
     laundering of funds through the money transmitters in 
     Arizona, as part of the much larger problem of illegal money 
     movement to and through the Southwest border region. This 
     mechanism is a major facilitator of the drug smuggling 
     operations. Foreign bank accounts and correspondence 
     accounts, immunity from U.S. forfeitures, and false 
     ownerships are significant barriers to successful control of 
     money laundering in the Southwest.
       Your bill is an example of the immense value of 
     institutions like the Permanent Subcommittee of 
     Investigations, because this type of bill requires a deeper 
     understanding of the issues that comes from long term 
     inquiries by professional staff. We who are involved in state 
     level money laundering control efforts should be particularly 
     supportive of such long term strategies because they are most 
     important to the quality of life of our citizens.
       I commend your efforts for introducing this important 
     legislation and will assist you in anyway I can to gain its 
     passage.
           Yours very truly,
                                                 Janet Napolitano,
                                                 Attorney General.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I tell the distinguished Senator from 
Michigan and the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, who made 
such strong and valid points on money laundering, we just received from 
the administration their statement of policy saying: This includes 
money laundering, other financial infrastructure provisions arising 
from separate legislative proposals. These provisions were added to 
this bill after unanimous approval to have these provisions in the 
Senate Banking Committee. The administration supports the effort to 
strengthen this--
  And so on. They are extremely important, and I can assure both 
Senators that I will strongly support retention of this in conference.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.


                           Amendment No. 1901

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 1901, which is 
at the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Miller). The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1901.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

   (Purpose: To modify the provisions relating to access to business 
    records under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978)

       Strike section 215 and insert the following:

     SEC. 215. ACCESS TO BUSINESS RECORD UNDER FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEIL-
                   LANCE ACT OF 1978.

       (A) In General.--Section 502 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1862) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``authorizing a common 
     carrier'' and all that follows through ``to release records'' 
     and inserting ``requiring a business to produce any tangible 
     things (including books, records, papers, documents, and 
     other items)'';
       (2) in subsection (b)(2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting: ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) the records concerned are not protected by any 
     Federal or State law governing access to the records for 
     intelligence or law enforcement purposes.''; and
       (3) in subsection (d), by striking ``common carrier, public 
     accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or vehicle 
     rental facility'' each place it appears and inserting 
     ``business''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The text of section 501 of that 
     Act (50 U.S.C. 1861) is amended to read as follows:
       ``Sec. 501. In this title, the terms `agent of a foreign 
     power', `foreign intelligence information', `international 
     terrorism', and `Attorney General' have the meanings given 
     such terms in section 101.''.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, this amendment has to do with section 
215 in the bill. It allows the Government, under FISA, to compel 
businesses to turn over records to assist in an investigation of 
terrorism or espionage. The provision makes two significant changes 
from current law. Under current law, the FBI can seek records from only 
a limited set of businesses--from public accommodations, such as hotels 
and motels, car rental companies, storage facilities, and travel 
records, such as those from airlines.
  Current law also requires the FBI to demonstrate to the FISA court 
that the records pertain to an agent of a foreign power. The FBI cannot 
go on a fishing expedition of records of citizens of this country who 
might have had incidental contact with a target of an investigation. 
But under section 215 of this bill, all business records can be 
compelled to be produced, including those containing sensitive personal 
information such as medical records from hospitals or doctors, or 
educational records, or records of what books someone has taken out of 
the library.
  This is an enormous expansion of authority, compounded by the 
elimination of the requirement that the records have to pertain to an 
agent of a foreign power. Under this provision, the Government can 
apparently go on a fishing expedition and collect information on 
anyone--perhaps someone who has worked with, or lived next door to, or 
has been seen in the company of, or went to school with, or whose phone 
number was called by the target of an investigation.
  So we are not talking here only about the targets of the 
investigation; we are talking about people who have simply had some 
incidental contact with the target. All the FBI has to do is to allege 
in order to get the order that the information is sought for an 
investigation of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
gathering. That is all they have to do, assert that--not to just get at 
the targets, but at people who have had any contact whatsoever with 
them.
  On that minimal showing in an ex parte application in a secret court, 
the Government can lawfully compel a doctor or a hospital to release 
medical records or a library to release circulation records. This is 
truly a breathtaking expansion of the police power, one that I do not 
think is warranted.
  My amendment does not completely strike the provision. There are 
elements of it that I think have legitimacy. First, my amendment 
maintains the requirement that the records pertain to a target alleged 
to be an agent of a foreign power. This provides some protection for 
American citizens who might otherwise become the subject of 
investigations for having some innocent contact with a suspected 
terrorist.
  Second, while the amendment maintains the expansion of the FISA 
authority to all business records, it also requires the FBI to comply 
with State and Federal laws that contain a higher standard for the 
disclosure of certain private information. The amendment makes it clear 
that existing Federal and State statutory protections for the privacy 
of certain information are not diminished or superseded by section 215.
  There are certain categories of records, such as medical records or 
educational records, that Congress and State legislatures have deemed 
worthy of a higher level of privacy protection. Let me quickly give you 
a couple of examples. In California, there is a very detailed statutory 
provision governing disclosure of medical information to law 
enforcement authorities. Generally, the law requires either patient 
consent, or a court order, or a subpoena. Before issuing an order for 
the records to be produced, the court must, among other things, find 
good cause based on a determination that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the records in question will disclose material 
information or evidence of substantial value in connection with the 
investigation or prosecution.
  Montana is another State with strong statutory, and indeed 
constitutional, protections for medical records. It provides that 
medical records can only be obtained with an investigative subpoena 
signed by a judge, and that subpoena may be issued only when it appears 
upon the affidavit of the prosecutor that a compelling State interest

[[Page 19531]]

requires it to be issued. In order to establish a compelling State 
interest, the prosecutor must state facts and circumstances sufficient 
to support probable cause to believe that an offense has been 
committed, and that the information relative to the commission of that 
offense is in the possession of the person or institution to whom the 
subpoena is directed.
  My State of Wisconsin, along with many other States, has very strong 
library confidentiality laws which requires a court order for 
disclosure of public library system records.
  Texas, for example, permits disclosure of library records ``to a law 
enforcement agency or prosecutor under a court order or subpoena 
obtained after a showing to a court that: (A) disclosure of the record 
is necessary to protect the public safety; (B) the record is evidence 
of an offense or constitutes evidence that a particular person 
committed an offense.''
  Missouri and Nevada library records confidentiality laws both require 
that a court find ``that the disclosure of such record is necessary to 
protect the public safety or to prosecute a crime.''
  South Carolina's library records confidentiality law permits 
disclosure ``in accordance with a proper judicial order upon finding 
that disclosure of the records is necessary to protect public safety, 
to prosecute a crime, or upon showing of good cause before a presiding 
judge in a civil matter.''
  In short, our States have made policy judgments about the protection 
to which certain kinds of records are justified. We have Federal laws 
that express similar judgments--Federal Educational Records Privacy 
Act. Indeed, as I will mention, this bill provides new standards for 
the production of educational records in connection with terrorism 
investigations.
  So my fear is that what section 215 does is effectively trump any and 
all of these State and Federal privacy protections. I think that is a 
result that most of our citizens and their State representatives would 
not countenance. So my amendment simply provides that this new 
authority to compel the production of business records through an order 
of a FISA court does not apply if another State or Federal law governs 
the law enforcement or intelligence access to the records.
  To the extent that the records sought have no such statutory 
protection, the only effect this amendment would have is to ensure that 
the records actually pertain to the target. But I strongly believe that 
merely alleging that the records are needed for an intelligence 
investigation should not override other protections provided by State 
and Federal law.
  I will quickly highlight the problem by referring to section 508 of 
this bill. That section, I think, would be rendered meaningless if 
section 215 is not amended as I propose.
  The original version of section 508 proposed by the administration 
would have given the Attorney General the right to obtain the 
educational records of virtually any student without a court order. I 
and many other Senators had serious problems with that provision, and 
it was significantly changed before S. 1510 was introduced. Section 508 
now does require a court order and does provide a specific showing that 
the Attorney General must make to obtain the order to get at these 
educational records. But if section 215 is enacted without my amendment 
a university could be ordered to turn over such records as ``tangible 
things'' on a much lower showing.
  The administration asserts that it is too great a burden for the 
Government to abide by existing privacy protections and seek court 
orders to obtain certain sensitive information specifically identified 
by Congress and State legislators. I remind my colleagues that the 
protections I seek to preserve were carefully drafted and debated and 
enacted at a time when legislators could thoughtfully consider the full 
weight of granting such protections. We are now asked to set these 
protections aside with scant discussion of either the merits or the 
consequences of such a proposal, during a time of incredible strain on 
our democratic principles, and for an indeterminate length of time.
  If my amendment is adopted, law enforcement will still have access to 
all of the information it seeks. But my amendment simply maintains the 
integrity of protections enacted by Congress and State legislatures for 
certain kinds of sensitive information to ensure that access to this 
information is given only where it is necessary. It makes sure that 
this provision does not become the platform or an excuse for a fishing 
expedition for damaging information on American citizens who are not 
the subjects of FISA surveillance.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say, again, to colleagues that this 
amendment the Senator from Wisconsin introduced makes sure that our 
Federal and State laws regarding certain sensitive privacy areas are 
not diminished or superseded by this provision.
  The amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin goes to the heart of the 
concerns that a lot of the people we represent have. I imagine that the 
vote may be overwhelmingly in opposition to this amendment. That has 
been the pattern.
  Again, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for raising these 
questions. This is what we should be doing.
  I conclude this way: I really think, in part, because of the kind of 
questions the Senator from Wisconsin has raised--again, I am not a 
lawyer--in looking at this bill, Mr. President, I say to Senator Leahy, 
it seems to me he and others have done a great job and are doing 
everything possible to make this more balanced. There are so many good 
provisions in this bill that we need. I believe that.
  I hope we can keep the sunset provision, which is so essential to 
oversight, because I think what is good is the provisions of this 
legislation that focus on combating terrorism and what is not quite so 
good is the parts of this bill that reach way beyond that.
  Yes, there is a lot of good. I will support it. I will reserve final 
judgment of what comes out of the conference committee. I think we can 
make it better.
  I thank my colleagues, Senator Hatch included, for their work. 
Sometimes people can honestly disagree. I know this is important. I 
know where we are as a nation, but the Senator from Wisconsin has 
raised important concerns tonight, and others as well. I hope we do 
better in conference.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Minnesota. He 
said it exactly right. Each of us who spoke on these amendments tonight 
cares just as much as everybody in this room about the fight against 
terrorism and stopping it. We just want to make sure we do not go 
beyond that goal with unnecessary language that intrudes on our civil 
liberties. That is it. That is all we are trying to do.
  I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Washington.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
  Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for 
the time and his energies this evening. We all know that the hour is 
late and that there are many things we must accomplish in our acts to 
fight terrorism. This is probably one of the most significant pieces of 
legislation that affects our home-front activities in fighting that 
battle.
  There are many good things in this bill. I am very proud of the 
authorizing language to triple the resources for our northern borders. 
I am very proud of the language in the bill that basically will set a 
new technology standard for our visa program so we can better identify 
people coming into this country. I am very proud of the many tools in 
the bill for law enforcement. I ask unanimous consent that the column 
in the Washington Post be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Oct. 10, 2001]

                         When Care Beats Haste

       The complex antiterrorism legislation that the 
     administration sent Congress less than a

[[Page 19532]]

     month ago could reach the floors of both houses this week. 
     The original proposal has been considerably improved since 
     its hasty submission, but civil liberties groups continue to 
     warn with cause that some of the detention and surveillance 
     provisions would give the government more power than is 
     either necessary or healthy.
       Some of the members of both parties who helped construct 
     the current compromises are likewise uneasy about their own 
     handiwork, but reluctant to be seen as holding up a bill the 
     administration insists it needs right away. The reluctance 
     will be the greater now that the country is engaged in 
     military action in Afghanistan; there is fear--we have no 
     doubt well-founded--of retaliation. But dangerous moments are 
     precisely the ones when it is most important that civil 
     liberties be protected.
       The House Judiciary Committee has dealt with the 
     conflicting pressures in part by putting a kind of asterisk 
     after the surveillance sections of the bill. It has 
     ``sunset'' them, meaning the powers they confer will expire 
     after two years unless a subsequent Congress, having seen how 
     the powers work out, votes to extend them. The administration 
     opposes the sunset provision and succeeded in keeping it out 
     of the Senate version. But it's a reasonable compromise. A 
     bill such as this is a balancing of risks--the risk of 
     further attack versus the risk to civil liberties in seeking 
     to forestall the attack. If the bill is as benign as the 
     administration insists, it has nothing to fear from a sunset 
     provision, which ought to be retained.
       Parts of the administration proposal were sensible and are 
     not in dispute: allowing the government in an age of cell 
     phones to seek court approval for placing a wiretap on a 
     person rather than a particular phone, for example. Others 
     were drawn too loosely, and some still need work. The 
     administration had sought authority to detain indefinitely 
     non-citizens whom the attorney general thought even might be 
     engaged in terrorism or other activities that endangered 
     national security. That power has been greatly circumscribed. 
     A person not charged with a crime after seven days can be 
     held only if the government is moving to deport him. The 
     question, which the bills don't clearly answer, is how long, 
     without judicial determination, can it hold him then?
       Wiretap authority now is easier to get for foreign 
     intelligence than for law enforcement purposes. The 
     legislation would make it easier still. The question then 
     becomes how to make sure that the new authority isn't 
     abused--in fact used for law enforcement purposes or fishing 
     expeditions--in such a way as to make such surveillance far 
     more commonplace than now. Related issues have to do with the 
     sharing of law enforcement and intelligence information among 
     government officials. There are ways to provide the broader 
     authority the government says it needs while hedging against 
     its abuse; in our view, not all of those have been fully 
     explored.
       So too with the power the bill would give law enforcement 
     officials to obtain records of an individual's Internet use, 
     including addresses of e-mail sent and received. Phone 
     records are now available to law enforcement agencies more or 
     less on request--when were calls made from phone A to phone 
     B? what should be the Internet analogy?
       The administration was said yesterday to be pressing for 
     quick passage by both houses of the Senate measure; the more 
     careful work of the House Judiciary Committee would be set 
     aside. That's wrong, and an acquiescent step that in the long 
     run Congress likely would regret.

  Ms. CANTWELL. This article said it best with the headline: ``When 
Care Beats Haste'':

       The question then becomes how to make sure that the new 
     authority isn't abused--in fact used for law enforcement 
     purposes or fishing expeditions--

  Later it says that it would be wrong for us to take an acquiescent 
step that in the long run would really hurt our country.
  What Senator Feingold is simply trying to say is that we have already 
painstakingly over many years crafted a careful balance in protecting 
personal privacy. This language in section 215 changes that. It 
basically says that the FBI can have access to other things, including 
business records from U.S. citizens who may have had incidental contact 
with someone who is defined as a terrorist.
  Think about that for a second. If you are an employer and someone in 
your company has now been accused of these terrorists acts and is under 
investigation, your business records can also be attained if, as 
Senator Feingold said, it was deemed part of this investigation, with 
very minimal judicial review.
  Take for another example, you happen to live across the hall from 
someone who now has become a suspect. Maybe you have been over to their 
house for dinner several times. Now, all of a sudden, you may be part 
of that investigation, and your financial records, your medical 
records, your personal records can now be part of that investigation, 
again, with very minimal judicial review.
  I have heard from many in my State, including my State librarian, 
consumers, and businesses that are concerned, that this provision is 
far too broad.
  It takes little imagination, as I said, to think of all the tangible 
items this would give the FBI carte blanche to examine some people's 
most private and personal papers.
  The bottom line is this legislation could circumvent or supersede 
Federal and State privacy laws that protect student records, library 
records, and health records not previously admissible under FISA.
  What we are talking about in the Feingold amendment is trying to 
preserve those State and Federal laws that already specify protection. 
The amendment simply states where Congress or a State legislature has 
enacted a law which requires an order to obtain records, that Federal 
or State law stands.
  That seems pretty simple. We have worked on these issues. We should 
not work on them in haste.
  This is a very complex time. It is no ordinary time for our country. 
This process has to remember those fourth amendment rights that we have 
so diligently fought for in the past. I urge my colleagues to support 
this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am grateful for the remarks of the 
Senator from Washington. I am afraid we are going to read them in a few 
years and wish maybe we listened more closely to what we are doing on 
this particular provision.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the Senator from Utah wanted to say 
something for the record.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues.
  I oppose Senator Feingold's amendment to Section 215 of the bill. 
Section 215 allows federal law enforcement to apply for a court order 
to obtain records and other evidence in the course of an investigation 
to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
activities. This provision has many safeguards built in to prevent its 
misuse.
  For instance, the application must be made by the Director of the FBI 
or his designee, whose rank cannot be lower than an Assistant Special 
Agent in Charge, and specify that the records concerned are sought for 
an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism 
or clandestine intelligence activities. Additionally, the investigation 
must be conducted pursuant to approved Attorney General guidelines and 
may not be conducted on a United States person solely upon the basis of 
activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.
  As written, the provision balances the investigatory needs of the FBI 
with privacy concerns and provides adequate protection, while not 
allowing a host of state-law provisions to stand in the way of national 
security needs. Senator Feingold's amendment would condition the 
issuance of the court order on a myriad of federal and state-law 
provisions. Such conditioning will have the effect of making 
investigations to protect against international terrorism more 
difficult than investigations of certain domestic criminal violations.
  Senator Feingold's amendment purports to preserve privacy protections 
in place for certain records. The amendment's effect, however, will be 
to place foreign international and intelligence investigations at a 
disadvantage to criminal investigations. For example, this amendment 
would make it more difficult for the government to obtain business 
records in a foreign-intelligence or foreign counter-intelligence 
investigation through a court order than it is to obtain the same 
records in a criminal health-care fraud or child pornography 
investigation through a

[[Page 19533]]

grand jury subpoena or administrative subpoena. (see 18 U.S.C. 3486).
  Federal law enforcement officers investigating the activities of a 
terrorist organization or foreign intelligence target should not face a 
greater burden than that imposed on investigators of health-care fraud 
or child pornography.
  I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, the administration originally wanted 
administrative subpoena authority in foreign intelligence cases for 
government access to any business record. I was able to reach agreement 
with the administration to subject this authority to judicial review 
and to bar investigations based on the basis of activities protected by 
the First Amendment.
  The Feingold amendment would ensure that current laws providing 
safeguards for certain types of records, such as medical and 
educational records, be maintained. Again, it is unfortunate that the 
administration did not accept this amendment.
  Mr. President, we are prepared to yield back the remainder of our 
time if the Senator from Wisconsin is prepared to yield back the 
remainder of his time.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. If the majority leader is going to speak, I would like 
to respond. If not, I will simply yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield back the remainder of our time.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask for 
the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The question is on agreeing to the motion. The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond), and the Senator 
from New Mexico (Mr. Domenici), are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from North 
Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 89, nays 8, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 301 Leg.]

                                YEAS--89

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wyden

                                NAYS--8

     Cantwell
     Corzine
     Dayton
     Dodd
     Feingold
     Harkin
     Levin
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Domenici
     Helms
     Thurmond
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. DASCHLE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                        NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank the members of the Judiciary 
Committee, especially Chairman Leahy and Senator Hatch for their hard 
work on this important legislation. This bill will give the 
administration an increased ability to fight terrorism on many fronts. 
One section of the bill that is extremely important to my state 
addresses Northern Border Security. This bill will triple the number of 
Border Patrol, Customs Service, and INS inspectors along America's 
northern borders. It also authorizes $100 million to improve INS and 
Customs technology and for additional equipment for monitoring the 
northern borders. Alaska and Alaskans are in a unique position. One 
section of our northern boarder stretches from Maine through, my good 
friend's home state of, Vermont all the way to Washington State. A 
second section is that of my home State. As you know we are the largest 
State in the Nation with an enormous border with Canada that runs over 
1,538 miles. We have one of the busiest international cargo airports in 
the world, which has lost a number of carriers since the September 11 
attacks due to grossly inadequate staffing at our secure, sterile 
customs facility. We also have several major international ports 
scattered throughout Alaska including the Port of Anchorage, which 
handles the most container traffic in Alaska; Dutch Harbor, which is 
America's busiest commercial fishing port; and Valdez, where millions 
of barrels of North Slope crude oil are sent by pipeline to the ``South 
48.'' The sections of the bill that address the Northern Border 
Security do not mention Alaska specifically. I intended to offer an 
amendment to insure that we are part of the definition. But as my good 
friend the Senator from Vermont pointed out to me, other northern 
border States are not mentioned specifically either. I understand that 
it is the intent of this legislation that Alaska and all other states 
that border Canada are ``Northern Border'' States and that INS, Border 
Patrol, U.S. Customs service and others should look at all of these 
states when addressing security issues. I would ask the manager of this 
bill if my understanding is correct?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska is correct. Alaska 
is definitely part of America's Northern Border and it was the intent 
of the committee and the Senate that it be part of that definition.
  The unfolding facts about how the terrorists who committed the 
September 11 attack were able to enter this country without difficulty 
are chilling. Since the attacks many have pointed to our northern 
border as vulnerable to the entry of future terrorists. This is not 
surprising when a simple review of the numbers shows that the northern 
border has been routinely short-changed in personnel. While the number 
of border patrol agents along the southern border has increased over 
the last few years to over 8,000, the number at the northern border has 
remained the same as a decade ago at 300. This remains true despite the 
fact that Admad Ressam, the Algerian who planned to blow up the Los 
Angeles International Airport in 1999, and who has been linked to those 
involved in the September 11 attacks, chose to enter the United States 
at our northern border. It will remain an inviting target until we 
dramatically improve our security.
  The USA Act includes my proposals to provide the substantial and long 
overdue assistance for our law enforcement and border control efforts 
along the Northern Border. My home State of Vermont has seen huge 
increases in Customs and INS activity since the signing of NAFTA. The 
number of people coming through our borders has risen steeply over the 
years, but our staff and our resources have not.
  I proposed--and this legislation authorizes in section 402--tripling 
the number of Border Patrol, INS inspectors, and Customs Service 
employees in each of the States along the Northern Border. Alaska is 
certainly one of those States. I was gratified when 22 Senators--
Democrats and Republicans--wrote to the President supporting such an 
increase, and I am pleased that the administration agreed that this 
critical law enforcement improvement should be included in the bill.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Vermont. With 
this clear statement of of the legislation I will not offer an 
amendment to specifically name Alaska as a Northern Border State.

[[Page 19534]]




                     alien terrorist removal court

  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, it had been my intention 
to offer an amendment which would strengthen provisions in the bill to 
deal with known terrorist aliens. As Senator Lott well remembers, we 
worked in 1996, created the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, to hear 
cases against aliens who were known terrorist and to allow the Justice 
Department to deport these aliens without divulging classified 
information to the terrorist organization.
  Mr. LOTT. I know the Senator from New Hampshire has been working a 
long time on this issue. In fact, when he sponsored this legislation 
back in 1995, I was a cosponsor of his bill. He has been a leader on 
this issue, he passed his legislation, and the Court was created.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. That is correct. As the leader knows, 
there are some changes that are needed to improve the law, which is 
what my amendment was going to be about.
  Mr. LOTT. I understand, and I agree that the law needs to be 
strengthened.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I would say to my 
colleagues, all the tools we are giving to the Justice Department in 
this bill are irrelevant if we cannot deport these terrorist who are 
living in our country preparing to terrorize American citizens. Page 
162 of the bill says the Attorney General shall place an alien in 
removal proceedings within 7 days of catching him, or charge him with a 
criminal act, or else the bill says ``the Attorney General shall 
release the alien.'' Mr. President, the problem is that most of these 
terrorist have not committed criminal acts until they are ready to 
attack. Therefore, in most of these cases, the only option is to deport 
them.
  Mr. LOTT. It is my opinion, that if we can deport known terrorist, we 
should do it. We cannot let the Justice Department be barred because 
the evidence was too sensitive to use in Court.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. That is exactly the problem. Under 
current law, the Justice Department would have to give a declassified 
summary of all the secret evidence used in the deportation proceedings 
to the terrorist. Now, why would we compromise our intelligence sources 
and methods by revealing sensitive intelligence information to a known 
terrorist? The intelligence community would never allow it, and with 
good reason. But as a result, the Justice Department has never once 
used the alien terrorist removal court to deport anyone.
  Mr. LOTT. That is my understanding, and it is a serious problem. I am 
in complete agreement with the Senator.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. President, I thank the Leader. As I 
said, it had been my intention to offer an amendment to resolve this 
problem by eliminating the requirement for the Attorney General to give 
this sensitive information to the alien terrorist before deporting him. 
However, upon discussions with the Attorney General, who indicated to 
me that he supports this provision, and after discussions with the 
Leader, I have decided in the interest of moving this legislation to 
withhold my amendment at this time, with the assurance of the Leader 
and the Administration that we will work to solve this problem in 
conference.
  Mr. LOTT. Let me say to the Senator that he can count me as a 
cosponsor of this amendment. It is an excellent amendment, it is 
needed, and I commit to the Senator that I will do my best to see that 
it is added in conference. I would further say to the Senator that I 
have also talked about this issue with the Attorney General, and he 
indicated to me that the Administration supports your amendment and 
that he will also work to support it in conference when we get to that 
point. So, I appreciate his withholding at this time so we can get this 
bill to conference where we can work to get the Smith amendment added 
to greatly improve this bill.
  Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank the Leader for his strong 
support, and I am pleased that the administration is also supportive. I 
know how many long hours the Attorney General is putting in on this 
issue, and how committed he is to winning this war on terrorism. I look 
forward to passing this important provision which will be an invaluable 
tool for the Attorney General and the President in this war.


                       deterring money laundering

  Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. President, I would like to clarify with Chairman 
Sarbanes my understanding of the provision in Title III, the anti-money 
laundering provisions in the antiterrorism package, entitled ``Section 
314. Cooperative Efforts to Deter Money Laundering''.
  As the Chairman is well aware, Section 314(b) is intended to address 
concerns about regulatory barriers that stand in the way of developing 
efficient mechanisms and services that financial institutions can use 
to fulfill their regulatory compliance obligations. The regulations to 
be issued by the Secretary, and potentially by bank and thrift 
regulators as well, could further this purpose by reconciling rules 
that could be interpreted in a way that places conflicting burdens on 
financial institutions.
  Does that comport with the Chairman's understanding of the intent of 
the provision and how that intent could best be carried out by the 
regulators?
  Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Senator for his question. Yes, that is also 
my understanding of Section 314.
  Mr. CORZINE. Mr. President, I am going to support this legislation, 
and I want to commend the leadership--Senators Daschle and Lott--and 
Senators Leahy and Hatch, for their efforts in developing the bill. 
Clearly, there is no higher priority than combating terrorism and 
protecting our national security. At the same time, I do have real 
concerns about the process by which this legislation has come to the 
floor, and about the implications of some provisions for fundamental 
civil liberties.
  There are several provisions in this legislation that make a real, 
positive contribution to the fight against terrorism. Other senators 
have discussed some of the highlights in more depth, so let me just 
focus on a few.
  First, this bill includes legislation approved by the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, on which I sit, that 
will help authorities crack down on money laundering. This is essential 
if we are to deprive terrorists of resources. The bill will require 
additional reporting of suspicious transactions, require identification 
of the foreign owners of certain U.S. accounts, and impose other 
requirements on financial institutions to give authorities a greater 
ability to identify and prosecute money launderers. I also note that 
the bill includes a provision I authored that calls for a study into 
the possibility of expanding the legislation to include hedge funds and 
other investment services that also can be used by terrorists to 
launder money.
  Beyond the money laundering provisions, I also am pleased that this 
bill provides additional funding for the victims of terrorism. Coming 
from New Jersey, where thousands of our residents have been victimized 
by the tragedy at the World Trade Center, this is especially important 
to me. In my view, we as a nation have a responsibility to ensure that 
terrorism victims and their families are not left alone and 
uncompensated. That is why I am pleased that the bill would replenish 
the antiterrorism emergency reserve, replace the annual cap on the 
Crime Victim Fund, authorize private contributions to the fund, and 
strengthen services for victims in other ways. While this is not all 
that we should be doing for victims and their families, I appreciate 
the work of the leaders in focusing on their needs.
  I also pleased that the bill would triple the number of Border 
Patrol, Customs Service and immigration inspectors at our northern 
border. This would significantly enhance security over an area that, 
until now, has been seriously understaffed. The bill also authorizes 
$100 million to improve INS and Customs technology and additional 
equipment for monitoring the U.S.-Canada border.
  In addition, I want to highlight language in this bill that would 
establish two new crimes related to bioterrorism, including provisions 
to prohibit

[[Page 19535]]

certain people from possessing a listed biological agent or toxin. 
There are many other things we need to do to prepare for the threat of 
a biological or chemical attack, and I have introduced related 
legislation, S. 1508, that would require states to develop coordinated 
plans, and that would provide additional resources for hospitals and 
other health care providers. The threat of bioterrorism is real, and I 
would hope that our leaders will bring related legislation to the 
Senate floor as soon as possible.
  While I support the provisions in this bill on money laundering, 
victim services, border enforcement, and bioterrorism, I do have 
serious concerns about the way this bill was put together, and about 
other provisions that raise serious questions about the protection of 
civil liberties.
  It is deeply troubling to me that we would be taking up a bill that 
deals with such sensitive civil liberties matters without comprehensive 
hearings, and without even consideration by the relevant committee. We 
are talking about a 243-page bill that was developed behind closed 
doors by a handful of people operating under enormous time pressure. 
This is a bill that raises fundamental questions that go to the very 
essence of our democracy, and our freedoms. It's not something that 
should be done in haste, with so little opportunity for input from 
outside experts, the public, and all senators.
  Perhaps because the legislation was developed so quickly, and in an 
environment so dominated by great public anxiety about security, there 
is a real risk that we will make serious mistakes.
  I am especially concerned about the provisions in this bill that 
require the detention of immigrants who are not terrorists, who are not 
criminals, but are merely suspected of future wrongdoing. In fact, 
these provisions go further than that. Lawful permanent residents who 
are charged with being deportable on terrorism grounds could be held 
indefinitely even if an immigration judge determines that the terrorism 
charges are false.
  I understand that we need to give the government sufficient authority 
to protect Americans from those who pose a real threat to public 
safety. But this provision goes too far. And I hope it can be corrected 
in conference.
  Similarly, there are other provisions of this legislation that seem 
very loosely drafted, and that could, perhaps unintentionally, lead to 
infringement on important civil liberties. For example, many have 
raised serious questions about provisions relating to law enforcement 
surveillance of Internet and telephone use, and about other provisions 
that give the government extensive new powers to conduct secret 
searches. These and other provisions do not seem to have received 
adequate scrutiny. I am hopeful that they can be examined more closely 
in conference, and any needed improvements can be made before the 
legislation is sent to the President.
  I also would urge our conferees to accept a provision, like one 
included in the House version of this legislation, that would set a 
time limit on the application of certain provisions that pose the 
greatest threats to civil liberties. In my view, that's especially 
important since we have rushed this legislation through the Senate so 
quickly. As I said, I am hopeful that we can identify and correct any 
mistakes in conference. But we still seem to be operating on a rush 
basis, and I suspect that some mistakes are inevitable. Given the 
stakes involved, I think it would be better to make many of these 
provisions temporary, and then revisit these issues when we have more 
time to thoroughly consider all their implications.
  In the end, while I do have serious concerns about certain aspects of 
this legislation, I have decided to support the effort to move it to 
conference. Our nation has just suffered the most horrendous act of 
terrorism in our history, and we are facing serious threats of other 
terrorist attacks. A vast, well-organized and well-funded terrorist 
network has gone to war against our nation. And while we should not 
overreact, or erode basic freedoms, we do have to defend ourselves.
  We must give our law enforcement officials the tools they need to 
find and destroy these terrorist networks. And this legislation should 
help. But we need to continue to review and improve its provision as we 
go to conference. And we will need to continue to closely review the 
implementation of the legislation after it is enacted.
  I yield the floor.
  Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, I support this bill, but I do so only 
with some reservations.
  We are giving broad new powers to our law enforcement and 
intelligence communities--without the traditional safeguards of 
judicial review and congressional oversight.
  I believe that many provisions of the bill, particularly those 
sections dealing with electronic eavesdropping and computer trespass, 
remain seriously flawed and may infringe on civil liberties.
  I am voting for this bill today with the strong hope that it will be 
improved in a conference with the House. As it currently stands, the 
Senate bill breaks down the traditional separation of domestic criminal 
matters governed by the fourth amendment right against unjustified 
search and seizure--from the gathering of international intelligence 
information traditionally gathered without the same concern for 
constitutional rights.
  I strongly believe that we should have included in this bill a sunset 
provision that would give Congress the opportunity to reassess whether 
these new tools are yielding the intended results in the war on terror, 
and I am hopeful that the final bill will emerge with this and other 
improvements.
  If this bill is not improved through a conference process or other 
negotiation, I reserve the right to vote against a conference report.
  However, I also believe this bill contains many provisions that will 
significantly advance our battle against terrorism. I thank the 
Chairman for his hard work on these provisions and appreciate his 
efforts particularly to strengthen security on our northern border.
  Among the most important provisions in this bill is the authorization 
to triple staffing across our northern border.
  These increases in manpower are desperately needed. The northern 
border is patrolled by only 300 border patrol agents in contrast to the 
9,000 on the southern border. More critically, at points of entry where 
suspect persons have repeatedly tried to enter or have entered, we 
currently lack sufficient staffing to allow Customs and INS inspectors 
and INS agents to do their job well. We place a tremendous 
responsibility on the individuals charged with deciding whom to admit 
and whom to turn away.
  One additional new tool this bill provides is the establishment of a 
visa technology standard to help secure our border. I personally worked 
to get language included in this bill that requires the State 
Department and the Department of Justice to develop a shared technology 
standard--so that we can be certain each individual who seeks entry 
into our country on a visa--is the person he or she claims to be.
  American citizenship comes with deeply valued privileges and rights. 
One of the most basic of those rights is privacy. To require a 
fingerprint or a digital photograph of an alien seeking to enter our 
country is a reasonable and effective way to improve our ability to 
keep terrorists out of this country while still welcoming a vibrant 
flow of legal immigrants.
  Unfortunately, aspects of this bill that impose unreasonable and 
unwarranted requirements on legal immigrants, greatly expand electronic 
eavesdropping, and potentially provide law enforcement easy access to 
some types of email communications--remain troubling.
  I would like to believe that the expansion of the ability of the 
government to place wiretaps on the lines of American citizens--done in 
secret with insignificant reporting or opportunity for oversight by the 
Congress--will not be abused.
  I would like to believe that technologies like that technologies like

[[Page 19536]]

Carnivore will not be used to derive content from email communications.
  But I am skeptical.
  Several other aspects of this bill, when taken together, also have 
the potential to interfere with Americans' enjoyment of their right to 
privacy without providing value in the fight against terrorists.
  Those of us who feel strongly about how new powers might chip away at 
traditional privacy rights will closely watch how law enforcement uses 
these tools.
  The events of September 11 have changed us as a country forever. We 
have been attacked on our own soil. Thousands have died, thousands more 
have been injured. Very simply, we must do all that we can to stop 
terrorism by finding and disrupting terrorist activities here and 
abroad. The challenge we face is to do this without compromising the 
value that make Americans unique and have allowed us to become great: 
respect for personal autonomy and the rights of the individual; and 
tolerance of all regardless of race or religion.
  While I will vote for this bill, I also promise to engage in vigilant 
oversight of these new powers, and I urge those in the law enforcement 
and intelligence communities to use these powers wisely and with great 
deliberation.
  Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 1510, the Uniting 
and Strengthening America Act.
  In the aftermath of September 11, we face two difficult and delicate 
tasks: to strengthen our security in order to prevent future terrorist 
attacks, and at the same time, to safeguard the individual liberties 
that make America a beacon of freedom to all the world.
  I believe that when the President signs this anti-terrorism 
legislation into law, we will have achieved those two goals as best we 
now can.
  The act is a far-reaching bill. I will mention just a few key aspects 
of that bill.
  First, the legislation brings our surveillance laws into the 21st 
century. Here are two of many examples. Under current law, the FBI can 
use a basic search warrant to access answering machine messages, but 
the FBI needs a different kind of warrant to get to voice mail. This 
law says the FBI can use a traditional warrant for both. Another 
example: Under current law, a Federal court can authorize many 
electronic surveillance warrants only within the court's limited 
jurisdiction. If the target of the investigation is in the judge's 
jurisdiction, but the subject of the warrant is technically an internet 
service provider located elsewhere, the warrant is no good as to that 
ISP. This bill allows the court overseeing an investigation to issue 
valid warrants nationwide.
  Second, the act gives law enforcement officers and the foreign 
intelligence community the ability to share intelligence information 
with each other in defined contexts. For example, the act says that 
under specified conditions, the FBI may share wiretap and grand jury 
information related to foreign- and counter-intelligence. I appreciate 
concerns that this information-sharing authority could be abused. Like 
Chairman Leahy, I would have preferred to see greater judicial 
oversight of these data exchanges. But I also believe we simply cannot 
prevail in the battle against terrorism if the right hand of our 
government has no idea what the left hand is doing.
  Third, the act enhances intelligence authorities under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). When I met with FBI agents in 
North Carolina shortly after September 11, they told me their number 
one priority was to streamline the FISA process. We've done that. We've 
said, for example, that the renewal periods of certain key FISA orders 
may be longer than the initial periods. This makes sure the FBI can 
focus on investigations, not duplicative court applications.
  A more controversial change concerns the purpose of FISA 
surveillance. Under current law, a FISA wiretap order may only enter if 
the primary purpose of the surveillance is foreign intelligence 
gathering. The administration initially proposed changing the ``primary 
purpose'' requirement to a requirement of ``a purpose,'' any foreign 
intelligence purpose. At a recent Intelligence Committee hearing, I was 
one of several Senators to raise constitutional questions about the 
Administration's initial proposal. The last thing we want is to see 
FISA investigations lost, and convictions overturned, because the 
surveillance is not constitutional. S. 1510 says that FISA surveillance 
requires not just ``a purpose,'' but ``a significant purpose,'' of 
foreign intelligence gathering. That new language is a substantial 
improvement that I support. In applying this ``significant purpose'' 
requirement, the FISA court will still need to be careful to enter FISA 
orders only when the requirements of the Constitution as well as the 
statute are satisfied. As the Department of Justice has stated in its 
letter regarding the proposed FISA change, the FISA court has ``an 
obligation,'' whatever the statutory standard, ``to reject FISA 
applications that do not truly qualify'' as constitutional. I 
anticipate continued close congressional oversight and inquiry in this 
area.
  A forth step taken by this legislation is to triple the number of 
Border Patrol, INS inspectors, and Customs Service agents along our 
4,000-mile northern border. Today there are just 300 border patrol 
agents to guard those 4,000 miles. Orange cones are too often our only 
defenses against illegal entries. This bill will change that.
  Fifth, the bill expedites the hiring of translators by the FBI. It is 
unthinkable that our law enforcement agents could have critical raw 
intelligence that they simply cannot understand because they do not 
know the relevant language. This statute will help to change that state 
of affairs.
  Finally, the bill makes the criminal law tougher on terrorists. We 
make it a crime to possess a biological agent or toxin in an amount 
with no reasonable, peaceful purpose, a crime to harbor a terrorist, a 
crime to provide material support to terrorism. And we say that when 
you commit a crime of terrorism, you can be prosecuted for that crime 
for the rest of your life, with no limitations period. Statutes of 
limitations guarantee what lawyers call ``repose.'' Terrorists deserve 
no repose.
  As Chairman Leahy and Senator Hatch have both said, this legislation 
is not perfect, and the House-Senate Conference may yet make 
improvements. For example, the Conference might clarify that, as to 
aliens detained as national security threats, the law will secure the 
due process protections and judicial review required by the 
Constitution and by the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Zadvydas v. 
Davis and INS v. St. Cyr. The Conference might also sensibly include a 
sunset of the new surveillance authorities, ensuring that Congress will 
reconsider this bill's provisions, which touch such cherished 
liberties, in light of further experience and reflection.
  The bill is not perfect, but it is a good bill, it is important for 
the Nation, and I am pleased to support it.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the antiterrorism 
bill, S. 1510. The bill would provide our nation's law enforcement with 
important tools to more effectively investigate and prevent further 
attacks against the people of the United States.
  At the outset, in response to concerns that some have raised, I want 
to make clear that we are not rushing to pass ill-conceived 
legislation.
  During the past two Congresses, when I chaired the Judiciary 
Committee's Subcommittee on Technology and Terrorism, the Subcommittee 
held 19 hearings on terrorism. I want to repeat that: 19. The witnesses 
who appeared before the Subcommittee included the then-Director of the 
FBI Louis Freeh and representatives of all three of the 
congressionally-mandated commissions on terrorism that have issued 
reports over the last two years. Additional hearings on terrorism were 
held by the full Judiciary Committee and by other committees.
  Many of the provisions contained in the Attorney General's proposed 
legislation mirror the recommendations of one or more of the major 
terrorism commissions and have already been examined by the committee 
of jurisdiction. In fact, some of these provisions

[[Page 19537]]

have already been voted on and passed by the Senate.
  Indeed, as I will discuss more fully in a minute, the language sent 
forward by the Attorney General to establish nationwide trap and trace 
authority was included in the Hatch-Feinstein-Kyl Amendment to the 
recently passed Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations bill. Much of 
the remaining language in that amendment was included in the 
Counterterrorism Act of 2000, which the Senate passed last fall, after 
a terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole killed 17 American sailors and 
injured another 39. That bill was based on recommendations of the 
bipartisan, congressionally-mandated National Commission on Terrorism, 
known as the Bremmer Commission, which was established in 1998 in 
response to the embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.
  One particularly important provision, which was included in the both 
the CJS bill and the current bill, updates the law to keep pace with 
technology. The provision on pen register and trap and trace devices 1. 
Would allow judges to enter pen/trap orders with nationwide scope and 
2. Would codify current caselaw that holds that pen/trap orders apply 
to modern communication technologies such as e-mail and the Internet, 
in addition to traditional phone lines.
  Nationwide jurisdiction for a court order will help law enforcement 
to quickly identify other members of a criminal organization such as a 
terrorist cell. Indeed, last year Director Freeh testified before the 
Terrorism Subcommittee that one of the problems law enforcement faces 
is ``the jurisdictional limitation of pen registers and trap-and-trace 
orders issued by federal courts.'' [Source: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong, 2nd Sess. (March 28, 
2000), at 31.]
  He continued: ``Today's electronic crimes, which occur at the speed 
of light, cannot be effectively investigated with procedural devices 
forged in the last millennium during the infancy of the information 
technology age.'' [Source: Id. at 32.]
  Currently, to track a communication that is purposely routed through 
Internet Service Providers located in different states, law enforcement 
must obtain multiple court orders. This is because, under current law, 
a Federal court can order only those communications carriers within its 
district to provide tracing information to law enforcement.
  According to Director Freeh's testimony before the Terrorism 
Subcommittee, ``As a result of the fact that investigators typically 
have to apply for numerous court orders to trace a single 
communication, there is a needless waste of time and resources, and a 
number of important investigations are either hampered or derailed 
entirely in those instances where law enforcement gets to a 
communications carrier after that carrier has already discarded the 
necessary information.'' [Source: Id. at 31.]
  Section 216 of the Senate bill solves this problem.
  I would also like to address another important provision.
  Section 802 is intended more clearly to criminalize the possession of 
biological and toxin agents by those who should not possess them. This 
section amends the implementing legislation for the 1972 ``Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of 
Bactiological, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction'', BWC. Article I of the BWC prohibits the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of Microbial or 
other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. It is not the 
intent of the BWC, nor is it the intent of Section 802, to prevent the 
legitimate application of biological agents or toxins for prophylactic, 
protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purposes. These 
purposes include, inter alia, medical and national health activities, 
and such national security activities as may include the confiscation, 
securing, and/or destruction of possible illegal biological substances.
  Finally, let me address briefly the concern voiced by some that we 
are in danger of ``trampling civil liberties.'' I reiterate that we are 
not rushing, that we have had thorough, deliberative hearings, and that 
many of the proposals have already been passed by the Senate. Nothing 
in the current bill impinges on civil liberties. The bill would give 
Federal agencies fighting terrorism the same tools we have given those 
fighting illicit drugs, or even postal fraud. Many of the tools in the 
bill are modernizations of the criminal laws, necessitated by the 
advent of the Internet.
  While some of these tools are extremely helpful in terrorism 
investigations, it makes no sense to refuse to apply these common sense 
changes to other crimes that are committed, like kidnapping, drug 
dealing, and child pornography. It is unwise to limit these tools to 
only terrorism offenses because often, at the outset of an 
investigation of a particular person or crime, law enforcement does not 
know what you are dealing with. A credit-card fraud case or a false 
immigration documents case may turn out to be connected to funding or 
facilitating the operations of a terrorist group. We should give law 
enforcement the tools it needs to have the best chance of discovering 
and disrupting these activities.
  We have a responsibility to the people of this nation to ensure that 
those who are charged with protecting us from future terrorist attacks 
are empowered to do so. This is not a zero sum game. We can both ensure 
our security and protect our liberties.
  We cannot afford to lose this race against terror, and we cannot 
afford to give the enemy in this war a full lap head-start. I support 
this bill. I commend President Bush and General Ashcroft for submitting 
a sound proposal to the Senate, and for their tremendous efforts during 
the past month.
  Mr. President, in addition to the all of the other provisions in this 
antiterrorism legislation that will provide our law enforcement 
communities with the tools to weed out and stop terrorism, I want to 
express my support for the immigration provisions upon which the 
administration, Senators Hatch, Kennedy, Leahy and I have reached 
agreement, and which are included in this bill.
  Even with the passage of these provisions, however, the United States 
will continue to face overwhelming infrastructure and personnel needs 
at our consular offices abroad, along both the southern and northern 
border, and in our immigration offices throughout the United States. In 
conjunction with increasing personnel and infrastructure, the U.S. must 
deprive terrorists of the ability to present altered international 
documents, and improve the dissemination of information about suspected 
terrorists to all appropriate agencies. Senator Feinstein and I, in a 
hearing of the Terrorism Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee this 
Friday, will continue to assess these needs by hearing from Justice and 
State Department officials.
  So, our actions on immigration reform as it is relates to terrorism 
must go beyond the scope of this anti-terrorism package. With that 
said, this bill will certainly provide a better legal framework for 
keeping foreign terrorists out of the United States, and detaining them 
should they enter.
  First, this antiterrorism bill clarifies that the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation is authorized to share data from its ``most wanted 
list,'' and any other information contained in its national crime-
information system, with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and 
the State Department. This will help the INS and State Department 
identify suspected terrorists before they come to the United States, 
and should they gain entry, will help track them down on our soil. It 
also allows the State Department, during a U.S. criminal investigation, 
to give foreign governments information on a case-by-case basis about 
the issuance or refusal to issue a U.S. visa.

