[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 90-93]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                   THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to comment briefly on an issue that 
is important to our national security: the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, or CTBT, that would ban all nuclear weapon tests. This is an 
issue that the new President and the new Senate should think about 
carefully and deliberately during the 107th Congress.
  Today General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, presented a report to President Clinton on his findings and 
recommendations on the CTBT. President Clinton had asked General 
Shalikashvili to conduct a comprehensive and independent study of the 
CTBT after the Senate voted against a resolution of ratification in 
October of 1999.
  The CTBT negotiations were completed in 1996, and the United States 
was the first nation to sign the Treaty. To date, 160 nations have 
signed it and 69 have ratified it, including all our NATO allies, 
Japan, South Korea and Russia. However, to enter into force, it must be 
ratified by 44 specified nations

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that have nuclear reactors, including the United States.
  The Treaty would prohibit all nuclear explosive tests. In so doing, 
it would make it much harder for nations to develop nuclear weapons, 
thus putting in place an important roadblock to nuclear weapon 
proliferation. The treaty provides for an expanded and improved 
international monitoring system that would improve our ability to 
detect and deter nuclear tests by other nations--but only if we ratify 
the treaty and it enters into force.
  Secretary of Defense Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all support 
ratification of the CTBT, as do four former Chairmen of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, including General Shalikashvili and Gen. Colin Powell.
  When the Senate took up the CTBT in October 1999, it did so in haste 
and without the traditional bipartisan deliberation we have accorded 
other arms control treaties. On the eve of the vote, 62 Senators signed 
a letter urging the Senate leadership to delay that vote and to 
postpone final consideration of the CTBT until the 107th Congress. 
Unfortunately, that request, which was made by nearly two-thirds of the 
Members of the Senate, to delay the vote, was not heeded, and the 
result was that the resolution of ratification was defeated by a vote 
of 51-48, with one Senator voting present.
  Again, General Shalikashvili was asked to review the entire 
situation, and in conducting his review, he met with a number of 
Senators from both sides of the aisle to discuss their concerns and 
their suggestions. He also met with many other experts on this issue, 
and he visited the nuclear weapons labs.
  General Shalikashvili's report is a valuable contribution to this 
important topic. This report, which was just filed today, places the 
CTBT in the broader context of our nuclear nonproliferation goals and 
efforts and points out that the CTBT is an important component of this 
enduring national security priority of nuclear nonproliferation. He 
concludes that the CTBT remains in our national interest and that the 
Senate should reconsider the treaty in a bipartisan manner, hopefully 
with the result that ratification is approved by the Senate.
  General Shalikashvili's report reviews the major concerns which were 
expressed about the CTBT during our debate, and it offers 
recommendations in each of these areas, including ways to improve our 
monitoring and verification of foreign nuclear testing efforts and ways 
to improve our nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship Program. These 
recommendations address concerns raised about the CTBT and provide some 
commonsense and balanced steps to improve our security while bringing 
the CTBT into force.
  Specifically, General Shalikashvili's report examines the larger 
nonproliferation context of the CTBT and concludes that the CTBT has a 
genuine nonproliferation value for our national security. His report 
studies the question of monitoring and verification and concludes that 
the monitoring system under the treaty will significantly enhance U.S. 
national monitoring capabilities and that cheating will be much harder 
and less useful than some fear. He evaluates our ability to maintain 
the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons and determines that 
we can do so without nuclear testing if we fully support the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program and manage it prudently.
  Finally, General Shalikashvili's report looks at the question of 
whether CTBT should be of indefinite duration and recommends that in 
addition to the safeguards accompanying the treaty, the Senate and the 
executive branch should conduct a joint review of the treaty 10 years 
after ratification and at 10-year intervals thereafter.
  One of the key points made by General Shalikashvili is that the CTBT 
is conditioned on a safeguard that will assure our ability to maintain 
a safe and reliable stockpile. Under safeguard F, the United States 
would maintain the right and the ability to withdraw from the treaty 
and to conduct any testing necessary if that were required to certify 
the safety and reliability of a nuclear weapon type critical to our 
nuclear deterrent. General Shalikashvili's recommendation on the joint 
review would strengthen this safeguard by saying that if, after that 
joint review, grave doubts remained about the treaty's value for our 
national security, the President would be prepared to withdraw from the 
treaty.
  I know General Shalikashvili's report will be considered carefully 
and seriously by the Senate and by the new administration. I hope we 
and the new administration will review his report and think through our 
CTBT position in a deliberate manner, and I will be making this point 
personally to President-elect Bush next Monday at a meeting in Austin 
for congressional defense and security leaders.
  We owe General Shalikashvili a national debt of gratitude for serving 
our Nation and its security once again. He has taken a great deal of 
his time since retiring to review the CTBT and to craft recommendations 
that I hope we will implement. I recommend his report to all Senators 
and to the new administration, and I hope we will reconsider the treaty 
in the best bipartisan spirit of the Senate as his report recommends.
  I ask unanimous consent that General Shalikashvili's letter to the 
President, accompanying his report, and his introduction and 
recommendations from the report be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of 
           State for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
                                                  January 4, 2001.
     Hon. William Jefferson Clinton,
     President of the United States, The White House.
       Dear Mr. President: Last year, you and the Secretary of 
     State requested that I serve as your Special Advisor for the 
     Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In this capacity, I met with 
     senators from both sides of the aisle to discuss their 
     concerns and suggestions for any additional steps that could 
     be taken to build bipartisan support for ratification. I was 
     deeply appreciative of their willingness to engage in 
     serious, substantive discussions about the Test Ban Treaty.
       In addition to talking with senators, I have also discussed 
     the Treaty with senior members of your administration, 
     leading national security experts from former 
     administrations, representatives of non-governmental 
     organizations, and numerous scientific and diplomatic 
     experts. I have visited the three nuclear weapon 
     laboratories, met with their directors, and talked with a 
     number of senior nuclear designers. My representatives have 
     traveled to the Air Force Technical Applications Center, 
     which operates U.S. national technical means for monitoring 
     compliance with nuclear test ban treaties, and to Vienna, 
     where work is underway on the international verification 
     system. I asked several think tanks to provide a ``second 
     opinion'' about verification and the Treaty's impact on other 
     countries' nuclear ambitions. I have also reviewed numerous 
     reports by external expert groups.
       At the end of my review of the Treaty's potential impact on 
     U.S. national security, I support the Treaty, just as I did 
     when I served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My 
     discussions over the last ten months have only strengthened 
     my view that the Treaty is a very important part of global 
     non-proliferation efforts and is compatible with keeping a 
     safe, reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent. I believe that an 
     objective and thorough net assessment shows convincingly that 
     U.S. interests, as well as those of friends and allies, will 
     be served by the Treaty's entry into force.
       The nation's nuclear arsenal is safe, reliable, and able to 
     meet all stated military requirements. For as far into the 
     future as we can see, the U.S. nuclear deterrent can remain 
     effective under the Test Ban Treaty, assuming prudent 
     stockpile stewardship--including the ability to remanufacture 
     aging components. While there are steps that should be taken 
     to better manage the long-term risks associated with 
     stockpile stewardship, I believe that there is no good reason 
     to delay ratification of the Treaty pending further advances 
     in the Stockpile Stewardship Program as long as we have a 
     credible mechanism to leave the Treaty should a serious 
     problem with the deterrent make that necessary. I fear that 
     the longer entry into force is delayed, the more likely it is 
     that other countries will move irrevocably to acquire nuclear 
     weapons or significantly improve their current nuclear 
     arsenal, and the less likely it is that we could mobilize a 
     strong international coalition against such activities.
       In my consultations with senators, I have found broad 
     bipartisan support for strengthened U.S. leadership of a 
     comprehensive international response to the dangers posed by 
     the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The overarching 
     question has been whether the

