[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 13]
[Senate]
[Pages 18130-18132]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                THREAT OF GERM WARFARE AND BIOTERRORISM

  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise to discuss an issue based on my 
observations over the past week, an issue clearly on the minds of many 
people, and that is the potential threat of germ warfare and 
bioterrorism. Over the weekend, there was a lot of discussion through 
the various media outlets about our broad vulnerability to terrorism in 
the United States of America, in part based on intelligence and in part 
based on the events of September 11.
  Over the last week, many people have rushed to obtain antibiotics and 
gas masks to prepare for the threat of bioterrorism or germ warfare--
the threat that is posed by germs, bacteria--if viruses fall into the 
wrong hands. Many people are concerned that given the powerful 
destructive ability of some of these viruses, they could used in a way 
that threatens not only all Americans, but all of civilization.
  A lot of people called me over the weekend, recognizing my interest 
in this topic and recognizing I had participated in passing a bill 
called the Public Health Threats and Emergency Act which was passed in 
the year 2000.
  People have asked if the threat of bioterrorism is real? The answer 
is yes, it is real. In fact, we have already seen the destructive use 
of bacteria by people in this country. In 1984, there was an outbreak 
in Oregon of salmonella poisoning from which over 700 people suffered 
some illness. This outbreak was caused by members of a religious cult 
placing living bacteria in the salad bars of 10 different sites across 
the State.
  The ``bio'' part of biogerm warfare or biochemical warfare is the 
living organism, and that is what was inserted in the salad bars that 
caused the illness of about 700 people. We know germ warfare has been 
used, so the threat is real.
  But before people attempt to respond to this threat by rushing out 
and buying items, we need to put the threat of bioterrorism in 
perspective. The overall probability of a bioterrorist attack is low. I 
do not know exactly what that number is. In fact, we cannot put a 
specific number on it, but the overall probability of a terrorist 
attack using biology, bacteria, living organisms--is low. However, it 
is increasing. It is now our number one or number two threat, and, at 
least to me, it is clear that we are highly vulnerable in the event 
such an attack takes place.
  The consequences of such an attack, whether it is with anthrax, 
smallpox, tularemia, pneumonic plague, nerve agents or blister agents, 
is huge. Why? Because we are ill equipped. We are unprepared. However, 
in saying that, we have to be careful that we do not become alarmists. 
People will have nightmares, will not sleep at night, and the response 
should be the opposite.
  We need to recognize there are things we can do right now, first and 
foremost, to develop a comprehensive biodefense plan capable of 
preventing a bioterrorist attack. Obviously, prevention should be our 
primary goal from the outset. We want to keep biological weapons out of 
the hands of people who are intent on destruction. At the same time we 
can be prepared--if these germs and agents fall in the hands of a 
potential terrorist--by preparing an effective response plan. Third, is 
the response, an area called consequence management, crisis management 
after such an assault takes place.
  Yes, the threat is real, but very low--a tiny probability, but 
growing. Why do I say growing? Because on September 11 we witnessed a 
calamity the likes of which have never been seen before in the history 
of the world. It was unexpected and unfathomable--using planes as 
bombs. We know those events were carefully planned out over a period of 
years in a very sophisticated way that was obviously well financed. 
Therefore, I will say it is growing because we did not expect it, and 
because it has occurred several years after Khobar Towers and after the 
attack on the USS Cole. So there is an increasing threat of calamity 
and destruction.

[[Page 18131]]