[[Page 19538]]

  The bill will also clarify U.S. law prohibiting the entry of, and 
requiring the removal of, individual alien terrorists. It will probably 
surprise the Members of this body a great deal to know that, under 
current law, a terrorist alien is not considered either inadmissible 
to, or deportable from, the United States even if he or she has 
``endorsed or espoused terrorist activity that undermines the efforts 
of the United States to fight terrorism,'' or has provided ``material 
support to a terrorist organization.'' Nor is an individual deportable 
for being a ``representative of a terrorist organization.'' The anti-
terrorism bill makes it clear to U.S. officials considering whether to 
allow someone to come to the country, that a person meeting any one of 
these criteria is not welcome here.
  In addition, the anti-terrorism package that we are debating today 
further defines what is considered by the United States to be a 
terrorist organization. Under current law, a terrorist organization 
must be designated by the Secretary of State under Section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. This process can take several months, 
and has been criticized by some experts as potentially politically 
corruptible. Under this Senate anti-terrorism package, Section 219 
remains in effect. A separate designation process is added, whereby an 
organization can be designated by the Secretary of State or the 
Attorney General, in consultation with each other, with seven days' 
notice to the leadership of the House and Senate and the congressional 
committees of jurisdiction. Additionally, an organization, whether or 
not it is formally designated by the Secretary of State or the Attorney 
General, can be considered to be terrorist if it is made up of two or 
more individuals who commit or plan to commit terrorist activities.
  The Senate's antiterrorism package also has provisions regarding 
temporary detention. It allows for the temporary detention of aliens 
who the Attorney General certifies that he has ``reasonable grounds to 
believe is inadmissible or deportable under the terrorism grounds.'' 
This compromise represents a bipartisan understanding that the Attorney 
General of the United States needs the flexibility to detain suspected 
terrorists. Under the compromise that Members have reached, the 
Attorney General must charge an alien with a deportable violation or he 
must release the alien. The underlying certification, and all 
collateral matters, can be reviewed by the U.S. District Court of the 
District of Columbia, and the Attorney General is required to report to 
Congress every six months on the use of this detention provision.
  Finally, the Senate package, as a result of amendments added by 
Senator Byrd, will determine whether ``consular shopping''--i.e., 
someone has a visa application pending from his or her home country, 
but goes to another country for adjudication--is a problem. If so, the 
Secretary of State must recommend ways to remedy it. Another authorizes 
$36.8 million for quick implementation of the INS foreign student 
tracking system, a program that I have repeatedly urged be implemented.
  As former chairman and now ranking Republican of the Judiciary 
Committee's Terrorism Subcommittee, I have long suggested, and strongly 
supported, many of the anti-terrorism and immigration initiatives now 
being advocated by Republicans and Democrats alike. In my sadness about 
the overwhelming and tragic events that took thousands of precious 
lives, I am resolved to push forward on all fronts to fight against 
terrorism. That means delivering justice to those who are responsible 
for the lives lost on September 11, and reorganizing the institutions 
of government so that the law-abiding can continue to live their lives 
in freedom.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the 
consensus terrorism bill now on the floor of the U.S. Senate.
  The people of the United States awoke on September 12 to a whole new 
world, one in which we can no longer feel safe within our borders. We 
awoke to a world in which our very way of life is under attack, and we 
have since resolved to fight back with every tool at our disposal.
  This is an unprecedented state of affairs, and it demands 
unprecedented action. We must seek out and defeat individuals and 
groups who would build upon the September 11 attacks with more of their 
own. We simply must give law enforcement officials the tools they need 
to track, to hunt down, and to capture terrorists, both in this 
country, and around the world as well. And that is what this bill would 
do.
  Let me just describe some of the key provisions of this legislation, 
and how those provisions will make an impact, even in the current 
investigation into the September 11 attacks.
  First, this bill makes it easier to collect foreign intelligence 
information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA. 
Under current law, authorities can proceed with surveillance under FISA 
only if the primary purpose of the investigation is to collect foreign 
intelligence.
  But in today's world things are not so simple. In many cases, 
surveillance will have two key goals--the gathering of foreign 
intelligence, and the gathering of evidence for a criminal prosecution. 
Determining which purpose is the ``primary'' purpose of the 
investigation can be difficult, and will only become more so as we 
coordinate our intelligence and law enforcement efforts in the war 
against terror.
  Rather than forcing law enforcement to decide which purpose is 
primary--law enforcement or foreign intelligence gathering, this bill 
strikes a new balance. It will now require that a ``significant'' 
purpose of the investigation must be foreign intelligence gathering to 
proceed with surveillance under FISA.
  The effect of this provision will be to make it easier for law 
enforcement to obtain a FISA search or surveillance warrant for those 
cases where the subject of the surveillance is both a potential source 
of valuable intelligence and the potential target of a criminal 
prosecution. Many of the individuals involved in supporting the 
September 11 attacks may well fall into both of these categories.
  This language is a negotiated compromise between those who wished the 
law to stay the same, and those who wished to virtually eliminate the 
foreign intelligence standard entirely.
  The administration originally proposed changing ``primary purpose'' 
to ``a purpose,'' but when I questioned Attorney General Ashcroft at 
our Judiciary Committee hearing, he agreed that ``significant purpose'' 
would represent a good compromise.
  Second, this legislation will provide multi-point authority, or so-
called ``roving wiretap authority'' in foreign intelligence 
investigations. This provision is designed to defeat attempts to evade 
law enforcement by simply switching cell phones or moving locations.
  Under current law, law enforcement must get a wiretap order for each 
individuals phone line. Criminals and terrorists know this, so they 
often manage to defeat surveillance by simply moving locations or 
exchanging countless disposable or even stolen cell phones.
  This legislation will now allow the surveillance to follow the 
person, wherever or however that person is communicating. So, no longer 
will duplicative wiretap orders be necessary simply to listen to the 
same, single target of an investigation. This is a powerful change to 
the law that does not put innocent conversations in danger, but stops 
the evasion of surveillance now possible under the law.
  Third, this legislation allows nationwide service of so-called ``pen 
register'' and ``trap and trace'' orders. Those orders allow law 
enforcement to track incoming and outgoing phone calls, and now 
Internet addressing, so that the authorities can make connections 
between various criminals or terrorists.
  The problem with current law is that it has not kept up with 
technology. Modern communications travel through many jurisdictions 
before reaching their final destinations, and current law requires 
court orders from every jurisdiction through which the communication 
travels.

[[Page 19539]]

  Under this new legislation, only one court order will be necessary, 
eliminating the time-consuming and burdensome requirements now placed 
on law enforcement simply because technology has changed the way 
communications travel from one place to the other. Law enforcement 
resources should be spent in the field, not filing unnecessarily 
burdensome motions in courtroom after courtroom.
  I should also mention one important point about this provision. The 
standard necessary to get a court-ordered pen register or trap and 
trace is lower than the standard necessary to get a wiretap, so it was 
very important to make sure that this legislation makes it clear that 
these orders do not allow law enforcement to eavesdrop on or read the 
content of communication. Only the origin and destination of the 
messages will be intercepted.
  This legislation also authorizes the seizure of voice-mail messages 
pursuant to a probable cause warrant, which is an easier standard for 
law enforcement to meet than the standard required for a wiretap.
  Current law treats a voice-mail like an ongoing oral communication, 
and requires law enforcement to obtain a wiretap order to seize and 
listen to those saved messages. E-mails, however, receive no similar 
protection. In my opinion, if law enforcement can access e-mail 
communications with probable cause, the same should be the case with 
voice-mails. And so it will be once this legislation passes.
  This legislation will also now allow for limited sharing of grand 
jury and other criminal investigation information with the intelligence 
community, to assist in the prevention of terrorist acts and the 
apprehension of the terrorists themselves.
  Under current law, law enforcement officials involved in a grand jury 
investigation cannot share information gathered in the grand jury with 
the intelligence community, even if that information would prevent a 
future terrorist act.
  Under this legislation, grand jury and other criminal investigative 
information can be shared if one, the information can is foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence information, as defined by 
statute; two, the information is given to an official with a need to 
know in the performance of his or her official duties; and three, 
limitations on public or other unauthorized disclosure would remain in 
force.
  This balance makes sense, I believe strongly that grand jury 
information should not be leaked to the public or disclosed haphazardly 
to anyone. But at the same time, it makes perfect sense to allow our 
own law enforcement officials to talk to each other about ongoing 
investigations, and to coordinate their efforts to capture terrorists 
wherever they may be.
  This legislation also contains a heavily negotiated provision 
regarding the detention of aliens suspected of links to terrorism 
without charging them. Agreement was reached to one, limit to 7 days 
the length of time an alien may be held before being charged with 
criminal or immigration violations, two, allow the Attorney General to 
delegate the certification power only to the INS Commissioner, and 
three, specify that the merits of the certification is subject to 
judicial review.
  This legislation also contains several key provisions from a bill I 
introduced last month with the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, 
Senator Graham. For instance, the bill: Clarifies the role of the CIA 
director as the coordinator of strategies and priorities for how the 
government uses its limited surveillance resources; requires that law 
enforcement officers who discover foreign intelligence information in 
the course of a criminal investigation share that information with the 
intelligence community; includes ``international terrorist activities'' 
in the definition of ``foreign intelligence'' to clarify the 
authorities of the CIA; includes a sense of Congress that the CIA 
should make efforts to recruit informants in the fight against 
terrorism, even if some of those informants may, as is likely the case, 
not be ideal citizens; requires a report from the CIA on the 
feasibility of establishing a virtual translation center for use by the 
intelligence community, so that translators around the country can 
assist in investigations taking place far, far away. For instance, this 
center would allow a translator living in Los Angeles to assist law 
enforcement in New York without even leaving California; and finally, 
agreement was reached to require the Attorney General, in consultation 
with the CIA Director, to provide training to federal, state and local 
government officials to identify foreign intelligence information 
obtained in the course of their duties.
  In addition, this bill also: Triples the number of Border Patrol, 
Customs Service, and INS inspectors at the northern border; authorizes 
$50 million to improve INS and Customs technology for monitoring the 
northern border and to add equipment on the border; lifts the statute 
of limitations on terrorist acts as defined by law where those crimes 
resulted in, or created a risk of, death or serious bodily injury. 
These crimes include bio-terrorism, attacks against airports or 
airplanes, arson or bombings of U.S. facilities, and other terrorist 
acts; adds this same list of terrorist crimes certain as predicates for 
RICO and money laundering; creates two new bio-terrorism crimes, the 
first prohibits certain restricted persons, including nonresident 
aliens from countries that support terrorism, from possessing a listed 
biological agent or toxin; and the second prohibits any person from 
possessing a biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of a type or 
in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably 
justified by a peaceful purpose.
  The Attorney General and the President of the United States have 
asked this Congress to give them legislation that will assist in the 
war against terrorism, and I am one who believes very strongly that we 
should do so, and we should do so quickly.
  This bill is a product of intense negotiations, and I believe that a 
good balance has been struck here. Compromises have been reached on the 
most controversial provisions, roving wiretap authority; trap and trace 
of computer routing information; sharing of grand jury information; and 
mandatory detention of aliens suspected of terrorism.
  Although I no longer believe it to be necessary now that these 
compromises have been reached, I would support a five-year sunset on 
the provisions I just mentioned as a valuable check on the potential 
abuse of the new powers granted in the bill.
  But a two-year sunset, such as the one contained in the House bill, 
is simply too short to allow law enforcement to accomplish what it 
needs to do to rout terrorists from this country.
  The legislation before us contains provisions that could actually 
help in the current investigation into Osama bin Laden and his network 
in the United States and abroad.
  I urge this Senate to pass this legislation and get it to the 
President for his signature. We are in a sustained war against terror, 
and we have waited long enough. I


                  FISA AND PEN REGISTER/TRAP AND TRACE

  Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, I would like to raise several concerns 
regarding the provisions of this legislation, the USA Act of 2001, that 
expand wiretapping authority under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, and amend Federal pen register and trap and 
trace authorities.
  Both of these changes purport to improve communication between law 
enforcement and intelligence operatives. There is a difference, 
however, between facilitating the sharing of information between the 
law enforcement and intelligence communities, and blurring the line 
between the missions of the two communities. Where information is 
sought for the purpose of law enforcement, we must ensure that fourth 
amendment protections apply. Much of the fear about the legislation is 
based on legitimate concern that information gathered ostensibly for 
intelligence and defense purposes could be used for law enforcement 
purposes. The intelligence community does not prosecute and lock up its 
targets; it uses information to intervene against foreign nationals 
seeking to harm America. But

[[Page 19540]]

the law enforcement community has a different mission, to catch and 
prosecute criminals in our courts of law. Because law enforcement acts 
upon U.S. citizens, it must do so within the bounds of the 
Constitution. The differences in these missions must be acknowledged, 
and we must be vigilant to maintain the distinctions.
  We can all agree that the events on September 11 have focused America 
on the fight against terrorism, and we applaud the efforts of the 
administration in the weeks since that tragic day. Clearly, there were 
failures in our investigative network, and this legislation will 
address some of those failures, allowing greater sharing of information 
that could foil terrorists before they carry out their brutal schemes 
against innocent civilians.
  I appreciate Chairman Leahy's tireless efforts to facilitate our 
intelligence gathering authorities while preserving our constitutional 
rights. The negotiations have been intense, but these are difficult and 
divisive issues. Given the time frame, Chairman Leahy's charge has not 
been an easy one, but I appreciate the substantial progress he has 
made.
  I remain concerned that some of the legislative changes fail to 
balance the increased powers to law enforcement against the need to 
protect the civil liberties of Americans. With these changes to FISA, 
it will be much more likely that the FBI will be able to obtain secret 
FISA wiretaps on American citizens. That information may not only be 
used for intelligence purposes, but also in a criminal prosecution, 
without complying with the normal requirements of a title III wiretap 
and the safeguards it provides to adhere to the fourth amendment. Some 
have warned that this language leaves room for ``fishing expeditions'' 
rather than properly authorized law enforcement activities. I would 
hope that this is not the case.
  Although the language has been improved from the administration's 
original proposal and now would require that ``a significant,'' rather 
than simply ``a,'' purpose for the wiretap must be the gathering of 
foreign intelligence, the possibility remains that the primary purpose 
of the wiretap would be a criminal investigation, without the 
safeguards of the title III wiretap law and the protections under the 
fourth amendment that those fulfill.
  I would like to ask the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee whether 
he interprets this language in this same way.
  Mr. LEAHY. Yes, the Senator from Washington is correct. While 
improved, the USA Act would make it easier for the FBI to use a FISA 
wiretap to obtain information where the Government's most important 
motivation for the wiretap is for use in a criminal prosecution. This 
is a disturbing and dangerous change in the law. The Justice Department 
concedes that ``the few courts that have addressed the issue have 
followed a primary purpose test'', October 1, 2001 Letter from Daniel 
J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, p. 13.
  I appreciate the administration's agreement to move off its original 
position of changing the law to only require the FISA surveillance to 
``a'' purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information. Indeed, 
the Justice Department's own constitutional analysis provided to the 
Committee at the request of our Members does not even attempt to 
justify the original proposal, but instead presents argument for why a 
change to ``a significant" purpose would be constitutional.
  I remain disappointed with the administration's insistence on forcing 
any change on this important statutory requirement. FISA was enacted 
for the express purpose of clarifying that different legal standards 
apply to those gathering foreign intelligence than to those seeking 
criminal evidence. This new provision will blur that distinction, and 
it is indeed very problematic in my mind.
  Federal courts have upheld FISA on the basis that what is reasonable 
under the fourth amendment may vary when national security is at risk. 
Thus, a FISA wiretap does not have to be based on probable cause to 
believe a crime has been or is about to be committed, and no notice is 
given unless the person is prosecuted. Further, while judges review 
warrants on the merits when targets are U.S. persons, the primary 
purpose for the wiretap must be the protection of our national 
security. Upon satisfaction of that critical condition, the statute 
authorized the use of evidence obtained under a FISA wiretap for 
criminal prosecution.
  Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, although much effort has gone into 
narrowing this provision to fit within the bounds of the Constitution, 
it would seem to me that this legislation may not stand up to this 
test, and thus may fail judicial scrutiny. Regardless, we cannot await 
court review. I believe Congress must keep watch over the use of this 
provision. May I ask the Chairman, do you agree that, under these 
circumstances, it is incumbent upon the committee, which has 
jurisdiction over the Department of Justice, to maintain vigilant 
oversight of the Department in its use of FISA authorities after 
enactment of this legislation?
  Mr. LEAHY. I agree with you completely, and you can rest assured that 
the Judiciary Committee under my chairmanship will conduct meaningful 
oversight, as we already have begun to do over the summer.
  Although FISA requires oversight reporting to the Intelligence 
Committees, the law makes clear that other Committees may also have 
oversight jurisdiction. Section 108 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. 1808, states, 
``Nothing in this title shall be deemed to limit the authority and 
responsibility of the appropriate committees of each House of Congress 
to obtain such information as they may need to carry out their 
respective functions and duties.'' Section 306 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. 1826, 
provides for semiannual reports from the Attorney General to the 
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees on the number of applications for 
physical search orders made, granted, modified, or denied, and the 
number of physical searches which involved the property of United 
States persons. The Judiciary Committee's responsibility will be 
greater under the amendment to FISA, because of the greater authority 
to use FISA for law enforcement purposes.
  Ms. CANTWELL. Mr. President, similarly, I am concerned that revisions 
to the laws regarding pen registers and trap and trace devices may have 
fourth amendment implications. Although modified since we received the 
original language from the Administration, the new language could 
encourage greater use of technologies such as the FBI's ``Carnivore'' 
to access information that is protected by the fourth amendment.
  The failure to properly define the term ``address'' in the e-mail 
context to exclude information protected by the Fourth Amendment will 
haunt us for a long time. And I regret this. Although it certainly can 
be said that new technologies are emerging and the definition may need 
be flexible, the term ``address'' presently is undefined and new in the 
context of our Federal criminal statutes. Because of this ambiguity, we 
may see law enforcement authorities take inconsistent approaches to 
filtering information pursuant to this new law. There is risk that some 
will obtain information, such as ``subject line'' information or URL 
codes, that may otherwise be protected by the fourth amendment. There 
is certain to be judicial scrutiny of this provision.
  Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Senator Cantwell and thank her for bringing 
these concerns to the attention of this body. I share these concerns.
  Ms. CANTWELL. I would like to suggest to the chairman, and I would be 
happy to work closely with the Chairman on this, that the General 
Accounting Office provide to the Senate Judiciary Committee every six 
months a report on the use of the FISA wiretap authorities, and the 
expanded pen register and trap and trace authorities, by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation or other agencies within the Department of 
Justice. I would certainly not suggest compromising the security of our 
nation with such a report, so I would be content with closed-session 
hearings on the findings of such reports. But only with such oversight 
can we reasonably

[[Page 19541]]

assure our constituents that the use of these new authorities is not 
impinging on our fourth amendment rights.
  Mr. LEAHY. I agree with Senator Cantwell and I appreciate her efforts 
to suggest restraint at the Department of Justice to avoid misusing the 
new authorities we are contemplating using to address terrorism. I 
share her view that the GAO should undertake this important assignment 
and will work with her and other Senators to see it accomplished. We 
all need to make certain that these new authorities are not abused.
  Ms. CANTWELL. I thank the chairman for his diligence in working to 
preserve our fundamental rights.
  Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I am proud to be a co-sponsor of S. 1510, 
the ``Uniting and Strengthening America Act'' or ``USA Act.'' This bill 
reflects a bipartisan effort to aid law enforcement, immigration, and 
the intelligence community in investigating, detaining, and 
apprehending suspected terrorists. This legislation follows lengthy 
committee inquiry, debate, and revision of legislation Attorney General 
Ashcroft proposed a few weeks ago and which sparked national debate 
over whether civil rights would be violated.
  During the past few weeks, Senate leaders have been working 
tirelessly with Attorney General Ashcroft in order to create a bill 
that strengthens our existing laws with respect to apprehending 
terrorists, but still protects the civil rights of our citizens. This 
is an important mission for Congress. Everyone in America understands 
the need for enforcement, immigration and the intelligence community to 
have the tools necessary to find terrorists, cut-off their financial 
support, and bring them to Justice.
  While I am committed to routing out terrorists here and abroad, I am 
equally committed to making sure the rights of innocent U.S. citizens 
are not violated. This includes the privacy and property rights our 
constitution affords and that make this country so great. I believe 
this bipartisan bill does both. This legislation strikes a balance 
between protecting our civil rights and assisting Attorney General 
Ashcroft and others to do their jobs. While the Senate and House may 
later debate some of the provisions in this legislation, be assured 
that every member of Congress is united in this mission. We are totally 
committed to passing anti-terrorism legislation and apprehending the 
bin Ladens of this world.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, this is one of the most important 
pieces of legislation we will consider during this Congress. The 
horrific loss of life and destruction that occurred on September 11, 
the crime against humanity, changed us as a country. The Uniting and 
Strengthening America Act is an opportunity to help ensure that such 
terrorist attacks do not occur again. We need to improve all aspects of 
our domestic security, including by enhancing our intelligence 
capacities so that we can identify possible future attacks in their 
planning stages and prevent them from happening. We must be vigilant 
and willing to invest the resources and time required to gather the 
information that we need to protect ourselves and our way of life.
  I appreciate the enormous amount of time and energy that my colleague 
from Vermont and others have put into this legislation. They have done 
their best to balance the risk of further terrorist attacks with 
possible risks to civil liberties. The bill updates and improves a 
number of existing laws, it creates important new security statutes, 
and it authorizes new money for programs that will bring much needed 
relief to victims of terrorist attacks. I have reservations about 
certain provisions of the bill as they might affect civil liberties. I 
wish that it were more tightly targeted to address only actions 
directly related to terrorism or suspected terrorism. And I hope that 
by the time it passes as a conference report the bill will contain a 
sunset provision. But I support the bill today as a step toward 
conference, and as an important and needed strengthening of our 
security from horrific attacks such as that of September 11.
  The bill expands the Regional Information Sharing Systems Program to 
promote information sharing among Federal, State and local law 
enforcement agencies in their anti-terrorism efforts. State and local 
law enforcement have a critical role to play in preventing and 
investigating terrorism, and this bill provides them benefits 
appropriate to such duty. The bill streamlines and expedites the Public 
Safety Officers' Benefits application process for family members of 
fire-fighters, police officers and other emergency personnel who are 
killed or suffer a disabling injury in connection with a future 
terrorist attack. And it raises the total amount of the Public Safety 
Officers' Benefit Program payments from approximately $150,000 to 
$250,000.
  This bill will also make an immediate difference in the lives of 
victims of terrorism and their families. It refines the Victims of 
Crime Act and by doing so improves the way in which its crime fund is 
managed and preserved. It replenishes the emergency reserve of the 
Crime Victims Fund with up to $50 million and improves the mechanism to 
replenish the fund in future years. The USA Act also increases security 
on our Northern Border, including the border between Canada and my 
State of Minnesota. It triples the number of Border Patrol, Customs 
Service and INS inspectors at the Northern Border and authorizes $100 
million to improve old equipment and provide new technology to INS and 
the Customs Service at that border.
  On the criminal justice side, the bill clarifies existing 
``cybercrime'' law to cover computers outside the United States that 
affect communications in this country and changes sentencing guidelines 
in some of these cases. It provides prosecutors betters tools to go 
after those involved in money-laundering schemes that are linked to 
terrorism, and it adds certain terrorism-related crimes as predicates 
for RICO and money-laundering. It creates a new criminal statute 
targeting acts of terrorism on mass transportation systems, and it 
strengthens our Federal laws relating to the threat of biological 
weapons. The bill will enhance the Government's ability to prosecute 
suspected terrorists in possession of biological agents. It will 
prohibit certain persons, particularly those from countries that 
support terrorism, from possessing biological agents. And it will 
prohibit any person from possessing a biological agent of a type or 
quantity that is not reasonably justified by a peaceful purpose.
  The bill also broadens the authority of the President to impose 
sanctions on the Taliban regime. Regarding criminal penalties for those 
convicted of terrorist acts, it provides a fair definition of what 
constitutes ``terrorism'' and ensures that penalties more closely 
reflect the offenses committed by terrorists. Again, I'd like to thank 
my colleague from Vermont and others who worked on these penalty 
provisions. The administration's initial proposal was too broad in this 
area, and the current bill provides a fair alternative.
  I strongly support these needed provisions. Still, I do have concerns 
about the possible effect on civil liberties of the bill's measures to 
enhance electronic surveillance and information sharing of criminal 
justice information, while at the same time reducing judicial review of 
those actions. I also hope that the bill's provisions to expand the 
Government's ability to conduct secret searches, as well as searches 
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, will not be abused.
  I believe we will need to monitor the use of new authorities provided 
to law enforcement agents to conduct surveillance of internet 
communications. The same is true of the bill's changes to laws allowing 
the sharing of confidential criminal justice information with various 
Federal agencies. I would prefer the requirement of judicial review 
before disclosure, which is contained in the House version of this 
bill. Likewise, I believe the House of Representatives' decision not to 
include this bill's expansion of the Government's ability to conduct 
secret, or so-called ``Sneak-n-Peek,'' searches, was correct. I hope 
the safeguards against abuse we have added in our bill--such as the 
prohibition against the Government seizing

[[Page 19542]]

any tangible property or stored electronic information unless it makes 
a showing of reasonable necessity, as well as the requirement that 
notice be given within a reasonable time of the execution of a sneak-n-
peak warrant--will prove sufficient.
  The bill broadens the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, by 
extending FISA surveillance authority to criminal investigations, even 
when the primary purpose is not intelligence gathering. The bill limits 
this ability by authorizing surveillance only if a significant purpose 
of it is to gather intelligence information. I hope this new FISA 
authority will be used for the purpose of investigating and preventing 
terrorism or suspected terrorism, and not for other domestic purposes.
  Mr. President, we have done our best in this bill to maximize our 
security while minimizing the impact some of these changes may have on 
our civil liberties. Nearly all of us have probably said since 
September 11 that if that day's terror is allowed to undermine our 
democratic principles and practices, then the terrorists will have won 
a victory. We should pass this bill today. And we should also commit 
ourselves to monitoring its impact on civil liberties in the coming 
months and years.
  I believe a sunset provision that ensures that review is essential. 
The bill before us today is good, but there are provisions that are too 
broad. There are parts that should be more narrowly focused on 
combating terrorism. I hope these are the concerns that will be 
addressed in conference. Mr. President, our challenge is to balance our 
security with our liberties. While it is not perfect, I believe we are 
doing that in this bill.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I rise today to support S. 1510, the anti-
terrorism bill.
  To more effectively fight terrorism and those who perpetrate it, we 
need to improve law enforcement's intelligence gathering capability and 
enhance their ability to investigate and prosecute suspected 
terrorists. This measure does both. But let's also be realistic about 
the act. It will not solve all of law enforcement's problems in 
combating terrorism nor will it severely compromise our civil 
liberties. The truth lies somewhere in between.
  The strongest proponents of the legislation argue that the bill 
primarily consists of long overdue updates of current laws, updates 
necessary because technology advances have allowed criminals and 
terrorists to stay a step, or two, ahead of law enforcement. Updates 
are necessary because the inability of Federal authorities to share 
information on suspected terrorists hampers criminal investigations. 
Updates are necessary because the penalties and limitations periods 
governing many terrorist crimes have been woefully inadequate. All of 
this is true. And for these reasons, I support the bill.
  But, we shouldn't be lulled into thinking that this measure will 
solve our problems. Indeed, I asked the Attorney General whether the 
new powers granted in this bill could have prevented the events of 
September 11. He answered me honestly, saying that he could not make 
that guarantee. Yet, he added that these new tools would make it less 
likely that terrorism could strike in the same way again.
  Tougher laws and penalties are an important part of our strategy to 
combat terrorism. That plan must also include more and better agents 
dedicated to gathering intelligence, an aggressive approach to 
preventing attacks, and patience from all Americans. Patience is 
essential because we will need to understand that we might have to 
temper our freedoms slightly in an effort to guarantee them.
  Critics of this legislation caution us to be wary of compromising our 
liberties in an effort to make our Nation safer. They comment that 
sacrificing freedom gives the terrorists a victory. Those warnings do 
have merit.
  Some of this bill's provisions do risk our civil liberties and ask 
Americans to sacrifice some privacy. This bill grants our prosecutors a 
great deal of discretion in enforcing the law and asks Americans to 
have faith that this power will not be abused. Most of us would rather 
not have our civil liberties depend on someone else's discretion.
  That's why I believe many of this bill's provisions should lapse in 
two years and then be reconsidered by Congress. The House version of 
this bill reconciles the need for tough law enforcement with the 
concern for our civil liberties by sunsetting some of the most 
objectionable portions of the bill in two years. That is a good idea. 
Two years from now, we can take stock of where we are, how this bill 
has affected us, and whether the trust we show in law enforcement is 
warranted. I hope that the final version of this bill will adopt such a 
sensible approach.
  I have never doubted that our country's law enforcement is the best 
in the world. They are dedicated, creative, committed, and decent. From 
local beat officers to the Director of the FBI, every one of them has a 
vital role to play in combating terrorism. We believe this bill will 
help them prevent terrorism when possible. It will help them catch 
wrongdoers. It will cut wrongdoers off from their support networks. It 
will guarantee stiff punishment for their criminal acts. It will deter 
others from following in the terrorists' footsteps. It is our 
responsibility to give law enforcement the tools they need in an 
increasingly complex world. It is their responsibility to use them 
wisely.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the 
antiterrorism legislation we have before us.
  First, let me say I am pleased to have also worked in conjunction 
with Senator Bond and Senator Conrad in supporting their legislation 
entitled ``The Visa Integrity and Security Act.'' This bill addresses 
many of the concerns I have, such as the importance of information 
sharing among Government law enforcement and intelligence agencies with 
the State Department and tightening tracking controls on those entering 
the United States on student visas, including those attending flight 
schools. These are critical issues, and I commend both Senators for 
their efforts.
  Today, our men and women in uniform are on the frontlines in the war 
against terrorism. We salute their willingness to put themselves in 
harm's way in defense of freedom, and we pray for their safety and 
well-being. Here at home, we are working to secure our nation, and that 
is why I am pleased that we will pass this legislation in the Senate 
that will take strong measures to help prevent further terrorist 
attacks on American soil.
  With this legislation, we will take reasonable, constitutional steps 
to enhance electronic and other forms of surveillance, without 
trampling on the rights of Americans. We will also institute critical 
measures to increase information sharing by mandating access to the 
FBI's National Crime Information Center, or NCIC, by the State 
Department and INS.
  In our war against terrorism, Americans stand as one behind our 
President. It is equally critical that, in the all-out effort to 
protect our homeland, Federal agencies be united in securing American 
soil.
  In that light, President Bush made exactly the right decision when he 
created the Office of Homeland Security, a national imperative in the 
wake of the horrific tragedies of September 11, and I commend him for 
appointing my former colleague, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, as its 
Director.
  With a seat at the Cabinet table, Governor Ridge will literally be at 
the President's side, giving him the standing that will be required to 
remove jurisdictional hurdles among the 40-plus agencies he will be 
responsible for coordinating. Now, we will assist in that coordination 
by allowing INS and the State Department access to the information they 
need to make informed decisions about who we will grant entrance into 
this country.
  I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in 
coordination and communication during my 12 years as ranking member of 
the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and 
Chair of the subcommittee's Senate counterpart. In fact, I recently 
wrote an op-ed piece

[[Page 19543]]

concerning my findings during that time and I would like to submit the 
entire text of that piece for the Record.
  In conducting oversight of Embassy security as well as visa and 
consular operations, I became extensively involved with the issue of 
terrorism, co-drafting antiterrorism legislation with former 
Representative Dan Mica in the wake of 1983 and 1984 terrorist attacks 
against the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks in Lebanon--traveling to 
Belgrade, Warsaw, and East Berlin to press government officials into 
helping stem the flow of money to the terrorist Abu Nidal and his 
organization--and investigating entry into the United States by radical 
Egyptian cleric Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, mastermind of the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing.


  As far back as our hearings on the 1985 Inman Report, commissioned by 
then-Secretary of State George Shultz in response to the attacks in 
Lebanon, it was abundantly clear that improved coordination and 
consolidation of information from agencies such as the FBI, CIA, DEA, 
Customs, INS and the State Department would be an essential step toward 
removing a vulnerability in our national security. That point was 
tragically underscored by our discovery that, astoundingly, in the 
period since 1987 when Sheikh Rahman was placed on the State Department 
lookout list, the Sheikh entered and exited the United States five 
times totally unimpeded.
  But it got even worse. Even after the State Department formally 
issued a certification of visa revocation, he was granted permanent 
residence status by the INS. When he was finally caught on July 31, 
1991, reentering the United States, he was immediately released back 
into U.S. society to allow him to pursue a multi-year appeal process.
  As unbelievable as that may sound, just as unfathomable is the fact 
that, even after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, membership 
in a terrorist organization in and of itself--with the exception of the 
PLO--was not sufficient grounds for visa denial. Rather, the 
Immigration Act of 1990 required the Government to prove that an 
individual either was personally involved in a terrorist act, or 
planning one.
  This absurd threshold made it almost impossible to block individuals, 
such as Sheikh Rahman, from entering the country legally. Legislation I 
introduced in 1993 removed that bureaucratic and legal obstacle--yet it 
took nearly 3 more years to enact it as part of the Anti-Terrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
  However, provisions from my bill were enacted in 1994 to respond to 
the trail of errors we uncovered requiring modernization in the State 
Department's antiquated microfiche ``lookout'' system to keep dangerous 
aliens from entering the United States.
  This system required manual searches, was difficult to use, and was 
subject to error. The language I crafted required the State Department 
to replace the old systems with one of two forms of state-of-the-art 
computerized systems. Visa fees were even increased for non-immigrants 
to pay for the upgrades.
  Recognizing the need to mate these new technologies with the need for 
the most comprehensive, current and reliable information, we also 
attempted to address the issue of access. This was all the more 
pressing because, in 1990, the Justice Department had ruled that 
because the State Department was not a ``law enforcement agency,'' it 
no longer had free access to the FBI's National Crime Information 
Center, NCIC.
  This system, which maintains arrest and criminal information from a 
wide variety of Federal, State, and local sources as well as from 
Canada, was used by the State Department to deny visas. Tellingly, 
after it lost access to the NCIC, the visa denial rate for past 
criminal activities plunged a remarkable 45 percent--stark evidence 
that we can't afford to tie the hands of America's overseas line of 
defense against terrorism.
  Incredibly, while intelligence is frequently exchanged, no law 
requires agencies like the FBI and CIA to share information on 
dangerous aliens with the State Department. To address this, my 1993 
bill also designated the State Department a ``law enforcement agency'' 
for purposes of accessing the NCIC as well as other FBI criminal 
records when processing any visa application, whether immigrant or non-
immigrant.
  Unfortunately, a revised provision also enacted in 1994 only provided 
the State Department with free access to these FBI resources for 
purposes of processing immigrant visas--dropping my requirement for 
non-immigrant visas eventually used by all 19 suspected hijackers.
  Also of note, we discovered later in trying to understand some of 
what's gone wrong that even that limited law was sunsetted in 1997 due 
to a provision added by the House-Senate conference on the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act for FY 1994-1995--a conference of which I 
was not a member. Subsequently, that law was extended to 1998 in the 
Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations bill for fiscal year 1998, and 
then was allowed to expire. This happened despite my legislation 
enacted in 1996 repealing the requirement that visa applicants be 
informed of the reason for a denial--a provision that law enforcement 
agencies legitimately believed could impede ongoing investigations, or 
reveal sources and methods. Thus, today, information sharing remains 
optional and ad hoc.
  Currently, U.S. posts check the lookout database called the 
``Consular Lookout and Support System--Enhanced,'' or CLASS-E, prior to 
issuing any visa. CLASS-E contains approximately 5.7 million records, 
most of which originate with U.S. Embassies and consulates abroad 
through the visa application process. The INS, DEA, Department of 
Justice, and other Federal agencies also contribute lookouts to the 
system, however, this is voluntary.
  To further fortify our front-line defenses against terrorism--to turn 
back terrorists at their point of origin--information sharing should be 
mandatory, not voluntary. That is why I introduced a bill that would 
require that law enforcement and the intelligence community share 
information with the State Department and INS for the purpose of 
issuing visas and permitting entry into the United States. And while my 
bill would have gone farther than the legislation before us--by 
including the DEA, CIA, Customs and the Department of Defense in the 
mandated information-sharing network--I am pleased that this bill we 
are considering does mandate access to the NCIC by INS and the State 
Department.
  Clearly, the catastrophic events of September 11 have catapulted us 
into a different era, and everything is forever changed. We must move 
heaven and earth to remove the impediments that keep us from maximizing 
our defense against terrorism. The bottom line is, if knowledge is 
power, we are only as strong as the weakest link in our information 
network--therefore, we must ensure that the only ``turf war'' will be 
the one to protect American turf.
  That is why we need a singular, Cabinet-level authority that can help 
change the prevailing system and culture, and why we need legislation 
to help them do it. Ironically, the most compelling reason for an 
Office of Homeland Security is also its greatest challenge--the need to 
focus on the ``three C's'' of coordination, communication and 
cooperation so that all our resources are brought to bear in securing 
our Nation.
  Winston Churchill, in a 1941 radio broadcast, sent a message to 
President Roosevelt saying, ``Give us the tools and we will finish the 
job.'' I have no doubt that, given the tools, the men and women of our 
Embassies throughout the world will get the job done and help us build 
a more secure American homeland.
  Finally, once a visa is issued at the point of origin, we should be 
ensuring that it's the same person who shows up at the point of entry. 
The fact is, we don't know how many--if any--of the 19 terrorists 
implicated in the September 11 attacks entered the United States on 
visas that were actually issued to someone else.
  Currently, once a visa is issued by the State Department, it then 
falls to INS officials at a port-of-entry to determine whether to grant 
entry. The problem is, no automated system is

