[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 711-713]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



 MOVING FROM POLITICS TO POLICY: THE PRESIDENT'S CHALLENGE ON NATIONAL 
                            MISSILE DEFENSE

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, last weekend the nation inaugurated a new 
President, President George W. Bush.

[[Page 712]]

With the change of power now complete, the President and Congress must 
now get down to the hard business of governing.
  After eight years of Democratic leadership, it is obvious that a Bush 
Administration will propose policy changes on several fronts. One of 
the most important and complex issues for President Bush will be how to 
implement his national missile defense policy in a manner that 
contributes to our national security, rather than putting it at risk.
  For six solid years, Republicans have used national missile defense 
as a ``big stick''--a stick employed not against America's enemies, but 
against those who thought we did not need a national missile defense. 
Republicans repeatedly criticized the Clinton administration for its 
approach to national missile defense, and in the last two presidential 
campaigns, the promise of a ``robust'' national missile defense figured 
prominently in the Republican Party's platform and foreign policy 
speeches.
  Although it is always difficult to get into the minds of the American 
people, it does appear that, for the most part, the public has ignored 
this debate. The missile defense issue has commanded the attention of 
only a tiny minority of the American people. In a recent survey by the 
Pew Charitable Trust of priorities for the new administration, 
Americans rated missile defense in eighteenth place among twenty 
issues.
  Whether missile defense was on voters' minds or not, however, George 
W. Bush is now our President. He and his team are committed to a 
national missile defense that will be, in the President's words, 
``effective,'' ``based on the best available options,'' deployed ``at 
the earliest possible date'' and ``designed to protect all 50 states 
and our friends and allies and deployed forces overseas from missile 
attacks by rogue nations, or accidental launches.''
  That mantra will suffice for a campaign, but not for policy. 
Presidential campaigns bear little relation to actually being 
President, and campaign slogans are but the shadows of flesh and blood 
policy somewhat related to it, but lacking in both detail and 
substance.
  In short, the real test of President Bush on national missile defense 
is just beginning. It is to take those campaign slogans and turn them 
into coherent policies and strategies.
  The challenge for the President and his team is this: to pursue their 
dream of a ``robust'' national missile defense with:
  Full attention to the technological challenges;
  Full attention to the potential consequences for arms control;
  Full attention to the potential impact on strategic stability; and
  Full attention to its possible effect on America's relations with our 
allies.
  As our former colleague and Armed Services Committee chairman Sam 
Nunn said recently, ``I would hope the new administration would 
approach this subject as a technology, not a theology.''
  Let me outline some of the key questions that I believe the 
Administration must consider.
  A national missile defense policy for the new administration will 
specify system objectives. Whom shall the system protect, against what 
level of attack, and with what level of success--or, on the other hand, 
allowing what rate of failure?
  As I noted earlier, then-Governor Bush set his initial objectives 
last May: ``to protect all 50 states and our friends and allies and 
deployed forces overseas from missile attacks by rogue nations, or 
accidental launches.''
  That's a very tall order, Mr. President. Can current technology 
support its achievement any time soon, or at an affordable cost? I have 
my doubts.
  Taken literally, protection ``from . . . accidental launches'' 
requires an ability to intercept at least a small number of advanced 
Russian warheads, rather than just simple warheads from the so-called 
``rogue states'' of North Korea, Iran or Iraq. And protecting ``our 
friends and allies and deployed forces overseas'' would require either 
multiple defenses against ICBM's or else a world-wide system like the 
space-based laser of Ronald Reagan's ``Star Wars.''
  A serious national missile defense policy will give careful attention 
to possible Russian reactions to our actions. It is not enough to say, 
as President Bush did during the campaign, that ``I will offer Russia 
the necessary amendments to the ABM Treaty'' and that, ``if Russia 
refuses the changes we propose, I will give prompt notice'' of our 
intent to withdraw from the Treaty.
  What will happen if the President does what he proposed during the 
campaign? Will Russia suspend its compliance with other arms control 
agreements, such as the START Treaty and the Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces Treaty? Will future arms reductions occur without agreed means 
of verification? Indeed, will Russia try to rebuild its nuclear forces, 
instead of reducing them?
  Will Russia ally itself more closely with China or--worse yet--with 
anti-American ``rogue states'' that seek weapons of mass destruction? 
Will our allies question America's leadership? Will our allies lose 
faith in the nuclear non-proliferation regime that we put in place?
  A serious national missile defense policy cannot wish away these 
risks. Rather, it must consider them and include a strategy for dealing 
with them.
  Let us suppose, however, that Russia agrees to work out an 
accommodation with the United States--which is another possible 
outcome. What sort of agreement should the President propose?
  Is there an agreement that would permit the sort of defense that the 
President seeks, while still being reliably limited? Would it be 
verifiable by Russia? How would it safeguard Russia against a U.S. 
``breakout'' from its limitations?
  How shall a ``robust'' national missile defense be fielded at the 
same time that Russia and the United States are substantially reducing 
their nuclear forces, which is another stated goal of the new 
administration? Missile defense advocates argue that Russia has nothing 
to fear from a limited defense, because it has so many strategic 
warheads.
  But what happens as those numbers go down? How can mutual deterrence 
of full-scale war be maintained? How can Russia accept a system that 
undermines that deterrence?
  Does it make sense to establish a combined limit on offensive and 
defensive systems, as some experts have proposed both here and in 
Russia? Is it possible, at very low numbers of strategic forces or by 
adopting sweeping ``de-alerting'' measures as well, to deny either side 
the ability to mount a disabling first strike? If so, would each side 
then have to target its remaining missiles on the other side's cities--
as China does today--in order to maintain a residual capability to 
cause unacceptable damage to a country?
  How would a U.S.-Russian agreement allowing a ``robust'' national 
missile defense affect U.S.-Russian strategic stability across the 
whole range of possible conflicts? If a system were good enough to 
guard against accidental Russian launches, then it could also combat 
such purposeful acts as a so-called ``demonstration'' attack using a 
small number of warheads. In effect, it would ``raise the bar'' for 
initiating a strategic nuclear war; that's why it would frustrate 
``rogue states'' with very small strategic forces.
  Would this extra ``firebreak'' against strategic nuclear war make 
tactical nuclear weapons more usable? If so, is that a problem? Would 
it also set a ``floor'' on strategic arms reductions, so that the 
United States (and Russia) could still deter ``the old-fashioned way'' 
any third-country attack that would overcome the missile defense?
  What about the START II ban on MIRV'ed ICBM's? Would an agreement 
with Russia require relaxation of that ban?
  What would the consequences be of allowing a given number of MIRV's? 
Would they be small if the number of MIRV's per missile were limited to 
2 or 3, or if MIRV's were restricted to mobile launchers? How 
verifiable would such limitations be, if the MIRV's were on a missile 
that had both mobile and silo-based variants?

