[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 146 (2000), Part 9]
[Senate]
[Pages 11855-11856]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]



                           NATIONAL SECURITY

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I thank the managers from Foreign 
Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee for accepting 
my amendment yesterday, which was a resolution arguing that we should 
restore the moneys that we cut from the NADR funding line in the State 
Department. The Foreign Operations Appropriation bill cut a lot of 
money out of a proposal and recommendation from the authorizing 
committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
  We cut a significant amount of money out of some vital programs that 
we have to support nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and related 
programs. As a matter of fact, the 10 programs in this category are all 
on the front line of protecting our people from terrorism and weapons 
of mass destruction. Unfortunately, the funding in the Foreign 
Operations bill for 7 of those 10 programs was 37 percent below the 
levels requested by the President. And that is without counting another 
$30 million that was cut because the Foreign Operations Subcommittee 
concluded that a new counterterrorism training center had to be funded 
in the Commerce-State-Justice appropriations bill instead.
  The national security and the very things my friend from Tennessee is 
talking about require that we provide substantially more of those 
requested funds.
  Let me describe the programs that are treated so badly. In the 
nonproliferation field, we have the Department of State's Export 
Control Assistance program, which helps foreign countries to combat the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Recently, Customs agents 
in Uzbekistan, for example, stopped the shipment of radioactive 
contraband to Kazakhstan, which was on its way to Iran with an official 
destination of Pakistan. Press stories suggest that the shipment was 
really intended for an Afghanistan terrorist group affiliated with 
Osama bin Laden, who would have used it to build a radiological weapon 
for use against Americans.
  Those Customs agents were trained in the United States. The equipment 
they used to detect the radioactive material was provided by the United 
States. In that case, the funding came from the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program, which is in another appropriations bill. But the 
Export Control Assistance Program has provided the same sort of 
assistance when the Nunn-Lugar program could not be used, and it 
regularly helps other countries enact the laws and regulations they 
need in order to be effective in export control. The personal ties that 
are forged by this program with export officials in other countries are 
equally critical in improving other countries' export controls and 
their willingness to work with us.
  I cite that as one example. We are cutting by 37 percent on average 
the non-proliferation and anti-terrorism programs. We are cutting by 37 
percent on average those programs that allow us to train customs agents 
and others in detecting the transfer of the very material my friend 
from the State of Tennessee is talking about being transferred. None of 
that is transferred in the open. China doesn't say, ``By the way, we 
are about to send to Pakistan the following.'' They don't do that. It 
is all done surreptitiously. How we are cutting funds to deal with the 
transport of materials that cause the proliferation to rise as it has 
is beyond me. It is absolutely beyond my comprehension.
  There are many other aspects of the program. Last year Congress 
increased funding for this program from $10 million to $14 million. 
Indeed, the report for the Foreign Operations Appropriation bill takes 
credit for the increase. This year the President asked for $14 million 
to maintain the level we set up last year. But what happened? The 
appropriations bill cut it back down to $10 million. I don't get this. 
Hello? What is going on here? The committee takes credit for raising 
this program's budget and then cuts it back down? If there is a logic 
here, I fail to see it.
  The fact is that last year, when it came to this program, the 
appropriators were right. This year they should do again just what they 
did last year. But they did not. That is why my co-sponsors and I 
offered our amendment, and I am grateful to the managers for their 
acceptance of that amendment; I hope the conferees will take it to 
heart.
  We need more export control assistance to help other countries keep 
nuclear materials out of the hands of their dangerous neighbors. 
Earlier this month the National Commission on Terrorism warned that it:

       . . . was particularly concerned about the persistent lack 
     of adequate security and

[[Page 11856]]

     safeguards for the nuclear material in the former Soviet 
     Union.

  That is a cogent concern, one my friend from Tennessee and I and 
others have talked about on this floor. Export control assistance is 
one of the programs that helps keep those dangerous materials from 
crossing the former Soviet borders.
  The Foreign Relations Committee is on record as favoring full funding 
of the request for this program. Indeed, it was suggested by Senator 
Helms we add another $5 million to our security assistance to support 
strategic cargo X-ray facilities that would be used in the free port of 
Malta. Malta is a crossroads for shipping in the Mediterranean area and 
sometimes it has been the doorway for contraband flowing to Libya. You 
might think appropriators would pay attention to such a sensible 
suggestion, but the Foreign Operations Appropriation bill did the 
opposite.
  Another non-proliferation program, International Science and 
Technology Centers, would provide safe employment opportunities for 
former Soviet experts. There are thousands and thousands of Soviet 
experts, nuclear experts. They are not getting paid. They don't have 
housing. Their economy is in the toilet. We have a program: We want to 
hire them. We don't want Qadhafi hiring them. We don't want them being 
hired in Libya. We don't want them hired in North Korea. So we have a 
sensible program.
  I will end with this. There are 4 more examples, but I will not take 
the time.
  What do we do? We cut these programs. Then we all stand--and I am not 
speaking of any particular Senator--and say we are going to fight 
terrorism, and nonproliferation is our greatest concern, and we are 
worried about this technology changing hands. The bottom line is the 
programs that help to do that are cut. That is why it is so important 
that our amendment of yesterday be implemented in conference.
  I yield the floor and thank my colleague from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, before proceeding to the bill, I 
compliment my colleagues, the Senator from Tennessee and the Senator 
from Delaware, for their comments this morning, calling attention to 
the major international problems on nuclear proliferation. This body 
will soon be voting on legislation to have permanent normal trade 
relations with China. As noted by the Senator from Tennessee, the 
People's Republic of China happens to be a major violator in 
proliferating nuclear weapons. They sent the M-11 missiles to Pakistan, 
which have been the basis for the nuclear arms confrontation between 
India and Pakistan. They have helped to proliferate weapons in Iran and 
North Korea. It is my view that the best way to restrain the People's 
Republic of China from posing an enormous international threat is to 
continue to give them permanent trade relations on an annual basis.
  I have discussed this many times with my distinguished colleague from 
Tennessee. I hope he will join me in ultimately opposing normal trade 
relations as the best leverage to try to keep the people's Republic of 
China in line.
  We have seen, again and again, problems that the executive branch 
cannot be, candidly, relied upon, with waivers being granted. 
Separation of powers has been established. The Senate is here and the 
House is here in order to see that there is another view about what is 
happening with China. The most effective leverage is to have an annual 
checkup on them, and to have the normal trade relations as the 
leverage, which would be very, very important.
  I urge my colleague from Tennessee and others to consider that when 
that vote comes up. There is more involved in that issue than just the 
money; the future of civilization may be on the line if we do not 
contain the People's Republic of China from proliferating weapons of 
mass destruction.

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