[[Page 19544]]

utilized to ensure that the person holding the visa is actually the 
person who was issued the visa. In other words, the INS official has to 
rely solely on the identification documents the person seeking entry is 
carrying--making that officials job that much more difficult.
  There is a better way, and legislation I introduced would require the 
establishment of a fingerprint-based check system to be used by State 
and INS to verify that the person who received the visa is the same 
person at the border crossing station trying to enter the country.
  Simply put, it requires the State Department and INS to jointly 
create an electronic database which stores fingerprints--and that other 
agencies may use as well. When a foreign national receives a visa, a 
fingerprint is taken, which then is matched against the fingerprint 
taken by INS upon entry to the United States. This is a common sense 
approach that would take us one step closer to minimizing the threat 
and maximizing our national security.
  The fact of the matter is, fingerprint technology--one part of the 
larger category of biological factors that can be used for 
identification known as biometrics--is not new. In fact, the U.S. 
Government has already employed biometrics to verify identities at 
military and secret facilities, at ports-of-entry, and for airport 
security, among many others.
  The INS has already announced it was beginning to implement the new 
biometric Mexican border crossing cards as required by 1996 Illegal 
Immigrations Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. These cards have 
the individual's fingerprint encoded on them and are matched to the 
fingerprint of the person possessing the card at a U.S. port-of-entry.
  This surely does not sound all that much different than the 
legislation I have proposed. I am pleased the bill before us at least 
starts us down the road toward implementing biometric technologies by 
requiring a review of the feasibility of instituting such technologies, 
and I hope this can be achieved as soon as possible.
  Despite areas where I might have wished to strengthen this bill even 
further, this legislation is vital to our national security, and I will 
be proud to support it. The war on terrorism is a war on myriad fronts. 
Some of the battles will be great in scale, many will be notable by 
what is not seen and by what doesn't happen--namely, that individuals 
who pose a serious threat to this Nation never see these shores and 
never set foot on our soil.
  Many of our greatest victories will be measured by the attacks that 
never happen--in battles we win before they ever have a name--in 
conflicts we prevent before they ever claim one American life. I hope 
we will pass and enact legislation that will help make that possible. I 
thank the Chair.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, a month ago today, America was attacked 
by vicious terrorists bent on doing all they can to undermine our 
Nation, our freedoms, and our way of life. But they have failed. Our 
country has never been more united behind the ideals that make us 
strong, or more committed to protecting our security.
  In recent weeks, we have sought international cooperation and 
received it. We have asked our men and women in uniform to protect and 
defend our Nation, and they are doing it superbly. We are equally 
committed to preserving our freedoms and our democracy.
  The goal of this antiterrorism legislation is to achieve greater 
coordination between the law enforcement and intelligence communities, 
while protecting the civil liberties of American citizens. We must give 
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General the tools to stop 
terrorists from entering our country, while guaranteeing America's 
proud tradition of welcoming immigrants from around the world.
  The terrorist attacks of September 11 make it an urgent priority to 
act as soon as possible. The INS and the State Department must have the 
technology and intelligence information they need to make quick and 
accurate decisions on whether to admit anyone to the United States.
  We must also take urgent steps to improve security at our borders 
with Canada and Mexico, to keep terrorists from entering the country 
illegally.
  These improvements in the immigration laws can make a huge and 
immediate difference. Immigration security is an indispensable part of 
our national security.
  As we protect our country, we must also protect the founding 
principles that have made our nation great. We must respond to the 
current crisis in ways that protect the basic rights and liberties of 
our citizens and others residing legally in the United States.
  Currently, the INS has broad authority to act against any foreign 
national who supports terrorism. With respect to visitors, foreign 
students, and other non-immigrants, as well as immigrants already in 
this country, the Federal Government has a broad range of enforcement 
tools. The INS may detain certain non-citizens if they pose a threat to 
national security or are a flight risk, and they may do so on the basis 
of secret evidence. The INS may also deport any alien who has engaged 
in terrorist activity, or supported terrorist activity in any way. If 
the INS has the resources to use its existing authority fully and 
fairly, we will be far closer to ensuring our national security.
  Nonetheless, loopholes may exist in our current laws, and we should 
close them. In recent weeks, many of us in Congress have worked closely 
with the administration to strengthen the law without creating serious 
civil liberties concerns. Although we have made progress, more remains 
to be done. I continue to be concerned that the Attorney General has 
the authority to detain even permanent residents without adequate 
cause, and with very few due process protections.
  We must be cautious that new measures are not enacted in haste, 
undermining current law in critical and constitutionally troubling 
respects. We must avoid enacting legislation with vague and overly 
broad definitions or legislation that punishes individuals exercising 
constitutionally protected rights.
  Consistent with these basic principles, it is essential for Congress 
to strengthen the criminal code in response to the September 11 
attacks. We must increase penalties for terrorists and those who 
support terrorist activity. We must punish those who possess biological 
weapons and commit acts of violence against mass transportation 
systems. We must also ensure that victim assistance and victim 
compensation programs are able to help all the victims of the September 
11 attacks. In fact, the current bill makes several important reforms 
to the Victim of Crimes Act to achieve that goal.
  I am concerned, however, that by authorizing foreign-intelligence 
searches where foreign-intelligence gathering is only ``a significant 
purpose''--not the sole or primary purpose--of the search, the bill may 
well make the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act unconstitutional 
under the fourth amendment.
  We must also ensure that, in acting to expand the powers of law 
enforcement to obtain student educational records for the investigation 
and prosecution of terrorism, we adequately safeguard the interests of 
innocent students. We should not permit schools and colleges to 
transfer student records to law enforcement agencies indiscriminately. 
We have worked closely with the administration to develop measures that 
strike a balance between the legitimate interests of law enforcement 
and the privacy of students.
  In the wake of the September 11 attacks, we have also seen a 
disturbing increase in hate-motivated violence directed at Arab 
Americans and Muslim Americans. The Department of Justice is currently 
investigating over 90 such incidents, including several murders.
  We need to do more to combat the acts of hate that cause many Arab 
and Muslim Americans to live in fear. Under current law, the Department 
of Justice cannot prosecute such cases as hate crimes unless it can 
prove that the victim was engaged in one of six ``federally protected 
activities''--such

[[Page 19545]]

as voting or attending a public university--when the crime occurred. 
This requirement is an unwise and unnecessary constraint on effective 
law enforcement and may hamper the Department's ability to prosecute 
some of the cases it is now investigating.
  The bipartisan hate crimes bill passed by the Senate last year and 
approved again by the Judiciary Committee in July would remove the 
``federally protected activity'' requirement from the law--making it 
easier for the Justice Department to prosecute hate crimes--while still 
ensuring that the Federal Government is only involved when necessary 
and appropriate.
  Congress and the President must send a strong and unequivocal message 
to the American people that hate-motivated violence in any form will 
not be tolerated in our nation.
  There are provisions in the Uniting and Strengthening America Act 
that do not strike the correct balance between law enforcement 
authority and civil liberties protection. However, I am confident that 
working with the House of Representatives and the administration, we 
can enact a final bill that meets these important concerns.
  We can send the President a tough, comprehensive, and balanced anti-
terrorism bill. The important work we do in the coming days will 
strengthen America, and make America proud of its ideals as well.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am very pleased to have the opportunity 
to speak for a few minutes about the Uniting and Strengthening America, 
USA, Act that is before the Senate today. This legislation reflects the 
hard work of the Senate Banking Committee and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and I want to thank them for their commitment to ensuring 
that Congress address this legislation as quickly as possible and for 
paying great attention to the civil rights and liberties of the 
American people.
  Right now our Nation is strongly united. We are bound together by, 
among other things, a desire to see justice brought to those who 
planned the terrorist attacks and those who aided and abetted the 
terrorists. And Americans are united by our desire to prevent future 
terrorist attacks. At this time, more so than at any time in the past 
40 years, the American people are standing firmly behind the Federal 
Government and they trust government to do the right thing. The 
American people support the idea that we must provide the FBI and the 
Department of Justice will the tools necessary to punish the 
perpetrators of the terrorist attacks and to prevent future attacks.
  But as much as the American people seek a just resolution to the acts 
of terror, they are adamant about protecting their rights and 
liberties. We have heard it time and again since September 11: our 
Nation must be secure, but must not become so at the expense of our 
freedoms, our rights, and our liberties. We must not let the American 
people down.
  I want to thank Senator Leahy for his leadership on this legislation 
and his concern with important Constitutional principles, such as due 
process and unreasonable search and seizure. At Senator Leahy's urging, 
the administration's anti-terrorism proposal was carefully and closely 
analyzed and Senator Leahy did not yield to the political pressures 
that threatened to push this legislation through the Congress without 
its careful consideration. I believe that the bill before the Senate is 
vastly improved from the proposal that the administration sent up, and 
I appreciate that important changes were made.
  Though I am grateful that important changes have been made to the 
Senate bill, I am still troubled by certain provisions in the 
legislation which fail to strike the proper balance between the need 
for security and the need for civil liberties. Moving an anti-terrorism 
bill through the Congress in a timely fashion is critically important, 
particularly in light of the ongoing air strikes in Afghanistan. We all 
know that a real threat exists for future terrorist attacks in this 
country and passing legislation that helps the Federal Government 
prevent those attacks is crucial. I support the process, I support 
moving this legislation forward, and I will vote for it. But I also 
believe that the bill that passed the House better balances our civil 
liberties and the Federal Government's need for greater surveillance 
powers, and I am hopeful that the bill that emerges from the conference 
committee retains some of these provisions. I am disturbed by comments 
made yesterday by the administration in which swift consideration by 
both houses of Congress of the Senate bill was urged. This legislation 
deserves the full measure of our attention and should not be hastily 
dispensed with when the threat to our most cherished civil liberties is 
so great.
  The wide-ranging legislation before us would enhance domestic 
surveillance powers, stiffen penalties for terrorism, increase the 
penalties for money-laundering, and make it easier for law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies to share information. There was broad 
agreement on some elements of the administration's anti-terrorism 
package, such as the need to update our anti-terrorism laws to take 
account of new technologies--such as cell phones--and to ensure that 
counter-terrorism investigators wield the same powers that apply to 
drug trafficking and organized crime. But agreement was more difficult 
to reach on other issues, like detaining foreign nationals, and I am 
pleased that we are in a position to move forward on the legislation.
  I am also pleased that this package includes a bill, which I 
sponsored, that will provide the tools the U.S. needs to crack down on 
international money laundering havens and protect the integrity of the 
U.S. financial system from the influx of tainted money from abroad. 
This legislation was part of a package of anti-money laundering 
provisions that unanimously passed the Senate Banking Committee last 
week.
  Today, the global volume of laundered money is estimated to be 2 to 5 
percent of global Gross Domestic Product, between $600 billion and $1.5 
trillion. The effects of money laundering extend far beyond the 
parameters of law enforcement, creating international political issues 
and generating domestic political crises.
  It is becoming more and more apparent that Osama bin Laden's 
terrorist network, known as al Qaida, provided assistance to the 
hijackers who attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon with 
funding that was transported from the Middle East to the United States 
through the global financial system. Al-Qaida has, for years, developed 
a worldwide terrorist network by taking advantage of an open system of 
international financial transactions.
  The United States has declared a war on terrorism. This new war is 
going to be unlike anything that we have ever engaged in previously. If 
we are to lead the world in the fight against terror, we must insure 
that our own laws are worthy of the difficult task ahead.
  The International Counter-Money Laundering and Foreign Anti-
corruption Act of 2001, which I sponsored and which has been included 
in this legislation, will stop the flow of assets through the 
international financial system that have been used by bin Laden, the al 
Qaeda terrorist network and other terrorist groups.
  The United States has the largest and most accessible economic 
marketplace in the world. Foreign financial institutions and 
jurisdictions must have unfettered access to markets to effectively 
work within the international economic system. The goal of this 
legislation is to give the Treasury Secretary, in conjunction with our 
allies in the European Union and the Financial Action Task Force, the 
authority to leverage the power of our markets to force countries or 
financial institutions with lax money laundering laws or standards to 
reform them. If they refuse, the Secretary will have the authority to 
deny foreign financial institutions or jurisdictions access to the 
United States marketplace. This will help stop international criminals 
from laundering the proceeds of their crimes into the United States 
financial system or using the proceeds to commit terrorist acts.
  Specifically, the bill will give the Secretary of the Treasury--
acting in

[[Page 19546]]

consultation with other senior government officials--the authority to 
designate a specific foreign jurisdiction, foreign financial 
institution, or class of international transactions as being of 
``primary money laundering concern.'' Then, on a case-by-case basis, 
the Secretary will have the option to use a series of new tools to 
combat the specific type of foreign money laundering threat we face. In 
some cases, the Secretary will have the option to require banks to 
pierce the veil of secrecy behind which foreign criminals hide. In 
other cases, the Secretary will have the option to require the 
identification of those using a foreign bank's correspondent or 
payable-through accounts. If these transparency provisions were deemed 
to be inadequate to address the specific problem identified, the 
Secretary will have the option to restrict or prohibit U.S. banks from 
continuing correspondent or payable-through banking relationships with 
money laundering havens and rogue foreign banks. Through these steps, 
the Secretary will help prevent laundered money from slipping 
undetected into the U.S. financial system and, as a result, increase 
the pressure on foreign money laundering havens to bring their laws and 
practices into line with international anti-money laundering standards.
  The bill provides for actions that will be graduated, discretionary, 
and targeted, in order to focus actions on international transactions 
involving criminal proceeds, while allowing legitimate international 
commerce to continue to flow unimpeded.
  It provides a clear warning to those who have assisted or unwittingly 
assisted those involved in the al Qaeda network or other terrorist 
organizations in laundering money. The United States will take whatever 
actions are necessary, including denying foreign banks and 
jurisdictions access to the United States economy, in order to stop 
terrorists and international criminal networks from continuing to 
launder money through the international financial system.
  Passage of this legislation will make it much more difficult for new 
terrorist organizations to develop. During the 1980s, as Chairman of 
the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I began an 
investigation of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), 
and uncovered a complex money laundering scheme involving billions of 
dollars. Fortunately, BCCI was forced to close and we were able to 
bring many of those involved in to justice. However, as we have learned 
since the closing of BCCI, Osama bin Laden had a number of accounts at 
BCCI and we had dealt him a very serious economic blow. So as we 
consider this bill as a response to recent attacks, we must not lose 
sight of the potential this legislation will have to stop the 
development of terrorist organizations in the future.
  With the support of the United States and the European Union, the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development has begun a 
crackdown on tax havens by targeting 36 jurisdictions which it said 
participate in unfair tax competition and undermine other nations' tax 
bases. The OECD approach does not punish countries just for having low 
tax rates, instead, it looks for tax systems that have a lack of 
transparency, a lack of effective exchange of information and those 
countries that have different tax rules for foreign customers than for 
its own citizens. Countries with these types of tax systems assist 
terrorists and international criminal organizations looking to hide 
money that was derived from the sale of drugs, weapons and other 
criminal enterprises that have already been laundered in the 
international financial system.
  Mr. President, earlier this evening my colleague Senator Feingold 
offered an amendment to the section of the USA Act that deals with the 
interception of computer trespass communications. This amendment, at 
its core, was intended to prevent law enforcement from abusing their 
authority to monitor computer activity. The Senator from Wisconsin's 
amendment would have limited the amount of time that law enforcement 
could monitor suspicious activity without a court order to 96 hours, 
after which time investigators would have to obtain a warrant for 
continued surveillance. I support the intent of this amendment, and 
regret that I felt compelled vote to table the amendment. I voted to 
table the amendment for two reasons: First, I was concerned that the 
amendment was overly restrictive because it prevented law enforcement 
from investigations unrelated to the computer trespass. My concern is 
that law enforcement authorities would, for example, be able to monitor 
activity which permitted a computer hacker to establish a ``dead drop'' 
zone for terrorists to post messages, but would not be able to monitor 
the content of those messages.
  I also voted to table Senator Feingold's amendment because I strongly 
believe that we must move forward with this anti-terrorism legislation. 
Just today the FBI issued a statement warning of terrorist attacks and 
put law enforcement on the highest alert. I believe these serious 
threats to our security justify our this legislation swiftly. But I 
sincerely hope that an acceptable compromise can be reached--on this 
and on other issues--in the final legislation.
  This legislation is a crucial step toward limiting the scourge of 
money laundering and to stop the development of international criminal 
organizations. It is my hope that the Congress will be able to develop 
anti-terrorism legislation that will provide needed protections of our 
citizens without eliminating any of our cherished individual liberties.
  Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, in the war against terrorism, Americans 
stand as one behind our President. Now, in the all-out effort to 
protect our homeland, Federal agencies must be united in securing 
American soil.
  In that light, President Bush made exactly the right decision when he 
created the Office of Homeland Security--a national imperative in the 
wake of the horrific tragedies of September 11--and I commend him for 
appointing my former colleague, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, as its 
director. With a seat at the Cabinet table, Governor Ridge will 
literally be at the President's side, giving him the standing that will 
be required to remove jurisdictional hurdles among the forty-plus 
agencies he will be responsible for coordinating.
  I saw firsthand the consequences of serious inadequacies in 
coordination and communication during my twelve years as ranking member 
of the House Foreign Affairs International Operations Subcommittee and 
Chair of the subcommittee's Senate counterpart. In conducting oversight 
of embassy security as well as visa and consular operations, I became 
extensively involved with the issue of terrorism, co-drafting anti-
terrorism legislation with former Representative Dan Mica, Florida, in 
the wake of 1983 and 1984 terrorist attacks against the U.S. embassy 
and Marine barracks in Lebanon; traveling to Belgrade, Warsaw, and East 
Berlin to press government officials into helping stem the flow of 
money to the terrorist Abu Nidal and his organization; and 
investigating entry into the United States by radical Egyptian cleric 
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing 
in 1993.
  As far back as our hearings on the 1985 Inman Report, commissioned in 
response to the attacks in Lebanon, it was abundantly clear that 
improved coordination and consolidation of information from agencies 
such as the FBI, CIA, DEA, Customs, INS and the State Department would 
be an essential step toward removing a vulnerability in our national 
security. That point was tragically underscored by our discovery that, 
astoundingly, in the period since 1987 when Sheikh Rahman was placed on 
the State Department lookout list, the Sheikh entered and exited the 
U.S. five times totally unimpeded. Even after the State Department 
formally issued a certification of visa revocation, he was granted 
permanent residence status by the INS. When he was finally caught on 
July 31, 1991, reentering the United States, he was immediately 
released back into U.S. society to allow him to pursue a multi-year 
appeal process.

[[Page 19547]]

  Just as unbelievable is the fact that, even after the 1993 attack on 
the World Trade Center, membership in a terrorist organization in and 
of itself--with the exception of the PLO--was not sufficient grounds 
for visa denial. Rather, the Immigration Act of 1990 required the 
Government to prove that an individual either was personally involved 
in a terrorist act, or planning one. This absurd threshold made it 
almost impossible to block individuals, such as Sheikh Rahman, from 
entering the country legally. Legislation I introduced in 1993 removed 
that bureaucratic and legal obstacle--yet it took nearly 3 more years 
to enact it as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996.
  Further, to respond to the trail of errors we uncovered, provisions 
from my bill were enacted in 1994 requiring modernization in the State 
Department's antiquated microfiche ``lookout'' system to keep dangerous 
aliens from entering the United States. This system required manual 
searches, was difficult to use, and was subject to error. The language 
I crafted required State to replace the old systems with one of two 
forms of state-of-the-art computerized systems. Visa fees were even 
increased for non-immigrants to pay for the upgrades.
  Recognizing the need to mate these new technologies with the need for 
the most comprehensive, current and reliable information, we also 
attempted to address the issue of access. This was all the more 
pressing because, in 1990, the Justice Department had ruled that 
because the State Department was not a ``law enforcement agency'', it 
no longer had free access to the FBI's National Crime Information 
Center. This system, which maintains arrest and criminal information 
from a wide variety of federal, state, and local sources as well as 
from Canada, is used by the State Department to deny visas. Tellingly, 
after it lost access to the NCIC, the visa denial rate for past 
criminal activities plunged a remarkable 45 percent--stark evidence 
that we can't afford to tie the hands of America's overseas line of 
defense against terrorism.
  Incredibly, while intelligence is frequently exchanged, no law 
requires agencies like the FBI and CIA to share information on 
dangerous aliens with the State Department. To address this, my 1993 
bill also designated the State Department a ``law enforcement agency'' 
for purposes of accessing the NCIC as well as other FBI criminal 
records when processing any visa application, whether immigrant or non-
immigrant.
  Unfortunately, a revised provision also enacted in 1994 only provided 
the State Department with free access to these FBI resources for 
purposes of processing immigrant visas--dropping my requirement for 
non-immigrant visas eventually used by at least 16 of the 19 suspected 
hijackers. Even that limited law was allowed to expire, despite my 
legislation enacted in 1996 repealing the requirement that visa 
applicants be informed of the reason for a denial--a provision that law 
enforcement agencies legitimately believed could impede ongoing 
investigations, or reveal sources and methods. Thus, today, information 
sharing remains optional and ad hoc.
  To further fortify our front-line defenses against terrorism, I also 
propose to assist our embassies in turning-back terrorists at their 
point of origin by establishing Terrorist Lookout Committees, comprised 
of the head of the political section of each embassy and senior 
representatives of all U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
The committees would be required to meet on a monthly basis to review 
and submit names to the State Department for inclusion in the visa 
lookout system.
  Clearly, the catastrophic events of September 11 have catapulted us 
into a different era, and everything is forever changed. We must move 
heaven and earth to remove the impediments that keep us from maximizing 
our defense against terrorism, and that is why we need a singular, 
Cabinet-level authority that can change the prevailing system and 
culture. Ironically, the most compelling reason for an Office of 
Homeland Security is also its greatest challenge: the need to focus on 
the ``three C's'' of coordination, communication and cooperation so 
that all our resources are brought to bear in securing our nation. The 
bottom line is, if knowledge is power, we are only as strong as the 
weakest link in our information network therefore, we must ensure that 
the only ``turf war'' will be the one to protect American turf. In our 
fight against terrorism, we can do no less.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the attention of the American 
people has turned to the security of our national border system and how 
these attackers were able to exploit that system to plot these 
dastardly acts.
  The September 11 attacks have highlighted numerous loopholes in our 
immigration laws that have allowed terrorists to enter the United Stats 
posing as students and tourists, and, in some cases, by simply walking 
across an unpatrolled border. In reviewing our counter-terrorism 
efforts within our intelligence community, it is also appropriate that 
we look at the numerous immigration loopholes these terrorists were 
able to slip through.
  There are currently between 7 million and 13 million illegal aliens 
living in the United States. Six out of 10 of these aliens crossed a 
U.S. border illegally, and therefore were not subject to background 
checks by the INS or the State Department to determine if they had a 
terrorist or criminal history. In fact, exit/entry records are so 
incomplete that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, INS, has no 
record of 6 of the 19 suspected hijackers entering the United States.
  Of the roughly 10,000 INS agents guarding our borders, only 3 percent 
are stationed on our northern border with Canada. That's 334 agents 
protecting a 4,000 mile border, or one agent for every 12 miles. 
According to media reports, a number of the September 11 terrorists 
crossed this border to enter the United States.
  Of those foreign nationals who have legally entered the United 
States, more than a half-a-million of them are registered as 
international students at 15,000 universities, colleges, and vocational 
schools across the United States. These are nuclear engineering 
scholars, biochemistry students, and even pilot trainees who have 
access to dangerous technology, training, and information.
  The Congress passed legislation in 1996 requiring the INS to create a 
database for tracking these students. The purpose was to more 
efficiently monitor the immigration/visa status and whereabouts of 
students from abroad. After 5 years, there is still no system in place 
to monitor these 500,000 students. The current pilot program operating 
at 21 schools is not expected to be fully operational for five more 
years, and even that date could slip.
  Without a monitoring system in place to audit schools that sponsor 
these foreign students, there is nothing to prevent an alien from 
entering the United States on a student visa and then just 
disappearing. Consequently, one of the September 11 hijackers was able 
to enter the United States on a student visa, dropped out, and remained 
illegally thereafter.
  Abuses of the visa system can also be found in the application 
process overseas at our U.S. consulates. Foreign nationals must apply 
for a visa at a U.S. consulate abroad and go through a series of 
security checks before they can enter the United States. Some media 
reports have raised the issue of consulate shopping, that is, foreign 
nationals choosing to apply at a U.S. consulate that they believe is 
most likely to grant them a visa. The ``New York Times'' reported in 
September that Chinese nationals applying for visas at a U.S. consulate 
in Beijing compare their experiences over the Internet--and even post 
tips on how to act and what to say, to boost their chances of receiving 
a visa.
  Such an article raises the question of whether a terrorist could 
travel from country to country in hopes of finding a U.S. consulate 
which would be less familiar with his background and more likely to 
award him a visa. One terrorist who was involved in the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing was denied a visa at the U.S. consulate in

[[Page 19548]]

Egypt, only to be awarded a visa by the U.S. consulate in Sudan.
  And these are loopholes that exist only for those terrorists who 
would risk a background check by seeking a visa at a U.S. consulate. 
The United States allows 29 countries to participate in a visa-waiver 
program, which effectively allows the citizens of many European 
countries to bypass the initial screening process at a U.S. consulate 
abroad by waiving the visa requirement. The Inspectors General for both 
the State and Justice Departments have raised the possibility that a 
foreign national could steal and counterfeit a visa-free passport to 
bypass the visa background check altogether.
  The October 8 Wall Street Journal reported that some 1,067 visa-free 
passports have been stolen in recent months, presumably to be used for 
entry into the United States. In fact, one of the terrorists who 
plotted the bombing of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was caught 
trying to slip through this loophole in 1992 when he tried to enter the 
United States using a visa-free Swedish passport.
  These are just some of the loopholes that terrorists are trying to 
exploit. To its credit, the Senate Judiciary Committee recognizes this 
fact.
  The legislation drafted by the committee would triple the number of 
INS agents on our northern border. This is a worthwhile investment, and 
one that should be made. However, the security of our borders depends 
on more than just INS agents. The first line of defense against 
terrorists are our U.S. consulates abroad.
  We must address the loopholes in the visa-waiver program that would 
allow a potential terrorist to enter the United States on a stolen 
passport. We must prevent consulate shopping. And, we must fully 
implement a system that can monitor foreign students.
  The State and Justice Departments confirm that these are real 
security threats that must be addressed if we are to protect our 
borders from terrorists.
  I have offered three amendments to address these concerns, which were 
accepted by the Judiciary Committee chairman and ranking member into 
the manager's package.
  My first amendment would authorize the necessary funding so that the 
Justice Department could immediately put into place a tracking system 
that would require every university, college, and vocational school to 
submit a name, an address, an enrollment status, and disciplinary 
action taken on each of the international students that these 
educational institutions sponsor. Such a database would be invaluable 
to law enforcement officials who may need to identify and locate a 
potential terrorist immediately.
  My second amendment would tighten the visa-waiver program by 
requiring that any country that participates in that program issue to 
its citizens within 2 years machine-readable passports that U.S. 
officials could scan into a ``look out'' system. This moves forward the 
original statutory deadline Congress agreed to last year by 4 years.
  This amendment would also require the State Department to regularly 
audit the passports of these visa-free countries to ensure that 
countries that participate in this program have implemented sufficient 
safety precautions to prevent the counterfeiting and the theft of their 
passports.
  My third amendment would require the State Department to review how 
it issues its visas to determine if consulate shopping is a problem, 
and then require the Secretary of State to take the necessary steps to 
correct the problem. The State Department has the legislative authority 
it needs to fix this problem. It is now imperative that it use that 
authority.
  My amendments are important steps toward closing down the loopholes 
in our immigration laws, and I look forward to working with my 
colleagues so that we may continue to tighten the security of national 
borders.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, three weeks ago, the President of the 
United States--with the undivided support of this Congress and the 
American people--announced a war on terrorism. In that address, he 
asked Congress to provide our law enforcement community with the tools 
that they need to wage that war effectively.
  After several weeks of negotiations with the Chairman and the 
Administration, I am pleased we have come to the point where we can 
pass a bipartisan, measured bill that does just that.
  Mr. President, each of us has, in different ways, had our lives 
touched by the awful events of September 11th. Each of us has, in the 
days since the attack, been shocked and appalled by the terrible images 
of destruction that have reached us, by television, by newspaper--and 
in many cases by our own eyes--from the sites of the attacks in 
Pennsylvania, at the World Trade Center, and at the Pentagon.
  Paradoxically, each of us has also been uplifted by the stories of 
heroism and self-sacrifice that have emerged from around the country in 
the wake of these terrible events.
  As the President made clear in his address to the nation, we did not 
seek this war. This war was thrust upon us--thrust upon us by an 
unprovoked attack upon our civilian population in the very midst of our 
greatest cities.
  Just one month ago, we could not have contemplated that today, 
October 11th, 2001, we would be at war. It is true that, for years, 
some of us in this Congress, and around the country, have warned that 
there were powerful, well-financed individuals located throughout the 
world who were dedicated to the destruction of our way of life. But, 
few of us could predict the horrific methods that these men would 
employ in an effort to destroy us and our democratic institutions.
  On September 11th, all that changed.
  In the last few weeks, we have all come to acknowledge that we live 
in a different and more dangerous world than the world we thought we 
knew when we woke up on the morning of September 11th . . .
  . . . A different world--not only because thousands of our countrymen 
are dead as a result of the September 11th attacks . . .
  . . . A different world--not only because many of our neighbors now 
hesitate to get on an airplane, or ride in an elevator, or engage in 
any one of a number of activities that we took for granted before the 
attacks . . .
  . . . But a different world, also, because we must acknowledge that 
there remains an ongoing and serious threat to our way of life and, in 
fact, to our health and well-being as a society.
  As has been reported in the national media, the investigation into 
the September 11th attacks has revealed there are terrorist cells that 
continue to operate actively among us. It is a chilling thought, but it 
is true.
  The war to which we have collectively committed is a war unlike any 
war in the history of this country. It is different because a 
substantial part of this war must be fought on our own soil. This is 
not a circumstance of our choosing. The enemy has brought the war to 
us.
  But we must not flinch from acknowledging the fact that, because this 
is a different kind of war, it is a war that will require different 
kinds of weapons, and different kinds of tactics.
  The Department of Justice, and its investigatory components including 
the FBI, the INS, and the Border Patrol, will continue to have the 
principal responsibility for identifying and eradicating terrorist 
activity within our national borders. Our intelligence community must 
have access to critical information available to our law enforcement 
community.
  Over the last several weeks, the Attorney General has made clear to 
us, in no uncertain terms, that he does not currently have adequate 
weapons to fight this war. Weeks ago, the Administration sent to 
Congress a legislative proposal that would give the Department of 
Justice and others in law enforcement the tools they need to be 
effective in tracking down and eliminating terrorist activity in this 
country.
  Over the last several weeks, Senator Leahy, other members of the 
Judiciary Committee, and I have undertaken a painstaking review of the 
anti-terrorism proposal submitted by the Administration. There have 
been several

[[Page 19549]]

hearings on this legislation in the Senate, and many briefings by 
experts and advocates.
  The legislation that we are about to vote upon is a product of 
intense bipartisan negotiations. It is a proposal I am proud to 
cosponsor with my other colleagues in the Senate and particularly the 
distinguished Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Leahy.
  I would like to congratulate Senator Leahy, in particular, for his 
thoroughness in reviewing this legislation and his many thoughtful 
comments and suggestions in our joint effort to ensure that the 
proposals adequately protect the constitutional liberties of all 
Americans.
  Now, after weeks of fine-tuning, we have reached a final product that 
accommodates the concerns of each of the Senators who has examined this 
bill. The bipartisan bill that we vote on today respects the 
constitutional liberties of the American people and, at the same time, 
does what people around America have been calling upon us in Congress 
to do--that is, give our law enforcement community the tools they need 
to keep us safe in our homes, in our travels, and in our places of 
business.
  I would like to make a few comments regarding the process for this 
legislation. Although we have considered this in a more expedited 
manner than other legislation, my colleagues can be assured that this 
bill has received thorough consideration. First, the fact is that the 
bulk of these proposals have been requested by the Department of 
Justice for years, and have languished in Congress for years because we 
have been unable to muster the collective political will to enact them 
into law.
  No one can say whether these tools could have prevented the attacks 
of September 11th. But, as the Attorney General has said, it is certain 
that without these tools, we did not stop the vicious acts of last 
month. I say to my colleagues, Mr. President, that if these tools could 
help us now to track down the perpetrators--if they will help us in our 
continued pursuit of terrorist activities within our national borders--
then we should not hesitate any further to pass these reforms into law. 
As long as these reforms are consistent with our Constitution--and they 
are--it is difficult to see why anyone would oppose their passage.
  Furthermore, I would like to clearly dispel the myth that the reforms 
in this legislation somehow abridge the Constitutional freedoms enjoyed 
by law-abiding American citizens. Some press reports have portrayed 
this issue as a choice between individual liberties on the one hand, 
and on the other hand, enhanced powers for our law enforcement 
institutions. This is a false dichotomy. We should all take comfort 
that the reforms in this bill are primarily directed at allowing law 
enforcement agents to work smarter and more efficiently--in no case do 
they curtail the precious civil liberties protected by our 
Constitution. I want to assure my colleagues that we worked very hard 
over the past several weeks to ensure that this legislation upholds all 
of the constitutional freedoms our citizens cherish. It does.
  I would like to take a minute to explain briefly a few of the most 
important provisions of this critical legislation.
  First, the legislation encourages information-sharing between various 
arms of the federal government. I believe most of our citizens would be 
shocked to learn that, even if certain government agents had prior 
knowledge of the September 11th attacks, under many circumstances they 
would have been prohibited by law from sharing that information with 
the appropriate intelligence or national security authorities.
  This legislation makes sure that, in the future, such information 
flows freely within the Federal government, so tat it will be received 
by those responsible for protecting against terrorist attacks.
  By making these reforms, we are rejecting the outdated Cold War 
paradigm that has prevented cooperation between our intelligence 
community and our law enforcement agents. Current law does not 
adequately allow for such cooperation, artificially hampering our 
government's ability to identify and prevent acts of terrorism against 
our citizens.
  In this new war, Mr. President, terrorists are a hybrid between 
domestic criminals and international agents. We must lower the barriers 
that discourage our law enforcement and intelligence agencies from 
working together to stop these terrorists. These hybrid criminals call 
for new, hybrid tools.
  Second, this bill updates the laws relating to electronic 
surveillance. Electronic surveillance, conducted under the supervision 
of a federal judge, is one of the most powerful tools at the disposal 
of our law enforcement community. It is simply a disgrace that we have 
not acted to modernize the laws currently on the books which govern 
such surveillance, laws that were enacted before the fax machine came 
into common usage, and well before the advent of cellular telephones, 
e-mail, and instant messaging. The Department of Justice has asked us 
for years to update these laws to reflect the new technologies, but 
there has always been a call to go slow, to seek more information, to 
order further studies.
  This is no hypothetical problem. We now know that e-mail, cellular 
telephones, and the Internet have been principal tools used by the 
terrorists to coordinate their atrocious activities. We need to pursue 
all solid investigatory leads that exist right now that our law 
enforcement agents would be unable to pursue because they must continue 
to work within these outdated laws. It is high time that we update our 
laws so that our law enforcement agencies can deal with the world as it 
is, rather than the world as it existed 20 years ago.
  A good example of the way we are handicapping our law enforcement 
agencies relates to devices called ``pen registers.'' Pen registers may 
be employed by the FBI, after obtaining a court order, to determine 
what telephone numbers are being dialed from a particular telephone. 
These devices are essential investigatory tools, which allow law 
enforcement agents to determine who is speaking to whom, within a 
criminal conspiracy.
  The Supreme Court has held, in Smith v. Maryland, that the 
information obtained by pen register devices is not information that is 
subject to ANY constitutional protection. Unlike the content of your 
telephone conversation once your call is connected, the numbers you 
dial into your telephone are not private. Because you have no 
reasonable expectation that such numbers will be kept private, they are 
not protected under the Constitution. The Smith holding was cited with 
approval by the Supreme Court just earlier this year.
  The legislation under consideration today would make clear what the 
federal courts have already ruled--that federal judges may grant pen 
register authority to the FBI to cover, not just telephones, but other 
more modern modes of communication such as e-mail or instant messaging. 
Let me make clear that the bill does not allow law enforcement to 
receive the content of the communication, but they can receive the 
addressing information to identify the computer or computers a suspect 
is using to further his criminal activity.
  Importantly, reform of the pen register law does not allow--as has 
sometimes been misreported in the press--for law enforcement agents to 
view the content of any e-mail messages--not even the subject line of 
e-mails. In addition, this legislation we are about to vote upon makes 
it explicit that content can not be collected through such pen register 
orders.
  This legislation also allows judges to enter pen register orders with 
nationwide scope. Nationwide jurisdiction for pen register orders makes 
common sense. It helps law enforcement agents efficiently identify 
communications facilities throughout the country, which greatly 
enhances the ability of law enforcement to identify quickly other 
members of a criminal organization, such as a terrorist cell.
  Moreover, this legislation provides our intelligence community with 
the same authority to use pen register devices, under the auspices of 
the Foreign

[[Page 19550]]

Intelligence Surveillance Act, that our law enforcement agents have 
when investigating criminal offenses. It simply makes sense to provide 
law enforcement with the same tools to catch terrorists that they 
already possess in connection with other criminal investigations, such 
as drug crimes or illegal gambling.
  In addition to the pen register statute, this legislation updates 
other aspects of our wiretapping statutes. It is amazing that law 
enforcement agents do not currently have authority to seek wiretapping 
authority from a federal judge when investigating a terrorist offense. 
This legislation fixes that problem.
  Moving on, I note that much has been made of the complex immigration 
provisions of this bill. I know Senators Specter, Kohl and Kennedy had 
questions about earlier provisions, particularly the detention 
provision for suspected alien terrorists.
  I want to assure my colleagues that we have worked hard to address 
your concerns, and the concerns of the public. As with the other 
immigration provisions of this bill, we have made painstaking efforts 
to achieve this workable compromise.
  Let me address some of the specific concerns. In response to the 
concern that the INS might detain a suspected terrorist indefinitely, 
Senator Kennedy, Senator Kyl, and I worked out a compromise that limits 
the provision. It provides that the alien must be charged with an 
immigration or criminal violation within seven days after the 
commencement of detention or be released. In addition, contrary to what 
has been alleged, the certification itself is subject to judicial 
review. The Attorney General's power to detain a suspected terrorist 
under this bill is, then, not unfettered.
  Moreover, Senator Leahy and I have also worked diligently to craft 
necessary language that provides for the deportation of those aliens 
who are representatives of organizations that endorse terrorist 
activity, those who use a position of prominence to endorse terrorist 
activity or persuade others to support terrorist activity, or those who 
provide material support to terrorist organizations. If we are to fight 
terrorism, we can not allow those who support terrorists to remain in 
our country. Also, I should note that we have worked hard to provide 
the State Department and the INS the tools they need to ensure that no 
applicant for admission who is a terrorist is able to secure entry into 
the United States through legal channels.
  Finally, the bill gives law enforcement agencies powerful tools to 
attack the financial infrastructure of terrorism--giving our government 
the ability to choke off the financing that these dangerous terrorist 
organizations need to survive. It criminalizes the practice of 
harboring terrorists, and puts teeth in the laws against providing 
material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations. It gives 
the President expanded authority to freeze the assets of terrorists and 
terrorist organizations, and provides for the eventual seizure of such 
assets. These tools are vital to our ability to effectively wage the 
war against terrorism, and ultimately to win it.
  Mr. President, before this debate comes to an end, I would be remiss 
if I did not acknowledge the hard work put in by my staff, the staff of 
Senator Leahy, and the representatives of the Administration who were 
involved in the negotiation of this bill. These people have engaged in 
discussions, literally around the clock over the last 3 weeks to 
produce this excellent bill, that now enjoys such widespread bipartisan 
support.
  I would like to thank my Chief Counsel, Makim Delrahim, who has been 
instrumental in putting this bill together. I also would like to thank 
my criminal counsel, Jeff Taylor, Stuart Nash, and Leah Belaire, who 
have brought invaluable expertise to this process. My immigration 
counsel, Dustin Pead and my legislative assistant Brigham Cannon have 
provided invaluable assistance.
  I would like to thank the staff of Senator Leahy--his chief counsel 
Bruce Cohen, and other members of his staff--Beryl Howell, Julie 
Katzman, Ed Pagano, David James, and John Eliff.
  The Department of Justice has been of great assistance to us in 
putting this bill together. I would like to thank Attorney General 
Ashcroft and his Deputy Larry Thompson for their wise counsel, and for 
their quick response to our many questions and concerns. Michael 
Chertoff, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division was 
a frequent participant in our meetings, as well as Assistant Attorneys 
General Dan Bryant and Viet Dinh. Jennifer Newstead, John Yew, John 
Elwood and Pat O'Brien were all important participants in this process.
  Finally, the White House staff provided essential contributions at 
all stages of this process. Judge Al Gonzales, the White House counsel 
provided key guidance, with the help of his wonderful staff, including 
Tim Flanagan, Courtney Elwood, and Porad Berensen.
  In addition, members of the White House Congressional Liaison Office 
kept this process moving forward. I would like to thank Heather 
Wingate, Candy Wolff and Nancy Dorn for all the assistance they have 
given us.
  There have been few, if any, times in our nation's great history 
where an event has brought home to so many of our citizens, so quickly, 
and in such a graphic fashion, a sense of our vulnerability to 
unexpected attack.
  I believe we all took some comfort when President Bush promised us 
that our law enforcement institutions would have the tools necessary to 
protect us from the danger that we are only just beginning to perceive.
  The Attorney General has told us what tools he needs. We have taken 
the time to review the problems with our current laws, and to reflect 
on their solutions. The time to act is now. Let us please move forward 
expeditiously, and give those who are in the business of protecting us 
the tools that they need to do the job.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues' support for this important 
legislation and yield the floor.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, 4 days ago, our military began strikes 
against terrorist training camps and the Taliban's military 
installations in Afghanistan. They are intended to disrupt the network 
of terror that spreads across Afghanistan.
  But these strikes are one part of a much larger battle. The network 
that we seek to disrupt and ultimately destroy often operates without 
borders or boundaries. Its tools are not simply the weapons it chooses 
to employ. And its trails are more often electronic than physical.
  This is a new kind of battle. Winning it will require a new set of 
tools . . . And winning is the only acceptable outcome.
  Just as we are committed to giving our men and women in uniform the 
tools and training they need to do what is asked of them, we must now 
make that same commitment to our justice and law enforcement officials.
  After all, we are now asking them to do nothing less than protect the 
American people by finding, tracking, monitoring--and ultimately 
stopping--any terrorist elements that threaten our nation or our 
citizens.
  I believe that by passing this measure today, we are taking a swift 
and significant step toward doing just that. We are also demonstrating, 
once again, that the Senate can work both quickly and effectively when 
we work cooperatively.
  I want to thank Senator Lott, Chairmen Leahy, Graham and Sarbanes, as 
well as Senators Hatch, Shelby, and Gramm for their leadership on this 
bill.
  I especially appreciate Chairman Leahy's management and handling of 
this important and delicate process.
  I also want to thank the many other Democratic and Republican 
Senators whose insights and suggestions improved this legislation.
  For example, Senator Kennedy's input on provisions regarding 
immigration addressed concerns a number of us had about the detention 
of legal permanent residents with only few due process protections.
  And Senators Enzi, Leahy and Dorgan were able to improve a provision 
regarding unilateral food and medical sanctions in a way that avoids 
needlessly hurting American farmers.