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     contributions that the Test Ban Treaty can make to national 
     and international security outweigh any potential risks. I 
     have recommended a number of steps that do not involve 
     renegotiating the Treaty and that would go a long way toward 
     addressing specific concerns. I am confident that there would 
     be broad bipartisan support for those of my recommendations 
     that deal with developing a more integrated non-proliferation 
     policy, enhancing U.S. capabilities to track nuclear 
     proliferation and monitor nuclear testing, and strengthening 
     stockpile stewardship. I urge their early implementation 
     because these actions are important for national security 
     without regard to the immediate fate of the Test Ban Treaty. 
     Since these steps would also strengthen the U.S. position 
     under the Treaty, I hope that the next Administration and the 
     Senate will re-evaluate the Test Ban Treaty as part of a 
     bipartisan effort to forge an integrated non-proliferation 
     strategy for the new century.
       I hope that the attacked report will prove useful in 
     charting a course for future reconsideration and eventual 
     ratification of the Test Ban Treaty. Should developments at 
     home or abroad ever cast doubt on our ability to maintain a 
     safe, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent, however, we 
     should withdraw from the Treaty if a resumption of nuclear 
     testing would make us more secure. My recommendations would 
     reduce the likelihood of such problems and provide additional 
     reassurances that, if they did occur, the United States would 
     take the appropriate actions. As additional insurance, I am 
     also recommending a joint ten-year Executive-Legislative 
     review of the full range of issues bearing on the Treaty's 
     net value for national security in response to concerns about 
     the Treaty's indefinite duration.
       The rest of the world is looking to us for continued 
     leadership of global efforts to stop proliferation and 
     strengthen the nuclear restraint regime. Nothing could be 
     more important to national security and international 
     stability.
           Very respectfully,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,
     General, USA (Ret.).
                                  ____


Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
                               Ban Treaty

 (By General John M. Shalikashvili (USA, Ret.), Special Advisor to the 
            President and Secretary of State, January 2001)


                            i. introduction

       A decade after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are 
     still important to U.S. and allied security, a silent giant 
     guarding against a catastrophic miscalculation by a potential 
     adversary. The United States has the safest, most reliable, 
     most capable arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world. It will 
     need a credible deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.
       Equally important to our security are global non-
     proliferation efforts. For the past half century, the United 
     States has led the campaign to prevent the spread of nuclear 
     weapons to additional countries or terrorist groups, and to 
     reduce the chances that such weapons would ever be used.
       The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty places obstacles 
     in the path of nuclear weapon development by states that 
     could some day threaten the United States or its allies. The 
     question associated with Treaty ratification is whether the 
     security benefits from the Treaty outweigh any risks that a 
     ban on all nuclear explosions could pose to the U.S. 
     deterrent.
       Four types of concerns have been most prominent in the 
     debate on advice and consent to ratification in October 1999 
     and in my subsequent investigations:
       1. Whether the Test Ban Treaty has genuine non-
     proliferation value;
       2. Whether cheating could threaten U.S. security;
       3. Whether we can maintain the safety and reliability of 
     the U.S. nuclear deterrent without nuclear explosive testing; 
     and
       4. Whether it is wise to endorse a Test Ban Treaty of 
     indefinite duration.
       After examining these issues, I remain convinced that the 
     advantages of the Test Ban Treaty outweigh any disadvantages, 
     and thus that ratification would increase national security. 
     In each area, though, I am recommending additional actions to 
     address concerns and further strengthen the U.S. position 
     under the Treaty. I believe that we can go a long way toward 
     bridging differences on these issues if they receive a level 
     of sustained bipartisan attention equal to their high 
     importance for national security.
       The broad objectives of my specific recommendations are to:
       1. Increase bipartisan and allied support for a carefully 
     coordinated comprehensive non-proliferation;
       2. Enhance U.S. capabilities to detect and deter nuclear 
     testing and other aspects of nuclear proliferation;
       3. Improve the management of potential risks associated 
     with the long-term reliability and safety of the U.S. nuclear 
     deterrent; and
       4. Address concerns about the Test Ban Treaty's indefinite 
     duration through a joint Executive-Legislative review of the 
     Treaty's net value for national security to be held ten years 
     after ratification and at regular intervals thereafter.
       Test Ban Treaty supporters, skeptics, and opponents all 
     agree that the United States needs to revitalize support for 
     an integrated non-proliferation strategy, enhance its 
     monitoring capabilities, and develop a bipartisan consensus 
     on stewardship of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. I urge early 
     implementation of my recommendations on these issues because 
     they would strengthen U.S. security regardless of the 
     immediate fate of the Test Ban Treaty. Action on these steps 
     would also go a long way toward addressing concerns that have 
     been voiced about the Treaty. Together with my recommendation 
     on the ten-year joint review procedure, these steps offer a 
     way to build bipartisan support for Test Ban Treaty 
     ratification as an integral component of an overarching 
     strategy to stop nuclear proliferation and strengthen the 
     nuclear restraint regime.