[[Page 713]]

  Were all these issues solved, and if a U.S.-Russian agreement were to 
be reached, how would a U.S. national missile defense affect China's 
strategic force structure and its relations with the United States? 
Would a geographically limited national missile defense--such as a 
boost-phase intercept system deployed only near ``countries of 
concern''--permit China to maintain its nuclear deterrence at low force 
levels?
  With a numerically limited defense, could we accept China increasing 
its strategic forces from 18 warheads to 200 or more? Would that prompt 
an arms race between China and India (and then Pakistan), or even with 
Russia?
  Or would a ``robust'' national missile defense--whether deployed with 
Russian assent or without it--be so large as to simply strip away 
China's deterrent capability? If that were the case, what risk would we 
run of China deciding to attack Taiwan before that date arrived? How 
would we prepare for that possibility?
  These are serious and complex questions that I have not heard debated 
or sufficiently discussed. That does not mean that they cannot be 
solved. It does underlie my own feeling, however, that the world may 
not be ready yet for the missile defense system that President Bush 
would like to build, even if the technology were available.
  If the President seeks substantial world agreement on this course, 
then the ground must be prepared--not only in Alaska, but in world 
capitals from London and Paris to Tokyo, and from Moscow to Beijing. If 
he seriously intends to proceed in the face of world objection, then 
we--and, whether they like it or not, the rest of the world--must 
prepare for all the complications that may result.
  It would be unfair to expect President Bush and his team to have 
answered all these questions already. They have argued the case for a 
``robust'' national missile defense only as a political issue, not as 
the carefully crafted policy of a government in power. That is 
understandable.
  But now they are the Executive Branch of government. They are in 
power. Now theirs is the burden of putting real flesh on the mere bones 
of a policy that sufficed while they were the opposition.
  What shall we say to those who take on that burden? On the one hand, 
we must wish them well. Nobody doubts the sincerity or morality of a 
belief in a national missile defense, only its practicality.
  On the other hand, we must also say: Do not go blindly crashing into 
this new venture.
  Remember Alexander Pope's line that ``fools rush in, where angels 
fear to tread.'' Remember also that the system you may wish to build 
does not yet exist. Neither has its feasibility or cost-effectiveness 
yet been adequately demonstrated.
  The complexity of the issues raised by a national missile defense--
and the lack of a proven design for even a limited missile defense, let 
alone a ``robust'' one--lead me to the following respectful suggestions 
to the President and his national security team:
  (1) fold these issues into the ``Nuclear Posture Review'' mandated by 
the Congress last year;
  (2) instruct our military experts to examine in that review the full 
range of interrelated offensive and defensive issues;
  (3) give them time to analyze those issues fully and thoughtfully; 
and
  (4) delay your decisions regarding missile defense architecture and 
deployment until that review has been completed and absorbed.
  If President Bush and his team proceed with caution and with fully 
articulated policies and strategies, perhaps they will transform the 
world. For that is, indeed, their goal, and it is a laudable goal.
  If they proceed rashly, however, the world is likely to be an 
unforgiving master. If they cannot develop a fully articulated policy, 
then perhaps a ``robust'' national missile defense is really an 
expression of the desire to be done with worldly cares, and not a truly 
rational approach to world leadership in the 21st century.

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