[[Page 19551]]

  I'll be honest, this bill is not perfect, and I hope that we will be 
able to work with our House colleagues in the days ahead in order to 
improve it.
  Whenever we weigh civil liberties against national security, we need 
to do so with the utmost care.
  Among other things, I am concerned about the provisions within this 
bill that allow the sharing of information gathered in grand juries and 
through wiretaps without judicial check. And, as we give the 
administration new legitimate powers to wiretap under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, I believe we should do more to protect 
the rights of Americans who are not suspects or targets of 
investigations.
  These flaws are not insubstantial, but ultimately the need for this 
bill outweighs them. When it comes to an issue as central to our 
democracy as the protection of our people, we must act.
  This bill does several important things:
  First, it will enhance the ability of law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveillance and execute 
searches in order to gather critical information to fight terrorism.
  Second, it will permit broader information sharing between 
traditional law enforcement and foreign intelligence officers.
  Third, it will increase the Attorney General's ability to deport and 
detain individuals who support terrorist activity. I should note, 
though, that the Senate bill requires the Attorney General either to 
bring criminal or immigration charges within seven days after taking 
custody of an alien or relinquish custody.
  Fourth, this bill also takes significant steps to increase law 
enforcement personnel on our northern border. For example, it would 
triple the number of Border Patrol, Customs Service, and INS inspectors 
at the northern border, who would work in concert with their Canadian 
counterparts in order to enhance security in this previously 
understaffed area.
  Fifth, thanks in large part to Senator Leahy's hard work, this bill 
makes major revisions to the Victims of Crime Act--by strengthening the 
Crime Victim Fund and expediting assistance to victims of domestic 
terrorism.
  Sixth and finally, the Banking Committee was able to agree on, and 
add to this bill, several significant counter money laundering 
measures. If we are to truly fight terrorism on all fronts, we must 
fight it on the financial front as well.
  As you can see, this is a complex piece of legislation. But its aim 
is simple: to give law enforcement the tools it needs to fight 
terrorism.
  It was a month ago on this day that we suffered the worst terrorist 
attack in our Nation's history. In the days since, we have honored the 
memories of the more than 6,000 innocent men and women who lost their 
lives on that terrible day.
  Hours ago, for example, we passed a resolution that designates 
September 11 as a national day of remembrance.
  But I believe that to truly honor those whose lives were lost, we 
must match our words with action, and do all that we can in order to 
prevent future attacks.
  This bill is a significant step towards keeping that commitment, and 
keeping Americans safe.
  Mr. DASCHLE. It is my understanding that the managers intend now to 
yield back the remainder of the time on the bill and we will go 
straight to final passage.
  First, I thank all Senators for their cooperation tonight. This was a 
very good day. We got a lot of work done, and I appreciate the work of 
all Members. There will not be rollcall votes tomorrow. In fact, we 
will not be in session. We will come in on Monday, midafternoon. There 
will be a vote on the motion to proceed to the foreign operations bill 
and a vote on the conference report on the Interior appropriations bill 
at approximately 5:30 Monday afternoon. I thank all Senators.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, we are about to go to final passage. We 
thought there would be a managers' package. We signed off on this side, 
and apparently the other side has not, which is their right.
  Mr. HATCH. We have a managers' package. It is done. It is just being 
assembled and put together and will be here.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY. I am glad there will be a managers' package. We cannot 
vote on final passage until the managers' package is here. I thank the 
majority leader for his help. As I said before, I don't think the bill 
could have gotten as far as it did without that help. I wish the 
administration had kept to the agreement they made September 30. We 
would have a more balanced bill. I still am not sure why the 
administration backed away from their agreement. I am the old style 
Vermonter: When you make an agreement, you stick with it. But they 
decided not to, and it slowed us up a bit.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Let's have order in the Senate Chamber so the 
Senator can be heard.
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield the floor.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that 
notwithstanding the passage of the amendment, the managers' amendment 
be considered subject to approval by both managers and both leaders.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. BYRD. What is the request?
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, I will repeat the request. There is a 
technical amendment having to do with some of the issues that have been 
worked out, that have no substantive consequence. I ask unanimous 
consent that this managers' amendment be approved, notwithstanding 
passage of the bill, subject to approval by the two managers and the 
two leaders.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I object to that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield all time. I ask for the yeas and nays on final 
passage.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.
  Mr. LEAHY. I ask for the yeas and nays on final passage.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the bill for the third 
time.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, what is the status?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is ready for third reading.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I ask the Chair if the managers' amendment has been 
adopted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It has not.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There has been none submitted.
  The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time, the 
question is, Shall the bill pass?
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. 
Helms), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond), and the Senator 
from New Mexico (Mr. Domenici) are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that if present and voting the Senator from North 
Carolina (Mr. Helms) would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 96, nays 1, as follows:

[[Page 19552]]



                      [Rollcall Vote No. 302 Leg.]

                                YEAS--96

     Akaka
     Allard
     Allen
     Baucus
     Bayh
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Breaux
     Brownback
     Bunning
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cantwell
     Carnahan
     Carper
     Chafee
     Cleland
     Clinton
     Cochran
     Collins
     Conrad
     Corzine
     Craig
     Crapo
     Daschle
     Dayton
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ensign
     Enzi
     Feinstein
     Fitzgerald
     Frist
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hagel
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hollings
     Hutchinson
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnson
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Kyl
     Landrieu
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lincoln
     Lott
     Lugar
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Miller
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nelson (FL)
     Nelson (NE)
     Nickles
     Reed
     Reid
     Roberts
     Rockefeller
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Schumer
     Sessions
     Shelby
     Smith (NH)
     Smith (OR)
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stabenow
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Torricelli
     Voinovich
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--1

       
     Feingold
       

                            NOT VOTING --- 3

     Domenici
     Helms
     Thurmond
  The bill (S. 1510) as passed as follows:

                                S. 1510

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Uniting 
     and Strengthening America Act'' or the ``USA Act of 2001''.
       (b) Table of Contents.-- The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
Sec. 2. Construction; severability.

         TITLE I--ENHANCING DOMESTIC SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM

Sec. 101. Counterterrorism fund.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress condemning discrimination against Arab and 
              Muslim Americans.
Sec. 103. Increased funding for the technical support center at the 
              Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 104. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in 
              certain emergencies.
Sec. 105. Expansion of national electronic crime task force initiative.
Sec. 106. Presidential authority.

               TITLE II--ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES

Sec. 201. Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic 
              communications relating to terrorism.
Sec. 202. Authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic 
              communications relating to computer fraud and abuse 
              offenses.
Sec. 203. Authority to share criminal investigative information.
Sec. 204. Clarification of intelligence exceptions from limitations on 
              interception and disclosure of wire, oral, and electronic 
              communications.
Sec. 205. Employment of translators by the Federal Bureau of 
              Investigation.
Sec. 206. Roving surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence 
              Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 207. Duration of FISA surveillance of non-United States persons 
              who are agents of a foreign power.
Sec. 208. Designation of judges.
Sec. 209. Seizure of voice-mail messages pursuant to warrants.
Sec. 210. Scope of subpoenas for records of electronic communications.
Sec. 211. Clarification of scope.
Sec. 212. Emergency disclosure of electronic communications to protect 
              life and limb.
Sec. 213. Authority for delaying notice of the execution of a warrant.
Sec. 214. Pen register and trap and trace authority under FISA.
Sec. 215. Access to records and other items under the Foreign 
              Intelligence Surveillance Act.
Sec. 216. Modification of authorities relating to use of pen registers 
              and trap and trace devices.
Sec. 217. Interception of computer trespasser communications.
Sec. 218. Foreign intelligence information.
Sec. 219. Single-jurisdiction search warrants for terrorism.
Sec. 220. Nationwide service of search warrants for electronic 
              evidence.
Sec. 221. Trade sanctions.
Sec. 222. Assistance to law enforcement agencies.

TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST 
                         FINANCING ACT OF 2001

Sec. 301. Short title.
Sec. 302. Findings and purposes.
Sec. 303. 4-Year congressional review-expedited consideration.

Subtitle A--International Counter Money Laundering and Related Measures

Sec. 311. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, 
              or international transactions of primary money laundering 
              concern.
Sec. 312. Special due diligence for correspondent accounts and private 
              banking accounts.
Sec. 313. Prohibition on United States correspondent accounts with 
              foreign shell banks.
Sec. 314. Cooperative efforts to deter money laundering.
Sec. 315. Inclusion of foreign corruption offenses as money laundering 
              crimes.
Sec. 316. Anti-terrorist forfeiture protection.
Sec. 317. Long-arm jurisdiction over foreign money launderers.
Sec. 318. Laundering money through a foreign bank.
Sec. 319. Forfeiture of funds in United States interbank accounts.
Sec. 320. Proceeds of foreign crimes.
Sec. 321. Exclusion of aliens involved in money laundering.
Sec. 322. Corporation represented by a fugitive.
Sec. 323. Enforcement of foreign judgments.
Sec. 324. Increase in civil and criminal penalties for money 
              laundering.
Sec. 325. Report and recommendation.
Sec. 326. Report on effectiveness.
Sec. 327. Concentration accounts at financial institutions.

   Subtitle B--Currency Transaction Reporting Amendments and Related 
                              Improvements

Sec. 331. Amendments relating to reporting of suspicious activities.
Sec. 332. Anti-money laundering programs.
Sec. 333. Penalties for violations of geographic targeting orders and 
              certain recordkeeping requirements, and lengthening 
              effective period of geographic targeting orders.
Sec. 334. Anti-money laundering strategy.
Sec. 335. Authorization to include suspicions of illegal activity in 
              written employment references.
Sec. 336. Bank Secrecy Act advisory group.
Sec. 337. Agency reports on reconciling penalty amounts.
Sec. 338. Reporting of suspicious activities by securities brokers and 
              dealers.
Sec. 339. Special report on administration of Bank Secrecy provisions.
Sec. 340. Bank Secrecy provisions and anti-terrorist activities of 
              United States intelligence agencies.
Sec. 341. Reporting of suspicious activities by hawala and other 
              underground banking systems.
Sec. 342. Use of Authority of the United States Executive Directors.

                      Subtitle D--Currency Crimes

Sec. 351. Bulk cash smuggling.

                  Subtitle E--Anticorruption Measures

Sec. 361. Corruption of foreign governments and ruling elites.
Sec. 362. Support for the financial action task force on money 
              laundering.
Sec. 363. Terrorist funding through money laundering.

                    TITLE IV--PROTECTING THE BORDER

               Subtitle A--Protecting the Northern Border

Sec. 401. Ensuring adequate personnel on the northern border.
Sec. 402. Northern border personnel.
Sec. 403. Access by the Department of State and the INS to certain 
              identifying information in the criminal history records 
              of visa applicants and applicants for admission to the 
              United States.
Sec. 404. Limited authority to pay overtime.
Sec. 405. Report on the integrated automated fingerprint identification 
              system for points of entry and overseas consular posts.

              Subtitle B--Enhanced Immigration Provisions

Sec. 411. Definitions relating to terrorism.
Sec. 412. Mandatory detention of suspected terrorists; habeas corpus; 
              judicial review.
Sec. 413. Multilateral cooperation against terrorists.

         TITLE V--REMOVING OBSTACLES TO INVESTIGATING TERRORISM

Sec. 501. Professional Standards for Government Attorneys Act of 2001.
Sec. 502. Attorney General's authority to pay rewards to combat 
              terrorism.
Sec. 503. Secretary of State's authority to pay rewards.
Sec. 504. DNA identification of terrorists and other violent offenders.
Sec. 505. Coordination with law enforcement.
Sec. 506. Miscellaneous national security authorities.
Sec. 507. Extension of Secret Service jurisdiction.
Sec. 508. Disclosure of educational records.
Sec. 509. Disclosure of information from NCES surveys.

[[Page 19553]]

 TITLE VI--PROVIDING FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM, PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS, 
                           AND THEIR FAMILIES

         Subtitle A--Aid to Families of Public Safety Officers

Sec. 611. Expedited payment for public safety officers involved in the 
              prevention, investigation, rescue, or recovery efforts 
              related to a terrorist attack.
Sec. 612. Technical correction with respect to expedited payments for 
              heroic public safety officers.
Sec. 613. Public Safety Officers Benefit Program payment increase.
Sec. 614. Office of justice programs.

       Subtitle B--Amendments to the Victims of Crime Act of 1984

Sec. 621. Crime Victims Fund.
Sec. 622. Crime victim compensation.
Sec. 623. Crime victim assistance.
Sec. 624. Victims of terrorism.

 TITLE VII--INCREASED INFORMATION SHARING FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
                               PROTECTION

Sec. 711. Expansion of regional information sharing system to 
              facilitate Federal-State-local law enforcement response 
              related to terrorist attacks.

     TITLE VIII--STRENGTHENING THE CRIMINAL LAWS AGAINST TERRORISM

Sec. 801. Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass 
              transportation systems.
Sec. 802. Expansion of the biological weapons statute.
Sec. 803. Definition of domestic terrorism.
Sec. 804. Prohibition against harboring terrorists.
Sec. 805. Jurisdiction over crimes committed at U.S. facilities abroad.
Sec. 806. Material support for terrorism.
Sec. 807. Assets of terrorist organizations.
Sec. 808. Technical clarification relating to provision of material 
              support to terrorism.
Sec. 809. Definition of Federal crime of terrorism.
Sec. 810. No statute of limitation for certain terrorism offenses.
Sec. 811. Alternate maximum penalties for terrorism offenses.
Sec. 812. Penalties for terrorist conspiracies.
Sec. 813. Post-release supervision of terrorists.
Sec. 814. Inclusion of acts of terrorism as racketeering activity.
Sec. 815. Deterrence and prevention of cyberterrorism.
Sec. 816. Additional defense to civil actions relating to preserving 
              records in response to government requests.
Sec. 817. Development and support of cybersecurity forensic 
              capabilities.

                    TITLE IX--IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE

Sec. 901. Responsibilities of Director of Central Intelligence 
              regarding foreign intelligence collected under Foreign 
              Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
Sec. 902. Inclusion of international terrorist activities within scope 
              of foreign intelligence under National Security Act of 
              1947.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress on the establishment and maintenance of 
              intelligence relationships to acquire information on 
              terrorists and terrorist organizations.
Sec. 904. Temporary authority to defer submittal to Congress of reports 
              on intelligence and intelligence-related matters.
Sec. 905. Disclosure to director of central intelligence of foreign 
              intelligence-related information with respect to criminal 
              investigations.
Sec. 906. Foreign terrorist asset tracking center.
Sec. 907. National virtual translation center.
Sec. 908. Training of government officials regarding identification and 
              use of foreign intelligence.

     SEC. 2. CONSTRUCTION; SEVERABILITY.

       Any provision of this Act held to be invalid or 
     unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person or 
     circumstance, shall be construed so as to give it the maximum 
     effect permitted by law, unless such holding shall be one of 
     utter invalidity or unenforceability, in which event such 
     provision shall be deemed severable from this Act and shall 
     not affect the remainder thereof or the application of such 
     provision to other persons not similarly situated or to 
     other, dissimilar circumstances.

         TITLE I--ENHANCING DOMESTIC SECURITY AGAINST TERRORISM

     SEC. 101. COUNTERTERRORISM FUND.

       (a) Establishment; Availability.--There is hereby 
     established in the Treasury of the United States a separate 
     fund to be known as the ``Counterterrorism Fund'', amounts in 
     which shall remain available without fiscal year limitation--
       (1) to reimburse any Department of Justice component for 
     any costs incurred in connection with--
       (A) reestablishing the operational capability of an office 
     or facility that has been damaged or destroyed as the result 
     of any domestic or international terrorism incident;
       (B) providing support to counter, investigate, or prosecute 
     domestic or international terrorism, including, without 
     limitation, paying rewards in connection with these 
     activities; and
       (C) conducting terrorism threat assessments of Federal 
     agencies and their facilities; and
       (2) to reimburse any department or agency of the Federal 
     Government for any costs incurred in connection with 
     detaining in foreign countries individuals accused of acts of 
     terrorism that violate the laws of the United States.
       (b) No Effect on Prior Appropriations.--Subsection (a) 
     shall not be construed to affect the amount or availability 
     of any appropriation to the Counterterrorism Fund made before 
     the date of enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
                   ARAB AND MUSLIM AMERICANS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from 
     South Asia play a vital role in our Nation and are entitled 
     to nothing less than the full rights of every American.
       (2) The acts of violence that have been taken against Arab 
     and Muslim Americans since the September 11, 2001, attacks 
     against the United States should be and are condemned by all 
     Americans who value freedom.
       (3) The concept of individual responsibility for wrongdoing 
     is sacrosanct in American society, and applies equally to all 
     religious, racial, and ethnic groups.
       (4) When American citizens commit acts of violence against 
     those who are, or are perceived to be, of Arab or Muslim 
     descent, they should be punished to the full extent of the 
     law.
       (5) Muslim Americans have become so fearful of harassment 
     that many Muslim women are changing the way they dress to 
     avoid becoming targets.
       (6) Many Arab Americans and Muslim Americans have acted 
     heroically during the attacks on the United States, including 
     Mohammed Salman Hamdani, a 23-year-old New Yorker of 
     Pakistani descent, who is believed to have gone to the World 
     Trade Center to offer rescue assistance and is now missing.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, 
     including Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans 
     from South Asia, must be protected, and that every effort 
     must be taken to preserve their safety;
       (2) any acts of violence or discrimination against any 
     Americans be condemned; and
       (3) the Nation is called upon to recognize the patriotism 
     of fellow citizens from all ethnic, racial, and religious 
     backgrounds.

     SEC. 103. INCREASED FUNDING FOR THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 
                   AT THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

       There are authorized to be appropriated for the Technical 
     Support Center established in section 811 of the 
     Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public 
     Law 104-132) to help meet the demands for activities to 
     combat terrorism and support and enhance the technical 
     support and tactical operations of the FBI, $200,000,000 for 
     each of the fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004.

     SEC. 104. REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ENFORCE 
                   PROHIBITION IN CERTAIN EMERGENCIES.

       Section 2332e of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``2332c'' and inserting ``2332a''; and
       (2) by striking ``chemical''.

     SEC. 105. EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ELECTRONIC CRIME TASK FORCE 
                   INITIATIVE.

       The Director of the United States Secret Service shall take 
     appropriate actions to develop a national network of 
     electronic crime task forces, based on the New York 
     Electronic Crimes Task Force model, throughout the United 
     States, for the purpose of preventing, detecting, and 
     investigating various forms of electronic crimes, including 
     potential terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure 
     and financial payment systems.

     SEC. 106. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY.

       Section 203 of the International Emergency Powers Act (50 
     U.S.C. 1702) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) at the end of subparagraph (A) (flush to that 
     subparagraph), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a comma 
     and the following:
     ``by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to 
     the jurisdiction of the United States;'';
       (B) in subparagraph (B)--
       (i) by inserting ``, block during the pendency of an 
     investigation'' after ``investigate''; and
       (ii) by striking ``interest;'' and inserting ``interest by 
     any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the United States; and''; and
       (C) by inserting at the end the following:
       ``(C) when the United States is engaged in armed 
     hostilities or has been attacked by a foreign country or 
     foreign nationals, confiscate any property, subject to the 
     jurisdiction of the United States, of any foreign person, 
     foreign organization, or foreign country

[[Page 19554]]

     that he determines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged 
     in such hostilities or attacks against the United States; and 
     all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated 
     shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms directed by the 
     President, in such agency or person as the President may 
     designate from time to time, and upon such terms and 
     conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or 
     property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, 
     or otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the 
     benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or 
     person may perform any and all acts incident to the 
     accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.''; and
       (2) by inserting at the end the following:
       ``(c) Classified Information.--In any judicial review of a 
     determination made under this section, if the determination 
     was based on classified information (as defined in section 
     1(a) of the Classified Information Procedures Act) such 
     information may be submitted to the reviewing court ex parte 
     and in camera. This subsection does not confer or imply any 
     right to judicial review.''.

               TITLE II--ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES

     SEC. 201. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC 
                   COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM.

       Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraph (p), as so redesignated by 
     section 434(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
     Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132; 110 Stat. 1274), as 
     paragraph (r); and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (p), as so redesignated by 
     section 201(3) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
     Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (division C of Public 
     Law 104-208; 110 Stat. 3009-565), the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(q) any criminal violation of section 229 (relating to 
     chemical weapons); or sections 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332d, 
     2339A, or 2339B of this title (relating to terrorism); or''.

     SEC. 202. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC 
                   COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPUTER FRAUD AND 
                   ABUSE OFFENSES.

       Section 2516(1)(c) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``and section 1341 (relating to mail 
     fraud),'' and inserting ``section 1341 (relating to mail 
     fraud), a felony violation of section 1030 (relating to 
     computer fraud and abuse),''.

     SEC. 203. AUTHORITY TO SHARE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Authority to Share Grand Jury Information.--
       (1) In general.--Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of 
     Criminal Procedure is amended--
       (A) in clause (iii), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (B) in clause (iv), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (C) by inserting at the end the following:
       ``(v) when the matters involve foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign 
     intelligence information (as defined in Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(ii)) 
     to any other Federal law enforcement, intelligence, 
     protective, immigration, national defense, or national 
     security official in order to assist the official receiving 
     that information in the performance of his official duties.
     Any Federal official who receives information pursuant to 
     clause (v) may use that information only as necessary in the 
     conduct of that person's official duties subject to any 
     limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of such 
     information.''.
       (2) Definition.--Rule 6(e)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of 
     Criminal Procedure, as amended by paragraph (1), is amended 
     by--
       (A) inserting ``(i)'' after ``(C)'';
       (B) redesignating clauses (i) through (v) as subclauses (I) 
     through (IV), respectively; and
       (C) inserting at the end the following:
       ``(ii) In this subparagraph, the term `foreign intelligence 
     information' means--
       ``(I) information, whether or not concerning a United 
     States person, that relates to the ability of the United 
     States to protect against--

       ``(aa) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile 
     acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
       ``(bb) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign 
     power or an agent of a foreign power; or
       ``(cc) clandestine intelligence activities by an 
     intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an 
     agent of a foreign power; or

       ``(II) information, whether or not concerning a United 
     States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign 
     territory that relates to--

       ``(aa) the national defense or the security of the United 
     States; or
       ``(bb) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United 
     States.''.

       (b) Authority To Share Electronic, Wire, and Oral 
     Interception Information.--
       (1) Law enforcement.--Section 2517 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the 
     following:
       ``(6) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or 
     attorney for the Government, who by any means authorized by 
     this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any 
     wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived 
     therefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal 
     law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, 
     national defense, or national security official to the extent 
     that such contents include foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence (as defined in section 3 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign 
     intelligence information (as defined in subsection (19) of 
     section 2510 of this title), to assist the official who is to 
     receive that information in the performance of his official 
     duties. Any Federal official who receives information 
     pursuant to this provision may use that information only as 
     necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties 
     subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of 
     such information.''.
       (2) Definition.--Section 2510 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by--
       (A) in paragraph (17), by striking ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (B) in paragraph (18), by striking the period and inserting 
     ``; and''; and
       (C) by inserting at the end the following:
       ``(19) `foreign intelligence information' means--
       ``(A) information, whether or not concerning a United 
     States person, that relates to the ability of the United 
     States to protect against--
       ``(i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile 
     acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
       ``(ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign 
     power or an agent of a foreign power; or
       ``(iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an 
     intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an 
     agent of a foreign power; or
       ``(B) information, whether or not concerning a United 
     States person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign 
     territory that relates to--
       ``(i) the national defense or the security of the United 
     States; or
       ``(ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United 
     States.''.
       (c) Procedures.--The Attorney General shall establish 
     procedures for the disclosure of information pursuant to 
     section 2517(6) and Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(v) of the Federal Rules 
     of Criminal Procedure that identifies a United States person, 
     as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)).
       (d) Foreign Intelligence Information.--
       (1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, it shall be lawful for foreign intelligence or 
     counterintelligence (as defined section 3 of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)) or foreign 
     intelligence information obtained as part of a criminal 
     investigation to be disclosed to any Federal law enforcement, 
     intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or 
     national security official in order to assist the official 
     receiving that information in the performance of his official 
     duties. Any Federal official who receives information 
     pursuant to this provision may use that information only as 
     necessary in the conduct of that person's official duties 
     subject to any limitations on the unauthorized disclosure of 
     such information.
       (2) Definition.--In this subsection, the term ``foreign 
     intelligence information'' means--
       (A) information, whether or not concerning a United States 
     person, that relates to the ability of the United States to 
     protect against--
       (i) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts 
     of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
       (ii) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power 
     or an agent of a foreign power; or
       (iii) clandestine intelligence activities by an 
     intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an 
     agent of a foreign power; or
       (B) information, whether or not concerning a United States 
     person, with respect to a foreign power or foreign territory 
     that relates to--
       (i) the national defense or the security of the United 
     States; or
       (ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United 
     States.

     SEC. 204. CLARIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTIONS FROM 
                   LIMITATIONS ON INTERCEPTION AND DISCLOSURE OF 
                   WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS.

       Section 2511(2)(f) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``this chapter or chapter 121'' and 
     inserting ``this chapter or chapter 121 or 206 of this 
     title''; and
       (2) by striking ``wire and oral'' and inserting ``wire, 
     oral, and electronic''.

     SEC. 205. EMPLOYMENT OF TRANSLATORS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                   INVESTIGATION.

       (a) Authority.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation is authorized to expedite the employment of 
     personnel as translators to support counterterrorism 
     investigations and operations without regard to applicable 
     Federal personnel requirements and limitations.
       (b) Security Requirements.--The Director of the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation shall

[[Page 19555]]

     establish such security requirements as are necessary for the 
     personnel employed as translators under subsection (a).
       (c) Report.--The Attorney General shall report to the 
     Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     and the Senate on--
       (1) the number of translators employed by the FBI and other 
     components of the Department of Justice;
       (2) any legal or practical impediments to using translators 
     employed by other Federal, State, or local agencies, on a 
     full, part-time, or shared basis; and
       (3) the needs of the FBI for specific translation services 
     in certain languages, and recommendations for meeting those 
     needs.

     SEC. 206. ROVING SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY UNDER THE FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       Section 105(c)(2)(B) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)(B)) is amended 
     by inserting ``, or in circumstances where the Court finds 
     that the actions of the target of the application may have 
     the effect of thwarting the identification of a specified 
     person, such other persons,'' after ``specified person''.

     SEC. 207. DURATION OF FISA SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES 
                   PERSONS WHO ARE AGENTS OF A FOREIGN POWER.

       (a) Duration .--
       (1) Surveillance.--Section 105(d)(1) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)(1)) 
     is amended by--
       (A) inserting ``(A)'' after ``except that''; and
       (B) inserting before the period the following: ``, and (B) 
     an order under this Act for a surveillance targeted against 
     an agent of a foreign power, as defined in section 101(b)(A) 
     may be for the period specified in the application or for 120 
     days, whichever is less''.
       (2) Physical Search.--Section 304(d)(1) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)(1)) 
     is amended by--
       (A) striking ``forty-five'' and inserting ``90'';
       (B) inserting ``(A)'' after ``except that''; and
       (C) inserting before the period the following: ``, and (B) 
     an order under this section for a physical search targeted 
     against an agent of a foreign power as defined in section 
     101(b)(A) may be for the period specified in the application 
     or for 120 days, whichever is less''.
       (b) Extension.--
       (1) In general.--Section 105(d)(2) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)(2)) 
     is amended by--
       (A) inserting ``(A)'' after ``except that''; and
       (B) inserting before the period the following: ``, and (B) 
     an extension of an order under this Act for a surveillance 
     targeted against an agent of a foreign power as defined in 
     section 101(b)(1)(A) may be for a period not to exceed 1 
     year''.
       (2) Defined term.--Section 304(d)(2) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)(2) 
     is amended by inserting after ``not a United States person,'' 
     the following: ``or against an agent of a foreign power as 
     defined in section 101(b)(1)(A)''.

     SEC. 208. DESIGNATION OF JUDGES.

       Section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended by--
       (1) striking ``seven district court judges'' and inserting 
     ``11 district court judges''; and
       (2) inserting ``of whom no less than 3 shall reside within 
     20 miles of the District of Columbia'' after ``circuits''.

     SEC. 209. SEIZURE OF VOICE-MAIL MESSAGES PURSUANT TO 
                   WARRANTS.

       Title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 2510--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking beginning with ``and 
     such'' and all that follows through ``communication''; and
       (B) in paragraph (14), by inserting ``wire or'' after 
     ``transmission of''; and
       (2) in subsections (a) and (b) of section 2703--
       (A) by striking ``Contents of electronic'' and inserting 
     ``Contents of wire or electronic'' each place it appears;
       (B) by striking ``contents of an electronic'' and inserting 
     ``contents of a wire or electronic'' each place it appears; 
     and
       (C) by striking ``any electronic'' and inserting ``any wire 
     or electronic'' each place it appears.

     SEC. 210. SCOPE OF SUBPOENAS FOR RECORDS OF ELECTRONIC 
                   COMMUNICATIONS.

       Section 2703(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code, as 
     redesignated by section 212, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``entity the name, address, local and long 
     distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or 
     other subscriber number or identity, and length of service of 
     the subscriber'' and inserting the following: ``entity the--
       ``(A) name;
       ``(B) address;
       ``(C) local and long distance telephone connection records, 
     or records of session times and durations;
       ``(D) length of service (including start date) and types of 
     service utilized;
       ``(E) telephone or instrument number or other subscriber 
     number or identity, including any temporarily assigned 
     network address; and
       ``(F) means and source of payment (including any credit 
     card or bank account number),
     of a subscriber''; and

       (2) by striking ``and the types of services the subscriber 
     or customer utilized,''.

     SEC. 211. CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE.

       Section 631 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
     551) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (c)(2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'';
       (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting''; or''; and
       (C) by inserting at the end the following:
       ``(D) authorized under chapters 119, 121, or 206 of title 
     18, United States Code, except that such disclosure shall not 
     include records revealing customer cable television viewing 
     activity.''; and
       (2) in subsection (h) by striking ``A governmental entity'' 
     and inserting ``Except as provided in subsection (c)(2)(D), a 
     governmental entity''.

     SEC. 212. EMERGENCY DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
                   TO PROTECT LIFE AND LIMB.

       (a) Disclosure of Contents.--
       (1) In general.--Section 2702 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking the section heading and inserting the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 2702. Voluntary disclosure of customer communications 
       or records'';

       (B) in subsection (a)--
       (i) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (ii) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (iii) by inserting after paragraph (2) the following:
       ``(3) a provider of remote computing service or electronic 
     communication service to the public shall not knowingly 
     divulge a record or other information pertaining to a 
     subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the 
     contents of communications covered by paragraph (1) or (2)) 
     to any governmental entity.'';
       (C) in subsection (b), by striking ``Exceptions.--A person 
     or entity'' and inserting ``Exceptions for disclosure of 
     communications.-- A provider described in subsection (a)'';
       (D) in subsection (b)(6)--
       (i) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``or'';
       (ii) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (iii) by adding after subparagraph (B) the following:
       ``(C) if the provider reasonably believes that an emergency 
     involving immediate danger of death or serious physical 
     injury to any person requires disclosure of the information 
     without delay.''; and
       (E) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
       ``(c) Exceptions for Disclosure of Customer Records.--A 
     provider described in subsection (a) may divulge a record or 
     other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer 
     of such service (not including the contents of communications 
     covered by subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2))--
       ``(1) as otherwise authorized in section 2703;
       ``(2) with the lawful consent of the customer or 
     subscriber;
       ``(3) as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of 
     the service or to the protection of the rights or property of 
     the provider of that service;
       ``(4) to a governmental entity, if the provider reasonably 
     believes that an emergency involving immediate danger of 
     death or serious physical injury to any person justifies 
     disclosure of the information; or
       ``(5) to any person other than a governmental entity.''.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of 
     sections for chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking the item relating to section 2702 and 
     inserting the following:

``2702. Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records.''.

       (b) Requirements for Government Access.--
       (1) In general.--Section 2703 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking the section heading and inserting the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 2703. Required disclosure of customer communications 
       or records'';

       (B) in subsection (c) by redesignating paragraph (2) as 
     paragraph (3);
       (C) in subsection (c)(1)--
       (i) by striking ``(A) Except as provided in subparagraph 
     (B), a provider of electronic communication service or remote 
     computing service may'' and inserting ``A governmental entity 
     may require a provider of electronic communication service or 
     remote computing service to'';
       (ii) by striking ``covered by subsection (a) or (b) of this 
     section) to any person other than a governmental entity.
       ``(B) A provider of electronic communication service or 
     remote computing service shall disclose a record or other 
     information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such 
     service (not including the contents of communications covered 
     by subsection (a) or (b) of this section) to a governmental 
     entity'' and inserting ``)'';

[[Page 19556]]

       (iii) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as paragraph (2);
       (iv) by redesignating clauses (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) as 
     subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D), respectively;
       (v) in subparagraph (D) (as redesignated) by striking the 
     period and inserting ``; or''; and
       (vi) by inserting after subparagraph (D) (as redesignated) 
     the following:
       ``(E) seeks information under paragraph (2).''; and
       (D) in paragraph (2) (as redesignated) by striking 
     ``subparagraph (B)'' and insert ``paragraph (1)''.
       (2) Technical and conforming amendment.--The table of 
     sections for chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking the item relating to section 2703 and 
     inserting the following:

``2703. Required disclosure of customer communications or records.''.

     SEC. 213. AUTHORITY FOR DELAYING NOTICE OF THE EXECUTION OF A 
                   WARRANT.

       Section 3103a of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(a) In General.--'' before ``In 
     addition''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) Delay.--With respect to the issuance of any warrant 
     or court order under this section, or any other rule of law, 
     to search for and seize any property or material that 
     constitutes evidence of a criminal offense in violation of 
     the laws of the United States, any notice required, or that 
     may be required, to be given may be delayed if--
       ``(1) the court finds reasonable cause to believe that 
     providing immediate notification of the execution of the 
     warrant may have an adverse result (as defined in section 
     2705);
       ``(2) the warrant prohibits the seizure of any tangible 
     property, any wire or electronic communication (as defined in 
     section 2510), or, except as expressly provided in chapter 
     121, any stored wire or electronic information, except where 
     the court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure; and
       ``(3) the warrant provides for the giving of such notice 
     within a reasonable period of its execution, which period may 
     thereafter be extended by the court for good cause shown.''.

     SEC. 214. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE AUTHORITY UNDER 
                   FISA.

       (a) Applications and Orders.--Section 402 of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1842) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking ``for any 
     investigation to gather foreign intelligence information or 
     information concerning international terrorism'' and 
     inserting ``for any investigation to protect against 
     international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
     activities, provided that such investigation of a United 
     States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 
     activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution'';
       (2) by amending subsection (c)(2) to read as follows:
       ``(2) a certification by the applicant that the information 
     likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing investigation 
     to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
     intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of 
     a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis 
     of activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution.'';
       (3) by striking subsection (c)(3); and
       (4) by amending subsection (d)(2)(A) to read as follows:
       ``(A) shall specify--
       ``(i) the identity, if known, of the person who is the 
     subject of the investigation;
       ``(ii) the identity, if known, of the person to whom is 
     leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line or other 
     facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device 
     is to be attached or applied;
       ``(iii) the attributes of the communications to which the 
     order applies, such as the number or other identifier, and, 
     if known, the location of the telephone line or other 
     facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device 
     is to be attached or applied and, in the case of a trap and 
     trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace 
     order.''.
       (b) Authorization During Emergencies.--Section 403 of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1843) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``foreign intelligence 
     information or information concerning international 
     terrorism'' and inserting ``information to protect against 
     international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
     activities, provided that such investigation of a United 
     States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 
     activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``foreign 
     intelligence information or information concerning 
     international terrorism'' and inserting ``information to 
     protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
     intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of 
     a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis 
     of activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution''.

     SEC. 215. ACCESS TO RECORDS AND OTHER ITEMS UNDER THE FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT.

       Title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) is amended by striking sections 
     501 through 503 and inserting the following:

     ``SEC. 501. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN 
                   INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
                   INVESTIGATIONS.

       ``(a)(1) The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation or a designee of the Director (whose rank shall 
     be no lower than Assistant Special Agent in Charge) may make 
     an application for an order requiring the production of any 
     tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, 
     and other items) for an investigation to protect against 
     international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
     activities, provided that such investigation of a United 
     States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 
     activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution.
       ``(2) An investigation conducted under this section shall--
       ``(A) be conducted under guidelines approved by the 
     Attorney General under Executive Order 12333 (or a successor 
     order); and
       ``(B) not be conducted of a United States person solely 
     upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment 
     to the Constitution of the United States.
       ``(b) Each application under this section--
       ``(1) shall be made to--
       ``(A) a judge of the court established by section 103(a); 
     or
       ``(B) a United States Magistrate Judge under chapter 43 of 
     title 28, United States Code, who is publicly designated by 
     the Chief Justice of the United States to have the power to 
     hear applications and grant orders for the production of 
     tangible things under this section on behalf of a judge of 
     that court; and
       ``(2) shall specify that the records concerned are sought 
     for an authorized investigation conducted in accordance with 
     subsection (a)(2) to protect against international terrorism 
     or clandestine intelligence activities.
       ``(c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, 
     the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as 
     modified, approving the release of records if the judge finds 
     that the application meets the requirements of this section.
       ``(2) An order under this subsection shall not disclose 
     that it is issued for purposes of an investigation described 
     in subsection (a).
       ``(d) No person shall disclose to any other person (other 
     than those persons necessary to produce the tangible things 
     under this section) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     has sought or obtained tangible things under this section.
       ``(e) A person who, in good faith, produces tangible things 
     under an order pursuant to this section shall not be liable 
     to any other person for such production. Such production 
     shall not be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege 
     in any other proceeding or context.

     ``SEC. 502. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.

       ``(a) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall 
     fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate concerning all requests for the 
     production of tangible things under section 402.
       ``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall 
     provide to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate a report setting forth with 
     respect to the preceding 6-month period--
       ``(1) the total number of applications made for orders 
     approving requests for the production of tangible things 
     under section 402; and
       ``(2) the total number of such orders either granted, 
     modified, or denied.''.

     SEC. 216. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO USE OF PEN 
                   REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES.

       (a) General Limitations.--Section 3121(c) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``or trap and trace device'' after ``pen 
     register'';
       (2) by inserting ``, routing, addressing,'' after 
     ``dialing''; and
       (3) by striking ``call processing'' and inserting ``the 
     processing and transmitting of wire or electronic 
     communications so as not to include the contents of any wire 
     or electronic communications''.
       (b) Issuance of Orders.--
       (1) In general.--Section 3123(a) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) In General.--
       ``(1) Attorney for the government.--Upon an application 
     made under section 3122(a)(1), the court shall enter an ex 
     parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen 
     register or trap and trace device anywhere within the United 
     States, if the court finds that the attorney for the 
     Government has certified to the court that the information 
     likely to be obtained by such installation and use is 
     relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The order, 
     upon service of that order, shall apply to any person or 
     entity providing wire or electronic communication service in 
     the United States whose assistance may facilitate the 
     execution of the order. Whenever such an order is served on 
     any person or entity not specifically named in the order, 
     upon request of such person or

[[Page 19557]]

     entity, the attorney for the Government or law enforcement or 
     investigative officer that is serving the order shall provide 
     written or electronic certification that the order applies to 
     the person or entity being served.
       ``(2) State investigative or law enforcement officer.--Upon 
     an application made under section 3122(a)(2), the court shall 
     enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use 
     of a pen register or trap and trace device within the 
     jurisdiction of the court, if the court finds that the State 
     law enforcement or investigative officer has certified to the 
     court that the information likely to be obtained by such 
     installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
     investigation.''.
       (2) Contents of order.--Section 3123(b)(1) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (A) in subparagraph (A)--
       (i) by inserting ``or other facility'' after ``telephone 
     line''; and
       (ii) by inserting before the semicolon at the end ``or 
     applied''; and
       (B) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the 
     following:
       ``(C) the attributes of the communications to which the 
     order applies, including the number or other identifier and, 
     if known, the location of the telephone line or other 
     facility to which the pen register or trap and trace device 
     is to be attached or applied, and, in the case of an order 
     authorizing installation and use of a trap and trace device 
     under subsection (a)(2), the geographic limits of the order; 
     and''.
       (3) Nondisclosure requirements.--Section 3123(d)(2) of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by inserting ``or other facility'' after ``the line''; 
     and
       (B) by striking ``, or who has been ordered by the court'' 
     and inserting ``or applied, or who is obligated by the 
     order''.
       (c) Definitions.--
       (1) Court of competent jurisdiction.--Section 3127(2) of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking 
     subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:
       ``(A) any district court of the United States (including a 
     magistrate judge of such a court) or any United States court 
     of appeals having jurisdiction over the offense being 
     investigated; or''.
       (2) Pen register.--Section 3127(3) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``electronic or other impulses'' and all 
     that follows through ``is attached'' and inserting ``dialing, 
     routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by 
     an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic 
     communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such 
     information shall not include the contents of any 
     communication''; and
       (B) by inserting ``or process'' after ``device'' each place 
     it appears.
       (3) Trap and trace device.--Section 3127(4) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``of an instrument'' and all that follows 
     through the semicolon and inserting ``or other dialing, 
     routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably 
     likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic 
     communication, provided, however, that such information shall 
     not include the contents of any communication;''; and
       (B) by inserting ``or process'' after ``a device''.
       (4) Conforming amendment.--Section 3127(1) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``and''; and
       (B) by inserting ``, and `contents' '' after ``electronic 
     communication service''.
       (5) Technical amendment.--Section 3124(d) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``the terms of''.

     SEC. 217. INTERCEPTION OF COMPUTER TRESPASSER COMMUNICATIONS.

       Chapter 119 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 2510--
       (A) in paragraph (17), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (B) in paragraph (18), by striking the period and inserting 
     a semicolon; and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (18) the following:
       ``(19) `protected computer' has the meaning set forth in 
     section 1030; and
       ``(20) `computer trespasser'--
       ``(A) means a person who accesses a protected computer 
     without authorization and thus has no reasonable expectation 
     of privacy in any communication transmitted to, through, or 
     from the protected computer; and
       ``(B) does not include a person known by the owner or 
     operator of the protected computer to have an existing 
     contractual relationship with the owner or operator of the 
     protected computer for access to all or part of the protected 
     computer.''; and
       (2) in section 2511(2), by inserting at the end the 
     following:
       ``(i) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a 
     person acting under color of law to intercept the wire or 
     electronic communications of a computer trespasser, if--
       ``(i) the owner or operator of the protected computer 
     authorizes the interception of the computer trespasser's 
     communications on the protected computer;
       ``(ii) the person acting under color of law is lawfully 
     engaged in an investigation;
       ``(iii) the person acting under color of law has reasonable 
     grounds to believe that the contents of the computer 
     trespasser's communications will be relevant to the 
     investigation; and
       ``(iv) such interception does not acquire communications 
     other than those transmitted to or from the computer 
     trespasser.''.

