[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 12]
[Senate]
[Pages 17239-17241]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                           AVIATION SECURITY

  Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, I come to the floor today to discuss the 
issue of aviation security. The Senate Commerce Committee, on which I 
serve, had hearings this week on this issue. I want to take a few 
minutes this morning to discuss the history of this issue, the history 
of the debate in Congress about aviation security. I do that with one 
overriding concern. I do not want to be back on the floor of the Senate 
in 6 months or a year taking my turn once again in the procession of 
somber floor speeches about how sorry and upset and how sad the Senate 
is that another air tragedy has occurred. I think it is important for 
the Senate to step back and take a look at this issue now so we are not 
dealing with it again in another 6 months or a year.
  Beginning my discussion this morning, I want to talk about the 
pattern of the past with respect to aviation security. Let's make no 
mistake about it. There is a very clear pattern. Again and again, there 
has been an air tragedy. Again and again, there is outrage in the 
Congress and in the country. Again and again, task forces are 
established and commissions are assigned to make reports and 
recommendations. Again and again, there has been incremental and 
ultimately ineffective implementation of changes that simply don't get 
the job done when it comes to aviation security.
  It would be an enormous disservice to those lives that have been lost 
and to the many who love them if the only response of this Congress is 
again to issue more reports, let more commissions go forward, and once 
again fail to act with respect to putting in place the actual 
provisions that are going to protect our citizens with respect to 
terrorism.
  The American people deserve quick, decisive, and sweeping aviation 
security reforms. It is time now to get the job done right.
  For a variety of reasons, for more than 20 years, plans to improve 
aviation security have not been put into practice. What I intend to do 
this morning is to outline specifically some of those specific 
proposals, to describe what happened to them, and why they didn't seem 
to be acted on.
  After the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie in 1988, and again 
after the TWA Flight 800 crashed near Long Island in 1996, there was 
enormous support for tightening aviation security. In each case, the 
Presidential commission was established and reforms were initiated. In 
each case, studies by the GAO or the Department of Transportation 
inspector general made clear that there were vulnerabilities. And in 
each case, by the time the reports came out, the momentum was lost. 
Action was slow. It was incomplete and incremental at best.
  I am not interested this morning in talking about whose fault that 
was. Clearly, part of the problem stems from what Presidential 
administrations of both political parties did in allowing the process 
to bog down in redtape and regulations. Part of the responsibility lies 
with airlines that, indeed, did fight tougher security measures by 
claiming costs would cripple their operations. But we should be very 
clear. Part of the responsibility lies right in this Chamber, right 
where the Congress did not insist on action, and did not insist on 
safety for our constituents.
  For example, in 1998, the GAO warned that vigilant congressional 
oversight was essential. They made clear that momentum for reform would 
stall otherwise. But while there were spasms of interest on Capitol 
Hill, Congress didn't do the job with respect to oversight.
  I am going to make clear as a member of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Aviation that this time is going to be different. This time the 
argument between those in the various agencies and the airline 
executives over cost, inconvenience, and control of the system aren't 
going to be allowed to be used as an argument for delay. We are not 
going to sit by again and reap the grim harvest of congressional 
inaction.
  This is just a bit of the history on this issue. In 1987, the GAO 
recommended that the FAA establish a certification program setting 
performance standards for screening companies that operate the airport 
security x rays. After the 1996 TWA Flight 800 crash, a White House 
commission said the same thing, and Congress passed legislation calling 
on the Federal Aviation Administration to get it done. But the Federal 
Aviation Administration's rulemaking process dragged on for years with 
multiple rounds of public comment. In June of 2000, the GAO reported 
that the Federal Aviation Administration was then 2 years behind 
schedule. As of this morning, the certification process for screening 
these companies still has not gone into effect.
  In 1988, the GAO reviewed FAA's progress in implementing a variety of 
key improvements, including passenger profiling, bag-matching action, 
and a variety of other initiatives.
  Their conclusion was:

       Based on FAA's current schedule and milestones, this whole 
     process for enhancing the Nation's aviation security system 
     will take years to fully implement.

  To ensure followthrough on it, the same White House commission 
recommended an annual report from the Secretary of Transportation on 
the implementation of new security measures. That report happened 
exactly once: on the first anniversary of the TWA crash. Once again, 
the response was nothing.
  Under legislation passed in 1990 and 1996, anyone with access to a 
secured area in an airport is subject to a background check. The White 
House commission established after the 1996 TWA

