[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 147 (2001), Part 1]
[Senate]
[Pages 1356-1357]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                      NONPROLIFERATION REPORT CARD

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss a recent report 
released by The Russia Task Force entitled ``A Report Card on the 
Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs with Russia.'' This 
bipartisan Task Force was co-chaired by Lloyd Cutler and Howard Baker. 
The report concludes that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
or weapons-usable material is ``the most urgent unmet national security 
threat for the United States today.''
  This conclusion restates similar conclusions of other reports and 
analyses done over the past several years. The book Avoiding Nuclear 
Anarchy published in 1996 drew a similar conclusion. A January 2000 
Center for Strategic and International Study report, ``Managing the 
Global Nuclear Materials Threat'' provided a concise analysis and 
numerous policy recommendations of this ``most devastating security 
threat.''
  The U.S. response has not been and still is not commensurate to the 
threat.
  The Cooperative Threat Reduction programs have achieved much and 
contributed greatly to U.S. security. Still there is always room for 
innovative approaches to remaining issues and faster progress.
  The Department of Energy programs--from Materials Protection, Control 
and Accounting to the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention--have 
also enhanced U.S. security. But their work is not even close to 
complete, and a ``clear and present danger'' looms.
  I have repeatedly suggested that we have a very simple choice: we can 
either spend money to reduce the threat or spend more money in the 
future to defend ourselves. I am a strong believer that threat 
reduction is now underfunded and is the first-best approach in this 
case.
  The report estimated the cost at $30 billion to be provided not only 
from the U.S. budget, but also by Russia and other countries. The 
national security benefits to U.S. citizens from securing 80,000 
nuclear weapons and potential nuclear weapons would constitute the 
highest return on investment of any current national security program.
  How do we get there? One recommendation of the report is the dire 
need for a White House-level nonproliferation czar. Not just the 
Department of Energy and the Defense Department are involved in Russia. 
We have a number of federal agencies chipping away at specific, 
isolated aspects of the problem.
  But we do not have a coherent, integrated agenda. Overlaps and 
shortfalls exist. But no one person--with budgetary responsibility and 
requisite authority--can view the spectrum and identify the gaps, 
remedy inter-agency turf battles and bring the necessary coordination 
to get the job done efficiently and quickly.
  A nonproliferation czar should be given access to the President and 
the necessary budgetary powers. This person should be charged with 
formulating a cohesive strategy. This would allow us to coordinate and 
streamline our efforts. This person would identify which programs are 
ripe for more resources and which ones are already adequate to address 
the immediate need.
  The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation enacted in 1996 required that 
such a nonproliferation czar be put in place. Also, Section 3174 of the 
FY2001 Defense Authorization bill expressed again Congressional will to 
have one person accountable for our nonproliferation efforts. The 
Clinton Administration refused to adhere to the statute and repeatedly 
ignored other Congressional attempts to address the coordination 
problem. Other Commissions have also recommended this remedy in the 
past to no avail. I am hopeful that the national security team within 
the new Administration will see the merits of this recommendation and 
act on it soon.
  The Task Force also offered several other important insights and 
recommendations. These included:

       The threat today arises from Russia's weakened ability to 
     secure its nuclear arsenal. Contributing factors include, 
     delays in paying those who guard nuclear facilities, 
     breakdown in command structures and inadequate budgets for 
     stockpile protection.

  I would go even further than that. I believe that it's the economics 
that drives many of the threats and areas of potential conflict that 
the U.S. faces with Russia today. They sell nuclear technologies to 
Iran not because they like the Iranians and want to snub the Americans. 
The Russians are also aware that Iran could present a threat should it 
acquire the requisite nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. 
However, the Russian decision is driven by economics--not by ideology, 
not by historical ties, but by necessity. If we don't attempt to 
address the underlying economics of the situation, cooperation with 
Iran may continue and many other programs may eventually fail.

       The President should develop a strategic plan, consulting 
     Congress and cooperating with the Russian Federation, to 
     secure all weapons-usable material located in Russia, and to 
     prevent the outflow of weapons of mass destruction-related 
     scientific expertise.

  We can only move so fast as the Russians allow. We can only achieve 
sufficient transparency and get access so long as Russia agrees. 
However, I believe several existing programs, such as the Plutonium 
Disposition Agreement, have demonstrated that a serious U.S. 
commitment, especially in financial terms, is exactly the appropriate 
incentive to get action.
  Repeatedly, however, our nonproliferation programs with Russia are in 
a Catch-22 situation. Congress will not adequately fund them until they 
demonstrate success. A trickle at the tap is insufficient to persuade 
Russians of the seriousness of our intent. So, the U.S. programs 
stumble along unable to achieve the gains necessary because the 
Russians are reticent to play ball. And, in turn, Congress becomes even 
more leery of providing any funding at all in light of the meager 
gains. It's in our immediate national security interest to remedy this 
situation.

       The plan should review existing programs, identifying 
     specific goals and measurable objectives for each program, as 
     well as providing criteria for success and an exit strategy.

  It would be reasonable to propose that one plan be geared toward 
addressing the fundamental linkages between economic and social 
instability in Russia and specific proliferation threats. Without 
addressing the relationship of Russians' economic situation to a 
decaying nuclear command and control infrastructure, threats of 
diversion from within, rather than from outside, the weapons complex, 
and many other tight relationships, we will fail to prevent 
proliferation.
  The report envisions an 8-10 year time-frame. At that point, Russia 
will hopefully be in a position to take over any remaining work.
  In the next decade we could eliminate the greatest security challenge 
we currently face. Inaction will only drive up costs to defend 
ourselves against unknowables that we could have squelched had we had 
greater foresight.
  I believe President Bush and his team have foresight. President Bush 
repeatedly mentioned the importance of these programs as an integral 
part of his national security strategy.
  To quote our new National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice:

       American security is threatened less by Russia's strength 
     than by its weakness and incoherence. This suggests immediate 
     attention to the safety and security of Moscow's nuclear 
     forces and stockpile.

  I believe this recent report reiterates this clear fact and sets 
forth several very important policy recommendations for tackling this 
challenge. I look forward to working with the new Administration to 
ensure that a decade

[[Page 1357]]

from now we have protected U.S. citizens from this proliferation threat 
and secured a more peaceful future.

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