     SEC. 218. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

       Sections 104(a)(7)(B) and section 303(a)(7)(B) (50 U.S.C. 
     1804(a)(7)(B) and 1823(a)(7)(B)) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 are each amended by striking ``the 
     purpose'' and inserting ``a significant purpose''.

     SEC. 219. SINGLE-JURISDICTION SEARCH WARRANTS FOR TERRORISM.

       Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
     amended by inserting after ``executed'' the following: ``and 
     (3) in an investigation of domestic terrorism or 
     international terrorism (as defined in section 2331 of title 
     18, United States Code), by a Federal magistrate judge in any 
     district in which activities related to the terrorism may 
     have occurred, for a search of property or for a person 
     within or outside the district''.

     SEC. 220. NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF SEARCH WARRANTS FOR 
                   ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE.

       Chapter 121 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 2703, by striking ``under the Federal Rules 
     of Criminal Procedure'' every place it appears and inserting 
     ``using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of 
     Criminal Procedure by a court with jurisdiction over the 
     offense under investigation''; and
       (2) in section 2711--
       (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``and'';
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting 
     ``; and''; and
       (C) by inserting at the end the following:
       ``(3) the term `court of competent jurisdiction' has the 
     meaning assigned by section 3127, and includes any Federal 
     court within that definition, without geographic 
     limitation.''.

     SEC. 221. TRADE SANCTIONS.

       (a) In general.--The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export 
     Enhancement Act of 2000 (Public Law 106-387; 114 Stat. 1549A-
     67) is amended--
       (1) by amending section 904(2)(C) to read as follows:
       ``(C) used to facilitate the design, development, or 
     production of chemical or biological weapons, missiles, or 
     weapons of mass destruction.'';
       (2) in section 906(a)(1)--
       (A) by inserting ``, the Taliban or the territory of 
     Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban,'' after ``Cuba''; and
       (B) by inserting ``, or in the territory of Afghanistan 
     controlled by the Taliban,'' after ``within such country''; 
     and
       (3) in section 906(a)(2), by inserting ``, or to any other 
     entity in Syria or North Korea'' after ``Korea''.
       (b) Application of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export 
     Enhancement Act.--Nothing in the Trade Sanctions Reform and 
     Export Enhancement Act of 2000 shall limit the application or 
     scope of any law establishing criminal or civil penalties, 
     including any executive order or regulation promulgated 
     pursuant to such laws (or similar or successor laws), for the 
     unlawful export of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or 
     medical device to--
       (1) a foreign organization, group, or person designated 
     pursuant to Executive Order 12947 of June 25, 1995;
       (2) a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to the 
     Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public 
     Law 104-132);
       (3) a foreign organization, group, or person designated 
     pursuant to Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001);
       (4) any narcotics trafficking entity designated pursuant to 
     Executive Order 12978 (October 21, 1995) or the Foreign 
     Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (Public Law 106-120); or
       (5) any foreign organization, group, or persons subject to 
     any restriction for its involvement in weapons of mass 
     destruction or missile proliferation.

     SEC. 222. ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

       Nothing in this Act shall impose any additional technical 
     obligation or requirement on a provider of wire or electronic 
     communication service or other person to furnish facilities 
     or technical assistance. A provider of a wire or electronic 
     communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person 
     who furnishes facilities or technical assistance pursuant to 
     section 216 shall be reasonably compensated for such 
     reasonable expenditures incurred in providing such facilities 
     or assistance.

TITLE III--INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING ABATEMENT AND ANTI-TERRORIST 
                         FINANCING ACT OF 2001.

     SEC. 301. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``International Money 
     Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 
     2001''.

     SEC. 302. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) money laundering, estimated by the International 
     Monetary Fund to amount to

[[Page 19558]]

     between 2 and 5 percent of global gross domestic product, 
     which is at least $600,000,000,000 annually, provides the 
     financial fuel that permits transnational criminal 
     enterprises to conduct and expand their operations to the 
     detriment of the safety and security of American citizens;
       (2) money laundering, and the defects in financial 
     transparency on which money launderers rely, are critical to 
     the financing of global terrorism and the provision of funds 
     for terrorist attacks;
       (3) money launderers subvert legitimate financial 
     mechanisms and banking relationships by using them as 
     protective covering for the movement of criminal proceeds and 
     the financing of crime and terrorism, and, by so doing, can 
     threaten the safety of United States citizens and undermine 
     the integrity of United States financial institutions and of 
     the global financial and trading systems upon which 
     prosperity and growth depend;
       (4) certain jurisdictions outside of the United States that 
     offer ``offshore'' banking and related facilities designed to 
     provide anonymity, coupled with special tax advantages and 
     weak financial supervisory and enforcement regimes, provide 
     essential tools to disguise ownership and movement of 
     criminal funds, derived from, or used to commit, offenses 
     ranging from narcotics trafficking, terrorism, arms 
     smuggling, and trafficking in human beings, to financial 
     frauds that prey on law-abiding citizens;
       (5) transactions involving such offshore jurisdictions make 
     it difficult for law enforcement officials and regulators to 
     follow the trail of money earned by criminals, organized 
     international criminal enterprises, and global terrorist 
     organizations;
       (6) correspondent banking facilities are one of the banking 
     mechanisms susceptible in some circumstances to manipulation 
     by foreign banks to permit the laundering of funds by hiding 
     the identity of real parties in interest to financial 
     transactions;
       (7) private banking services can be susceptible to 
     manipulation by money launderers, for example corrupt foreign 
     government officials, particularly if those services include 
     the creation of offshore accounts and facilities for large 
     personal funds transfers to channel funds into accounts 
     around the globe;
       (8) United States anti-money laundering efforts are impeded 
     by outmoded and inadequate statutory provisions that make 
     investigations, prosecutions, and forfeitures more difficult, 
     particularly in cases in which money laundering involves 
     foreign persons, foreign banks, or foreign countries;
       (9) the ability to mount effective counter-measures to 
     international money launderers requires national, as well as 
     bilateral and multilateral action, using tools specially 
     designed for that effort; and
       (10) the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and 
     Supervisory Practices and the Financial Action Task Force on 
     Money Laundering, of both of which the United States is a 
     member, have each adopted international anti-money laundering 
     principles and recommendations.
       (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this title are--
       (1) to increase the strength of United States measures to 
     prevent, detect, and prosecute international money laundering 
     and the financing of terrorism;
       (2) to ensure that--
       (A) banking transactions and financial relationships and 
     the conduct of such transactions and relationships, do not 
     contravene the purposes of subchapter II of chapter 53 of 
     title 31, United States Code, section 21 of the Federal 
     Deposit Insurance Act, or chapter 2 of title I of Public Law 
     91-508 (84 Stat. 1116), or facilitate the evasion of any such 
     provision; and
       (B) the purposes of such provisions of law continue to be 
     fulfilled, and that such provisions of law are effectively 
     and efficiently administered;
       (3) to strengthen the provisions put into place by the 
     Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (18 U.S.C. 981 note), 
     especially with respect to crimes by non-United States 
     nationals and foreign financial institutions;
       (4) to provide a clear national mandate for subjecting to 
     special scrutiny those foreign jurisdictions, financial 
     institutions operating outside of the United States, and 
     classes of international transactions that pose particular, 
     identifiable opportunities for criminal abuse;
       (5) to provide the Secretary of the Treasury (in this title 
     referred to as the ``Secretary'') with broad discretion, 
     subject to the safeguards provided by the Administrative 
     Procedures Act under title 5, United States Code, to take 
     measures tailored to the particular money laundering problems 
     presented by specific foreign jurisdictions, financial 
     institutions operating outside of the United States, and 
     classes of international transactions;
       (6) to ensure that the employment of such measures by the 
     Secretary permits appropriate opportunity for comment by 
     affected financial institutions;
       (7) to provide guidance to domestic financial institutions 
     on particular foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions 
     operating outside of the United States, and classes of 
     international transactions that are of primary money 
     laundering concern to the United States Government;
       (8) to ensure that the forfeiture of any assets in 
     connection with the anti-terrorist efforts of the United 
     States permits for adequate challenge consistent with 
     providing due process rights;
       (9) to clarify the terms of the safe harbor from civil 
     liability for filing suspicious activity reports;
       (10) to strengthen the authority of the Secretary to issue 
     and administer geographic targeting orders, and to clarify 
     that violations of such orders or any other requirement 
     imposed under the authority contained in chapter 2 of title I 
     of Public Law 91-508 and subchapters II and III of chapter 53 
     of title 31, United States Code, may result in criminal and 
     civil penalties;
       (11) to ensure that all appropriate elements of the 
     financial services industry are subject to appropriate 
     requirements to report potential money laundering 
     transactions to proper authorities, and that jurisdictional 
     disputes do not hinder examination of compliance by financial 
     institutions with relevant reporting requirements;
       (12) to fix responsibility for high level coordination of 
     the anti-money laundering efforts of the Department of the 
     Treasury;
       (13) to strengthen the ability of financial institutions to 
     maintain the integrity of their employee population; and
       (14) to strengthen measures to prevent the use of the 
     United States financial system for personal gain by corrupt 
     foreign officials and to facilitate the repatriation of any 
     stolen assets to the citizens of countries to whom such 
     assets belong.

     SEC. 303. 4-YEAR CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW-EXPEDITED 
                   CONSIDERATION.

       (a) In General.--Effective on and after the first day of 
     fiscal year 2005, the provisions of this title and the 
     amendments made by this title shall terminate if the Congress 
     enacts a joint resolution, the text after the resolving 
     clause of which is as follows: ``That provisions of the 
     International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist 
     Financing Act of 2001, and the amendments made thereby, shall 
     no longer have the force of law.''.
       (b) Expedited Consideration.--Any joint resolution 
     submitted pursuant to this section shall be considered in the 
     Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of 
     the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 
     1976. For the purpose of expediting the consideration and 
     enactment of a joint resolution under this section, a motion 
     to proceed to the consideration of any such joint resolution 
     after it has been reported by the appropriate committee, 
     shall be treated as highly privileged in the House of 
     Representatives.

Subtitle A--International Counter Money Laundering and Related Measures

     SEC. 311. SPECIAL MEASURES FOR JURISDICTIONS, FINANCIAL 
                   INSTITUTIONS, OR INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS OF 
                   PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.

       (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 
     5318 the following new section:

     ``SEC. 5318A. SPECIAL MEASURES FOR JURISDICTIONS, FINANCIAL 
                   INSTITUTIONS, OR INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS OF 
                   PRIMARY MONEY LAUNDERING CONCERN.

       ``(a) International Counter-Money Laundering 
     Requirements.--
       ``(1) In general.--The Secretary may require domestic 
     financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to 
     take 1 or more of the special measures described in 
     subsection (b) if the Secretary finds that reasonable grounds 
     exist for concluding that a jurisdiction outside of the 
     United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating 
     outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of 
     transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts is of 
     primary money laundering concern, in accordance with 
     subsection (c).
       ``(2) Form of requirement.--The special measures described 
     in--
       ``(A) subsection (b) may be imposed in such sequence or 
     combination as the Secretary shall determine;
       ``(B) paragraphs (1) through (4) of subsection (b) may be 
     imposed by regulation, order, or otherwise as permitted by 
     law; and
       ``(C) subsection (b)(5) may be imposed only by regulation.
       ``(3) Duration of orders; rulemaking.--Any order by which a 
     special measure described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of 
     subsection (b) is imposed (other than an order described in 
     section 5326)--
       ``(A) shall be issued together with a notice of proposed 
     rulemaking relating to the imposition of such special 
     measure; and
       ``(B) may not remain in effect for more than 120 days, 
     except pursuant to a rule promulgated on or before the end of 
     the 120-day period beginning on the date of issuance of such 
     order.
       ``(4) Process for selecting special measures.--In selecting 
     which special measure or measures to take under this 
     subsection, the Secretary--
       ``(A) shall consult with the Chairman of the Board of 
     Governors of the Federal Reserve System, any other 
     appropriate Federal banking agency, as defined in section 3 
     of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Securities and 
     Exchange Commission, the National

[[Page 19559]]

     Credit Union Administration Board, and in the sole discretion 
     of the Secretary such other agencies and interested parties 
     as the Secretary may find to be appropriate; and
       ``(B) shall consider--
       ``(i) whether similar action has been or is being taken by 
     other nations or multilateral groups;
       ``(ii) whether the imposition of any particular special 
     measure would create a significant competitive disadvantage, 
     including any undue cost or burden associated with 
     compliance, for financial institutions organized or licensed 
     in the United States; and
       ``(iii) the extent to which the action or the timing of the 
     action would have a significant adverse systemic impact on 
     the international payment, clearance, and settlement system, 
     or on legitimate business activities involving the particular 
     jurisdiction, institution, or class of transactions.
       ``(5) No limitation on other authority.--This section shall 
     not be construed as superseding or otherwise restricting any 
     other authority granted to the Secretary, or to any other 
     agency, by this subchapter or otherwise.
       ``(b) Special Measures.--The special measures referred to 
     in subsection (a), with respect to a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States, financial institution operating outside of 
     the United States, class of transaction within, or involving, 
     a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 1 or more 
     types of accounts are as follows:
       ``(1) Recordkeeping and reporting of certain financial 
     transactions.--
       ``(A) In general.--The Secretary may require any domestic 
     financial institution or domestic financial agency to 
     maintain records, file reports, or both, concerning the 
     aggregate amount of transactions, or concerning each 
     transaction, with respect to a jurisdiction outside of the 
     United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating 
     outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of 
     transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts if the 
     Secretary finds any such jurisdiction, institution, or class 
     of transactions to be of primary money laundering concern.
       ``(B) Form of records and reports.--Such records and 
     reports shall be made and retained at such time, in such 
     manner, and for such period of time, as the Secretary shall 
     determine, and shall include such information as the 
     Secretary may determine, including--
       ``(i) the identity and address of the participants in a 
     transaction or relationship, including the identity of the 
     originator of any funds transfer;
       ``(ii) the legal capacity in which a participant in any 
     transaction is acting;
       ``(iii) the identity of the beneficial owner of the funds 
     involved in any transaction, in accordance with such 
     procedures as the Secretary determines to be reasonable and 
     practicable to obtain and retain the information; and
       ``(iv) a description of any transaction.
       ``(2) Information relating to beneficial ownership.--In 
     addition to any other requirement under any other provision 
     of law, the Secretary may require any domestic financial 
     institution or domestic financial agency to take such steps 
     as the Secretary may determine to be reasonable and 
     practicable to obtain and retain information concerning the 
     beneficial ownership of any account opened or maintained in 
     the United States by a foreign person (other than a foreign 
     entity whose shares are subject to public reporting 
     requirements or are listed and traded on a regulated exchange 
     or trading market), or a representative of such a foreign 
     person, that involves a jurisdiction outside of the United 
     States, 1 or more financial institutions operating outside of 
     the United States, 1 or more classes of transactions within, 
     or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States, or 
     1 or more types of accounts if the Secretary finds any such 
     jurisdiction, institution, or transaction to be of primary 
     money laundering concern.
       ``(3) Information relating to certain payable-through 
     accounts.--If the Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating 
     outside of the United States, or 1 or more classes of 
     transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States to be of primary money laundering concern, 
     the Secretary may require any domestic financial institution 
     or domestic financial agency that opens or maintains a 
     payable-through account in the United States for a foreign 
     financial institution involving any such jurisdiction or any 
     such financial institution operating outside of the United 
     States, or a payable through account through which any such 
     transaction may be conducted, as a condition of opening or 
     maintaining such account--
       ``(A) to identify each customer (and representative of such 
     customer) of such financial institution who is permitted to 
     use, or whose transactions are routed through, such payable-
     through account; and
       ``(B) to obtain, with respect to each such customer (and 
     each such representative), information that is substantially 
     comparable to that which the depository institution obtains 
     in the ordinary course of business with respect to its 
     customers residing in the United States.
       ``(4) Information relating to certain correspondent 
     accounts.--If the Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating 
     outside of the United States, or 1 or more classes of 
     transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States to be of primary money laundering concern, 
     the Secretary may require any domestic financial institution 
     or domestic financial agency that opens or maintains a 
     correspondent account in the United States for a foreign 
     financial institution involving any such jurisdiction or any 
     such financial institution operating outside of the United 
     States, or a correspondent account through which any such 
     transaction may be conducted, as a condition of opening or 
     maintaining such account--
       ``(A) to identify each customer (and representative of such 
     customer) of any such financial institution who is permitted 
     to use, or whose transactions are routed through, such 
     correspondent account; and
       ``(B) to obtain, with respect to each such customer (and 
     each such representative), information that is substantially 
     comparable to that which the depository institution obtains 
     in the ordinary course of business with respect to its 
     customers residing in the United States.
       ``(5) Prohibitions or conditions on opening or maintaining 
     certain correspondent or payable-through accounts.--If the 
     Secretary finds a jurisdiction outside of the United States, 
     1 or more financial institutions operating outside of the 
     United States, or 1 or more classes of transactions within, 
     or involving, a jurisdiction outside of the United States to 
     be of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney 
     General, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
     Federal Reserve System, may prohibit, or impose conditions 
     upon, the opening or maintaining in the United States of a 
     correspondent account or payable- through account by any 
     domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency 
     for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if such 
     correspondent account or payable-through account involves any 
     such jurisdiction or institution, or if any such transaction 
     may be conducted through such correspondent account or 
     payable-through account.
       ``(c) Consultations and Information To Be Considered in 
     Finding Jurisdictions, Institutions, Types of Accounts, or 
     Transactions To Be of Primary Money Laundering Concern.--
       ``(1) In general.--In making a finding that reasonable 
     grounds exist for concluding that a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States, 1 or more financial institutions operating 
     outside of the United States, 1 or more classes of 
     transactions within, or involving, a jurisdiction outside of 
     the United States, or 1 or more types of accounts is of 
     primary money laundering concern so as to authorize the 
     Secretary to take 1 or more of the special measures described 
     in subsection (b), the Secretary shall consult with the 
     Secretary of State, and the Attorney General.
       ``(2) Additional considerations.--In making a finding 
     described in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall consider in 
     addition such information as the Secretary determines to be 
     relevant, including the following potentially relevant 
     factors:
       ``(A) Jurisdictional factors.--In the case of a particular 
     jurisdiction--
       ``(i) evidence that organized criminal groups, 
     international terrorists, or both, have transacted business 
     in that jurisdiction;
       (ii) the extent to which that jurisdiction or financial 
     institutions operating in that jurisdiction offer bank 
     secrecy or special tax or regulatory advantages to 
     nonresidents or nondomiciliaries of that jurisdiction;
       ``(iii) the substance and quality of administration of the 
     bank supervisory and counter-money laundering laws of that 
     jurisdiction;
       ``(iv) the relationship between the volume of financial 
     transactions occurring in that jurisdiction and the size of 
     the economy of the jurisdiction;
       ``(v) the extent to which that jurisdiction is 
     characterized as a tax haven or offshore banking or secrecy 
     haven by credible international organizations or multilateral 
     expert groups;
       ``(vi) whether the United States has a mutual legal 
     assistance treaty with that jurisdiction, and the experience 
     of United States law enforcement officials, regulatory 
     officials, and tax administrators in obtaining information 
     about transactions originating in or routed through or to 
     such jurisdiction; and
       ``(vii) the extent to which that jurisdiction is 
     characterized by high levels of official or institutional 
     corruption.
       ``(B) Institutional factors.--In the case of a decision to 
     apply 1 or more of the special measures described in 
     subsection (b) only to a financial institution or 
     institutions, or to a transaction or class of transactions, 
     or to a type of account, or to all 3, within or involving a 
     particular jurisdiction--
       ``(i) the extent to which such financial institutions, 
     transactions, or types of accounts are used to facilitate or 
     promote money laundering in or through the jurisdiction;

[[Page 19560]]

       ``(ii) the extent to which such institutions, transactions, 
     or types of accounts are used for legitimate business 
     purposes in the jurisdiction; and
       ``(iii) the extent to which such action is sufficient to 
     ensure, with respect to transactions involving the 
     jurisdiction and institutions operating in the jurisdiction, 
     that the purposes of this subchapter continue to be 
     fulfilled, and to guard against international money 
     laundering and other financial crimes.
       ``(d) Notification of Special Measures Invoked by the 
     Secretary.--Not later than 10 days after the date of any 
     action taken by the Secretary under subsection (a)(1), the 
     Secretary shall notify, in writing, the Committee on 
     Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
     Senate of any such action.
       ``(e) Study and Report on Foreign Nationals.--
       ``(1) Study.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     appropriate Federal agencies, including the Federal banking 
     agencies (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit 
     Insurance Act), shall conduct a study to--
       ``(A) determine the most timely and effective way to 
     require foreign nationals to provide domestic financial 
     institutions and agencies with appropriate and accurate 
     information, comparable to that which is required of United 
     States nationals, concerning their identity, address, and 
     other related information necessary to enable such 
     institutions and agencies to comply with the reporting, 
     information gathering, and other requirements of this 
     section; and
       ``(B) consider the need for requiring foreign nationals to 
     apply for and obtain an identification number, similar to 
     what is required for United States citizens through a social 
     security number or tax identification number, prior to 
     opening an account with a domestic financial institution.
       ``(2) Report.--The Secretary shall report to Congress not 
     later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
     section with recommendations for implementing such action 
     referred to in paragraph (1) in a timely and effective 
     manner.
       ``(f) Definitions.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this subchapter, for purposes of this section, the following 
     definitions shall apply:
       ``(1) Bank definitions.--The following definitions shall 
     apply with respect to a bank:
       ``(A) Account.--The term `account'--
       ``(i) means a formal banking or business relationship 
     established to provide regular services, dealings, and other 
     financial transactions; and
       ``(ii) includes a demand deposit, savings deposit, or other 
     transaction or asset account and a credit account or other 
     extension of credit.
       ``(B) Correspondent account.--The term `correspondent 
     account' means an account established to receive deposits 
     from, make payments on behalf of a foreign financial 
     institution, or handle other financial transactions related 
     to such institution.
       ``(C) Payable-through account.--The term `payable-through 
     account' means an account, including a transaction account 
     (as defined in section 19(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Reserve 
     Act), opened at a depository institution by a foreign 
     financial institution by means of which the foreign financial 
     institution permits its customers to engage, either directly 
     or through a subaccount, in banking activities usual in 
     connection with the business of banking in the United States.
       ``(2) Definitions applicable to institutions other than 
     banks.--With respect to any financial institution other than 
     a bank, the Secretary shall, after consultation with the 
     Securities and Exchange Commission, define by regulation the 
     term `account', and shall include within the meaning of that 
     term, to the extent, if any, that the Secretary deems 
     appropriate, arrangements similar to payable-through and 
     correspondent accounts.
       ``(3) Regulatory definition.--The Secretary shall 
     promulgate regulations defining beneficial ownership of an 
     account for purposes of this section. Such regulations shall 
     address issues related to an individual's authority to fund, 
     direct, or manage the account (including, without limitation, 
     the power to direct payments into or out of the account), and 
     an individual's material interest in the income or corpus of 
     the account, and shall ensure that the identification of 
     individuals under this section does not extend to any 
     individual whose beneficial interest in the income or corpus 
     of the account is immaterial.''.
       ``(4) Other terms.--The Secretary may, by regulation, 
     further define the terms in paragraphs (1) and (2) and define 
     other terms for the purposes of this section, as the 
     Secretary deems appropriate.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for 
     subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, 
     is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
     5318 the following new item:

``5318A. Special measures for jurisdictions, financial institutions, or 
              international transactions of primary money laundering 
              concern.''.

     SEC. 312. SPECIAL DUE DILIGENCE FOR CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS 
                   AND PRIVATE BANKING ACCOUNTS.

       (a) In General.--Section 5318 of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(i) Due Diligence for United States Private Banking and 
     Correspondent Bank Accounts Involving Foreign Persons.--
       ``(1) In general.--Each financial institution that 
     establishes, maintains, administers, or manages a private 
     banking account or a correspondent account in the United 
     States for a non-United States person, including a foreign 
     individual visiting the United States, or a representative of 
     a non-United States person shall establish appropriate, 
     specific, and, where necessary, enhanced, due diligence 
     policies, procedures, and controls to detect and report 
     instances of money laundering through those accounts.
       ``(2) Minimum standards for correspondent accounts.--
       ``(A) In general.--Subparagraph (B) shall apply if a 
     correspondent account is requested or maintained by, or on 
     behalf of, a foreign bank operating--
       ``(i) under an offshore banking license; or
       ``(ii) under a banking license issued by a foreign country 
     that has been designated--

       ``(I) as noncooperative with international anti-money 
     laundering principles or procedures by an intergovernmental 
     group or organization of which the United States is a member; 
     or
       ``(II) by the Secretary as warranting special measures due 
     to money laundering concerns.

       ``(B) Policies, procedures, and controls.--The enhanced due 
     diligence policies, procedures, and controls required under 
     paragraph (1) shall, at a minimum, ensure that the financial 
     institution in the United States takes reasonable steps--
       ``(i) to ascertain for any such foreign bank, the shares of 
     which are not publicly traded, the identity of each of the 
     owners of the foreign bank, and the nature and extent of the 
     ownership interest of each such owner;
       ``(ii) to conduct enhanced scrutiny of such account to 
     guard against money laundering and report any suspicious 
     transactions under section 5318(g); and
       ``(iii) to ascertain whether such foreign bank provides 
     correspondent accounts to other foreign banks and, if so, the 
     identity of those foreign banks and related due diligence 
     information, as appropriate under paragraph (1).
       ``(3) Minimum standards for private banking accounts.--If a 
     private banking account is requested or maintained by, or on 
     behalf of, a non-United States person, then the due diligence 
     policies, procedures, and controls required under paragraph 
     (1) shall, at a minimum, ensure that the financial 
     institution takes reasonable steps--
       ``(A) to ascertain the identity of the nominal and 
     beneficial owners of, and the source of funds deposited into, 
     such account as needed to guard against money laundering and 
     report any suspicious transactions under section 5318(g); and
       ``(B) to conduct enhanced scrutiny of any such account that 
     is requested or maintained by, or on behalf of, a senior 
     foreign political figure, or any immediate family member or 
     close associate of a senior foreign political figure, to 
     prevent, detect, and report transactions that may involve the 
     proceeds of foreign corruption.
       ``(4) Definitions and regulatory authority.--
       ``(A) Offshore banking license.--For purposes of this 
     subsection, the term `offshore banking license' means a 
     license to conduct banking activities which, as a condition 
     of the license, prohibits the licensed entity from conducting 
     banking activities with the citizens of, or with the local 
     currency of, the country which issued the license.
       ``(B) Regulatory authority.--The Secretary, in consultation 
     with the appropriate functional regulators of the affected 
     financial institutions, may further delineate, by regulation 
     the due diligence policies, procedures, and controls required 
     under paragraph (1).''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect beginning 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act with respect to accounts covered by 
     section 5318(i) of title 31, United States Code, as added by 
     this section, that are opened before, on, or after the date 
     of enactment of this Act.

     SEC. 313. PROHIBITION ON UNITED STATES CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNTS 
                   WITH FOREIGN SHELL BANKS.

       (a) In General.--Section 5318 of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 5318(i), as added 
     by section 312 of this title, the following:
       ``(j) Prohibition on United States Correspondent Accounts 
     With Foreign Shell Banks.--
       ``(1) In general.--A financial institution described in 
     subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 5312(a)(2) (in this 
     subsection referred to as a `covered financial institution') 
     shall not establish, maintain, administer, or manage a 
     correspondent account in the United States for, or on behalf 
     of, a foreign bank that does not have a physical presence in 
     any country.
       ``(2) Prevention of indirect service to foreign shell 
     banks.--A covered financial

[[Page 19561]]

     institution shall take reasonable steps to ensure that any 
     correspondent account established, maintained, administered, 
     or managed by that covered financial institution in the 
     United States for a foreign bank is not being used by that 
     foreign bank to indirectly provide banking services to 
     another foreign bank that does not have a physical presence 
     in any country. The Secretary shall, by regulation, delineate 
     the reasonable steps necessary to comply with this paragraph.
       ``(3) Exception.--Paragraphs (1) and (2) do not prohibit a 
     covered financial institution from providing a correspondent 
     account to a foreign bank, if the foreign bank--
       ``(A) is an affiliate of a depository institution, credit 
     union, or foreign bank that maintains a physical presence in 
     the United States or a foreign country, as applicable; and
       ``(B) is subject to supervision by a banking authority in 
     the country regulating the affiliated depository institution, 
     credit union, or foreign bank described in subparagraph (A), 
     as applicable.
       ``(4) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection--
       ``(A) the term `affiliate' means a foreign bank that is 
     controlled by or is under common control with a depository 
     institution, credit union, or foreign bank; and
       ``(B) the term `physical presence' means a place of 
     business that--
       ``(i) is maintained by a foreign bank;
       ``(ii) is located at a fixed address (other than solely an 
     electronic address) in a country in which the foreign bank is 
     authorized to conduct banking activities, at which location 
     the foreign bank--

       ``(I) employs 1 or more individuals on a full-time basis; 
     and
       ``(II) maintains operating records related to its banking 
     activities; and

       ``(iii) is subject to inspection by the banking authority 
     which licensed the foreign bank to conduct banking 
     activities.''.

     SEC. 314. COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO DETER MONEY LAUNDERING.

       (a) Cooperation Among Financial Institutions, Regulatory 
     Authorities, and Law Enforcement Authorities.--
       (1) Regulations.--The Secretary shall, within 120 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, adopt regulations to 
     encourage further cooperation among financial institutions, 
     their regulatory authorities, and law enforcement 
     authorities, with the specific purpose of encouraging 
     regulatory authorities and law enforcement authorities to 
     share with financial institutions information regarding 
     individuals, entities, and organizations engaged in or 
     reasonably suspected based on credible evidence of engaging 
     in terrorist acts or money laundering activities.
       (2) Contents.--The regulations promulgated pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) may--
       (A) require that each financial institution designate 1 or 
     more persons to receive information concerning, and to 
     monitor accounts of individuals, entities, and organizations 
     identified, pursuant to paragraph (1); and
       (B) further establish procedures for the protection of the 
     shared information, consistent with the capacity, size, and 
     nature of the institution to which the particular procedures 
     apply.
       (3) Rule of construction.--The receipt of information by a 
     financial institution pursuant to this section shall not 
     relieve or otherwise modify the obligations of the financial 
     institution with respect to any other person or account.
       (4) Use of information.--Information received by a 
     financial institution pursuant to this section shall not be 
     used for any purpose other than identifying and reporting on 
     activities that may involve terrorist acts or money 
     laundering activities.
       (b) Cooperation Among Financial Institutions.--Upon notice 
     provided to the Secretary, 2 or more financial institutions 
     and any association of financial institutions may share 
     information with one another regarding individuals, entities, 
     organizations, and countries suspected of possible terrorist 
     or money laundering activities. A financial institution or 
     association that transmits, receives, or shares such 
     information for the purposes of identifying and reporting 
     activities that may involve terrorist acts or money 
     laundering activities shall not be liable to any person under 
     any law or regulation of the United States, any constitution, 
     law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision 
     thereof, or under any contract or other legally enforceable 
     agreement (including any arbitration agreement), for such 
     disclosure or for any failure to provide notice of such 
     disclosure to the person who is the subject of such 
     disclosure, or any other person identified in the disclosure, 
     except where such transmission, receipt, or sharing violates 
     this section or regulations promulgated pursuant to this 
     section.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Compliance with the provisions 
     of this title requiring or allowing financial institutions 
     and any association of financial institutions to disclose or 
     share information regarding individuals, entities, and 
     organizations engaged in or suspected of engaging in 
     terrorist acts or money laundering activities shall not 
     constitute a violation of the provisions of title V of the 
     Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Public Law 106-102).

     SEC. 315. INCLUSION OF FOREIGN CORRUPTION OFFENSES AS MONEY 
                   LAUNDERING CRIMES.

       Section 1956(c)(7)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in clause (ii), by striking ``or destruction of 
     property by means of explosive or fire'' and inserting 
     ``destruction of property by means of explosive or fire, or a 
     crime of violence (as defined in section 16)'';
       (2) in clause (iii), by striking ``1978'' and inserting 
     ``1978)''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(iv) bribery of a public official, or the 
     misappropriation, theft, or embezzlement of public funds by 
     or for the benefit of a public official;
       ``(v) smuggling or export control violations involving--

       ``(I) an item controlled on the United States Munitions 
     List established under section 38 of the Arms Export Control 
     Act (22 U.S.C. 2778); or
       ``(II) an item controlled under regulations under the 
     Export Administration Act of 1977 (15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774);

       ``(vi) an offense with respect to which the United States 
     would be obligated by a multilateral treaty, either to 
     extradite the alleged offender or to submit the case for 
     prosecution, if the offender were found within the territory 
     of the United States; or
       ``(vii) the misuse of funds of, or provided by, the 
     International Monetary Fund in contravention of the Articles 
     of Agreement of the Fund or the misuse of funds of, or 
     provided by, any other international financial institution 
     (as defined in section 1701(c)(2) of the International 
     Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2)) in 
     contravention of any treaty or other international agreement 
     to which the United States is a party, including any articles 
     of agreement of the members of the international financial 
     institution;''.

     SEC. 316. ANTI-TERRORIST FORFEITURE PROTECTION.

       (a) Right to Contest.--An owner of property that is 
     confiscated under any provision of law relating to the 
     confiscation of assets of suspected international terrorists, 
     may contest that confiscation by filing a claim in the manner 
     set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
     (Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime 
     Claims), and asserting as an affirmative defense that--
       (1) the property is not subject to confiscation under such 
     provision of law; or
       (2) the innocent owner provisions of section 983(d) of 
     title 18, United States Code, apply to the case.
       (b) Evidence.--In considering a claim filed under this 
     section, the Government may rely on evidence that is 
     otherwise inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
     if a court determines that such reliance is necessary to 
     protect the national security interests of the United States.
       (c) Other Remedies.--Nothing in this section shall limit or 
     otherwise affect any other remedies that may be available to 
     an owner of property under section 983 of title 18, United 
     States Code, or any other provision of law.

     SEC. 317. LONG-ARM JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN MONEY 
                   LAUNDERERS.

       Section 1956(b) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and moving the 
     margins 2 ems to the right;
       (2) by inserting after ``(b)'' the following: 
     ``Penalties.--
       ``(1) In general.--'';
       (3) by inserting ``, or section 1957'' after ``or (a)(3)''; 
     and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) Jurisdiction over foreign persons.--For purposes of 
     adjudicating an action filed or enforcing a penalty ordered 
     under this section, the district courts shall have 
     jurisdiction over any foreign person, including any financial 
     institution authorized under the laws of a foreign country, 
     against whom the action is brought, if service of process 
     upon the foreign person is made under the Federal Rules of 
     Civil Procedure or the laws of the country in which the 
     foreign person is found, and--
       ``(A) the foreign person commits an offense under 
     subsection (a) involving a financial transaction that occurs 
     in whole or in part in the United States;
       ``(B) the foreign person converts, to his or her own use, 
     property in which the United States has an ownership interest 
     by virtue of the entry of an order of forfeiture by a court 
     of the United States; or
       ``(C) the foreign person is a financial institution that 
     maintains a bank account at a financial institution in the 
     United States.
       ``(3) Court authority over assets.--A court described in 
     paragraph (2) may issue a pretrial restraining order or take 
     any other action necessary to ensure that any bank account or 
     other property held by the defendant in the United States is 
     available to satisfy a judgment under this section.
       ``(4) Federal receiver.--
       ``(A) In general.--A court described in paragraph (2) may 
     appoint a Federal Receiver, in accordance with subparagraph 
     (B) of this paragraph, to collect, marshal, and take custody, 
     control, and possession of all assets of the defendant, 
     wherever located, to satisfy a judgment under this section or 
     section 981, 982, or 1957, including an order of restitution 
     to any victim of a specified unlawful activity.

[[Page 19562]]

       ``(B) Appointment and authority.--A Federal Receiver 
     described in subparagraph (A)--
       ``(i) may be appointed upon application of a Federal 
     prosecutor or a Federal or State regulator, by the court 
     having jurisdiction over the defendant in the case;
       ``(ii) shall be an officer of the court, and the powers of 
     the Federal Receiver shall include the powers set out in 
     section 754 of title 28, United States Code; and
       ``(iii) shall have standing equivalent to that of a Federal 
     prosecutor for the purpose of submitting requests to obtain 
     information regarding the assets of the defendant--

       ``(I) from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the 
     Department of the Treasury; or
       ``(II) from a foreign country pursuant to a mutual legal 
     assistance treaty, multilateral agreement, or other 
     arrangement for international law enforcement assistance, 
     provided that such requests are in accordance with the 
     policies and procedures of the Attorney General.''.

     SEC. 318. LAUNDERING MONEY THROUGH A FOREIGN BANK.

       Section 1956(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
       ``(6) the term `financial institution' includes--
       ``(A) any financial institution, as defined in section 
     5312(a)(2) of title 31, United States Code, or the 
     regulations promulgated thereunder; and
       ``(B) any foreign bank, as defined in section 1 of the 
     International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101).''.

     SEC. 319. FORFEITURE OF FUNDS IN UNITED STATES INTERBANK 
                   ACCOUNTS.

       (a) Forfeiture From United States Interbank Account.--
     Section 981 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(k) Interbank Accounts.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) In general.--For the purpose of a forfeiture under 
     this section or under the Controlled Substances Act (21 
     U.S.C. 801 et seq.), if funds are deposited into an account 
     at a foreign bank, and that foreign bank has an interbank 
     account in the United States with a covered financial 
     institution (as defined in section 5318A of title 31), the 
     funds shall be deemed to have been deposited into the 
     interbank account in the United States, and any restraining 
     order, seizure warrant, or arrest warrant in rem regarding 
     the funds may be served on the covered financial institution, 
     and funds in the interbank account, up to the value of the 
     funds deposited into the account at the foreign bank, may be 
     restrained, seized, or arrested.
       ``(B) Authority to suspend.--The Attorney General, in 
     consultation with the Secretary, may suspend or terminate a 
     forfeiture under this section if the Attorney General 
     determines that a conflict of law exists between the laws of 
     the jurisdiction in which the foreign bank is located and the 
     laws of the United States with respect to liabilities arising 
     from the restraint, seizure, or arrest of such funds, and 
     that such suspension or termination would be in the interest 
     of justice and would not harm the national interests of the 
     United States.
       ``(2) No requirement for government to trace funds.--If a 
     forfeiture action is brought against funds that are 
     restrained, seized, or arrested under paragraph (1), it shall 
     not be necessary for the Government to establish that the 
     funds are directly traceable to the funds that were deposited 
     into the foreign bank, nor shall it be necessary for the 
     Government to rely on the application of section 984.
       ``(3) Claims brought by owner of the funds.--If a 
     forfeiture action is instituted against funds restrained, 
     seized, or arrested under paragraph (1), the owner of the 
     funds deposited into the account at the foreign bank may 
     contest the forfeiture by filing a claim under section 983.
       ``(4) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection, the 
     following definitions shall apply:
       ``(A) Interbank account.--The term `interbank account' has 
     the same meaning as in section 984(c)(2)(B).
       ``(B) Owner.--
       ``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), the 
     term `owner'--

       ``(I) means the person who was the owner, as that term is 
     defined in section 983(d)(6), of the funds that were 
     deposited into the foreign bank at the time such funds were 
     deposited; and
       ``(II) does not include either the foreign bank or any 
     financial institution acting as an intermediary in the 
     transfer of the funds into the interbank account.

       ``(ii) Exception.--The foreign bank may be considered the 
     `owner' of the funds (and no other person shall qualify as 
     the owner of such funds) only if--

       ``(I) the basis for the forfeiture action is wrongdoing 
     committed by the foreign bank; or
       ``(II) the foreign bank establishes, by a preponderance of 
     the evidence, that prior to the restraint, seizure, or arrest 
     of the funds, the foreign bank had discharged all or part of 
     its obligation to the prior owner of the funds, in which case 
     the foreign bank shall be deemed the owner of the funds to 
     the extent of such discharged obligation.''.

       (b) Bank Records.--Section 5318 of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(k) Bank Records Related to Anti-Money Laundering 
     Programs.--
       ``(1) Definitions.--For purposes of this subsection, the 
     following definitions shall apply:
       ``(A) Appropriate federal banking agency.--The term 
     `appropriate Federal banking agency' has the same meaning as 
     in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 
     1813).
       ``(B) Incorporated terms.--The terms `correspondent 
     account', `covered financial institution', and `foreign bank' 
     have the same meanings as in section 5318A.
       ``(2) 120-hour rule.--Not later than 120 hours after 
     receiving a request by an appropriate Federal banking agency 
     for information related to anti-money laundering compliance 
     by a covered financial institution or a customer of such 
     institution, a covered financial institution shall provide to 
     the appropriate Federal banking agency, or make available at 
     a location specified by the representative of the appropriate 
     Federal banking agency, information and account documentation 
     for any account opened, maintained, administered or managed 
     in the United States by the covered financial institution.
       ``(3) Foreign bank records.--
       ``(A) Summons or subpoena of records.--
       ``(i) In general.--The Secretary or the Attorney General 
     may issue a summons or subpoena to any foreign bank that 
     maintains a correspondent account in the United States and 
     request records related to such correspondent account, 
     including records maintained outside of the United States 
     relating to the deposit of funds into the foreign bank.
       ``(ii) Service of summons or subpoena.--A summons or 
     subpoena referred to in clause (i) may be served on the 
     foreign bank in the United States if the foreign bank has a 
     representative in the United States, or in a foreign country 
     pursuant to any mutual legal assistance treaty, multilateral 
     agreement, or other request for international law enforcement 
     assistance.
       ``(B) Acceptance of service.--
       ``(i) Maintaining records in the united states.--Any 
     covered financial institution which maintains a correspondent 
     account in the United States for a foreign bank shall 
     maintain records in the United States identifying the owners 
     of such foreign bank and the name and address of a person who 
     resides in the United States and is authorized to accept 
     service of legal process for records regarding the 
     correspondent account.
       ``(ii) Law enforcement request.--Upon receipt of a written 
     request from a Federal law enforcement officer for 
     information required to be maintained under this paragraph, 
     the covered financial institution shall provide the 
     information to the requesting officer not later than 7 days 
     after receipt of the request.
       ``(C) Termination of correspondent relationship.--
       ``(i) Termination upon receipt of notice.--A covered 
     financial institution shall terminate any correspondent 
     relationship with a foreign bank not later than 10 business 
     days after receipt of written notice from the Secretary or 
     the Attorney General that the foreign bank has failed--

       ``(I) to comply with a summons or subpoena issued under 
     subparagraph (A); or
       ``(II) to initiate proceedings in a United States court 
     contesting such summons or subpoena.

