[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1543-1545]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                 THE FUTURE OF INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the powerful earthquake which recently 
devastated India's densely populated western state of Gujarat has 
focused our attention, once again, on India. Gujarat officials estimate 
that 28,000 to 30,000 people have died. Thousands more have been 
injured, and hundreds of thousands have been displaced.
  In response to India's dire need for help, USAID has sent blankets, 
generators, water containers, plastic sheeting, food, and other relief 
supplies--all part of our official commitment to provide some $10 
million in emergency humanitarian aid. But in my view this is not 
enough. We can and should do more. In the initial phase of this 
disaster when India particularly needed search and rescue teams and 
medical assistance, the United States was conspicuous in its absence. 
The Russians, the Brits, the Swiss and others were engaged in pulling 
people out of the rubble. We were not. At least half a dozen countries, 
including Denmark, Israel, and Sweden, sent field hospitals, doctors 
and medical personnel. We did not. Given our slow start, it is 
especially important for the United States to be particularly generous 
when it comes to reconstruction.
  Indian-Americans, on the other hand, have moved quickly to mobilize 
their own relief effort--collecting sizeable donations and medical 
supplies as well as assembling teams of doctors. Reflecting the depth 
of concern among Americans for the tragedy that has struck India, 
President Bush, last week, made a condolence call to Indian Prime 
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. I commend the President for making this 
call, not only because it was the right thing to do under the 
circumstances, but also because it was an important gesture by the new 
Administration toward a country in a region that the United States 
tends to ignore, except in times of crisis.
  Regrettably the Clinton Administration paid little attention to 
developments in South Asia until May 1998, when India broke its 25 year 
moratorium on nuclear testing with five underground tests. Taken by 
surprise, the Administration tried--to no avail--to persuade Pakistan 
not to test in response. Confronted with escalating tensions not only 
in the nuclear realm but on the ground over Kashmir, the Administration 
was forced to focus on growing instability in the subcontinent.
  Belatedly the Administration picked up the pace of its diplomacy in 
the region, opening a high level dialogue with India and Pakistan on 
nuclear issues, interceding to reduce tensions over Kashmir, and 
arranging a Presidential visit last March to India, with a brief stop 
in Pakistan. President Clinton's trip to India--the first by a US 
president in 22 years--was an effort, in his words, to ``rekindle the 
relationship'' between the United States and India. It was a welcome 
initiative.
  I was in India in December 1999, a few months before President 
Clinton's visit, to participate in the World Economic Forum's India 
Economic Summit. While there, I had an opportunity to meet with a 
number of Indian officials including the Prime Minister, his National 
Security Adviser and the Defense Minister. During the course of these 
meetings, it became very clear to me that India wanted a better 
relationship with the United States. In many respects, this was 
predictable because from India's perspective, the neighborhood in which 
it lives has become less friendly and more threatening, and its 
historical ally, the Soviet Union, no longer exists.
  Pakistan is under the control of a military regime rather than a 
democratically elected government--a regime which New Delhi views as 
illegitimate and threatening. In the months before the Clinton visit, 
tensions with Pakistan had intensified not only over Kashmir but also 
over Pakistani support for terrorists. Although tensions have subsided 
since then, Kashmir continues to be a volatile issue that could provoke 
another war between India and Pakistan both armed with nuclear weapons. 
Pakistan, like India, has declared its intention to be in the nuclear 
game. Pakistan clearly poses a security problem for India but not of 
the magnitude of China. As one Indian told me during my visit, 
``Pakistan is a nuisance but not a threat--China is a threat.''
  The biggest and from the Indian viewpoint most menacing power in the 
neighborhood is China--a country with which India has had longstanding 
tensions over border and territorial issues. China's past assistance to 
Pakistan's nuclear program and its ongoing efforts to build influence 
with other smaller countries in the region, particularly those on 
India's border such as Burma, are proof at least in the minds of 
Indians that China is trying to encircle India. Whereas most of the 
countries in Southeast Asia see Chinese aspirations as limited to that 
of a regional power that wants recognition and respect, India is wary 
of China's aspirations both in the region and globally.
  The Indian fear of China seems to me to be larger than reality but it 
is real nonetheless, and it is a major reason why India has been 
seeking improved relations with the United States. The Clinton 
Administration, recognizing

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that improved relations would be in America's interests as well as 
India's, wisely took advantage of this opportunity. India is the 
largest democracy in Asia and a potentially important partner in our 
efforts to promote regional stability, economic growth and more open 
political systems in surrounding countries. It is a fledgling nuclear 
power with the potential to affect the nuclear balance in South Asia as 
well as our nonproliferation goals on a global level. It is involved in 
a longstanding conflict with Pakistan which could erupt into another 
war possibly at the nuclear level. It is a player in a region dominated 
by China, with whom the US has mutual interests but also major 
differences.
  While the United States and India have differences over serious 
issues related to the development of India's nuclear program, labor and 
the environment, Cold War politics and alliances no longer stand in the 
way of improved relations. In fact, as many of my Indian hosts 
suggested, the United States and India are ``natural allies''. Both are 
vibrant democracies; Indian-American family ties are strong and 
extensive. As India has begun to open and liberalize its economy over 
the past decade, American business and investment in India has grown, 
particularly in the high tech region of Bangalore, and America has 
become India's largest trading partner and source of foreign 
investment. And on the flip side, Indians are playing a major role in 
the growth of our high tech industry in California, Massachusetts, New 
York, and elsewhere. Together with the Taiwanese, Indians own more than 
25 percent of the firms and supply more than 25 percent of the labor in 
this country in those technology fields. All of India's political 
parties have accepted the need to continue India's economic 
modernization. Undoubtedly there will be disagreements over how to do 
it but continuation of the process holds out the prospects of increased 
economic interaction with the United States.