[[Page 17240]]

crash went further, recommending a full criminal background check and 
the FBI fingerprint check. However, the inspector general of the 
Department of Transportation recorded in 2000 that existing background 
check procedures were, in his view, ineffective.
  First, Federal Aviation Administration regulations required a 
criminal background check for some employees but not for others. 
Second, and more incredibly, some serious crimes, such as assault with 
a deadly weapon, were not on the list of offenses that would disqualify 
an employee.
  Many airports were not complying with the FAA's rules anyway. For 35 
percent of the employee files reviewed by the inspector general, there 
was no evidence that a complete background check was ever performed.
  Let's reflect on that. In 35 percent of the instances, the inspector 
general found no evidence that a complete background check was ever 
performed.
  Last year, one screening company pled guilty and paid a $1.2 million 
fine for doing inadequate background checks and for hiring at least 14 
airport workers who had criminal convictions.
  Congress passed legislation in 2000 directing the FAA to implement 
criminal fingerprint checks and expanding the list of disqualifying 
offenses. New requirements, however, apply only to large airports. And 
there still is no requirement to repeat fingerprint checks 
periodically.
  In 1993, the Department of Transportation inspector general reported 
weaknesses in airport measures to keep unauthorized persons out of 
restricted areas. A followup review in 1996 found no significant 
improvement.
  In 1999, the inspector general reported that in a test of eight major 
airports, undercover agents were able to penetrate secure areas in 117 
of 173 attempts--a 68-percent success rate. In many of those cases, the 
test intruder, an individual who was testing the system, was able to 
actually board an aircraft. Now, the list goes on.
  I want to mention just several more in terms of laying out this 
chronology.
  Following the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, there was a major 
effort to develop baggage-screening equipment in order to detect 
explosives. Technology was developed, but it was still not widely 
deployed at the time of the 1996 TWA crash.
  The White House commission created in response to that tragedy 
recommended the widespread deployment of such equipment. Congress 
provided funding, and machines were deployed in a variety of locations.
  But last year--just last year--the Department of Transportation 
inspector general found that these machines were significantly 
underutilized. The inspector general found that more than 50 percent of 
the machines were being used to screen fewer than 225 bags per day, 
even though their capacity is 225 bags per hour.
  According to a 1999 report by the National Research Council, at some 
locations ``the throughput rate has been so low that operators could 
even lose their skills for operating the equipment.''
  The reason I am going through this 15-year chronology is that on 
September 11, 2001, known vulnerabilities in America's aviation system 
remained unaddressed.
  Last week's hijackers knew there were holes. The General Accounting 
Office, that serves the U.S. Congress, had documented these significant 
gaps in our system. The terrorists took advantage of those gaps, and 
the price paid by our country has been far too great.
  Now it is time to correct these vulnerabilities. The legislation 
should include action on at least four fronts:
  First, swift implementation of the specific to-do list that I have 
outlined this morning should be a top priority. This is a to-do list 
not made up from some sort of cavalier review by an interest group. 
This is a to-do list taken from recommendations from the inspector 
general of the United States and from the General Accounting Office. 
These recommendations have accumulated for years. It is time to focus 
on getting those tasks done rather than just perpetually creating more 
reports and more lists.
  Second, Tuesday's unprecedented attack points to the need for a 
number of additional safeguards. As we all know, a number of our 
colleagues have advocated armed sky marshals onboard many flights. 
Certainly this is a sensible recommendation, a credible deterrent; and 
I support that.
  I also think there needs to be significantly improved intelligence 
sharing of information. Background checks for students applying for 
flight training obviously need to be more thorough and more meticulous. 
If a passenger is on a terrorist watch list, the country is saying: How 
in the world can aviation security officials not be aware of that?
  The technology exists to coordinate efforts between law enforcement 
and the airline industry, so no more turf fights, no more lack of 
communication. Focusing on information sharing of the best and most 
current intelligence is absolutely key so that the names and faces of 
those who are apparently unknown to the airline industry but aware to 
some in the intelligence gathering can be out and available so as to 
serve as an important tier of protection for the public.
  Third, and perhaps most important, Congress must fundamentally 
rethink who should be responsible for carrying out day-to-day 
functions, such as the screening of baggage and access to restricted 
areas. A number of forward-thinking Members of the Senate have been 
after this issue for years, particularly the chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, Senator Hollings. He has been suggesting this since 
1996 and before.
  Obviously, between airlines and airports there have been conflicts in 
the past, with some wanting security, some wanting to maximize the 
number of flights and passengers and convenience. Certainly, security 
and speed and convenience do not always fit perfectly together. But 
aviation security functions need to be placed in the hands of those 
without any conflict of law, those whose sole and paramount focus will 
be the security of the American people.
  Finally, it is obvious there will be costs associated with this. If, 
in fact, the question of airline security becomes a function of the 
Government--which is something I support, and I believe has bipartisan 
support in this body--there are opportunities to use existing funds, 
such as the airport trust fund. I, for one, would be willing to look at 
additional ways to secure that revenue. And there has been a debate of 
an aviation security trust fund. We are all aware that our constituents 
are saying, in great numbers, that they would be willing to pay a bit 
more for aviation security.
  Let's look at using existing funds more efficiently, but if that does 
not do the job, clearly, responding to our constituents, and getting 
the job done, even if it requires some additional charges, will be 
necessary.
  Finally, I think we ought to be especially concerned about smaller, 
more rural airports. It is clear they are not going to be able to 
afford some security measures. Let's be clear to the public that we are 
not going to allow rural airports to be security-sacrifice zones, in 
effect, written off by the Congress.
  In considering the cost of the massive airline security overhaul, we 
are all going to remember the numbers of last week. It is going to 
require additional funds to rebuild the Pentagon, to rebuild New York 
City. To me, to say the cost of improving airline security is too great 
is not an argument that is acceptable. The country expects us to do 
what it takes and to work together to get the job done.
  Let me conclude this morning with one last point. I came to the 
Chamber this morning to go through the 15-year chronology of inaction 
with respect to aviation security so as to set out on the record how 
again and again the inspector general and the General Accounting Office 
have laid bare the vulnerabilities of our aviation system.
  I want to make clear, again, I am not interested in assessing blame. 
When we look at the various executive branch leaders, when we look at 
the Congress, when we look at those in the various interest groups, 
including the airline industry, all of them would now say that if they 
could do it again, it would be very different. We would not have