       ``(ii) Limitation on liability.--A covered financial 
     institution shall not be liable to any person in any court or 
     arbitration proceeding for terminating a correspondent 
     relationship in accordance with this subsection.
       ``(iii) Failure to terminate relationship.--Failure to 
     terminate a correspondent relationship in accordance with 
     this subsection shall render the covered financial 
     institution liable for a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per 
     day until the correspondent relationship is so terminated.''.
       (c) Grace Period.--Financial institutions affected by 
     section 5333 of title 31 United States Code, as amended by 
     this title, shall have 60 days from the date of enactment of 
     this Act to comply with the provisions of that section.
       (d) Requests for Records.--Section 3486(a)(1) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended by striking ``, or (II) a 
     Federal offense involving the sexual exploitation or abuse of 
     children'' and inserting ``, (II) a Federal offense involving 
     the sexual exploitation or abuse of children, or (III) money 
     laundering, in violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of 
     this title''.
       (e) Authority To Order Convicted Criminal To Return 
     Property Located Abroad.--
       (1) Forfeiture of substitute property.--Section 413(p) of 
     the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853) is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(p) Forfeiture of Substitute Property.--
       ``(1) In general.--Paragraph (2) of this subsection shall 
     apply, if any property described in subsection (a), as a 
     result of any act or omission of the defendant--
       ``(A) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
       ``(B) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a 
     third party;

[[Page 19563]]

       ``(C) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
       ``(D) has been substantially diminished in value; or
       ``(E) has been commingled with other property which cannot 
     be divided without difficulty.
       ``(2) Substitute property.--In any case described in any of 
     subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1), the court 
     shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the 
     defendant, up to the value of any property described in 
     subparagraphs (A) through (E) of paragraph (1), as 
     applicable.
       ``(3) Return of property to jurisdiction.--In the case of 
     property described in paragraph (1)(C), the court may, in 
     addition to any other action authorized by this subsection, 
     order the defendant to return the property to the 
     jurisdiction of the court so that the property may be seized 
     and forfeited.''.
       (2) Protective orders.--Section 413(e) of the Controlled 
     Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853(e)) is amended by adding at the 
     end the following:
       ``(4) Order to repatriate and deposit.--
       ``(A) In general.--Pursuant to its authority to enter a 
     pretrial restraining order under this section, including its 
     authority to restrain any property forfeitable as substitute 
     assets, the court may order a defendant to repatriate any 
     property that may be seized and forfeited, and to deposit 
     that property pending trial in the registry of the court, or 
     with the United States Marshals Service or the Secretary of 
     the Treasury, in an interest-bearing account, if appropriate.
       ``(B) Failure to comply.--Failure to comply with an order 
     under this subsection, or an order to repatriate property 
     under subsection (p), shall be punishable as a civil or 
     criminal contempt of court, and may also result in an 
     enhancement of the sentence of the defendant under the 
     obstruction of justice provision of the Federal Sentencing 
     Guidelines.''.

     SEC. 320. PROCEEDS OF FOREIGN CRIMES.

       Section 981(a)(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(B) Any property, real or personal, within the 
     jurisdiction of the United States, constituting, derived 
     from, or traceable to, any proceeds obtained directly or 
     indirectly from an offense against a foreign nation, or any 
     property used to facilitate such an offense, if the offense--
       ``(i) involves the manufacture, importation, sale, or 
     distribution of a controlled substance (as that term is 
     defined for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act), or 
     any other conduct described in section 1956(c)(7)(B);
       ``(ii) would be punishable within the jurisdiction of the 
     foreign nation by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding 
     1 year; and
       ``(iii) would be punishable under the laws of the United 
     States by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year, if the 
     act or activity constituting the offense had occurred within 
     the jurisdiction of the United States.''.

     SEC. 321. EXCLUSION OF ALIENS INVOLVED IN MONEY LAUNDERING.

       Section 212(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
     1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(I) Money laundering activities.--Any alien who the 
     consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason 
     to believe is or has been engaged in activities which, if 
     engaged in within the United States would constitute a 
     violation of section 1956 or 1957 of title 18, United States 
     Code, or has been a knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, 
     or colluder with others in any such illicit activity is 
     inadmissible.''.

     SEC. 322. CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY A FUGITIVE.

       Section 2466 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     designating the present matter as subsection (a), and adding 
     at the end the following:
       ``(b) Subsection (a) may be applied to a claim filed by a 
     corporation if any majority shareholder, or individual filing 
     the claim on behalf of the corporation is a person to whom 
     subsection (a) applies.''.

     SEC. 323. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.

       Section 2467 of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (d), by adding the following after 
     paragraph (2):
       ``(3) Preservation of property.--To preserve the 
     availability of property subject to a foreign forfeiture or 
     confiscation judgment, the Government may apply for, and the 
     court may issue, a restraining order pursuant to section 
     983(j) of title 18, United States Code, at any time before or 
     after an application is filed pursuant to subsection (c)(1). 
     The court, in issuing the restraining order--
       ``(A) may rely on information set forth in an affidavit 
     describing the nature of the proceeding investigation 
     underway in the foreign country, and setting forth a 
     reasonable basis to believe that the property to be 
     restrained will be named in a judgment of forfeiture at the 
     conclusion of such proceeding; or
       ``(B) may register and enforce a restraining order has been 
     issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in the foreign 
     country and certified by the Attorney General pursuant to 
     subsection (b)(2).
     No person may object to the restraining order on any ground 
     that is the subject to parallel litigation involving the same 
     property that is pending in a foreign court.'';
       (2) in subsection (b)(1)(C), by striking ``establishing 
     that the defendant received notice of the proceedings in 
     sufficient time to enable the defendant'' and inserting 
     ``establishing that the foreign nation took steps, in 
     accordance with the principles of due process, to give notice 
     of the proceedings to all persons with an interest in the 
     property in sufficient time to enable such persons'';
       (3) in subsection (d)(1)(D), by striking ``the defendant in 
     the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice'' 
     and inserting ``the foreign nation did not take steps, in 
     accordance with the principles of due process, to give notice 
     of the proceedings to a person with an interest in the 
     property''; and
       (4) in subsection (a)(2)(A), by inserting ``, any violation 
     of foreign law that would constitute a violation of an 
     offense for which property could be forfeited under Federal 
     law if the offense were committed in the United States'' 
     after ``United Nations Convention''.

     SEC. 324. INCREASE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR MONEY 
                   LAUNDERING.

       (a) Civil Penalties.--Section 5321(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(7) Penalties for international counter money laundering 
     violations.--The Secretary may impose a civil money penalty 
     in an amount equal to not less than 2 times the amount of the 
     transaction, but not more than $1,000,000, on any financial 
     institution or agency that violates any provision of 
     subsection (i) or (j) of section 5318 or any special measures 
     imposed under section 5318A.''.
       (b) Criminal Penalties.--Section 5322 of title 31, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) A financial institution or agency that violates any 
     provision of subsection (i) or (j) of section 5318, or any 
     special measures imposed under section 5318A, or any 
     regulation prescribed under subsection (i) or (j) of section 
     5318 or section 5318A, shall be fined in an amount equal to 
     not less than 2 times the amount of the transaction, but not 
     more than $1,000,000.''.

     SEC. 325. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION.

       Not later than 30 months after the date of enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney 
     General, the Federal banking agencies (as defined at section 
     3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), the Securities and 
     Exchange Commission, and such other agencies as the Secretary 
     may determine, at the discretion of the Secretary, shall 
     evaluate the operations of the provisions of this subtitle 
     and make recommendations to Congress as to any legislative 
     action with respect to this subtitle as the Secretary may 
     determine to be necessary or advisable.

     SEC. 326. REPORT ON EFFECTIVENESS.

       The Secretary shall report annually on measures taken 
     pursuant to this subtitle, and shall submit the report to the 
     Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
     Senate and to the Committee on Financial Services of the 
     House of Representatives.

     SEC. 327. CONCENTRATION ACCOUNTS AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

       Section 5318(h) of title 31, United States Code, as amended 
     by section 202 of this title, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:
       ``(3) Concentration accounts.--The Secretary may issue 
     regulations under this subsection that govern maintenance of 
     concentration accounts by financial institutions, in order to 
     ensure that such accounts are not used to prevent association 
     of the identity of an individual customer with the movement 
     of funds of which the customer is the direct or beneficial 
     owner, which regulations shall, at a minimum--
       ``(A) prohibit financial institutions from allowing clients 
     to direct transactions that move their funds into, out of, or 
     through the concentration accounts of the financial 
     institution;
       ``(B) prohibit financial institutions and their employees 
     from informing customers of the existence of, or the means of 
     identifying, the concentration accounts of the institution; 
     and
       ``(C) require each financial institution to establish 
     written procedures governing the documentation of all 
     transactions involving a concentration account, which 
     procedures shall ensure that, any time a transaction 
     involving a concentration account commingles funds belonging 
     to 1 or more customers, the identity of, and specific amount 
     belonging to, each customer is documented.''.

   Subtitle B--Currency Transaction Reporting Amendments and Related 
                              Improvements

     SEC. 331. AMENDMENTS RELATING TO REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Amendment Relating to Civil Liability Immunity for 
     Disclosures.--Section 5318(g)(3) of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(3) Liability for disclosures.--
       ``(A) In general.--Any financial institution that makes a 
     voluntary disclosure of any possible violation of law or 
     regulation to a government agency or makes a disclosure

[[Page 19564]]

     pursuant to this subsection or any other authority, and any 
     director, officer, employee, or agent of such institution who 
     makes, or requires another to make any such disclosure, shall 
     not be liable to any person under any law or regulation of 
     the United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of 
     any State or political subdivision of any State, or under any 
     contract or other legally enforceable agreement (including 
     any arbitration agreement), for such disclosure or for any 
     failure to provide notice of such disclosure to the person 
     who is the subject of such disclosure or any other person 
     identified in the disclosure.
       ``(B) Rule of construction.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be 
     construed as creating--
       ``(i) any inference that the term `person', as used in such 
     subparagraph, may be construed more broadly than its ordinary 
     usage so as to include any government or agency of 
     government; or
       ``(ii) any immunity against, or otherwise affecting, any 
     civil or criminal action brought by any government or agency 
     of government to enforce any constitution, law, or regulation 
     of such government or agency.''.
       (b) Prohibition on Notification of Disclosures.--Section 
     5318(g)(2) of title 31, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:
       ``(2) Notification prohibited.--
       ``(A) In general.--If a financial institution or any 
     director, officer, employee, or agent of any financial 
     institution, voluntarily or pursuant to this section or any 
     other authority, reports a suspicious transaction to a 
     government agency--
       ``(i) the financial institution, director, officer, 
     employee, or agent may not notify any person involved in the 
     transaction that the transaction has been reported; and
       ``(ii) no officer or employee of the Federal Government or 
     of any State, local, tribal, or territorial government within 
     the United States, who has any knowledge that such report was 
     made may disclose to any person involved in the transaction 
     that the transaction has been reported, other than as 
     necessary to fulfill the official duties of such officer or 
     employee.
       ``(B) Disclosures in certain employment references.--
       ``(i) Rule of construction.--Notwithstanding the 
     application of subparagraph (A) in any other context, 
     subparagraph (A) shall not be construed as prohibiting any 
     financial institution, or any director, officer, employee, or 
     agent of such institution, from including information that 
     was included in a report to which subparagraph (A) applies--

       ``(I) in a written employment reference that is provided in 
     accordance with section 18(v) of the Federal Deposit 
     Insurance Act in response to a request from another financial 
     institution, except that such written reference may not 
     disclose that such information was also included in any such 
     report or that such report was made; or
       ``(II) in a written termination notice or employment 
     reference that is provided in accordance with the rules of 
     the self-regulatory organizations registered with the 
     Securities and Exchange Commission, except that such written 
     notice or reference may not disclose that such information 
     was also included in any such report or that such report was 
     made.

       ``(ii) Information not required.--Clause (i) shall not be 
     construed, by itself, to create any affirmative duty to 
     include any information described in clause (i) in any 
     employment reference or termination notice referred to in 
     clause (i).''.

     SEC. 332. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAMS.

       Section 5318(h) of title 31, United States Code, is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(h) Anti-money Laundering Programs.--
       ``(1) In general.--In order to guard against money 
     laundering through financial institutions, each financial 
     institution shall establish anti-money laundering programs, 
     including, at a minimum--
       ``(A) the development of internal policies, procedures, and 
     controls;
       ``(B) the designation of a compliance officer;
       ``(C) an ongoing employee training program; and
       ``(D) an independent audit function to test programs.
       ``(2) Regulations.--The Secretary may prescribe minimum 
     standards for programs established under paragraph (1), and 
     may exempt from the application of those standards any 
     financial institution that is not subject to the provisions 
     of the rules contained in part 103 of title 31, of the Code 
     of Federal Regulations, or any successor rule thereto, for so 
     long as such financial institution is not subject to the 
     provisions of such rules.''.

     SEC. 333. PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF GEOGRAPHIC TARGETING 
                   ORDERS AND CERTAIN RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS, 
                   AND LENGTHENING EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF GEOGRAPHIC 
                   TARGETING ORDERS.

       (a) Civil Penalty for Violation of Targeting Order.--
     Section 5321(a)(1) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``or order issued'' after ``subchapter or 
     a regulation prescribed''; and
       (2) by inserting ``, or willfully violating a regulation 
     prescribed under section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
     Act or section 123 of Public Law 91-508,'' after ``sections 
     5314 and 5315)''.
       (b) Criminal Penalties for Violation of Targeting Order.--
     Section 5322 of title 31, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by inserting ``or order issued'' after ``willfully 
     violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed''; and
       (B) by inserting ``, or willfully violating a regulation 
     prescribed under section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
     Act or section 123 of Public Law 91-508,'' after ``under 
     section 5315 or 5324)''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by inserting ``or order issued'' after ``willfully 
     violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed''; and
       (B) by inserting ``or willfully violating a regulation 
     prescribed under section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
     Act or section 123 of Public Law 91-508,'' after ``under 
     section 5315 or 5324),''.
       (c) Structuring Transactions To Evade Targeting Order or 
     Certain Recordkeeping Requirements.--Section 5324(a) of title 
     31, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting a comma after ``shall'';
       (2) by striking ``section--'' and inserting ``section, the 
     reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed by any order 
     issued under section 5326, or the recordkeeping requirements 
     imposed by any regulation prescribed under section 21 of the 
     Federal Deposit Insurance Act or section 123 of Public Law 
     91-508--'';
       (3) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``, to file a report or 
     to maintain a record required by an order issued under 
     section 5326, or to maintain a record required pursuant to 
     any regulation prescribed under section 21 of the Federal 
     Deposit Insurance Act or section 123 of Public Law 91-508'' 
     after ``regulation prescribed under any such section''; and
       (4) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``, to file a report or 
     to maintain a record required by any order issued under 
     section 5326, or to maintain a record required pursuant to 
     any regulation prescribed under section 5326, or to maintain 
     a record required pursuant to any regulation prescribed under 
     section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or section 
     123 of Public Law 91-508,'' after ``regulation prescribed 
     under any such section''.
       (d) Lengthening Effective Period of Geographic Targeting 
     Orders.--Section 5326(d) of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``more than 60'' and inserting ``more 
     than 180''.

     SEC. 334. ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY.

       (b) Strategy.--Section 5341(b) of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(12) Data regarding funding of terrorism.--Data 
     concerning money laundering efforts related to the funding of 
     acts of international terrorism, and efforts directed at the 
     prevention, detection, and prosecution of such funding.''.

     SEC. 335. AUTHORIZATION TO INCLUDE SUSPICIONS OF ILLEGAL 
                   ACTIVITY IN WRITTEN EMPLOYMENT REFERENCES.

       Section 18 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 
     1828) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(v) Written Employment References May Contain Suspicions 
     of Involvement in Illegal Activity.--
       ``(1) Authority to disclose information.--Notwithstanding 
     any other provision of law, any insured depository 
     institution, and any director, officer, employee, or agent of 
     such institution, may disclose in any written employment 
     reference relating to a current or former institution-
     affiliated party of such institution which is provided to 
     another insured depository institution in response to a 
     request from such other institution, information concerning 
     the possible involvement of such institution-affiliated party 
     in potentially unlawful activity.
       ``(2) Information not required.--Nothing in paragraph (1) 
     shall be construed, by itself, to create any affirmative duty 
     to include any information described in paragraph (1) in any 
     employment reference referred to in paragraph (1).
       ``(3) Malicious intent.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this subsection, voluntary disclosure made by an 
     insured depository institution, and any director, officer, 
     employee, or agent of such institution under this subsection 
     concerning potentially unlawful activity that is made with 
     malicious intent, shall not be shielded from liability from 
     the person identified in the disclosure.
       ``(4) Definition.--For purposes of this subsection, the 
     term `insured depository institution' includes any uninsured 
     branch or agency of a foreign bank.''.

     SEC. 336. BANK SECRECY ACT ADVISORY GROUP.

       Section 1564 of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering 
     Act (31 U.S.C. 5311 note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``, of nongovernmental 
     organizations advocating financial privacy,'' after ``Drug 
     Control Policy''; and
       (2) in subsection (c), by inserting ``, other than 
     subsections (a) and (d) of such Act which shall apply'' 
     before the period at the end.

     SEC. 337. AGENCY REPORTS ON RECONCILING PENALTY AMOUNTS.

       Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal banking 
     agencies

[[Page 19565]]

     (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
     (12 U.S.C. 1813)) shall each submit their respective reports 
     to the Congress containing recommendations on possible 
     legislation to conform the penalties imposed on depository 
     institutions (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit 
     Insurance Act) for violations of subchapter II of chapter 53 
     of title 31, United States Code, to the penalties imposed on 
     such institutions under section 8 of the Federal Deposit 
     Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1818).

     SEC. 338. REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES BY SECURITIES 
                   BROKERS AND DEALERS; INVESTMENT COMPANY STUDY.

       (a) 270-Day Regulation Deadline.--Not later than 270 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the 
     Treasury, after consultation with the Securities and Exchange 
     Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
     System, shall issue final regulations requiring registered 
     brokers and dealers to file reports of suspicious financial 
     transactions, consistent with the requirements applicable to 
     financial institutions, and directors, officers, employees, 
     and agents of financial institutions under section 5318(g) of 
     title 31, United States Code.
       (b) Report on Investment Companies.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, Secretary of the Treasury, the Board 
     of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the 
     Securities and Exchange Commission shall jointly submit a 
     report to Congress on recommendations for effective 
     regulations to apply the requirements of subchapter II of 
     chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code, to investment 
     companies, pursuant to section 5312(a)(2)(I) of title 31, 
     United States Code.
       (2) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``investment company''--
       (A) has the same meaning as in section 3 of the Investment 
     Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3); and
       (B) any person that, but for the exceptions provided for in 
     paragraph (1) or (7) of section 3(c) of the Investment 
     Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)), would be an 
     investment company.
       (3) Additional recommendations.--In its report, the 
     Securities and Exchange Commission may make different 
     recommendations for different types of entities covered by 
     this section.
       (4) Beneficial ownership of personal holding companies.--
     The report described in paragraph (1) shall also include 
     recommendations as to whether the Secretary should promulgate 
     regulations to treat any corporation or business or other 
     grantor trust whose assets are predominantly securities, bank 
     certificates of deposit, or other securities or investment 
     instruments (other than such as relate to operating 
     subsidiaries of such corporation or trust) and that has 5 or 
     fewer common shareholders or holders of beneficial or other 
     equity interest, as a financial institution within the 
     meaning of that phrase in section 5312(a)(2)(I) and whether 
     to require such corporations or trusts to disclose their 
     beneficial owners when opening accounts or initiating funds 
     transfers at any domestic financial institution.

     SEC. 339. SPECIAL REPORT ON ADMINISTRATION OF BANK SECRECY 
                   PROVISIONS.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than 6 months after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit a 
     report to the Congress relating to the role of the Internal 
     Revenue Service in the administration of subchapter II of 
     chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code (commonly known as 
     the ``Bank Secrecy Act'').
       (b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a)--
       (1) shall specifically address, and contain recommendations 
     concerning--
       (A) whether it is advisable to shift the processing of 
     information reporting to the Department of the Treasury under 
     the Bank Secrecy Act provisions to facilities other than 
     those managed by the Internal Revenue Service; and
       (B) whether it remains reasonable and efficient, in light 
     of the objective of both anti-money-laundering programs and 
     Federal tax administration, for the Internal Revenue Service 
     to retain authority and responsibility for audit and 
     examination of the compliance of money services businesses 
     and gaming institutions with those Bank Secrecy Act 
     provisions; and
       (2) shall, if the Secretary determines that the information 
     processing responsibility or the audit and examination 
     responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service, or both, with 
     respect to those Bank Secrecy Act provisions should be 
     transferred to other agencies, include the specific 
     recommendations of the Secretary regarding the agency or 
     agencies to which any such function should be transferred, 
     complete with a budgetary and resources plan for 
     expeditiously accomplishing the transfer.

     SEC. 340. BANK SECRECY PROVISIONS AND ANTI-TERRORIST 
                   ACTIVITIES OF UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE 
                   AGENCIES.

       (a) Amendment relating to the Purposes of the Bank Secrecy 
     Act.--Section 5311 of title 31, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting before the period at the end the 
     following: ``, or in the conduct of intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to 
     protect against international terrorism''.
       (b) Amendment Relating to Reporting of Suspicious 
     Activities.--Section 5318(g)(4)(B) of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking ``or supervisory agency'' and 
     inserting ``, supervisory agency, or United States 
     intelligence agency for use in the conduct of intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to 
     protect against international terrorism''.
       (c) Amendment Relating to Availability of Reports.--Section 
     5319 of title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as 
     follows:

     ``Sec. 5319. Availability of reports

       ``The Secretary of the Treasury shall make information in a 
     report filed under this subchapter available to an agency, 
     including any State financial institutions supervisory agency 
     or United States intelligence agency, upon request of the 
     head of the agency. The report shall be available for a 
     purpose that is consistent with this subchapter. The 
     Secretary may only require reports on the use of such 
     information by any State financial institutions supervisory 
     agency for other than supervisory purposes or by United 
     States intelligence agencies. However, a report and records 
     of reports are exempt from disclosure under section 552 of 
     title 5.''.
       (d) Amendment Relating to the Purposes of the Bank Secrecy 
     Act Provisions.--Section 21(a) of the Federal Deposit 
     Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b(a)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(a) Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose.--
       ``(1) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       ``(A) adequate records maintained by insured depository 
     institutions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, 
     tax, and regulatory investigations or proceedings, and that, 
     given the threat posed to the security of the Nation on and 
     after the terrorist attacks against the United States on 
     September 11, 2001, such records may also have a high degree 
     of usefulness in the conduct of intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to 
     protect against domestic and international terrorism; and
       ``(B) microfilm or other reproductions and other records 
     made by insured depository institutions of checks, as well as 
     records kept by such institutions, of the identity of persons 
     maintaining or authorized to act with respect to accounts 
     therein, have been of particular value in proceedings 
     described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(2) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this section to 
     require the maintenance of appropriate types of records by 
     insured depository institutions in the United States where 
     such records have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, 
     tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, recognizes 
     that, given the threat posed to the security of the Nation on 
     and after the terrorist attacks against the United States on 
     September 11, 2001, such records may also have a high degree 
     of usefulness in the conduct of intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities, including analysis, to 
     protect against international terrorism.''.
       (e) Amendment Relating to the Purposes of the Bank Secrecy 
     Act.--Section 123(a) of Public Law 91-508 (12 U.S.C. 1953(a)) 
     is amended to read as follows:
       ``(a) Regulations.--If the Secretary determines that the 
     maintenance of appropriate records and procedures by any 
     uninsured bank or uninsured institution, or any person 
     engaging in the business of carrying on in the United States 
     any of the functions referred to in subsection (b), has a 
     high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory 
     investigations or proceedings, and that, given the threat 
     posed to the security of the Nation on and after the 
     terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 
     2001, such records may also have a high degree of usefulness 
     in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence 
     activities, including analysis, to protect against 
     international terrorism, he may by regulation require such 
     bank, institution, or person.''.
       (f) Amendments to the Right to Financial Privacy Act.--The 
     Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 is amended--
       (1) in section 1112(a) (12 U.S.C. 3412(a)), by inserting 
     ``, or intelligence or counterintelligence activity, 
     investigation or analysis related to international 
     terrorism'' after ``legitimate law enforcement inquiry''; and
       (2) in section 1114(a)(1) (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(1))--
       (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; or''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(C) a Government authority authorized to conduct 
     investigations of, or intelligence or counterintelligence 
     analyses related to, international terrorism for the purpose 
     of conducting such investigations or analyses.''.
       (g) Amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.--The Fair 
     Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new section:

[[Page 19566]]



     ``SEC. 626. DISCLOSURES TO GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES FOR 
                   COUNTERTERRORISM PURPOSES.

       ``(a) Disclosure.--Notwithstanding section 604 or any other 
     provision of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall 
     furnish a consumer report of a consumer and all other 
     information in a consumer's file to a government agency 
     authorized to conduct investigations of, or intelligence or 
     counterintelligence activities or analysis related to, 
     international terrorism when presented with a written 
     certification by such government agency that such information 
     is necessary for the agency's conduct or such investigation, 
     activity or analysis.
       ``(b)  Form of Certification.--The certification described 
     in subsection (a) shall be signed by the Secretary of the 
     Treasury.
       ``(c) Confidentiality.--No consumer reporting agency, or 
     officer, employee, or agent of such consumer reporting 
     agency, shall disclose to any person, or specify in any 
     consumer report, that a government agency has sought or 
     obtained access to information under subsection (a).
       ``(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in section 625 shall 
     be construed to limit the authority of the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation under this section.
       ``(e) Safe Harbor.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this subchapter, any consumer reporting agency or agent or 
     employee thereof making disclosure of consumer reports or 
     other information pursuant to this section in good-faith 
     reliance upon a certification of a governmental agency 
     pursuant to the provisions of this section shall not be 
     liable to any person for such disclosure under this 
     subchapter, the constitution of any State, or any law or 
     regulation of any State or any political subdivision of any 
     State.''.

     SEC. 341. REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITIES BY HAWALA AND 
                   OTHER UNDERGROUND BANKING SYSTEMS.

       (a) Definition for Subchapter.--Section 5312(a)(2)(R) of 
     title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(R) a licensed sender of money or any other person who 
     engages as a business in the transmission of funds, including 
     through an informal value transfer banking system or network 
     of people facilitating the transfer of value domestically or 
     internationally outside of the conventional financial 
     institutions system;''.
       (b) Money Transmitting Business.--Section 5330(d)(1)(A) of 
     title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting before 
     the semicolon the following: ``or any other person who 
     engages as a business in the transmission of funds, including 
     through an informal value transfer banking system or network 
     of people facilitating the transfer of value domestically or 
     internationally outside of the conventional financial 
     institutions system;''.
       (d) Applicability of Rules.--Section 5318 of title 31, 
     United States Code, as amended by this title, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(l) Applicability of Rules.--Any rules promulgated 
     pursuant to the authority contained in section 21 of the 
     Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1829b) shall apply, 
     in addition to any other financial institution to which such 
     rules apply, to any person that engages as a business in the 
     transmission of funds, including through an informal value 
     transfer banking system or network of people facilitating the 
     transfer of value domestically or internationally outside of 
     the conventional financial institutions system.''.
       (e) Report.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
     report to Congress on the need for any additional legislation 
     relating to informal value transfer banking systems or 
     networks of people facilitating the transfer of value 
     domestically or internationally outside of the conventional 
     financial institutions system, counter money laundering and 
     regulatory controls relating to underground money movement 
     and banking systems, such as the system referred to as 
     `hawala', including whether the threshold for the filing of 
     suspicious activity reports under section 5318(g) of title 
     31, United States Code should be lowered in the case of such 
     systems.

     SEC. 342. USE OF AUTHORITY OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE 
                   DIRECTORS.

       (a) Action by the President.--If the President determines 
     that a particular foreign country has taken or has committed 
     to take actions that contribute to efforts of the United 
     States to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international 
     terrorism, the Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with 
     other applicable provisions of law, instruct the United 
     States Executive Director of each international financial 
     institution to use the voice and vote of the Executive 
     Director to support any loan or other utilization of the 
     funds of respective institutions for such country, or any 
     public or private entity within such country.
       (b) Use of Voice and Vote.--The Secretary of the Treasury 
     may instruct the United States Executive Director of each 
     international financial institution to aggressively use the 
     voice and vote of the Executive Director to require an 
     auditing of disbursements at such institutions to ensure that 
     no funds are paid to persons who commit, threaten to commit, 
     or support terrorism.
       (c) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``international financial institution'' means an institution 
     described in section 1701(c)(2) of the International 
     Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)(2)).

                      Subtitle C--Currency Crimes

     SEC. 351. BULK CASH SMUGGLING.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) effective enforcement of the currency reporting 
     requirements of chapter 53 of title 31, United States Code 
     (commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act), and the 
     regulations promulgated thereunder, has forced drug dealers 
     and other criminals engaged in cash-based businesses to avoid 
     using traditional financial institutions;
       (2) in their effort to avoid using traditional financial 
     institutions, drug dealers, and other criminals are forced to 
     move large quantities of currency in bulk form to and through 
     the airports, border crossings, and other ports of entry 
     where it can be smuggled out of the United States and placed 
     in a foreign financial institution or sold on the black 
     market;
       (3) the transportation and smuggling of cash in bulk form 
     may, at the time of enactment of this Act, be the most common 
     form of money laundering, and the movement of large sums of 
     cash is one of the most reliable warning signs of drug 
     trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, racketeering, tax 
     evasion, and similar crimes;
       (4) the intentional transportation into or out of the 
     United States of large amounts of currency or monetary 
     instruments, in a manner designed to circumvent the mandatory 
     reporting provisions of chapter 53 of title 31, United States 
     Code, is the equivalent of, and creates the same harm as, the 
     smuggling of goods;
       (5) the arrest and prosecution of bulk cash smugglers is an 
     important part of law enforcement's effort to stop the 
     laundering of criminal proceeds, but the couriers who attempt 
     to smuggle the cash out of the United States are typically 
     low-level employees of large criminal organizations, and are 
     easily replaced, and therefore only the confiscation of the 
     smuggled bulk cash can effectively break the cycle of 
     criminal activity of which the laundering of bulk cash is a 
     critical part;
       (6) the penalties for violations of the currency reporting 
     requirements of the chapter 53 of title 31, United States 
     Code, are insufficient to provide a deterrent to the 
     laundering of criminal proceeds;
       (7) because the only criminal violation under Federal law 
     before the date of enactment of this Act was a reporting 
     offense, the law does not adequately provide for the 
     confiscation of smuggled currency; and
       (8) if the smuggling of bulk cash were itself an offense, 
     the cash could be confiscated as the corpus delicti of the 
     smuggling offense.
       (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this section are--
       (1) to make the act of smuggling bulk cash itself a 
     criminal offense;
       (2) to authorize forfeiture of any cash or instruments of 
     the smuggling offense;
       (3) to emphasize the seriousness of the act of bulk cash 
     smuggling; and
       (4) to prescribe guidelines for determining the amount of 
     property subject to such forfeiture in various situations.
       (c) Bulk Cash Smuggling Offense.--
       (1) In general.--Subchapter II of chapter 53 of title 31, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``Sec. 5331. Bulk cash smuggling

       ``(a) Criminal Offense.--
       ``(1) In general.--Whoever, with the intent to evade a 
     currency reporting requirement under section 5316, knowingly 
     conceals more than $10,000 in currency or other monetary 
     instruments on his or her person or in any conveyance, 
     article of luggage, merchandise, or other container, and 
     transports or transfers or attempts to transport or transfer 
     the currency or monetary instruments from a place within the 
     United States to a place outside of the United States, or 
     from a place outside of the United States to a place within 
     the United States, shall be guilty of a currency smuggling 
     offense and subject to punishment under subsection (b).
       ``(b) Penalties.--
       ``(1) Prison term.--A person convicted of a currency 
     smuggling offense under subsection (a), or a conspiracy to 
     commit such an offense, shall be imprisoned for not more than 
     5 years.
       ``(2) Forfeiture.--
       ``(A) In general.--In addition to a prison term under 
     paragraph (1), the court, in imposing sentence, shall order 
     that the defendant forfeit to the United States any property, 
     real or personal, involved in the offense, and any property 
     traceable to such property, subject to subsection (d).
       ``(B) Applicability of other laws.--The seizure, restraint, 
     and forfeiture of property under this section shall be 
     governed by section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
     U.S.C. 853). If the property subject to forfeiture is 
     unavailable, and the defendant has no substitute property 
     that may be forfeited pursuant to section 413(p) of that Act, 
     the court shall enter a personal money judgment against the 
     defendant in an amount equal to the value of the unavailable 
     property.
       ``(c) Seizure of Smuggling Cash.--
       ``(1) In general.--Any property involved in a violation of 
     subsection (a), or a conspiracy to commit such violation, and 
     any property traceable thereto, may be seized and, subject

[[Page 19567]]

     to subsection (d), forfeited to the United States.
       ``(2) Applicable procedures.--A seizure and forfeiture 
     under this subsection shall be governed by the procedures 
     governing civil forfeitures under section 981(a)(1)(A) of 
     title 18, United States Code.
       ``(d) Proportionality of Forfeiture.--
       ``(1) Mitigation.--Upon a showing by the property owner by 
     a preponderance of the evidence that the currency or monetary 
     instruments involved in the offense giving rise to the 
     forfeiture were derived from a legitimate source and were 
     intended for a lawful purpose, the court shall reduce the 
     forfeiture to the maximum amount that is not grossly 
     disproportional to the gravity of the offense.
       ``(2) Considerations.--In determining the amount of the 
     forfeiture under paragraph (1), the court shall consider all 
     aggravating and mitigating facts and circumstances that have 
     a bearing on the gravity of the offense, including--
       ``(A) the value of the currency or other monetary 
     instruments involved in the offense;
       ``(B) efforts by the person committing the offense to 
     structure currency transactions, conceal property, or 
     otherwise obstruct justice; and
       ``(C) whether the offense is part of a pattern of repeated 
     violations of Federal law.
       ``(e) Rule of Construction.--For purposes of subsections 
     (b) and (c), any currency or other monetary instrument that 
     is concealed or intended to be concealed in violation of 
     subsection (a) or a conspiracy to commit such violation, any 
     article, container, or conveyance used or intended to be used 
     to conceal or transport the currency or other monetary 
     instrument, and any other property used or intended to be 
     used to facilitate the offense, shall be considered property 
     involved in the offense.''.
       (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 
     53 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item relating to section 5330 the following new 
     item:

``5331. Bulk cash smuggling.''.
       (d) Currency Reporting Violations.--Section 5317(c) of 
     title 31, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(c) Forfeiture of Property.--
       ``(1) In general.--
       ``(A) Criminal forfeiture.--The court, in imposing sentence 
     for any violation of section 5313, 5316, or 5324, or any 
     conspiracy to commit such violation, shall order the 
     defendant to forfeit all property, real or personal, involved 
     in the offense and any property traceable thereto.
       ``(B) Applicable procedures.--Forfeitures under this 
     paragraph shall be governed by the procedures set forth in 
     section 413 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853), 
     and the guidelines set forth in paragraph (3) of this 
     subsection.
       ``(2) Civil forfeiture.--Any property involved in a 
     violation of section 5313, 5316, or 5324, or any conspiracy 
     to commit such violation, and any property traceable thereto, 
     may be seized and, subject to paragraph (3), forfeited to the 
     United States in accordance with the procedures governing 
     civil forfeitures in money laundering cases pursuant to 
     section 981(a)(1)(A) of title 18, United States Code.
       ``(3) Mitigation.--In a forfeiture case under this 
     subsection, upon a showing by the property owner by a 
     preponderance of the evidence that any currency or monetary 
     instruments involved in the offense giving rise to the 
     forfeiture were derived from a legitimate source, and were 
     intended for a lawful purpose, the court shall reduce the 
     forfeiture to the maximum amount that is not grossly 
     disproportional to the gravity of the offense. In determining 
     the amount of the forfeiture, the court shall consider all 
     aggravating and mitigating facts and circumstances that have 
     a bearing on the gravity of the offense. Such circumstances 
     include, but are not limited to, the following: the value of 
     the currency or other monetary instruments involved in the 
     offense; efforts by the person committing the offense to 
     structure currency transactions, conceal property, or 
     otherwise obstruct justice; and whether the offense is part 
     of a pattern of repeated violations.
       (e) Conforming Amendments.--Title 18, United States Code, 
     is amended--
       (1) in section 981(a)(1)(A) by striking ``of section 
     5313(a) or 5324(a) of title 31, or''; and
       (2) in section 982(a)(1), striking ``of section 5313(a), 
     5316, or 5324 of title 31, or''.

                  Subtitle E--Anticorruption Measures

     SEC. 361. CORRUPTION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND RULING 
                   ELITES.

       It is the sense of Congress that, in deliberations between 
     the United States Government and any other country on money 
     laundering and corruption issues, the United States 
     Government should--
       (1) emphasize an approach that addresses not only the 
     laundering of the proceeds of traditional criminal activity 
     but also the increasingly endemic problem of governmental 
     corruption and the corruption of ruling elites;
       (2) encourage the enactment and enforcement of laws in such 
     country to prevent money laundering and systemic corruption;
       (3) make clear that the United States will take all steps 
     necessary to identify the proceeds of foreign government 
     corruption which have been deposited in United States 
     financial institutions and return such proceeds to the 
     citizens of the country to whom such assets belong; and
       (4) advance policies and measures to promote good 
     government and to prevent and reduce corruption and money 
     laundering, including through instructions to the United 
     States Executive Director of each international financial 
     institution (as defined in section 1701(c) of the 
     International Financial Institutions Act) to advocate such 
     policies as a systematic element of economic reform programs 
     and advice to member governments.

     SEC. 362. SUPPORT FOR THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON 
                   MONEY LAUNDERING.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the United States should continue to actively and 
     publicly support the objectives of the Financial Action Task 
     Force on Money Laundering (hereafter in this section referred 
     to as the ``FATF'') with regard to combating international 
     money laundering;
       (2) the FATF should identify noncooperative jurisdictions 
     in as expeditious a manner as possible and publicly release a 
     list directly naming those jurisdictions identified;
       (3) the United States should support the public release of 
     the list naming noncooperative jurisdictions identified by 
     the FATF;
       (4) the United States should encourage the adoption of the 
     necessary international action to encourage compliance by the 
     identified noncooperative jurisdictions; and
       (5) the United States should take the necessary 
     countermeasures to protect the United States economy against 
     money of unlawful origin and encourage other nations to do 
     the same.

     SEC. 363. TERRORIST FUNDING THROUGH MONEY LAUNDERING.

       It is the sense of the Congress that, in deliberations and 
     negotiations between the United States Government and any 
     other country regarding financial, economic, assistance, or 
     defense issues, the United States should encourage such other 
     country--
       (1) to take actions which would identify and prevent the 
     transmittal of funds to and from terrorists and terrorist 
     organizations; and
       (2) to engage in bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
     with the United States and other countries to identify 
     suspected terrorists, terrorist organizations, and persons 
     supplying funds to and receiving funds from terrorists and 
     terrorist organizations.

                    TITLE IV--PROTECTING THE BORDER

               Subtitle A--Protecting the Northern Border

     SEC. 401. ENSURING ADEQUATE PERSONNEL ON THE NORTHERN BORDER.

       The Attorney General is authorized to waive any FTE cap on 
     personnel assigned to the Immigration and Naturalization 
     Service to address the national security needs of the United 
     States on the Northern border.

     SEC. 402. NORTHERN BORDER PERSONNEL.

       There are authorized to be appropriated--
       (1) such sums as may be necessary to triple the number of 
     Border Patrol personnel (from the number authorized under 
     current law), and the necessary personnel and facilities to 
     support such personnel, in each State along the Northern 
     Border;
       (2) such sums as may be necessary to triple the number of 
     Customs Service personnel (from the number authorized under 
     current law), and the necessary personnel and facilities to 
     support such personnel, at ports of entry in each State along 
     the Northern Border;
       (3) such sums as may be necessary to triple the number of 
     INS inspectors (from the number authorized on the date of 
     enactment of this Act), and the necessary personnel and 
     facilities to support such personnel, at ports of entry in 
     each State along the Northern Border; and
       (4) an additional $50,000,000 each to the Immigration and 
     Naturalization Service and the United States Customs Service 
     for purposes of making improvements in technology for 
     monitoring the Northern Border and acquiring additional 
     equipment at the Northern Border.