  The potential exists for the U.S. and India to have a strong, 
cooperative relationship across a broad range of issues. President 
Clinton's visit to India was an important step in laying the foundation 
for this new relationship. Working groups were set up on trade, clean 
energy and environment, and science and technology. A broad range of 
environmental, social and health agreements were signed. To strengthen 
economic ties, $2 billion in Eximbank support for U.S. exports to India 
was announced. U.S. firms signed some $4 billion in agreements with 
Indian firms. The effort to institutionalize dialogue was capped by an 
agreement between President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee for 
regular bilateral summits between the leaders of both countries. An 
invitation was extended to the Prime Minister to visit Washington, 
which he did last September. During that visit, the two leaders agreed 
to expand cooperation to the areas of arms control, terrorism and AIDS.
  The seeds have been sown for a new Indo-American relationship. It is 
up to the Bush Administration to nurture them. The Administration must 
devote time and attention to the relationship--and to developments in 
the region--on a consistent basis, not on a crisis only basis. 
President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee set out to regularize 
bilateral contacts not only at the working level but also at the 
highest levels. President Bush should continue this process. Personal 
diplomacy at the highest levels, particularly when dealing with Asian 
countries, is an essential element of relationship-building. I also 
believe that the time is long overdue for the United States to 
distinguish, once and for all, between India and Pakistan and to treat 
each differently and according to the demands of those bilateral 
relationships.
  A constant source of irritation for Indians has been the inability or 
unwillingness of the United States to differentiate between India and 
Pakistan. From their perspective, India's commitment to democracy and 
economic reform dictate that the United States have a different 
relationship with India than with Pakistan, which has a military regime 
that supports terrorism. I agree that a distinction must be drawn. That 
the United States lumps them together or even worse is soft on Pakistan 
is clearly unacceptable from the Indian point of view. To a certain 
extent, they have a point. To a certain extent, they have made their 
point accurately.
  Just as the passing of the Cold War has improved the atmosphere for 
an improvement in Indo-American relations, it has also removed the need 
for the United States to ignore Pakistan's transgressions both within 
and outside of its borders. The United States no longer needs to tilt 
toward Pakistan in pursuit of larger strategic objectives. We should 
look at our relationships with India and Pakistan separately, analyzing 
each in terms of mutual interests and differences and being more candid 
in defining areas of agreement and disagreement. President Clinton 
attempted to find a new balance during his trip last year, by spending 
several days in India and only a few hours in Islamabad. But more needs 
to be done. In my view, we can advance our interests and strengthen our 
relationship with India by immediately terminating the sanction on 
loans to India from international financial institutions (IFIs).
  Although President Clinton waived most of the sanctions imposed on 
India after it tested in 1998, he chose not to exercise the waiver for 
IFI loans to India, amounting to some $1.7 billion, or for FMF (foreign 
military financing) for India. I believe that we should lift the IFI 
sanction at this time. The release of these funds would send an 
important signal to India of our ongoing commitment to improved 
relations while also encouraging the government of India to continue 
its economic modernization.
  The sanction on FMF needs discussion in hopes of finding further 
progress regarding India's position on nuclear issues. At the moment, 
Indian officials have made it clear that there would be no rollback of 
India's nuclear program and that India intends to have a credible 
minimum nuclear deterrent which means nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems. They believe that the United States is under-emphasizing 
India's security needs and overemphasizing nonproliferation objectives. 
I believe there is a happy medium between these two. Although there has 
been ongoing dialogue between Indian and American officials on the 
Clinton Administration's four nonproliferation benchmarks set after the 
1998 tests--signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), halting fissile material production, refraining from deploying 
or testing missiles or nuclear weapons, and instituting export controls 
on sensitive goods and technology.
  Despite the fact that we set up these benchmarks, the truth is there 
has been little progress made with respect to them.
  We must be frank and acknowledge at the same time, as we see and 
measure the progress, that we have to be honest about our own status, 
if you will. That requires us to acknowledge that our failure in the 
Senate to approve the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty has undermined our 
ability to influence India and many other countries. And Pakistan, 
obviously, is in the same equation.
  Nevertheless, it is imperative that the dialog continue because too 
much is at stake in terms of regional stability and nonproliferation to 
allow it to wither. We need to understand the fears that are driving 
India's sense of security and insecurity. We need to ask ourselves what 
is realistic to expect from India in light of those fears.
  For their part, the Indians must understand that much can be gained 
in the relationship with the United States and with progress on these 
issues. Arms control and regional stability are inextricably linked, 
and global security is inextricably linked to our resolution of these 
issues.
  I am very hopeful we can quickly reach a mutual understanding to 
permit the FMF sanction to also be lifted. I believe we can make 
progress on these difficult issues if both parties are prepared to 
tackle them and to be sensitive to understanding the other's security 
concerns.

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  India and the United States have begun to build a new cooperative 
relationship that reflects our common ties and our common interests. A 
process has begun, and the administration needs to continue that 
progress with commitment and with zeal.
  India and the United States have an enormous amount to offer each 
other. We both can benefit, in my judgment, from a more cooperative and 
friendly working relationship. I think the groundwork has been laid. I 
hope this administration can move rapidly to lift the current 
sanctions, to enter into the talks, and to move forward in this most 
critical relationship. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, are we in morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are in a period for morning business, with 
Members allowed to speak for up to 10 minutes.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up 
to 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KENNEDY. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Kennedy pertaining to the introduction of S. 277 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. KENNEDY. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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