                  VIII. Compilation of Recommendations

     Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation, and the Test Ban Treaty
       A. Working closely with the Congress and with U.S. friends 
     and allies, the next Administration should implement on an 
     urgent basis an integrated non-proliferation policy targeted 
     on, but not limited to, countries and groups believed to have 
     an active interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.
       B. To increase high level attention and policy coherence, 
     the next Administration should appoint a Deputy National 
     Security Advisor for Non-Proliferation, with the authority 
     and resources needed to coordinate and oversee implementation 
     of U.S. non-proliferation policy.
       C. As part of its effort to build bipartisan and allied 
     support for an integrated non-proliferation policy, the next 
     Administration should review at the highest level issues 
     related to the Test Ban Treaty. There should be a sustained 
     interagency effort to address senators' questions and 
     concerns on these issues of great importance to national 
     security.
       D. The United States should continue its testing moratorium 
     and take other concrete actions to demonstrate its commitment 
     to a world without nuclear explosions, such as continuing 
     leadership in building up the International Monitoring System 
     (IMS) being established for the Treaty.
     Monitoring, Verification, and Foreign Nuclear Programs
       A. Higher funding and intelligence collection priorities 
     should be assigned to monitoring nuclear test activities and 
     other aspects of nuclear weapon acquisition or development by 
     other states.
       B. Collaboration should be increased among U.S. government 
     officials and other experts to ensure that national 
     intelligence, the Treaty's international verification regime, 
     and other scientific stations are used as complementary 
     components of an all-source approach to verification.
       C. The transition from research to operational use should 
     be accelerated for new verification technologies and 
     analytical techniques.
       D. The United States should continue working with other 
     Test Ban Treaty signatories to prepare for inspections and 
     develop confidence-building measures.
       E. Additional steps should be taken unilaterally or 
     bilaterally to increase transparency regarding the nature and 
     purpose of activities at known nuclear test sites.
     Stewardship of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile
       A. Working with the Department of Defense, other Executive 
     Branch agencies, and the Congress, the Administrator of the 
     NNSA should complete as soon as possible his comprehensive 
     review of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The review will 
     clarify objectives and requirements, set priorities, assess 
     progress, identify needs, and develop an overarching program 
     plan with broad-based support.
       Highest priority should be given to aspects of stockpile 
     stewardship that are most urgently needed to assure the near-
     term reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, i.e. 
     surveillance, refurbishment, and infrastructure 
     revitalization.
       Enhance surveillance and monitoring activities should 
     receive full support and not be squeezed by higher profile 
     aspects of the SSP.
       The NNSA should make a decision about the need for a large-
     scale plutonium pit remanufacturing facility as soon as 
     possible after the next Administration has determined the 
     appropriate size and composition of the enduring stockpile, 
     including reserves.
       A dedicated infrastructure revitalization fund should be 
     established after the NNSA has completed a revitalization 
     plan for its production facilities and laboratories.
       B. The NNSA, working with Congress and the Office of 
     Management and Budget, should place the SSP on a multi-year 
     budget cycle like the Department of Defense's Future Years 
     Defense Program. Some increase in funds for the SSP is likely 
     to be necessary
       C. Steps to improve interagency management of stockpile 
     stewardship matters, such as the revitalization of the 
     Nuclear Weapons Council, are essential and should be 
     continued.
       D. Appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that the 
     performance margins of various weapon types are adequate when 
     conservatively evaluated.

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       E. Strict discipline should be exercised over changes to 
     existing nuclear weapon designs to ensure that neither an 
     individual change nor the cumulative effect of small 
     modifications would make it difficult to certify weapons 
     realiability or safety without a nuclear explosion.
       F. The Administrator of the NNSA should establish an on-
     going high level external advisory mechanism, such as a panel 
     of outstanding and independent scientists.
     Minimizing Uncertainty with a Treaty of Indefinite Duration
       A. The Administration and the Senate should commit to 
     conducting an intensive joint review of the Test Ban Treaty's 
     net value for national security ten years after U.S. 
     ratification, and at ten-year intervals thereafter. This 
     review should consider the Stockpile Stewardship Program's 
     priorities, accomplishments, and challenges; current and 
     planned verification capabilities; and the Treaty's 
     adherence, implementation, compliance, and enforcement 
     record. Recommendations to address concerns should be 
     formulated for domestic use and to inform the U.S. position 
     at the Treaty's ten-year review conference. If, after these 
     steps, grave doubts remain about the Treaty's net value for 
     U.S. national security, the President, in consultation with 
     Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the Test Ban 
     Treaty under the ``supreme national interests'' clause.

  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

                          ____________________