[[Page 17241]]

this pattern, from 1987 until September 11, at the very least, that 
constantly resulted in this cycle of tragedy, outrage, recommendations, 
and then essentially slow motion implementation.
  I do not want to be back here in 6 months or a year. I don't want to 
be back in just a few months waiting with the distinguished Senator 
from North Dakota and the President of the Senate, waiting in a line to 
give speeches about yet another tragedy. The American people know their 
elected officials share their grief right now. What they want to see is 
that we can get the job done, that this time it is going to be 
different. This time the Congress is going to take the to-do list that 
has been spelled out by the General Accounting Office and the inspector 
general for years now and, without any more delay, that to-do list is 
going to be put in place and the American people will have every 
possible measure of security as they fly in our skies.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Lincoln). The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to speak for up to 5 minutes as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Dayton are printed in today's Record under 
``Morning Business.'')
  Mr. DAYTON. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the 
quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dayton). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Dorgan and Mr. Allen are printed in today's 
Record under ``Morning Business.'')
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as in 
morning business for up to 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The remarks of Mr. Allen pertaining to the introduction of S. 1433 
are printed in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. ALLEN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. CARNAHAN. I ask unanimous consent to speak as in morning 
business for up to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. CARNAHAN. Mr. President, last Tuesday's terrorist attack is 
having an immeasurable effect on our country. We are a nation of heavy 
and broken hearts devastated by the tremendous loss of life, property, 
and sense of security. My heart goes out to the victims and their 
families. We continue to take solace in the heroic deeds of the rescue 
workers and the patriotic response of Americans across the country.
  September 11 was a dark day in our history. But we have had dark days 
before.
  In the midst of World War II, Thornton Wilder wrote:

       Every good and worthwhile thing stands moment by moment on 
     the razor edge of danger and must be fought for whether it is 
     a home, or a field, or a country.

  We will lead the fight for freedom today. And, as in times past, we 
will be victorious.
  Last week Congress acted with unity and speed to respond to the 
attack on our people. We are authorized the use of force. We provided 
$40 billion for the relief effort.
  We must deal promptly and decisively on another front. The ongoing 
stability of the aviation industry must be an immediate priority.
  First of all, we need to act quickly to heighten security in our 
airports and on commercial aircraft. We must make Americans feel safe 
so that they will continue to fly.
  Unfortunately, improving security will not be enough. Our Nation's 
airlines are clearly suffering as a result of the Federal Aviation 
Administration's decision to ground commercial aircraft last week. 
While most airlines began operating again last Thursday, it is unclear 
when carriers will be able to resume their full schedules. Moreover, it 
appears that ticket sales are declining, which will further weaken this 
already distressed industry.
  We must respond to this crisis to ensure that last week's attackers 
do not succeed in bringing down our Nation's airlines. This Congress 
must provide a meaningful economic recovery package to help stabilize 
the airline industry.
  A number of proposals are currently being considered. They include 
extending credit or guaranteed loans to the airlines and providing 
direct compensation for losses sustained as a result of last week's 
events. I am extremely supportive of these measures.
  I also believe that any relief package for the airlines must include 
an additional component to provide assistance to displaced workers. 
This Congress must demonstrate that while we stand ready to bolster the 
airline industry, we are also committed to supporting the men and women 
who represent its heart and soul.
  I fear that even if a stabilization package for the airlines is 
expeditiously approved, a certain number of layoffs are inevitable.
  Midway Airlines has already been forced to suspend all of its flight 
operations and will lay off its remaining 1,700 employees. Continental 
Airlines announced that it was furloughing 12,000 of its employees. 
Airline executives estimate that as many as 100,000 workers could lose 
their jobs in the next few weeks.
  The problems afflicting the airline industry will have a devastating 
impact on thousands of hard-working men and women. I believe we must 
enact a meaningful relief package designed to both reinforce the 
airline industry and provide support for displaced workers.
  I am currently crafting a proposal to provide support for displaced 
workers. We do not know how long these employees will be out of work or 
indeed if they will ever be able to be employed by the airline industry 
again. They are going to need financial assistance. They are going to 
need retraining. And they are going to need health coverage. As with 
other aspects of the disaster relief effort, the Federal Government 
needs to take the lead.
  Our airline industry needs help. So do its many employees. I am 
committed to ensuring that assistance for displaced workers is part of 
the larger airline relief package that we will take up in the days 
ahead.
  I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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