     SEC. 403. ACCESS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE INS TO 
                   CERTAIN IDENTIFYING INFORMATION IN THE CRIMINAL 
                   HISTORY RECORDS OF VISA APPLICANTS AND 
                   APPLICANTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) Amendment of the Immigration and Nationality Act.--
     Section 105 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1105) is amended--
       (1) in the section heading, by inserting ``; data 
     exchange'' after ``security officers'';
       (2) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``Sec. 105.'';
       (3) in subsection (a), by inserting ``and border'' after 
     ``internal'' the second place it appears; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b)(1) The Attorney General and the Director of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide the Department 
     of State and the Service access to the criminal history 
     record information contained in the National Crime 
     Information Center's Interstate Identification Index (NCIC-
     III), Wanted Persons File, and to any other files maintained 
     by the National Crime Information Center that

[[Page 19568]]

     may be mutually agreed upon by the Attorney General and the 
     agency receiving the access, for the purpose of determining 
     whether or not a visa applicant or applicant for admission 
     has a criminal history record indexed in any such file.
       ``(2) Such access shall be provided by means of extracts of 
     the records for placement in the automated visa lookout or 
     other appropriate database, and shall be provided without any 
     fee or charge.
       ``(3) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall provide 
     periodic updates of the extracts at intervals mutually agreed 
     upon with the agency receiving the access. Upon receipt of 
     such updated extracts, the receiving agency shall make 
     corresponding updates to its database and destroy previously 
     provided extracts.
       ``(4) Access to an extract does not entitle the Department 
     of State to obtain the full content of the corresponding 
     automated criminal history record. To obtain the full content 
     of a criminal history record, the Department of State shall 
     submit the applicant's fingerprints and any appropriate 
     fingerprint processing fee authorized by law to the Criminal 
     Justice Information Services Division of the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation.
       ``(c) The provision of the extracts described in subsection 
     (b) may be reconsidered by the Attorney General and the 
     receiving agency upon the development and deployment of a 
     more cost-effective and efficient means of sharing the 
     information.
       ``(d) For purposes of administering this section, the 
     Department of State shall, prior to receiving access to NCIC 
     data but not later than 4 months after the date of enactment 
     of this subsection, promulgate final regulations--
       ``(1) to implement procedures for the taking of 
     fingerprints; and
       ``(2) to establish the conditions for the use of the 
     information received from the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, in order--
       ``(A) to limit the redissemination of such information;
       ``(B) to ensure that such information is used solely to 
     determine whether or not to issue a visa to an alien or to 
     admit an alien to the United States;
       ``(C) to ensure the security, confidentiality, and 
     destruction of such information; and
       ``(D) to protect any privacy rights of individuals who are 
     subjects of such information.''.
       (b) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 2 years after 
     the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General and 
     the Secretary of State jointly shall report to Congress on 
     the implementation of the amendments made by this section.
       (c) Technology Standard to Confirm Identity.--
       (1) In General.--The Attorney General and the Secretary of 
     State jointly, through the National Institute of Standards 
     and Technology (NIST), and in consultation with the Secretary 
     of the Treasury and other Federal law enforcement and 
     intelligence agencies the Attorney General or Secretary of 
     State deems appropriate, shall within 2 years after the date 
     of enactment of this section, develop and certify a 
     technology standard that can confirm the identity of a person 
     applying for a United States visa or such person seeking to 
     enter the United States pursuant to a visa.
       (2) Integrated.--The technology standard developed pursuant 
     to paragraph (1), shall be the technological basis for a 
     cross-agency, cross-platform electronic system that is a 
     cost-effective, efficient, fully integrated means to share 
     law enforcement and intelligence information necessary to 
     confirm the identity of such persons applying for a United 
     States visa or such person seeking to enter the United States 
     pursuant to a visa.
       (3) Accessible.--The electronic system described in 
     paragraph (2), once implemented, shall be readily and easily 
     accessible to--
       (A) all consular officers responsible for the issuance of 
     visas;
       (B) all Federal inspection agents at all United States 
     border inspection points; and
       (C) all law enforcement and intelligence officers as 
     determined by regulation to be responsible for investigation 
     or identification of aliens admitted to the United States 
     pursuant to a visa.
       (4) Report.--Not later than 18 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and every 2 years thereafter, the 
     Attorney General and the Secretary of State shall jointly, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Treasury, report to 
     Congress describing the development, implementation and 
     efficacy of the technology standard and electronic database 
     system described in this subsection.
       (d) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section, or in 
     any other law, shall be construed to limit the authority of 
     the Attorney General or the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation to provide access to the criminal history 
     record information contained in the National Crime 
     Information Center's (NCIC) Interstate Identification Index 
     (NCIC-III), or to any other information maintained by the 
     NCIC, to any Federal agency or officer authorized to enforce 
     or administer the immigration laws of the United States, for 
     the purpose of such enforcement or administration, upon terms 
     that are consistent with the National Crime Prevention and 
     Privacy Compact Act of 1998 (subtitle A of title II of Public 
     Law 105-251; 42 U.S.C. 14611-16) and section 552a of title 5, 
     United States Code.

     SEC. 404. LIMITED AUTHORITY TO PAY OVERTIME.

       The matter under the headings ``Immigration And 
     Naturalization Service: Salaries and Expenses, Enforcement 
     And Border Affairs'' and ``Immigration And Naturalization 
     Service: Salaries and Expenses, Citizenship And Benefits, 
     Immigration And Program Direction'' in the Department of 
     Justice Appropriations Act, 2001 (as enacted into law by 
     Appendix B (H.R. 5548) of Public Law 106-553 (114 Stat. 
     2762A-58 to 2762A-59)) is amended by striking the following 
     each place it occurs: ``Provided, That none of the funds 
     available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service shall 
     be available to pay any employee overtime pay in an amount in 
     excess of $30,000 during the calendar year beginning January 
     1, 2001:''.

     SEC. 405. REPORT ON THE INTEGRATED AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT 
                   IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM FOR POINTS OF ENTRY AND 
                   OVERSEAS CONSULAR POSTS.

       (a) In General.--The Attorney General, in consultation with 
     the appropriate heads of other Federal agencies, including 
     the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and the 
     Secretary of Transportation, shall report to Congress on the 
     feasibility of enhancing the Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
     Identification System (IAFIS) of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation and other identification systems in order to 
     better identify a person who holds a foreign passport or a 
     visa and may be wanted in connection with a criminal 
     investigation in the United States or abroad, before the 
     issuance of a visa to that person or the entry or exit by 
     that person from the United States.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated not less than $2,000,000 to carry out this 
     section.

              Subtitle B--Enhanced Immigration Provisions

     SEC. 411. DEFINITIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM.

       (a) Grounds of Inadmissibility.--Section 212(a)(3) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (B)--
       (A) in clause (i)--
       (i) by amending subclause (IV) to read as follows:

       ``(IV) is a representative (as defined in clause (v)) of--

       ``(aa) a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by 
     the Secretary of State under section 219, or
       ``(bb) a political, social or other similar group whose 
     public endorsement of acts of terrorist activity the 
     Secretary of State has determined undermines United States 
     efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities,'';
       (ii) in subclause (V), by inserting ``or'' after ``section 
     219,''; and
       (iii) by adding at the end the following new subclauses:

       ``(VI) has used the alien's position of prominence within 
     any country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or to 
     persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist 
     organization, in a way that the Secretary of State has 
     determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or 
     eliminate terrorist activities, or
       ``(VII) is the spouse or child of an alien who is 
     inadmissible under this section, if the activity causing the 
     alien to be found inadmissible occurred within the last 5 
     years,'';

       (B) by redesignating clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) as 
     clauses (iii), (iv), and (v), respectively;
       (C) in clause (i)(II), by striking ``clause (iii)'' and 
     inserting ``clause (iv)'';
       (D) by inserting after clause (i) the following:
       ``(ii) Exception.--Subclause (VII) of clause (i) does not 
     apply to a spouse or child--

       ``(I) who did not know or should not reasonably have known 
     of the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible 
     under this section; or
       ``(II) whom the consular officer or Attorney General has 
     reasonable grounds to believe has renounced the activity 
     causing the alien to be found inadmissible under this 
     section.'';

       (E) in clause (iii) (as redesignated by subparagraph (B))--
       (i) by inserting ``it had been'' before ``committed in the 
     United States''; and
       (ii) in subclause (V)(b), by striking ``or firearm'' and 
     inserting ``, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device'';
       (F) by amending clause (iv) (as redesignated by 
     subparagraph (B)) to read as follows:
       ``(iv) Engage in terrorist activity defined.--As used in 
     this chapter, the term `engage in terrorist activity' means, 
     in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization--

       ``(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances 
     indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily 
     injury, a terrorist activity;
       ``(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
       ``(III) to gather information on potential targets for 
     terrorist activity;
       ``(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for--

       ``(aa) a terrorist activity;

[[Page 19569]]

       ``(bb) a terrorist organization described in clauses 
     (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
       ``(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause 
     (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did 
     not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the 
     solicitation would further the organization's terrorist 
     activity;

       ``(V) to solicit any individual--

       ``(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this 
     clause;
       ``(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described 
     in clauses (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
       ``(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described 
     in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate 
     that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, 
     that the solicitation would further the organization's 
     terrorist activity; or

       ``(VI) to commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably 
     should know, affords material support, including a safe 
     house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of 
     funds or other material financial benefit, false 
     documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, 
     biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or 
     training--

       ``(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
       ``(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably 
     should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist 
     activity;
       ``(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clauses 
     (vi)(I) or (vi)(II); or
       ``(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause 
     (vi)(III), unless the actor can demonstrate that he did not 
     know, and should not reasonably have known, that the act 
     would further the organization's terrorist activity.


     This clause shall not apply to any material support the alien 
     afforded to an organization or individual that has committed 
     terrorist activity, if the Secretary of State, after 
     consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney 
     General, after consultation with the Secretary of State, 
     concludes in his sole unreviewable discretion, that this 
     clause should not apply.''; and

       (D) by adding at the end the following new clause:
       ``(vi) Terrorist organization defined.--As used in clause 
     (i)(VI) and clause (iv), the term `terrorist organization' 
     means an organization--

       ``(I) designated under section 219;
       ``(II) otherwise designated, upon publication in the 
     Federal Register, by the Secretary of State in consultation 
     with or upon the request of the Attorney General, as a 
     terrorist organization, after finding that it engages in the 
     activities described in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of 
     clause (iv), or that it provides material support to further 
     terrorist activity; or
       ``(III) that is a group of two or more individuals, whether 
     organized or not, which engages in the activities described 
     in subclause (I), (II), or (III) of clause (iv).''; and

       (2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(F) Association with terrorist organizations.--Any alien 
     who the Secretary of State, after consultation with the 
     Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after consultation 
     with the Secretary of State, determines has been associated 
     with a terrorist organization and intends while in the United 
     States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in 
     activities that could endanger the welfare, safety, or 
     security of the United States is inadmissible.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 237(a)(4)(B) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(B)) is 
     amended by striking ``section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)'' and 
     inserting ``section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)''.
       (c) Retroactive Application of Amendments.--
       (1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this 
     subsection, the amendments made by this section shall take 
     effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply 
     to--
       (A) actions taken by an alien before, on, or after such 
     date; and
       (B) all aliens, without regard to the date of entry or 
     attempted entry into the United States--
       (i) in removal proceedings on or after such date (except 
     for proceedings in which there has been a final 
     administrative decision before such date); or
       (ii) seeking admission to the United States on or after 
     such date.
       (2) Special rule for aliens in exclusion or deportation 
     proceedings.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     amendments made by this section shall apply to all aliens in 
     exclusion or deportation proceedings on or after the date of 
     enactment of this Act (except for proceedings in which there 
     has been a final administrative decision before such date) as 
     if such proceedings were removal proceedings.
       (3) Special rule for section 219 organizations and 
     organizations designated under section 
     212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II).--
       (A) In general.--Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), no 
     alien shall be considered inadmissible under section 
     212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1182(a)(3)), or deportable under section 237(a)(4)(B) of such 
     Act (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4)(B)), by reason of the amendments 
     made by subsection (a), on the ground that the alien engaged 
     in a terrorist activity described in subclause (IV)(bb), 
     (V)(bb), or (VI)(cc) of section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of such Act 
     (as so amended) with respect to a group at any time when the 
     group was not a terrorist organization designated by the 
     Secretary of State under section 219 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1189) or otherwise designated under section 
     212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II).
       (B) Statutory construction.--Subparagraph (A) shall not be 
     construed to prevent an alien from being considered 
     inadmissible or deportable for having engaged in a terrorist 
     activity--
       (i) described in subclause (IV)(bb), (V)(bb), or (VI)(cc) 
     of section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of such Act (as so amended) with 
     respect to a terrorist organization at any time when such 
     organization was designated by the Secretary of State under 
     section 219 of such Act or otherwise designated under section 
     212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(II); or
       (ii) described in subclause (IV)(cc), (V)(cc), or (VI)(dd) 
     of section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) of such Act (as so amended) with 
     respect to a terrorist organization described in section 
     212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
       (4) Exception.--The Secretary of State, in consultation 
     with the Attorney General, may determine that the amendments 
     made by this section shall not apply with respect to actions 
     by an alien taken outside the United States before the date 
     of enactment of this Act upon the recommendation of a 
     consular officer who has concluded that there is not 
     reasonable ground to believe that the alien knew or 
     reasonably should have known that the actions would further a 
     terrorist activity.
       (c) Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.--
     Section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1189(a)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(B), by inserting ``or terrorism (as 
     defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
     Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 
     2656f(d)(2)) or retains the capability and intent to engage 
     in terrorist activity or terrorism)'' after 
     ``212(a)(3)(B))'';
       (2) in paragraph (1)(C), by inserting ``or terrorism'' 
     after ``terrorist activity'';
       (3) by amending paragraph (2)(A) to read as follows:
       ``(A) Notice.--
       ``(i) To congressional leaders.--Seven days before making a 
     designation under this subsection, the Secretary shall, by 
     classified communication, notify the Speaker and Minority 
     Leader of the House of Representatives, the President pro 
     tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the Senate, 
     and the members of the relevant committees, in writing, of 
     the intent to designate an organization under this 
     subsection, together with the findings made under paragraph 
     (1) with respect to that organization, and the factual basis 
     therefor.
       ``(ii) Publication in federal register.--The Secretary 
     shall publish the designation in the Federal Register seven 
     days after providing the notification under clause (i).'';
       (4) in paragraph (2)(B)(i), by striking ``subparagraph 
     (A)'' and inserting ``subparagraph (A)(ii)'';
       (5) in paragraph (2)(C), by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and 
     inserting ``paragraph (2)(A)(i)'';
       (6) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection (c)'' and 
     inserting ``subsection (b)'';
       (7) in paragraph (4)(B), by inserting after the first 
     sentence the following: ``The Secretary also may redesignate 
     such organization at the end of any 2-year redesignation 
     period (but not sooner than 60 days prior to the termination 
     of such period) for an additional 2-year period upon a 
     finding that the relevant circumstances described in 
     paragraph (1) still exist. Any redesignation shall be 
     effective immediately following the end of the prior 2-year 
     designation or redesignation period unless a different 
     effective date is provided in such redesignation.'';
       (8) in paragraph (6)(A)--
       (A) by inserting ``or a redesignation made under paragraph 
     (4)(B)'' after ``paragraph (1)'';
       (B) in clause (i)--
       (i) by inserting ``or redesignation'' after ``designation'' 
     the first place it appears; and
       (ii) by striking ``of the designation''; and
       (C) in clause (ii), by striking ``of the designation'';
       (9) in paragraph (6)(B)--
       (A) by striking ``through (4)'' and inserting ``and (3)''; 
     and
       (B) by inserting at the end the following new sentence: 
     ``Any revocation shall take effect on the date specified in 
     the revocation or upon publication in the Federal Register if 
     no effective date is specified.'';
       (10) in paragraph (7), by inserting ``, or the revocation 
     of a redesignation under paragraph (6),'' after ``paragraph 
     (5) or (6)''; and
       (11) in paragraph (8)--
       (A) by striking ``paragraph (1)(B)'' and inserting 
     ``paragraph (2)(B), or if a redesignation under this 
     subsection has become effective under paragraph (4)(B)'';
       (B) by inserting ``or an alien in a removal proceeding'' 
     after ``criminal action''; and
       (C) by inserting ``or redesignation'' before ``as a 
     defense''.

[[Page 19570]]



     SEC. 412. MANDATORY DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS; HABEAS 
                   CORPUS; JUDICIAL REVIEW.

       (a) In General.--The Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     236 the following:


      ``MANDATORY DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS; HABEAS CORPUS; 
                            JUDICIAL REVIEW

       ``Sec. 236A. (a) Detention of Terrorist Aliens.--
       ``(1) Custody.--The Attorney General shall take into 
     custody any alien who is certified under paragraph (3).
       ``(2) Release.--Except as provided in paragraph (5), the 
     Attorney General shall maintain custody of such an alien 
     until the alien is removed from the United States. Such 
     custody shall be maintained irrespective of any relief from 
     removal for which the alien may be eligible, or any relief 
     from removal granted the alien, until the Attorney General 
     determines that the alien is no longer an alien who may be 
     certified under paragraph (3).
       ``(3) Certification.--The Attorney General may certify an 
     alien under this paragraph if the Attorney General has 
     reasonable grounds to believe that the alien--
       ``(A) is described in section 212(a)(3)(A)(i), 
     212(a)(3)(A)(iii), 212(a)(3)(B), 237(a)(4)(A)(i), 
     237(a)(4)(A)(iii), or 237(a)(4)(B); or
       ``(B) is engaged in any other activity that endangers the 
     national security of the United States.
       ``(4) Nondelegation.--The Attorney General may delegate the 
     authority provided under paragraph (3) only to the 
     Commissioner. The Commissioner may not delegate such 
     authority.
       ``(5) Commencement of proceedings.--The Attorney General 
     shall place an alien detained under paragraph (1) in removal 
     proceedings, or shall charge the alien with a criminal 
     offense, not later than 7 days after the commencement of such 
     detention. If the requirement of the preceding sentence is 
     not satisfied, the Attorney General shall release the alien.
       ``(b) Habeas Corpus and Judicial Review.--Judicial review 
     of any action or decision relating to this section (including 
     judicial review of the merits of a determination made under 
     subsection (a)(3)) is available exclusively in habeas corpus 
     proceedings in the United States District Court for the 
     District of Columbia. Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, 
     except as provided in the preceding sentence, no court shall 
     have jurisdiction to review, by habeas corpus petition or 
     otherwise, any such action or decision.
       ``(c) Statutory Construction.--The provisions of this 
     section shall not be applicable to any other provisions of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 236 the following:

``Sec. 236A. Mandatory detention of suspected terrorist; habeas corpus; 
              judicial review.''.
       (c) Reports.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, and every 6 months thereafter, the 
     Attorney General shall submit a report to the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, with respect to the 
     reporting period, on--
       (1) the number of aliens certified under section 236A(a)(3) 
     of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as added by 
     subsection (a);
       (2) the grounds for such certifications;
       (3) the nationalities of the aliens so certified;
       (4) the length of the detention for each alien so 
     certified; and
       (5) the number of aliens so certified who--
       (A) were granted any form of relief from removal;
       (B) were removed;
       (C) the Attorney General has determined are no longer 
     aliens who may be so certified; or
       (D) were released from detention.

     SEC. 413. MULTILATERAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISTS.

       Section 222(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
     U.S.C. 1202(f)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``except that in the discretion of'' and 
     inserting the following: ``except that--
       ``(1) in the discretion of''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2) the Secretary of State, in the Secretary's discretion 
     and on the basis of reciprocity, may provide to a foreign 
     government information in the Department of State's 
     computerized visa lookout database and, when necessary and 
     appropriate, other records covered by this section related to 
     information in the database--
       ``(A) with regard to individual aliens, at any time on a 
     case-by-case basis for the purpose of preventing, 
     investigating, or punishing acts that would constitute a 
     crime in the United States, including, but not limited to, 
     terrorism or trafficking in controlled substances, persons, 
     or illicit weapons; or
       ``(B) with regard to any or all aliens in the database, 
     pursuant to such conditions as the Secretary of State shall 
     establish in an agreement with the foreign government in 
     which that government agrees to use such information and 
     records for the purposes described in subparagraph (A) or to 
     deny visas to persons who would be inadmissible to the United 
     States.''.

         TITLE V--REMOVING OBSTACLES TO INVESTIGATING TERRORISM

     SEC. 501. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR GOVERNMENT ATTORNEYS ACT 
                   OF 2001.

       (a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the 
     ``Professional Standards for Government Attorneys Act of 
     2001''.
       (b) Professional Standards for Government Attorneys.--
     Section 530B of title 28, United States Code, is amended to 
     read as follows:

     ``Sec. 530B. Professional Standards for Government Attorneys

       ``(a) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) Government attorney.--The term `Government 
     attorney'--
       ``(A) means the Attorney General; the Deputy Attorney 
     General; the Solicitor General; the Associate Attorney 
     General; the head of, and any attorney employed in, any 
     division, office, board, bureau, component, or agency of the 
     Department of Justice; any United States Attorney; any 
     Assistant United States Attorney; any Special Assistant to 
     the Attorney General or Special Attorney appointed under 
     section 515; any Special Assistant United States Attorney 
     appointed under section 543 who is authorized to conduct 
     criminal or civil law enforcement investigations or 
     proceedings on behalf of the United States; any other 
     attorney employed by the Department of Justice who is 
     authorized to conduct criminal or civil law enforcement 
     proceedings on behalf of the United States; any independent 
     counsel, or employee of such counsel, appointed under chapter 
     40; and any outside special counsel, or employee of such 
     counsel, as may be duly appointed by the Attorney General; 
     and
       ``(B) does not include any attorney employed as an 
     investigator or other law enforcement agent by the Department 
     of Justice who is not authorized to represent the United 
     States in criminal or civil law enforcement litigation or to 
     supervise such proceedings.
       ``(2) State.--The term `State' includes a Territory and the 
     District of Columbia.
       ``(b) Choice of Law.--Subject to any uniform national rule 
     prescribed by the Supreme Court under chapter 131, the 
     standards of professional responsibility that apply to a 
     Government attorney with respect to the attorney's work for 
     the Government shall be--
       ``(1) for conduct in connection with a proceeding in or 
     before a court, or conduct reasonably intended to lead to a 
     proceeding in or before a court, the standards of 
     professional responsibility established by the rules and 
     decisions of the court in or before which the proceeding is 
     brought or is intended to be brought;
       ``(2) for conduct in connection with a grand jury 
     proceeding, or conduct reasonably intended to lead to a grand 
     jury proceeding, the standards of professional responsibility 
     established by the rules and decisions of the court under 
     whose authority the grand jury was or will be impaneled; and
       ``(3) for all other conduct, the standards of professional 
     responsibility established by the rules and decisions of the 
     Federal district court for the judicial district in which the 
     attorney principally performs his or her official duties.
       ``(c) Licensure.--A Government attorney (except foreign 
     counsel employed in special cases)--
       ``(1) shall be duly licensed and authorized to practice as 
     an attorney under the laws of a State; and
       ``(2) shall not be required to be a member of the bar of 
     any particular State.
       ``(d) Undercover Activities.--Notwithstanding any provision 
     of State law, including disciplinary rules, statutes, 
     regulations, constitutional provisions, or case law, a 
     Government attorney may, for the purpose of enforcing Federal 
     law, provide legal advice, authorization, concurrence, 
     direction, or supervision on conducting undercover 
     activities, and any attorney employed as an investigator or 
     other law enforcement agent by the Department of Justice who 
     is not authorized to represent the United States in criminal 
     or civil law enforcement litigation or to supervise such 
     proceedings may participate in such activities, even though 
     such activities may require the use of deceit or 
     misrepresentation, where such activities are consistent with 
     Federal law.
       ``(e) Admissibility of Evidence.--No violation of any 
     disciplinary, ethical, or professional conduct rule shall be 
     construed to permit the exclusion of otherwise admissible 
     evidence in any Federal criminal proceedings.
       ``(f) Rulemaking Authority.--The Attorney General shall 
     make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to ensure 
     compliance with this section.''.
       (c) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The analysis for 
     chapter 31 of title 28, United States Code, is amended, in 
     the item relating to section 530B, by striking ``Ethical 
     standards for attorneys for the Government'' and inserting 
     ``Professional standards for Government attorneys''.
       (d) Reports.--
       (1) Uniform rule.--In order to encourage the Supreme Court 
     to prescribe, under chapter 131 of title 28, United States 
     Code, a uniform national rule for Government attorneys

[[Page 19571]]

     with respect to communications with represented persons and 
     parties, not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of 
     this Act, the Judicial Conference of the United States shall 
     submit to the Chief Justice of the United States a report, 
     which shall include recommendations with respect to amending 
     the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure to provide for 
     such a uniform national rule.
       (2) Actual or potential conflicts.--Not later than 2 years 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Judicial 
     Conference of the United States shall submit to the Chairmen 
     and Ranking Members of the Committees on the Judiciary of the 
     House of Representatives and the Senate a report, which shall 
     include--
       (A) a review of any areas of actual or potential conflict 
     between specific Federal duties related to the investigation 
     and prosecution of violations of Federal law and the 
     regulation of Government attorneys (as that term is defined 
     in section 530B of title 28, United States Code, as amended 
     by this Act) by existing standards of professional 
     responsibility; and
       (B) recommendations with respect to amending the Federal 
     Rules of Practice and Procedure to provide for additional 
     rules governing attorney conduct to address any areas of 
     actual or potential conflict identified pursuant to the 
     review under subparagraph (A).
       (3) Report considerations.--In carrying out paragraphs (1) 
     and (2), the Judicial Conference of the United States shall 
     take into consideration--
       (A) the needs and circumstances of multiforum and 
     multijurisdictional litigation;
       (B) the special needs and interests of the United States in 
     investigating and prosecuting violations of Federal criminal 
     and civil law; and
       (C) practices that are approved under Federal statutory or 
     case law or that are otherwise consistent with traditional 
     Federal law enforcement techniques.

     SEC. 502. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S AUTHORITY TO PAY REWARDS TO 
                   COMBAT TERRORISM.

       (a) Payment of Rewards To Combat Terrorism.--Funds 
     available to the Attorney General may be used for the payment 
     of rewards pursuant to public advertisements for assistance 
     to the Department of Justice to combat terrorism and defend 
     the Nation against terrorist acts, in accordance with 
     procedures and regulations established or issued by the 
     Attorney General.
       (b) Conditions.--In making rewards under this section--
       (1) no such reward of $250,000 or more may be made or 
     offered without the personal approval of either the Attorney 
     General or the President;
       (2) the Attorney General shall give written notice to the 
     Chairmen and ranking minority members of the Committees on 
     Appropriations and the Judiciary of the Senate and of the 
     House of Representatives not later than 30 days after the 
     approval of a reward under paragraph (1);
       (3) any executive agency or military department (as 
     defined, respectively, in sections 105 and 102 of title 5, 
     United States Code) may provide the Attorney General with 
     funds for the payment of rewards;
       (4) neither the failure of the Attorney General to 
     authorize a payment nor the amount authorized shall be 
     subject to judicial review; and
       (5) no such reward shall be subject to any per- or 
     aggregate reward spending limitation established by law, 
     unless that law expressly refers to this section, and no 
     reward paid pursuant to any such offer shall count toward any 
     such aggregate reward spending limitation.

     SEC. 503. SECRETARY OF STATE'S AUTHORITY TO PAY REWARDS.

       Section 36 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 
     1956 (Public Law 885, August 1, 1956; 22 U.S.C. 2708) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``or'' at the end;
       (B) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``, including by dismantling an organization in 
     whole or significant part; or''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(6) the identification or location of an individual who 
     holds a key leadership position in a terrorist 
     organization.'';
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking paragraphs (2) and (3) 
     and redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (2); and
       (3) in subsection (e)(1), by inserting ``, except as 
     personally authorized by the Secretary of State if he 
     determines that offer or payment of an award of a larger 
     amount is necessary to combat terrorism or defend the Nation 
     against terrorist acts.'' after ``$5,000,000''.

     SEC. 504. DNA IDENTIFICATION OF TERRORISTS AND OTHER VIOLENT 
                   OFFENDERS.

       Section 3(d)(2) of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act 
     of 2000 (42 U.S.C. 14135a(d)(2)) is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(2) In additional to the offenses described in paragraph 
     (1), the following offenses shall be treated for purposes of 
     this section as qualifying Federal offenses, as determined by 
     the Attorney General:
       ``(A) Any offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 
     18, United States Code.
       ``(B) Any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of 
     title 18, United States Code).
       ``(C) Any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above 
     offenses.''.

     SEC. 505. COORDINATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Information Acquired From an Electronic Surveillance.--
     Section 106 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806), is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:
       ``(k)(1) Federal officers who conduct electronic 
     surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information 
     under this title may consult with Federal law enforcement 
     officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect 
     against--
       ``(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile 
     acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
       ``(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign 
     power or an agent of a foreign power; or
       ``(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an 
     intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an 
     agent of a foreign power.
       ``(2) Coordination authorized under paragraph (1) shall not 
     preclude the certification required by section 104(a)(7)(B) 
     or the entry of an order under section 105.''.
       (b) Information Acquired From a Physical Search.--Section 
     305 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1825) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(k)(1) Federal officers who conduct physical searches to 
     acquire foreign intelligence information under this title may 
     consult with Federal law enforcement officers to coordinate 
     efforts to investigate or protect against--
       ``(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile 
     acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
       ``(B) sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign 
     power or an agent of a foreign power; or
       ``(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an 
     intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an 
     agent of a foreign power.
       ``(2) Coordination authorized under paragraph (1) shall not 
     preclude the certification required by section 303(a)(7) or 
     the entry of an order under section 304.''.

     SEC. 506. MISCELLANEOUS NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES.

       (a) Telephone Toll and Transactional Records.--Section 
     2709(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting 
     ``at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent in Charge in a 
     Bureau field office designated by the Director'' after 
     ``Assistant Director'';
       (2) in paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``in a position not lower than Deputy 
     Assistant Director''; and
       (B) by striking ``made that'' and all that follows and 
     inserting the following: ``made that the name, address, 
     length of service, and toll billing records sought are 
     relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against 
     international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
     activities, provided that such an investigation of a United 
     States person is not conducted solely on the basis of 
     activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution of the United States; and''; and
       (3) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by striking ``in a position not lower than Deputy 
     Assistant Director''; and
       (B) by striking ``made that'' and all that follows and 
     inserting the following: ``made that the information sought 
     is relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against 
     international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
     activities, provided that such an investigation of a United 
     States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 
     activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution of the United States.''.
       (b) Financial Records.--Section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right 
     to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A)) is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``in a position not lower than Deputy 
     Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent 
     in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the 
     Director'' after ``designee''; and
       (2) by striking ``sought'' and all that follows and 
     inserting ``sought for foreign counter intelligence purposes 
     to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
     intelligence activities, provided that such an investigation 
     of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the 
     basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution of the United States.''.
       (c) Consumer Reports.--Section 624 of the Fair Credit 
     Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by inserting ``in a position not lower than Deputy 
     Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent 
     in Charge of a Bureau field office designated by the 
     Director'' after ``designee'' the first place it appears; and
       (B) by striking ``in writing that'' and all that follows 
     through the end and inserting the following: ``in writing, 
     that such information is sought for the conduct of an 
     authorized investigation to protect against

[[Page 19572]]

     international terrorism or clandestine intelligence 
     activities, provided that such an investigation of a United 
     States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of 
     activities protected by the first amendment to the 
     Constitution of the United States.'';
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by inserting ``in a position not lower than Deputy 
     Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent 
     in Charge of a Bureau field office designated by the 
     Director'' after ``designee'' the first place it appears; and
       (B) by striking ``in writing that'' and all that follows 
     through the end and inserting the following: ``in writing 
     that such information is sought for the conduct of an 
     authorized investigation to protect against international 
     terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided 
     that such an investigation of a United States person is not 
     conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by 
     the first amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States.''; and
       (3) in subsection (c)--
       (A) by inserting ``in a position not lower than Deputy 
     Assistant Director at Bureau headquarters or a Special Agent 
     in Charge in a Bureau field office designated by the 
     Director'' after ``designee of the Director''; and
       (B) by striking ``in camera that'' and all that follows 
     through ``States.'' and inserting the following: ``in camera 
     that the consumer report is sought for the conduct of an 
     authorized investigation to protect against international 
     terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided 
     that such an investigation of a United States person is not 
     conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by 
     the first amendment to the Constitution of the United 
     States.''.

      SEC. 507. EXTENSION OF SECRET SERVICE JURISDICTION.

       (a) Concurrent Jurisdiction Under 18 U.S.C. 1030.--Section 
     1030(d) of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read 
     as follows:
       ``(d)(1) The United States Secret Service shall, in 
     addition to any other agency having such authority, have the 
     authority to investigate offenses under this section.
       ``(2) The Federal Bureau of Investigation shall have 
     primary authority to investigate offenses under subsection 
     (a)(1) for any cases involving espionage, foreign 
     counterintelligence, information protected against 
     unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or 
     foreign relations, or Restricted Data (as that term is 
     defined in section 11y of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2014(y)), except for offenses affecting the duties of 
     the United States Secret Service pursuant to section 3056(a) 
     of this title.
       ``(3) Such authority shall be exercised in accordance with 
     an agreement which shall be entered into by the Secretary of 
     the Treasury and the Attorney General.''.
       (b) Reauthorization of Jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 1344.--
     Section 3056(b)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``credit and debit card frauds, and false 
     identification documents or devices'' and inserting ``access 
     device frauds, false identification documents or devices, and 
     any fraud or other criminal or unlawful activity in or 
     against any federally insured financial institution''.

     SEC. 508. DISCLOSURE OF EDUCATIONAL RECORDS.

       Section 444 of the General Education Provisions Act (20 
     U.S.C. 1232g), is amended by adding after subsection (i) a 
     new subsection (j) to read as follows:
       ``(j) Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorism.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) through 
     (i) or any provision of State law, the Attorney General (or 
     any Federal officer or employee, in a position not lower than 
     an Assistant Attorney General, designated by the Attorney 
     General) may submit a written application to a court of 
     competent jurisdiction for an ex parte order requiring an 
     educational agency or institution to permit the Attorney 
     General (or his designee) to--
       ``(A) collect education records in the possession of the 
     educational agency or institution that are relevant to an 
     authorized investigation or prosecution of an offense listed 
     in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18 United States Code, or 
     an act of domestic or international terrorism as defined in 
     section 2331 of that title; and
       ``(B) for official purposes related to the investigation or 
     prosecution of an offense described in paragraph (1)(A), 
     retain, disseminate, and use (including as evidence at trial 
     or in other administrative or judicial proceedings) such 
     records, consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney 
     General, after consultation with the Secretary, shall issue 
     to protect confidentiality.
       ``(2) Application and approval.--
       ``(A) In general.--An application under paragraph (1) shall 
     certify that there are specific and articulable facts giving 
     reason to believe that the education records are likely to 
     contain information described in paragraph (1)(A).
       ``(B) The court shall issue an order described in paragraph 
     (1) if the court finds that the application for the order 
     includes the certification described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(3) Protection of educational agency or institution.--An 
     educational agency or institution that, in good faith, 
     produces education records in accordance with an order issued 
     under this subsection shall not be liable to any person for 
     that production.
       ``(4) Record-keeping.--Subsection (b)(4) does not apply to 
     education records subject to a court order under this 
     subsection.''.

     SEC. 509. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION FROM NCES SURVEYS.

       Section 408 of the National Education Statistics Act of 
     1994 (20 U.S.C. 9007), is amended by adding after subsection 
     (b) a new subsection (c) to read as follows:
       ``(c) Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorism.--
       ``(1) In General.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), 
     the Attorney General (or any Federal officer or employee, in 
     a position not lower than an Assistant Attorney General, 
     designated by the Attorney General) may submit a written 
     application to a court of competent jurisdiction for an ex 
     parte order requiring the Secretary to permit the Attorney 
     General (or his designee) to--
       ``(A) collect reports, records, and information (including 
     individually identifiable information) in the possession of 
     the center that are relevant to an authorized investigation 
     or prosecution of an offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) 
     of title 18, United States Code, or an act of domestic or 
     international terrorism as defined in section 2331 of that 
     title; and
       ``(B) for official purposes related to the investigation or 
     prosecution of an offense described in paragraph (1)(A), 
     retain, disseminate, and use (including as evidence at trial 
     or in other administrative or judicial proceedings) such 
     information, consistent with such guidelines as the Attorney 
     General, after consultation with the Secretary, shall issue 
     to protect confidentiality.
       ``(2) Application and approval.--
       ``(A) In general.--An application under paragraph (1) shall 
     certify that there are specific and articulable facts giving 
     reason to believe that the information sought is described in 
     paragraph (1)(A).
       ``(B) The court shall issue an order described in paragraph 
     (1) if the court finds that the application for the order 
     includes the certification described in subparagraph (A).
       ``(3) Protection.--An officer or employee of the Department 
     who, in good faith, produces information in accordance with 
     an order issued under this subsection does not violate 
     subsection (b)(2) and shall not be liable to any person for 
     that production.''.

 TITLE VI--PROVIDING FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM, PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS, 
                           AND THEIR FAMILIES

         Subtitle A--Aid to Families of Public Safety Officers

     SEC. 611. EXPEDITED PAYMENT FOR PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS 
                   INVOLVED IN THE PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION, 
                   RESCUE, OR RECOVERY EFFORTS RELATED TO A 
                   TERRORIST ATTACK.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding the limitations of 
     subsection (b) of section 1201 or the provisions of 
     subsections (c), (d), and (e) of such section or section 1202 
     of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
     of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796, 3796a), upon certification 
     (containing identification of all eligible payees of benefits 
     pursuant to section 1201 of such Act) by a public agency that 
     a public safety officer employed by such agency was killed or 
     suffered a catastrophic injury producing permanent and total 
     disability as a direct and proximate result of a personal 
     injury sustained in the line of duty as described in section 
     1201 of such Act in connection with prevention, 
     investigation, rescue, or recovery efforts related to a 
     terrorist attack, the Director of the Bureau of Justice 
     Assistance shall authorize payment to qualified 
     beneficiaries, said payment to be made not later than 30 days 
     after receipt of such certification, benefits described under 
     subpart 1 of part L of such Act (42 U.S.C. 3796 et seq.).
       (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section, the terms 
     ``catastrophic injury'', ``public agency'', and ``public 
     safety officer'' have the same meanings given such terms in 
     section 1204 of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
     Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796b).

     SEC. 612. TECHNICAL CORRECTION WITH RESPECT TO EXPEDITED 
                   PAYMENTS FOR HEROIC PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS.

       Section 1 of Public Law 107-37 (an Act to provide for the 
     expedited payment of certain benefits for a public safety 
     officer who was killed or suffered a catastrophic injury as a 
     direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in 
     the line of duty in connection with the terrorist attacks of 
     September 11, 2001) is amended by--
       (1) inserting before ``by a'' the following: ``(containing 
     identification of all eligible payees of benefits pursuant to 
     section 1201)'';
       (2) inserting ``producing permanent and total disability'' 
     after ``suffered a catastrophic injury''; and
       (2) striking ``1201(a)'' and inserting ``1201''.

     SEC. 613. PUBLIC SAFETY OFFICERS BENEFIT PROGRAM PAYMENT 
                   INCREASE.

       (a) Payments.--Section 1201(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control 
     and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796) is amended by 
     striking ``$100,000'' and inserting ``$250,000''.
       (b) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply to any death or

[[Page 19573]]

     disability occurring on or after January 1, 2001.

     SEC. 614. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS.

       Section 112 of title I of section 101(b) of division A of 
     Public Law 105-277 and section 108(a) of appendix A of Public 
     Law 106-113 (113 Stat. 1501A-20) are amended--
       (1) after ``that Office'', each place it occurs, by 
     inserting ``(including, notwithstanding any contrary 
     provision of law (unless the same should expressly refer to 
     this section), any organization that administers any program 
     established in title 1 of Public Law 90-351)''; and
       (2) by inserting ``functions, including any'' after 
     ``all''.

       Subtitle B--Amendments to the Victims of Crime Act of 1984

     SEC. 621. CRIME VICTIMS FUND.

       (a) Deposit of Gifts in the Fund.--Section 1402(b) of the 
     Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601(b)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) any gifts, bequests, or donations to the Fund from 
     private entities or individuals.''.
       (b) Formula for Fund Distributions.--Section 1402(c) of the 
     Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601(c)) is amended 
     to read as follows:
       ``(c) Fund Distribution; Retention of Sums in Fund; 
     Availability for Expenditure Without Fiscal Year 
     Limitation.--
       ``(1) Subject to the availability of money in the Fund, in 
     each fiscal year, beginning with fiscal year 2003, the 
     Director shall distribute not less than 90 percent nor more 
     than 110 percent of the amount distributed from the Fund in 
     the previous fiscal year, except the Director may distribute 
     up to 120 percent of the amount distributed in the previous 
     fiscal year in any fiscal year that the total amount 
     available in the Fund is more than 2 times the amount 
     distributed in the previous fiscal year.
       ``(2) In each fiscal year, the Director shall distribute 
     amounts from the Fund in accordance with subsection (d). All 
     sums not distributed during a fiscal year shall remain in 
     reserve in the Fund to be distributed during a subsequent 
     fiscal year. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all 
     sums deposited in the Fund that are not distributed shall 
     remain in reserve in the Fund for obligation in future fiscal 
     years, without fiscal year limitation.''.
       (c) Allocation of Funds for Costs and Grants.--Section 
     1402(d)(4) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 
     10601(d)(4)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``deposited in'' and inserting ``to be 
     distributed from'';
       (2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``48.5'' and inserting 
     ``47.5'';
       (3) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``48.5'' and inserting 
     ``47.5''; and
       (4) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``3'' and inserting 
     ``5''.
       (d) Antiterrorism Emergency Reserve.--Section 1402(d)(5) of 
     the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601(d)(5)) is 
     amended to read as follows:
       ``(5)(A) In addition to the amounts distributed under 
     paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), the Director may set aside up 
     to $50,000,000 from the amounts transferred to the Fund for 
     use in responding to the airplane hijackings and terrorist 
     acts that occurred on September 11, 2001, as an antiterrorism 
     emergency reserve. The Director may replenish any amounts 
     expended from such reserve in subsequent fiscal years by 
     setting aside up to 5 percent of the amounts remaining in the 
     Fund in any fiscal year after distributing amounts under 
     paragraphs (2), (3) and (4). Such reserve shall not exceed 
     $50,000,000.
       ``(B) The antiterrorism emergency reserve referred to in 
     subparagraph (A) may be used for supplemental grants under 
     section 1404B and to provide compensation to victims of 
     international terrorism under section 1404C.
       ``(C) Amounts in the antiterrorism emergency reserve 
     established pursuant to subparagraph (A) may be carried over 
     from fiscal year to fiscal year. Notwithstanding subsection 
     (c) and section 619 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, 
     and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
     Act, 2001 (and any similar limitation on Fund obligations in 
     any future Act, unless the same should expressly refer to 
     this section), any such amounts carried over shall not be 
     subject to any limitation on obligations from amounts 
     deposited to or available in the Fund.''.
       (e) Victims of September 11, 2001.--Amounts transferred to 
     the Crime Victims Fund for use in responding to the airplane 
     hijackings and terrorist acts (including any related search, 
     rescue, relief, assistance, or other similar activities) that 
     occurred on September 11, 2001, shall not be subject to any 
     limitation on obligations from amounts deposited to or 
     available in the Fund, notwithstanding--
       (1) section 619 of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, 
     and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations 
     Act, 2001, and any similar limitation on Fund obligations in 
     such Act for Fiscal Year 2002; and
       (2) subsections (c) and (d) of section 1402 of the Victims 
     of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10601).

     SEC. 622. CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION.

       (a) Allocation of Funds for Compensation and Assistance.--
     Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 1403(a) of the Victims of 
     Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602(a)) are amended by 
     inserting ``in fiscal year 2002 and of 60 percent in 
     subsequent fiscal years'' after ``40 percent''.
       (b) Location of Compensable Crime.--Section 1403(b)(6)(B) 
     of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 
     10602(b)(6)(B)) is amended by striking ``are outside the 
     United States (if the compensable crime is terrorism, as 
     defined in section 2331 of title 18), or''.
       (c) Relationship of Crime Victim Compensation to Means-
     Tested Federal Benefit Programs.--Section 1403 of the Victims 
     of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602) is amended by striking 
     subsection (c) and inserting the following:
       ``(c) Exclusion From Income, Resources, and Assets for 
     Purposes of Means Tests.--Notwithstanding any other law 
     (other than title IV of Public Law 107-42), for the purpose 
     of any maximum allowed income, resource, or asset eligibility 
     requirement in any Federal, State, or local government 
     program using Federal funds that provides medical or other 
     assistance (or payment or reimbursement of the cost of such 
     assistance), any amount of crime victim compensation that the 
     applicant receives through a crime victim compensation 
     program under this section shall not be included in the 
     income, resources, or assets of the applicant, nor shall that 
     amount reduce the amount of the assistance available to the 
     applicant from Federal, State, or local government programs 
     using Federal funds, unless the total amount of assistance 
     that the applicant receives from all such programs is 
     sufficient to fully compensate the applicant for losses 
     suffered as a result of the crime.''.
       (d) Definitions of ``Compensable Crime'' and ``State''.--
     Section 1403(d) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 
     U.S.C. 10602(d)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``crimes involving 
     terrorism,''; and
       (2) in paragraph (4), by inserting ``the United States 
     Virgin Islands,'' after ``the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,''.
       (e) Relationship of Eligible Crime Victim Compensation 
     Programs to the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.--
       (1) In general.--Section 1403(e) of the Victims of Crime 
     Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10602(e)) is amended by inserting 
     ``including the program established under title IV of Public 
     Law 107-42,'' after ``Federal program,''.
       (2) Compensation.--With respect to any compensation payable 
     under title IV of Public Law 107-42, the failure of a crime 
     victim compensation program, after the effective date of 
     final regulations issued pursuant to section 407 of Public 
     Law 107-42, to provide compensation otherwise required 
     pursuant to section 1403 of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 
     (42 U.S.C. 10602) shall not render that program ineligible 
     for future grants under the Victims of Crime Act of 1984.