  This threat is rising, secondly, because of scientific advances in 
areas such as aerosolization. People talk about anthrax and how you 
cannot really aerosolize it--that is, breaking it down into defined 
particles so it can be inhaled into the lungs--because 10 years ago we 
tried to do it and could not do it. However, over the last 10 years 
there have been huge advances in this technology. Today we use 
nebulizers in hospitals to aerosolize particles to get medication deep 
into the lungs. We did not have that technology 10 to 15 years ago, but 
the technology has been developed.
  Take perfume, for example. When one goes through a department store, 
one can smell the perfume around. The technology of aerosolization has 
progressed rapidly over the last 10 to 15 years. What we thought could 
not be done 10 or 15 years ago can be done today because of advances in 
technology.
  Another example is airplanes spraying chemicals. They say: Oh, those 
crop dusters cannot do it, but there are some dry chemical crop dusters 
that might be able to spray agents.
  I have mentioned these examples because science has changed and what 
we could not do years ago can be done today.
  In addition, the scientific expertise related to biochemical warfare 
is there. A lot of people don't realize that during the 1980s, well 
after a general pact in 1972 was agreed upon by really the world, the 
Soviet Union set out in a very determined and aggressive way to develop 
biochemical weapons. The number one goal of this project was the 
development of pathogens that could kill. This was not a little, secret 
project. This project involved as many as 7,000 scientists whose 
professional being, through the 1980s in the Soviet Union, was to 
develop these pathogens and effective mechanisms for their delivery.
  With the fall of the Soviet Union 13 years ago, those scientists all 
of a sudden became unemployed. With no employment available in the 
former Soviet Union, those scientists have gone elsewhere in the world. 
We do not know where they all are, but we do know that they spent their 
entire professional life studying how to develop the boichemical 
weapons that threaten us today.
  I say that because it is not beyond the realm of possibility that 
those scientists can be either hired or bought. All of this is in the 
public record, and, again, I want to be very careful because I do not 
want to be an alarmist. On the other hand, people need to realize that 
from the technology and the scientific standpoint, the expertise is out 
there.
  The third area, and the reason why I say the risk is rising compared 
to 10 years ago, is that the United States today has emerged as the 
sole superpower of the world. Without the cold war and the sort of 
balances and the trade-offs and the push and the pull, the United 
States has become the target of many people who resent us, who do not 
like us, who are jealous of us, and a lot of that fervor today will hit 
the surface, or was hitting the surface more than 10 or 15 years ago in 
the middle of the cold war.
  So, the threat is real: low probability but rising.
  Let me just close on an issue that has to be addressed, and that is 
this whole field of vulnerability. Why are we so vulnerable today? We 
have heard recently that the Federal Government has worked aggressively 
and compared to 4 years ago, there has been enormous improvement at the 
Federal level. We are investing money that was not being invested 4 
years ago. We are organized. We have 12-hour push products that allow 
us to very quickly get antibiotics and vaccine, although not enough 
vaccine. We have a delivery system that could be mobilized very 
quickly. All of this is good.
  We also know that at the Federal level we are not nearly as 
coordinated as we should be. Treasury, Defense, Energy, and Health and 
Human Services are all doing something, but according to the GAO report 
that came out last week, we need better organization and better 
coordination to eliminate the duplication and to eliminate the possible 
conflicting messages that are sent from the Federal level. So, we can 
coordinate better.
  I am delighted that Governor Ridge has taken on this overall 
responsibility because that is the first step toward better 
coordination.
  What really bothers me, when I say the vulnerability is high in spite 
of low probability, is that our public health infrastructure has been 
woefully and inadequately underfunded over the last really 15 years to 
two decades.
  If there were a bioterrorist attack using germ warfare, what would 
happen? Basically, you have to diagnosis, you have to have good medical 
surveillance, you have to be able to assimilate a response team, and 
you have to do in it a rapid fashion. That is done through our public 
health system. The difference between conventional weaponry and 
bioweaponry is that bioweaponry requires first responders that are not 
just the firemen and the policemen, which are so critical and whose 
courage was so well demonstrated 2\1/2\ weeks ago, but in addition the 
first responders have to be the physicians, nurses, and the people who 
are managing the public health systems today.
  Most physicians have never been trained to recognize smallpox or to 
recognize the pneumonic plague that affects the lungs or to recognize 
tularemia or the various types of food poisoning. They have not been 
trained. When you see 100 cases of flu, you do not even think about 
pneumonic anthrax. So we need better training.
  We have underfunded the public health infrastructure. Communities of 
fewer than 25,000 people are being served by public health units of 
which fewer than two-thirds have fax machines or an Internet 
connection. The ability to communicate between public health units once 
something is suspected or identified between the public health entities 
is absolutely critical. This communication infrastructure, at least 
from my standpoint, as a physician, as someone who has dealt in 
treating the immuno-compromised host through the field of 
transplantation for 20 years before coming to the Senate, is totally 
inadequate today.
  There are four other things that we can do. The bill that we passed 
in this body last year, the Public Health Threats and Emergency Act, is 
a good first step. It addressed this prevention, it addressed this 
preparedness, and it addressed this third category of consequence 
management.
  Unless we support our public health infrastructure, we cannot 
minimize the vulnerability that is out there today by training those 
first responders, by making sure that coordination at the local level 
among various entities is intact. This coordination is not there today 
because we have underinvested. Finally we must make sure that there is 
coordination at the State level and then at the Federal level and then 
across the Federal level, and that there is appropriate coordination 
without duplication.
  I will simply close by saying that now is not the time for 
individuals to go out and hoard antibiotics or to buy gas masks. Now is 
the time for us to come together and develop a comprehensive biodefense 
plan that looks first at prevention to make sure we have the adequate 
intelligence, the appropriate research in terms of viruses, in terms of 
vaccines, and in terms of methods of early detection; second to look at 
preparedness, to make sure we are stockpiling the appropriate 
antibiotics, that we have a sufficient number of vaccines, which we 
simply do not have today but we are working very hard to get; and third 
that our consequence management and crisis management could handle what 
is called the surge product, the rush of people to emergency rooms, in 
a straightforward way.
  I am very optimistic. We are working very hard over the course of 
this week on how much money should be put into this effort. We had a 
good first step last year in the Public Health Threats and Emergency 
Act. I am very confident that the American public will be very well 
served by this body and by the administration as we look at this 
critical area of biodefense.
  I yield the floor.

[[Page 18132]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, we are in morning business, is that 
correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are in morning business.

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