     SEC. 623. CRIME VICTIM ASSISTANCE.

       (a) Assistance for Victims in the District of Columbia, 
     Puerto Rico, and Other Territories and Possessions.--Section 
     1404(a) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 
     10603(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(6) An agency of the Federal Government performing local 
     law enforcement functions in and on behalf of the District of 
     Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the United States 
     Virgin Islands, or any other territory or possession of the 
     United States may qualify as an eligible crime victim 
     assistance program for the purpose of grants under this 
     subsection, or for the purpose of grants under subsection 
     (c)(1).''.
       (b) Prohibition on Discrimination Against Certain 
     Victims.--Section 1404(b)(1) of the Victims of Crime Act of 
     1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603(b)(1)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(F) does not discriminate against victims because they 
     disagree with the way the State is prosecuting the criminal 
     case.''.
       (c) Grants for Program Evaluation and Compliance Efforts.--
     Section 1404(c)(1)(A) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 
     U.S.C. 10603(c)(1)(A)) is amended by inserting ``, program 
     evaluation, compliance efforts,'' after ``demonstration 
     projects''.
       (d) Allocation of Discretionary Grants.--Section 1404(c)(2) 
     of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603(c)(2)) 
     is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``not more than'' and 
     inserting ``not less than''; and
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``not less than'' and 
     inserting ``not more than''.
       (e) Fellowships and Clinical Internships.--Section 
     1404(c)(3) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 
     10603(c)(3)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(E) use funds made available to the Director under this 
     subsection--
       ``(i) for fellowships and clinical internships; and

[[Page 19574]]

       ``(ii) to carry out programs of training and special 
     workshops for the presentation and dissemination of 
     information resulting from demonstrations, surveys, and 
     special projects.''.

     SEC. 624. VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.

       (a) Compensation and Assistance to Victims of Domestic 
     Terrorism.--Section 1404B(b) of the Victims of Crime Act of 
     1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603b(b)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(b) Victims of Terrorism Within the United States.--The 
     Director may make supplemental grants as provided in section 
     1402(d)(5) to States for eligible crime victim compensation 
     and assistance programs, and to victim service organizations, 
     public agencies (including Federal, State, or local 
     governments) and nongovernmental organizations that provide 
     assistance to victims of crime, which shall be used to 
     provide emergency relief, including crisis response efforts, 
     assistance, compensation, training and technical assistance, 
     and ongoing assistance, including during any investigation or 
     prosecution, to victims of terrorist acts or mass violence 
     occurring within the United States.''.
       (b) Assistance to Victims of International Terrorism.--
     Section 1404B(a)(1) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 
     U.S.C. 10603b(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``who are not 
     persons eligible for compensation under title VIII of the 
     Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986''.
       (c) Compensation to Victims of International Terrorism.--
     Section 1404C(b) of the Victims of Crime of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 
     10603c(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
     ``The amount of compensation awarded to a victim under this 
     subsection shall be reduced by any amount that the victim 
     received in connection with the same act of international 
     terrorism under title VIII of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security 
     and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.''.

 TITLE VII--INCREASED INFORMATION SHARING FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
                               PROTECTION

     SEC. 711. EXPANSION OF REGIONAL INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM TO 
                   FACILITATE FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
                   RESPONSE RELATED TO TERRORIST ATTACKS.

       Section 1301 of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
     Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3796h) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``and terrorist 
     conspiracies and activities'' after ``activities'';
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' after the 
     semicolon;
       (B) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5);
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following:
       ``(4) establishing and operating secure information sharing 
     systems to enhance the investigation and prosecution 
     abilities of participating enforcement agencies in addressing 
     multi-jurisdictional terrorist conspiracies and activities; 
     and (5)''; and
       (3) by inserting at the end the following:
       ``(d) Authorization of Appropriation to the Bureau of 
     Justice Assistance.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     to the Bureau of Justice Assistance to carry out this section 
     $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2002 and $100,000,000 for fiscal 
     year 2003.''.

     TITLE VIII--STRENGTHENING THE CRIMINAL LAWS AGAINST TERRORISM

     SEC. 801. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND OTHER ACTS OF VIOLENCE 
                   AGAINST MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS.

       Chapter 97 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 1993. Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence 
       against mass transportation systems

       ``(a) General Prohibitions.--Whoever willfully--
       ``(1) wrecks, derails, sets fire to, or disables a mass 
     transportation vehicle or ferry;
       ``(2) places or causes to be placed any biological agent or 
     toxin for use as a weapon, destructive substance, or 
     destructive device in, upon, or near a mass transportation 
     vehicle or ferry, without previously obtaining the permission 
     of the mass transportation provider, and with intent to 
     endanger the safety of any passenger or employee of the mass 
     transportation provider, or with a reckless disregard for the 
     safety of human life;
       ``(3) sets fire to, or places any biological agent or toxin 
     for use as a weapon, destructive substance, or destructive 
     device in, upon, or near any garage, terminal, structure, 
     supply, or facility used in the operation of, or in support 
     of the operation of, a mass transportation vehicle or ferry, 
     without previously obtaining the permission of the mass 
     transportation provider, and knowing or having reason to know 
     such activity would likely derail, disable, or wreck a mass 
     transportation vehicle or ferry used, operated, or employed 
     by the mass transportation provider;
       ``(4) removes appurtenances from, damages, or otherwise 
     impairs the operation of a mass transportation signal system, 
     including a train control system, centralized dispatching 
     system, or rail grade crossing warning signal;
       ``(5) interferes with, disables, or incapacitates any 
     dispatcher, driver, captain, or person while they are 
     employed in dispatching, operating, or maintaining a mass 
     transportation vehicle or ferry, with intent to endanger the 
     safety of any passenger or employee of the mass 
     transportation provider, or with a reckless disregard for the 
     safety of human life;
       ``(6) commits an act, including the use of a dangerous 
     weapon, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
     injury to an employee or passenger of a mass transportation 
     provider or any other person while any of the foregoing are 
     on the property of a mass transportation provider;
       ``(7) conveys or causes to be conveyed false information, 
     knowing the information to be false, concerning an attempt or 
     alleged attempt being made or to be made, to do any act which 
     would be a crime prohibited by this subsection; or
       ``(8) attempts, threatens, or conspires to do any of the 
     aforesaid acts,
     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 
     twenty years, or both, if such act is committed, or in the 
     case of a threat or conspiracy such act would be committed, 
     on, against, or affecting a mass transportation provider 
     engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or if 
     in the course of committing such act, that person travels or 
     communicates across a State line in order to commit such act, 
     or transports materials across a State line in aid of the 
     commission of such act.
       ``(b) Aggravated Offense.--Whoever commits an offense under 
     subsection (a) in a circumstance in which--
       ``(1) the mass transportation vehicle or ferry was carrying 
     a passenger at the time of the offense; or
       ``(2) the offense has resulted in the death of any person,
     shall be guilty of an aggravated form of the offense and 
     shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for a term of 
     years or for life, or both.
       ``(c) Definitions.--In this section--
       ``(1) the term `biological agent' has the meaning given to 
     that term in section 178(1) of this title;
       ``(2) the term `dangerous weapon' has the meaning given to 
     that term in section 930 of this title;
       ``(3) the term `destructive device' has the meaning given 
     to that term in section 921(a)(4) of this title;
       ``(4) the term `destructive substance' has the meaning 
     given to that term in section 31 of this title;
       ``(5) the term `mass transportation' has the meaning given 
     to that term in section 5302(a)(7) of title 49, United States 
     Code, except that the term shall include schoolbus, charter, 
     and sightseeing transportation;
       ``(6) the term `serious bodily injury' has the meaning 
     given to that term in section 1365 of this title;
       ``(7) the term `State' has the meaning given to that term 
     in section 2266 of this title; and
       ``(8) the term `toxin' has the meaning given to that term 
     in section 178(2) of this title.''.
       (f) Conforming Amendment.--The analysis of chapter 97 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
     end:

``1993. Terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against mass 
              transportation systems.''.

     SEC. 802. EXPANSION OF THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS STATUTE.

       Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in section 175--
       (A) in subsection (b)--
       (i) by striking ``does not include'' and inserting 
     ``includes'';
       (ii) by inserting ``other than'' after ``system for''; and
       (iii) by inserting ``bona fide research'' after 
     ``protective'';
       (B) by redesignating subsection (b) as subsection (c); and
       (C) by inserting after subsection (a) the following:
       ``(b) Additional Offense.--Whoever knowingly possesses any 
     biological agent, toxin, or delivery system of a type or in a 
     quantity that, under the circumstances, is not reasonably 
     justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, 
     or other peaceful purpose, shall be fined under this title, 
     imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. In this 
     subsection, the terms `biological agent' and `toxin' do not 
     encompass any biological agent or toxin that is in its 
     naturally occurring environment, if the biological agent or 
     toxin has not been cultivated, collected, or otherwise 
     extracted from its natural source.'';
       (2) by inserting after section 175a the following:

     ``SEC. 175B. POSSESSION BY RESTRICTED PERSONS.

       ``(a) No restricted person described in subsection (b) 
     shall ship or transport interstate or foreign commerce, or 
     possess in or affecting commerce, any biological agent or 
     toxin, or receive any biological agent or toxin that has been 
     shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, if 
     the biological agent or toxin is listed as a select agent in 
     subsection (j) of section 72.6 of title 42, Code of

[[Page 19575]]

     Federal Regulations, pursuant to section 511(d)(l) of the 
     Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public 
     Law 104-132), and is not exempted under subsection (h) of 
     such section 72.6, or appendix A of part 72 of the Code of 
     Regulations.
       ``(b) In this section:
       ``(1) The term `select agent' does not include any such 
     biological agent or toxin that is in its naturally-occurring 
     environment, if the biological agent or toxin has not been 
     cultivated, collected, or otherwise extracted from its 
     natural source.
       ``(2) The term `restricted person' means an individual 
     who--
       ``(A) is under indictment for a crime punishable by 
     imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year;
       ``(B) has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable 
     by imprisonment for a term exceeding 1 year;
       ``(C) is a fugitive from justice;
       ``(D) is an unlawful user of any controlled substance (as 
     defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 
     U.S.C. 802));
       ``(E) is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United 
     States;
       ``(F) has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has 
     been committed to any mental institution;
       ``(G) is an alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted 
     for permanent residence) who is a national of a country as to 
     which the Secretary of State, pursuant to section 6(j) of the 
     Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), 
     section 620A of chapter 1 of part M of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), or section 40(d) of chapter 3 
     of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780(d)), has made 
     a determination (that remains in effect) that such country 
     has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
     terrorism; or
       ``(H) has been discharged from the Armed Services of the 
     United States under dishonorable conditions.
       ``(3) The term `alien' has the same meaning as in section 
     1010(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
     1101(a)(3)).
       ``(4) The term `lawfully admitted for permanent residence' 
     has the same meaning as in section 101(a)(20) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)).
       ``(c) Whoever knowingly violates this section shall be 
     fined as provided in this title, imprisoned not more than 10 
     years, or both, but the prohibition contained in this section 
     shall not apply with respect to any duly authorized United 
     States governmental activity.''; and
       (3) in the chapter analysis, by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 175a the following:

``175b. Possession by restricted persons.''.

     SEC. 803. DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM.

       (a) Domestic Terrorism Defined.--Section 2331 of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1)(B)(iii), by striking ``by 
     assassination or kidnapping'' and inserting ``by mass 
     destruction, assassination, or kidnapping'';
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'';
       (3) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(5) the term `domestic terrorism' means activities that--
       ``(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a 
     violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any 
     State;
       ``(B) appear to be intended--
       ``(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
       ``(ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
     intimidation or coercion; or
       ``(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
     destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
       ``(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction 
     of the United States.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 3077(1) of title 18, 
     United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(1) `act of terrorism' means an act of domestic or 
     international terrorism as defined in section 2331;''.

     SEC. 804. PROHIBITION AGAINST HARBORING TERRORISTS.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding after section 2338 the following 
     new section:

     ``Sec. 2339. Harboring or concealing terrorists

       ``(a) Whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows, 
     or has reasonable grounds to believe, has committed, or is 
     about to commit, an offense under section 32 (relating to 
     destruction of aircraft or aircraft facilities), section 175 
     (relating to biological weapons), section 229 (relating to 
     chemical weapons), section 831 (relating to nuclear 
     materials), paragraph (2) or (3) of section 844(f) (relating 
     to arson and bombing of government property risking or 
     causing injury or death), section 1366(a) (relating to the 
     destruction of an energy facility), section 2280 (relating to 
     violence against maritime navigation), section 2332a 
     (relating to weapons of mass destruction), or section 2332b 
     (relating to acts of terrorism transcending national 
     boundaries) of this title, section 236(a) (relating to 
     sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel) of the Atomic Energy 
     Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284(a)), or section 46502 (relating 
     to aircraft piracy) of title 49, shall be fined under this 
     title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.''.
       ``(b) A violation of this section may be prosecuted in any 
     Federal judicial district in which the underlying offense was 
     committed, or in any other Federal judicial district as 
     provided by law.''.
       (b) Technical Amendment.--The chapter analysis for chapter 
     113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting 
     after the item for section 2338 the following:

``2339. Harboring or concealing terrorists.''.

     SEC. 805. JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES COMMITTED AT U.S. 
                   FACILITIES ABROAD.

       Section 7 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(9) With respect to offenses committed by or against a 
     United States national, as defined in section 1203(c) of this 
     title--
       ``(A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, 
     military or other United States Government missions or 
     entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of 
     buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used 
     for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of 
     ownership; and
       ``(B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant 
     or ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for 
     purposes of those missions or entities or used by United 
     States personnel assigned to those missions or entities.
     Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to supersede any 
     treaty or international agreement in force on the date of 
     enactment of this paragraph with which this paragraph 
     conflicts. This paragraph does not apply with respect to an 
     offense committed by a person described in section 3261(a) of 
     this title.''.

     SEC. 806. MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.

       (a) In General.--Section 2339A of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``, within the United States,'';
       (B) by inserting ``229,'' after ``175,'';
       (C) by inserting ``1993,'' after ``1992,'';
       (D) by inserting ``, section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act 
     of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284),'' after ``of this title'';
       (E) by inserting ``or 60123(b)'' after ``46502''; and
       (F) by inserting at the end the following: ``A violation of 
     this section may be prosecuted in any Federal judicial 
     district in which the underlying offense was committed, or in 
     any other Federal judicial district as provided by law.''; 
     and
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by striking ``or other financial securities'' and 
     inserting ``or monetary instruments or financial 
     securities''; and
       (B) by inserting ``expert advice or assistance,'' after 
     ``training,''.
       (b) Technical Amendment.--Section 1956(c)(7)(D) of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``or 2339B'' 
     after ``2339A''.

     SEC. 807. ASSETS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

       Section 981(a)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting at the end the following:
       ``(G) All assets, foreign or domestic--
       ``(i) of any person, entity, or organization engaged in 
     planning or perpetrating any act of domestic or international 
     terrorism (as defined in section 2331) against the United 
     States, citizens or residents of the United States, or their 
     property, and all assets, foreign or domestic, affording any 
     person a source of influence over any such entity or 
     organization;
       ``(ii) acquired or maintained by any person for the purpose 
     of supporting, planning, conducting, or concealing an act of 
     domestic or international terrorism (as defined in section 
     2331) against the United States, citizens or residents of the 
     United States, or their property; or
       ``(iii) derived from, involved in, or used or intended to 
     be used to commit any act of domestic or international 
     terrorism (as defined in section 2331) against the United 
     States, citizens or residents of the United States, or their 
     property.''.

     SEC. 808. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION RELATING TO PROVISION OF 
                   MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISM.

       No provision of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export 
     Enhancement Act of 2000 (title IX of Public Law 106-387) 
     shall be construed to limit or otherwise affect section 2339A 
     or 2339B of title 18, United States Code.

     SEC. 809. DEFINITION OF FEDERAL CRIME OF TERRORISM.

       Section 2332b of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (f), by inserting after ``terrorism'' the 
     following: ``and any violation of section 351(e), 844(e), 
     844(f)(1), 956(b), 1361, 1366(b), 1366(c), 1751(e), 2152, or 
     2156 of this title,'' before ``and the Secretary''; and
       (2) in subsection (g)(5)(B), by striking clauses (i) 
     through (iii) and inserting the following:
       ``(i) section 32 (relating to destruction of aircraft or 
     aircraft facilities), 37 (relating to violence at 
     international airports), 81 (relating to arson within special 
     maritime and territorial jurisdiction), 175 or 175b (relating 
     to biological weapons), 229 (relating to chemical weapons), 
     351 (a) through (d) (relating to congressional, cabinet, and 
     Supreme Court assassination and kidnaping), 831 (relating to 
     nuclear materials), 842(m) or (n) (relating to

[[Page 19576]]

     plastic explosives), 844(f) (2) through (3) (relating to 
     arson and bombing of Government property risking or causing 
     death), 844(i) (relating to arson and bombing of property 
     used in interstate commerce), 930(c) (relating to killing or 
     attempted killing during an attack on a Federal facility with 
     a dangerous weapon), 956(a)(1) (relating to conspiracy to 
     murder, kidnap, or maim within special maritime and 
     territorial jurisdiction of the United States), 1030(a)(1) 
     (relating to protection of computers), 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) 
     resulting in damage as defined in 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) through 
     (v) (relating to protection of computers), 1114 (relating to 
     killing or attempted killing of officers and employees of the 
     United States), 1116 (relating to murder or manslaughter of 
     foreign officials, official guests, or internationally 
     protected persons), 1203 (relating to hostage taking), 1362 
     (relating to destruction of communication lines, stations, or 
     systems), 1363 (relating to injury to buildings or property 
     within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
     United States), 1366(a) (relating to destruction of an energy 
     facility), 1751 (a) through (d) (relating to Presidential and 
     Presidential staff assassination and kidnaping), 1992 
     (relating to wrecking trains), 1993 (relating to terrorist 
     attacks and other acts of violence against mass 
     transportation systems), 2155 (relating to destruction of 
     national defense materials, premises, or utilities), 2280 
     (relating to violence against maritime navigation), 2281 
     (relating to violence against maritime fixed platforms), 2332 
     (relating to certain homicides and other violence against 
     United States nationals occurring outside of the United 
     States), 2332a (relating to use of weapons of mass 
     destruction), 2332b (relating to acts of terrorism 
     transcending national boundaries), 2339 (relating to 
     harboring terrorists), 2339A (relating to providing material 
     support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material 
     support to terrorist organizations), or 2340A (relating to 
     torture) of this title;
       ``(ii) section 236 (relating to sabotage of nuclear 
     facilities or fuel) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
     U.S.C. 2284); or
       ``(iii) section 46502 (relating to aircraft piracy), the 
     second sentence of section 46504 (relating to assault on a 
     flight crew with a dangerous weapon), section 46505(b)(3) or 
     (c) (relating to explosive or incendiary devices, or 
     endangerment of human life by means of weapons, on aircraft), 
     section 46506 if homicide or attempted homicide is involved 
     (relating to application of certain criminal laws to acts on 
     aircraft), or section 60123(b) (relating to destruction of 
     interstate gas or hazardous liquid pipeline facility) of 
     title 49.''.

     SEC. 810. NO STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR CERTAIN TERRORISM 
                   OFFENSES.

       (a) In General.--Section 3286 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended to read as follows:

     ``Sec. 3286. Extension of statute of limitation for certain 
       terrorism offenses.

       ``(a) Eight-Year Limitation.--Notwithstanding section 3282, 
     no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any 
     noncapital offense involving a violation of any provision 
     listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B) other than a provision 
     listed in section 3295, or a violation of section 112, 
     351(e), 1361, or 1751(e) of this title, or section 46504, 
     46505, or 46506 of title 49, unless the indictment is found 
     or the information is instituted within 8 years after the 
     offense was committed.
       ``(b) No Limitation.--Notwithstanding any other law, an 
     indictment may be found or an information instituted at any 
     time without limitation for any offense listed in section 
     2332b(g)(5)(B), if the commission of such offense resulted 
     in, or created a forseeable risk of, death or serious bodily 
     injury to another person.''.
       (b) Application.--The amendments made by this section shall 
     apply to the prosecution of any offense committed before, on, 
     or after the date of enactment of this section.

     SEC. 811. ALTERNATE MAXIMUM PENALTIES FOR TERRORISM OFFENSES.

       (a) Arson.--Section 81 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended in the second undesignated paragraph by striking 
     ``not more than twenty years'' and inserting ``for any term 
     of years or for life''.
       (b) Destruction of an Energy Facility.--Section 1366 of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking ``ten'' and inserting 
     ``20''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(d) Whoever is convicted of a violation of subsection (a) 
     or (b) that has resulted in the death of any person shall be 
     subject to imprisonment for any term of years or life.''.
       (c) Material Support to Terrorists.--Section 2339A(a) of 
     title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``10'' and inserting ``15''; and
       (2) by striking the period and inserting ``and, if the 
     death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term 
     of years or for life.''.
       (d) Material Support to Designated Foreign Terrorist 
     Organizations.--Section 2339B(a)(1) of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``10'' and inserting ``15''; and
       (2) by striking the period after ``or both'' and inserting 
     ``and, if the death of any person results, shall be 
     imprisoned for any term of years or for life.''.
       (e) Destruction of National-Defense Materials.--Section 
     2155(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``ten'' and inserting ``20''; and
       (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, 
     and, if death results to any person, shall be imprisoned for 
     any term of years or for life.''.
       (f) Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel.--Section 236 of 
     the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), is amended--
       (1) by striking ``ten'' each place it appears and inserting 
     ``20'';
       (2) in subsection (a), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``, and, if death results to any person, shall 
     be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.''; and
       (3) in subsection (b), by striking the period at the end 
     and inserting ``, and, if death results to any person, shall 
     be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.''.
       (g) Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States.--
     Section 46505(c) of title 49, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``15'' and inserting ``20''; and
       (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, 
     and, if death results to any person, shall be imprisoned for 
     any term of years or for life.''.
       (h) Damaging or Destroying an Interstate Gas or Hazardous 
     Liquid Pipeline Facility.--Section 60123(b) of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``15'' and inserting ``20''; and
       (2) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``, 
     and, if death results to any person, shall be imprisoned for 
     any term of years or for life.''.

     SEC. 812. PENALTIES FOR TERRORIST CONSPIRACIES.

       (a) Arson.--Section 81 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended in the first undesignated paragraph--
       (1) by striking ``, or attempts to set fire to or burn''; 
     and
       (2) by inserting ``or attempts or conspires to do such an 
     act,'' before ``shall be imprisoned''.
       (b) Killings in Federal Facilities.--
       (1) Section 930(c) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (A) by striking ``or attempts to kill'';
       (B) by inserting ``or attempts or conspires to do such an 
     act,'' before ``shall be punished''; and
       (C) by striking ``and 1113'' and inserting ``1113, and 
     1117''.
       (2) Section 1117 of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting ``930(c),'' after ``section''.
       (c) Communications Lines, Stations, or Systems.--Section 
     1362 of title 18, United States Code, is amended in the first 
     undesignated paragraph--
       (1) by striking ``or attempts willfully or maliciously to 
     injure or destroy''; and
       (2) by inserting ``or attempts or conspires to do such an 
     act,'' before ``shall be fined''.
       (d) Buildings or Property Within Special Maritime and 
     Territorial Jurisdiction.--Section 1363 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or attempts to destroy or injure''; and
       (2) by inserting ``or attempts or conspires to do such an 
     act,'' before ``shall be fined'' the first place it appears.
       (e) Wrecking Trains.--Section 1992 of title 18, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) A person who conspires to commit any offense defined 
     in this section shall be subject to the same penalties (other 
     than the penalty of death) as the penalties prescribed for 
     the offense, the commission of which was the object of the 
     conspiracy.''.
       (f) Material Support to Terrorists.--Section 2339A of title 
     18, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``or attempts 
     or conspires to do such an act,'' before ``shall be fined''.
       (g) Torture.--Section 2340A of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) Conspiracy.--A person who conspires to commit an 
     offense under this section shall be subject to the same 
     penalties (other than the penalty of death) as the penalties 
     prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the 
     object of the conspiracy.''.
       (h) Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel.--Section 236 of 
     the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking ``, or who intentionally and willfully 
     attempts to destroy or cause physical damage to'';
       (B) in paragraph (4), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a comma; and
       (C) by inserting ``or attempts or conspires to do such an 
     act,'' before ``shall be fined''; and
       (2) in subsection (b)--
       (A) by striking ``or attempts to cause''; and
       (B) by inserting ``or attempts or conspires to do such an 
     act,'' before ``shall be fined''.
       (i) Interference with Flight Crew Members and Attendants.--
     Section 46504 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by 
     inserting ``or attempts or conspires to do such an act,'' 
     before ``shall be fined''.
       (j) Special Aircraft Jurisdiction of the United States.--
     Section 46505 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(e) Conspiracy.--If two or more persons conspire to 
     violate subsection (b) or (c), and

[[Page 19577]]

     one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object 
     of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy 
     shall be punished as provided in such subsection.''.
       (k) Damaging or Destroying an Interstate Gas or Hazardous 
     Liquid Pipeline Facility.--Section 60123(b) of title 49, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``, or attempting to damage or destroy,''; 
     and
       (2) by inserting ``, or attempting or conspiring to do such 
     an act,'' before ``shall be fined''.

     SEC. 813. POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION OF TERRORISTS.

       Section 3583 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(j) Supervised Release Terms for Terrorism Predicates.--
     Notwithstanding subsection (b), the authorized term of 
     supervised release for any offense listed in section 
     2332b(g)(5)(B), the commission of which resulted in, or 
     created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily injury 
     to another person, is any term of years or life.''.

     SEC. 814. INCLUSION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM AS RACKETEERING 
                   ACTIVITY.

       Section 1961(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``or (F)'' and inserting ``(F)''; and
       (2) by inserting before the semicolon at the end the 
     following: ``, or (G) any act that is indictable as an 
     offense listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)''.

     SEC. 815. DETERRENCE AND PREVENTION OF CYBERTERRORISM.

       (a) Clarification of Protection of Protected Computers.--
     Section 1030(a)(5) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(i)'' after (A)'';
       (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (B) and (C) as clauses 
     (ii) and (iii), respectively;
       (3) by adding ``and'' at the end of clause (iii), as so 
     redesignated; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, 
     would, if completed, have caused) conduct described in clause 
     (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A) that resulted in--
       ``(i) loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period 
     (including loss resulting from a related course of conduct 
     affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at 
     least $5,000 in value;
       ``(ii) the modification or impairment, or potential 
     modification or impairment, of the medical examination, 
     diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals;
       ``(iii) physical injury to any person;
       ``(iv) a threat to public health or safety; or
       ``(v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a 
     Government entity in furtherance of the administration of 
     justice, national defense, or national security;''.
       (b) Penalties.--Section 1030(c) of title 18, United States 
     Code is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) in subparagraph (A) --
       (i) by inserting ``except as provided in subparagraph 
     (B),'' before ``a fine'';
       (ii) by striking ``(a)(5)(C)'' and inserting 
     ``(a)(5)(A)(iii)''; and
       (iii) by striking ``and' at the end;
       (B) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``or an attempt to 
     commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph,'' after 
     ``subsection (a)(2),'' in the matter preceding clause (i); 
     and
       (C) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (2) in paragraph (3)--
       (A) by striking ``, (a)(5)(A), (a)(5)(B),'' both places it 
     appears; and
       (B) by striking ``and'' at the end; and
       (3) by striking ``(a)(5)(C)'' and inserting 
     ``(a)(5)(A)(iii)''; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(4)(A) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more 
     than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense under 
     subsection (a)(5)(A)(i), or an attempt to commit an offense 
     punishable under that subsection;
       ``(B) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more 
     than 5 years, or both, in the case of an offense under 
     subsection (a)(5)(A)(ii), or an attempt to commit an offense 
     punishable under that subsection;
       ``(C) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more 
     than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense under 
     subsection (a)(5)(A)(i) or (a)(5)(A)(ii), or an attempt to 
     commit an offense punishable under either subsection, that 
     occurs after a conviction for another offense under this 
     section.''.
       (c) Definitions.--Subsection (e) of section 1030 of title 
     18, United States Code is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2)(B), by inserting ``, including a 
     computer located outside the United States'' before the 
     semicolon;
       (2) in paragraph (7), by striking ``and'' at the end;
       (3) by striking paragraph (8) and inserting the following 
     new paragraph (8):
       ``(8) the term `damage' means any impairment to the 
     integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or 
     information;'';
       (4) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (5) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(10) the term `conviction' shall include a conviction 
     under the law of any State for a crime punishable by 
     imprisonment for more than 1 year, an element of which is 
     unauthorized access, or exceeding authorized access, to a 
     computer;
       ``(11) the term `loss' includes any reasonable cost to any 
     victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, 
     conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, 
     program, system, or information to its condition prior to the 
     offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other 
     consequential damages incurred because of interruption of 
     service;
       ``(12) the term `person' means any individual, firm, 
     corporation, educational institution, financial institution, 
     governmental entity, or legal or other entity;''.
       (d) Damages in Civil Actions.--Subsection (g) of section 
     1030 of title 18, United States Code is amended--
       (1) by striking the second sentence and inserting the 
     following new sentences: ``A suit for a violation of 
     subsection (a)(5) may be brought only if the conduct involves 
     one of the factors enumerated in subsection (a)(5)(B). 
     Damages for a violation involving only conduct described in 
     subsection (a)(5)(B)(i) are limited to economic damages.''; 
     and
       (2) by adding at the end the following: ``No action may be 
     brought under this subsection for the negligent design or 
     manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or 
     firmware.''.
       (e) Amendment of Sentencing Guidelines Relating to Certain 
     Computer Fraud and Abuse.--Pursuant to its authority under 
     section 994(p) of title 28, United States Code, the United 
     States Sentencing Commission shall amend the Federal 
     sentencing guidelines to ensure that any individual convicted 
     of a violation of section 1030 of title 18, United States 
     Code, can be subjected to appropriate penalties, without 
     regard to any mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.

     SEC. 816. ADDITIONAL DEFENSE TO CIVIL ACTIONS RELATING TO 
                   PRESERVING RECORDS IN RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT 
                   REQUESTS.

       Section 2707(e)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after ``or statutory authorization'' the 
     following: ``(including a request of a governmental entity 
     under section 2703(f) of this title)''.

     SEC. 817. DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT OF CYBERSECURITY FORENSIC 
                   CAPABILITIES.

       (a) In General.--The Attorney General shall establish such 
     regional computer forensic laboratories as the Attorney 
     General considers appropriate, and provide support to 
     existing computer forensic laboratories, in order that all 
     such computer forensic laboratories have the capability--
       (1) to provide forensic examinations with respect to seized 
     or intercepted computer evidence relating to criminal 
     activity (including cyberterrorism);
       (2) to provide training and education for Federal, State, 
     and local law enforcement personnel and prosecutors regarding 
     investigations, forensic analyses, and prosecutions of 
     computer-related crime (including cyberterrorism);
       (3) to assist Federal, State, and local law enforcement in 
     enforcing Federal, State, and local criminal laws relating to 
     computer-related crime;
       (4) to facilitate and promote the sharing of Federal law 
     enforcement expertise and information about the 
     investigation, analysis, and prosecution of computer-related 
     crime with State and local law enforcement personnel and 
     prosecutors, including the use of multijurisdictional task 
     forces; and
       (5) to carry out such other activities as the Attorney 
     General considers appropriate.
       (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--
       (1) Authorization.--There is hereby authorized to be 
     appropriated in each fiscal year $50,000,000 for purposes of 
     carrying out this section.
       (2) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
     authorization of appropriations in paragraph (1) shall remain 
     available until expended.

                    TITLE IX--IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE

     SEC. 901. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE REGARDING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   COLLECTED UNDER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
                   SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.

       Section 103(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating paragraphs (6) and (7) as paragraphs 
     (7) and (8), respectively; and
       (2) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following new 
     paragraph (6):
       ``(6) establish requirements and priorities for foreign 
     intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to 
     ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance 
     or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may 
     be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence 
     purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to 
     direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance 
     operations pursuant to that Act unless otherwise authorized 
     by statute or executive order;''.

[[Page 19578]]



     SEC. 902. INCLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES 
                   WITHIN SCOPE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE UNDER 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

       Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (2), by inserting before the period the 
     following: ``, or international terrorist activities''; and
       (2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and activities 
     conducted'' and inserting ``, and activities conducted,''.

     SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND 
                   MAINTENANCE OF INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS TO 
                   ACQUIRE INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST 
                   ORGANIZATIONS.

       It is the sense of Congress that officers and employees of 
     the intelligence community of the Federal Government, acting 
     within the course of their official duties, should be 
     encouraged, and should make every effort, to establish and 
     maintain intelligence relationships with any person, entity, 
     or group for the purpose of engaging in lawful intelligence 
     activities, including the acquisition of information on the 
     identity, location, finances, affiliations, capabilities, 
     plans, or intentions of a terrorist or terrorist 
     organization, or information on any other person, entity, or 
     group (including a foreign government) engaged in harboring, 
     comforting, financing, aiding, or assisting a terrorist or 
     terrorist organization.

     SEC. 904. TEMPORARY AUTHORITY TO DEFER SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS 
                   OF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-
                   RELATED MATTERS.

       (a) Authority To Defer.--The Secretary of Defense, Attorney 
     General, and Director of Central Intelligence each may, 
     during the effective period of this section, defer the date 
     of submittal to Congress of any covered intelligence report 
     under the jurisdiction of such official until February 1, 
     2002.
       (b) Covered Intelligence Report.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (c), for purposes of subsection (a), a covered 
     intelligence report is as follows:
       (1) Any report on intelligence or intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government that is required 
     to be submitted to Congress by an element of the intelligence 
     community during the effective period of this section.
       (2) Any report or other matter that is required to be 
     submitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives by the Department of Defense or the 
     Department of Justice during the effective period of this 
     section.
       (c) Exception for Certain Reports.--For purposes of 
     subsection (a), any report required by section 502 or 503 of 
     the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a, 413b) is 
     not a covered intelligence report.
       (d) Notice to Congress.--Upon deferring the date of 
     submittal to Congress of a covered intelligence report under 
     subsection (a), the official deferring the date of submittal 
     of the covered intelligence report shall submit to Congress 
     notice of the deferral. Notice of deferral of a report shall 
     specify the provision of law, if any, under which the report 
     would otherwise be submitted to Congress.
       (e) Extension of Deferral.--(1) Each official specified in 
     subsection (a) may defer the date of submittal to Congress of 
     a covered intelligence report under the jurisdiction of such 
     official to a date after February 1, 2002, if such official 
     submits to the committees of Congress specified in subsection 
     (b)(2) before February 1, 2002, a certification that 
     preparation and submittal of the covered intelligence report 
     on February 1, 2002, will impede the work of officers or 
     employees who are engaged in counterterrorism activities.
       (2) A certification under paragraph (1) with respect to a 
     covered intelligence report shall specify the date on which 
     the covered intelligence report will be submitted to 
     Congress.
       (f) Effective Period.--The effective period of this section 
     is the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this 
     Act and ending on February 1, 2002.
       (g) Element of the Intelligence Community Defined.--In this 
     section, the term ``element of the intelligence community'' 
     means any element of the intelligence community specified or 
     designated under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

     SEC. 905. DISCLOSURE TO DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE OF 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE-RELATED INFORMATION WITH 
                   RESPECT TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection 105B as section 105C; and
       (2) by inserting after section 105A the following new 
     section 105B:


       ``disclosure of foreign intelligence acquired in criminal 
     investigations; notice of criminal investigations of foreign 
                          intelligence sources

       ``Sec. 105B. (a) Disclosure of Foreign Intelligence.--(1) 
     Except as otherwise provided by law and subject to paragraph 
     (2), the Attorney General, or the head of any other 
     department or agency of the Federal Government with law 
     enforcement responsibilities, shall expeditiously disclose to 
     the Director of Central Intelligence, pursuant to guidelines 
     developed by the Attorney General in consultation with the 
     Director, foreign intelligence acquired by an element of the 
     Department of Justice or an element of such department or 
     agency, as the case may be, in the course of a criminal 
     investigation.
       ``(2) The Attorney General by regulation and in 
     consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence may 
     provide for exceptions to the applicability of paragraph (1) 
     for one or more classes of foreign intelligence, or foreign 
     intelligence with respect to one or more targets or matters, 
     if the Attorney General determines that disclosure of such 
     foreign intelligence under that paragraph would jeopardize an 
     ongoing law enforcement investigation or impair other 
     significant law enforcement interests.
       ``(b) Procedures for Notice of Criminal Investigations.--
     Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this 
     section, the Attorney General, in consultation with the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, shall develop guidelines to 
     ensure that after receipt of a report from an element of the 
     intelligence community of activity of a foreign intelligence 
     source or potential foreign intelligence source that may 
     warrant investigation as criminal activity, the Attorney 
     General provides notice to the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, within a reasonable period of time, of his 
     intention to commence, or decline to commence, a criminal 
     investigation of such activity.
       ``(c) Procedures.--The Attorney General shall develop 
     procedures for the administration of this section, including 
     the disclosure of foreign intelligence by elements of the 
     Department of Justice, and elements of other departments and 
     agencies of the Federal Government, under subsection (a) and 
     the provision of notice with respect to criminal 
     investigations under subsection (b).''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of that Act is amended by striking the item relating 
     to section 105B and inserting the following new items:

``Sec. 105B. Disclosure of foreign intelligence acquired in criminal 
              investigations; notice of criminal investigations of 
              foreign intelligence sources.
``Sec. 105C. Protection of the operational files of the National 
              Imagery and Mapping Agency.''.

     SEC. 906. FOREIGN TERRORIST ASSET TRACKING CENTER.

       (a) Report on Reconfiguration.--Not later than February 1, 
     2002, the Attorney General, the Director of Central 
     Intelligence, and the Secretary of the Treasury shall jointly 
     submit to Congress a report on the feasibility and 
     desirability of reconfiguring the Foreign Terrorist Asset 
     Tracking Center and the Office of Foreign Assets Control of 
     the Department of the Treasury in order to establish a 
     capability to provide for the effective and efficient 
     analysis and dissemination of foreign intelligence relating 
     to the financial capabilities and resources of international 
     terrorist organizations.
       (b) Report Requirements.--(1) In preparing the report under 
     subsection (a), the Attorney General, the Secretary, and the 
     Director shall consider whether, and to what extent, the 
     capacities and resources of the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
     Center of the Department of the Treasury may be integrated 
     into the capability contemplated by the report.
       (2) If the Attorney General, Secretary, and the Director 
     determine that it is feasible and desirable to undertake the 
     reconfiguration described in subsection (a) in order to 
     establish the capability described in that subsection, the 
     Attorney General, the Secretary, and the Director shall 
     include with the report under that subsection a detailed 
     proposal for legislation to achieve the reconfiguration.

     SEC. 907. NATIONAL VIRTUAL TRANSLATION CENTER.

       (a) Report on Establishment.--(1) Not later than February 
     1, 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, in 
     consultation with the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress a report on the establishment and maintenance within 
     the intelligence community of an element for purposes of 
     providing timely and accurate translations of foreign 
     intelligence for all other elements of the intelligence 
     community. In the report, the element shall be referred to as 
     the ``National Virtual Translation Center''.
       (2) The report on the element described in paragraph (1) 
     shall discuss the use of state-of-the-art communications 
     technology, the integration of existing translation 
     capabilities in the intelligence community, and the 
     utilization of remote-connection capacities so as to minimize 
     the need for a central physical facility for the element.
       (b) Resources.--The report on the element required by 
     subsection (a) shall address the following:
       (1) The assignment to the element of a staff of individuals 
     possessing a broad range of linguistic and translation skills 
     appropriate for the purposes of the element.
       (2) The provision to the element of communications 
     capabilities and systems that are

[[Page 19579]]

     commensurate with the most current and sophisticated 
     communications capabilities and systems available to other 
     elements of intelligence community.
       (3) The assurance, to the maximum extent practicable, that 
     the communications capabilities and systems provided to the 
     element will be compatible with communications capabilities 
     and systems utilized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     in securing timely and accurate translations of foreign 
     language materials for law enforcement investigations.
       (4) The development of a communications infrastructure to 
     ensure the efficient and secure use of the translation 
     capabilities of the element.
       (c) Secure Communications.--The report shall include a 
     discussion of the creation of secure electronic 
     communications between the element described by subsection 
     (a) and the other elements of the intelligence community.
       (d) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) Foreign intelligence.--The term ``foreign 
     intelligence'' has the meaning given that term in section 
     3(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(2)).
       (2) Element of the intelligence community.--The term 
     ``element of the intelligence community'' means any element 
     of the intelligence community specified or designated under 
     section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4)).

     SEC. 908. TRAINING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS REGARDING 
                   IDENTIFICATION AND USE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

       (a) Program Required.--The Attorney General shall, in 
     consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, carry 
     out a program to provide appropriate training to officials 
     described in subsection (b) in order to assist such officials 
     in--
       (1) identifying foreign intelligence information in the 
     course of their duties; and
       (2) utilizing foreign intelligence information in the 
     course of their duties, to the extent that the utilization of 
     such information is appropriate for such duties.
       (b) Officials.--The officials provided training under 
     subsection (a) are, at the discretion of the Attorney General 
     and the Director, the following:
       (1) Officials of the Federal Government who are not 
     ordinarily engaged in the collection, dissemination, and use 
     of foreign intelligence in the performance of their duties.
       (2) Officials of State and local governments who encounter, 
     or may encounter in the course of a terrorist event, foreign 
     intelligence in the performance of their duties.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is hereby 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Justice 
     such sums as may be necessary for purposes of carrying out 
     the program required by subsection (a).

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

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